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Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
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Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Persian: محمدرضا پهلوی [mohæmˈmæd reˈzɒː pæhlæˈviː]) (26 October 1919 – 27 July 1980) was the Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979.[1] He succeeded his father Reza Shah and ruled the Imperial State of Iran until he was overthrown by the 1979 Islamic Revolution led by Ruhollah Khomeini, which abolished the Iranian monarchy to establish the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1967, he took the title Shahanshah (lit. 'King of Kings'),[2] and also held several others, including Aryamehr (lit. 'Light of the Aryans') and Bozorg Arteshtaran (lit. 'Grand Army Commander'). He was the second and last ruling monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Key Information
During World War II, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran forced the abdication of Reza Shah and succession of Mohammad Reza Shah. During his reign, the British-owned oil industry was nationalized by the prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had support from Iran's national parliament to do so; however, Mosaddegh was overthrown in the 1953 Iranian coup d'état, which was carried out by the Iranian military under the aegis of the United Kingdom and the United States. Subsequently, the Iranian government centralized power under the Shah and brought foreign oil companies back into the country's industry through the Consortium Agreement of 1954.[3]
In 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah introduced the White Revolution, a series of reforms aimed at transforming Iran into a global power and modernizing the nation by nationalizing key industries and redistributing land. The regime also implemented Iranian nationalist policies establishing numerous popular symbols of Iran relating to Cyrus the Great. The Shah initiated major investments in infrastructure, subsidies and land grants for peasant populations, profit sharing for industrial workers, construction of nuclear facilities, nationalization of Iran's natural resources, and literacy programs which were considered some of the most effective in the world. The Shah also instituted economic policy tariffs and preferential loans to Iranian businesses which sought to create an independent Iranian economy. Manufacturing of cars, appliances, and other goods in Iran increased substantially, creating a new industrialist class insulated from threats of foreign competition. By the 1970s, the Shah was seen as a master statesman and used his growing power to pass the 1973 Sale and Purchase Agreement. The reforms culminated in decades of sustained economic growth that would make Iran one of the fastest-growing economies among both the developed world and the developing world. During his 37-year-long rule, Iran spent billions of dollars' worth on industry, education, health, and military spending. Between 1950 and 1979, real GDP per capita nearly tripled from about $2700 to about $7700 (2011 international dollars).[4] By 1977, the Shah's focus on defense spending to end foreign powers' intervention in the country had culminated in the Iranian military standing as the world's fifth-strongest armed force.[5]
As political unrest grew throughout Iran in the late 1970s,[6] the Shah's position was made untenable by the Cinema Rex fire and the Jaleh Square massacre. The 1979 Guadeloupe Conference saw his Western allies state that there was no feasible way to save the Iranian monarchy from being overthrown. The Shah ultimately left Iran for exile in January 1979.[7] Although he had told some Western contemporaries that he would rather leave the country than fire on his own people,[8] estimates for the total number of deaths during the Islamic Revolution range from 540 to 2,000 (figures of independent studies) to 60,000 (figures of the Islamic government).[9] After formally abolishing the Iranian monarchy, Shia Islamist cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini assumed leadership as the Supreme Leader of Iran. Mohammad Reza Shah died in exile in Egypt, where he had been granted political asylum by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, and his son Reza Pahlavi declared himself the new Shah of Iran in exile.
Early life, family and education
[edit]
Born in Tehran, in the Sublime State of Iran, to Reza Khan (later Reza Shah Pahlavi, first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty) and his second wife, Tadj ol-Molouk, Mohammad Reza was his father's eldest son and third of his eleven children. His father was of Mazandarani origin[10][11][12] and born in Alasht, Savadkuh County, Māzandarān Province. He was a Brigadier-General of the Persian Cossack Brigade, commissioned in the 7th Savadkuh Regiment, who served in the Anglo-Persian War in 1856.[13] Mohammad Reza's mother was a Muslim immigrant from Georgia (then part of the Russian Empire),[14] whose family had emigrated to mainland Iran after Iran was forced to cede all of its territories in the Caucasus following the Russo-Persian Wars several decades prior.[15] She was of Azerbaijani origin, being born in Baku, Russian Empire (now Azerbaijan).

Mohammad Reza was born with his twin sister, Ashraf; however, he, Ashraf, his siblings Shams and Ali Reza, and his older half-sister, Fatimeh, were not royalty by birth, as their father did not become Shah until 1925. Nevertheless, Reza Khan was always convinced that his sudden quirk of good fortune had commenced in 1919 with the birth of his son, who was dubbed khoshghadam ("bird of good omen").[16] Like most Iranians at the time, Reza Khan did not have a surname. After the 1921 Persian coup d'état which saw the deposal of Ahmad Shah Qajar, Reza Khan was informed that he would need a surname for his house. This led him to pass a law ordering all Iranians to take a surname; he chose for himself the surname Pahlavi, which is the name for the Middle Persian language, itself derived from Old Persian.[17] On 24 April 1926, the day before his father's coronation, 6-year-old Mohammad Reza was proclaimed Crown Prince.[17][18]
Family
[edit]Mohammad Reza described his father in his book Mission for My Country as "one of the most frightening men" he had ever known, depicting Reza Shah as a dominating man with a violent temper.[19] A tough, fierce, and very ambitious soldier who became the first Persian to command the elite Russian-trained Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan liked to kick subordinates in the groin who failed to follow his orders. Growing up under his shadow, Mohammad Reza was a deeply scared and insecure boy who lacked self-confidence, according to Iranian-American historian Abbas Milani.[20]

Reza Khan believed if fathers showed love for their sons, it caused homosexuality later in life, so to ensure his favourite son was heterosexual, he denied him love and affection when he was young, though he later became more affectionate toward the Crown Prince when he was a teenager.[21] Reza Khan always addressed his son as shoma ("sir") and refused to use the more informal tow ("you"), and in turn was addressed by his son using the same formality.[22] The Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuściński observed in his book Shah of Shahs that looking at old photographs of Reza Khan and his son, he was struck by how self-confident and assured Reza Khan appeared in his uniform, while Mohammad Reza appeared nervous and jittery in his uniform standing next to his father.[23]
In the 1930s, Reza Khan was an outspoken admirer of Adolf Hitler, less because of Hitler's racism and anti-Semitism and more because he had risen from an undistinguished background, much like Reza Khan, to become a notable leader of the 20th century.[24] Reza Khan often impressed on his son his belief that history was made by great men such as himself, and that a real leader is an autocrat.[24] Throughout his life, Mohammad Reza was obsessed with height and stature, wearing elevator shoes to make himself look taller than he really was, often boasting that Iran's highest mountain Mount Damavand was higher than any peak in Europe or Japan, and proclaiming that he was always most attracted to tall women.[25] As Shah, Mohammad Reza constantly disparaged his father in private, calling him a thuggish Cossack who achieved nothing as Shah. In fact, he almost airbrushed his father out of history during his reign, to the point of implying the House of Pahlavi began its rule in 1941 rather than 1925.[26]

Mohammad Reza's mother, Tadj ol-Molouk, was an assertive woman who was also very superstitious. She believed that dreams were messages from another world, sacrificed lambs to bring good fortune and scare away evil spirits, and clad her children with protective amulets to ward off the power of the evil eye.[27] Tadj ol-Molouk was the main emotional support to her son, and she cultivated a belief in him that destiny had chosen him for great things, which the soothsayers she consulted had interpreted her dreams as proving.[28] Mohammad Reza grew up surrounded by women, as the main influences on him were his mother, his older sister Shams, and his twin sister Ashraf, leading the American psychoanalyst and political economist Marvin Zonis to conclude that it was "from women, and apparently from women alone" that the future Shah "received whatever psychological nourishment he was able to get as a child".[29] Traditionally, male children were considered preferable to females, and as a boy, Mohammad Reza was often spoiled by his mother and sisters.[29] Mohammad Reza was very close to his twin sister Ashraf, who commented, "It was this twinship and this relationship with my brother that would nourish and sustain me throughout my childhood ... No matter how I would reach out in the years to come—sometimes even desperately—to find an identity and a purpose of my own, I would remain inextricably tied to my brother ... always, the center of my existence was, and is, Mohammad Reza".[30]
