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Mohammad Mosaddegh
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Mohammad Mosaddegh[a] (Persian: محمد مصدق, IPA: [mohæmˈmæd(-e) mosædˈdeɢ] ⓘ;[b] 16 June 1882 – 5 March 1967) was an Iranian politician, author, and lawyer who served as the 30th Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953, elected by the 16th Majlis.[5][6] He was a member of the Iranian parliament from 1923, and served through a contentious 1952 election into the 17th Iranian Majlis,[7] until his government was overthrown in the 1953 Iranian coup d'etat aided by the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom (MI6) and the United States (CIA), led by Kermit Roosevelt Jr.[8][9] His National Front was suppressed from the 1954 election.[10]
Before its removal from power, his administration introduced a range of social and political measures such as social security, land reforms and higher taxes including the introduction of taxation on the rent of land. His time as Prime Minister was marked by the clash with the British government, known as Abadan Crisis, following the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry, which had been built by the British on Persian lands since 1913 through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC/AIOC), later known as British Petroleum (BP).[11]
In the aftermath of the overthrow, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi returned to power, and negotiated the Consortium Agreement of 1954 with the British, which gave split ownership of Iranian oil production between Iran and western companies until 1979.[12] Mosaddegh was subsequently charged with treason, imprisoned for three years, then put under house arrest until his death and was buried in his own home in order to prevent a political furor.[13][14] In 2013, the United States government formally acknowledged its role in the coup as being a part of its foreign policy initiatives, including paying protesters and bribing officials.[15]
Early life, education and early career
[edit]

Mosaddegh was born to a prominent Persian family of high officials in Ahmedabad, near Tehran,[16] on 16 June 1882; his father, Mirza Hideyatu'llah Ashtiani, was the finance minister under the Qajar dynasty, and his mother, Princess Malek Taj Najm-es-Saltaneh, was the granddaughter of the reformist Qajar prince Abbas Mirza, and a great-granddaughter of Fath-Ali Shah Qajar.[17][18][19] When Mosaddegh's father died in 1892 of cholera, his uncle was appointed the tax collector of the Khorasan province and was bestowed with the title of Mosaddegh-os-Saltaneh by Naser al-Din Shah Qajar.[20]
Mosaddegh himself later bore the same title, by which he was still known to some long after titles were abolished.[21][c]
Mossadegh's mother wanted her son to marry his cousin, daughter to her sister and Mozaffar ad-Din Shah Qajar.[22]
In 1901, Mosaddegh married Zahra Emami (1879–1965), a granddaughter of Naser al-Din Shah through her mother Zi'a es-Saltaneh.[23]
Education
[edit]In 1909, Mosaddegh pursued education abroad in Paris, France, where he studied at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris (Sciences Po). He studied there for two years, returning to Iran because of illness in 1911. After two months, Mosaddegh returned to Europe to study a Doctorate of Laws (doctorate en Droit) at the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland.[24] In June 1913, Mosaddegh received his doctorate and in doing so became the first Iranian to receive a PhD in law from a European university.[25]
Mosaddegh taught at the Tehran School of Political Science at the start of World War I before beginning his political career.[26]
Early political career
[edit]Mosaddegh started his political career with the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–07. At the age of 24, he was elected from Isfahan to the newly inaugurated Persian Parliament, the Majlis of Iran. However, he was unable to assume his seat, because he had not reached the legal age of 30.[27] During this period he also served as deputy leader of the Society of Humanity, under Mostowfi ol-Mamalek.[28] In protest at the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919, he relocated to Switzerland, from where he returned the following year after being invited by the new Iranian prime minister, Hassan Pirnia (Moshir-ed-Dowleh), to become his minister of justice. While en route to Tehran, he was asked by the people of Shiraz to become the governor of the Fars province. He was later appointed finance minister, in the government of Ahmad Qavam (Qavam os-Saltaneh) in 1921, and then foreign minister in the government of Moshir-ed-Dowleh in June 1923. He then became governor of the Azerbaijan Province. In 1923, he was re-elected to the Majlis.[29]
In 1925, the supporters of Reza Khan in the Majlis proposed legislation to dissolve the Qajar dynasty and appoint Reza Khan the new Shah. Mossadegh voted against such a move, arguing that such an act was a subversion of the 1906 Iranian constitution. He gave a speech in the Majlis, praising Reza Khan's achievements as prime minister while encouraging him to respect the constitution and stay as the prime minister. On 12 December 1925, the Majlis deposed the young Shah Ahmad Shah Qajar and declared Reza Shah the new monarch of the Imperial State of Persia, and the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty.[30] Mosaddegh then retired from politics, due to disagreements with the new regime.[31][32]
In 1941, Reza Shah Pahlavi was forced by the British to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In 1944, Mosaddegh was once again elected to parliament. This time he took the lead of Jebhe Melli (National Front of Iran, created in 1949), an organisation he had founded with nineteen others such as Hossein Fatemi, Ahmad Zirakzadeh, Ali Shayegan and Karim Sanjabi, aiming to establish democracy and end the foreign presence in Iranian politics, especially by nationalising the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (AIOC) operations in Iran. In 1947 Mossadegh once again announced retirement, after an electoral-reform bill he had proposed failed to pass through Majlis.[33]
Prime Minister of Iran
[edit]Election
[edit]On 28 April 1951, the Shah confirmed Mosaddegh as Prime Minister after the Majlis (Parliament of Iran) elected Mosaddegh by a vote of 79–12.[34][35] After a period of assassinations by Fada'iyan-e Islam and political unrest by the National Front, the Shah was aware of Mosaddegh's rising popularity and political power. Demonstrations erupted in Tehran after Mosaddegh was elected, with crowds further invigorated by the speeches of members from the National Front. There was a special focus on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the heavy involvement of foreign actors and influences in Iranian affairs. Although Iran was not officially a colony or a protectorate, it was still heavily controlled by foreign powers beginning with concessions provided by the Qajar Shahs and leading up to the oil agreement signed by Reza Shah in 1933.[36]
The new administration introduced a wide range of social reforms: unemployment compensation was introduced, factory owners were ordered to pay benefits to sick and injured workers, and peasants were freed from forced labour in their landlords' estates. In 1952, Mosaddegh passed the Land Reform Act, which forced landlords to place 20% of their revenue into a development fund. This development fund paid for various projects such as public baths, rural housing, and pest control.[37]
In March 1951, Mosaddegh nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, cancelling its oil concession, which was otherwise set to expire in 1993, and expropriating its assets. Mosaddegh saw the AIOC as an arm of the British government controlling much of the oil in Iran, pushing him to seize what the British had built in Iran.[38] The next month, a committee of five majlis deputies was sent to Khuzestan to enforce the nationalisation.[39][40] Mosaddegh justified his nationalisation policy by claiming Iran was "the rightful owner..." of all the oil in Iran. He also pointed out that Iran could use the money in a 21 June 1951 speech:
Our long years of negotiations with foreign countries... have yielded no results thus far. With the oil revenues, we could meet our entire budget and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our people. Another important consideration is that by the elimination of the power of the British company, we would also eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means of which the internal affairs of our country have been influenced. Once this tutelage has ceased, Iran will have achieved its economic and political independence. The Iranian state prefers to take over the production of petroleum itself. The company should do nothing else but return its property to the rightful owners. The nationalization law provides that 25% of the net profits on oil be set aside to meet all the legitimate claims of the company for compensation. It has been asserted abroad that Iran intends to expel the foreign oil experts from the country and then shut down oil installations. Not only is this allegation absurd; it is utter invention.[41]
The confrontation between Iran and Britain escalated as Mosaddegh's government refused to allow the British any involvement in their former enterprise. Britain made sure Iran could not sell the oil, which it considered stolen. In July, Mosaddegh broke off negotiations with AIOC after it threatened to "pull out its employees" and told owners of oil tanker ships that "receipts from the Iranian government would not be accepted on the world market." Two months later, the AIOC evacuated its technicians and closed down the oil installations. Under nationalised management, many refineries lacked the trained technicians that were needed to continue production. The British government announced a de facto blockade and embargo, reinforced its naval force in the Persian Gulf, and lodged complaints against Iran before the United Nations Security Council,[39] where, on 15 October 1951, Mosaddegh declared that "the petroleum industry has contributed nothing to well-being of the people or to the technological progress or industrial development of my country."[42]

The British government also threatened legal action against purchasers of oil produced in the Iranian refineries and obtained an agreement with its sister international oil companies not to fill the void left by the AIOC. The entire Iranian oil industry came to a virtual standstill, with oil production dropping almost 96% from 664,000 barrels (105,600 m3) in 1950 to 27,000 barrels (4,300 m3) in 1952.[43] This Abadan Crisis reduced Iran's oil income to almost nothing, putting a severe strain on the implementation of Mosaddegh's promised domestic reforms. At the same time, BP and Aramco doubled their production in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq to make up for lost production in Iran so that no hardship was felt in Britain.[44]
Still enormously popular in late 1951, Mosaddegh called elections and introduced a modified version of his 1944 electoral reform bill. As his base of support was in urban areas and not in the provinces, the proposed reform no longer barred illiterate voters, but it placed them into a separate category from literate voters and increased the representation of the urban population.[45] The opposition defeated the bill on the grounds that it would "unjustly discriminate patriots who had been voting for the last forty years", thus leaving the National Front to compete against conservatives, royalists, and tribal leaders alike in the upcoming election.[46]

4 January 1952: "Dr. Mosaddegh facing political problems"
His government came under scrutiny for ending the 1952 election before rural votes could be fully counted.[7] According to historian Ervand Abrahamian: "Realizing that the opposition would take the vast majority of the provincial seats, Mosaddegh stopped the voting as soon as 79 deputies—just enough to form a parliamentary quorum—had been elected."[46] An alternative account is offered by journalist Stephen Kinzer: Beginning in the early 1950s under the guidance of C.M. Woodhouse, chief of the British intelligence station in Tehran, Britain's covert operations network had funnelled roughly £10,000 per month to the Rashidian brothers (two of Iran's most influential royalists) in the hope of buying off, according to CIA estimates, "the armed forces, the Majlis (Iranian parliament), religious leaders, the press, street gangs, politicians and other influential figures".[47] Thus, in his statement asserting electoral manipulation by "foreign agents", Mosaddegh suspended the elections.[48] His National Front party had made up 30 of the 79 deputies elected. Yet none of those present vetoed the statement, and completion of the elections was postponed indefinitely. The 17th Majlis convened in April 1952, with the minimum required[d] of the 136 seats filled.[49][7]
Throughout his career, Mosaddegh strove to increase the power parliament held versus the expansion of the crown's authority.[50] But tension soon began to escalate in the Majlis. Conservative, pro-Shah, and pro-British opponents refused to grant Mosaddegh special powers to deal with the economic crisis caused by the sharp drop in revenue and voiced regional grievances against the capital Tehran, while the National Front waged "a propaganda war against the landed upper class".[51]
Resignation and uprising
[edit]On the 16th of July 1952, during the royal approval of his new cabinet, Mosaddegh insisted on the constitutional prerogative of the Prime Minister to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff, something the Shah had done up to that point. The Shah refused, seeing it as unconstitutional and a means for Mosaddegh to consolidate his power over the government at the expense of the monarchy. In response, Mosaddegh announced his resignation, appealing directly to the public for support, pronouncing that "in the present situation, the struggle started by the Iranian people cannot be brought to a victorious conclusion".[52]
Veteran politician Ahmad Qavam (also known as Ghavam os-Saltaneh) was appointed as Iran's new Prime Minister. On the day of his appointment, he announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute, a reversal of Mosaddegh's policy. The National Front—along with various Nationalist, Islamist, and socialist parties and groups[53]—including Tudeh—responded by calling for protests, assassinations of the Shah and other royalists, strikes, and mass demonstrations in favour of Mosaddegh. Major strikes broke out in all of Iran's major towns, with the Bazaar closing down in Tehran. Over 250 demonstrators in Tehran, Hamadan, Ahvaz, Isfahan, and Kermanshah were killed or suffered serious injuries.[54]
On the fourth day of mass demonstrations, Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani called on the people to wage a "holy war" against Qavam. On the following day, Si-ye Tir (the 30th of Tir on the Iranian calendar), military commanders ordered their troops back to barracks, fearful of over-straining the enlisted men's loyalty, and left Tehran in the hands of the protesters.[55] Frightened by the unrest, the Shah asked for Qavam's resignation and re-appointed Mosaddegh to form a government, granting him control over the Ministry of War he had previously demanded.[56] The Shah asked whether he should step down as monarch, but Mosaddegh declined.[57]
Reinstatement and emergency powers
[edit]
