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For the exercise in 1942, see Exercise Tiger (1942). For various other military events, see Operation Tiger (disambiguation).

American troops landing on Slapton Sands in England during rehearsals for the invasion of Normandy

Exercise Tiger, or Operation Tiger was one of a series of large-scale rehearsals for the D-Day invasion of Normandy. Held in April 1944 on Slapton Sands in Devon, it proved fraught with difficulties. Coordination and communication problems resulted in friendly fire injuries during the exercise, and an Allied convoy positioning itself for the landing was attacked by E-boats of Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine, resulting in the deaths of at least 749 American servicemen.[1][2]

Because of the impending invasion of Normandy, the incident was under the strictest secrecy at the time and was only minimally reported afterwards.

Exercise

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Landing operations

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In late 1943, as part of the build-up to D-day, the British government set up a training ground at Slapton Sands, Devon, to be used by Force "U", the American forces tasked with landing on Utah Beach. Slapton Beach was selected for its similarity to Utah Beach: a gravel beach, followed by a strip of land and then a lake. Approximately 3,000 local residents in the area of Slapton,[3] now South Hams District of Devon, were evacuated.[4] Some had never left their villages before being evacuated.[5]

Landing exercises started in December 1943. Exercise Tiger was one of the larger exercises that took place in April and May 1944. The exercise was to last from 22 April until 30 April 1944, and covered all aspects of the invasion, culminating in a beach landing at Slapton Sands. On board nine large tank landing ships (LSTs), the 30,000 troops prepared for their mock landing, which also included a live-firing exercise.

Protection for the exercise area came from the Royal Navy. Four O-class destroyers, three Motor Torpedo Boats and two Motor Gun Boats patrolled the entrance to Lyme Bay while three Motor Torpedo Boats were stationed off Cherbourg, where German E-boats were based.[6]

The first phase of the exercise focused on marshalling and embarkation drills, and lasted from 22 to 25 April. On the evening of 26 April the first wave of assault troops boarded their transports and set off, the plan being to simulate the Channel crossing by taking a roundabout route through Lyme Bay, in order to arrive off Slapton at first light on 27 April.

Friendly fire incident

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The first practice assault took place on the morning of 27 April[7][8] and was marked by an incident involving friendly fire. H-hour was set for 07:30, and was to include live ammunition to acclimatise the troops to the sights, sounds and even smells of a naval bombardment. During the landing itself, live rounds were to be fired over the heads of the incoming troops by forces on land, for the same reason. This followed an order made by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, who felt that the men must be hardened by exposure to real battle conditions.[9] The exercise was to include naval bombardment by ships of Force U Bombardment Group fifty minutes prior to the landing.[10]

Several of the landing ships for that morning were delayed, and the officer in charge, American Admiral Don P. Moon, decided to delay H-hour for 60 minutes, until 08:30.[9] Some of the landing craft did not receive word of the change. Landing on the beach at their originally scheduled time, the second wave came under fire, suffering an unknown number of casualties. Rumours circulated among the fleet that as many as 450 men were killed.[11]

Battle of Lyme Bay

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Battle of Lyme Bay
Part of World War II

Arrow shows Lyme Bay in south-west England
Date28 April 1944
Location
off Portland, England, Lyme Bay, English Channel
50°16′48″N 3°38′51″W / 50.28°N 3.64750°W / 50.28; -3.64750
Result German victory
Belligerents
United States
United Kingdom		  Germany
Strength
1 corvette
8 LSTs		 9 E-boats
Casualties and losses
749 killed
~200 wounded
2 LSTs sunk
2 LSTs damaged		 none
Map

On the day after the first practice assaults, early on the morning of 28 April, the exercise was blighted when Convoy T-4, consisting of eight LSTs carrying vehicles and combat engineers of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, was attacked by German E-boats in Lyme Bay.[a] Nine German E-boats had left Cherbourg shortly after midnight, avoiding the British MTBs watching the port area and patrols in the English Channel.[13]

Around 0130 hrs, six E-boats of the 5. S-Boot Flottille (5th E-Boat Flotilla) commanded by Korvettenkapitän Bernd Klug saw eight dark ships and split into three pairs to attack with torpedoes: first Rotte 3 (S-136 & S-138), then Rotte 2 under Oberleutnant zur See Goetschke (S-140 & S-142), then Rotte 1 (S-100 & S-143). The final three E-boats of the nine, S-Boot Flottille commanded by Korvettenkapitän Götz Freiherr von Mirbach (S-130, S-145 & S-150), saw the red flares for attack (or may have heard the contact report sent at 0203 hrs) and joined the attack. Within the Rotte 1 pair, S-100 collided with S-143, damaged its superstructure, and the boats decided to leave, masking their retreat with smoke while sending another contact report. S-145 attacked the ships with gunfire. The attack ended circa at 0330 hrs. The Germans had been puzzled by the strange-looking ships which did not look like merchantmen. They estimated that they were some type of American landing ship with a shallow draft as the initial torpedoes from Rotte 3 and Rotte 2 seemed to miss.[13]

Of the two ships assigned to protect the convoy, only one was present. HMS Azalea, a corvette, was leading the LSTs in a straight line, a formation that later drew criticism since it presented an easy target to the E-boats. The second ship that was supposed to be present, HMS Scimitar, a World War I destroyer, had been in a collision with an LST, suffered structural damage and left the convoy to be repaired at Plymouth.[14] Because the LSTs and British naval headquarters were operating on different frequencies, the American forces did not know this.[9] HMS Saladin was dispatched as a replacement, but did not arrive in time to help protect the convoy.[15]