After becoming Crown Prince, Mohammad Reza was taken away from his mother and sisters to be given a "manly education" by officers selected by his father, who also ordered that everyone, including his mother and siblings, were to address the Crown Prince as "Your Highness".[22] According to Zonis, the result of his contradictory upbringing by a loving, if possessive and superstitious, mother and an overbearing martinet father was to make Mohammad Reza "a young man of low self-esteem who masked his lack of self-confidence, his indecisiveness, his passivity, his dependency and his shyness with masculine bravado, impulsiveness, and arrogance". This made him into a person of marked contradictions, Zonis claims, as the Crown Prince was "both gentle and cruel, withdrawn and active, dependent and assertive, weak and powerful".[31]
Education
[edit]
By the time Mohammad Reza turned 11, his father deferred to the recommendation of Abdolhossein Teymourtash, the Minister of Court, to dispatch his son to Institut Le Rosey, a Swiss boarding school, for further studies. Mohammad Reza left Iran for Switzerland on 7 September 1931.[32] On his first day as a student at Le Rosey. As a student, Mohammad Reza played competitive football, but school records indicate that his principal problem as a player was his "timidity", as the Crown Prince was afraid to take risks.[33] He was educated in French at Le Rosey, and his time there left Mohammad Reza with a lifelong love of all things French.[34] In articles he wrote in French for the student newspaper in 1935 and 1936, Mohammad Reza praised Le Rosey for broadening his mind and introducing him to European civilisation.[33]
Mohammad Reza was the first Iranian prince in line for the throne to be sent abroad to attain a foreign education and remained there for the next four years before returning to obtain his high school diploma in Iran in 1936. After returning to the country, the Crown Prince was registered at the local military academy in Tehran where he remained enrolled until 1938, graduating as a Second Lieutenant. Upon graduating, Mohammad Reza was quickly promoted to the rank of Captain, a rank which he kept until he became Shah. During college, the young prince was appointed Inspector of the Army and spent three years travelling across the country, examining both civil and military installations.[18][35]
Mohammad Reza spoke English, French, and German fluently, in addition to his native Persian.[36]

During his time in Switzerland, Mohammad Reza befriended his teacher Ernest Perron, who introduced him to French poetry, and under his influence, Chateaubriand and Rabelais became his "favorite French authors".[37] The Crown Prince liked Perron so much that when he returned to Iran in 1936, he brought Perron back with him, installing his best friend in the Marble Palace.[38] Perron lived in Iran until his death in 1961, and as the best friend of Mohammad Reza, was a man of considerable behind-the-scenes power.[39] After the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, a best-selling book was published by the new regime, Ernest Perron, the Husband of the Shah of Iran, by Mohammad Pourkian, alleging a homosexual relationship between the Shah and Perron. Even today, this remains the official interpretation of their relationship by the Islamic Republic of Iran.[40] Marvin Zonis described the book as long on assertions and short on evidence of a homosexual relationship between the two, noting that all of the Shah's courtiers rejected the claim that Perron was the Shah's lover. He argued that the strong-willed Reza Khan, who was very homophobic, would not have allowed Perron to move into the Marble Palace in 1936 if he believed Perron was his son's lover.[41]
Rise to power and rule as Shah
[edit]First marriage
[edit]
One of the main initiatives of Iranian and Turkish foreign policy had been the Saadabad Pact of 1937, an alliance bringing together Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, with the intent of creating a Muslim bloc that, it was hoped, would deter any aggressors. President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey suggested to his friend Reza Khan during the latter's visit that a marriage between the Iranian and Egyptian courts would be beneficial for the two countries and their dynasties, as it might lead to Egypt joining the Saadabad pact.[42] Dilawar Princess Fawzia of Egypt (5 November 1921 – 2 July 2013) was daughter of King Fuad I of Egypt and Nazli Sabri, and sister of King Farouk I of Egypt. In line with Atatürk's suggestion, Mohammad Reza and the Egyptian Princess Fawzia were married on 15 March 1939 in the Abdeen Palace in Cairo.[42] Reza Shah did not participate in the ceremony.[42] During his visit to Egypt, Mohammad Reza was greatly impressed with the grandeur of the Egyptian court as he visited the various palaces built by Isma'il "the Magnificent" Pasha, the famously free-spending khedive of Egypt, and resolved that Iran needed similarly grandiose palaces to match them.[43]
Mohammad Reza's marriage to Fawzia produced one child, Princess Shahnaz Pahlavi (born 27 October 1940). Their marriage was not a happy one, as the Crown Prince was openly unfaithful, often being seen driving around Tehran in one of his expensive cars with one of his girlfriends.[44] Additionally, Mohammad Reza's dominating and possessive mother saw her daughter-in-law as a rival to her son's love, and took to humiliating Princess Fawzia, whose husband sided with his mother.[44] A quiet, shy woman, Fawzia described her marriage as miserable, feeling very much unwanted and unloved by the Pahlavi family and longing to return to Egypt.[44] In his 1961 book Mission for My Country, Mohammad Reza wrote that the "only happy light moment" of his entire marriage to Fawzia was the birth of his daughter.[45]
Anglo-Soviet invasion and deposition of his father Reza Shah
[edit]
Meanwhile, in the midst of World War II in 1941, Nazi Germany began Operation Barbarossa and invaded the Soviet Union, breaking the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. This had a major impact on Iran, which had declared neutrality in the conflict.[46] In the summer of 1941, Soviet and British diplomats passed on numerous messages warning that they regarded the presence of Germans administering the Iranian state railroads as a threat, implying war if the Germans were not dismissed.[47] Britain wished to ship arms to the Soviet Union via Iranian railroads, and statements from the German managers of the Iranian railroads that they would not cooperate made both the Soviets and British insistent that the Germans Reza Khan had hired had to be sacked at once.[47] As his father's closest advisor, the Crown Prince Mohammad Reza did not see fit to raise the issue of a possible Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, blithely assuring his father that nothing would happen.[47] The Iranian-American historian Abbas Milani wrote about the relationship between the Reza Khan and the Crown Prince at the time, noting, "As his father's now constant companion, the two men consulted on virtually every decision".[48]
Later that year, British and Soviet forces occupied Iran in a military invasion, forcing Reza Shah to abdicate.[49] On 25 August 1941, British and Australian naval forces attacked the Persian Gulf while the Soviet Union conducted a land invasion from the north. On the second day of the invasion, with the Soviet air force bombing Tehran, Mohammad Reza was shocked to see the Iranian military simply collapse, with thousands of terrified officers and men all over Tehran taking off their uniforms in order to desert and run away, despite having not yet seen combat.[50] Reflecting the panic, a group of senior Iranian generals called the Crown Prince to receive his blessing to hold a meeting to discuss how best to surrender.[48] When Reza Khan learned of the meeting, he flew into a rage and attacked one of his generals, Ahmad Nakhjavan, striking him with his riding crop, tearing off his medals, and nearly personally executing him before his son persuaded him to have the general court-martialed instead.[48] The collapse of the Iranian military that his father had worked so hard to build humiliated his son, who vowed that he would never see Iran defeated like that again, foreshadowing the future Shah's later obsession with military spending.[50]
Ascension to the Sun throne
[edit]
On 16 September 1941, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Foroughi and Foreign Minister Ali Soheili attended a special session of parliament to announce the resignation of Reza Shah and that Mohammad Reza was to replace him. The next day, at 4:30 p.m., Mohammad Reza took the oath of office and was received warmly by parliamentarians. On his way back to the palace, the streets filled with people welcoming the new Shah jubilantly, seemingly more enthusiastic than the Allies would have liked.[51] The British would have liked to put a Qajar back on the throne, but the principal Qajar claimant to the throne was Prince Hamid Mirza, an officer in the Royal Navy who did not speak Persian, so the British were forced to accept Mohammad Reza as Shah.[52] The main Soviet interest in 1941 was to ensure political stability to ensure Allied supplies, which meant accepting Mohammad Reza's ascension to the throne. Subsequent to his succession as king, Iran became a major conduit for British and, later, American aid to the USSR during the war. This massive supply route became known as the Persian Corridor.[53]