More popular than ever, a greatly strengthened Mosaddegh introduced a single-clause bill to parliament to grant him emergency "dictatorial decree" powers for six months to pass "any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms"[58] in order to implement his nine-point reform program and to bypass the stalled negotiations of the nationalisation of the oil industry.[59] On the 3rd of August 1952, the Majlis voted in approval and elected Ayatollah Kashani as House Speaker. Kashani's Islamic scholars, as well as the Tudeh Party, proved to be two of Mosaddegh's key political allies, although relations with both were often strained.[60]
In addition to the reform program, which intended to make changes to a broad region of laws covering elections, financial institutions, employment, the judiciary, the press, education, health, and communications services,[56] Mosaddegh tried to limit the monarchy's powers.[61] He cut the Shah's personal budget, forbade his direct communications with foreign diplomats, and transferred royal lands back to the state. He also expelled the Shah's politically active sister, Ashraf Pahlavi.[55]
However, six months proved not long enough, so Mosaddegh asked for an extension in January 1953, successfully pressing Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months.[59]
Though the Shah had only initiated land reforms in January 1951, where all territory inherited by the Crown was sold to peasants at 20% of the assessed value over a payment period of 25 years,[62] Mosaddegh decreed a new land reform law to supersede it, establishing village councils and increasing the peasants' share of production.[58] This weakened the landed aristocracy by imposing a 20% tax on their income, of which 20% was diverted back to the crop-sharing tenants and their rural banks. It also weakened them by levying heavy fines for compelling peasants to work without wages.[62] Mosaddegh attempted to abolish Iran's centuries-old feudal agriculture sector by replacing it with a system of collective farming and government land ownership, which also centralised power in his government. Ann Lambton indicates that Mosaddegh saw this as a means of checking the power of the Tudeh Party, who had been agitating the peasants by criticising his lack of significant land reforms.[63]
Despite these accomplishments, Iranians were "becoming poorer and unhappier by the day", in large part due to the British-led boycott. As Mosaddegh's political coalition began to fray, his enemies increased in number.[64]
Partly through the efforts of Iranians sympathising with the British, and partly in fear of the growing dictatorial powers of the Prime Minister, several former members of Mosaddegh's coalition turned against him, fearing arrest. They included Mozzafar Baghai, head of the worker-based Toilers party; Hossein Makki, who had helped lead the takeover of the Abadan refinery and was at one point considered Mosaddegh's successor; and most outspokenly, Ayatollah Kashani, who damned Mosaddegh with the "vitriol he had once reserved for the British".[65] The reason for difference of opinion among Makki and Mosaddegh was the sharp response of Mosaddegh to Kashani, who he saw as a largely inoffensive scholar who attracted public support. Hossein Makki strongly opposed the dissolution of the majlis by Mossadegh and evaluated that, because of its closure, the right to dismiss the Prime minister is reserved for the Shah.[66]
Overthrow of Mosaddegh
[edit]Plot to depose Mosaddegh
[edit]The British government had grown increasingly distressed over Mosaddegh's policies and were especially bitter over the loss of their control of the Iranian oil industry. Repeated attempts to reach a settlement had failed, and, in October 1952, Mosaddegh declared Britain an enemy and cut all diplomatic relations.[67] Since 1935, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had the exclusive rights to Iranian oil. Earlier in 1914, the British government had purchased 51% of its shares and became the majority shareholder. After the British Royal Navy converted its ships to use oil as fuel, the corporation was considered vital to British national security, and the company's profits partially alleviated Britain's budget deficit.[68]
Engulfed in a variety of problems following World War II, Britain was unable to resolve the issue single-handedly and looked towards the United States to settle the matter. Initially, the US had opposed British policies. After mediation had failed several times to bring about a settlement, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson concluded that the British were "destructive, and determined on a rule-or-ruin policy in Iran."[69]
The American position shifted in late 1952 when Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president. In November and December, British intelligence officials suggested to American intelligence that the Iranian prime minister should be ousted. British prime minister Winston Churchill suggested to the incoming Eisenhower administration that Mosaddegh, despite the latter's open dislike of communism, would become reliant on the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party,[70] resulting in Iran "increasingly turning towards communism" and towards the Soviet sphere at a time of high Cold War fears.[71][72][73][74]
Though his suggestion was rebuffed by Eisenhower as "paternalistic", Churchill's government had already begun "Operation Boot", and simply waited for the next opportunity to press the Americans. On 28 February 1953, rumours spread by British-backed Iranians that Mosaddegh was trying to exile the Shah from the country gave the Eisenhower administration the impetus to join the plan.[75] The United States and the United Kingdom agreed to work together toward Mosaddegh's removal and began to publicly denounce Mosaddegh's policies for Iran as harmful to the country. In the meantime, the already precarious alliance between Mosaddegh and Kashani was severed in January 1953, when Kashani opposed Mosaddegh's demand that his increased powers be extended for a period of one year. Finally, to end Mossadegh's destabilising influence that threatened the supply of oil to the West and could potentially pave the way for a communist takeover of the country, the US made an attempt to depose him.[76][77]
Operation Ajax
[edit]
In March 1953, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles directed the CIA, which was headed by his younger brother Allen Dulles, to draft plans to overthrow Mossadegh.[78] On 4 April 1953, Dulles approved $1 million to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddegh". Soon the CIA's Tehran station started to launch a propaganda campaign against Mossadegh. Finally, according to The New York Times, in early June, American and British intelligence officials met again, this time in Beirut, and put the finishing touches on the strategy. Soon afterward, according to his later published accounts, the chief of the CIA's Near East and Africa division, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. the grandson of US President Theodore Roosevelt, arrived in Tehran to direct it.[79] In 2000, The New York Times made partial publication of a leaked CIA document titled Clandestine Service History – Overthrow of Premier Mosaddegh of Iran – November 1952 – August 1953.
The plot, known as Operation Ajax, centered on convincing Iran's monarch to issue a decree to dismiss Mosaddegh from office, as he had attempted some months earlier. But the Shah was terrified to attempt such a dangerously unpopular and risky move against Mosaddegh. It would take much persuasion and many US-funded meetings, which included bribing his sister Ashraf with a mink coat and money, to successfully change his mind.[80]
Mosaddegh became aware of the plots against him and grew increasingly wary of conspirators acting within his government.[81] According to Donald Wilber, who was involved in the plot to remove Mossadegh from power, in early August, Iranian CIA operatives pretending to be socialists and nationalists threatened Muslim leaders with "savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh", thereby giving the impression that Mossadegh was cracking down on dissent earlier than planned, and stirring anti-Mossadegh sentiments within the religious community.[82] A referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister power to make law was submitted to voters, and it passed with 99 per cent approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against.[83] According to historian Mark Gasiorowski, "There were separate polling stations for yes and no votes, producing sharp criticism of Mosaddeq" and that the "controversial referendum...gave the CIA's precoup propaganda campaign to show up Mosaddeq as an anti-democratic dictator an easy target".[84] On or around 16 August, Parliament was suspended indefinitely, and Mosaddeq's emergency powers were extended.
Declassified documents released by the CIA in 2017 revealed that—after the Shah had fled to Italy—CIA headquarters believed the coup to have failed.[85] Following the initial failed coup by the foreign-backed General Fazlollah Zahedi, the CIA sent Roosevelt a telegram on 18 August 1953 telling him to flee Iran immediately, but Roosevelt ignored it and began work on the second coup, circulating a false account that Mossadegh attempted to seize the throne and bribed Iranian agents.[86][12]

Soon, massive popular protests, aided by Roosevelt's team, took place across the city and elsewhere with tribesmen at the ready to assist the coup, with anti- and pro-monarchy protesters, both being paid by Roosevelt.[87] By paying mobs to demonstrate, tricking Mossadegh into urging his supporters to stay home, and bribing and mobilising officers against Mossadegh, he was able to force a military confrontation outside Mossadegh's home.[12]
The protests turned increasingly violent, leaving almost 300 dead, at which point the pro-monarchy leadership, led by retired army General and former Minister of Interior in Mosaddegh's cabinet, Fazlollah Zahedi, interceded, joined with underground figures such as the Rashidian brothers and local strongman Shaban Jafari.[88] Pro-Shah tank regiments stormed the capital and bombarded the prime minister's official residence.[89] With loyalist troops overwhelmed, Mossadegh was taken into hiding by his aides, narrowly escaping the mob that set in to ransack his house. The following day, he surrendered himself at the Officers' Club,[12] where General Zahedi had been set up with makeshift headquarters by the CIA. Zahedi announced an order for his arrest on the radio, and Mosaddegh was transferred to a military jail shortly after.[89]
The Shah finally agreed to Mossadegh's overthrow after Roosevelt said that the United States would proceed with or without him,[87] and formally dismissed the prime minister in a written decree, an act that had been made part of the constitution during the Constitutional Assembly of 1949, convened under martial law, at which time the power of the monarchy was increased in various ways by the Shah himself.[90] As a precautionary measure, he flew to Baghdad and from there hid safely in Rome. He actually signed two decrees, one dismissing Mosaddegh and the other nominating the CIA's choice, General Zahedi, as Prime Minister. These decrees, called Farmāns, played a major role in giving legitimacy to the coup, and were further spread by CIA officials.[91] On 22 August, the Shah returned from Rome.[92] Zahedi's new government soon reached an agreement with foreign oil companies to form a consortium and "restore the flow of Iranian oil to world markets in substantial quantities", giving the United States and Great Britain the lion's share of the restored British holdings. In return, the US massively funded the Shah's resulting government, until the Shah's overthrow in 1979.[93]
As soon as the coup succeeded, many of Mosaddegh's former associates and supporters were tried, imprisoned, and tortured. Some were sentenced to death and executed.[94] The minister of foreign affairs and the closest associate of Mosaddegh, Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military court. The order was carried out by firing squad on 10 November 1954.[95]
Post-overthrow life
[edit]
On 21 December 1953, Mosaddegh was sentenced to three years' solitary confinement in a military prison, well short of the death sentence requested by prosecutors. After hearing the sentence, Mossadegh was reported to have said with a calm voice of sarcasm: "The verdict of this court has increased my historical glories. I am extremely grateful you convicted me. Truly tonight the Iranian nation understood the meaning of constitutionalism."[96]
Death
[edit]Mosaddegh was kept under house arrest at his Ahmadabad residence, until his death on 5 March 1967 from cancer. Mossadegh had been diagnosed with carcinoma[97] in 1966,[97] and undergone cancer-treatment at Mehr hospital in Tehran in the form of radiation-therapy[97] Mossadegh's condition worsened in 1967, and, after ulcers in his stomach started bleeding, his condition was so bad that he was taken to Najmieh Hospital,[97] where he died the same night.
Mossadegh was denied a funeral and was buried in his living room, despite his request to be buried in the public graveyard, beside the victims of the political violence on 30th Tir 1331 (21 July 1952).[98][99][100][101][102]
Electoral history
[edit]| Year | Election | Votes | % | Rank | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1906 | Parliament | Unknown | Won but did not take seat[27] | ||
| 1923 | Parliament | Unknown | 3rd[103] | Won | |
| 1926 | Parliament | Unknown | Won[103] | ||
| 1928 | Parliament | Unknown | Lost[104] | ||
| 1943 | Parliament | ≈15,000[105] | Unknown | 1st[103] | Won |
| 1947 | Parliament | Unknown | Lost | ||
| 1950 | Parliament | 30,738[103] | Unknown | 1st[103] | Won |
Offspring
[edit]- Zia Ashraf, (b. ?- d. 1991) married her cousin, politician Ezzatullah Bayat[106] (son of her paternal aunt Showkat al-Dowleh and Abbasghali Bayat Sahm al-Mulk) and brother of Morteza-Qoli Bayat. Had offspring. Later divorced.
- Ahmad.[107][108] (b. 1907 -d. ?) Became an engineer,[105] and held the position of Director General of the Ministry of Roads during his fathers time as prime minister. Head of the State Railway Organization[105] until being replaced by another official favoured by the shah's sister, Ashraf Pahlavi.[105] After the shah had been deposed politically involved in the National Democratic Front.[107] Married Amina Quds-e-Azam.
- Gholam-Hossein (b. 1906- d. 1990) Educated as a doctor and served as his father's personal physician.[109] Also held other positions such as Inspector-Genersl of the Central Committee Iranian Lion & Sun Org, Head of Iranian Delegation to International Committee of the Red Cross in 1946. Married Malekeh Khajeh-Nouri[110] and had offspring.
- Yahya, (b.1912-d.1912). Died as an infant in Neuchatel from scarlet fever or measles.[106]
- Mansoureh, (b.1908 - d.1979) married her cousin Ahmad Matin-Daftari.[106] Had offspring, most notably the painter, Leyly Matin-Daftari and the politician, Hedayatollah Matin-Daftari,[111] founder of the National Democratic Front. Died in a plane crash in 1979[110][112] while en route between Mashhad and Tehran.[112]
- Mahmoud, died young in Tehran.[113]
- Khadije (b. 1927 - d. 2003) One of her father's arrests, which she witnessed, left her so traumatized that she suffered a mental breakdown from which she never fully recovered. Undergoing many treatments she was eventually lobotomized and lived out the remainder of her life in a hospital in Switzerland.
