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Natural rights and legal rights
Natural rights and legal rights
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Some philosophers distinguish two types of rights, natural rights and legal rights.[1]

  • Natural rights are those that are not dependent on the laws or customs of any particular culture or government, and so are universal, fundamental and inalienable (they cannot be repealed by human laws, though one can forfeit their enjoyment through one's actions, such as by violating someone else's rights). Natural law is the law of natural rights.
  • Legal rights are those bestowed onto a person by a given legal system (they can be modified, repealed, and restrained by human laws). The concept of positive law is related to the concept of legal rights.

Natural law first appeared in ancient Greek philosophy,[2] and was referred to by Roman philosopher Cicero. It was subsequently alluded to by Saint Paul,[3] and then developed in the Middle Ages by Catholic philosophers such as Albert the Great, his pupil Thomas Aquinas, and Jean Gerson in his 1402 work "De Vita Spirituali Animae."[4] During the Age of Enlightenment, the concept of natural laws was used to challenge the divine right of kings, and became an alternative justification for the establishment of a social contract, positive law, and government – and thus legal rights – in the form of classical republicanism. Conversely, the concept of natural rights is used by others to challenge the legitimacy of all such establishments.

The idea of human rights derives from theories of natural rights.[5] Those rejecting a distinction between human rights and natural rights view human rights as the successor that is not dependent on natural law, natural theology, or Christian theological doctrine.[5] Natural rights, in particular, are considered beyond the authority of any government or international body to dismiss. The 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights is an important statement of natural rights,[citation needed] but not legally binding on any member state unless its provisions are adopted into that state's laws.

Natural rights were traditionally viewed as exclusively negative rights,[6] whereas human rights also comprise positive rights.[7] Even on a natural rights conception of human rights, the two terms may not be synonymous.

Iusnaturalism, particularly, holds that legal norms follow a human universal knowledge. Thus, it views enacted laws that contradict such universal knowledge as unjust and illegitimate, but some jusnaturalists might attribute the source of natural law to a natural order instead of a divine mandate.[8][9]

The concept of natural rights is not universally accepted, partly due to its religious associations and perceived incoherence.[10] Some philosophers argue that natural rights do not exist and that legal rights are the only rights; for instance, Jeremy Bentham called natural rights "simple nonsense".[10]

History

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The idea that certain rights are natural or inalienable also has a history dating back at least to the Stoics of late Antiquity, through Catholic law of the early Middle Ages,[11] and descending through the Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment to today.[12]

The existence of natural rights has been asserted by different individuals on different premises, such as a priori philosophical reasoning or religious principles. For example, Immanuel Kant claimed to derive natural rights through reason alone. The United States Declaration of Independence, meanwhile, is based upon the "self-evident" truth that "all men are ... endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights".[13]

Likewise, different philosophers and statesmen have designed different lists of what they believe to be natural rights; almost all include the right to life and liberty as the two highest priorities. H. L. A. Hart argued that if there are any rights at all, there must be the right to liberty, for all the others would depend upon this. T. H. Green argued that "if there are such things as rights at all, then, there must be a right to life and liberty, or, to put it more properly to free life."[14] John Locke emphasized "life, liberty and property" as primary. However, despite Locke's influential defense of the right of revolution, Thomas Jefferson substituted "pursuit of happiness" in place of "property" in the United States Declaration of Independence.[15]

Ancient

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Stephen Kinzer, a veteran journalist for The New York Times and the author of the book All The Shah's Men, writes in the latter that:

The Zoroastrian religion taught Iranians that citizens have an inalienable right to enlightened leadership and that the duty of subjects is not simply to obey wise kings but also to rise up against those who are wicked. Leaders are seen as representative of God on earth, but they deserve allegiance only as long as they have farr, a kind of divine blessing that they must earn by moral behavior.

[16]

The 40 Principal Doctrines of the Epicureans taught that "in order to obtain protection from other men, any means for attaining this end is a natural good" (PD 6). They believed in a contractarian ethics where mortals agree to not harm or be harmed, and the rules that govern their agreements are not absolute (PD 33), but must change with circumstances (PD 37–38). The Epicurean doctrines imply that humans in their natural state enjoy personal sovereignty and that they must consent to the laws that govern them, and that this consent (and the laws) can be revisited periodically when circumstances change.[17]

The Stoics held that no one was a slave by nature; slavery was an external condition juxtaposed to the internal freedom of the soul (sui juris). Seneca the Younger wrote:

It is a mistake to imagine that slavery pervades a man's whole being; the better part of him is exempt from it: the body indeed is subjected and in the power of a master, but the mind is independent, and indeed is so free and wild, that it cannot be restrained even by this prison of the body, wherein it is confined.[18]

Of fundamental importance to the development of the idea of natural rights was the emergence of the idea of natural human equality. As the historian A.J. Carlyle notes: "There is no change in political theory so startling in its completeness as the change from the theory of Aristotle to the later philosophical view represented by Cicero and Seneca. ... We think that this cannot be better exemplified than with regard to the theory of the equality of human nature."[19] Charles H. McIlwain likewise observes that "the idea of the equality of men is the profoundest contribution of the Stoics to political thought" and that "its greatest influence is in the changed conception of law that in part resulted from it."[20] Cicero argues in De Legibus that "we are born for Justice, and that right is based, not upon opinions, but upon Nature."[21]

Modern

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One of the first Western thinkers to develop the contemporary idea of natural rights was French theologian Jean Gerson, whose 1402 treatise De Vita Spirituali Animae is considered one of the first attempts to develop what would come to be called modern natural rights theory.[22]

The Polish-Lithuanian union made a natural rights case at the Council of Constance (1414–1418), led by Paulus Vladimiri, rector of the Jagiellonian University. He challenged legality of the Teutonic Order's crusade against Lithuania, arguing that the Order could only wage a defensive war if pagans violated the natural rights of the Christians. Vladimiri further stipulated that infidels had rights which had to be respected, and neither the Pope nor the Holy Roman Emperor had the authority to violate them. Lithuanians also brought a group of Samogitian representatives to testify to atrocities committed by the Order.[23]

The Stoic doctrine that the "inner part cannot be delivered into bondage"[24] re-emerged centuries later in the Reformation doctrine of liberty of conscience. In 1523, Martin Luther wrote:

Furthermore, every man is responsible for his own faith, and he must see it for himself that he believes rightly. As little as another can go to hell or heaven for me, so little can he believe or disbelieve for me; and as little as he can open or shut heaven or hell for me, so little can he drive me to faith or unbelief. Since, then, belief or unbelief is a matter of everyone's conscience, and since this is no lessening of the secular power, the latter should be content and attend to its own affairs and permit men to believe one thing or another, as they are able and willing, and constrain no one by force.[25]

17th-century English philosopher John Locke discussed natural rights in his work, identifying them as being "life, liberty, and estate (property)", and argued that such fundamental rights could not be surrendered in the social contract. Preservation of the natural rights to life, liberty, and property was claimed as justification for the rebellion of the American colonies. As George Mason stated in his draft for the Virginia Declaration of Rights, "all men are born equally free", and hold "certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity."[26] Another 17th-century Englishman, John Lilburne (known as Freeborn John), who came into conflict with both the monarchy of King Charles I and the military dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell, argued for level human basic rights he called "freeborn rights" which he defined as being rights that every human being is born with, as opposed to rights bestowed by government or by human law[citation needed].

The distinction between alienable and unalienable rights was introduced by Francis Hutcheson. In his Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), Hutcheson foreshadowed the Declaration of Independence, stating: "For wherever any Invasion is made upon unalienable Rights, there must arise either a perfect, or external Right to Resistance. ... Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations in all Governments." Hutcheson, however, placed clear limits on his notion of unalienable rights, declaring that "there can be no Right, or Limitation of Right, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest public Good."[27] Hutcheson elaborated on this idea of unalienable rights in his A System of Moral Philosophy (1755), based on the Reformation principle of the liberty of conscience. One could not in fact give up the capacity for private judgment (e.g., about religious questions) regardless of any external contracts or oaths to religious or secular authorities so that right is "unalienable". Hutcheson wrote: "Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another; nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is contrary to his heart. The right of private judgment is therefore unalienable."[28]

In the German Enlightenment, Hegel gave a highly developed treatment of this inalienability argument. Like Hutcheson, Hegel based the theory of inalienable rights on the de facto inalienability of those aspects of personhood that distinguish persons from things. A thing, like a piece of property, can in fact be transferred from one person to another. According to Hegel, the same would not apply to those aspects that make one a person:

The right to what is in essence inalienable is imprescriptible, since the act whereby I take possession of my personality, of my substantive essence, and make myself a responsible being, capable of possessing rights and with a moral and religious life, takes away from these characteristics of mine just that externality which alone made them capable of passing into the possession of someone else. When I have thus annulled their externality, I cannot lose them through lapse of time or from any other reason drawn from my prior consent or willingness to alienate them.[29]

In discussion of social contract theory, "inalienable rights" were said to be those rights that could not be surrendered by citizens to the sovereign. Such rights were thought to be natural rights, independent of positive law. Some social contract theorists reasoned, however, that in the natural state only the strongest could benefit from their rights. Thus, people form an implicit social contract, ceding their natural rights to the authority to protect the people from abuse, and living henceforth under the legal rights of that authority[citation needed].