Much of the credit for orchestrating a smooth transition of power from the King to the Crown Prince was due to the efforts of Mohammad Ali Foroughi.[54] Suffering from angina, a frail Foroughi was summoned to the Palace and appointed prime minister when Reza Shah feared the end of the Pahlavi dynasty once the Allies invaded Iran in 1941.[55] When Reza Shah sought his assistance to ensure that the Allies would not put an end to the Pahlavi dynasty, Foroughi put aside his adverse personal sentiments for having been politically sidelined since 1935. The Crown Prince confided in amazement to the British minister that Foroughi "hardly expected any son of Reza Shah to be a civilized human being",[55] but Foroughi successfully derailed thoughts by the Allies to undertake a more drastic change in the political infrastructure of Iran.[56]

A general amnesty was issued two days after Mohammad Reza's accession to the throne on 19 September 1941. All political personalities who had suffered disgrace during his father's reign were rehabilitated, and the forced unveiling policy inaugurated by his father in 1935 was overturned. Despite the young king's enlightened decisions, the British minister in Tehran reported to London that "the young Shah received a fairly spontaneous welcome on his first public experience, possibly rather [due] to relief at the disappearance of his father than to public affection for himself". During his early days as Shah, Mohammad Reza lacked self-confidence and spent most of his time with Perron writing poetry in French.[57]
In 1942, Mohammad Reza met Wendell Willkie, the Republican candidate for the U.S. presidency in the 1940 election who was now on a world tour to promote his "one world" policy. Willkie took the Shah flying for the first time.[58] The prime minister, Ahmad Qavam, had advised the Shah against flying with Willkie, saying he had never met a man with a worse flatulence problem, but the Shah took his chances.[58] Mohammad Reza told Willkie that when he was flying that he "wanted to stay up indefinitely".[58] Enjoying flight, Mohammad Reza hired the American pilot Dick Collbarn to teach him how to fly. Upon arriving at the Marble Palace, Collbarn noted that "the Shah must have twenty-five custom-built cars ... Buicks, Cadillacs, six Rolls-Royces, a Mercedes".[58] During the Tehran Conference with the Allied forces in 1943, the Shah was humiliated when he met Joseph Stalin, who visited him in the Marble Palace but did not allow the Shah's bodyguards to be present, with the Red Army alone guarding them.[59]
Opinion of his father's rule
[edit]Despite his public professions of admiration in later years, Mohammad Reza had serious misgivings about not only the coarse and roughshod political means adopted by his father, but also his unsophisticated approach to affairs of state. The young Shah possessed a decidedly more refined temperament, and amongst the unsavory developments that "would haunt him when he was king" were the political disgrace brought by his father on Teymourtash, the dismissal of Foroughi by the mid-1930s, and Ali Akbar Davar's suicide in 1937.[60] An even more significant decision that cast a long shadow was the disastrous and one-sided agreement his father had negotiated with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1933, one which compromised the country's ability to receive more favourable returns from oil extracted from the country.
Relationship with his exiled father
[edit]
Mohammad Reza expressed concern for his exiled father, who had previously complained to the British governor of Mauritius that living on the island was both a climatic and social prison. Attentively following his life in exile, Mohammad Reza would object to his father's treatment to the British at any opportunity. The two sent letters to one another, although delivery was often delayed, and Mohammad Reza commissioned his friend, Ernest Perron, to hand-deliver a taped message of love and respect to his father, bringing back with him a recording of his voice:[61]
My dear son, since the time I resigned in your favour and left my country, my only pleasure has been to witness your sincere service to your country. I have always known that your youth and your love of the country are vast reservoirs of power on which you will draw to stand firm against the difficulties you face and that, despite all the troubles, you will emerge from this ordeal with honour. Not a moment passes without my thinking of you and yet the only thing that keeps me happy and satisfied is the thought that you are spending your time in the service of Iran. You must remain always aware of what goes on in the country. You must not succumb to advice that is self-serving and false. You must remain firm and constant. You must never be afraid of the events that come your way. Now that you have taken on your shoulders this heavy burden in such dark days, you must know that the price to be paid for the slightest mistake on your part may be our twenty years of service and our family's name. You must never yield to anxiety or despair; rather, you must remain calm and so strongly rooted in your place that no power may hope to move the constancy of your will.
Onset of the Cold War
[edit]
In 1945–46, the main issue in Iranian politics was the Soviet-sponsored separatist government in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, which greatly alarmed the Shah. He repeatedly clashed with his prime minister Ahmad Qavam, whom he viewed as too pro-Soviet.[62] At the same time, the growing popularity of the communist Tudeh Party worried Mohammad Reza, who felt there was a serious possibility of them leading a coup.[63] In June 1946, Mohammad Reza was relieved when the Red Army pulled out of Iran.[64] In a letter to the Azerbaijani Communist leader Ja'far Pishevari, Stalin wrote that he had to pull out of Iran, as otherwise the Americans would not pull out of China, and he wanted to assist the Chinese Communists in their civil war against the Kuomintang.[65] However, the Pishevari regime remained in power in Tabriz, Azerbaijan, and Mohammad Reza sought to undercut Qavam's attempts to make an agreement with Pishevari as way of getting rid of both.[66] On 11 December 1946, the Iranian Army, led by the Shah in person, entered Iranian Azerbaijan and the Pishevari regime collapsed with little resistance, with most of the fighting occurring between ordinary people who attacked functionaries of the Pishevari that had treated them brutally.[66] In his statements at the time and later, Mohammad Reza credited his easy success in Azerbaijan to his "mystical power".[67] Knowing Qavam's penchant for corruption, the Shah used that issue as a reason to sack him.[68] By this time, the Shah's wife Fawzia had returned to Egypt, and despite efforts to have King Farouk persuade her to return to Iran, she refused to go, which led Mohammad Reza to divorce her on 17 November 1948.[69]
By now a qualified pilot, Mohammad Reza was fascinated with flying and the technical details of aeroplanes, and any insult to him was always an attempt to "clip [his] wings". Mohammad Reza directed more money to the Imperial Iranian Air Force than any branch of the armed forces, and his favourite uniform was that of the Marshal of the Imperial Iranian Air Force.[70] Marvin Zonis wrote that Mohammad Reza's obsession with flying reflected an Icarus complex, also known as "ascensionism", a form of narcissism based on "a craving for unsolicited attention and admiration" and the "wish to overcome gravity, to stand erect, to grow tall ... to leap or swing into the air, to climb, to rise, to fly".[71]
Mohammad Reza often spoke of women as sexual objects who existed only to gratify him, and during a 1973 interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, she vehemently objected to his attitudes towards women.[72] As a regular visitor to the nightclubs of Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, Mohammad Reza was linked romantically to several actresses, including Gene Tierney, Yvonne De Carlo, and Silvana Mangano.[73]
At least two unsuccessful assassination attempts were made against the young Shah. On 4 February 1949, he attended an annual ceremony to commemorate the founding of Tehran University.[74] At the ceremony, gunman Fakhr-Arai fired five shots at him at a range of about three metres. Only one of the shots hit the king, grazing his cheek. The gunman was instantly shot by nearby officers. After an investigation, Fakhr-Arai was declared a member of the communist Tudeh Party,[75] which was subsequently banned.[76] However, there is evidence that the would-be assassin was not a Tudeh member but a religious fundamentalist member of Fada'iyan-e Islam.[73][77] The Tudeh were nonetheless blamed and persecuted.[78][full citation needed]
The Shah's second wife was Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiary, a half-German, half-Iranian woman and the only daughter of Khalil Esfandiary-Bakhtiary, Iranian Ambassador to West Germany, and his wife Eva Karl. She was introduced to the Shah by Forough Zafar Bakhtiary, a close relative of Soraya's, via a photograph taken by Goodarz Bakhtiary, in London, per Forough Zafar's request. They married on 12 February 1951,[42] when Soraya was 18, according to the official announcement. However, it was rumoured that she was actually 16, the Shah being 32.[79] As a child, she was tutored and brought up by Frau Mantel, and hence lacked proper knowledge of Iran, as she herself admitted in her personal memoirs, stating, "I was a dunce—I knew next to nothing of the geography, the legends of my country, nothing of its history, nothing of Muslim religion".[62]
Conflict with the King of Jordan
[edit]In 1952, the Shah of Iran insulted the King of Jordan by sending him a dog as a gift. This act was perceived as a significant slight because, in many cultures, including those in the Middle East, dogs are considered unclean animals. The gesture was seen as a deliberate insult, exacerbating tensions between the two monarchs.