Casualties

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  • LST-289 was set on fire but eventually made it back to shore with the loss of 13 Navy personnel.
  • LST-507 was torpedoed and sunk with the loss of 202 US Army/US Navy personnel.
  • LST-511 was damaged by friendly fire from LST-496 (intended to be directed at one of the E-boats which passed between the two LSTs)[16] resulting in injuries to 18 US Army/Navy personnel.[17]
  • LST-531 sank within six minutes of being torpedoed with the loss of 424 Army and Navy personnel.[1][2][18]

The remaining ships and their escort fired back and the E-boats made no more attacks. In total, 749 servicemen (551 United States Army and 198 United States Navy) were killed during Exercise Tiger.[2][19] Many servicemen drowned or died of hypothermia in the cold sea while waiting to be rescued. Many had not been shown how to put on their lifebelt correctly, and placed it around their waist, the only available spot because of their large backpacks. In some cases this meant that when they jumped into the water, the weight of their combat packs flipped them upside down, dragging their heads under water and drowning them.[20] Dale Rodman, who travelled on LST-507, commented: "The worst memory I have is setting off in the lifeboat away from the sinking ship and watching bodies float by".[5] The 248 bodies that were recovered were sent to Brookwood Cemetery in Surrey on 29 April.[21] The unit with the most casualties was the 1st Special Engineer Brigade.[22]

Aftermath

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Operational consequences

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Vice Admiral Kirk of the US Navy immediately realised the huge damage E-boats could inflict on slow-moving landing craft with minimal defences and feared that the German success in Lyme Bay could be repeated on D-day, with disastrous consequences. On 4 May 1944 he sent a signal to Admiral Ramsay of the Royal Navy arguing for heavy aerial and naval bombardment of Cherbourg:

In my opinion the E-boats must be destroyed or driven from the Cherbourg area, prior to D-day. The only successful defense against the E-boat is to sink it before it can reach an attack position.

— Vice Admiral Kirk[6]

Other consequences

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The attack was reported up the chain of command to Dwight D. Eisenhower on 29 April. Eisenhower was enraged that the convoy was sailing in a straight line and not zig-zagging, that the attack reduced reserves of LSTs, that it indicated to the Germans that the Allies were nearly ready to invade, and that ten American officers with knowledge of the invasion were missing. Each had BIGOT-level clearance for D-Day, giving them knowledge that could have compromised the invasion should they have been captured alive. As a result, D-day was nearly called off while Eisenhower's order to find the missing bodies and any incriminating papers they might have had was carried out. All ten were recovered.[9]

The ten American officers were from the 1st Engineer Special Brigade; they knew when and where the Utah and Omaha landings were to take place, and had seen the amphibious DUKWs that were to take the Rangers to below Pointe du Hoc.[23] Merely knowing that exercises were taking place at Slapton was of interest to the Germans; the historian Stephen Ambrose suggests that the insistence in May by Hitler that the Normandy area be reinforced was because "he noticed the similarity between Slapton Sands and the Cotentin beach".[24]

There were reports that E-boats were nosing through the wreckage for information with searchlights or torches. The shore batteries around nearby Salcombe Harbour had visually spotted unidentified small craft, but were ordered not to fire on them as it would have shown the Germans that the harbour was defended and disclosed the battery position.[25]

As a result of official embarrassment and concerns over potential leaks just prior to the real invasion, all survivors were sworn to secrecy about the events by their superiors. There is little information about exactly how individual soldiers and sailors died. The US Department of Defense stated in 1988 that record-keeping may have been inadequate aboard some of the ships, and the most pertinent log books were lost at sea.[26] A ninth LST (LST-508) was scheduled to be in the convoy, but was damaged. Author Nigel Lewis speculates that some or all of its infantrymen may have been aboard LST 507 when it went down.[27] Various eyewitness accounts detail hasty treatment of casualties and rumours circulated of unmarked mass graves in Devon fields.[9]

Several changes resulted from mistakes made in Exercise Tiger:

  1. Radio frequencies were standardised; Azalea and Scimitar were late and out of position due to radio problems, and a signal about the E-boats' presence was not picked up by the LSTs.
  2. Better lifejacket training was provided for landing troops
  3. Plans were made for small craft to pick up floating survivors on D-Day.

Official histories contain little information about the tragedy. Some commentators have called it a cover-up, but protecting the secrecy of the Normandy landings was paramount, and the urgencies created by the invasion spread non-critical resources thin. In his book The Forgotten Dead: Why 946 American Servicemen Died Off The Coast Of Devon In 1944 – And The Man Who Discovered Their True Story, published in 1988, Ken Small declares that the event "was never covered up; it was 'conveniently forgotten'".[9]

The casualty statistics from Tiger were not released by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) until August 1944, along with the casualties of the actual D-Day landings. This report stated that there were 442 army dead and 197 navy, for a total of 639.[28] (However, Moon had reported on 30 April that there were 749 dead.[19]) Charles B. MacDonald, author and former deputy chief historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, notes that information from the SHAEF press release appeared in the August issue of Stars and Stripes. MacDonald surmises that the press release went largely unnoticed in light of the larger events that were occurring at the time.[1] The story was detailed in at least three books at the end of the war, including Captain Harry C. Butcher's My Three Years With Eisenhower (1946),[29] and in several publications and speeches.[1]

Memorials

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Sherman DD tank at the Torcross memorial in South Devon.