Many historical apologies for slavery and illiberal government were based on explicit or implicit voluntary contracts to alienate any "natural rights" to freedom and self-determination.[30] The de facto inalienability arguments of Hutcheson and his predecessors provided the basis for the anti-slavery movement to argue not simply against involuntary slavery but against any explicit or implied contractual forms of slavery. Any contract that tried to legally alienate such a right would be inherently invalid. Similarly, the argument was used by the democratic movement to argue against any explicit or implied social contracts of subjection (pactum subjectionis) by which a people would supposedly alienate their right of self-government to a sovereign as, for example, in Leviathan by Thomas Hobbes. According to Ernst Cassirer,

There is, at least, one right that cannot be ceded or abandoned: the right to personality...They charged the great logician [Hobbes] with a contradiction in terms. If a man could give up his personality he would cease being a moral being. ... There is no pactum subjectionis, no act of submission by which man can give up the state of free agent and enslave himself. For by such an act of renunciation he would give up that very character which constitutes his nature and essence: he would lose his humanity.[31]

These themes converged in the debate about American independence. While Jefferson was writing the Declaration of Independence, Welsh nonconformist Richard Price sided with the colonists' claim that King George III was "attempting to rob them of that liberty to which every member of society and all civil communities have a natural and unalienable title."[32]: 67  Price again based the argument on the de facto inalienability of "that principle of spontaneity or self-determination which constitutes us agents or which gives us a command over our actions, rendering them properly ours, and not effects of the operation of any foreign cause."[32]: 67–68  Any social contract or compact allegedly alienating these rights would be non-binding and void, wrote Price:

Neither can any state acquire such an authority over other states in virtue of any compacts or cessions. This is a case in which compacts are not binding. Civil liberty is, in this respect, on the same footing with religious liberty. As no people can lawfully surrender their religious liberty by giving up their right of judging for themselves in religion, or by allowing any human beings to prescribe to them what faith they shall embrace, or what mode of worship they shall practise, so neither can any civil societies lawfully surrender their civil liberty by giving up to any extraneous jurisdiction their power of legislating for themselves and disposing their property.[32]: 78–79 

Price raised a furor of opposition so in 1777 he wrote another tract that clarified his position and again restated the de facto basis for the argument that the "liberty of men as agents is that power of self-determination which all agents, as such, possess."[33] In Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism, Staughton Lynd pulled together these themes and related them to the slavery debate:

Then it turned out to make considerable difference whether one said slavery was wrong because every man has a natural right to the possession of his own body, or because every man has a natural right freely to determine his own destiny. The first kind of right was alienable: thus Locke neatly derived slavery from capture in war, whereby a man forfeited his labor to the conqueror who might lawfully have killed him; and thus Dred Scott was judged permanently to have given up his freedom. But the second kind of right, what Price called "that power of self-determination which all agents, as such, possess," was inalienable as long man remained man. Like the mind's quest for religious truth from which it was derived, self-determination was not a claim to ownership which might be both acquired and surrendered, but an inextricable aspect of the activity of being human.[34]

Meanwhile, in America, Thomas Jefferson "took his division of rights into alienable and unalienable from Hutcheson, who made the distinction popular and important",[35] and in the 1776 United States Declaration of Independence, famously condensed this to:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights...

In the 19th century, the movement to abolish slavery seized this passage as a statement of constitutional principle, although the U.S. constitution recognized and protected the institution of slavery. As a lawyer, future Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase argued before the Supreme Court in the case of John Van Zandt, who had been charged with violating the Fugitive Slave Act, that:

The law of the Creator, which invests every human being with an inalienable title to freedom, cannot be repealed by any interior law which asserts that man is property.

The concept of inalienable rights was criticized by Jeremy Bentham and Edmund Burke as groundless. Bentham and Burke claimed that rights arise from the actions of government, or evolve from tradition, and that neither of these can provide anything inalienable. (See Bentham's "Critique of the Doctrine of Inalienable, Natural Rights", and Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France). Presaging the shift in thinking in the 19th century, Bentham famously dismissed the idea of natural rights as "nonsense on stilts". By way of contrast to the views of Burke and Bentham, Patriot scholar and justice James Wilson criticized Burke's view as "tyranny".[36]

The signers of the Declaration of Independence deemed it a "self-evident truth" that all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights". In The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau claims that the existence of inalienable rights is unnecessary for the existence of a constitution or a set of laws and rights. This idea of a social contract – that rights and responsibilities are derived from a consensual contract between the government and the people – is the most widely recognized alternative.

One criticism of natural rights theory is that one cannot draw norms from facts.[37] This objection is variously expressed as the is-ought problem, the naturalistic fallacy, or the appeal to nature. G.E. Moore, for example, said that ethical naturalism falls prey to the naturalistic fallacy.[citation needed] Some defenders of natural rights theory, however, counter that the term "natural" in "natural rights" is contrasted with "artificial" rather than referring to nature. John Finnis, for example, contends that natural law and natural rights are derived from self-evident principles, not from speculative principles or from facts.[37]

There is also debate as to whether all rights are either natural or legal. Fourth president of the United States James Madison, while representing Virginia in the House of Representatives, believed that there are rights, such as trial by jury, that are social rights, arising neither from natural law nor from positive law (which are the basis of natural and legal rights respectively) but from the social contract from which a government derives its authority.[38]

Thomas Hobbes

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Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) included a discussion of natural rights in his moral and political philosophy. Hobbes' conception of natural rights extended from his conception of man in a "state of nature". Thus he argued that the essential natural (human) right was "to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in his own judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto." (Leviathan. 1, XIV)

Hobbes sharply distinguished this natural "liberty", from natural "laws", described generally as "a precept, or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving his life; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may best be preserved." (Leviathan. 1, XIV)

In his natural state, according to Hobbes, man's life consisted entirely of liberties and not at all of laws – "It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has the right to every thing; even to one another's body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man... of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily allow men to live." (Leviathan. 1, XIV)

This would lead inevitably to a situation known as the "war of all against all", in which human beings kill, steal and enslave others to stay alive, and due to their natural lust for "Gain", "Safety" and "Reputation". Hobbes reasoned that this world of chaos created by unlimited rights was highly undesirable, since it would cause human life to be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". As such, if humans wish to live peacefully they must give up most of their natural rights and create moral obligations to establish political and civil society. This is one of the earliest formulations of the theory of government known as the social contract.

Hobbes objected to the attempt to derive rights from "natural law", arguing that law ("lex") and right ("jus") though often confused, signify opposites, with law referring to obligations, while rights refer to the absence of obligations. Since by our (human) nature, we seek to maximize our well being, rights are prior to law, natural or institutional, and people will not follow the laws of nature without first being subjected to a sovereign power, without which all ideas of right and wrong are meaningless – "Therefore before the names of Just and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants..., to make good that Propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of the Commonwealth." (Leviathan. 1, XV)

This marked an important departure from medieval natural law theories which gave precedence to obligations over rights.

John Locke

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John Locke, "Life, Liberty, Estate (property)"

John Locke (1632–1704) was another prominent Western philosopher who conceptualized rights as natural and inalienable. Like Hobbes, Locke believed in a natural right to life, liberty, and property. It was once conventional wisdom that Locke greatly influenced the American Revolution with his writings of natural rights, but this claim has been the subject of protracted dispute in recent decades. For example, the historian Ray Forrest Harvey declared that Jefferson and Locke were at "two opposite poles" in their political philosophy, as evidenced by Jefferson's use in the Declaration of Independence of the phrase "pursuit of happiness" instead of "property".[39] More recently, the eminent[40] legal historian John Phillip Reid has deplored contemporary scholars' "misplaced emphasis on John Locke", arguing that American revolutionary leaders saw Locke as a commentator on established constitutional principles.[41][42] Thomas Pangle has defended Locke's influence on the Founding, claiming that historians who argue to the contrary either misrepresent the classical republican alternative to which they say the revolutionary leaders adhered, do not understand Locke, or point to someone else who was decisively influenced by Locke.[43] This position has also been sustained by Michael Zuckert.[44][45][46]

According to Locke, there are three natural rights:

  • Life: everyone is entitled to live.[47]
  • Liberty: everyone is entitled to do anything they want to so long as it does not conflict with the first right.
  • Estate: everyone is entitled to own all they create or gain through gift or trade so long as it does not conflict with the first two rights.