Legacy
[edit]Iran
[edit]
Although Mosaddegh was never directly elected as Prime Minister, he enjoyed massive popularity throughout most of his career.[114] Despite beginning to fall out of favour during the later stages of the Abadan Crisis,[115] the secret U.S. overthrow of Mosaddegh served as a rallying point in anti-US protests during the 1979 Iranian revolution, and to this day he is one of the most popular figures in Iranian history.[116]
The withdrawal of support for Mosaddegh by the powerful Shia clergy has been regarded as having been motivated by their fear of a communist takeover.[117] Some argue that while many elements of Mosaddegh's coalition abandoned him, it was the loss of support from Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani and another cleric that was fatal to his cause,[115] reflective of the dominance of the Ulema in Iranian society and a portent of the Islamic Revolution to come. The loss of the political clerics effectively cut Mosaddegh's connections with the lower middle classes and the Iranian masses which are crucial to any popular movement in Iran.[118]
On 5 March 1979, not even a month after the Shah was deposed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians marked the 12th anniversary of Mossadegh's death. In Ahmadabad, where he was buried, Iranian leaders and politicians eulogized him in a way that would've been unthinkable before the Shah's removal. It was estimated that the crowd in size was over one million.[119] The event was described as:
For sixty solid miles, the highway from Tehran to Mossadeq's burial site...transformed into a massive, unbroken daisy chain of cars...In the final seven or eight miles approaching the village, traffic became so gridlocked that mourners were forced to...complete the journey on foot.[119]
U.S.
[edit]
The U.S. role in Mosaddegh's overthrow was not formally acknowledged for many years,[120] although the Eisenhower administration vehemently opposed Mossadegh's policies. President Eisenhower wrote angrily about Mosaddegh in his memoirs, describing him as impractical and naive.[121]
Eventually, the CIA's involvement with the coup was exposed. This caused controversy within the organisation and the CIA congressional hearings of the 1970s. CIA supporters maintained that the coup was strategically necessary and praised the efficiency of the agents responsible. Critics say the scheme was paranoid, colonial, illegal, and immoral—and truly caused the "blowback" suggested in the pre-coup analysis. The extent of this "blowback", over time, was not completely clear to the CIA, as they had an inaccurate picture of the stability of the Shah's regime. The Iranian revolution of 1979 caught the CIA and the U.S. very much off guard (as CIA reporting a mere month earlier predicted no imminent insurrectionary turbulence whatsoever for the Shah's regime) and resulted in the overthrow of the Shah by a fundamentalist faction opposed to the U.S., headed by Ayatollah Khomeini. In retrospect, not only did the CIA and the U.S. underestimate the extent of popular discontent for the Shah, but much of that discontent historically stemmed from the removal of Mosaddegh and the subsequent clientelism of the Shah.[122]
In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated her regret that Mosaddegh was ousted: "The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons. But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America."[9] In the same year, The New York Times published a detailed report about the coup based on declassified CIA documents.[123]
British
[edit]Mosaddegh's overthrow had a direct relationship with the creation of an Islamic revolution and the collapse of the Pahlavi government. America's close relationship with the Shah and the subsequent hostility of the United States to the Islamic Republic and Britain's profitable interventions caused pessimism for Iranians, stirring nationalism and suspicion of foreign interference.[122]
Mosaddegh in the media
[edit]- Mosaddegh was named man of the year in 1951 by Time. Others considered for that year's title included Dean Acheson, General (and future President) Dwight D. Eisenhower and General Douglas MacArthur.[124]
- The figure of Mosaddegh was an important element in the 2003 French TV production Soraya,[125] which deals with the life of the Shah's second wife and former Queen of Iran, Princess Soraya Esfandiary Bakhtiari. Mosaddegh's role was played by the French actor Claude Brasseur.
- In Argo, Malick (Victor McCay) references Mosaddegh and the coup as he and Bates (Titus Welliver) try to deal with the situation at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.[126]
- A short 24-minute film titled Mosaddegh, directed by Roozbeh Dadvand, was released in 2011. The role of Mosaddegh was played by Iranian American actor David Diaan.[127]
- An independent video game called The Cat and the Coup was released in 2011. It features the player playing as Mosaddegh's cat reversing Mosaddegh's life to the beginning.
- In the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, Senator Bernie Sanders, during debates, interviews, and speeches, repeatedly praised Mosaddegh's "secular, democratic government", while commenting on the 1953 CIA-backed coup, stating that it is a "bad example of U.S. foreign policy", resulting in "negative unintended consequences and dictatorships".[128][129][130] Another candidate, Governor Martin O'Malley, said similar things.[131]
- In Coup 53, a 2021 documentary, co-writers Taghi Amirani and Walter Murch assess new archive material about the 1953 CIA-backed coup of Mossadegh. The documentary's primary contribution is to uncover the extent of MI6 involvement, particularly that of Norman Darbyshire, the operative who led MI6's involvement in the coup. According to the newly discovered archive material, Darbyshire was involved in the kidnapping, torture, and assassination of General Mahmoud Afshartous, Mosaddegh's chief of police, and the bribing of Princess Ashraf, the twin sister of Shah Reza Pahlavi, to obtain the Shah's approval for the coup. The British government has never admitted its involvement in the overthrow of Mosaddegh.
- In neighbouring Afghanistan, support and sympathy for Mosaddegh was evident in a 1953 article in the Kabul-based Pamir newspaper under the title "A friendly suggestion to the great nation of Iran", urging the authorities of the time to use best judgment during the trial regarding a man like Mosaddegh.[132]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ His surname is also spelt Mossadeq, Mosaddiq, Mossadegh, Mossaddeq, Mosadeck, or Musaddiq.
- ^ The -[e] is the Izāfa, which is a grammatical marker linking two words together. It is not indicated in writing, and is not part of the name itself, but is used when a first and last name are used together.
- ^ "Older people still speak of Dr. Musaddiq as Musaddiqu's-Saltanah."[21]
- ^ Sources differ, either 79, 81, or 88 seats (Collier 2017) were elected in 1952.
Citations
[edit]- ^ "Mohammad Mosaddegh". Encyclopedia Britannica. 20 July 1998. Retrieved 16 July 2025.
- ^ Matini, Jalal (2009). نگاهی به کارنامه سیاسی دکتر محمد مصدق [A Glance at the Political Career of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq] (in Persian). Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Co. p. 25. ISBN 978-1595842268.
- ^ Bani-Jamali, Ahmad (2008). آشوب: مطالعهای در زندگی و شخصیت دکتر محمد مصدق [Chaos: A Study on Life and Character of Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq] (in Persian). Tehran: Ney. pp. 146–155. ISBN 978-9643129705.
- ^ Houchang E. Chehabi (1990). Iranian Politics and Religious Modernism: The Liberation Movement of Iran Under the Shah and Khomeini. I.B.Tauris. p. 113. ISBN 978-1850431985.
- ^ McQuade, Joseph (27 July 2017). "How the CIA toppled Iranian democracy". The Conversation. Retrieved 13 April 2022.
- ^ Gasiorowski, Roham Alvandi, Mark J. (30 October 2019). "The United States Overthrew Iran's Last Democratic Leader". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 13 April 2022.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ a b c Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann (2013). Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic. Georgetown University Press. pp. 85–86. ISBN 9781589019782.
- ^ James Risen (2000). "The C.I.A. in Iran: First Few Days Look Disastrous". The New York Times.
- ^ a b Kinzer 2003.
- ^ Gasiorowski, Mark (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran. Cornell University Press. p. 166. ISBN 0-8014-2412-7.
- ^ Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (ISBN 9781439110126).
- ^ a b c d Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1987). "The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 19 (3): 261–286. doi:10.1017/S0020743800056737. ISSN 0020-7438. JSTOR 163655. S2CID 154201459.
- ^ "CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup". nsarchive2.gwu.edu. The National Security Archive. 19 August 2013. Retrieved 21 August 2018.
- ^ Saeed Kamali Dehghan; Richard Norton-Taylor (19 August 2013). "CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup". The Guardian. Retrieved 20 August 2013.
- ^ "In declassified document, CIA acknowledges role in '53 Iran coup". CNN. Retrieved 22 August 2013.
- ^ Hassan Mohammadi Nejad (1970). Elite-Counterelite Conflict and the Development of a Revolutionary Movement: The Case of Iranian National Front (PhD thesis). Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. p. 19. ISBN 9798657957457. ProQuest 302536657.
- ^ Diba 1986, p. 4.
- ^ Afkhami 2009, p. 110.
- ^ Frankel 1992.
- ^ "Key figures", The Telegraph, London, 4 June 2003, archived from the original on 27 November 2004, retrieved 7 November 2007
- ^ a b Avery 1965, p. 273.
- ^ Bellaigue, Christopher de (15 May 2012). Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup. Harper Collins. ISBN 978-0-06-219662-0.
- ^ She was also known as Zahra Khanum (literally: Princess Zahra), and after the death of her mother, she inherited her title name of Zi'a es-Saltaneh.
- ^ "آموزش زبان". blogfa.com.
- ^ Kinzer, Stephen (October 2008). "Inside Iran's Fury". Smithsonian Magazine. Archived from the original on 3 October 2008. Retrieved 9 August 2013.
- ^ Abrahamian 2012, p. 33.
- ^ a b Kinzer 2003, p. 54
- ^ Baktiar, Salar (24 November 2004). "The life of Mirza Hassan Khan, Mostofi Al Mamalek" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 24 April 2018. Retrieved 31 July 2011.
- ^ Farrokh 2011, p. 297.
- ^ Diba 1986, p. 41.
- ^ "Centers of Power in Iran" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. May 1972. Retrieved 5 August 2013.
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. 60.
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. 135-136.
- ^ "Iran celebrates 65th anniversary of oil nationalization". en.irna.ir. Retrieved 13 July 2025.
- ^ "Office of the Historian". Historical Documents. 22 May 1951. Retrieved 13 July 2025.
- ^ Cleveland 2008, p. 289-290.
- ^ "atimes.com". Asia Times. Archived from the original on 15 September 2004.
- ^ Cleveland 2008, p. 291.
- ^ a b Abrahamian 1982, p. 268.
- ^ Alan W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951–1952. University of California Press, Berkeley 1954, p. 268.
- ^ M. Fateh, Panjah Sal-e Naft-e Iran, p. 525.
- ^ United Nations Security Council Verbatim record 560. Security Council Official Records S/PV.560 15 October 1951. Retrieved accessdate.
- ^ Badakhshan, A.; Najmabadi, F. (July 2004), Oil Industry II. Iran's Oil and Gas Resources, retrieved 6 July 2023
- ^ Jensen, James T. (1974). "International Oil--Shortage, Cartel or Emerging Resource Monopoly?". Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2 Spring 1974): 346. Retrieved 11 October 2022.
- ^ Abrahamian 1982, p. 268-269.
- ^ a b Abrahamian 1982, p. 269.
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. https://archive.org/details/allshahsmenameri00kinz/page/150 150-151.
- ^ Collier 2017, p. 101.
- ^ Collier 2017, p. 102.
- ^ Cleveland 2008, p. 290: "He also became known for his support of parliamentary democracy and his strong opposition to foreign activities in Iran. [...] Mosaddiq’s impassioned campaign against continued foreign interference in Iran and his warnings about the dangers of abandoning democracy for royal dictatorship attracted widespread support."
- ^ Abrahamian 1982, p. 268-270.
- ^ Abrahamian 1982, p. 270-271.
- ^ Mosaddegh: The Years of Struggle and Opposition by Col. Gholamreza Nejati, p. 761.
- ^ Abrahamian 1982, p. 271.
- ^ a b Abrahamian 1982, p. 272.
- ^ a b Collier 2017, p. 108.
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. 141.
- ^ a b Abrahamian 1982, p. 273.
- ^ a b Efimenco, N. Marbury (1955). "An Experiment with Civilian Dictatorship in Iran; The Case of Mohammed Mossadegh". The Journal of Politics. 17 (3): 398–399. doi:10.1017/S0022381600091076. JSTOR 2127013. S2CID 154990164. Retrieved 11 October 2022.
- ^ Loy W. Henderson (11 August 1952). Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, No. 198 "The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954 (Report). Office of the Historian.
- ^ Zabih, Sepehr. The Mosaddegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution, p. 65.
- ^ a b Chaudhri, A. T. (1954). "The Problem of Land-Reform in the Middle East". Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. 7 (4): 223. JSTOR 41403757.
- ^ Lambton, A. K. S. (1969). The Persian Land Reform. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 40. ISBN 0198281633.
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. https://archive.org/details/allshahsmenameri00kinz/page/135 135-136].
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. https://archive.org/details/allshahsmenameri00kinz/page/159 159].
- ^ Makki, Hossein. Twenty-year-old history of Iran.
- ^ "No traction for proposal to name street after Mosaddeq". Mehr News Agency. 9 September 2008. News ID: 2820572. Retrieved 31 March 2017.
- ^ ben, cool (31 July 2015). "The Coup Against Iran's Mohammad Mossadegh".
- ^ Saikal, Amin, The Rise and Fall of the Shah, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 42.
- ^ Elm 1994, p. 276-278.
- ^ Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne Mohammad Mosaddegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Syracuse University Press, May 2004. ISBN 0-8156-3018-2, p. 125.