Devon resident and civilian Ken Small took on the task of seeking to commemorate the event, after discovering evidence of the aftermath washed up on the shore while beachcombing in the early 1970s.[30]

In 1974, Small bought from the U.S. Government the rights to a submerged tank from the 70th Tank Battalion discovered in his search. In 1984, with the aid of local residents and diving firms, he raised the tank, which now stands as a memorial to the incident. The local authority provided a plinth on the seafront to put the tank on, and erected a plaque in memory of the men killed. The American military honoured and supported him.

The Slapton Sands memorial plaque reads:

Dedicated by the United States of America in honor of the men of the US Army's 1st Engineer Special Brigade, the 4th Infantry Division, and the VII Corps Headquarters; and the US Navy's 11th Amphibious Force who perished in the waters of Lyme Bay during the early hours of April 28, 1944.

A plaque was erected in 1995 at Arlington National Cemetery entitled "Exercise Tiger Memorial". In 1997, the Exercise Tiger Association established a memorial to veterans of the exercise in Mexico, Missouri.[31] It is a 2,300-kilogram (5,000 lb) stern anchor from an LST of the Suffolk County Class on permanent loan from the Navy. In 2006, the non-profit Sands Memorial Tank Limited established a more prominent memorial listing the names of all the victims of the attacks on Exercise Tiger.[32]

In 2012, a memorial plaque was erected at Utah Beach, Normandy, on the wall of a former German anti-aircraft bunker.

An M4 Sherman tank stands as a memorial to Exercise Tiger at Fort Rodman Park in New Bedford, Massachusetts.

In 2019, the US servicemen who died in the exercise were remembered in an art installation by artist Martin Barraud. Bootprints of 749 troops were laid out on Slapton Sands to mark the 75th anniversary of Exercise Tiger. Commemorative bootprints and special plaques made by veterans to represent each of the 22,763 British and Commonwealth servicemen and women who were killed on D-Day and during the Battle of Normandy in the summer of 1944 were sold. Barraud said:

Our enduring hope is that every one of the US, British and Commonwealth soldiers, sailors and airmen who gave their lives will have a bootprint purchased in their memory.[33]

[edit]
  • Someone In Time by Stuart Cowley is a 2019 novel based around the events of "Exercise Tiger" from the point of view of fictitious people and their individual stories.[34][35]
  • Sanford Margalith's novel Captains is a fictionalised account of his experiences during the Slapton Sands incident.[36][37]
  • In her book The Armada Boy, Kate Ellis relocated Exercise Tiger from Slapton to Bereton on the Devon coast, and used it as the background of the story.
  • A major plotline of Foyle's War was based on the Slapton Sands disaster, in the episode entitled "All Clear".
  • The Jack Higgins novel Night of the Fox begins with a fictionalised account of the Battle of Lyme Bay and the primary plot involves rescuing one of the BIGOT officers.
  • The Leslie Thomas novel The Magic Army is a fictionalised account of the evacuation of Slapton and the events leading up to the Slapton Sands disaster.[38]
  • The 1985 film Code Name: Emerald is based around the disaster. As part of a deception from a Nazi spy who is a British Double Agent a message is sent to German High Command that indicating the location of a rehearsal for landings in France. Due to the secrecy around Operation Tiger they are unaware the location and time coincide with the Operation. Consequently, the E-boats attack and capture an officer with oversight of the D-Day landings. The plot revolves around ensuring his secrets aren't revealed necessitating a delay in the Normandy plans.
  • The J. D. Salinger short story For Esme with Love and Squalor is narrated by an American serviceman suffering Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in Devon after the Slapton Sands massacre.
  • The final issue of DC Comics Sgt. Rock concerns Exercise Tiger and its aftermath.
  • The Amazing Story of Adolphus Tips by Michael Morpurgo is based around the events, following the story of a girl who is forced to leave Slapton and her cat.
  • One of Ellie Dean's novels in the Cliffehaven Series called The Waiting Hours has a major plotline based on the events in Slapton Sands.

Notes

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References

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Sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Exercise Tiger

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Exercise Tiger was a full-scale amphibious exercise conducted by forces from April 22 to 30, , off the coast of Slapton Sands in , , serving as a dress rehearsal for the landings during the Allied invasion of on D-Day. The exercise involved approximately 30,000 troops, primarily from the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and supporting units such as the 3206th Quartermaster Service Company, along with naval elements including eight (LST) vessels in Convoy T-4. Tragically, on the night of April 27–28, , a of nine German Schnellboote (S-boats, equivalent to E-boats) ambushed the convoy in , torpedoing and sinking LST-507 and LST-531 while damaging LST-289 with gunfire and shelling. The attack resulted in the deaths of 749 American personnel—198 from the U.S. Navy and 551 from the U.S. Army—marking it as one of the deadliest incidents for U.S. forces prior to the . Casualties were exacerbated by several factors, including the element of surprise due to communication failures between British and American forces, inadequate radio that allowed to intercept exercise details, and the issuance of British-style life preservers to American troops, which they were largely untrained to use and which restricted movement when worn over equipment, often failing to keep many afloat in the cold waters. Fires aboard the stricken LSTs, machine-gun , , and contributed to the high toll, with the 3206th Service suffering particularly heavy losses: 201 of its 251 members perished. In the aftermath, the incident was shrouded in secrecy to prevent compromising the impending D-Day operation, with details not publicly disclosed until after June 6, 1944, and some reports suggesting an initial to maintain morale. Key lessons from Exercise Tiger prompted immediate improvements, such as enhanced convoy escorts, better for radio communications, and the elimination of the German S-boat threat in the through RAF and Allied air operations by mid-June 1944. These changes contributed to the success of the actual Normandy invasion, though the event remains a somber reminder of the risks in wartime preparations.