In developing his concept of natural rights, Locke was influenced by reports of society among Native Americans, whom he regarded as natural peoples who lived in a "state of liberty" and perfect freedom, but "not a state of license".[48] It also informed his conception of social contract. Although he does not say so explicitly, his position implies that even in light of our unique characteristics we should not be treated differently by our neighbors or our rulers. "Locke is arguing that there is no natural characteristic sufficient to distinguish one person from another... of course, there are plenty of natural differences between us" (Haworth 103).[49] What Haworth takes from Locke is that John Locke was obsessed with supporting equality in society, treating everyone as an equal. He does though highlight our differences with his philosophy showing that we are all unique and important to society. In his philosophy, it is highlighted that the ideal government should also protect everyone, and provide rights and freedom to everyone, because we are all important to society. His ideas then were developed into the movements for freedom from the British creating our government. However, his implied thought of freedom for all is applied most heavily in our culture today. Starting with the civil rights movement, and continuing through women's rights, Locke's call for a fair government can be seen as the influence in these movements. His ideas are typically just seen as the foundation for modern democracy; however, it is not unreasonable to credit Locke with the social activism throughout the history of America.

By founding this sense of freedom for all, Locke was laying the groundwork for the equality that occurs today. Despite the apparent misuse of his philosophy in early American democracy. The Civil Rights movement and the suffrage movement both called out the state of American democracy during their challenges to the government's view on equality. To them it was clear that when the designers of democracy said all, they meant all people shall receive those natural rights that John Locke cherished so deeply. "a state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another" (Locke II,4).[50] Locke in his papers on natural philosophy clearly states that he wants a government where all are treated equal in freedoms especially. "Locke's views on toleration were very progressive for the time" (Connolly).[51] Authors such as Jacob Connolly confirm that to them Locke was highly ahead of his time with all this progressive thinking. That is that his thought fits our current state of democracy where we strive to make sure that everyone has a say in the government, and everyone has a chance at a good life. Regardless of race, gender, or social standing starting with Locke it was made clear not only that the government should provide rights, but rights to everyone through his social contract.[52]

The social contract is an agreement between members of a country to live within a shared system of laws. Specific forms of government are the result of the decisions made by these persons acting in their collective capacity. Government is instituted to make laws that protect the three natural rights. If a government does not properly protect these rights, it can be overthrown.[53]

Thomas Paine

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Thomas Paine

Thomas Paine (1731–1809) further elaborated on natural rights in his influential work Rights of Man (1791),[54] emphasizing that rights cannot be granted by any charter because this would legally imply they can also be revoked and under such circumstances, they would be reduced to privileges:

It is a perversion of terms to say that a charter gives rights. It operates by a contrary effect – that of taking rights away. Rights are inherently in all the inhabitants; but charters, by annulling those rights, in the majority, leave the right, by exclusion, in the hands of a few. ... They ... consequently are instruments of injustice. The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.

American individualist anarchists

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Benjamin Tucker

While at first American individualist anarchists adhered to natural rights positions, later in this era led by Benjamin Tucker, some abandoned natural rights positions and converted to Max Stirner's Egoist anarchism. Rejecting the idea of moral rights, Tucker said there were only two rights: "the right of might" and "the right of contract".[55] He also said, after converting to Egoist individualism, "In times past... it was my habit to talk glibly of the right of man to land. It was a bad habit, and I long ago sloughed it off. ... Man's only right to land is his might over it."[56]

According to Wendy McElroy:

In adopting Stirnerite egoism (1886), Tucker rejected natural rights which had long been considered the foundation of libertarianism. This rejection galvanized the movement into fierce debates, with the natural rights proponents accusing the egoists of destroying libertarianism itself. So bitter was the conflict that a number of natural rights proponents withdrew from the pages of Liberty in protest even though they had hitherto been among its frequent contributors. Thereafter, Liberty championed egoism although its general content did not change significantly.[57]

Several periodicals were "undoubtedly influenced by Liberty's presentation of egoism, including I published by C.L. Swartz, edited by W.E. Gordak and J.W. Lloyd (all associates of Liberty); The Ego and The Egoist, both of which were edited by Edward H. Fulton. Among the egoist papers that Tucker followed were the German Der Eigene, edited by Adolf Brand, and The Eagle and The Serpent, issued from London. The latter, the most prominent English-language egoist journal, was published from 1898 to 1900 with the subtitle 'A Journal of Egoistic Philosophy and Sociology'".[57] Among those American anarchists who adhered to egoism include Benjamin Tucker, John Beverley Robinson, Steven T. Byington, Hutchins Hapgood, James L. Walker, Victor Yarros and E.H. Fulton.[57]

Leo Strauss: Critique & Defense of Natural Right

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Leo Strauss defends natural right against German critiques of a sort that pave the way to the Third Reich in his Walgreen lectures and in later works[58] also entering into a debate with the Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt on related issues.[59] His concern echoes Locke’s fear of the war-of-all-against-all. His defense is multi-faceted and his primary thesis remains largely implicit—without an operative defense of Natural Right society will disintegrate and nihilisms of the sort that gave rise to the Third Reich will predominate.[58] Effectively: Natural Right may be repealed in practice yet what remains will not transcend but rather fall short of any organization that could properly be considered ‘social,’ or 'human'--in which the notion of freedom would be rendered meaningless. Whether or not the argument for Natural Right is plausible in an absolutely decisive or purely formal sense it will nevertheless motivate a sufficiently popular self-defense of liberalism against the (equally false or contingent) transcendentalism of fascism, thought Leo Strauss.[59] Incomplete according to its formal contingency or dependence on popular behavior, Strauss’s argument remains permanently open until such time as liberalism is impracticable or becomes indefensible—seemingly (arguably) supported by the supremacy of liberal republicanism (or representative democratic capitalism) in geopolitics in the later phases of the 20th century, but potentially falling with the failure of the same.

Contemporary

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Many documents now echo the phrase used in the United States Declaration of Independence. The preamble to the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that rights are inalienable: "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." Article 1, § 1 of the California Constitution recognizes inalienable rights and articulated some (not all) of those rights as "defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." However, there is still much dispute over which "rights" are truly natural rights and which are not, and the concept of natural or inalienable rights is still controversial to some.[citation needed]

Erich Fromm argued that some powers over human beings could be wielded only by God, and that if there were no God, no human beings could wield these powers.[60]

Contemporary political philosophies continuing the classical liberal tradition of natural rights include libertarianism, anarcho-capitalism and Objectivism, and include amongst their canon the works of authors such as Robert Nozick, Ayn Rand[61] and Murray Rothbard.[62] A libertarian view of inalienable rights is laid out in Morris and Linda Tannehill's The Market for Liberty, which claims that a man has a right to ownership over his life and therefore also his property, because he has invested time (i.e. part of his life) in it and thereby made it an extension of his life. However, if he initiates force against and to the detriment of another man, he alienates himself from the right to that part of his life which is required to pay his debt: "Rights are not inalienable, but only the possessor of a right can alienate himself from that right – no one else can take a man's rights from him."[63]

Various definitions of inalienability include non-relinquishability, non-salability, and non-transferability.[64] This concept has been recognized by libertarians as being central to the question of voluntary slavery, which Murray Rothbard dismissed as illegitimate and even self-contradictory.[65] Stephan Kinsella argues that "viewing rights as alienable is perfectly consistent with – indeed, implied by – the libertarian non-aggression principle. Under this principle, only the initiation of force is prohibited; defensive, restitutive, or retaliatory force is not."[66]

Various philosophers have created different lists of rights they consider to be natural. Proponents of natural rights, in particular Hesselberg and Rothbard, have responded that reason can be applied to separate truly axiomatic rights from supposed rights, stating that any principle that requires itself to be disproved is an axiom. Critics have pointed to the lack of agreement between the proponents as evidence for the claim that the idea of natural rights is merely a political tool.