Nationalization of oil and 1953 Iranian coup d'état
[edit]
By the early 1950s, the political crisis brewing in Iran commanded the attention of British and American policy leaders. Following the 1950 Iranian legislative election, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in 1951. He was committed to nationalising the Iranian petroleum industry controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (formerly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, or APOC).[80] Under the leadership of Mosaddegh and his nationalist movement, the Iranian parliament unanimously voted to nationalise the oil industry, thus shutting out the immensely profitable AIOC, which was a pillar of Britain's economy and provided it political clout in the region.[81]
At the start of the confrontation, American political sympathy with Iran was forthcoming from the Truman Administration.[82] In particular, Mosaddegh was buoyed by the advice and counsel he was receiving from the American Ambassador in Tehran, Henry F. Grady. However, eventually American decision-makers lost their patience, and by the time the Republican administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower entered office, fears that communists were poised to overthrow the government became an all-consuming concern. These concerns were later dismissed as "paranoid" in retrospective commentary on the coup from U.S. government officials. Shortly prior to the 1952 presidential election in the United States, the British government invited Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer Kermit Roosevelt Jr., to London to propose collaboration on a secret plan to force Mosaddegh from office.[83] This would be the first of three "regime change" operations led by CIA director Allen Dulles (the other two being the successful CIA-instigated 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état and the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba).
Under the direction of Roosevelt, the American CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) funded and led a covert operation to depose Mosaddegh with the help of military forces disloyal to the government. Referred to as Operation Ajax,[84] the plot hinged on orders signed by Mohammad Reza to dismiss Mosaddegh as prime minister and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi, a choice agreed on by the British and Americans.[85][86][87]
Before the attempted coup, the American Embassy in Tehran reported that Mosaddegh's popular support remained robust. The Prime Minister requested direct control of the army from the Majlis. Given the situation, alongside the strong personal support of Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden for covert action, the American government gave the go-ahead to a committee, attended by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt Jr., Loy W. Henderson, and Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson. Roosevelt returned to Iran on 13 July 1953, and again on 1 August 1953, in his first meeting with the king. A car picked him up at midnight and drove him to the palace. He lay down on the seat and covered himself with a blanket as guards waved his driver through the gates. The Shah got into the car and Roosevelt explained the mission. The CIA bribed him with $1 million in Iranian currency, which Roosevelt had stored in a large safe—a bulky cache, given the then-exchange rate of 1,000 rial to 15 US dollars.[88]
Meanwhile, the Communists staged massive demonstrations to hijack Mosaddegh's initiatives, and the United States actively plotted against him. On 16 August 1953, the right wing of the Army attacked. Armed with an order by the Shah, it appointed General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. A coalition of mobs and retired officers close to the Palace executed this coup d'état. They failed dismally and the Shah fled the country to Baghdad, and then to Rome. Ettelaat, the nation's largest daily newspaper, and its pro-Shah publisher, Abbas Masudi, criticised him, calling the defeat "humiliating".[89][full citation needed]
During the Shah's time in Rome, a British diplomat reported that the monarch spent most of his time in nightclubs with Queen Soraya or his latest mistress, writing, "He hates taking decisions and cannot be relied on to stick to them when taken. He has no moral courage and succumbs easily to fear".[90] To get him to support the coup, his twin sister Princess Ashraf—who was much tougher than him and publicly questioned his manhood several times—visited him on 29 July 1953 to berate him into signing a decree dismissing Mossaddegh.[91]
In the days leading up to the second coup attempt, the communists turned against Mosaddegh. Opposition against him grew tremendously. They roamed Tehran, raising red flags and pulling down statues of Reza Shah. This was rejected by conservative clerics like Kashani and National Front leaders like Hossein Makki, who sided with the king. On 18 August 1953, Mosaddegh defended the government against this new attack. Tudeh partisans were clubbed and dispersed.[92] The Tudeh party had no choice but to accept defeat.

In the meantime, according to the CIA plot, Zahedi appealed to the military, claimed to be the legitimate prime minister and charged Mosaddegh with staging a coup by ignoring the Shah's decree. Zahedi's son Ardeshir acted as the contact between the CIA and his father. On 19 August 1953, pro-Shah partisans—bribed with $100,000 in CIA funds—finally appeared and marched out of south Tehran into the city centre, where others joined in. Gangs with clubs, knives, and rocks controlled the streets, overturning Tudeh trucks and beating up anti-Shah activists. As Roosevelt was congratulating Zahedi in the basement of his hiding place, the new Prime Minister's mobs burst in and carried him upstairs on their shoulders. That evening, Loy W. Henderson suggested to Ardashir that Mosaddegh not be harmed. Roosevelt gave Zahedi US$900,000 left from Operation Ajax funds.[93]
After his brief exile in Italy, the Shah returned to Iran, this time through the successful second coup attempt. The deposed Mosaddegh was arrested and tried, with the king intervening and commuting his sentence to three years,[94] to be followed by life in internal exile. Zahedi was installed to succeed Mosaddegh.[95] Although Mohammad Reza returned to power, he never extended the elite status of the court to the technocrats and intellectuals who emerged from Iranian and Western universities. Indeed, his system irritated the new classes, for they were barred from partaking in real power.[96]
Self-assertion: from figurehead monarch to effective authoritarian
[edit]
In the aftermath of the 1953 coup d'état, Mohammad Reza was widely viewed as a figurehead monarch, and General Fazlollah Zahedi, the Prime Minister, saw himself and was viewed by others as the "strong man" of Iran.[97] Mohammad Reza feared that history would repeat itself, remembering how his father was a general who had seized power in a coup d'état in 1921 and deposed the last Qajar shah in 1925, and his major concern in the years 1953–55 was to neutralise Zahedi.[98] American and British diplomats in their reports back to Washington and London in the 1950s were openly contemptuous of Mohammad Reza's ability to lead, calling the Shah a weak-willed and cowardly man who was incapable of making a decision.[98] The contempt in which the Shah was held by Iranian elites led to a period in the mid-1950s where the elite displayed fissiparous tendencies, feuding amongst themselves now that Mossadegh had been overthrown, which ultimately allowed Mohammad Reza to play off various factions in the elite to assert himself as the nation's leader.[98]
The very fact that Mohammad Reza was considered a coward and insubstantial turned out be an advantage as the Shah proved to be an adroit politician, playing off the factions in the elite and the Americans against the British with the aim of being an autocrat in practice as well as in theory.[98] Supporters of the banned National Front were persecuted, but in his first important decision as leader, Mohammad Reza intervened to ensure most of the members of the National Front brought to trial, such as Mosaddegh himself, were not executed as many had expected.[99] Many in the Iranian elite were openly disappointed that Mohammad Reza did not conduct the expected bloody purge and hang Mosaddegh and his followers as they had wanted and expected.[99] In 1954, when twelve university professors issued a public statement criticising the 1953 coup, all were dismissed from their jobs, but in the first of his many acts of "magnanimity" towards the National Front, Mohammad Reza intervened to have them reinstated.[100] Mohammad Reza tried very hard to co-opt the supporters of the National Front by adopting some of their rhetoric and addressing their concerns, for example declaring in several speeches his concerns about the Third World economic conditions and poverty which prevailed in Iran, a matter that had not much interested him before.[101]

Mohammad Reza was determined to copy Mosaddegh, who had won popularity by promising broad socio-economic reforms, and wanted to create a mass powerbase as he did not wish to depend upon the traditional elites, who only wanted him as a legitimising figurehead.[99] In 1955, Mohammad Reza dismissed General Zahedi from his position as prime minister and appointed his archenemy, the technocrat Hossein Ala' as prime minister, whom he in turn dismissed in 1957.[102] Starting in 1955, Mohammad Reza began to quietly cultivate left-wing intellectuals, many of whom had supported the National Front and some of whom were associated with the banned Tudeh party, asking them for advice about how best to reform Iran.[103] It was during this period that Mohammad Reza began to embrace the image of a "progressive" Shah, a reformer who would modernise Iran, who attacked in his speeches the "reactionary" and "feudal" social system that was retarding progress, bring about land reform and give women equal rights.[103]