- ^ James S. Lay Jr. (20 November 1952), United States policy regarding the current situation in Iran (PDF), George Washington University, retrieved 7 November 2007 Statement of policy proposed by the National Security Council
- ^ Walter B. Smith, Undersecretary (20 March 1953), First Progress Report on Paragraph 5-1 of NSC 136/1, "U.S. Policy Regarding the Current Situation in Iran" (PDF), George Washington University, retrieved 7 November 2007
- ^ Measures which the United States Government Might Take in Support of a Successor Government to Mosaddegh (PDF), George Washington University, March 1953, retrieved 7 November 2007
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. 157].
- ^ McQuade, Joseph (27 July 2017). "How the CIA toppled Iranian democracy".
- ^ "Documents reveal new details about CIA's role in 1953 coup in Iran". Fox News. Associated Press. 20 August 2013. Retrieved 3 January 2020.
- ^ Malcolm Byrne, ed. (2 November 2000), The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953, George Washington University, quoting National security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 28, retrieved 7 November 2007
- ^ Halberstam, David (1993). The Fifties. New York: Ballantine Books. pp. 366–367. ISBN 978-0-449-90933-1.
- ^ Kinzer 2003, p. https://archive.org/details/allshahsmenameri00kinz/page/7 7].
- ^ Trying to Persuade a Reluctant Shah, The New York Times 7 December 2009.
- ^ Risen, James (16 April 2000). "Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran – A special report.; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)". The New York Times. Retrieved 16 July 2015.
- ^ Abrahamian 1982, p. 274.
- ^ Gasiorowski, Mark J. (2004). Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press. ISBN 978-0815630180.
- ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (20 June 2017). "64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup". Retrieved 3 January 2020.
- ^ Kinkead, Gwen (16 December 2010). "Kermit Roosevelt." Harvard Magazine.
- ^ a b Kermit Roosevelt Jr. Countercoup: The Struggle for the Control of Iran (McGraw-Hill, 1979) ISBN 0-07-053590-6.
- ^ "Pahlavani: Misinformation, Misconceptions and Misrepresentations". pahlavani.com.
- ^ a b C.I.A. and Moscow Are Both Surprised, The New York Times 7 December 2009.
- ^ Farrokh 2011, p. 449.
- ^ Record of Meeting in the Central Intelligence Agency, No. 307. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Second Edition (Report). Office of the Historian. 28 August 1953.
- ^ Ahmed, Eqbal (1980). "What's Behind the Crises in Iran and Afghanistan". Social Text (3): 44–58. doi:10.2307/466342. ISSN 0164-2472. JSTOR 466342.
- ^ "Statements on Iran Oil Accord", The New York Times, Associated Press, 6 August 1954, retrieved 7 November 2007
- ^ The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War, University of California Press, 2011-01-03, by Mehran Kamrava, page 148
- ^ Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics by L.P. Elwell-Sutton. 1955. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. London. p. 315.
- ^ Hangen, Welles (22 December 1952). "Mossadegh Gets 3-Year Jail Term". The New York Times.
- ^ a b c d "ناگفتههای پزشک مصدق در "حصر" / رهایش میکردند، شاید چند سالی بیشتر زنده میماند" [Interview with Mossadegh´s doctor]. خبرآنلاین (in Persian). 27 December 2022. Retrieved 11 May 2025.
- ^ Abrahamian 1982, p. 280.
- ^ Mossadegh – A Medical Biography by Ebrahim Norouzi
- ^ Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics by L.P. Elwell-Sutton. 1955. Lawrence and Wishart Ltd. London
- ^ Eccentric Nationalist Begets Strange History, The New York Times 7 December 2009.
- ^ "1. Iran (1905–present)". uca.edu. University of Arkansas (Political Science). Retrieved 5 October 2018.
- ^ a b c d e Azimi, Fakhreddin (13 December 2011) [15 December 1998]. "Elections I. Under the Qajar and Pahlavi Monarchies, 1906–79". In Yarshater, Ehsan (ed.). Encyclopædia Iranica. 4. Vol. VIII. New York City: Bibliotheca Persica Press. pp. 345–355. Retrieved 15 March 2016.
- ^ Ladjevardi, Habib (1985). Labor unions and autocracy in Iran. Syracuse University Press. p. 19. ISBN 978-0-8156-2343-4.
- ^ a b c d Ladjevardi, Habib (1985). Labor unions and autocracy in Iran. Syracuse University Press. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-8156-2343-4.
- ^ a b c "غلامحسین مصدق، نوار ۱" [Interview with Gholamhossein Mossadegh]. Iran Oral History (in Persian). Retrieved 23 June 2025.
- ^ a b Times, Nicholas Gage Special to The New York (31 December 1978). "IRAN DESIGNEE SEES A NEW REGIME SOON, WITH SHAH ON LEAVE". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 27 April 2025.
- ^ Ladjevardi, Habib (1 November 1985). Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-8156-2343-4.
- ^ Project, Mossadegh. "Mossadegh — A Medical Biography | Ebrahim Norouzi, MD". The Mossadegh Project. Retrieved 27 April 2025.
- ^ a b Parsay, Roya (20 October 2020). My Life as a Bowl of Changes. AuthorHouse. ISBN 978-1-6655-0256-6.
- ^ Kinzer, Stephen (2008). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0.
- ^ a b "دختر دکتر مصدق کشته شد". تاریخ ایرانی (in Persian). Ettelaat Newspaper. 1979. Retrieved 11 May 2025.
محمد مصدق رهبر بزرك ملي ايران كه . حنود تيست مال داتست ، جان خود را از نصبت داد : انشار دادء اس ، تن "أهازممه بشرح زير است اكداز خائم «منصوره متين دفتري" دختر يبشوايبزرك ملت انان دكتر محمد يصندق و مادر جناب آقاى دكس هذأ بتله متين دنترى رهبر حبه دمـكاتيك م تبران أعناق افتاد ما با ملت ايران و به خاتو دهيشواى"
[Today, the political group of Iran expresses its heartfelt condolences to the Iranian nation and to the family of its leader Dr. Hedayatullah Matin Daftary, the daughter of the great leader of the Iranian nation, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, and the mother of Dr. Hedayatullah Matin Daftary, the leader of the National Democratic Front of Iran, who occurred yesterday evening in the crash of the plane crash in Mashhad-e Tehran.] - ^ "شجرهنامه خاندان مصدق از چهارنسل قبل تا چهار نسل بعد" [The genealogy of the Mossadegh family]. خبرآنلاین (in Persian). 17 August 2017. Retrieved 11 May 2025.
- ^ Carlston, Morgan (2 September 2014). "Six Myths about the Coup against Iran's Mossadegh". The National Interest.
- ^ a b Roy M. Melbourne First Secretary of Embassy (1 July 1953). Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, No. 337 "Popularity and Prestige of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosadeq". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Iran, 1951–1954 (Report). Office of the Historian.
- ^ Noreena Hertz, The Silent Takeover: Global Capitalism and the Death of Democracy, HarperCollins, 2003, ISBN 0-06-055973-X, Page 88
- ^ Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton (2006), p. 124.
- ^ Mackay, Sandra, The Iranians, Plume (1997), pp. 203, 204.
- ^ a b Ghazvinian, John (2024). America and Iran: A History, 1720 to the Present. Vintage Books (published 2021). ISBN 978-0307271815.
- ^ Sanchez, Raf (19 August 2013). "British diplomats tried to suppress details of a MI6 role in Iran coup". The telegraph. Archived from the original on 12 January 2022.
- ^ Allen-Ebrahimian, Bethany (18 March 2024). "64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup". Foreign Policy.
- ^ a b Norton-Taylor, Richard (19 August 2013). "CIA admits role in 1953 Iranian coup". The Guardian.
- ^ James Risen (16 April 2000). "Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran". The New York Times. Retrieved 3 November 2006.
- ^ "Mohammad Mosaddegh, Man of the Year". Time. 7 January 1951. Archived from the original on 11 January 2007. Retrieved 19 November 2006.
- ^ Soraya (2003) (TV), IMDb, 5 October 2003, retrieved 7 November 2007
- ^ Argo Final Shooting Script Script Slug. Retrieved 15 September 2020
- ^ "Mossadegh". clevelandfilm.org. Archived from the original on 2 August 2012.
- ^ Archived at Ghostarchive and the Wayback Machine: Maz451 (12 February 2016). "Bernie Sanders on Regime Change and Mossadegh" – via YouTube.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link) - ^ Picard, Joe (29 February 2016). "Bernie Sanders, Dr. Mossadegh, and US foreign policy".
- ^ Archived at Ghostarchive and the Wayback Machine: The Young Turks (23 March 2016). "Bernie Sanders – The Young Turks Interview (FULL)" – via YouTube.
- ^ Project, Mossadegh. "Martin O'Malley: Imagine If Iran Had Continued on a Democratic Path".
- ^ "Publications and Honors". hafizsahar.com. Retrieved 5 January 2022.
Sources
[edit]- Abrahamian, Ervand (1982). Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton University. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1fkgcnz. ISBN 9780691101347.
- Abrahamian, Ervand (2012). The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern U.S.-Iranian Relations. The New Press. ISBN 9781620970867.
- Farrokh, Kaveh (2011). Iran at War: 1500–1988. Osprey Publishing. p. 449. ISBN 978-1780962214.
- Afkhami, Gholam Reza (2009). The life and times of the Shah. University of California Press. p. 110. ISBN 978-0-520-25328-5.
- Cleveland, William (2008). A History of the Modern Middle East (4 ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Collier, David R. (2017). "Mossadegh and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis". Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941-1979. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 9780815635123.
- Avery, Peter (1965). Modern Iran. Praeger.
- Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's men: an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-0471265177.
- Diba, Farhad (1986). Mohammad Mossadegh: Political biography. Croom Helm. ISBN 9780709945178.
- Frankel, Benjamin (1992). The Cold War, 1945–1991: Leaders and other important figures in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, and the Third World. Gale Research. ISBN 9780810389281.
- Elm, Mostafa (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. ISBN 0-8156-2642-8.
Further reading
[edit]- (in French) Yves Bomati et Houchang Nahavandi: Mohammad Réza Pahlavi, le dernier shah – 1919–1980. Editions Perrin, 2013. ISBN 978-2262035877
- Abrahamian, Ervand, Khomeinism: essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press, c 1993. 0-520-08173-0
- Amir Taheri, The Persian Night: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution. Encounter Books, 2009, ISBN 978-1-59403-240-0
- Farhad Diba, Mohammad Mossadegh; A Political Biography. London: Croom Helm, 1986, ISBN 0-7099-4517-5
- Katouzian, Homa (2020). "Muṣaddiq, Muḥammad". In Fleet, Kate; Krämer, Gudrun; Matringe, Denis; Nawas, John; Rowson, Everett (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam (3rd ed.). Brill Online. ISSN 1873-9830.
- Mark Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Cornell University Press, 1991, ISBN 0-8014-2412-7
- Mary Ann Heiss, Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950–1954, Columbia University Press,1997, ISBN 0-231-10819-2
- Sattareh Farman Farmaian & Dona Munker, Daughter of Persia: A Woman's Journey from Her Father's Harem through the Islamic Revolution. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006. ISBN 0-307-33974-2
- Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley & Sons, 2003, ISBN 0-471-26517-9
- Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq, Times Books, 2006, ISBN 0-8050-7861-4
- Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, Yale University Press, 2003, ISBN 0-300-09856-1
- Homa Katouzian, Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, I B Tauris & Co, 1991, ISBN 1-85043-210-4
- Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne. Translated into Persian as Mosaddegh va Coup de Etat by Ali Morshedizad, Ghasidehsara Pub. Co.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1987). "The 1953 Coup D'etat in Iran". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 19 (3): 261–86. doi:10.1017/S0020743800056737. ISSN 1471-6380. JSTOR 163655. S2CID 154201459.
- Tom Gabbay The Tehran Conviction. William Morrow, 2009 ISBN 978-0-06-118860-2.
- Christopher de Bellaigue, Patriot of Persia, ISBN 978-1-84792-108-6.