Hugh Gibbons has proposed a descriptive argument based on human biology. His contention is that human beings were other-regarding as a matter of necessity, to avoid the costs of conflict. Over time they developed expectations that individuals would act in certain ways which were then prescribed by society (duties of care etc.) and that eventually crystallized into actionable rights.[67]

Philosopher Alex Naileg argues that if biological parents have parental responsibility towards their born children, then abortion rights entail that persons capable of becoming pregnant have the right to relinquish their future parental responsibility; however, the biological fathers of their born children do not have the same right to relinquish their future parental responsibility, thereby violating equality of rights. Thus, under these premises biologically different people have different rights.[68] The argument extends to natural rights if someone maintains that the right to bodily autonomy is a natural right.

Catholic Church

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The Catholic Church considers natural law a dogma. The Church considers that: "The natural law expresses the original moral sense which enables man to discern by reason the good and the evil, the truth and the lie: 'The natural law is written and engraved in the soul of each and every man, because it is human reason ordaining him to do good and forbidding him to sin . . . But this command of human reason would not have the force of law if it were not the voice and interpreter of a higher reason to which our spirit and our freedom must be submitted.'"[69] The natural law consists, for the Catholic Church, of one supreme and universal principle from which are derived all our natural moral obligations or duties. Thomas Aquinas resumes the various ideas of Catholic moral thinkers about what this principle is: since good is what primarily falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, the supreme principle of moral action must have the good as its central idea, and therefore the supreme principle is that good is to be done and evil avoided.[70]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Natural rights and legal rights constitute a fundamental distinction in political and legal , wherein natural rights are moral entitlements inherent to individuals by virtue of their , existing prior to and independently of any governmental authority, while legal rights are those established, recognized, and enforceable through positive laws created by human institutions. Natural rights theory posits that such rights—classically including protections for life, liberty, and property—derive from rational and the requirements of human agency, serving as the ethical foundation upon which legitimate governments are formed to protect rather than originate them. In contrast, legal rights vary across jurisdictions and can expand, contract, or even conflict with natural rights depending on legislative or judicial enactments, as seen in historical shifts from absolute monarchies to constitutional limits on power. The doctrine of natural rights gained prominence through thinkers like , who argued in his Second Treatise of Government that individuals in the possess equal rights to enforce the law of nature against transgressors, necessitating to better secure these pre-existing entitlements. This framework influenced foundational documents such as the U.S. Declaration of Independence, which asserted that governments derive just powers from the to safeguard unalienable rights. Legal rights, however, rooted in , emphasize the sovereignty of enacted law over moral derivation, allowing for rights like voting or welfare benefits that lack universal moral grounding but arise from societal compact or statute. Debates persist over the ontological basis of natural rights—whether grounded in divine endowment, rational deduction from human , or empirical observation of societal stability—contrasted against critiques from utilitarians and positivists who view rights as conventional artifacts lacking independent validity. from regime changes and rights violations suggests that disregard for natural rights correlates with increased conflict and reduced human flourishing, underscoring their causal role in stable orders beyond mere legal fiat.

Core Concepts

Natural Rights

Natural rights are entitlements that individuals hold inherently due to their , existing prior to and independently of any governmental or societal institutions. These rights derive from , discernible through human reason, and are not contingent on legal enactment or cultural norms. They are often described as universal, applying to all persons regardless of time or place, and inalienable, meaning they cannot be legitimately surrendered or transferred. In the philosophical tradition, natural rights emphasize individual claims against interference, contrasting with duties imposed by natural law. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government published in 1689, articulated the foundational triad of natural rights as life, liberty, and property, asserting that these stem from the state of nature where individuals are free and equal. Locke argued that in this pre-political condition, the law of nature—understood as reason—prohibits harm to another's life, liberty, health, or possessions, thereby grounding these rights as protections against aggression. Governments, per Locke, form through consent to secure these rights more effectively, but their legitimacy depends on not infringing them. The concept posits that natural rights provide a standard for evaluating , where legal systems that violate them lack full authority. Empirical observation supports this through historical instances where recognition of such rights correlated with resistance to tyrannical rule, as in the English of 1689, influenced by Lockean ideas. While interpretations vary, the core assertion remains that these rights are not creations of the state but preconditions for just governance, rooted in the causal reality of human agency and . Legal rights are entitlements or protections explicitly created and delimited by , including statutes, constitutions, judicial precedents, and administrative regulations within a specific . These rights derive their authority from the enacting legal institutions rather than from any pre-existing moral or natural order, allowing them to be modified, expanded, or abolished through subsequent legislative or judicial action. For example, classified such rights as arising from obligations imposed by coercive laws, where the right holder's entitlement correlates directly to duties enforced by the state. Unlike inherent claims, legal rights are inherently conventional and vary across societies and eras, reflecting the priorities of ruling authorities; they may codify protections against interference (e.g., liberties) or mandate affirmative actions (e.g., entitlements to services). Enforcement relies on state mechanisms such as courts, police, and sanctions, providing remedies like monetary damages, injunctions, or criminal penalties for breaches. In modern contexts, the U.S. established legal rights against based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, enforceable through federal agencies and litigation. Similarly, the created legal entitlements to non-discriminatory and access, addressing historical barriers via federal oversight, though portions were invalidated by the in 2013 on grounds of outdated coverage formulas. Philosophically, legal rights align with positivist traditions emphasizing law's separation from morality; their validity stems from formal sources like sovereign commands or social rules of recognition, not ethical justification. This contingency enables legal systems to grant rights absent in others—for instance, constitutional immunities from warrantless searches in the U.S. Fourth Amendment, absent in jurisdictions without analogous provisions. Critics, including natural rights advocates, argue that unjust legal rights (e.g., historical entitlements to own slaves under Roman or antebellum U.S. ) lack moral legitimacy, underscoring legal rights' dependence on institutional power rather than universal principles.

Key Distinctions and Implications

Theoretical Foundations

The theoretical foundations of natural rights emphasize their derivation from or a higher moral order, independent of governmental creation. Proponents argue these rights exist in a pre-political , where individuals possess inherent entitlements to protect their existence and pursue their ends. , in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), posited that natural rights to , , and property stem from , discernible through reason, and that forms to safeguard rather than originate them. This framework implies that governments hold authority conditionally, forfeiting legitimacy if they infringe upon these foundational entitlements. In contrast, the foundations of legal rights rest on , enacted by human authorities and enforceable through institutional mechanisms. , emerging prominently in the , asserts that rights acquire validity solely from their recognition within a legal system, detached from moral or natural preconditions. John Austin's command theory, outlined in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), defines law as sovereign commands backed by sanctions, rendering legal rights artifacts of political power rather than universal imperatives. This separation allows for variability across jurisdictions, where rights expand or contract based on legislative will, without reference to extrinsic ethical standards. The distinction carries profound implications for legitimacy and enforcement: natural rights theory critiques unjust laws as void, prioritizing moral evaluation over mere positivity, whereas upholds systemic obedience to maintain order, even amid ethical disputes. This tension manifests in debates over constitutional limits, where natural rights advocates invoke higher laws to constrain , while positivists emphasize procedural validity. Empirical observations of rights abuses under authoritarian regimes underscore the risks of unanchored , as seen in 20th-century totalitarian legal systems that codified violations without moral recoil. Conversely, natural rights' reliance on contested interpretations of invites subjective applications, potentially undermining uniform legal predictability.

Governance and Societal Impacts

The concept of natural rights has profoundly shaped governance by establishing the primary purpose of government as the protection of inherent individual liberties, such as life, liberty, and property, rather than as an unlimited sovereign entity. This framework, drawn from thinkers like , posits that governments derive legitimacy from the and exist to secure these pre-political rights, leading to constitutional structures that limit state power through mechanisms like and checks and balances. In contrast, legal rights, being creations of , allow governments greater flexibility to define, expand, or curtail entitlements based on legislative majorities, potentially enabling shifts toward expansive authority without recourse to enduring natural limits. In the American founding, natural rights directly influenced governance by justifying rebellion against perceived violations of these liberties, as articulated in the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776, which declared that governments institute to secure unalienable rights and can be altered when destructive of those ends. The U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1788, and the Bill of Rights, added in 1791, operationalized this by enumerating protections against government overreach, such as prohibitions on unreasonable searches and guarantees of free speech, reflecting Founding-era understandings that natural rights were regulable for the public good but not absolute trumps on legislative authority. Legal rights, however, manifested in statutory laws and judicial precedents that could evolve, sometimes conflicting with natural rights principles, as seen in debates over sedition laws where legislative balancing of and order prevailed over rigid prohibitions. Societally, adherence to natural rights fosters individual agency and responsibility by emphasizing negative liberties—freedoms from interference—that encourage self-reliance and innovation, underpinning economic prosperity in systems prioritizing and limited intervention. This contrasts with legal rights frameworks that increasingly incorporate positive entitlements, such as to or healthcare, which expand governmental roles and can cultivate dependency, as evidenced in the shift from the U.S. Founders' faculties-based rights to the ' 1948 encompassing 30 articles of needs-based claims. While natural rights provide a stable moral benchmark restraining societal excesses, legal rights' malleability risks majoritarian tyranny, though they enable adaptive responses to collective needs when aligned with natural foundations.