Background

Planning and Preparation

Exercise Tiger was established in as a large-scale rehearsal for , the Allied invasion of , under the oversight of the (SHAEF). Planning began with initial training exercises on December 15, 1943, in the Slapton Sands area to simulate amphibious assaults on . The exercise was designed to integrate all elements of the invasion, including troop movements, naval support, and live-fire simulations, with phased development continuing through early 1944. Slapton Sands in , , was selected as the primary training site due to its geological and topographical resemblance to , featuring a backed by low cliffs and an inland similar to the French coastline. To secure the 30,000-acre area for unrestricted use, approximately 3,000 local residents from villages including Slapton, Torcross, and Strete were evacuated starting in , with the process completed by early 1944; this displaced 750 families across a 10-mile coastal stretch, and the zone was placed under a cordon to maintain operational secrecy. Logistical preparations involved assembling around 30,000 U.S. troops, primarily from the 4th Infantry Division along with attached engineer and tank units, for embarkation and landing drills. A fleet of over 200 vessels, including multiple Landing Ship, Tank (LST) craft for troop and vehicle transport, was mobilized from ports in southern England. Coordination with British forces was essential, with the Royal Navy providing escort destroyers, corvettes, and support ships under U.S. Navy command led by Rear Admiral Don P. Moon. Security protocols were rigorously enforced to prevent intelligence leaks, including a complete blackout on information about the exercise's scale and timing, enforced through the BIGOT security classification system. Radio silence was mandated for all participating units during key phases to mimic operational conditions, supplemented by challenge-response codes for convoy and vessel identification. The planning timeline culminated in final approvals by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on April 19, 1944, authorizing the full-scale rehearsal to commence on April 22.

Objectives and Scope

Exercise Tiger was designed as a critical for the amphibious assault on during Operation Neptune, the naval component of the Normandy invasion. Its primary objectives included testing the integration of amphibious assault tactics, such as beach landings under simulated combat conditions, and evaluating coordination among naval, air, and ground forces to ensure seamless execution in a high-stress environment. The exercise emphasized the use of live ammunition to replicate the psychological and operational pressures of real combat, marking the first instance of live naval bombardment directed over troops during such a training operation. The scope of the exercise encompassed a large-scale of the Utah Beach sector, involving Assault Force U under Don P. Moon, primarily comprising elements of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division, including its three regimental combat teams (8th, 22nd, and 12th Infantry Regiments), along with engineer, tank, and logistics units. Scheduled from April 22 to 30, 1944, it featured eight (LST) vessels carrying approximately 4,000 troops for the follow-up assault echelons, supported by naval gunfire from vessels like HMS Hawkins, destroyer escorts, and air cover from Allied aircraft. The operation incorporated prototypes of Mulberry harbor components to practice rapid unloading and logistical sustainment under fire. Overall, the exercise mobilized around 30,000 personnel and more than 200 vessels, including 21 LSTs, 28 Landing Craft, Infantry (Large) (LCI(L)), and 65 (LCT), to validate operations and address logistical challenges identified in prior smaller-scale trainings. As part of a broader series of rehearsals for , Exercise Tiger built upon deficiencies noted in earlier exercises, such as coordination issues and unloading inefficiencies, to refine tactics for the actual invasion. It prioritized conceptual testing of force synchronization over exhaustive drills, using Slapton Sands' terrain to closely replicate Beach's geography and tidal conditions, thereby enhancing the realism of the simulated cross-Channel transit and assault phases.

Conduct of the Exercise

Initial Phases and Training

Exercise Tiger commenced on April 22, 1944, marking the beginning of its initial phases focused on marshalling, embarkation, and preparatory drills to simulate the amphibious assault planned for the Normandy invasion. Troops from the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division and attached units began loading onto landing ship tanks (LSTs) at ports including Dartmouth, , Plymouth, and along the southern English coast. By April 24, the embarkation process was largely complete, with soldiers, vehicles, and equipment secured aboard vessels such as LSTs 289, 499, 507 from and others from nearby harbors, setting the stage for at-sea maneuvers. Preliminary training emphasized small-boat drills and night exercises to hone loading procedures, , and coordination under simulated conditions. Infantry units practiced beach to identify defensive positions, while engineers trained in obstacle breaching using Bangalore torpedoes—long sectional pipes filled with explosives—to clear and other barriers. These activities extended to operations with engineers for mine clearing, replicating the expected challenges on enemy-held shores, and included live-fire support from naval vessels to enhance realism. Concurrently, naval forces under U.S. Assault Force U ( 125) conducted anti-submarine screen drills in , employing destroyers, corvettes, motor boats, and gunboats to protect the simulated from underwater threats. The force was commanded by of Assault Force U ( 125), comprising eight LSTs loaded with approximately 7,800 troops and support elements, escorted initially by the British destroyer HMS Scimitar as leader. Early challenges included minor delays from inclement weather affecting schedules and equipment malfunctions, such as damage to HMS Scimitar from a collision with an American landing craft, which sidelined it and reduced the escort to the corvette HMS Azalea; however, these issues did not significantly disrupt progress, allowing the exercise to advance smoothly toward the main landing phase on April 27.