External links
[edit]- Mohammad Mosaddeq biography, Iran Chamber Society
- Mohammad Mosaddegh and the 1953 Coup in Iran—Book and declassified documents from the National Security Archive, 22 June 2004
Mohammad Mosaddegh
View on GrokipediaMohammad Mosaddegh (1882–1967) was an Iranian aristocrat, lawyer, and statesman who served as Prime Minister of Iran from 1951 to 1953, during which he led the nationalization of the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to assert control over Iran's petroleum resources.[1][2] This move, while initially popular among nationalists, triggered a British-led embargo that crippled Iran's economy, exacerbating inflation, unemployment, and fiscal deficits as oil revenues plummeted.[3][4] Facing mounting crises and opposition, Mosaddegh secured emergency powers from parliament in 1952, which he extended into 1953, enabling rule by decree amid fears of communist influence from the Tudeh Party and governmental collapse.[5][6] In July 1953, he dissolved the Majlis through a public referendum, consolidating authority but alienating constitutionalists and facilitating the August coup backed by the United States and United Kingdom, which restored Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's power.[7][6] Post-overthrow, Mosaddegh was tried for treason, placed under house arrest until his death, and remains a polarizing figure—celebrated by some as a defender of sovereignty yet criticized for policies that hastened economic ruin and authoritarian overreach.[4][2]
Early Life and Education
Family Background and Upbringing
Mohammad Mosaddegh was born on June 16, 1882, in Tehran to a family of high-ranking officials in the Qajar dynasty. His father, Mirza Hedayat Ashtiani (also known as Mirza Hideyatu'llah Khan), served as Minister of Finance under Naser al-Din Shah, managing key aspects of the imperial treasury.[8][9] His mother, Najm al-Saltaneh (or Malek al-Taj Najm al-Saltaneh), descended from the Qajar royal line as the granddaughter of Abbas Mirza, the crown prince, and a cousin to Naser al-Din Shah, linking the family to the landowning and aristocratic elite.[8][10] Mosaddegh's father died in 1892, when the future leader was about ten years old, leaving the family to navigate the intrigues of Qajar court politics under continued elite status. Raised in an affluent household in Tehran's Sangelaj district, he experienced the privileges of aristocratic life amid the dynasty's increasing corruption and vulnerability to foreign pressures from Britain and Russia.[10][11] This environment provided early immersion in administrative and reformist circles, though the Qajar system's absolutism and concessions to European powers sowed seeds of discontent in many such families.[12] The Mostowfian Ashtiani lineage, to which Mosaddegh belonged through his father, traced its administrative prominence back to the Zand period and solidified influence under the Qajars, emphasizing fiscal oversight roles that exposed members to the empire's fiscal woes and political machinations.[13][14]Formal Education and Influences
Mosaddegh received his early formal education in Tehran, where he studied political science at a local institution before pursuing advanced studies abroad in 1909.[8] His training emphasized legal and administrative principles, laying the groundwork for his later expertise in governance and jurisprudence.[9] In Europe, Mosaddegh first attended courses in Paris, focusing on international law at the Sorbonne, before transferring to Switzerland to complete a Doctorate of Laws at the University of Neuchâtel.[5] He earned his doctorate in June 1914, becoming one of the first Iranians to obtain such a qualification from a European university, with a thesis examining inheritance laws that bridged Islamic traditions and continental civil law frameworks.[8] [15] This period exposed him to Swiss federalist structures, codified legal systems, and democratic parliamentary practices in a neutral, multilingual environment, contrasting with the autocratic tendencies in Qajar Iran.[10] Mosaddegh returned to Iran shortly after obtaining his degree, on July 28, 1914, coinciding with the outbreak of World War I, which disrupted broader European travel and heightened global awareness of imperial vulnerabilities.[8] This timing reinforced his appreciation for balanced constitutional mechanisms over centralized power, integrating Swiss models of decentralized governance with Persian historical precedents for limited monarchy.[16] His legal formation thus equipped him with tools for advocating rule-of-law principles amid Iran's transitional politics, though direct causal links to specific policies emerged later.[9]Entry into Iranian Politics
Role in the Constitutional Revolution
Mohammad Mosaddegh entered politics amid the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911, a movement driven by merchants, intellectuals, and clerics demanding a constitution to curb the Qajar dynasty's absolute monarchy and mitigate foreign interference from Britain and Russia. Born in 1882 into a prominent family with ties to the Qajar court, Mosaddegh aligned with reformers seeking parliamentary oversight of royal authority and fiscal policies.[17] In October 1906, at age 24, residents of Isfahan elected him to the newly convened First Majlis as their deputy, reflecting grassroots support for his family's prestige and his nascent advocacy for accountable governance. However, the Supplementary Fundamental Laws, ratified in 1907, required Majlis members to be at least 30 years old, disqualifying Mosaddegh from assuming the seat despite the election outcome. This episode underscored the revolution's tensions between popular aspirations and institutional constraints, as the Majlis grappled with drafting laws to limit royal prerogatives, including veto powers and budget approvals.[8][15] Though unable to serve formally, Mosaddegh contributed to revolutionary discourse by opposing Qajar reliance on foreign loans, which he viewed as exacerbating fiscal dependency and enabling European spheres of influence, as formalized in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention partitioning Iran. His positions emphasized judicial independence from monarchical fiat and resistance to concessions granting extraterritorial rights to foreigners, establishing an early pattern of prioritizing national sovereignty over court favoritism. These stances, rooted in first-hand observation of Qajar corruption, positioned him as a critic of arbitrary rule during a period when royalists shelled the Majlis in 1908, temporarily halting reforms.[17]Early Parliamentary and Ministerial Positions
Mosaddegh entered the Fifth Majlis in 1924, representing Tehran, where he voiced strong criticism of the military's growing influence following Reza Khan's 1921 coup d'état and pushed for enhanced civilian authority over the armed forces to preserve constitutional governance.[18] In this parliamentary role during the early Pahlavi period, he focused on anti-corruption measures and fiscal accountability, aligning with his broader advocacy for administrative reforms amid Iran's post-World War I economic strains.[19] Appointed Minister of Finance in Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam's cabinet in early 1921, Mosaddegh enacted swift reforms over three months, slashing salaries across his ministry and dismissing numerous inefficient personnel to curb waste and graft in public spending.[20] These actions aimed at stabilizing Iran's finances amid foreign debts and internal mismanagement, though the cabinet's short tenure limited long-term impact. In June 1923, he briefly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Prime Minister Moshir al-Dowleh, resigning amid tensions with Reza Khan over policies seen as compromising Iranian sovereignty to foreign interests.[21][22] Within the Fifth Majlis, Mosaddegh opposed the October 1925 bill deposing the Qajar dynasty and installing Reza Khan as Reza Shah Pahlavi, contending it subverted parliamentary legitimacy and risked authoritarian rule.[15] His stance drew reprisals, including threats of imprisonment and exile. By 1928, as Reza Shah consolidated power, Mosaddegh's resistance to proposed press restrictions—intended to suppress dissent—led to electoral manipulations that barred his reelection to the Seventh Majlis, effectively sidelining him from active politics until the 1940s.[23][24]Opposition Activities Under Reza Shah
Mosaddegh vocally opposed Reza Khan's ascension to the throne in the Majlis in 1925, arguing that the deposition of the Qajar dynasty and self-coronation violated constitutional principles, as the assembly had no authority to establish a new monarchy without broader ratification.[5] This stance led to his effective exclusion from public office, as Reza Shah consolidated power by manipulating subsequent elections, such as those in 1928, to remove critics like Mosaddegh from the Majlis.[23] Rather than compromising, Mosaddegh withdrew to his family estate in Ahmadabad, focusing on agricultural management and avoiding alignment with the regime's authoritarian measures, which included suppression of dissent and centralization of authority.[8] By the late 1930s, amid escalating repression, Mosaddegh's persistent criticism culminated in his arrest and internal exile to Birjand prison in 1940, where he was held for opposing Reza Shah's dictatorial policies, including forced secularization and land reforms perceived as self-serving.[8] Released in November 1940 under house arrest at Ahmadabad with orders to remain until death, he continued to embody constitutionalist resistance by refusing collaboration or petitions for favor, even as Reza Shah's government leaned toward Axis sympathies during the early World War II period, prioritizing neutrality that favored German economic influence over Allied overtures.[8] This period of isolation enhanced his stature as an incorruptible figure, as he sustained his estates without state patronage, contrasting with elites who accommodated the shah's rule to preserve privileges. Reza Shah's abdication in September 1941 following Anglo-Soviet invasion ended the direct repression, but Mosaddegh's prior defiance underscored his commitment to limiting monarchical overreach amid a regime that had dismantled parliamentary checks.[8]Rise Through the National Front
Formation and Leadership of the National Front
Mosaddegh secured election to Iran's 14th Majlis in 1944 as a representative from Tehran, resuming active parliamentary opposition after years of exile under Reza Shah. In this role, he chaired the Majlis Oil Commission, which pursued audits of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) accounts to verify royalty payments and operational compliance under existing concessions. These investigations exposed persistent imbalances, including Iran's entitlement to only 16% of the AIOC's net profits—stemming from the original 1901 D'Arcy agreement—while the British government, holding a controlling stake, reaped vast revenues exceeding £200 million annually by the late 1940s, with minimal reinvestment or technology transfer benefiting Iran.[25][26] The 1933 renegotiation of the AIOC concession, imposed during Reza Shah's rule, exacerbated grievances by extending the exploitative terms until 1993, reducing the concessionary area but failing to grant Iran majority control, equitable profit-sharing, or veto rights over foreign staffing, thereby perpetuating perceptions of economic subjugation.[27][28] Nationalist critics, including Mosaddegh, argued this renewal prioritized British imperial interests over Iranian sovereignty, as evidenced by the AIOC's evasion of full accounting transparency and its routing of profits through London-based entities.[29] In October 1949, responding to widespread allegations of electoral fraud in the vote for the 15th Majlis and the unresolved oil inequities, Mosaddegh orchestrated the establishment of the National Front (Jebhe Melli) as a broad coalition of nine prominent politicians committed to nationalist reforms. This alliance integrated secular intellectuals, constitutional advocates, and nascent clerical supporters, coalescing around demands for democratic elections, press freedoms, and, centrally, the termination of foreign monopoly over Iran's oil sector to reclaim sovereign resource control.[20][30] Between 1949 and 1951, the National Front intensified agitation through Majlis debates and public campaigns, culminating in resolutions urging the government to compel AIOC renegotiations for higher royalties, Iranianization of operations, and profit repatriation safeguards. Mosaddegh emerged as the coalition's unchallenged figurehead, leveraging these efforts to galvanize anti-imperialist opposition while navigating alliances with bazaari merchants and moderate Islamists, though internal ideological tensions over socialism and monarchy persisted.[31][30]Advocacy for Oil Nationalization Pre-Premiership
As a deputy in the Majlis following his election in 1943, Mohammad Mosaddegh emerged as a vocal critic of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's (AIOC) dominance over Iran's petroleum resources, rooted in the 1901 D'Arcy Concession that granted the company exclusive exploration and extraction rights for 60 years in exchange for an initial payment and 16% of annual net profits to the Iranian government.[32] This arrangement, renegotiated in 1933 to extend operations until 1993, shifted compensation to a fixed royalty of 4 shillings per ton of exported oil plus 20% of dividends exceeding £671,250 annually, alongside a £1 million lump sum for prior claims, but failed to adjust adequately for the postwar production boom that multiplied output while Iran's revenues remained volume-tied and disproportionately low relative to AIOC's gains.[33] Mosaddegh highlighted these terms as emblematic of foreign exploitation, arguing they denied Iran sovereignty over its subsurface resources and equitable economic benefits, especially as global peers like Saudi Arabia secured 50-50 profit splits by 1950. In 1949, as leader of the newly formed National Front coalition, Mosaddegh channeled this critique into parliamentary action by chairing the Majlis Oil Commission, which scrutinized the AIOC's proposed 1949 Supplemental Agreement intended to revise the 1933 terms through higher royalties (6 shillings per ton retroactive to 1948), a £5 million one-off payment, and steps toward 50-50 profit sharing via a new subsidiary structure.[33] On November 25, 1950, the commission under his leadership unanimously rejected the proposal as insufficient, insisting on immediate 50% profit allocation to Iran, majority Iranian representation on the company's board, and full operational control to rectify historical imbalances and align with emerging decolonization norms.[34] This stance blocked ratification under Prime Minister Ali Mansur and later General Ali Razmara, escalating calls within the National Front for outright nationalization while exposing AIOC's refusal to relinquish monopoly privileges. Mosaddegh amplified these parliamentary efforts through public advocacy, leveraging National Front platforms to publicize AIOC's labor practices in Abadan, where Iranian workers endured segregated facilities, wages 10-20% of British counterparts, and substandard housing amid refinery expansions that employed over 40,000 by 1950.[35] He supported worker agitation, including the December 1950 strikes demanding enforcement of Iranian labor laws, better healthcare, and pay equity, framing them as symptoms of colonial disregard that resonated with postwar nationalist sentiments influenced by independence movements in India and elsewhere.[36] These campaigns, including rallies at Baharestan Square, built grassroots momentum for reclaiming oil revenues—estimated at under 20% of AIOC's profits despite Iran's resource ownership—without yet enacting legislation, positioning nationalization as a sovereign imperative against entrenched foreign interests.[8]Premiership and Policy Implementation (1951–1953)
Appointment and Initial Mandate
