Hubbry Logo
De OfficiisDe OfficiisMain
Open search
De Officiis
Community hub
De Officiis
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Contribute something
De Officiis
De Officiis
De Officiis
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

De Officiis (On Duties, On Obligations, or On Moral Responsibilities) is a 44 BC treatise by Marcus Tullius Cicero divided into three books, in which Cicero expounds his conception of the best way to live, behave, and observe moral obligations. The posthumously published work discusses what is honorable (Book I), what is to one's advantage (Book II), and what to do when the honorable and private gain apparently conflict (Book III). For the first two books Cicero was dependent on the Stoic philosopher Panaetius, but wrote more independently for the third book.

Key Information

Background

[edit]

De Officiis was written in October–November 44 BC, in under four weeks.[1] This was Cicero's last year alive, and he was 62 years of age. Cicero was at this time still active in politics, trying to stop revolutionary forces from taking control of the Roman Republic. Despite his efforts, the republican system failed to revive even upon the assassination of Caesar, and Cicero was himself assassinated shortly thereafter.

Writing

[edit]

De Officiis is written in the form of a letter to his son Cicero Minor, who studied philosophy in Athens. Judging from its form, it is nonetheless likely that Cicero wrote with a broader audience in mind. The essay was published posthumously.

Although Cicero was influenced by the Academic, Peripatetic, and Stoic schools of Greek philosophy, this work shows the influence of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius.[2][3] Panaetius was a Greek philosopher who had resided in Rome around eighty years previously.[4] He wrote a book On Duties (Greek: Περὶ Καθήκοντος) in which he divided his subject into three parts but had left the work unfinished at the third stage.[4] Although Cicero draws from many other sources, for his first two books he follows the steps of Panaetius fairly closely.[5] The third book is more independent,[5] and Cicero disclaims having been indebted to any preceding writers on the subject.[6] Michael Grant tells us that "Cicero himself seems to have regarded this treatise as his spiritual testament and masterpiece."[7]

Cicero urged his son Marcus to follow nature and wisdom, as well as politics, and warned against pleasure and indolence. Cicero's essay relies heavily on anecdotes, much more than his other works, and is written in a more leisurely and less formal style than his other writings, perhaps because he wrote it hastily. Like the satires of Juvenal, Cicero's De Officiis refers frequently to current events of his time.

Contents

[edit]
From a German edition – 1531

De Officiis discusses what is honorable (Book I), what is expedient or to one's advantage (Book II), and what to do when the honorable and expedient conflict (Book III). Cicero says they are the same and that they only appear to be in conflict. In Book III, Cicero expresses his own ideas.[8]

Book I

[edit]

The first book treats of what is honorable in itself.[6] He shows in what true manner our duties are founded in honor and virtue.[6] The four constituent parts of virtue are truth, justice, fortitude, and decorum, and our duties are founded in the right perception of these.[6]

Book II

[edit]

The second book enlarges on those duties which relate to private advantage and the improvement of life.[6] The book focuses on political advancement, and the means employed for the attainment of wealth and power.[6] The honorable means of gaining popularity include generosity, courtesy, and eloquence.[6]

Book III

[edit]

The third book discusses the choice to be made when there is an apparent conflict between virtue and expediency.[6] True virtue can never be put in competition with private advantage.[6] Thus nothing should be accounted useful or profitable if not strictly virtuous, and there ought to be no separation of the principles of virtue and expediency.[6]

Cicero proposes some rules for cases of doubt, where seeming utility comes into competition with virtue.[6] He examines in what situations one may seek private gain with honour.[6] He takes his examples from Roman history, such as the case of Marcus Atilius Regulus who was released by the Carthaginians to negotiate a peace, advised the Roman Senate to reject the proposals, and fulfilled his oath by returning to Carthage.[6]

Themes

[edit]

De Officiis has been characterized as an attempt to define ideals of public behavior.[9] It criticizes the recently overthrown dictator Julius Caesar in several places, and his dictatorship as a whole. Cicero claims that the absence of political rights corrupts moral virtues. Cicero also speaks of a natural law that is said to govern both humans[10] and gods alike.[11]

Legacy

[edit]

The legacy of De Officiis is profound. Although not a Christian work, in 390 St. Ambrose declared it legitimate for the Church to use (along with everything else Cicero, and the equally popular Roman philosopher Seneca, had written). It became a moral authority during the Middle Ages. Of the Church Fathers, St. Augustine, St. Jerome and even more so St. Thomas Aquinas, are known to have been familiar with it.[12] Illustrating its importance, some 700 handwritten copies remain extant in libraries around the world dating back to before the invention of the printing press. Though this does not surpass the Latin grammarian Priscian's 900 extant handwritten copies, it places De Officiis far above many classical works. Following the invention of the printing press, De Officiis was the third book to be printed—third only to the Gutenberg Bible and Donatus's Ars Minor, which was the first printed book.[a]

Petrarch, the father of humanism and a leader in the revival of Classical learning, championed Cicero. Several of his works build upon the precepts of De Officiis.[14] Prince Peter, Duke of Coimbra, member of the Order of the Garter, translated the treatise to Portuguese in 1437, signal of the wide spread of the work in medieval courts.[15] The Catholic humanist Erasmus published his own edition in Paris in 1501. His enthusiasm for this moral treatise is expressed in many works.[14][16] The German humanist Philip Melanchthon established De Officiis in Lutheran humanist schools.[14]

Henry VIII's childhood copy of De Officiis, bearing the inscription "Thys boke is myne" in his hand, from the collection of the Folger Shakespeare Library

T. W. Baldwin said that "in Shakespeare's day De Officiis was the pinnacle of moral philosophy".[17] Sir Thomas Elyot, in his popular Governour (1531), lists three essential texts for bringing up young gentlemen: Plato's works, Aristotle's Ethics, and De Officiis.[18]

In the 17th century it was a standard text at English schools (Westminster and Eton) and universities (Cambridge and Oxford). It was extensively discussed by Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf.[19] Grotius drew heavily on De Officiis in his major work, On the Law of War and Peace.[14] It influenced Robert Sanderson and John Locke.[19]

In the 18th century, Voltaire said of De Officiis "No one will ever write anything more wise".[20] Frederick the Great thought so highly of the book that he asked the scholar Christian Garve to do a new translation of it, even though there had been already two German translations since 1756. Garve's project resulted in 880 additional pages of commentary.