Determined to rule as well as reign, it was during the mid 1950s that Mohammad Reza started to promote a state cult around Cyrus the Great, portrayed as a great Shah who had reformed the country and built an empire with obvious parallels to himself.[103] Alongside this change in image, Mohammad Reza started to speak of his desire to "save" Iran, a duty that he claimed he had been given by God, and promised that under his leadership Iran would reach a Western standard of living in the near future.[104] During this period, Mohammad Reza sought the support of the ulema, and resumed the traditional policy of persecuting those Iranians who belonged to the Baháʼí Faith, allowing the chief Baháʼí temple in Tehran to be razed in 1955 and bringing in a law banning the Baháʼí from gathering together in groups.[104] A British diplomat reported in 1954 that Reza Khan "must have been spinning in his grave at Rey. To see the arrogance and effrontery of the mullahs once again rampant in the holy city! How the old tyrant must despise the weakness of his son, who allowed these turbulent priests to regain so much of their reactionary influence!"[104] By this time, the Shah's marriage was under strain as Queen Soraya complained about the power of Mohammad Reza's best friend Ernest Perron, whom she called a "shetun" and a "limping devil".[105] Perron was a man much resented for his influence on Mohammad Reza and was often described by enemies as a "diabolical" and "mysterious" character, whose position was that of a private secretary, but who was one of the Shah's closest advisors, holding far more power than his job title suggested.[37]
In a 1957 study compiled by the U.S. State Department, Mohammad Reza was praised for his "growing maturity" and no longer needing "to seek advice at every turn" as the previous 1951 study had concluded.[106] On 27 February 1958, a military coup to depose the Shah led by General Valiollah Gharani was thwarted, which led to a major crisis in Iranian-American relations when evidence emerged that associates of Gharani had met American diplomats in Athens, which the Shah used to demand that henceforward no American officials could meet with his opponents.[107] Another issue in Iranian-American relations was Mohammad Reza's suspicion that the United States was insufficiently committed to Iran's defense, observing that the Americans refused to join the Baghdad Pact, and military studies had indicated that Iran could only hold out for a few days in the event of a Soviet invasion.[108]

In January 1959, the Shah began negotiations on a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which he claimed to have been driven to by a lack of American support.[109] After receiving a mildly threatening letter from President Eisenhower warning him against signing the treaty, Mohammad Reza chose not to sign, which led to a major Soviet propaganda effort calling for his overthrow.[110] Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ordered Mohammad Reza assassinated.[111] A sign of Mohammad Reza's power came in 1959 when a British company won a contract with the Iranian government that was suddenly cancelled and given to Siemens instead.[112] An investigation by the British embassy soon uncovered the reason why: Mohammad Reza wanted to bed the wife of the Siemens sales agent for Iran, and the Siemens agent had consented to allowing his wife to sleep with the Shah in exchange for winning back the contract that he had just lost.[112] On 24 July 1959, Mohammad Reza gave Israel implicit recognition by allowing an Israeli trade office to be opened in Tehran that functioned as a de facto embassy, a move that offended many in the Islamic world.[113] When Eisenhower visited Iran on 14 December 1959, Mohammad Reza told him that Iran faced two main external threats: the Soviet Union to the north and the new pro-Soviet revolutionary government in Iraq to the west. This led him to ask for vastly increased American military aid, saying his country was a front-line state in the Cold War that needed as much military power as possible.[113]
The Shah and Soraya's marriage ended in 1958 when it became apparent that, even with help from medical doctors, she could not bear children. Soraya later told The New York Times that the Shah had no choice but to divorce her, and that he was heavy-hearted about the decision.[114] However, even after the marriage, it is reported that the Shah still had great love for Soraya, and it is reported that they met several times after their divorce and that she lived her post-divorce life comfortably (even though she never remarried),[115] being paid a monthly salary of about $7,000 from Iran.[116] Following her death in 2001 at the age of 69 in Paris, an auction of the possessions included a three-million-dollar Paris estate, a 22.37-carat diamond ring, and a 1958 Rolls-Royce.[117]
Pahlavi subsequently indicated his interest in marrying Princess Maria Gabriella of Savoy, a daughter of the deposed Italian king, Umberto II. Pope John XXIII reportedly vetoed the suggestion. In an editorial about the rumours surrounding the marriage of a "Muslim sovereign and a Catholic princess", the Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano, considered the match "a grave danger",[118] especially considering that under the 1917 Code of Canon Law a Roman Catholic who married a divorced person would be automatically, and could be formally, excommunicated.
In the 1960 U.S. presidential election, the Shah had favoured the Republican candidate, incumbent Vice President Richard Nixon, whom he had first met in 1953 and rather liked, and according to the diary of his best friend Asadollah Alam, Mohammad Reza contributed money to the 1960 Nixon campaign.[119] Relations with the victor of the 1960 election, the Democrat John F. Kennedy, were not friendly.[119] In an attempt to mend relations after Nixon's defeat, Mohammad Reza sent General Teymur Bakhtiar of SAVAK to meet Kennedy in Washington on 1 March 1961.[120] From Kermit Roosevelt Jr., Mohammad Reza learned that Bakhtiar, during his trip to Washington, had asked the Americans to support a coup he was planning, which greatly increased the Shah's fears about Kennedy.[120] On 2 May 1961, a teacher's strike involving 50,000 people began in Iran, which Mohammad Reza believed was the work of the CIA.[121] Mohammad Reza had to sack his prime minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and give in to the teachers after learning that the Army probably would not fire on the demonstrators.[122] In 1961, Bakhtiar was dismissed as chief of SAVAK and expelled from Iran in 1962 following a clash between demonstrating university students and the army on 21 January 1962 that left three dead.[123] In April 1962, when Mohammad Reza visited Washington, he was met with demonstrations by Iranian students at American universities, which he believed were organised by U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President's brother and the leading anti-Pahlavi voice in the Kennedy administration.[124] Afterwards, Mohammad Reza visited London. In a sign of the changed dynamics in Anglo-Iranian relations, the Shah took offence when he was informed he could join Queen Elizabeth II for a dinner at Buckingham Palace that was given in somebody else's honour, insisting successfully he would have dinner with the Queen only when given in his own honour.[124]
Mohammad Reza's first major clash with Ayatollah Khomeini occurred in 1962, when the Shah changed the local laws to allow Iranian Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Baháʼí to take the oath of office for municipal councils using their holy books instead of the Koran.[125] Khomeini wrote to the Shah to say this was unacceptable and that only the Koran could be used to swear in members of the municipal councils regardless of what their religion was, writing that he heard "Islam is not indicated as a precondition for standing for office and women are being granted the right to vote .... Please order all laws inimical to the sacred and official faith of the country to be eliminated from government policies."[125] The Shah wrote back, addressing Khomeini as Hojat-al Islam rather than as Ayatollah, declining his request.[125] Feeling pressure from demonstrations organised by the clergy, the Shah withdrew the offending law, but it was reinstated with the White Revolution of 1963.[126]
Middle years
[edit]The White Revolution
[edit]
Conflict with Islamists
[edit]In 1963, Mohammad Reza launched the White Revolution, a series of far-reaching reforms, which caused much opposition from the religious scholars. They were enraged that the referendum approving of the White Revolution in 1963 allowed women to vote, with the Ayatollah Khomeini saying in his sermons that the fate of Iran should never be allowed to be decided by women.[127] In 1963 and 1964, nationwide demonstrations against Mohammad Reza's rule took place all over Iran, with the centre of the unrest being the holy city of Qom.[128] Students studying to be imams at Qom were most active in the protests, and Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as one of the leaders, giving sermons calling for the Shah's overthrow.[128] At least 200 people were killed, with the police throwing some students to their deaths from high buildings, and Khomeini was exiled to Iraq in 4 October 1965.[129]
The second attempt on the Shah's life occurred on 10 April 1965.[130] A soldier named Reza Shamsabadi shot his way through the Marble Palace. The assassin was killed before he reached the royal quarters, but two civilian guards died protecting the Shah.[131]
Conflict with communists
[edit]According to Vladimir Kuzichkin, a former KGB officer who defected to MI-6, the Soviet Union also targeted the Shah. The Soviets tried to use a TV remote control to detonate a bomb-laden Volkswagen Beetle; the TV remote failed to function.[132] A high-ranking Romanian defector, Ion Mihai Pacepa, also supported this claim, asserting that he had been the target of various assassination attempts by Soviet agents for many years.[133]
Pahlavi's court
[edit]

Mohammad Reza's third and final wife was Farah Diba (born 14 October 1938), the only child of Sohrab Diba, a captain in the Imperial Iranian Army (son of an Iranian ambassador to the Romanov Court in St. Petersburg, Russia), and his wife, the former Farideh Ghotbi. They were married in 1959, and Queen Farah was crowned Shahbanu, or Empress, a title created especially for her in 1967. Previous royal consorts had been known as "Malakeh" (Arabic: Malika), or Queen. The couple remained together for 21 years, until the Shah's death. They had four children together:
- Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi (born 31 October 1960), heir to the now defunct Iranian throne. Reza Pahlavi is the founder and leader of National Council of Iran, a government in exile of Iran;
- Princess Farahnaz Pahlavi (born 12 March 1963);
- Prince Ali Reza Pahlavi (28 April 1966 – 4 January 2011);
- Princess Leila Pahlavi (27 March 1970 – 10 June 2001).