Historical Development

Ancient and Medieval Roots

In , precursors to the distinction between natural and legal rights appeared in 's conception of justice in the (c. 350 BCE), where he differentiated —universal principles inherent to and unchanging across societies—from legal justice, which varies by convention and within specific communities. argued that , akin to the natural superiority of the right hand over the left, holds everywhere by virtue of its alignment with human , while legal justice depends on enacted statutes that can differ, such as penalties for currency counterfeiting tailored to local customs. This framework laid groundwork for viewing certain moral obligations as derived from nature rather than arbitrary human decree, though emphasized among unequals rather than individual entitlements. The Stoic school, originating with (c. 334–262 BCE), advanced as a rational, cosmic order governing all humanity, positing that divine reason (logos) embeds universal moral precepts accessible through human intellect, transcending particular legal systems. Stoics like viewed this law as eternal and binding, equating right action with living according to nature, which implied duties like justice and piety inherent to all rational beings, independent of civic statutes. In Roman adaptation, (106–43 BCE) synthesized Stoic ideas in , defining true law as "right reason in agreement with nature," universal, immutable, and equivalent to divine will, which validates or invalidates human laws; he contrasted this with variable positive laws of states, asserting that unjust statutes, like tyrannical edicts, lack true legal force. Roman jurisprudence formalized this in the ius naturale (principles common to humans and animals, extended to rational equity) versus ius civile (rights and duties under civil law, such as via , c. 450 BCE), with ius gentium bridging universal norms and state-specific rules in praetorian edicts. Medieval thinkers, particularly (1225–1274 CE), integrated Aristotelian and Stoic-Roman with in the (1265–1274), positing as rational creatures' participation in eternal divine law, directing humans toward goods like and sociality through (innate moral knowledge). Aquinas held that human (positive) law derives legitimacy only insofar as it conforms to , rendering tyrannical or immoral statutes invalid, as in his example that commands to kill innocents contradict natural precepts against murder. This subordinated legal rights—codified in (e.g., Gratian's Decretum, c. 1140 CE) or revived Roman civil law via Justinian's (529–534 CE)—to higher natural principles, emphasizing that rights to life, procreation, and knowledge-seeking stem from God's rational order rather than mere enactment. Medieval feudal customs and manorial rights exemplified legal constructs, often conflicting with natural equity, as seen in ecclesiastical challenges to secular overreach.

Enlightenment and Early Modern Thinkers

Early modern thinkers laid foundational distinctions between natural rights, inherent to and discoverable through reason, and legal rights, which derive from positive laws enacted by states. , in (1625), advanced a secular theory positing that rights stem from rational principles applicable even "if we concede that there is no God," emphasizing and sociability as bases for obligations among individuals and nations. , building on Grotius in De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672), framed natural rights within a system of moral duties derived from human sociability, where individuals possess rights to and as preconditions for , contrasting these with civil rights enforced by sovereign authority. Thomas Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651), defined the natural right as the liberty of each person to use their power for self-preservation in the state of nature, where no enforceable moral constraints exist beyond this instinct, leading to a "war of all against all." He argued that legal rights emerge only through the social contract, whereby individuals surrender most natural liberties to an absolute sovereign, retaining only the inalienable right against direct self-destruction, thus subordinating natural rights to the legal order for peace. This absolutist view prioritized legal rights as the practical realization of minimal natural self-preservation, influencing later debates on state authority over inherent claims. John Locke, in Two Treatises of Government (1689), countered Hobbes by specifying natural rights to life, liberty, and property as God-given and rationally discernible under natural law, which prohibits harm to others' persons or possessions in the state of nature. Governments, formed by consent, exist to secure these rights via legal protections; if they fail, individuals retain the natural right to dissolve tyrannical regimes, establishing legal rights as derivative and conditional upon upholding natural ones. Locke's framework emphasized property as arising from labor mixed with unowned resources, a claim independent of civil law. Enlightenment figures like extended these ideas institutionally. In The Spirit of the Laws (1748), he advocated separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers to safeguard political liberty—a natural right against arbitrary rule—ensuring legal rights align with rational limits on rather than unchecked . This mechanism aimed to prevent the conflation of natural and legal rights under , promoting moderated monarchies or republics where positive laws reflect underlying natural principles of moderation and justice.

Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Evolutions

In the nineteenth century, natural rights theory faced significant challenges from utilitarian and positivist thinkers who prioritized empirical utility and sovereign commands over abstract moral entitlements. , in works such as his 1789 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation and later writings, derided natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts," arguing that rights derive solely from enacted by the state to maximize happiness, not from pre-political moral claims. This critique gained traction amid industrialization and reform movements, where natural rights were seen as impediments to progressive legislation, contributing to a in their acceptance within British political discourse by the mid-century. John Austin's 1832 The Province of Jurisprudence Determined advanced by defining law as commands backed by sovereign threats, explicitly severing it from or moral foundations, which implied that legal rights exist independently of any inherent human entitlements. This framework influenced jurisprudence across Europe and the , emphasizing enacted statutes over customary or deduced rights, as seen in the codification efforts like the French Civil Code's expansions and Britain's parliamentary reforms, where legal rights were increasingly viewed as malleable tools for social engineering rather than reflections of immutable natural principles. The twentieth century witnessed a partial revival of natural rights discourse, spurred by the moral vacuums exposed in totalitarian regimes, where positivist separation of law from ethics enabled atrocities like those under , prompting critiques that unmoored legal systems lacked safeguards against injustice. Post-World War II, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) articulated a catalog of fundamental protections, drawing rhetorical parallels to natural rights through phrases like "inherent dignity" and freedoms from arbitrary interference, yet it incorporated positive entitlements such as rights to social security and , marking a shift toward state-obligated welfare provisions rather than strictly negative liberties. Philosophers like and contributed to this resurgence by grounding rights in objective human goods and practical reason, countering positivism's dominance in legal theory, as evidenced in Finnis's 1980 Natural Law and Natural Rights, which reframed natural rights as derived from basic human flourishing rather than abstract . Meanwhile, legal rights proliferated through international covenants and domestic welfare states, such as the (1950), which imposed enforceable obligations on governments, blurring lines with natural rights by embedding moral claims into binding treaties, though critics noted this expansion diluted the original emphasis on individual against state overreach. This evolution reflected causal pressures from global conflicts and ideological contests, where natural rights served as a bulwark against collectivism, yet legal frameworks often subordinated them to utilitarian or egalitarian priorities.

Philosophical Traditions

Natural Law and Thomistic Influences

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), in his Summa Theologica (composed circa 1265–1274), systematized natural law as the rational creature's participation in the eternal law, defined as God's providential governance of creation through intellect. This eternal law manifests in human affairs via natural law, accessible through practical reason (synderesis), which discerns universal precepts binding all people regardless of civil authority or revelation. The foundational axiom is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided," yielding derivative norms like the injunctions against homicide, adultery, and theft, derived syllogistically from human inclinations toward self-preservation, societal living, and rational inquiry. Aquinas integrated Aristotelian teleology with Christian theology, positing that human nature's ends—such as life, reproduction within marriage, and knowledge of God—impose objective moral obligations, rendering laws contrary to these precepts defective or non-binding as "perversions of law." In Thomistic thought, natural law grounds duties correlative to human goods, implying protections against interference that thwart natural ends; for instance, the precept preserving life entails a prohibition on unjust killing, foundational to claims of self-defense and bodily integrity. This duty-rights structure influenced natural rights discourse by establishing pre-political moral constraints on rulers: just positive laws must align with natural law for legitimacy, as "an unjust law is no law at all," a dictum Aquinas drew from Augustine and . Unlike voluntarist views emphasizing divine command, roots normativity in reason's grasp of essences, avoiding arbitrariness and providing a causal basis for rights as participatory in divine order rather than mere conventions. Thomistic natural law profoundly shaped subsequent rights theories, bridging medieval scholasticism to modern formulations; Enlightenment figures like John Locke echoed its emphasis on reason-derived rights to life and property, though secularizing the divine telos. Twentieth-century neo-Thomists, such as Jacques Maritain (1882–1973), adapted it to affirm inherent human dignity and rights in documents like the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arguing that natural law's objective goods underpin universal claims without relativism. John Finnis's contemporary restatement aligns Thomistic basic goods (e.g., knowledge, friendship) with rights as participatory in communal flourishing, countering positivist denials of moral foundations for law. Critics note Thomism's theocentric orientation may subordinate individual rights to common good, yet its insistence on reason's universality sustains defenses against cultural subjectivism in rights adjudication.