In 1885, the city of Perugia was shaken by the theft of an illuminated manuscript of De Officiis from the city's Library Augusta. The chief librarian Adamo Rossi, a well-known scholar, was originally suspected but exonerated after a lengthy administrative and judicial investigation. The culprit in the theft was never found. Suspicion fell on a janitor who a few years later became well-to-do enough to build for himself a fine house. The former janitor's house was nicknamed "Villa Cicero" by residents of Perugia.

The 2002 George Mason Memorial in Washington, D.C., includes De Officiis as an element of the statue of a seated Mason.

De Officiis continues to be one of the most popular of Cicero's works because of its style, and because of its depiction of Roman political life under the Republic.

Footnotes

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ Marcus Tullius Cicero and P. G. Walsh. On Obligations. 2001, p. ix
  2. ^ Atkins & Griffin 1991, p. xix
  3. ^ Cicero, Miller: On Duty, iii. 23
  4. ^ a b Dunlop 1827, p. 257
  5. ^ a b Miller 1913, p. xiv
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Dunlop 1827, p. 258
  7. ^ Cicero, Grant: "Selected Works", p. 158
  8. ^ Cicero, Grant: "Selected Works", p. 157
  9. ^ Marcus Tullius Cicero and P. G. Walsh. On Obligations. 2001, p. xxx
  10. ^ Atkins & Griffin 1991, p. xxvi
  11. ^ Cicero, Miller: On Duty, Book III. v. 23
  12. ^ Hannis Taylor, Cicero: A Sketch of His Life and Works, A.C. McClurg & Co. 1916, p. 9
  13. ^ Jürgen Leonhardt, Latin: A World Language (Belknap Press 2013) p. 99.
  14. ^ a b c d Cicero; Walsh: "On Obligations" pp. xliii–xliv
  15. ^ Manuel Cadafaz de Matos, "A PRESENÇA DE CÍCERO NA OBRA DE PENSADORES PORTUGUESES NOS SÉCULOS XV E XVI (1436-1543)", Humanitas 46 (1994)
  16. ^ Erasmus' Epistolae 152
  17. ^ T. W. Baldwin, "William Shakspere's Small Latine & lesse Greeke", Vol. 2, University of Illinois Press, 1944, p. 590, Available online Archived 2012-03-03 at the Wayback Machine
  18. ^ Sir Thomas Elyot, The Boke named the Governour, Vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co. 1883 pp. 91–94
  19. ^ a b John Marshall, "John Locke: Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility", Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 162, 164, 299
  20. ^ Voltaire, Cicero, Philosophical Dictionary Part 2 Orig. Published 1764

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

De Officiis

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia

De Officiis (On Duties) is a philosophical treatise on moral obligations authored by the Roman statesman Marcus Tullius Cicero in 44 BCE, composed in the aftermath of Julius Caesar's assassination as a letter of guidance to his son. It delineates the principles governing proper conduct in private and public life, prioritizing virtue derived from nature and reason over expediency, and adapts Stoic ethics to the practical demands of Roman republicanism. The text unfolds across three books: the first expounds the honorable (honestum), rooted in virtues like , , and greatness of spirit, rejecting expedients that compromise integrity; the second explores the expedient (utile), advocating prudent self-interest aligned with communal welfare; and the third resolves apparent tensions between the two, insisting that true utility inheres solely in the honorable. synthesizes teachings from the Stoic of —whose lost work On Duties he emulates in structure—with Peripatetic and Platonic insights, employing historical exempla from Roman and Greek figures to illustrate causal links between actions, character, and societal outcomes. Throughout, Cicero critiques the moral decay under Caesar's dictatorship, upholding the republic's constitutional order as the framework for virtuous duty, and warns against tyranny's erosion of justice and liberty. This emphasis on ethical realism—grounded in empirical observation of and historical precedent—rendered De Officiis a cornerstone of Western thought, profoundly shaping patristic writings, medieval , , and Enlightenment political theory, with its precepts echoed in the ethical frameworks of early Christian leaders like and in the civic of later statesmen.

Historical Context

Cicero's Role in the Late Roman Republic

Marcus Tullius , born in 106 BC, rose from a provincial equestrian background as a —the first in his family to achieve the consulship—to become a leading figure in Roman politics during the late Republic. Elected consul in 63 BC alongside , prioritized the defense of senatorial authority against subversive threats. That year, he uncovered and thwarted the led by Lucius Sergius Catilina, a disaffected patrician seeking to cancel debts, redistribute land, and seize power through violence, including alliances with disgruntled veterans and slaves. Through his four delivered before the Senate and people, rallied support to declare Catiline a , forcing his flight from Rome, while ordering the summary execution of key conspirators Lentulus and Cethegus without trial, an act justified under emergency but later used by political rivals to exile him in 58 BC. Cicero positioned himself as an advocate for constitutional balance, aligning with the optimates faction in opposition to the populares, who mobilized urban plebs and indebted classes through promises of agrarian reforms and , as exemplified by Julius Caesar's tribunate in 59 BC and his subsequent Gallic campaigns that amassed personal wealth and legions. He critiqued Caesar's unchecked ambition and manipulation of popular assemblies, viewing such tactics as erosive to the Senate's deliberative role and the mixed constitution's stability, which blended monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements to prevent any single power's dominance. In speeches like Pro Sestio (56 BC), defended optimate resistance to populares as safeguarding the against demagoguery, emphasizing that true popular will aligned with ancestral precedents rather than transient mob sentiments. Central to Cicero's worldview was fidelity to the mos maiorum—the customs and moral exemplars of Rome's forebears—which he invoked in letters and orations as essential bulwarks against anarchy and tyranny, particularly by upholding property rights and elite restraint as foundations of . He attributed the Republic's erosion to a moral crisis wherein ambitious generals like Marius, , , and Caesar pursued personal glory over collective good, exacerbated by populares' rhetoric of wealth redistribution that incentivized factionalism and undermined incentives for productive citizenship. Empirical patterns from the Gracchi reforms (133–121 BC) onward showed how such policies fueled civil strife, , and military loyalty to individuals rather than the state, culminating in proscriptions and civil wars that prioritized raw power over institutional norms. Cicero's insistence on and restraint in , drawn from his forensic and philosophical writings, framed these dynamics as causal drivers of republican decline, positioning ethical leadership as the antidote to ambition's corrosive effects.