On March 7, 1951, Prime Minister Hossein Ali Razmara, who had opposed full oil nationalization, was assassinated by Navvab Safavi of the Fada'iyan-e Islam group, creating a political vacuum amid escalating demands for sovereignty over Iran's oil resources.[29] The Majlis, facing deadlock after interim prime ministers failed to secure confidence, nominated Mohammad Mosaddegh on April 28, 1951, as the candidate to lead the government, with a vote of 79 to 12 endorsing the National Front's platform focused on implementing the recently passed oil nationalization legislation.[5] This selection reflected the parliamentary majority's prioritization of nationalist economic control over foreign concessions, particularly the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's dominance since 1901. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, wary of Mosaddegh's republican leanings and potential challenges to monarchical authority, reluctantly issued the firman confirming the appointment on April 29, 1951, influenced by threats of mass unrest if a popular nationalist figure was overlooked.[37] The decision established an immediate tension between the executive premiership and the palace, as the Shah viewed Mosaddegh's rise as a concession to parliamentary pressure rather than a preferred alignment.[20] Mosaddegh's initial mandate centered on executing the Majlis-approved oil nationalization law of March 1951, framed as a restoration of Iranian economic independence from British influence, supplemented by electoral reforms to broaden democratic participation.[20] He entered office amid a surge of public enthusiasm, drawing backing from urban bazaar merchants—who funded National Front activities—and key clerics like Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani, who mobilized religious networks against perceived foreign exploitation.[38] This coalition positioned the premiership as a pivotal step toward national self-determination, though underlying factional divisions foreshadowed governance challenges.[20]Oil Industry Nationalization and Legal Justifications
On March 15, 1951, the Iranian Majlis approved the principle of nationalizing the oil industry, following a recommendation from a special parliamentary oil committee chaired by Mohammad Mosaddegh.[27] This vote, passed by a majority, targeted the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), whose operations stemmed from the 1901 D'Arcy Concession, which Mosaddegh and supporters portrayed as an exploitative colonial-era grant that surrendered vast territorial rights and minimal royalties to Britain for 60 years.[27] The Majlis verification followed on March 17, with the Senate approving the full nationalization law on May 1, 1951, enacting the expropriation of AIOC assets and establishing the National Iranian Oil Company to manage operations.[39] [40] Iranian justifications rested on assertions of sovereign control over natural resources under the 1906 Constitution, which vested subsurface wealth in the state, and the AIOC's perceived failure to renegotiate the 1933 supplemental agreement on equitable terms despite Iranian demands since the 1940s.[41] Proponents, including Mosaddegh, invoked international law precedents allowing expropriation for public purpose with prompt, adequate compensation, arguing that the 1933 agreement—imposed after Reza Shah's cancellation attempt—unfairly preserved British dominance while providing Iran only 16% of profits net of costs.[41] Britain countered that nationalization breached the 1933 concession's arbitration clause and constituted discriminatory expropriation without genuine negotiation, violating principles of pacta sunt servanda and acquired rights under customary international law.[39] In response, Britain filed an application with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on May 26, 1951, seeking adjudication under the 1933 agreement's compromissory clause, which Iran had incorporated into its 1932 declaration accepting ICJ jurisdiction.[42] Iran rejected the referral, maintaining that the dispute involved sovereign domestic legislation immune from international adjudication and that the 1933 clause did not confer compulsory jurisdiction, as Iran had not intended broad consent via its optional clause declaration.[42] Initially, Iranian officials, including Mosaddegh, signaled willingness for arbitration on compensation but conditioned it on recognizing nationalization's validity; these overtures were later withdrawn as Britain pursued legal and economic pressures.[43] The ICJ, in its July 22, 1952, judgment, upheld Iran's objection, ruling it lacked jurisdiction due to the declaration's reservations excluding matters of domestic jurisdiction.[42]Economic Policies and Resulting Crises
Following the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in March 1951, Iran's oil exports plummeted from over 600,000 barrels per day in early 1951 to zero by year's end, as a British-led international boycott prevented tanker access and major buyers refused Iranian crude.[44] This severed government revenues, which had averaged around £16 million annually from AIOC royalties and taxes prior to nationalization, reducing public income by approximately one-third overall.[45][46] Foreign exchange reserves, already strained, faced depletion within two years at prevailing deficit rates without alternative income.[47] The Abadan refinery's closure in October 1951 exacerbated the downturn, idling roughly 20,000 of its 24,000 workers as operations halted amid the embargo and withdrawal of British technical staff.[48] Budget shortfalls prompted reliance on reserve drawdowns and monetary expansion, fueling annual inflation rates of 20-25% through 1953, with the rial devaluing amid import shortages and rising costs.[47] These pressures manifested in widespread economic instability, including a contraction in overall activity as oil-dependent sectors stalled and non-oil exports failed to fully offset losses. To mitigate deficits and inflation, Mosaddegh implemented price controls on essentials and subsidies adjustments, alongside a 1952 land reform act mandating landlords to divert 20% of rents to a peasant development fund for rural infrastructure.[6] However, controls spurred black markets and goods shortages, undermining efficacy, while land measures yielded limited immediate fiscal relief amid the broader crisis.[47] Government spending cuts targeted military budgets, but persistent deficits and reserve erosion heightened vulnerability, contributing to a reported 10-15% GDP decline in the 1951-1953 period per contemporary economic analyses.[49]Domestic Governance and Power Consolidation Measures
Following the dissolution of the 16th Majlis in late 1950 amid disputes over his initial emergency powers, Mosaddegh faced ongoing deadlock in the 17th Majlis elected in 1952, where opposition from conservative deputies and clerical factions blocked his agenda. On July 25, 1952, his cabinet issued a decree authorizing a national referendum to decide on dissolving the Majlis, bypassing constitutional requirements for legislative or royal approval.[50] The vote, held on July 30, employed separate ballot boxes for "yes" and "no" votes in public view, a method decried for compromising secrecy and enabling irregularities, with opposition groups boycotting en masse and questioning turnout verification amid reports of coerced participation.[51] Official results claimed over 99% approval for dissolution from roughly 6 million voters, though independent scrutiny was absent, and the process deviated from parliamentary norms, consolidating executive authority directly via plebiscite.[51] Post-referendum, Mosaddegh's government suspended the Majlis indefinitely around August 16, 1952, and extended his emergency powers, initially granted after the July 1952 uprising (Siyeh-e Tir) for six months in October 1952 and renewed for another year in January 1953, allowing rule by decree without legislative oversight.[4] These decrees facilitated military purges targeting officers suspected of monarchist loyalties, removing hundreds from command roles to install reliable appointees, a move that prioritized control over institutional independence despite Mosaddegh's nationalist rhetoric.[4] Media restrictions followed, including suppression of two Tudeh Party newspapers in mid-1953 and curbs on critical domestic outlets, framing dissent as subversive amid economic strain.[52] Relations with the Tudeh Party, Iran's communist organization, revealed tactical pragmatism verging on authoritarianism; while initially tolerating Tudeh street support against rivals, Mosaddegh cracked down on party-led strikes and demonstrations in 1952–1953, deploying security forces to quell unrest and limit communist influence, even as Tudeh propaganda backed his oil policies.[52] Clashes extended to traditional elites, including landowners and clerics outside his National Front coalition, whom he marginalized through decrees redistributing influence and sidelining opposition voices in governance, underscoring a shift from constitutional checks to centralized executive dominance justified as necessary for national sovereignty.[4] These measures, while stabilizing his base, eroded pluralism, inviting accusations of overreach from constitutionalists who viewed them as undermining the very parliamentary system Mosaddegh had long championed.[51]Foreign Relations and Diplomatic Standoffs
Following the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on May 1, 1951, Mosaddegh's government pursued international diplomacy to assert Iran's sovereignty, lodging a formal complaint with the United Nations Security Council on October 1, 1951, accusing Britain of economic aggression and threats to peace through its refusal to accept nationalization.[53] In his address to the Council on October 15, 1951, Mosaddegh emphasized Iran's right to control its resources, rejecting British claims of illegality under the 1933 concession and framing the dispute as a colonial holdover.[54] The Security Council deferred substantive debate, urging bilateral negotiations, but Britain's subsequent naval buildup near Abadan and global oil embargo—initiated in October 1951—intensified the standoff, with the U.S. refusing to purchase Iranian oil to enforce compliance.[55] The Truman administration engaged in mediation efforts from mid-1951, dispatching envoys like W. Averell Harriman in July 1951 to broker a settlement, proposing a 50-50 profit-sharing model akin to the 1950 Aramco-Saudi agreement, coupled with interim oil purchases to alleviate Iran's economic strain.[56] Mosaddegh rejected these overtures, insisting on prior British recognition of the nationalization law's validity and full Iranian operational control, viewing concessions as undermining sovereignty; for instance, he declined a September 1951 U.S.-backed supplemental agreement that preserved British managerial roles.[57] Similarly, proposals for World Bank arbitration in late 1951 and early 1952 were rebuffed, as Mosaddegh argued they implied shared ownership and contravened the nationalization decree's provisions for exclusive Iranian authority, prioritizing absolute control over pragmatic revenue resumption.[34] Mosaddegh maintained an anti-communist posture, suppressing the Tudeh Party despite its tactical support for nationalization and ignoring Soviet diplomatic feelers for closer ties, such as offers of technical aid amid the oil crisis, due to ideological opposition and fears of external domination.[1] This isolationist stance extended to rejecting consortium models that would involve multiple foreign firms, as they diluted Iran's monopoly. By early 1953, U.S.-Iran relations had deteriorated amid Iran's fiscal collapse and perceived Tudeh gains in labor unrest and Majlis influence, with American assessments warning of a potential communist takeover if instability persisted, shifting policy from mediation to contingency planning for regime change.[58] The prolonged rejection of compromises thus causally linked to sustained British-led sanctions—costing Iran an estimated $30 million monthly in lost revenue by 1952—and diplomatic isolation, exacerbating internal pressures without yielding foreign investment or markets.[59]The 1953 Overthrow
Escalating Conflicts with the Shah and Institutions
In July 1952, tensions between Mosaddegh and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi intensified when Mosaddegh demanded control of the War Ministry portfolio to assert the prime minister's constitutional authority over the armed forces, a domain traditionally influenced by the monarchy.[60][61] The Shah refused, prompting Mosaddegh to resign on July 16 and submit his cabinet for royal approval, leading the Shah to appoint Ahmad Qavam as interim prime minister.[62] Pro-Mosaddegh demonstrators launched the Siyeh-e Tir uprising on July 21, clashing with security forces in Tehran and other cities, resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds arrested amid widespread riots against Qavam's appointment.[63] Under pressure from the unrest, the Shah dismissed Qavam after less than a day and reinstated Mosaddegh on July 22, conceding temporary control of the War Ministry; this event significantly boosted Mosaddegh's popular support while diminishing the Shah's perceived authority and exposing fractures in monarchical-institutional relations.[64] By early 1953, conflicts escalated as Mosaddegh accused the Shah of interfering in government affairs and backing oppositional elements, including demands in January for the dismissal of generals deemed disloyal and control over the Ministry of Court, which managed the royal civil list and palace matters.[64] The Shah's refusal deepened mutual distrust, with Mosaddegh viewing royal influence as a barrier to effective governance amid economic woes from oil sanctions, while the Shah saw Mosaddegh's maneuvers as encroachments on constitutional prerogatives.[65] These disputes fractured potential collaborations, as Mosaddegh's National Front allies in the Majlis increasingly aligned against perceived royalist interference, leading to institutional paralysis where legislative debates stalled on key reforms. Mosaddegh further strained military ties by accusing figures like General Fazlollah Zahedi of plotting against him, claiming in public statements to have thwarted schemes to install Zahedi as prime minister, which alienated moderate officers and highlighted growing paranoia over royalist cabals.[66] Zahedi, a veteran general with ties to the Pahlavi regime, had initially cooperated loosely but broke ranks amid these charges, contributing to a breakdown in cross-institutional trust as army loyalty divided between civilian leadership and the throne.[66] In July 1953, amid deadlock over extending emergency powers for finance, economy, and personnel—rejected by a divided Majlis—Mosaddegh tendered his resignation to pressure the legislature and Shah, publicly attributing it to royal court intrigues.[52][65] The Majlis swiftly rejected the resignation on July 13, urging Mosaddegh to remain and effectively blocking his strategy to dissolve the assembly for new elections, which intensified perceptions of institutional collapse and Mosaddegh's isolation from traditional power centers. This episode underscored failed attempts at compromise, as Mosaddegh's insistence on abdication-like concessions from the Shah alienated even supportive deputies, paving the way for broader governance crises.[64]Operation Ajax: Covert Planning and Execution