Landing Operations

The landing operations of Exercise Tiger commenced on the morning of April 27, 1944, as a simulated H-Hour assault on Slapton Sands, designed to replicate the amphibious invasion of . However, a delay in the H-hour start due to rough seas and communication issues exposed to live naval , resulting in incidents that killed approximately 10 U.S. Army personnel and wounded others. Naval began at 0630, with cruisers and destroyers firing live 4.7-inch shells over the heads of the approaching forces to provide realistic combat conditions. , including 21 LSTs, 28 LCI(L)s, and 65 LCTs in the first echelon, approached the beach under protective screens to obscure their movements from simulated enemy positions. Troops from Assault Group U, primarily elements of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division and VII Corps under , debarked and began advancing inland, practicing the seizure of beach exits and initial penetration of defended terrain. Key tactical elements included coordinated from offshore vessels, which continued to suppress mock defenses during the landings. Post-landing maneuvers focused on securing beachheads, with troops conducting follow-on advances to establish defensive perimeters and link up with inland forces, utilizing vehicles such as tanks and trucks unloaded from the LSTs. echelon followed on April 28 after a night transit, reinforcing the initial assault waves and extending the exercise to test sustained and maneuver under simulated stress. Initially, the operations achieved successes in simulating the cross-channel transit and beach assault, with efficient unloading of equipment demonstrating improved procedures from prior drills. However, disruptions arose from poor visibility due to and , which complicated and targeting, alongside communication failures exacerbated by enforced protocols. High-ranking observers, including Rear Admiral commanding Force U and elements of VII , evaluated the performance to assess alignment with D-Day objectives, noting both tactical proficiencies and areas for refinement in joint operations.

The Lyme Bay Incident

Convoy Formation and Departure

Convoy T-4 was assembled as the second echelon support group for the Exercise Tiger landings scheduled at Slapton Sands on April 28, 1944. The convoy comprised eight U.S. Navy Landing Ship, Tank (LST) vessels, including LST-507 and LST-531, loaded with approximately 4,500 troops primarily from combat engineer units of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, including the 3206th and 557th Quartermaster Service Companies, along with vehicles and equipment for subsequent waves of the invasion. Troops and materiel were embarked at ports such as Plymouth and Brixham, with the LSTs forming up in Lyme Bay en route to Slapton Sands. The convoy departed those ports on the evening of April 27 under the command of U.S. Navy Commander Bernard J. Skahill, bound for Slapton Sands. The intended route traced a zigzag pattern through to evade potential threats from German U-boats or surface vessels, covering roughly 20 miles across the exposed waters off the coast. Protection was provided primarily by the HMS Azalea, as the HMS Scimitar was unable to join due to recent collision damage and its attempted replacement, HMS Saladin, did not arrive in time. The planned speed of 20 knots was unattainable, reduced to 5-8 knots by the LSTs' mechanical constraints and heavy loads, forcing a straight-line course that heightened exposure. To maintain operational realism, strict was imposed throughout the transit, prohibiting voice or transmissions except in extremis; instead, identification and emergency signaling relied on pyrotechnic flares and recognition rockets. Departure was delayed by approximately one hour due to deteriorating weather, including low visibility and rough seas in , which further complicated navigation for the slow-moving formation. These arrangements exposed several key vulnerabilities that compromised the convoy's safety. cover was allocated for the overnight passage, as Allied fighter resources were stretched thin across multiple exercises in . Additionally, the escort force lacked sufficient modern destroyers, with allocations prioritized for higher-priority rehearsals elsewhere, leaving the convoy dependent on limited antisubmarine vessels ill-equipped for fast-moving surface threats.

German E-Boat Attack

On the evening of 27 April 1944, German naval intelligence, through radio intercepts and Luftwaffe reconnaissance observing unusual Allied naval activity in the English Channel, alerted Marinegruppe West (Naval Group West) to potential targets near the British coast. This prompted the dispatch of nine Schnellboote (S-boats, known to the Allies as E-boats) from the 5th and 9th Flotillas based in Cherbourg, under the command of Korvettenkapitän Bernd Klug. The boats, including S-130, S-136, S-138, S-145, and S-150 among others, evaded British motor torpedo boat patrols and proceeded northwest into Lyme Bay, exploiting the cover of darkness and the convoy's radio silence to approach undetected. The attack commenced shortly after 0200 hours on 28 April 1944, as the E-boats, traveling at high speed, closed to within 1,000 yards of T-4's rear and split into three pairs to launch a coordinated assault. S-130 fired that struck USS LST-507 amidships at approximately 0207, igniting a massive fire that engulfed the vessel and led to its sinking within 20 minutes after a second hit. Minutes later, at 0218, S-136 and S-138 USS LST-531 twice, causing it to sink rapidly in about six minutes; a also damaged the of USS LST-289, though its forward section was beached and saved. The E-boats followed up with gunfire from their 20 mm and 40 mm cannons for around 40 minutes, damaging additional LSTs such as USS LST-511 through shell hits, before withdrawing eastward around 0240 after expending their . The Allied response was severely hampered by communication failures and the absence of effective escorts. British radar at Start Point had detected the approaching E-boats around 0130 but transmitted warnings on a not monitored by the convoy, which maintained strict . The destroyer HMS Scimitar had collided with another vessel earlier and returned to port, leaving HMS as the sole protector; Azalea fired starshells for illumination but withheld to avoid silhouetting the LSTs. Surviving LST crews, including those on USS LST-496 and USS LST-515, returned fire with their 40 mm guns—firing hundreds of rounds—but the confusion led to some friendly fire incidents among the ships, with the E-boats escaping without losses. The E-boats capitalized on several tactical vulnerabilities in the convoy's setup, including the lack of zigzagging due to the LSTs' slow speed of 8 knots, the reduced escort presence, and the troops' inadequate for rapid evacuation in jackets, many of which were improperly fitted. The survivors of the attack arrived late at Slapton Sands, contributing to coordination issues during the subsequent landing phase. This surprise assault resulted in the sinking of two LSTs and damage to at least three others, inflicting heavy casualties before the Germans disengaged and returned to by dawn.