Political Turmoil Leading to Composition

The on the , 44 BC, initiated a period of acute political instability in , as power vacuums and rivalries among surviving leaders threatened renewed . , as , moved to assert control by honoring Caesar's will publicly on March 17 and rallying support against the assassins, including Brutus and Cassius, who fled the city amid public unrest. This escalation undermined hopes for a swift restoration of republican governance, with Antony's maneuvers—such as commandeering Caesar's assets and delaying punitive actions—exacerbating factional divisions in the . Cicero, initially optimistic about the assassination's potential to revive senatorial authority, soon confronted the fragility of the post-Caesar order, particularly Antony's consolidation of legions and influence. By summer , amid failed negotiations and Antony's preparations for confrontation with the liberators, Cicero withdrew from direct political engagement, traveling to before returning to in August. His subsequent orations beginning September 2 targeted Antony's ambitions, but the intensifying threats prompted a pivot to philosophical reflection as a means of preserving ethical principles amid chaos. In late October 44 BC, from his Tusculan villa, commenced De Officiis, completing the treatise by year's end to instruct his son Marcus, then studying philosophy in under peril of the unfolding conflict. This composition responded to the evident collapse of dutiful , where leaders' pursuit of personal advantage over communal had precipitated crisis, underscoring the need for a systematic guide to moral obligations in governance and private life.

Authorship and Influences

Composition Details and Intended Audience

De Officiis was composed by Marcus Tullius in the autumn of 44 BC, during a period of enforced leisure following the on March 15 of that year and amid ongoing political instability in the . undertook the work rapidly, completing its three books over approximately six weeks between late and early , as detailed in his correspondence with , where he reports dictating sections and refining the text amid his withdrawal from active involvement in the Philippics against . This treatise marked 's final major philosophical composition before his execution on December 7, 43 BC, by order of the Second Triumvirate. Unlike Cicero's earlier philosophical dialogues, such as or , which featured dramatized conversations among historical figures, De Officiis adopts a primarily expository format framed as an extended epistolary address, eschewing fictional interlocutors in favor of direct argumentation divided into three distinct books. Each book begins with a preface outlining its scope, reflecting Cicero's methodical approach to moral instruction without the dialogic structure typical of his prior works. The work was explicitly dedicated to Cicero's son, Marcus Tullius Cicero the Younger, then aged 21 and pursuing philosophical studies in under the Epicurean and traditions. In the opening dedication, Cicero presents the treatise as paternal guidance on ethical duties (officia) suited to a young Roman entering public life, emphasizing virtues applicable to statesmanship and personal conduct. Beyond this primary recipient, the text implicitly targets the Roman senatorial class and elites, offering a blueprint for moral renewal to counteract the ethical erosion wrought by decades of civil wars, factionalism, and demagogic leadership.

Reliance on Panaetius and Stoic Foundations

Cicero's De Officiis draws its primary philosophical framework from the Stoic thinker of , particularly his now-lost treatise Peri tou kathēkontos (On Appropriate Acts), composed around 139–138 BCE. , who headed the Stoic school in after of Tarsus, adapted orthodox by extending the doctrine of kathēkonta—duties or appropriate actions—beyond the unattainable ideal of the sage to encompass "middle" or progressive virtues suitable for ordinary moral agents progressing toward wisdom. This pragmatic expansion allowed for a graded where actions could be honorable in degrees, rather than strictly binary as in earlier Stoic thought, emphasizing societal roles and practical conduct over abstract perfection. Cicero explicitly acknowledges this debt, structuring his work around Panaetius' division of duties into the honorable (honestum) and the expedient (utile), while addressing their apparent conflicts. At its core, the Stoic foundations in De Officiis rest on the four —wisdom (prudentia), (iustitia), courage (fortitudo), and temperance (temperantia)—which integrated into a framework governing human sociality and self-preservation. These virtues derive from Stoic cosmology, where rational order in nature dictates moral obligations, but softened rigid determinism by incorporating Peripatetic influences, such as moderate emotional engagement in ethical decision-making. adopts this synthesis but orients it toward Roman gravitas and civic utility, illustrating virtues through concrete historical exempla like the consul Marcus Atilius , who in 255 BCE honored a parole to return to Carthaginian captivity despite foreseeable , embodying unyielding over personal expediency. Such cases ground abstract principles in empirically verifiable Roman traditions, prioritizing virtues' causal role in sustaining republican institutions against demagogic erosion. Cicero's adaptation eschews direct Greek citations, rendering Panaetius' ideas in idiomatic Latin prose accessible to his son and Roman s, thus emphasizing over cosmopolitan theory. This reflects a causal realism: virtues must demonstrably preserve res publica through habituated practice, as seen in Cicero's preference for historical precedents that validate duties' real-world consequences, such as alliances forged by yielding long-term stability. By subordinating Stoic universalism to Roman particularism—e.g., elevating patria over abstract humanity—De Officiis transforms Panaetius' framework into a tool for elite moral formation amid civil strife, without diluting its empirical grounding in observable human motivations like aligned with communal order.

Textual Structure and Contents

Book I: Defining the Honorable

In Book I of De Officiis, Cicero defines the honestum (the honorable or morally good) as the foundation of ethical action, arguing that it arises inherently from rather than external goods or sensory pleasures. He posits that the honorable is self-evident and pursued for its own sake, rejecting Epicurean views that prioritize pleasure as the ultimate end, since virtuous conduct often conflicts with immediate gratification. Cicero structures his analysis around four derived from Panaetius's framework, asserting that "all moral rectitude springs from four sources": , (or social instinct), fortitude (or ), and temperance. Prudence, the first virtue, involves discerning what is truly good or evil through rational insight, guiding practical decisions without reliance on deceit or expediency. Justice encompasses duties toward others, emphasizing non-maleficence—refraining from harm—and active beneficence, such as honoring agreements, respecting property, and treating enemies with integrity. Cicero illustrates this with the Roman Senate's and Gaius Fabricius's refusal to accept a deserter's offer to poison King Pyrrhus in 280 BCE, returning the traitor instead to uphold fides (good faith) even in wartime. Fortitude requires enduring hardships, scorning death or pain when honor demands, and prioritizing communal welfare over personal safety, as exemplified by Roman generals who sacrificed for the res publica. Temperance, the final virtue, demands moderation in desires, self-control in appetites, and in conduct, ensuring actions align with one's station and avoid excess. Cicero integrates these virtues as interdependent, rooted in natura (), which inclines humans toward rational sociability and rejects base impulses like or as incompatible with the honorable life. Throughout, he draws on historical exempla from Roman figures to concretize officia (duties), reinforcing that the honorable manifests in deliberate choices aligned with these virtues, independent of outcomes or utility.