Individualist and Anarchist Perspectives

Individualist perspectives emphasize as the axiomatic foundation of natural rights, positing that each person inherently controls their body and the fruits of their labor, independent of societal or governmental conferral. This view holds that legal rights derive legitimacy only insofar as they reflect these pre-existing natural entitlements to life, liberty, and property; any statute contradicting them represents illegitimate . articulated this in his 1882 work Natural Law; or the Science of Justice, defining as the recognition of individuals' equal claims to their persons and possessions, thereby invalidating all legislation purporting to override such claims as an "assumed right to abolish outright all the natural rights" of others. Spooner distinguished "crimes"—infringements on others' rights—from mere "vices," which harm only the actor and thus fall outside rightful legal prohibition. Anarchist thinkers in the individualist tradition radicalize this by denying the state's capacity to enforce natural rights without monopolistic aggression, advocating voluntary associations for defense and adjudication instead. Spooner rejected constitutional authority as a fiction, arguing that no compact can bind non-consenting parties or delegate rights over others' liberty, rendering legal rights under government as presumptive usurpations unless proven consensual. Benjamin Tucker, through his journal Liberty (1881–1908), initially rooted individualist anarchism in natural rights against state and capitalist privileges like land monopolies and patents, which he saw as distortions of equal exchange. Later influenced by Max Stirner, Tucker pivoted to "equal liberty"—the maxim that liberty consists in not invading others' equal sphere—effectively supplanting strict natural rights with a pragmatic egoism, while still opposing legal rights as state-imposed inequalities. This individualist anarchist framework contrasts with collectivist variants, which subordinate personal claims to communal welfare and often dismiss natural rights as bourgeois illusions lacking empirical grounding in social interdependence. Individualists counter that true cooperation arises from uncoerced contracts, not enforced collectivity, preserving natural rights through market-based mutual aid agencies. Modern extensions, such as Murray Rothbard's , formalize via principles—unowned resources become property through first use—and the non-aggression axiom, prohibiting initiated force; here, legal rights evaporate into contractual obligations adjudicated by private courts, with the state exposed as the paramount rights violator through taxation and regulation. Rothbard's The Ethics of Liberty (1982) derives these from rational argumentation ethics, where asserting claims presupposes , rendering state sovereignty ethically baseless. Empirical historical precedents, like medieval Irish túatha systems of competing , illustrate decentralized rights protection without centralized legal monopoly, though scalability critiques persist absent rigorous data on modern analogs.

Positivist Rejection of Natural Rights

Legal positivism maintains that the validity and content of law derive solely from social facts, such as legislative enactments or sovereign commands, rather than from any antecedent moral or natural order. This separation thesis, central to the doctrine, implies that rights, including those posited as natural, possess no independent existence outside ; they emerge only when recognized and enforced by human authorities. Positivists contend that invoking natural rights conflates descriptive analysis of law with normative evaluation, leading to confusion between what law is and what it ought to be. Jeremy Bentham, a foundational positivist, dismissed natural rights as metaphysical fiction, famously labeling them "simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts." In his 1796 essay "Anarchical Fallacies," Bentham critiqued the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen for grounding rights in abstract declarations of nature, arguing that such claims lacked empirical basis and served only to justify against established legal orders. He insisted that , measured by the greatest happiness principle, should guide legislation, rendering pre-legal "rights" superfluous and potentially anarchic, as they empower individuals to override sovereign will without accountability. John Austin extended this rejection by defining law strictly as the command of a backed by sanctions, excluding any or derivation. In his 1832 work The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Austin argued that positive law's essence lies in its coercive enforcement by a habitual obedience-commanding , not in alignment with putative entitlements. Consequently, rights hold no jurisprudential force unless incorporated into such commands; to treat them as binding independently invites judicial overreach and undermines . Later positivists like refined these views while upholding the core divorce of law from morality. Hart's The Concept of Law posits law as a union of primary rules (obligations) and secondary rules (recognition, change, ), determined by social acceptance rather than natural validity criteria. Though Hart acknowledged a "minimum content of " in law's survival-oriented rules (e.g., prohibiting violence), he rejected natural rights as inherent limits on legal validity, maintaining that even immoral laws remain law if socially validated. This framework critiques natural rights theories for imposing unverifiable moral preconditions on law, prioritizing analytical clarity over substantive justice claims. Positivism's emphasis on observable sources thus renders natural rights legally inert until positivized, exposing them to potential override by utilitarian or sovereign imperatives.

Defenses Against Positivism

Defenses of natural rights against emphasize that rights derive from inherent and moral principles antecedent to , rather than solely from state enactment or social facts. Proponents argue that positivism's separation thesis—which holds that law's existence and content depend only on social sources without necessary moral validity—fails to account for law's essential purpose of promoting justice and human flourishing, rendering it incapable of critiquing profoundly unjust regimes. For instance, theorists contend that statutes enabling atrocities, such as those under the Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945, retain no claim to obligatory force if they contravene fundamental moral norms like the prohibition on retrospective criminalization or the requirement for general, prospective rules. A central defense arises from the Hart-Fuller debate of 1958, where Lon L. Fuller challenged H.L.A. Hart's positivist framework by asserting an "inner morality of law" comprising eight procedural desiderata—generality, publicity, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, capacity for compliance, stability, and congruence between rules and official action—that any system must minimally satisfy to qualify as law rather than mere coercion. Fuller maintained that these principles embody a moral dimension intrinsic to law's efficacy, as evidenced by the failure of arbitrary or secret edicts in regimes like Nazi Germany, where over 90% of pre-1933 laws were repealed or amended by 1938, undermining legal predictability and fidelity. In contrast to positivism's allowance for "law" without such restraints, this view posits that natural rights, such as to due process and non-arbitrary governance, impose a substantive moral filter, ensuring law serves human dignity rather than enabling tyranny. Hart countered that morality is external to law's identification, but critics note this permits obedience to immoral commands, as in the 1942 German court rulings upholding retroactive penalties under positivist validity criteria. John Finnis further bolsters this critique by arguing that legal positivism is incoherent in its reduction of law to social facts, ignoring the "focal meaning" of law as an instrument for coordinating human goods like life, knowledge, and justice, which presupposes natural rights grounded in practical reason. In his 1980 work Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis contends that while positive law can incorporate natural rights, positivism's exclusion of moral evaluation from law's essence fails to explain why unjust "laws" lack full authority, as seen in historical failures like apartheid South Africa's legal system from 1948 to 1994, where racial classifications contradicted universal human equality. Finnis reconciles elements of positivism—such as law's social origination—with natural law by affirming that true legal obligation arises only when rules align with moral reasoning, thus defending natural rights' primacy without denying empirical legal practices. This approach counters positivist claims of neutrality by demonstrating that detached social-fact theories cannot justify law's normative force, which empirically correlates with moral legitimacy in stable societies. Empirical and causal arguments reinforce these defenses: societies enforcing rights solely as positive grants, absent natural foundations, exhibit higher instability, as quantified in studies of post-colonial legal transplants where imported positivist codes without moral anchoring led to legitimacy crises, such as in African states with rule-of-law indices below 0.4 on the scale. Natural rights advocates thus maintain that positivism's denial of pre-positive entitlements undermines causal mechanisms for accountability, permitting legislators to erode through formal validity alone, whereas ensures rights like property and persist as critiques of defective .