One of Mohammad Reza's favourite activities was watching films, and his favourites were light French comedies and Hollywood action films, much to the disappointment of Farah, who tried hard to interest him in more serious films.[134] Mohammad Reza was frequently unfaithful towards Farah, and his right-hand man Asadollah Alam regularly imported tall European women for "outings" with the Shah, though Alam's diary also mentions that if women from the "blue-eyed world" were not available, he would bring the Shah "local product".[135] Mohammad Reza had an insatiable appetite for sex, and Alam's diary has the Shah constantly telling him he needed to have sex several times a day, every day, or otherwise he would fall into depression.[135] When Farah learned about his affairs in 1973, Alam blamed the prime minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda, while the Shah thought it was the KGB. Milani noted that neither admitted it was the Shah's "crass infidelities" that caused this issue.[135] Milani further wrote that "Alam, in his most destructive moments of sycophancy, reassured the Shah—or his 'master' as he calls him—that the country was prosperous and no one begrudged the King a bit of fun". He also had a passion for automobiles and aeroplanes, and by the mid-1970s, the Shah had amassed one of the world's largest collections of luxury cars and planes.[136] His visits to the West were invariably the occasions for major protests by the Confederation of Iranian Students, an umbrella group of far-left Iranian university students studying abroad, and Mohammad Reza had one of the world's largest security details as he lived in constant fear of assassination.[123]

Milani described Mohammad Reza's court as open and tolerant, noting that his and Farah's two favourite interior designers, Keyvan Khosrovani and Bijan Saffari, were openly gay, and were not penalised for their sexual orientation, with Khosrovani often advising the Shah about how to dress.[137] Milani noted the close connection between architecture and power, as architecture is the "poetry of power" in Iran.[137] In this sense, the Niavaran Palace, with its mixture of modernist style, heavily influenced by current French and traditional Persian styles, reflected Mohammad Reza's personality.[138] Mohammad Reza was a Francophile whose court had a decidedly French ambiance.[139]
Mohammad Reza commissioned a documentary from the French filmmaker Albert Lamorisse meant to glorify Iran under his rule. But he was annoyed that the film focused only on Iran's past, writing to Lamorisse there were no modern buildings in his film, which he charged made Iran look "backward".[134] Mohammad Reza's office was functional, with ceilings and walls decorated with Qajar art.[140] Farah began collecting modern art and by the early 1970s owned works by Picasso, Gauguin, Chagall, and Braque, which added to the modernist feel of the Niavaran Palace.[139]
Imperial coronation
[edit]On 26 October 1967, twenty-six years into his reign as Shah ("King"), he took the ancient title Shāhanshāh ("Emperor" or "King of Kings") in a lavish coronation ceremony held in Tehran. He said that he chose to wait until this moment to assume the title because, in his own opinion, he "did not deserve it" up until then; he is also recorded as saying that there was "no honour in being Emperor of a poor country" (which he viewed Iran as being until that time).[141]
2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire
[edit]
As part of his efforts to modernise Iran and give the Iranian people a non-Islamic identity, Mohammad Reza quite consciously started to celebrate Iranian history before the Arab conquest with a special focus on the Achaemenid period.[142] In October 1971, he marked the anniversary of 2,500 years of continuous Persian monarchy since the founding of the Achaemenid Empire by Cyrus the Great. Concurrent with this celebration, Mohammad Reza changed the benchmark of the Iranian calendar from the Hijrah to the beginning of the First Persian Empire, measured from Cyrus the Great's coronation.[143]
At the celebration at Persepolis in 1971, the Shah had an elaborate fireworks show intended to send a dual message; that Iran was still faithful to its ancient traditions and that Iran had transcended its past to become a modern nation, that Iran was not "stuck in the past", but as a nation that embraced modernity had chosen to be faithful to its past.[144] The message was further reinforced the next day when the "Parade of Persian History" was performed at Persepolis when 6,000 soldiers dressed in the uniforms of every dynasty from the Achaemenids to the Pahlavis marched past Mohammad Reza in a grand parade that many contemporaries remarked "surpassed in sheer spectacle the most florid celluloid imaginations of Hollywood epics".[144] To complete the message, Mohammad Reza finished off the celebrations by opening a brand new museum in Tehran, the Shahyad Aryamehr, that was housed in a very modernistic building and attended another parade in the newly opened Aryamehr Stadium, intended to give a message of "compressed time" between antiquity and modernity.[144] A brochure put up by the Celebration Committee explicitly stated the message: "Only when change is extremely rapid, and the past ten years have proved to be so, does the past attain new and unsuspected values worth cultivating", going on to say the celebrations were held because "Iran has begun to feel confident of its modernization".[144] Milani noted it was a sign of the liberalization of the middle years of Mohammad Reza's reign that Hussein Amanat, the architect who designed the Shahyad was a young Baháʼí from a middle-class family who did not belong to the "thousand families" that traditionally dominated Iran, writing that only in this moment in Iranian history such a thing was possible.[145]
Role at OPEC
[edit]Prior to the 1973 oil embargo, Iran spearheaded OPEC's aim for higher oil prices. When raising oil prices, Iran would point out the rising inflation as a means to justify the price increases.[146] In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, Arab states employed an oil embargo in 1973 against Western nations. Although the Shah declared neutrality, he sought to exploit the lack of crude oil supply to Iran's benefit. The Shah held a meeting of Persian Gulf oil producers, declaring they should double the price of oil for the second time in a year. The price hike resulted in an "oil shock" that crippled Western economies while Iran saw a rapid growth of oil revenues. Iranian oil incomes doubled to $4.6 billion in 1973–1974 and spiked to $17.8 billion in the following year. As a result, the Shah had established himself as the dominant figure of OPEC, having control over oil prices and production. Iran experienced an economic growth rate of 33% in 1973 and 40% the next year, and GNI expanded 50% in the next year.[147]
The Shah directed the growth in oil revenues back into the domestic economy. Elementary school education was made free and mandatory, major investments were made in the military, and in 1974, $16 billion was spent on building new schools and hospitals. The Shah's oil coup signaled that the United States had lost the ability to influence Iranian foreign and economic policy.[147] Under the Shah, Iran dominated OPEC and Middle Eastern oil exports.[148]
Nationalist Iran
[edit]
By the 19th century, the Persian word Vatan began to refer to a national homeland for many intellectuals in Iran. The education system was controlled mainly by Shiite clergy who utilized a Maktab system in which open political discussion of modernization was prevented. However, a number of scholarly intellectuals, including Mirzā FathʿAli Ākhundzādeh, Mirzā Āqā Khān Kermāni, and Mirzā Malkam Khān began to criticize Islam's role in public life while promoting a secular identity for Iran. Over time, studies of Iran's glorious history and present reality of a declined Qajar period led many to question what led to Iran's decline.[149] Iranian history was categorized into pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. Iran's pre-Islamic period was seen as prosperous, while the Arab invasions were seen as "a political catastrophe that pummelled the superior Iranian civilization under its hoof".[150] Therefore, as a result of the growing number of Iranian intellectuals in the 1800s, the Ancient Persian Empire symbolized modernity and originality, while the Islamic period brought by Arab invasions imposed on Iran a period of backwardness.[149]
Ultimately, these revelations in Iran would lead to the rise of Aryan nationalism in Iran and the perception of an "intellectual awakening", as described by Homa Katouzian. In Europe, many concepts of Aryan nationalism were directed at the anti-Jewish sentiment. In contrast, Iran's Aryan nationalism was deeply rooted in Persian history and became synonymous with an anti-Arab sentiment instead. Furthermore, the Achaemenid and Sasanian periods were perceived as the real Persia, a Persia which commanded the respect of the world and was void of foreign culture before the Arab invasions.[149]
Thus, under the Pahlavi state, these ideas of Aryan and pre-Islamic Iranian nationalism continued with the rise of Reza Shah. Under the last Shah, the tomb of Cyrus the Great was established as a significant site for all Iranians. The Mission for My Country, written by the Shah, described Cyrus as "one of the most dynamic men in history" and stated that "wherever Cyrus conquered, he would pardon the very people who had fought him, treat them well, and keep them in their former posts .... While Iran at the time knew nothing of democratic political institutions, Cyrus nevertheless demonstrated some of the qualities which provide the strength of the great modern democracies". The Cyrus Cylinder also became an important cultural symbol and Pahlavi successfully popularized the decree as an ancient declaration of human rights.[149] The Shah employed titles like Āryāmehr and Shāhanshāh in order to emphasize Iranian supremacy and the kings of Iran.[151]