Book II: The Expedient in Practice

In Book II of De Officiis, Cicero explores the concept of the expedient (utile), presenting it not as a rival to the honorable (honestum) but as its practical manifestation in human affairs. He contends that genuine advantage flows inherently from moral rectitude, asserting that "whatever is just, they hold, is also expedient; and, in like manner, whatever is morally right is also just." This unity ensures that self-interest, when pursued virtuously, yields societal cooperation—such as advancements in , , and —while deviations, like relying on or for influence, prove ultimately self-defeating and "meanest and most sordid." Cicero illustrates expediency through everyday virtues, emphasizing that true glory stems from embodying the character one seeks to project, rather than superficial displays. Cicero applies these principles to beneficence, advocating liberality as a means of building alliances and reputation, but warns against prodigality, which exhausts resources without lasting reciprocity: "prodigal giving has no bottom." He prioritizes non-monetary aid, such as personal counsel or , over gifts, as the former fosters broader networks of support: "the more people they assist, the more helpers they will have." In public life, expediency demands inspiring affection rather than dread, drawing on historical precedents like the tyrants and , whose reigns of terror invited hatred and collapse. Justice underpins all such actions, securing trust essential for friendship and leadership, as a reputation for fairness amplifies one's influence far beyond coercion. Duties vary by social station, aligning expediency with decorum suited to one's role: young nobles pursue military valor or oratory for glory, while engage in commerce tempered by integrity, and in honest trades. Cicero critiques excesses like lavish spectacles or unchecked ambition, which erode public welfare; instead, leaders should invest in enduring , such as harbors or aqueducts, to cultivate goodwill and prosperity. This hierarchical approach reinforces that utility serves the when roles are fulfilled virtuously, avoiding the pitfalls of envy or overreach that disrupt social order. On economic pursuits, Cicero ranks agriculture highest for stability and honor, followed by moderate trade, while condemning usury as akin to "murder," per Cato's judgment, and speculative ventures that prioritize quick gain over reliability. Wealth accumulation is dutiful if achieved justly—"it is a duty to make money, but only by honourable means"—and preserved through thrift, enabling further liberality without depletion. Luxury imports and ostentation are disparaged as corrosive to self-reliance, favoring self-sufficiency that aligns personal advantage with communal strength. Thus, expediency in practice demands vigilance against greed, ensuring that apparent gains do not undermine the honorable foundations of enduring success.

Book III: Reconciling Conflicts

In Book III of De Officiis, Cicero addresses apparent conflicts between the honorable (honestum), defined as actions aligned with and , and the expedient (utile), understood as actions promoting personal or communal advantage. He contends that no genuine opposition exists, as true expediency inheres in the honorable; pursuits seeming advantageous but violating moral duty inevitably lead to greater harm, undermining trust, stability, and long-term welfare. This principle rests on the Stoic-influenced view that nature ordains humans to live in through , making dishonesty self-defeating by eroding the bonds essential for mutual benefit. Cicero employs historical exempla to illustrate his method, drawing from Roman and Greek traditions to resolve dilemmas where short-term gain tempts deviation from duty. These cases demonstrate that adhering to honor secures superior outcomes, as breeds isolation and retribution while fosters enduring alliances and self-respect. For instance, he examines scenarios involving for profit, such as refusing to disclose allies' secrets even under promise of wealth, arguing that such preserves one's and societal role, outweighing transient riches. A prominent case is that of Manius Manlius Torquatus, the who executed his own son for engaging the enemy without orders, despite the youth's victory. resolves the apparent tension between paternal affection (seemingly expedient for family harmony) and military discipline (the honorable course) by emphasizing that leniency would erode command authority and invite chaos, whereas strict justice upholds the , yielding collective security over personal grief. Similarly, in the example of , the exiled tyrant of Syracuse who turned to schoolmastering after losing power, highlights how initial expedients like plundering temples for gain fail without moral foundation, leading to insecurity; true utility demands justice to sustain rule or personal integrity. The paradigmatic illustration is Marcus Atilius Regulus, captured during the (264–241 BCE), who was sent by Carthaginians under oath to Rome to negotiate prisoner exchanges but instead advised the against it, returning to face torture and death. argues the conflict—personal survival versus oath-bound duty—is resolved by recognizing that violating fides (trustworthiness) destroys one's honor and 's credibility, rendering future diplomacy impossible; Regulus's choice exemplified how ensures communal strength, proving expediency and honor coincide in rational self-interest. Through such analyses, systematically dissects objections, showing that apparent gains from injustice, like or , collapse under scrutiny, as they forfeit alliances and invite reprisal. Cicero concludes that virtue constitutes the ultimate expedient, as the wise person, guided by reason, discerns no divergence between moral rectitude and prosperity; conversely, he denounces Epicurean doctrine, which subordinates to , as fostering and societal dissolution, since prioritizing sensory gratification over yields neither secure nor stable communities. This synthesis reinforces that ethical consistency, not opportunistic calculation, aligns individual fortune with the .

Philosophical Principles

Virtue, Duty, and First-Principles Ethics

In De Officiis, derives the concept of officia—duties or appropriate actions—from the inherent structure of , beginning with rational as the foundational impulse. Nature, he argues, instills in individuals a drive to sustain their own existence through innate faculties like reason and physical capabilities, but this self-regard extends beyond isolation to foster sociability as a necessary extension for thriving. alone would permit solitary withdrawal, yet empirical observation of vulnerabilities—such as limited strength, dependence on labor for sustenance, and exposure to threats—demonstrates that isolation undermines , while interdependence enables mutual and resource . Thus, duties emerge causally from this reality: universal officia apply to all humanity, prohibiting harm and promoting common benefit, as one's security relies on reciprocal restraint among interdependent agents. These universal duties contrast with selective officia, which intensify toward kin, friends, and fellow citizens due to graduated bonds of affinity and shared vulnerability. Cicero maintains that nature differentiates these relations hierarchically—parent to child preceding stranger to stranger—yet subordinates all to the baseline of , ensuring that even preferential treatment does not violate the general prohibition against injury. This framework rejects solipsistic philosophies, such as those advocating withdrawal or unchecked , by emphasizing causal outcomes: isolated pursuits falter against collective needs, whereas justice-aligned yields measurable stability in personal and communal flourishing, as evidenced by the sustenance of skills, defenses, and innovations impossible in . Cicero's privileges objective standards over , grounding in nature's fixed dictates rather than subjective opinion or expediency. What is honorable aligns with rational sociability, verifiable through its promotion of enduring human associations rather than transient pleasures or cultural variances; deviations, like prioritizing isolation or harm, produce verifiable discord, underscoring 's non-negotiable causality in ethical order. This first-principles approach, influenced by Stoic antecedents yet adapted to observable human contingencies, posits duties as empirically anchored imperatives, where truth resides in alignment with nature's design for interdependent agency.