Planning for Operation Ajax, the joint CIA-MI6 effort code-named TPAJAX by the United States and Operation Boot by Britain, commenced in late 1952 amid escalating concerns over Iran's oil nationalization and perceived vulnerability to Soviet influence.[67] Declassified CIA documents detail the operational blueprint, which emphasized psychological warfare, propaganda dissemination, and targeted bribery to undermine Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh's government while bolstering Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's authority.[4] The CIA allocated approximately $1 million for the covert phase, funding payments to military officers for defection, recruitment of street mobs including hired thugs for staged riots, and subsidies to media outlets and religious figures to amplify anti-Mosaddegh narratives portraying him as a communist sympathizer.[67] [68] Kermit Roosevelt Jr., head of the CIA's Near East and Africa Division, directed on-the-ground implementation from Tehran starting in July 1953, coordinating with Iranian assets like General Fazlollah Zahedi to execute the decree dismissing Mosaddegh.[67] The initial thrust on August 15, 1953—TPAJAX's first phase—involved Imperial Guard commander Nematollah Nassiri attempting to deliver the Shah's firman appointing Zahedi prime minister, but it collapsed when Nassiri was arrested en route, prompting the Shah's flight to Baghdad and Rome.[69] [4] Roosevelt then improvised, disbursing funds to orchestrate chaos: operatives bombed a prominent cleric's home to feign Tudeh Party culpability, while paid protesters—numbering in the thousands and including bazaar toughs—clashed with police, sacked pro-Mosaddegh newspapers, and rallied pro-Shah crowds that converged on Tehran by August 19.[67] [68] The coup's success on August 19, 1953—known locally as the 28 Mordad coup (کودتای ۲۸ مرداد)—hinged on these mechanics amid Iran's economic distress from the ongoing British oil embargo, which fueled public desperation and eroded Mosaddegh's base beyond foreign manipulation.[4] The Tudeh Party's restrained response—failing to mobilize decisively for Mosaddegh despite ideological alignment—further isolated his regime, as declassified assessments noted their depleted influence post-nationalization backlash.[4] [70] Military buyouts proved pivotal, with bribed units under Zahedi seizing key sites like radio stations to broadcast the Shah's decree, tipping the balance against loyalist forces.[67] This blend of covert orchestration and opportunistic domestic fractures secured Zahedi's installation, restoring monarchical control.[68]Coup Dynamics and Domestic Support Factors
By mid-1953, widespread public disillusionment with Mosaddegh's government had intensified due to severe economic hardships stemming from the ongoing oil boycott and import restrictions imposed after nationalization. Inflation rates accelerated to approximately 20-25 percent annually between 1951 and 1953, exacerbating shortages of essential goods and driving up living costs, while unemployment rose amid governance stagnation and fiscal mismanagement.[47] The rial's market value devalued sharply, shifting from 50 rials per U.S. dollar to around 100 rials by August 1953, further eroding purchasing power and fueling urban discontent among workers, merchants, and the middle class.[71] These pressures contributed to a broader sense of paralysis, as Mosaddegh's reliance on emergency decrees following the dissolution of the Majlis alienated former allies and highlighted his inability to resolve the crisis through negotiation or reform. Shifts among domestic elites played a pivotal role in undermining Mosaddegh's position. Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani, initially a key supporter in the National Front coalition, broke with Mosaddegh by early 1953 over disagreements regarding power extensions and the referendum to dissolve parliament, openly opposing him by mid-year and mobilizing clerical networks against perceived secular overreach.[72] Non-communist nationalists and bazaar merchants, traditional pillars of Iranian society, withdrew support as economic woes hit their livelihoods hardest; bazaaris, in particular, funded anti-Mosaddegh agitation, viewing his policies as disruptive to commerce and stability.[73] Clerical figures like Ayatollah Seyyed Abu al-Qasem Kashani leveraged mosques to rally crowds, framing opposition as a defense of Islamic values against dictatorial tendencies, which resonated amid fears of Tudeh Party influence.[74] Military dynamics tipped decisively during the coup's execution on August 19, 1953. Initial hesitation gave way to defections by key officers in Tehran and provinces, who aligned with General Fazlollah Zahedi, bolstering pro-Shah forces with control over armored units and tanks—pro-coup elements secured approximately 24 tanks that day.[75] These shifts reflected broader officer corps resentment over Mosaddegh's purges and favoritism toward loyalists, enabling rapid consolidation without widespread armed resistance from pro-Mosaddegh troops. The coup's success revealed underlying domestic fractures rather than uniform foreign imposition. On August 19, anti-Mosaddegh crowds, including nationalists, clergy followers, and bazaar-backed groups, overwhelmed pro-government demonstrators, attacking official buildings and party offices with minimal Tudeh or National Front pushback, indicating genuine momentum from alienated sectors.[75] Subsequent celebrations in Tehran, involving thousands, underscored this erosion of support, as reports noted spontaneous participation beyond paid agitators, challenging accounts that portray the overthrow as solely externally orchestrated.[6]Trial, Imprisonment, and Final Years
Post-Coup Arrest and Military Tribunal
Following the success of the coup on August 19, 1953, Iranian military forces under General Fazlollah Zahedi bombarded Mohammad Mosaddegh's residence in Tehran with artillery and machine-gun fire after he refused to surrender, resulting in his capture and formal arrest the next day, August 20.[76] Mosaddegh was charged with treason, attempting to overthrow the monarchy by resisting the Shah's dismissal decree, dissolving the Majlis without legal authority, and conspiring to establish a republic.[77][78] The military tribunal, convened by the Zahedi government and presided over by five judges, began proceedings on November 8, 1953, and concluded on December 21. Defense opportunities were restricted, with the court ruling that no jury was required as Mosaddegh was deemed an "ordinary person" rather than a high official entitled to special protections, and Mosaddegh repeatedly rejected the tribunal's legitimacy in defiant statements, arguing it lacked jurisdiction and defending his actions as constitutional responses to foreign threats and royal overreach.[79] Prosecutors sought the death penalty, but the tribunal sentenced him to three years of solitary confinement retroactive to his arrest date, a reduction attributed to the Shah's intervention for clemency.[80] While the trial drew some international criticism for its political nature, it faced broad domestic acceptance under the new regime, with no significant organized resistance.[81]Sentencing, House Arrest, and Health Decline
Following the military tribunal's verdict on December 21, 1953, imposing three years of solitary confinement for rebellion against the Shah, Mosaddegh completed his prison sentence and was transferred on August 4, 1956, to lifelong house arrest at his ancestral estate in Ahmadabad, approximately 60 kilometers west of Tehran.[82][83] The estate, a walled compound he had developed earlier in life, became his place of confinement under continuous military surveillance, with guards restricting access to prevent political agitation.[8] Authorities enforced severe isolation measures, banning unsanctioned visitors, prohibiting publication of any writings, and limiting communication to immediate household essentials, thereby curtailing Mosaddegh's ability to engage publicly or organize supporters.[83] These restrictions compounded the psychological strain of his overthrow and trial, fostering a profound seclusion that historical accounts describe as deliberately aimed at neutralizing his influence without outright execution.[1] Mosaddegh's health began deteriorating markedly in the mid-1960s due to throat cancer, diagnosed after symptoms of severe mouth and throat pain prompted limited medical evaluation under guard supervision.[84] He received cobalt radiation therapy at a Tehran hospital, but access to advanced care remained constrained by his confinement, and he rejected proposals for overseas treatment, preferring Iranian physicians to avoid reliance on foreign or royal facilitation.[85] The aggressive tumor and radiation side effects induced persistent agony and frailty, accelerating physical decline amid the unyielding isolation.[86] Despite the prohibitions, Mosaddegh dictated and penned reflections reiterating themes of Iranian sovereignty and critiquing foreign interference, with some manuscripts and letters covertly conveyed beyond Ahmadabad through trusted intermediaries.[87] This clandestine output, produced in defiance of censorship, underscored his enduring commitment to first-principles nationalism even as bodily frailty intensified the toll of captivity.[88]Death and Private Burial
Mohammad Mosaddegh died on March 5, 1967, at his residence in Ahmadabad from complications arising from cancer treatment, at the age of 84.[86][84] He had been diagnosed with cancer of the roof of the mouth and undergone radium therapy, which contributed to his decline into coma and eventual passing.[89][90] The Iranian government, under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, prohibited public announcements of his death in newspapers and denied permission for a formal funeral, citing concerns over potential unrest or rallies that could challenge the regime's authority.[91] To circumvent state interference and honor his wishes while avoiding official control, Mosaddegh's family arranged an immediate private burial in a vault constructed in the courtyard of his Ahmadabad villa, rather than transferring the body to a public cemetery or abroad as initially stipulated in his will for Najaf, Iraq.[91][92] The ceremony was limited to relatives, including sons Gholam-Hossein and Ahmad Mosaddegh, son-in-law Matin Daftari, and a small group of sympathizers, with the body transported discreetly in a hospital ambulance accompanied by a few cars.[91] This secretive interment highlighted the regime's persistent suppression of Mosaddegh's symbolic influence, as public commemoration was deemed a risk even 14 years after his overthrow.[91] Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the vault's location and the circumstances of the burial became points of contention, with debates over exhumation or relocation reflecting ongoing political reinterpretations of his legacy, though his remains remained at Ahmadabad, serving as a site of quiet defiance against monarchical controls.[93]Personal Life and Ideology
Family Dynamics and Offspring
Mohammad Mosaddegh married Zahra Emami, a granddaughter of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, in 1901 at the age of 19.[94] The couple, adhering to traditional Persian aristocratic norms, raised their five children in a household emphasizing familial duty and discretion, with Zahra managing domestic affairs while Mosaddegh pursued public and legal careers.[8] Their offspring included two sons, Ahmad and Gholam-Hossein, and three daughters, Zia Ashraf (the eldest child), Mansoureh, and Khadijeh.[8] [10] Gholam-Hossein trained as a physician, maintaining a professional life apart from political spotlight.[95] Ahmad resided abroad at times, corresponding with his father on personal and legal matters, such as attorney selections.[96] Following the 1953 events, the sons adopted low public profiles, with Ahmad involved in estate administration amid family efforts to navigate restrictions.[97] Some family members emigrated or stayed overseas to mitigate risks of reprisal, reflecting the offspring's preference for private stability over visibility.[96] The daughters similarly limited involvement, providing discreet familial backing during Mosaddegh's house arrest without seeking prominence.[8]Personal Character Traits and Ideological Commitments
Mohammad Mosaddegh exhibited a dramatic personality marked by emotional oratory, frequently shedding tears during Majlis speeches to convey fervor, as observed by U.S. diplomats who described it as essential to his demagogic appeal.[20] Such displays extended to physical collapses, including fainting on the Majlis floor amid tearful addresses, which witnesses attributed to intense emotional investment rather than mere theatrics.[4] These traits endeared him to supporters as authentic passion but drew criticism for perceived manipulation of public sentiment.[98] Mosaddegh maintained an ascetic lifestyle, shunning personal enrichment amid widespread elite corruption, which earned him admiration for incorruptibility and aligned with his rejection of ostentatious privilege.[99] Ideologically, he championed secular nationalism, prioritizing Iranian sovereignty and modernization while firmly opposing communism, though he tolerated limited Tudeh Party support without advancing Marxist goals.[100] His commitment to constitutional monarchy emphasized Majlis supremacy and legal governance, evolving amid Shah conflicts to implicit republican sympathies, yet he rebuffed explicit republican calls to preserve institutional continuity.[101] This reflected a pacifist bent, favoring diplomatic and judicial means over military coercion, as seen in his reluctance to deploy force against domestic opponents despite constitutional authority.[102] Critics among contemporaries highlighted Mosaddegh's intransigence, arguing his refusal of pragmatic compromises—such as oil settlement concessions or coalition accommodations—exacerbated isolation and crises, prioritizing ideological purity over feasible resolutions.[103] Former allies like Mozaffar Baqai and Ayatollah Kashani cited this stubbornness as alienating key factions, transforming initial broad support into fragmentation.[104] While admirers viewed such resolve as principled defense of national interests, detractors contended it reflected eccentric rigidity unfit for governance amid geopolitical pressures.[84]Electoral and Political Record
Key Elections and Majlis Votes
In the 1943–1944 legislative elections for Iran's 14th Majlis, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected to represent Tehran, having founded and led the National Front coalition that achieved strong results in the capital's constituencies.[4] This marked his return to parliament after previous terms, with the National Front positioning itself against perceived foreign influence and monarchical overreach.[5] On April 28, 1951, the 16th Majlis voted 79–12 to confirm Mosaddegh as prime minister, shortly after parliament's approval of the oil nationalization legislation that had propelled his political ascent.[105] This mandate reflected broad legislative backing amid widespread public sentiment favoring national control over Iran's petroleum resources.[29] Facing parliamentary opposition to his emergency powers decree, Mosaddegh initiated Iran's first national referendum in August 1953 to dissolve the 17th Majlis, with official results showing 99.9% approval nationwide, including in Tehran where 204,275 votes favored dissolution against 384 opposed.[106] The plebiscite's format—separate ballot boxes for yes and no votes—drew criticism for potentially inflating turnout and suppressing dissent, though it underscored Mosaddegh's residual mobilization capacity in urban centers despite economic strains from the British-led oil embargo.[50]Legacy and Historiographical Debates
Economic Impacts: Nationalization's Verifiable Outcomes