The Shah continued with his father's ideas of Iranian nationalism, treating Arabs as the utmost other. Nationalist narratives, which were widely accepted by a majority of Iranians, portrayed Arabs as hostile to Pahlavi's revival of "modern" and "authentic" Iran.[152]
Economic growth
[edit]
In the 1970s, Iran had an economic growth rate equal to that of South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan; Western journalists regularly predicted that Iran would become a First World nation within the next generation.[153] Significantly, a "reverse brain drain" had begun with Iranians who had been educated in the West returning home to take up positions in government and business.[154] The firm of Iran National, run by the Khayami brothers, had become by 1978 the largest automobile manufacturer in the Middle East, producing 136,000 cars every year while employing 12,000 people in Mashhad.[154] Mohammad Reza had strong étatist tendencies and was deeply involved in the economy, with his economic policies bearing a strong resemblance to the same étatist policies being pursued simultaneously by General Park Chung-hee in South Korea. Mohammad Reza considered himself a socialist, saying he was "more socialist and revolutionary than anyone".[154] Reflecting his self-proclaimed socialist tendencies, although unions were illegal, the Shah brought in labour laws that were "surprisingly fair to workers".[135] Iran in the 1960s and 70s was a tolerant place for the Jewish minority with one Iranian Jew, David Menasheri, remembering that Mohammad Reza's reign was the "golden age" for Iranian Jews when they were equals, and when the Iranian Jewish community was one of the wealthiest Jewish communities in the world. The Baháʼí minority also did well after the bout of persecution in the mid-1950s ended, with several Baháʼí families rising to prominence in the world of Iranian business.[155]
Under his reign, Iran experienced over a decade of double-digit GDP growth coupled with major investments in military and infrastructure.[156]
The Shah's first economic plan was geared towards large infrastructure projects and improving the agricultural sector, which led to the development of many major dams, particularly in Karaj, Safīdrūd, and Dez. The next economic plan was directed and characterized by an expansion in the credit and monetary policy of the nation, which resulted in a rapid expansion of Iran's private sector, particularly in construction. From the period 1955–1959, real gross fixed capital formation in the private sector saw an average annual increase of 39.3%.[157] The private sector credit rose by 46 percent in 1957, 61 percent in 1958, and 32 percent in 1959 (Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report, 1960 and 1961). By 1963, the Shah had begun a redistribution of land offering compensation to landlords valued on previous tax assessments, and the land obtained by the government was then sold on favorable terms to Iranian peasants.[158] The Shah also initiated the nationalization of forests and pastures, female suffrage, profit-sharing for industrial workers, privatization of state industries, and formation of literacy corps. These developments marked a turning point in Iranian history as the nation prepared to embark on a rapid and aggressive industrialization process.[157]
The years 1963–1978 represented the longest period of sustained growth in per capita real income that the Iranian economy ever experienced. During the 1963–77 period, gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an average annual rate of 10.5% with an annual population growth rate of around 2.7% placing Iran as one of the fasted growing economies in the world. Iran's GDP per capita was $170 in 1963, rising to $2,060 by 1977. The growth was not just a result of increased oil revenues. In fact, the non-oil GDPs grew by an average annual rate of 11.5 percent, which was higher than the average annual rate of growth experienced in oil revenues. By the fifth economic planning, oil GDP rose to 15.3% strongly outpacing growth rates in oil revenue, which only saw 0.5% growth. From 1963 to 1977, the industrial and the service sectors experienced annual growth rates of 15.0% and 14.3%, respectively. The manufacturing of cars, television sets, refrigerators, and other household goods increased substantially in Iran. For instance, from 1969 to 1977, the number of private cars produced in Iran increased steadily from 29,000 to 132,000, and the number of television sets produced rose from 73,000 in 1969 to 352,000 in 1975.[157]
The growth of industrial sectors in Iran led to substantial urbanization of the country. The extent of urbanization rose from 31 percent in 1956 to 49 percent in 1978. By the mid-1970s, Iran's national debt was paid off, turning the nation from a debtor to a creditor nation. The balances on the nation's account for the 1959–78 period resulted in a surplus of approximately $15.17 billion. The Shah's fifth five-year economic plan sought to achieve a reduction in foreign imports through the use of higher tariffs on consumer goods, preferential bank loans to the industrialists, maintenance of an overvalued rial, and food subsidies in urban areas. These developments led to a new large industrialist class in Iran, and the nation's industrial structure was extremely insulated from threats of foreign competition.[157]
In 1976, Iran saw its largest-ever GDP uptick, largely thanks to the Shah's economic policies. According to the World Bank, when valued in 2010 dollars, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi improved the country's per-capita GDP to $10,261, the highest at any point in Iran's history.[159]
According to economist Fereydoun Khavand:[160]
During these 15 years, the average annual growth rate of the country fluctuated above 10%. The total volume of Iran's economy increased nearly fivefold during this period. In contrast, during the past 40 years, Iran's average annual economic growth rate has been only about two percent. Considering the growth rate of Iran's population in the post-revolution period, the average per capita growth rate of Iran in the last 40 years is estimated between zero percent and half a percent. Among the main factors hindering the growth rate in Iran are a lack of a favorable business environment, severe investment weakness, very low levels of productivity, and constant tension in the country's regional and global relations.
Many European, American, and Japanese investment firms sought business ventures and to open up headquarters in Iran. According to one American investment banker, "They are now dependent on Western technology, but what happens when they produce and export steel and copper, when they reduce their agricultural problems? They'll eat everybody else in the Middle East alive."[161]
Relationship with the Western world
[edit]By the 1960s and 1970s, Iranian oil revenues experienced rapid growth. By the mid-1960s, Iran saw "weakened U.S. influence in Iranian politics" and a strengthening in the power of the Iranian state. According to Homa Katouzian, the perception that the US was the instructor of the Shah's regime due to their support for the 1953 coup contradicted the reality that "its real influence" in domestic Iranian politics and policy "declined considerably".[162] In 1973 the Shah initiated an oil price hike with his control of OPEC further demonstrating the US no longer had influence over Iranian foreign and economic policies.[147] In response to American media outlets critical of him, the Shah claimed that Iran's oil price hikes did little to contribute to the rising inflation in the United States. Pahlavi also implied criticism of the US for not taking the lead on anti-communist efforts.[163]
In 1974, during the oil crisis, the Shah began an atomic nuclear energy policy, prompting US Trade Administrator William E. Simon to denounce the Shah as a "nut." In response, US President Nixon publicly apologized to the Shah through a letter in order to disassociate the president and the United States from the statement. Simon's statement illustrated the growing American tensions with Iran over the Shah's raising of oil prices. Nixon's apology covered up the reality that the Shah's ambitions to become the leader in the Persian Gulf Area and the Indian Ocean basin were placing a serious strain on his relationship with the United States, particularly as India had tested its first atomic bomb in May 1974.[164][page needed]
Many critics labeled the Shah as a Western and American "puppet", an accusation that has been disproven as unfounded by contemporary scholars due to the Shah's strong regional and nationalist ambitions, which often led Tehran to disputes with its Western allies.[165] In particular, the Carter administration which took control of the White House in 1977 saw the Shah as a troublesome ally and sought change in Iran's political system.[166]
By the 1970s, the Shah had become a strongman. His power had dramatically increased both in Iran and internationally, and on the tenth anniversary of the White Revolution, he challenged The Consortium Agreement of 1954 and terminated the agreement after negotiations with the oil consortium resulting in the establishment of 1973 Sale and Purchase Agreement.[167][168]
Khomeini accused the Shah of false rumors and employed Soviet methods of deception. The accusations were amplified by international media outlets, which widely propagated the information, and protests were widely shown on Iranian televisions.[169]
Many Iranian students studied across Western Europe and the United States, where ideas of liberalism, democracy, and counterculture flourished. Among left-leaning Westerners, the Shah's reign was seen as equivalent to that of right-wing hate figures. Western anti-Shah fervor broadcast by European and American media outlets was ultimately adopted by Iranian students and intellectuals studying in the West, who accused the Shah of Westoxification when it was the students themselves who were adopting Western liberalism they experienced during their studies. These Western ideas of liberalism resulted in utopian visions for revolution and social change. In turn, the Shah criticized Western democracies and equated them to chaos.