Major Debates and Controversies

Grounding and Justification Issues

The grounding of natural rights, understood as entitlements inherent to human beings independent of governmental or societal grant, has long been a central philosophical challenge, distinct from legal rights whose validity derives from enacted laws or conventions. Proponents argue that such rights must be anchored in some objective feature of reality—be it divine will, rational deduction from human nature, or axiomatic self-evidence—to avoid reducing to mere preferences or utilities that could justify legal positivism's sovereign discretion. However, critics contend that no such foundation withstands scrutiny, rendering natural rights metaphysically unsubstantiated and practically indistinguishable from legal constructs in application. Traditional justifications often invoke theological premises, positing rights as endowments from a creator who imbues humans with equal moral standing. , in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), grounds rights to life, liberty, and property in the law of nature, discerned by reason as obliging individuals not to harm others, since all are "the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker." This view presupposes a divine order where reason reveals pre-political entitlements, limiting legitimate authority to protection thereof; yet it falters in secular contexts, as empirical verification of divine intent remains impossible, and alternative interpretations of religious texts yield conflicting rights hierarchies. Secular efforts to justify natural rights typically appeal to human nature or rational , deriving entitlements from observable capacities like or . For instance, attempts frame rights as necessary for individuals to pursue a , rooted in "ontological "—the inherent human experience of responsible choice—without theological reliance, as explored in phenomenological terms akin to Jean-Paul Sartre's existential or Robert Nozick's emphasis on self-shaping projects. Such approaches posit as axiomatic, arguing that denying it leads to contradictions in agency or argumentation, thereby justifying non-aggression as a precondition for rational action. However, these derivations encounter circularity: human nature's "needs" for rights are inferred post hoc from desired outcomes, lacking independent empirical or logical compulsion, and vary across cultures or , where Darwinian competition suggests no intrinsic entitlements beyond survival fitness. Positivist objections exacerbate justification woes, asserting that rights absent legal enactment are fictitious inventions. Jeremy Bentham famously dismissed natural rights as "simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts," arguing they fabricate moral imperatives from abstract fictions, enabling anarchy by overriding utilitarian calculus or sovereign will. Empirical challenges compound this: unlike physical laws verifiable through observation, natural rights evade falsification, relying on subjective self-evidence that fails intersubjective tests—evident in historical disputes where claims to natural entitlements justified both abolitionism and conquest. Defenses counter that legal rights themselves presuppose natural ones for legitimacy, as statutes gain moral force only by aligning with pre-existing human entitlements, but this regresses to undefended axioms without bridging to causal realism or data-driven universality. Ultimately, unresolved tensions persist: theological anchors exclude nonbelievers, rationalist ones invite relativism, and consequentialist proxies undermine deontological absolutes, leaving natural rights' justification vulnerable to reduction as aspirational heuristics rather than ontologically binding truths.

Universality Versus Cultural Relativism

The debate over the universality of natural rights pits advocates of inherent, human-nature-derived entitlements against those emphasizing cultural variability in moral norms. Proponents of universality maintain that natural rights, such as the and from arbitrary , arise from objective features of human existence—including biological vulnerabilities, cognitive capacities for reciprocity, and empirical universals like aversion to unprovoked —making them applicable across all societies irrespective of local customs. In contrast, assert that rights conceptions are socially constructed artifacts shaped by historical, communal, and environmental contexts, rendering universal impositions a form of that disregards legitimate diversity in ethical frameworks. Empirical cross-cultural research bolsters universality claims by revealing consistent patterns in human moral intuitions and institutional protections. For example, surveys encompassing over 80 countries, including the waves from 1981 to 2022, demonstrate broad global consensus on core entitlements like prohibitions against , , and enslavement, with endorsement rates exceeding 90% in most regions despite socioeconomic disparities. Anthropological analyses further identify recurrent taboos on intra-group violence and protections for vulnerable dependents in , agrarian, and modern societies, suggesting these stem from adaptive responses to shared evolutionary pressures rather than arbitrary traditions. Such findings challenge relativist premises by indicating that while surface-level expressions vary, underlying causal mechanisms—such as kin and mutual defense incentives—yield functionally equivalent recognitions worldwide. Criticisms of cultural relativism highlight its practical perils, particularly in shielding entrenched abuses under the guise of . Relativism's insistence on across practices has been faulted for logically permitting justifications of female genital mutilation in parts of and the or honor-based violence in , as these align with purported communal values, thereby eroding mechanisms to address intra-cultural dissenters who suffer disproportionately. Legal scholars note that relativist defenses often collapse when applied reciprocally, as no society willingly cedes claims to universal protections during or migration, revealing an implicit acknowledgment of trans-cultural baselines; this inconsistency underscores 's failure to furnish stable criteria for adjudication amid power asymmetries. Moreover, historical precedents, such as colonial-era invocations of relativism to sustain until the , illustrate how it can entrench hierarchies by prioritizing collective norms over individual agency, contravening causal evidence from that innate harm-avoidance drives rights evolution even in isolated groups. Despite these critiques, relativists counter that universality masks Western philosophical biases, pointing to variances in communal obligations—such as in Confucian systems or in sub-Saharan ethics—as evidence that rights must accommodate relational rather than atomistic to avoid neocolonial overreach. Pragmatic compromises appear in instruments like the 1948 , endorsed by 48 of 58 UN members at adoption and now reflected in 193 state ratifications of core covenants, yet persistent opt-outs and reservations (e.g., on religious freedoms in 20% of Islamic states as of 2023) sustain the tension. Ultimately, the debate hinges on whether empirical convergences in outweigh interpretive divergences, with universality gaining traction through verifiable protections against existential threats like , which no culture endorses for itself.

Negative Versus Positive Rights Tension

Negative rights, also known as rights, entail claims against interference by others, requiring only or non-action to be respected, such as the prohibiting or the barring theft. Positive rights, conversely, impose affirmative obligations on others—typically the state or society—to provide goods, services, or resources, exemplified by claims to education, healthcare, or a minimum income that demand active provision. In the classical natural rights tradition, as articulated by in his Second Treatise of Government (1689), rights to , , and estate are inherently negative, deriving from principles that limit government to protecting individuals from aggression rather than mandating redistribution. The tension between these categories arises principally from the enforcement mechanisms required for positive rights, which often necessitate coercive measures like taxation or resource reallocation that can violate corresponding negative rights. For instance, fulfilling a positive right to housing might compel seizure or heavy taxation of , directly infringing the negative right to retain one's justly acquired holdings, as critiqued in Robert Nozick's of justice, which holds that any patterned redistribution beyond rectification of past injustices constitutes an unjust infringement on individual holdings. Philosophers in the libertarian tradition, such as , argue that expanding positive rights erodes negative liberties by expanding state power, potentially leading to a "road to " where provision claims subordinate individual to collective ends. This conflict manifests empirically in policy debates, where positive entitlements like universal healthcare systems in nations such as the (established via the Act of 1946) have relied on progressive taxation rates exceeding 50% for high earners, prompting claims of violating negative akin to those in the U.S. (1776). Critics from the classical liberal perspective, including in (1964), contend that positive are not genuine but "claims to the unearned," transforming moral duties of charity into legal mandates that treat producers as means to others' ends, thus inverting the natural hierarchy. Defenders of positive , such as in (1971), justify them via the difference principle, allowing inequalities only if they benefit the least advantaged, yet this framework presupposes a veil of ignorance that abstractly prioritizes outcomes over the deontological constraints of negative . In constitutional contexts, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) blends both by affirming negative protections in Articles 3–21 while introducing positive claims in Articles 22–27, creating ongoing interpretive tensions; for example, the has occasionally expanded Article 8 privacy to imply positive state duties, raising conflicts with property freedoms under Protocol 1. From a first-principles standpoint, negative align with causal realism by respecting individual agency and the , as interference-free zones enable voluntary cooperation without predetermining distributive outcomes, whereas positive risk systemic inefficiencies, as evidenced by economic analyses showing welfare expansions correlating with reduced growth rates in countries post-1960s (e.g., average GDP growth falling from 4.5% in the 1950s–1960s to 2.2% in the 1970s–1990s). This tension underscores a core debate in theory: whether positive entitlements can coexist with negative without subordinating the latter to utilitarian aggregation.