Friendly Fire During Bombardment

During the morning bombardment phase of Exercise Tiger on April 28, 1944, Allied naval forces, including the British HMS Hawkins, fired live rounds at simulated enemy positions on Slapton Beach to replicate conditions for the landing in . However, navigational and environmental factors, compounded by delays from the earlier attack, caused shells to overshoot their intended targets, landing among exposed American troops who had begun disembarking from landing ships. These troops, lacking adequate cover due to the exercise's realistic setup, included personnel from the 3206th Service Company and the 478th Amphibious Truck Company, who were positioned to support and engineering tasks inland. The incident unfolded around 0730 hours, shortly after the scheduled H-Hour, when the bombardment—intended to cease 30 minutes before troop landings—continued due to communication delays and scheduling errors. Shells from HMS Hawkins and supporting vessels struck the beach area, prompting immediate panic as soldiers mistook the incoming fire for simulated enemy action or actual German counterfire. This led to disorganized retreats, with troops scattering and halting planned advances, exacerbating confusion in the command structure. The exposure of follow-on waves without airburst fuzes on the shells further intensified the danger, as impacts created lethal shrapnel patterns on the open terrain. Key causes included inaccurate ranging from erroneous grid references on naval charts, failure to fully adjust firing solutions for and tidal variations at Slapton Sands, and procedural lapses in coordinating the end of live fire with landing timelines. These errors resulted in an uncertain number of American casualties, with some declassified reports indicating around 29 wounded or injured, though no deaths are confirmed in official records, separate from the E-boat attack losses. The event underscored vulnerabilities in joint Allied operations, prompting post-exercise reviews that influenced D-Day bombardment protocols.

Casualties and Immediate Aftermath

Death Toll and Identification

The death toll from Exercise Tiger stood at 551 U.S. Army personnel and 198 U.S. Navy personnel killed, for a total of 749 fatalities, marking it as one of the deadliest training incidents in U.S. military history. The vast majority of these losses occurred during the German E-boat attack on the convoy, with specific sinkings accounting for significant portions: 202 deaths aboard LST-507 after it was torpedoed and set ablaze, and 424 aboard LST-531 following its rapid sinking. All 749 deaths resulted from the E-boat attack, including direct effects of torpedoes, fires, and over 200 from drowning exacerbated by inadequate life jackets—designed primarily for with kapok filling that caused wearers to float face-down in water—and in the cold English Channel waters, highlighting equipment shortcomings in amphibious training. Identifying the deceased presented substantial challenges, as many bodies were unrecovered due to the chaotic sinkings and the operation's extreme secrecy, which limited immediate search efforts to avoid alerting German . Approximately 320 bodies were recovered overall, but strong currents meant many were never located, with numerous remains going unidentified at the time. Dog tags served as the primary means of identification for those recovered, though wartime conditions restricted autopsies and forensic analysis. Declassification of related documents in the confirmed the full extent of the toll, revealing that initial wartime reports had understated as low as 10-20 to maintain and ahead of D-Day. No significant revisions to these figures have occurred since 2000, with official tallies remaining consistent based on postwar reviews.

Rescue and Recovery Efforts

Following the German E-boat attack on Convoy T4 in Lyme Bay during the early hours of April 28, 1944, immediate rescue operations focused on the oil-slicked waters where survivors from the torpedoed LSTs 507 and 531 struggled amid debris, cold temperatures around 42°F (6°C), and injuries from blasts and burns. LST-515, returning to the scene approximately two hours after the initial strikes, launched landing craft to retrieve personnel, rescuing 132 individuals by 04:30, many of whom had clung to Carley floats, whalers, and wreckage for hours while battling hypothermia and oil contamination. British vessels, including HMS Saladin arriving at 03:15 and HMS Onslow at 05:00, joined the effort, with HMS Onslow alone picking up 28 Navy and 44 Army survivors from LST-531; by dawn on April 29, these combined operations had saved approximately 500 personnel from the chaotic waters. Survivor accounts described troops treading water or holding onto floating debris for up to four hours, exacerbating risks from exposure and wounds, though the total number rescued from the convoy ultimately reached around 2,000 out of roughly 2,700 embarked. Logistically, additional ships such as HMS Brissenden, Primrose, and Dianthus were diverted from other duties to bolster searches in , while drifters and coastal craft scoured the area over the following four days, recovering approximately 320 bodies from the sunken LSTs. The 605th Graves Registration Company handled identifications and transport, moving remains via over 45 trucks to sites like , though strong currents and the expansive search area meant many bodies were never located. These efforts, hampered by communication failures and the threat, underscored the challenges of coordinating in darkness and poor visibility.