Justice, Property, and Natural Law

Cicero delineates justice in De Officiis as encompassing two core duties: the primary obligation to refrain from inflicting harm on others except in response to provocation, and the secondary duty to employ communal resources for collective benefit while treating private holdings as exclusive to their owners. This framework positions justice as foundational to human fellowship, rooted in the rational discernment of right and wrong that distinguishes humans from beasts. Non-maleficence demands abstention from violence, theft, or fraud, even when legally sanctioned if such acts contravene natural equity; Cicero illustrates this by condemning tyrannical seizures or factional statutes that redistribute property under pretext of law, deeming them no less theft than overt robbery. Beneficence, in turn, urges active support for others' welfare, but only insofar as it preserves the non-harm principle and respects established divisions of possession. Private property, Cicero argues, emerges not as a dictate of —which furnishes for common initial use—but through human conventions that assign via prior , legislative enactment, customary practice, or equitable distribution according to individual merit and need. Long , for instance, vests title when settlers claim unclaimed lands, transforming communal availability into exclusive rights; civil laws and traditions further solidify these claims, as seen in Rome's agrarian allotments to veterans or citizens. Cicero rejects egalitarian myths positing equal shares as natural, asserting instead that disparities arise legitimately from effort, , or fortune, and that coerced equalization—whether by demagogues or flawed statutes—erodes trust, invites retaliation, and destabilizes the , as evidenced by the tumults following the Gracchi's land reforms in 133 BCE and subsequent decades. Such violations, he warns, fracture the social bonds (societas hominum) essential for civilized order, where each prospers by securing his own gains without predation. This conception underpins Cicero's natural law doctrine, wherein justice embodies an eternal, universal dictate discerned by reason and binding irrespective of positive 's variances. Human enactments qualify as true only when aligned with this rational order; otherwise, they devolve into instruments of iniquity, as when oligarchs or mobs manipulate redistribution to favor their class, contravening the impartiality nature demands. Cicero's emphasis on inviolability thus serves causal realism: societies thrive by upholding these , fostering industry and reciprocity, whereas their neglect breeds envy, factionalism, and collapse, a pattern he traces in Rome's escalating civil disorders from the late second century BCE onward.

Opposition to Tyranny and Demagoguery

posits that tyrants fundamentally violate the duties of justice by placing personal dominion above the and the , thereby dissolving the social bonds essential to human society. In distinguishing rightful kingship from tyranny, he asserts that legitimate is granted by the to virtuous rulers for the benefit of the commonwealth, whereas tyrants seize power through or deceit, ruling solely for self-aggrandizement and treating subjects as slaves rather than citizens. This subversion of officia—the moral obligations binding individuals to the —renders tyrants hostes , outside the pale of reciprocal societal duties, justifying their removal as an act aligned with natural right rather than injustice. Demagogues exacerbate this peril by eroding republican institutions through flattery and promises that undermine lawful authority, fostering mob rule that empirically devolves into or dictatorship. Cicero warns that leaders who court popular favor by redistributing property or inciting sedition against the senate and magistrates betray the honorable path, as true expediency lies in upholding constitutional balance rather than pandering to transient passions. Historical precedents, such as the Sicilian tyrant or the demagogic tribunes of , illustrate how such tactics precipitate civil discord, enabling ambitious men to exploit moral laxity for unchecked power— a causal wherein civic virtue's decline invites strongmen who exploit the resulting . The text advocates resistance to such threats as a paramount duty, defending an elite-guided republic where glory accrues from principled statesmanship, not sycophantic appeals to the masses. Cicero critiques the pursuit of power via unlawful means, implicitly referencing precedents like Julius Caesar's crossing of the in 49 BCE, which breached senatorial decrees and set a model for subsequent figures like to claim impunity in subverting the . Citizens, bound by officia to preserve the of —tempering , , and —must prioritize the over personal safety, as exemplified by historical liberators who overthrew tyrants through cunning or force when legal avenues failed. This stance reflects Cicero's broader causal realism: unchecked demagoguery and tyrannical precedents erode the virtuous habits sustaining free governance, demanding proactive defense to avert irreversible decay.

Transmission and Early Reception

Survival in Late Antiquity

Following Cicero's death in 43 BC, De Officiis circulated widely among Roman elites and was preserved through scribal copying during the empire's in the 4th and 5th centuries AD. The treatise's ethical focus on and facilitated its transmission amid declining pagan literary production, with scribes maintaining copies in both secular and emerging ecclesiastical contexts up to the sack of Rome in 410 AD and the empire's western fall in 476 AD. A key indicator of its survival is the 4th-century grammarian Nonius Marcellus, who quoted passages from De Officiis in his lexicon De Compendiosa Doctrina, compiling excerpts from Republican authors to illustrate Latin usage. These citations, drawn from multiple sections of the work, demonstrate active consultation and reproduction of the text in late antique or , where Nonius likely compiled his material around 370–400 AD. Similarly, Christian writers accessed exemplars, as evidenced by of Milan's extensive borrowing in his De Officiis Ministrorum (c. 390 AD), which paraphrases and quotes to outline clerical duties. The work evaded the widespread destruction or neglect afflicting overtly pagan texts, such as Epicurean treatises or certain Neoplatonic works, with no recorded losses attributable to imperial edicts like Theodosius I's bans on pagan practices in 391–392 AD. Extant medieval manuscripts—over 700 in total—trace their lineage to late antique archetypes, inferred from consistent textual variants predating Carolingian recensions and corroborated by patristic quotations. This continuity underscores De Officiis as one of the few Ciceronian philosophical texts to bridge the classical and post-Roman eras without interruption.