Criticisms and Responses

Collectivist and Egalitarian Critiques

Collectivists maintain that natural rights are not inherent or pre-social but emerge from collective arrangements, prioritizing group welfare over individual claims that purportedly foster atomism and conflict. Karl Marx, in his 1844 critique "," contended that the rights enumerated in documents like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) embody the "rights of egoistic man," isolating as property owners and abstracting them from communal bonds, thereby perpetuating class antagonism rather than achieving human emancipation through shared production. This perspective holds that true liberation requires transcending such rights in a where individual development aligns with collective needs, as Marx later elaborated in the (1875), dismissing equal right to labor's product as bourgeois residue in favor of distribution "to each according to his needs." Egalitarian critiques, often intertwined with collectivism, fault natural rights for enshrining formal equality that masks and entrenches material disparities, particularly through entitlements that enable unequal accumulation. Marxist analysis, as systematized by George E. McCarthy in Marx and Social Justice (2018), rejects natural rights as ahistorical and idealist, arguing they legitimize capitalist injustice by ignoring causal structures of exploitation and advocating instead for egalitarian norms derived from , where justice entails communal control over production to equalize access and outcomes. Such views posit that natural rights' emphasis on negative liberties—freedom from interference—neglects positive obligations to redress inequalities from unequal endowments or social positions, as evidenced in socialist programs prioritizing welfare redistribution over inviolable holdings. These critiques have informed 20th-century progressive thought, exemplified by early U.S. Progressives like , who in The Promise of American Life (1909) assailed natural doctrine for underpinning policies that exacerbated inequality, urging state intervention to realize egalitarian ends through rather than individualistic entitlements. Empirical outcomes in collectivist regimes, such as the Soviet Union's subordination of personal freedoms to Five-Year Plans (e.g., the First Plan, 1928–1932, which mobilized labor for industrialization at the cost of individual dissent), illustrate the practical tension, where egalitarian aims justified curtailing natural claims in pursuit of societal equity.

Skeptical and Empirical Objections

, a founder of , rejected natural rights as unverifiable abstractions that prioritize rhetorical flourishes over measurable consequences. In his 1796 critique "Anarchical Fallacies," Bentham described the notion of natural and imprescriptible rights as "simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts," contending that such doctrines erode legal order by encouraging resistance to sovereign authority without empirical grounding in human welfare or utility calculations. He argued that rights derive solely from enacted for the greatest happiness, dismissing inherent entitlements as prone to subjective interpretation and anarchic application, as evidenced by the French Revolution's invocation of abstract rights to justify upheaval. David Hume's 1739 "is-ought" problem poses a foundational skeptical challenge by highlighting the logical gap between descriptive facts about human nature or the physical world and prescriptive claims to rights. Hume contended in "A Treatise of Human Nature" that no observation of what is—such as self-preservation instincts or social cooperation—can entail what ought to be, like inviolable entitlements, without smuggling in unstated normative assumptions, rendering natural rights derivations philosophically invalid absent circular reasoning or divine fiat. This critique implies that appeals to "nature" for rights, as in Lockean theory, conflate empirical regularities with moral imperatives, a fallacy echoed in later positivist dismissals of moral realism. Empirical objections draw on cross-cultural and historical data showing no consistent, innate recognition or enforcement of natural rights independent of legal or cultural constructs. Anthropological surveys, such as those compiled in studies of pre-modern societies, indicate that individual entitlements like property or liberty often yield to communal norms or hierarchical dominance, with no universal behavioral evidence of inherent rights adherence; for example, in groups documented through ethnographic fieldwork, resource allocation follows reciprocity and rather than abstract individual claims. The American Anthropological Association's 1947 response to the emphasized cultural variability, arguing that Western-derived individual rights lack empirical universality and impose ethnocentric standards on societies where group survival trumps personal , as seen in practices from polities to African tribal systems. Historical precedents, including persistent and across civilizations from ancient (circa 2000 BCE) to 19th-century empires, demonstrate that alleged natural rights fail to manifest without coercive legal backing, suggesting they function as post-hoc justifications rather than causally effective principles.

Contemporary Relevance

Applications in Modern Constitutionalism

Modern constitutionalism frequently applies natural rights principles by framing government as an institution designed to secure pre-political liberties rather than create them anew. In the United States, the and Bill of Rights embody this approach, with provisions protecting freedoms of speech, religion, assembly, and the press in the First Amendment, as well as the right to bear arms in , reflecting Lockean natural rights to and resistance against tyranny. These amendments, ratified on December 15, 1791, limit federal power to prevent infringement on inherent individual liberties, aligning with the Declaration of Independence's assertion that governments derive powers from the to secure rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The Ninth Amendment further applies natural rights by declaring that enumeration of certain rights in the Constitution shall not deny or disparage others retained by the people, preserving unenumerated natural liberties against legislative encroachment. In judicial practice, originalist interpretations invoke natural rights understandings from the founding era, such as viewing free speech as a pre-existing natural liberty circumscribed only by natural law duties to avoid harm, rather than as a government-conferred privilege. State constitutions mirror this, with provisions like Virginia's 1776 Declaration of Rights explicitly affirming that all men are by nature equally free and independent, influencing modern state court decisions on fundamental rights. Contemporary applications persist in constitutional adjudication, where natural rights underpin arguments for limits on authority, as seen in U.S. references to inherent dignities in cases involving or equal protection, though positivist critiques challenge such derivations as extra-textual. For example, some scholars advocate a revival in interpreting constitutional text to align with unchanging principles of , countering relativist expansions of rights. This framework contrasts with purely legal positivist systems, emphasizing that constitutional supremacy derives from safeguarding natural rights against , as evidenced in limited- structures worldwide influenced by American models post-1787.

Extensions to Nature and Technology

The concept of represents a contemporary legal extension of anthropocentric natural rights frameworks, positing that ecosystems and natural entities possess inherent legal protections akin to those derived from classical theories. Proponents argue this builds on the philosophical recognition of intrinsic value in creation, as articulated in natural rights traditions emphasizing over resources, though critics contend it anthropomorphizes non-sentient entities without grounding in human reason or agency. Ecuador's 2008 was the first to enshrine such provisions, with Article 71 declaring that "Nature, or Pacha Mama... has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes." Similar recognitions include New Zealand's 2017 granting of legal personhood to the , allowing it to be represented in court as a juridical entity, and Colombia's 2018 ruling extending rights to the to prevent . These developments, totaling over 40 jurisdictions worldwide by 2023 including municipal ordinances in the United States such as Toledo, Ohio's 2019 ban on denying corporate rights to nature, aim to enable lawsuits on behalf of natural objects for harms like , bypassing traditional standing requirements under positivist legal systems. However, empirical assessments reveal mixed efficacy; for instance, Ecuador's framework has yielded limited enforcement successes amid ongoing extractive industries, raising questions about whether such extensions dilute human-centric natural rights by prioritizing ecological entities over individual claims rooted in labor and . Philosophical extensions of natural rights to technology primarily manifest in justifications for (IP) as a derivative of Lockean self-ownership and labor theory, where innovation through mental effort mirrors physical mixing of labor with unowned resources. John Locke's Second Treatise of Government () underpins this by asserting that individuals acquire property rights via productive exertion, a principle applied to inventions and copyrights: "Every man has a property in his own person... The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his." This rationale supports U.S. constitutional IP protections under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, enabling to secure "for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries," as interpreted through natural rights lenses in cases like the Supreme Court's recognition of patents for novel processes. In software and digital realms, Lockean arguments justify ownership against commons tragedies, countering utilitarian dilutions by emphasizing moral desert from creation, though challenges arise with AI-generated outputs; the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ruled in 2020 that AI systems like cannot be listed as inventors, preserving human agency as prerequisite for natural rights-derived claims. Biotechnological advancements, including genetic engineering, test natural rights boundaries by altering human nature itself, prompting debates over whether enhancements violate inherent teleology or self-ownership principles. Natural law theorists, drawing from Aristotelian-Thomistic traditions integrated into modern rights discourse, argue that interventions like CRISPR-Cas9 editing of germline DNA—first demonstrated in human embryos by Chinese researchers in 2018—usurp the unchosen givens of biology, potentially eroding dignity tied to species-typical functions such as procreation without design. For instance, the 2015 International Summit on Human Gene Editing cautioned against heritable modifications absent broad consensus, citing risks to equality and consent, as unequal access could exacerbate hierarchies contrary to Lockean equality in the state of nature. Yet, pro-extension views invoke self-ownership to defend voluntary enhancements, positing that adults' liberty includes bodily sovereignty over genetic therapies, provided no harm to others; empirical data from somatic gene therapies, like the FDA-approved Zolgensma for spinal muscular atrophy in 2019, demonstrate therapeutic benefits without philosophical rupture. In artificial intelligence contexts, natural rights frameworks emphasize human governance over machine agency rather than reciprocal rights, as AI lacks moral reasoning or ends-directed nature; Vatican documents, such as the 2020 Rome Call for AI Ethics, invoke natural law to mandate proportionality and subsidiarity in deployment, rejecting sentience-based entitlements for algorithms. These applications highlight tensions: while IP extends property rights productively, biotech and AI challenge foundational assumptions of fixed human essence, requiring causal analysis of long-term societal outcomes like reduced biodiversity from engineered organisms or surveillance erosions of privacy liberty.

References

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