Prior to the 1951 nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), Iran received $44.8 million in oil royalties in 1950, equivalent to a substantial share of government revenues and over 50% of foreign exchange earnings, derived from production levels of 648,000 barrels per day.[27][107] Following the March 1951 nationalization decree and the subsequent British-led boycott, which restricted market access and technical support, oil production plummeted to an average of 28,000 barrels per day during 1952–1953—approximately 4% of 1950 levels—resulting in export revenues approaching zero by 1953.[26][108] This abrupt halt, compounded by the expulsion of foreign personnel and loss of operational expertise, directly caused a fiscal crisis, with government budgets unable to cover expenditures without oil income, leading to depleted reserves and reliance on short-term loans.[109] The revenue collapse triggered broader economic contraction, including a 38% decline in imports from 1951 to 1953, industrial output stagnation due to energy shortages and supply chain disruptions, and inflationary pressures from currency devaluation and reduced productivity.[47] Urban sectors, heavily dependent on oil-linked trade and employment, suffered most acutely, while rural areas faced indirect strains from curtailed public investments, fostering increased migration to cities and exacerbating pre-existing inequalities without compensatory diversification.[109] Economic analyses attribute these outcomes causally to the boycott's enforcement following unilateral expropriation, rather than inherent production limits, as domestic management proved incapable of sustaining output amid skill gaps and market exclusion.[108] Restoration of flows occurred only via the 1954 consortium agreement, which allocated Iran 50% of net profits in exchange for multinational operational control, enabling production to recover to 951,000 barrels per day by 1959 and revenues to exceed pre-1951 adjusted levels thereafter.[26] No evidence indicates net economic gains from the nationalization interregnum itself; instead, the two-year revenue void delayed capital accumulation and infrastructure, with verifiable growth resuming solely upon reintegration of foreign technology and investment.[108] Comparative assessments by resource economists highlight that Saudi Arabia's 1950 50-50 profit split with Aramco, negotiated without expropriation, maintained uninterrupted production and revenues, suggesting Iran could have secured similar terms bilaterally to avert the boycott-induced losses while achieving equivalent fiscal shares over time.[110][111] This path dependency underscores nationalization's role in forgoing stable alternatives for ideological assertions that yielded short-term collapse without offsetting domestic capacity gains.[47]Assessments of Governance: Democratic Ideals vs. Authoritarian Tendencies
Mosaddegh's governance emphasized popular sovereignty through initiatives like the oil nationalization campaign, which galvanized public support and positioned him as a champion against monarchical and foreign influence, with some historians interpreting these as steps toward proto-democratic accountability.[112] His personal incorruptibility contrasted sharply with prevailing elite practices, as he dismissed officials implicated in graft and prioritized merit-based appointments, actions lauded by analysts focused on anti-corruption reforms as fostering institutional integrity.[7] Left-leaning scholars, often emphasizing anti-imperial resistance, credit him with elevating public participation over elite vetoes, viewing his tenure as an aspirational model for Third World democracy despite institutional constraints.[16] Counterarguments highlight a shift toward power centralization, exemplified by the Majlis granting him emergency powers on August 3, 1952, initially for six months to address the oil crisis, which he extended in January 1953 and sought to prolong further in July, enabling decree-based rule that bypassed legislative checks.[113] The August 3-10, 1953, referendum dissolving the 17th Majlis passed with 2,043,300 "yes" votes against 39,944 "no," but its design—separate ballot boxes for each option—facilitated voter identification and alleged coercion, alienating liberals and conservatives alike and drawing accusations of procedural manipulation. These measures culminated in arrests of opponents, including figures like Mohammad Sa'ed, under martial law provisions, prompting scholarly critiques of authoritarian drift akin to Reza Shah's centralizing tactics.[114] Right-leaning assessments portray this trajectory as a slide into personalist rule, where frustration with parliamentary deadlock justified extraconstitutional actions that eroded separation of powers and risked societal anarchy by sidelining moderating institutions.[104] Empirical parallels include the deprivation of the Shah's constitutional prerogatives in 1952-1953 and suppression of dissent via military units, actions that, while framed as defensive necessities by proponents, undermined the very constitutionalism Mosaddegh publicly invoked.[115] Balanced scholarly views acknowledge his initial democratic intent but substantiate a causal progression from crisis response to unchecked authority, with institutional biases in post-coup narratives often amplifying pro-democratic hagiography at the expense of these verifiable power grabs.[7]International Perspectives: Anti-Imperial Narratives vs. Strategic Necessity Arguments
Anti-imperial narratives, prevalent in left-leaning academic and media analyses, frame the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh as a quintessential act of Western imperialism driven primarily by the desire to safeguard British oil interests and maintain geopolitical dominance in the Middle East. These accounts emphasize the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in March 1951 as a legitimate sovereign act, portraying the subsequent British-led economic boycott and U.S.-backed Operation Ajax on August 19, 1953, as punitive interference that subverted Iranian democracy to prevent resource control by a nationalist government.[116] Such critiques often attribute long-term regional instability, including the 1979 Iranian Revolution, to this event as a foundational betrayal of anti-colonial aspirations.[2] In contrast, strategic necessity arguments, drawn from declassified U.S. and British documents, highlight pragmatic imperatives rooted in Cold War containment and economic stability rather than unadulterated imperialism. The United Kingdom maintained that Mosaddegh's expropriation of AIOC assets without compensation breached the 1933 concession agreement, justifying legal and economic countermeasures to uphold international contract norms and avert precedent for global resource seizures.[29] U.S. policy initially under President Truman supported mediation for an oil settlement to bolster Mosaddegh against communist influences, but shifted under Eisenhower by mid-1953 amid fears of Iran's economic collapse—exacerbated by the British boycott, domestic mismanagement, and rising Tudeh Party activity—which risked Soviet encroachment in a strategically vital oil-producing nation.[6][117] Declassified CIA assessments from 2013 onward reveal that intervention was motivated not solely by oil but by apprehensions of governmental breakdown and communist takeover, with internal reports citing Iran's fiscal insolvency by July 1953 and Mosaddegh's authoritarian consolidation of power as catalysts for instability.[118][119] Recent realist analyses in the 2020s affirm that while foreign orchestration enabled the coup, domestic factors—such as Mosaddegh's refusal to compromise on oil revenues, suppression of opposition, and failure to stabilize the economy—predominated in precipitating his ouster, rendering intervention a response to invited chaos rather than unprovoked aggression.[6][120] This dichotomy underscores a causal tension: Mosaddegh's nationalization inspired decolonization movements worldwide by challenging entrenched concessions, yet his intransigence on negotiations—rejecting supplemental agreements that could have mitigated boycott effects—arguably heightened vulnerabilities to external leverage and internal unrest, per evidence-based reconstructions prioritizing verifiable policy deliberations over ideological indictments.[121][16] Anti-imperial framings, while highlighting sovereignty erosions, often underweight these endogenous drivers, reflecting interpretive biases in sources sympathetic to Third World nationalism.[122]Iranian Domestic Views: Monarchical Era to Post-Revolutionary Reinterpretations
During the Pahlavi monarchy, particularly after the 1953 coup, Mohammad Mosaddegh was officially portrayed as a traitor who violated the constitution by seeking to dismantle the monarchy's authority, including through a 1953 referendum that dissolved the Majlis with 99% reported approval, an action monarchists deemed unconstitutional as only the Shah held such prerogative.[123] He was arrested, tried by a military court, convicted of treason on December 21, 1953, sentenced to three years in prison followed by lifelong house arrest until his death on March 5, 1967, and his image was suppressed in state media and education to emphasize loyalty to the Shah.[60] Despite this, underground nationalist and liberal groups revered him as a symbol of sovereignty for leading the 1951 oil nationalization, viewing his ouster as a capitulation to foreign powers that perpetuated economic dependency.[124] Following the 1979 Revolution, the Islamic Republic selectively co-opted Mosaddegh's anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist narrative to legitimize its overthrow of the Shah, with associates from his National Front briefly dominating the provisional government under Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan in 1979. However, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rejected full endorsement, declaring in 1981 that Mosaddegh was "not a Muslim" due to his secularism and advocacy for separating religion from state governance, leading to the erasure of his name from streets, textbooks, and public discourse to prioritize Islamic revolutionary icons.[125] The regime's historiography frames him as a flawed precursor whose failure to integrate Shia clerical authority resulted in instability, while suppressing celebrations of his tenure to avoid highlighting democratic constitutionalism over theocratic rule.[126] In post-revolutionary opposition circles, Mosaddegh's legacy revived as a beacon of secular nationalism and parliamentary democracy, invoked during protests against theocratic overreach, such as the 2009 Green Movement where reformists cited his Majlis-centered governance to critique the Supreme Leader's dominance, and in 2022 Woman, Life, Freedom demonstrations where chants referenced the 1953 coup as a cautionary tale of lost sovereignty without endorsing the regime.[123] Iranian monarchists, both in exile and domestically, maintain criticism of him for provoking economic crisis through oil nationalization's fallout and authoritarian maneuvers like suspending civil courts, arguing these actions destabilized the monarchy and paved the way for radicalism rather than stable reform.[93] Reformist intellectuals, conversely, emphasize his commitment to constitutional limits on executive power and civilian oversight of military, using it to underscore the theocracy's deviations from 1906 Constitutional Revolution principles he championed.[127] This divergence persists, with state media occasionally rehabilitating his anti-Shah stance for propaganda while opposition factions leverage his image to advocate secular pluralism amid ongoing suppression.[124]Representations in Media and Culture
Film, Literature, and Documentary Portrayals
The documentary Coup 53 (2019), directed by Taghi Amirani, centers on the CIA and MI6 roles in the 1953 coup d'état that ousted Mosaddegh, drawing on declassified British Foreign Office documents discovered in 2013 and interviews with participants' relatives to underscore foreign orchestration.[128] The film portrays Mosaddegh as a principled democrat whose nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company provoked imperial backlash, framing the coup—Operation Ajax—as a pivotal betrayal that installed the Shah's authoritarian rule and sowed long-term anti-Western sentiment in Iran.[129] Western productions like this often amplify external culpability, attributing Iran's post-coup trajectory primarily to Anglo-American intervention while underemphasizing Mosaddegh's internal challenges, such as economic disruptions from the oil boycott and his dissolution of parliament in 1953.[130] In Iranian cultural output, state-sponsored narratives heroize Mosaddegh as a symbol of sovereignty and anti-imperial defiance, particularly through television series and commemorative programming that celebrate the 1951 oil nationalization as a triumphant assertion of independence against British exploitation.[131] These depictions, prevalent in official media since the 1979 Revolution, align with regime ideology by linking Mosaddegh's legacy to broader resistance against foreign dominance, though they tend to gloss over verifiable governance shortcomings like hyperinflation exceeding 50% annually by 1952 and factional paralysis in the Majlis.[132] Literary portrayals include Mosaddegh's own Memoirs and Teachings, compiled posthumously, which recount his advocacy for constitutionalism and oil sovereignty from a first-person vantage, defending nationalization as essential to Iran's fiscal autonomy amid British concessions dating to 1901.[133] Contrasting accounts, such as those in General Fazlollah Zahedi's post-coup writings, depict Mosaddegh as erratic and subversive, accusing him of undermining monarchical stability and provoking chaos through populist measures that alienated elites and clergy alike.[87] Fictional works, like Tom Bradby's 2023 novel Yesterday's Spy, embed Mosaddegh-era events in espionage thrillers, dramatizing the coup's intrigue from British intelligence perspectives and highlighting tactical alliances with Iranian military figures.[134] Recent documentaries from 2020 onward, including re-releases and analyses tied to ongoing declassifications, revisit the coup with mixed emphases; for instance, discussions in 2024 productions like An Iranian Odyssey balance Mosaddegh's victimhood narrative with acknowledgments of production shortfalls post-nationalization, such as refinery output dropping to near zero by mid-1952 due to embargo enforcement.[132] These works, often produced by Iranian expatriates, critique both Western overreach and Mosaddegh's authoritarian drifts, like his 1953 referendum securing 99.9% approval for dissolving the Majlis amid reported irregularities, offering a more nuanced counter to unidirectional blame.[135]Scholarly Works and Recent Analyses
Declassified U.S. and British documents released in the 2010s have facilitated revised historiographical assessments of Mosaddegh's tenure, shifting emphasis from unilateral foreign orchestration of his 1953 ouster to multifaceted internal vulnerabilities. Gregory Brew's 2019 analysis in the Texas National Security Review, drawing on these archives, contends that U.S. policymakers perceived acute risks of Iranian state collapse under Mosaddegh, driven by economic contraction, fiscal insolvency, and the Tudeh Party's expanding influence amid suppressed oil revenues, rather than mere communist subversion or British imperial pique.[6] This perspective critiques earlier narratives, such as Stephen Kinzer's 2003 All the Shah's Men, for overemphasizing Anglo-American agency while underplaying Mosaddegh's domestic policy choices—like the 1953 dissolution of the Majlis—that exacerbated governance instability and alienated key constituencies including tribal leaders and the military.[6] Iranian exile scholars have further illuminated authoritarian tendencies in Mosaddegh's rule, challenging romanticized depictions of unalloyed democratic commitment. Darioush Bayandor's examinations highlight how Mosaddegh's emergency powers, suppression of opposition media, and centralization of authority undermined parliamentary checks, fostering a de facto personalist regime that prioritized nationalist symbolism over institutional pluralism.[136] Ray Takeyh's archival-based works similarly portray Mosaddegh's coalition as a fragile alliance of urban nationalists and rural elites, prone to factionalism and reliant on coercive measures against rivals, rather than a robust democratic vanguard.[104] Recent quantitative reassessments debunk claims of nationalization's economic viability, underscoring policy-induced shortfalls over external embargoes alone. Iranian oil production plummeted from 242 million barrels in 1950 to 10.6 million in 1952 following the British boycott and operational disruptions, with imports declining 38% from $258 million to $158 million between 1950 and 1952, precipitating hyperinflation and budget deficits that eroded public support.[47] These data, integrated into causal analyses, attribute downturns primarily to Mosaddegh's rejection of interim revenue-sharing compromises and mismanagement of the National Iranian Oil Company—lacking technical expertise—over conspiracy-driven isolation, revealing systemic policy errors as pivotal to the regime's unraveling.[47][6]References
- https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q24279245