Medieval Christian Integration

In the late 4th century, Saint of composed De Officiis Ministrorum (c. 390 AD), explicitly modeling its structure and discussion of virtues on Cicero's De Officiis to outline duties for Christian clergy, adapting pagan ethical principles to ecclesiastical responsibilities such as , , and temperance. retained Cicero's tripartite division into the honorable, the expedient, and their reconciliation but infused it with , portraying virtues like (honestas) as reflections of divine order rather than mere Stoic rational imperatives, while critiquing pagan elements incompatible with scriptural . This work bridged classical ethics and by presenting Cicero's framework as a scaffold for moral instruction, demonstrating how Stoic-derived duties could be harmonized with faith, though subordinated human reason to God's will to resolve tensions between and supernatural grace. Cicero's De Officiis survived extensively in the medieval West through over 200 manuscripts copied between the 9th and 15th centuries, often in monastic scriptoria, preserving its text amid the decline of other classical works and enabling its integration into Christian intellectual life despite its pagan authorship. These manuscripts facilitated its use in schools and early universities, where it served as a core ethical text for training clerics and lay scholars in virtues like and beneficence, viewed as preparatory for teachings rather than antithetical to them. The compatibility arose from Cicero's Stoic emphasis on universal moral duties rooted in nature, which medieval thinkers interpreted as aligning with divine creation, allowing to be seen as an expression of God's rational order enforceable through both human and authority, though tensions persisted over Cicero's secular lacking explicit redemption. Thomas Aquinas further embedded De Officiis in Christian doctrine during the 13th century, citing it over a dozen times in the , particularly in the (I-II, q. 94, a. 2), where he draws on Cicero's account of natural inclinations—such as , procreation, and social living—to articulate the foundations of as participatory in . Aquinas harmonized Cicero's ethical realism with by affirming that pagan insights into honestum (the morally fitting) anticipate revealed truth, yet he critiqued incomplete Stoic self-sufficiency, insisting duties culminate in charity and divine beatitude rather than autonomous . This selective appropriation underscored De Officiis' role in as a bridge text, validating classical reason's alignment with faith while subordinating it to scripture and patristic authority.

Long-Term Impact

Renaissance Revival and Humanist Endorsement

Francesco Petrarch (1304–1374), a foundational figure in , extolled Cicero's De Officiis as a practical ethical guide, valuing its focus on moral duties rooted in reason and over medieval theological abstractions. This endorsement highlighted the text's utility for personal and public conduct, aligning with emerging humanist priorities of studia humanitatis and classical revival distinct from . Petrarch's possession and promotion of Cicero's works, including De Officiis, spurred a broader rediscovery of Roman republican ideals amid the political fragmentation of . The advent of printing accelerated the text's dissemination; the first edition was issued in 1465 by Johann Fust and Peter Schöffer in , , combining De Officiis with Cicero's . Subsequent editions proliferated, with over 200 by the late , embedding the work in humanist curricula and ethical discourse across . This accessibility reinforced De Officiis' emphasis on honestum (the honorable) and utile (the expedient) as guides for statesmanship, influencing educators and rulers in republics like and . Northern humanists adapted Cicero's framework; Desiderius Erasmus produced editions in 1501 and 1520, integrating concepts of —fitting action in context—from Book I into rhetorical theory and , promoting balanced moral propriety. In Italy, Niccolò Machiavelli confronted De Officiis directly in Il Principe (written 1513, published 1532), subverting its virtuous prescriptions—such as and liberality—with realist critiques of princely necessity, yet engaging its dichotomies to argue for virtù in sustaining republics against . The revival cultivated civic humanism, linking De Officiis' doctrines of , property rights, and anti-tyrannical duty to the participatory governance of Italian communes, where countered feudal hierarchies and fostered self-reliant polities. In , for instance, humanists invoked Cicero's model to justify republican vigilance, empirically correlating ethical training with sustained amid 14th–15th-century factional strife. This causal emphasis on in politics distinguished Renaissance appropriations from prior Christian integrations, prioritizing empirical republican practice over divine ordinance.

Enlightenment, American Founders, and Republicanism

John , a pivotal Enlightenment thinker, owned nine editions of De Officiis by the time of his death in 1704, reflecting its profound impact on his conceptions of natural rights and as derived from moral duties and justice. Locke's emphasis on as an extension of and labor echoes Cicero's arguments in De Officiis for the moral legitimacy of private ownership grounded in natural equity and utility, distinguishing it from mere acquisition through force or fraud. similarly drew from Ciceronian ethics in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), integrating De Officiis's framework of virtuous governance and to advocate for moderated republics that balance liberty with moral restraint, influencing later constitutional designs. American Founders extensively engaged De Officiis in articulating republican principles of duty, anti-tyranny, and balanced authority. , who internalized 's legal and civic ethics from De Officiis, referenced its teachings on public service and opposition to demagoguery in his 1775 writings, such as Novanglus, to justify resistance to arbitrary rule while emphasizing reciprocal duties between rulers and citizens. styled himself as an "American ," applying De Officiis's hierarchy of virtues—, , and —to critique monarchical overreach and promote a of laws, not men, as seen in his contributions to the of 1780. Thomas Jefferson praised Cicero as "the father of eloquence and philosophy," incorporating De Officiis's foundations into the Declaration of Independence (1776), where unalienable rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness align with Ciceronian duties rooted in human reason and equity rather than divine right or alone. During Federalist debates, Founders like invoked Ciceronian balance—mixing monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy as in De Officiis's ethical governance—to design the U.S. Constitution's checks and balances, ratified in 1788, prioritizing institutional stability over populist excess. This Ciceronian emphasis on moral duty constraining power empirically underpinned the American republic's longevity, fostering a constitutional order that averted the factional violence plaguing the (1789–1799), where unchecked democratic fervor led to the and over 16,000 executions by 1794, contrasting Cicero's advocated harmony of virtues with revolutionary abstractions detached from tempered authority. The U.S. system's success in sustaining liberty through 1787's —echoing De Officiis's as societal glue—demonstrates causal efficacy over the French model's radical , which prioritized abstract rights without equivalent ethical anchors.