Investigation and Consequences

Official Inquiry and Findings

Following the Lyme Bay incident on 28 April 1944, the U.S. Navy conducted an immediate review led by John Hall, who issued a formal report on 5 May 1944 expressing regret for the losses and outlining initial assessments of the failures. The U.S. First Army also established a board to investigate the overall exercise, including the separate episode during the 27 April landing bombardment, focusing on coordination between and ground forces. These inquiries, coordinated under (SHAEF) oversight, examined communications breakdowns, security lapses, and tactical procedures but remained classified to protect D-Day planning. The key findings identified multiple primary causes for the disaster. German E-boats exploited an intelligence breach by investigating unusual radio activity in the , penetrating the convoy due to inadequate escorts—only one remained after HMS Scimitar was damaged in a collision—and the absence of zigzagging by the slow LSTs. Flawed challenge-and-response codes compounded the issue, as British recognition signals were not properly recognized by U.S. vessels, delaying defensive actions. during the bombardment stemmed from poor inter-service coordination, with naval shells falling short on and troops due to mismatched timings and visibility challenges. No individuals faced courts-martial, as the reports attributed failures to systemic overload from concurrent exercises and wartime pressures, though they recommended procedural changes like standardized radio frequencies and enhanced escort protocols. Cover-up elements emerged to safeguard secrecy, with initial suppression of details to prevent German exploitation of the success; no public communiqué was issued, and hospital staff at the 228th Station Hospital in Sherbourne were warned of for discussing the event. Troop lists were altered to disguise losses as generic training accidents, minimizing reported casualties. The classified report saw partial release in 1945, but full declassification occurred in 1974 through the Freedom of Information Act, revealing the extent of the tragedy. The inquiries had notable gaps, with limited emphasis on equipment failures such as ineffective life jackets, which contributed to drownings among non-swimmers rescued from the water but unable to stay afloat.

Impact on D-Day Operations

The lessons derived from Exercise Tiger prompted significant tactical enhancements for Operation Neptune, the naval component of the D-Day landings. In response to the vulnerability of the to German s demonstrated during the incident, Allied planners increased escorts and implemented more robust air patrols to protect approaching . For instance, the inadequacy of a single escort in Exercise Tiger led to the deployment of additional warships and intensified , which neutralized the E-boat threat through pre-invasion strikes that destroyed several vessels by mid-June . Additionally, communication failures due to mismatched radio frequencies between American and British forces were addressed by standardizing procedures and adopting clearer identification codes, ensuring better coordination during the actual invasion. Strategically, Exercise Tiger reinforced the emphasis on secrecy and deception operations, such as , which misled German intelligence about sites and thereby reduced the risk of similar interdictions. The incident also led to standardized life jacket designs and mandatory evacuation drills for troops, addressing the high drowning rates from improper equipment use and observed in the rehearsal. These adjustments stemmed directly from the official inquiry's recommendations, which highlighted systemic preparedness gaps. The broader effects of these changes were evident in the reduced casualties during the D-Day landings at , where only 197 American troops were killed or wounded, compared to the 749 deaths in Exercise Tiger. This disparity underscored the value of the applied lessons in mitigating risks. General Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision to proceed with the invasion, despite awareness of the rehearsal's failures, was informed by these rectified shortcomings, contributing to the overall success of the operation. Sources have historically underemphasized the psychological impact on surviving troops, though accounts indicate that the tragedy heightened their resolve and realism about combat dangers. casualties during the exercise remain uncertain, with estimates ranging from dozens to several hundred, separate from the E-boat attack losses.

Cover-Up and Secrecy

Following the disaster of Exercise Tiger, (SHAEF) imposed stringent measures to suppress information about the incident, primarily to safeguard the secrecy of the impending Normandy invasion. Survivors were ordered to maintain lifelong silence under threat of , a directive enforced to prevent any disclosure that could alert German forces to Allied preparations. Medical personnel treating the wounded, including doctors and nurses, were similarly instructed not to inquire into the causes of injuries and to uphold absolute confidentiality, ensuring that even routine hospital records did not reveal the true nature of the event. Casualty figures were deliberately underreported and misattributed in official communications, with the deaths classified as routine " accidents" to obscure the scale of the losses from the German attack and subsequent . Initial reports listed only 29 casualties, a figure that later expanded but still conflated losses with unrelated mishaps, such as vehicle accidents during the exercise, to minimize scrutiny. Media coverage in both the and faced a blackout during the war, with SHAEF censoring details to avoid public alarm; post-war reporting remained sparse until the 1970s, when Freedom of Information Act requests began to unearth suppressed documents. The rationale for this concealment stemmed from acute concerns over German intelligence exploitation and the erosion of Allied morale. Allied commanders, including General , feared that news of the heavy losses—exceeding those on during the actual D-Day landings—could demoralize troops and embolden Axis propaganda, especially since the exercise had inadvertently exposed staging areas and tactics in . Moreover, the drowning of 10 officers with "BIGOT"-level clearance (the highest security classification for invasion details) raised alarms about potential document recovery by the enemy, prompting Ultra intelligence monitoring for any defensive shifts by German forces; fortunately, no such exploitation occurred. These measures prioritized the element of surprise for , as any leak could have compromised the deception operations misleading the Germans about the invasion site. The veil of secrecy began to lift partially after D-Day, with a limited SHAEF press release in July 1944 acknowledging the exercise's tragedies without specifics, followed by brief mentions in military histories during the late 1940s and 1950s. Full public exposure came in the 1970s through declassified files accessed via the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, but widespread awareness surged in the 1980s due to local historian Ken Small's persistent research. Small, a resident near Slapton Sands, investigated rumors and underwater wreckage starting in the late 1960s, culminating in 1984 when he recovered a submerged Sherman tank from the sea floor off Torcross, using it as the centerpiece for a that honored the victims and prompted survivors to break their silence. By 2025, no significant new declassifications or revelations have emerged regarding Exercise Tiger, though historians and veterans' advocates continue to critique the prolonged for delaying official recognition and support for survivors, many of whom suffered in isolation for decades. This overreach in suppression has been highlighted in retrospectives as a cautionary example of wartime information control's long-term human cost, underscoring how the imperative to protect operational security overshadowed immediate accountability for the dead and wounded.