19th-21st Century Political and Ethical Applications

invoked Cicero's De Officiis as a of conservative thought in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, praising it as a "blameless piece" that grounded political in duties rather than abstract schemes. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in (1790) echoed the treatise's emphasis on organic social ties and resistance to upheaval, drawing on Cicero's ideal of the statesman as a philosopher applying ethical officia to preserve inherited institutions against radical innovation. In the 20th century, F.A. Hayek's theory of paralleled De Officiis' defense of as a natural emerging from , where rules of and exchange evolve without coercive design to foster coordination. Hayek's works, such as Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973–1979), align with Cicero's view that stem from moral obligations to fairness and utility, countering constructivist interventions that disrupt emergent ethical norms. Recent scholarship, including Raphael Woolf's edited volume Cicero's De Officiis: A Critical Guide (2023), elucidates the treatise's authorial intentions in blending Stoic and Peripatetic to provide a practical framework for honorable conduct amid , rejecting situational in favor of universal officia. Conservative analyses apply this to modern politics, arguing De Officiis exposes egalitarian impositions as violations of , since prioritizes individual and property acquisition over redistributive equality, which undermines honestas. In , a 2023 study integrates De Officiis' Stoic virtues—such as and fidelity—into , proposing they enable ethical persuasion within a "fully functioning " by aligning communication with duties to truth and common benefit, rather than manipulative expediency. Politically, the work counters by insisting on objective standards of right, as seen in critiques where neglect of officia—like demagogic appeals ignoring hierarchies—contributes to institutional failures, including populist ventures that prioritize expedience over principled order.

Criticisms and Debates

Internal Coherence and Anti-Stoic Elements

Scholars identify a core tension in De Officiis between Stoic absolutism, which prioritizes an unyielding standard of rational nature, and Cicero's accommodation of Roman social norms, such as calibrating personal splendor like housing to one's dignitas rather than abstract reason alone. This manifests in adaptations like extending just war principles to encompass Roman imperial expansion, diverging from Panaetius's stricter defensive framework to align with communal evaluations of expediency. Cicero's framework incorporates "middle" or intermediate duties (officia media), a Stoic innovation from denoting obligations suitable for ordinary individuals rather than the perfect sage, thereby injecting flexibility into ethical absolutes by permitting situational judgments on partial goods like family or state loyalty over universal impartiality. These deviations critique pure Stoic rigidity as ill-suited to practical , with Book 3 explicitly reconciling (honestas) and utility through pragmatic overrides, such as conditional promise-breaking for greater communal benefit. Apparent inconsistencies, including inter-book shifts from honor to expediency, cohere under Cicero's thesis that authentic inherently produces advantageous outcomes, prioritizing partial duties (e.g., to kin or republic) without fully abandoning impartial , thus adapting for non-philosophical actors in .

Oversights on Slavery and Hierarchical Norms

In De Officiis, Cicero endorses humane treatment of slaves as a of the virtuous individual, advising masters to regard them not merely as but with consideration for their potential future or shared humanity, yet he offers no critique of as an institution itself. This acceptance aligns with prevailing Roman norms, where slaves constituted a foundational element of household and economic structures, comprising up to 30-40% of the urban population in by the late Republic. Cicero's framework in Book I emphasizes (iustitia) as refraining from harm to others except in retaliation, but this principle applies asymmetrically, exempting the systemic violence of enslavement through or debt, which he treats as legitimate outcomes of or fortune. Such oversights reflect broader unexamined assumptions about hierarchical norms, including rigid class divisions and gender roles, which Cicero presents as consonant with natural order and societal stability. He praises the decorum of maintaining distinctions by birth, wealth, and , decrying manual labor as unbecoming to the freeborn elite while implying women's primary duties lie in domestic spheres under paternal or marital authority. These views echo Stoic influences, where universal rational capacity coexists with acceptance of empirical social stratifications, without probing their justice; philosopher has highlighted this as evidencing partial coherence in Cicero's , where cosmopolitan impulses toward human dignity falter against entrenched particularist hierarchies. Causally, these blindspots stem from the material realities of the , which relied heavily on slave labor for , , and urban services, enabling elite leisure and expansion without which republican institutions like Cicero's idealized could not function. Later abolitionist movements, from Enlightenment thinkers onward, selectively invoked Cicero's principles of and human sociability to undermine , extending his anti-harm doctrine beyond ancient constraints to argue for universal , though without retroactively imputing moral culpability to Cicero's era-specific context.

Modern Ideological Misreadings

Contemporary interpreters, particularly those inclined toward egalitarian frameworks, have occasionally recast Cicero's De Officiis as a proto-universalist endorsing broad human equality and redistributive , yet this overlooks the text's rootedness in Roman particularism, where Stoic cosmopolitanism serves patriotic allegiance to the republic rather than abstract global equity. Cicero integrates universal with hierarchical duties tied to Roman civic order, prioritizing the res publica over undifferentiated humanity, as evidenced in his subordination of broader fellowship to national defense and . Such readings dilute the work's emphasis on particular attachments, projecting modern onto a framework that demands ordered roles within specific polities. A related misappropriation involves interpreting Cicero's justice (iustitia) as supportive of social justice initiatives like property redistribution, ignoring his explicit defense of private ownership as essential to human fellowship and moral order. In De Officiis, Cicero asserts that private possessions must remain private to prevent harm, deriving property rights from initial occupation and labor while condemning expropriation as a violation of natural bonds, a stance that underpins his critique of demagogic appeals to the masses. Progressive spins that frame this as malleable for equity overlook the causal link Cicero draws between secure property and stable hierarchy, where erosion invites tyranny; empirical history, including the American Founders' invocation of De Officiis for limited-government republicanism rather than plebiscitary democracy, underscores its anti-egalitarian slant favoring virtuous elites over mass expediency. These distortions contribute to a broader ideological , as noted in analyses tying De Officiis to conservative responses against normalized demagoguery masquerading as . Francis Graham Wilson's 2020 reflection highlights how egalitarian misreadings erode Cicero's moral order, fostering denial of civilizational decline akin to Rome's, where "lies prostrate" amid unchecked utility. By prioritizing relativist beneficence over hierarchical , such interpretations enable tyrannical expediency, inverting Cicero's warning that true officium resists popular passions for principled restraint, a causal dynamic evident in the work's historical application to mixed constitutions guarding against democratic excess.

References

  1. https://www.worldhistory.org/De_Officiis/
  2. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/historic-document-library/detail/cicerode-officiis-on-duties-44-bc
  3. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/cicero-de-officiis/
  4. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis
  5. https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/1997/1997.07.08/
  6. https://www.worldhistory.org/article/861/cicero--the-catiline-conspiracy/
  7. https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/history/catiline-conspiracy
  8. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23041986
  9. https://brewminate.com/optimates-conservative-faction-in-ancient-rome/
  10. https://journals.library.wustl.edu/wuulr/article/8802/galley/25588/view/
  11. https://the-blindspot.com/rationist-no-7-that-extreme-wealth-concentration-destroyed-the-roman-republic/
  12. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cicero/
  13. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/47001/47001-h/47001-h.htm
  14. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/id/1e3d9bf6-bd36-4df3-8754-3e733424dfa0/9783111292779.pdf
  15. http://files.libertyfund.org/files/542/Cicero_0041-01_EBk_v6.0.pdf
  16. https://www.loebclassics.com/view/LCL030/1913/volume.xml
  17. http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Officiis/home.html
  18. http://nlnrac.org/classical/cicero/documents/duties-de-officiis.html
  19. https://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/stoa/panaeti1.htm
  20. https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/panaetius-c-185-c-110-bc/v-1
  21. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ciceros-de-officiis/care-of-the-written-self/632CC80A7CEAB5FF9B2990FE12656E48
  22. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ciceros-de-officiis/oikeiosis-and-the-origin-of-virtue/243EE4FF5A219941D849CE18F21DF200
  23. https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2002/2002.08.40/
  24. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1408717
  25. https://topostext.org/work/616
  26. https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Officiis/2A*.html
  27. https://genius.com/Marcus-tullius-cicero-on-duties-de-officiis-book-ii-annotated
  28. https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Cicero/de_Officiis/2B*.html
  29. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=2
  30. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=5
  31. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=70
  32. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=99
  33. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=86
  34. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=107
  35. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=116
  36. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:2008.01.0547:book=3:chapter=13
  37. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ciceros-de-officiis/self-and-society/D2EC7EC3FDBFEC206D0D79EA92706EB0
  38. https://philarchive.org/archive/LOCTPC
  39. https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2024/2024.01.49/
  40. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-ciceros-philosophy/nature-and-social-ethics/E3B73573B875A87C71FD612D0B591012
  41. https://www.hillsdale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/1981-Ciceros_Teaching_on_Natural_Law.pdf
  42. https://www.libertarianism.org/columns/ciceros-natural-law-political-philosophy
  43. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis#lf0223_label_055
  44. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ciceros-de-officiis/politics/D5D03C46345EC11AA67C9C0AF1BAB6DC
  45. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis#lf0223_label_197
  46. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-cicero/cicero-in-late-antiquity/670BD9DE2A08A81DC4BBBE200F435F17
  47. https://www.jstor.org/stable/287347
  48. https://academic.oup.com/book/25723/chapter/193258540
  49. https://www.textmanuscripts.com/medieval/cicero-de-officiis-264805
  50. https://philpapers.org/rec/WINTTO-2
  51. https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/34011.htm
  52. https://academic.oup.com/book/25309/chapter/192298512
  53. https://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0339-0397%2C_Ambrosius%2C_De_Officiis_Ministrorum_Libri_Tres_%255BSchaff%255D%2C_EN.pdf
  54. https://scalar.usc.edu/works/usc-illuminated-medieval-manuscripts/introduction-de-officiis.4
  55. https://www.saet.ac.uk/Christianity/StoicismandChristianEthics
  56. https://philpapers.org/rec/SMIUTC-2
  57. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2005.00231.x
  58. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40017685.pdf
  59. https://www.degruyterbrill.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780822382614-007/pdf
  60. https://www.historyofinformation.com/detail.php?id=2789
  61. https://utoronto.scholaris.ca/bitstreams/4bfd9cff-ae93-469e-82a7-329b41572660/download
  62. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/historical-journal/article/erasmus-and-juan-luis-vives-on-rhetorical-decorum-and-politics/A051537503C7AE97273E676ADA1FADC4
  63. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2540045
  64. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26219664
  65. https://brewminate.com/cicero-and-the-roman-civic-spirit-in-the-middle-ages-and-early-renaissance/
  66. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/humanism-civic/
  67. https://hal.science/hal-01599603/document
  68. https://www.cato-unbound.org/2021/01/15/paul-meany/cicero-locke-american-founding
  69. https://www.bemidjistate.edu/academics/honors/wp-content/uploads/sites/73/2022/11/Theres-No-I-in-Team.-Individualism-Private-Property-and-Propriety-in-Ciceros-De-Officiis-Parrish-Alex.pdf
  70. https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/montesquieu-mes-pensees
  71. https://ojs.unito.it/index.php/COL/article/download/1280/1116/4516
  72. https://college.holycross.edu/faculty/wziobro/ClassicalAmerica/johnadams.htm
  73. https://fee.org/articles/why-the-founders-favorite-philosopher-was-cicero/
  74. https://journals.law.harvard.edu/jlpp/wp-content/uploads/sites/90/2025/03/Ferguson-Ciceronian-Origins.pdf
  75. https://constitutioncenter.org/media/files/Cicero_and_the_Constitution_Transcript.pdf
  76. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-the-roman-republic/roman-republic-and-the-french-and-american-revolutions/5117AB4E3574F273B01EFAE722FD7657
  77. https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2156&context=all_fac
  78. https://lawliberty.org/book-review/ciceros-fragile-trinity/
  79. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30070995
  80. https://iep.lisboa.ucp.pt/asset/10061/file
  81. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/ciceros-de-officiis/introduction/3623BD03E9DAD3C6A632FE1A13A64372
  82. https://voegelinview.com/the-conservative-in-crisis-notes-on-de-officiis/
  83. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/393687741_Atlantic_Journal_of_Communication_Stoic_virtue_in_modern_public_relations_Cicero%27s_De_Officiis_and_the_fully_functioning_society_theory_Stoic_virtue_in_modern_public_relations_Cicero%27s_De_Officiis_and
  84. https://www.constitution.org/1-History/rom/de_officiis.htm
  85. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-politics/article/on-the-intention-of-ciceros-de-officiis/289A957891BC98FAD4C567F2EB5110CF
  86. https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/bitstreams/471dc450-b189-4715-b4bd-37d8d09b8168/download
  87. https://www.britishmuseum.org/exhibitions/nero-man-behind-myth/slavery-ancient-rome
  88. https://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/doubtful_descent_3.htm
  89. https://sciendo.com/pdf/10.2478/genst-2020-0001
  90. https://dc.etsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3303&context=etd
  91. https://etd.library.emory.edu/concern/etds/qz20st828?locale=it
  92. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-ciceros-philosophy/empire-just-wars-and-cosmopolitanism/4177B6A1D61D4B69463491BD5A3BE825
  93. https://cit.catholic.edu/cicero-natural-law-and-constitutionalism-transcript/
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
Contribute something
User Avatar
No comments yet.