Legacy

Memorials and Commemorations

One of the primary physical memorials to the victims of Exercise Tiger is the Sherman DD tank at Torcross on Slapton Sands in South Devon, . Recovered from the sea in May 1984 by local resident Ken Small after years of effort, the tank was dedicated as a memorial on November 9, 1984, during a service at Slapton Village Church, honoring the American servicemen who perished in the 1944 tragedy. The restored M4A1 Sherman tank, positioned overlooking the beach where the exercise took place, serves as a poignant reminder of the event's scale and serves as the focal point for ongoing commemorations, maintained by the non-profit Exercise Tiger Memorial Ltd. In April 2024, a new stone was unveiled at Slapton Sands to specifically commemorate the 110 American servicemen killed by during the exercise's initial bombardment phase on April 27, 1944. This addition, erected near the Sherman tank site, was funded through local efforts and highlights the dual tragedies of the rehearsal, drawing veterans and families for its dedication ceremony. The site is also recognized within the U.S. National D-Day Memorial's commemorative framework in , which incorporates Exercise Tiger as a key element of D-Day preparation history. Annual remembrance services have been held at the Slapton Sands Sherman tank memorial since its dedication in 1984, organized by the Exercise Tiger Association and later supported by the Royal Tank Regiment Association, typically on the Sunday nearest April 28. These events include wreath-laying, readings of the honored dead, and attendance by survivors, families, and officials, fostering cross-Atlantic bonds between American and British communities. The 80th anniversary in 2024 featured expanded reunions of veterans and descendants at the memorial, with a service attended by U.S. and U.K. representatives, emphasizing the exercise's role in D-Day success despite its cost. The 81st anniversary in 2025 included a service at Slapton Sands on April 27 and various U.S. ceremonies, such as one in Audrain County, Missouri, on April 28. Official recognitions include plaques in churches, such as the one in Blackawton Church commemorating local involvement and the American losses, installed as part of post-war tributes to the region's wartime contributions. , the Exercise Tiger National Commemorative Foundation has facilitated resolutions, including a 1989 New Jersey state proclamation and a 1997 entry in the , acknowledging the victims and promoting education about the event. During the in 2020, traditional public ceremonies were curtailed, but the U.S. and foundation conducted adapted wreath-layings at sea and bases, with virtual elements to include remote participants in honoring the nearly 750 lost. Despite these efforts, awareness of Exercise Tiger remains limited internationally compared to D-Day itself, partly due to the event's initial secrecy, though ongoing advocacy by groups like the foundation continues to push for greater recognition, including potential heritage designations for Slapton Sands.

Depictions in Media

Exercise Tiger has been portrayed in various books that highlight its tragic elements and role as a precursor to the invasion. Ken Small's seminal 1988 work, The Forgotten Dead: Why 946 American Servicemen Died Off the Coast of in 1944 and the Man Who Discovered Their True Story, co-authored with Mark Rogerson, played a pivotal role in uncovering the event through Small's personal research and recovery of artifacts like a submerged from Slapton Sands. Another notable account, Exercise Tiger: The Dramatic True Story of a Hidden Tragedy of by Nigel Lewis (1990), draws on survivor testimonies and declassified documents to narrate the rehearsal's chaos and its suppression. Nigel Lewis's Channel Firing: Tragedy of Exercise Tiger (1989) examines the incident's human cost, emphasizing the loss of over 700 lives in a single night. Documentaries have brought Exercise Tiger to wider audiences, often focusing on its secrecy and lessons for D-Day. Channel 4's Secret History: D-Day Disaster (1998) explores the rehearsal's failures through archival footage and interviews, revealing how friendly fire and E-boat attacks led to heavy casualties. The Smithsonian Channel's America's Secret D-Day Disaster (2014), aired to mark the 70th anniversary, investigates the death toll—estimated at 749—and questions surrounding the cover-up, using veteran accounts and reenactments. More recently, the BBC's short film The Top Secret WW2 Disaster That Cost Hundreds of US Lives (2023) recounts the exercise's mishaps in a concise format, highlighting communication breakdowns during the Lyme Bay convoy. While major feature films like Saving Private Ryan (1998) depict D-Day's intensity without direct reference, extended editions and related discussions occasionally note Exercise Tiger as a grim prelude to Utah Beach landings. In other media, audio formats have sustained interest in the event. The podcast episode "Disaster Before D-Day: Exercise Tiger" from the Warfare podcast (2021) delves into the operational errors, drawing parallels to broader Allied preparations. Video games such as Call of Duty: WWII (2017) indirectly evoke rehearsal scenarios through D-Day missions, though without explicit mention of Exercise Tiger, underscoring its influence on portrayals of amphibious training risks. Public awareness of Exercise Tiger evolved from wartime secrecy, with minimal coverage until the when Small's investigations prompted and publications, leading to a surge in documentaries and commemorative works by the 1990s and 2000s. This trend continued into the 2020s, amplified by anniversary programming, though no major new depictions emerged in 2025 amid ongoing D-Day retrospectives.

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