Furthermore, the Shah chastised Americans and Europeans as being "lazy" and "lacking discipline" and criticized their student radicalism as being caused by Western decline. President Nixon expressed his concern to the Shah that Iranian students in the United States would similarly become radicalized, asking the Shah: "Are your students infected?" and "Can you do anything?"[170]
Foreign relations and policies
[edit]France
[edit]
In 1961, the Francophile Mohammad Reza visited Paris to meet his favourite leader, General Charles de Gaulle of France.[171] Mohammad Reza saw height as the measure of a man and a woman (the Shah had a marked preference for tall women) and the 6 feet 5 inches (1.96 m) de Gaulle was his most admired leader. Mohammad Reza loved to be compared to his "ego ideal" of General de Gaulle, and his courtiers constantly flattered him by calling him Iran's de Gaulle.[171] During the French trip, Queen Farah, who shared her husband's love of French culture and language, befriended the culture minister André Malraux, who arranged for the exchange of cultural artifacts between French and Iranian museums and art galleries, a policy that remained a key component of Iran's cultural diplomacy until 1979.[172] Many of the legitimising devices of the regime, such as the constant use of referendums, were modelled after de Gaulle's regime.[172] Intense Francophiles, Mohammad Reza and Farah preferred to speak French rather than Persian to their children.[173] Mohammad Reza built the Niavaran Palace, which took up 840 square metres (9,000 sq ft) and whose style was a blend of Persian and French architecture.[174]
United States
[edit]The Shah's diplomatic foundation was the United States' guarantee that it would protect his regime, enabling him to stand up to larger enemies. While the arrangement did not preclude other partnerships and treaties, it helped to provide a somewhat stable environment in which Mohammad Reza could implement his reforms. Another factor guiding Mohammad Reza's foreign policy was his wish for financial stability, which required strong diplomatic ties. A third factor was his wish to present Iran as a prosperous and powerful nation; this fuelled his domestic policy of Westernisation and reform. A final component was his promise that communism could be halted at Iran's border if his monarchy was preserved. By 1977, the country's treasury, the Shah's autocracy, and his strategic alliances seemed to form a protective layer around Iran.[175]


Although the U.S. was responsible for putting the Shah in power, he did not always act as a close American ally. In the early 1960s, when the State Department's Policy Planning Staff that included William R. Polk encouraged the Shah to distribute Iran's growing revenues more equitably, slow the rush toward militarisation, and open the government to political processes, he became furious. He identified Polk as "the principal enemy of his regime." In July 1964, the Shah, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, and Pakistani President Ayub Khan announced in Istanbul the establishment of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) organisation to promote joint transportation and economic projects. It also envisioned Afghanistan's joining at some time in the future. The Shah was the first regional leader to grant de facto recognition to Israel.[176] When interviewed on 60 Minutes by reporter Mike Wallace, he criticised American Jews for their presumed control over U.S. media and finance, saying that The New York Times and The Washington Post were so pro-Israel in their coverage that it was a disservice to Israel's own interests. He also said that the Palestinians were "bully[ing] the world" through "terrorism and blackmail".[177] The Shah's remarks on the alleged Jewish lobby are widely believed to have been intended to pacify the Shah's Arab critics. In any case, bilateral relations between Iran and Israel were not adversely affected.[176] In a 1967 memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wrote that "our sales [to Iran] have created about 1.4 million man-years of employment in the U.S. and over $1 billion in profits to American industry over the last five years," leading him to conclude that Iran was an arms market the United States could not do without.[178] In June 1965, after the Americans proved reluctant to sell Mohammad Reza some of the weapons he asked for, the Shah visited Moscow, where the Soviets agreed to sell some $110 million-worth of weaponry; the threat of Iran pursuing the "Soviet option" caused the Americans to resume selling Iran weapons.[178] Additionally, British, French, and Italian arms firms were willing to sell Iran weapons, thus giving Mohammad Reza considerable leverage in his talks with the Americans, who sometimes worried that the Shah was buying more weapons than Iran needed or could handle.[178]
Arab countries
[edit]
Concerning the fate of Bahrain (which Britain had controlled since the 19th century, but which Iran claimed as its own territory) and three small Persian Gulf islands, the Shah negotiated an agreement with the British, which, by means of a public consensus, ultimately led to the independence of Bahrain (against the wishes of Iranian nationalists). In return, Iran took full control of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz, three strategically sensitive islands which the United Arab Emirates claimed. During this period, the Shah sent one of his most trusted tribal men, Sheikh Abdulkarim Al-Faisali, and maintained cordial relations with the Persian Gulf states and established close diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. Mohammad Reza saw Iran as the natural dominant power in the Persian Gulf region, and tolerated no challenges to Iranian hegemony, a claim supported by a gargantuan arms-buying spree that started in the early 1960s.[179] Mohammad Reza supported the Yemeni royalists against republican forces in the Yemen Civil War (1962–70) and assisted the sultan of Oman in putting down a rebellion in Dhofar (1971). In 1971, Mohammad Reza told a journalist: "World events were such that we were compelled to accept the fact that [the] sea adjoining the Oman Sea—I mean the Indian Ocean—does not recognise borders. As for Iran's security limits—I will not state how many kilometers we have in mind, but anyone who is acquainted with geography and the strategic situation, and especially with the potential air and sea forces, know what distances from Chah Bahar this limit can reach".[180]
From 1968 to 1975 the Iraq deported over 60,000 Iraqis of Iranian descent into Iran, causing a rise in tensions.[181] Iran's relations with Iraq, however, were often difficult due to political instability in the latter country. Mohammad Reza was distrustful of both the socialist government of Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Arab nationalist Ba'ath Party. He resented the internationally recognised Iran-Iraq border on the Shatt al-Arab River, which a 1937 treaty fixed on the low watermark on the Iranian side, giving Iraq control of most of the Shatt al-Arab.[182] On 19 April 1969, the Shah abrogated the treaty, and as a result, Iran ceased paying tolls to Iraq when its ships used the Shatt al-Arab, ending Iraq's lucrative source of income.[183] He justified his move by arguing that almost all river borders all over the world ran along the thalweg, and by claiming that because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian, the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran.[184] Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but when on 24 April 1969 an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships sailed down the Shatt al-Arab without paying tolls, Iraq, being the militarily weaker state, did nothing.[185] The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi–Iranian tension that was to last until the Algiers Accords of 1975.[185] The fact that Iraq had welcomed the former SAVAK chief General Teymur Bakhtiar to Baghdad, where he regularly met with representatives of the Tudeh Party and the Confederation of Iranian Students, added to the difficult relations between Iran and Iraq.[186] On 7 August 1970, Bakhtiar was badly wounded by a SAVAK assassin who shot him five times, and he died five days later; Alam wrote in his diary that Mohammad Reza rejoiced at the news.[187]
Soviet Union
[edit]
On 7 May 1972, Mohammad Reza told a visiting President Richard Nixon that the Soviet Union was attempting to dominate the Middle East via its close ally Iraq, and that to check Iraqi ambitions would also be to check Soviet ambitions.[188] Nixon agreed to support Iranian claims to have the thalweg in the Shatt al-Arab recognised as the border and to generally back Iran in its confrontation with Iraq.[188] Mohammad Reza financed Kurdish separatist rebels in Iraq, and to cover his tracks, armed them with Soviet weapons which Israel had seized from Soviet-backed Arab regimes, then handed them over to Iran at the Shah's behest. The initial operation was a disaster, but the Shah continued to attempt to support the rebels and weaken Iraq. Then, in 1975, the countries signed the Algiers Accord, which granted Iran equal navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab as the thalweg was now the new border, while Mohammad Reza agreed to end his support for Iraqi Kurdish rebels.[189] The Shah also maintained close relations with King Hussein of Jordan, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and King Hassan II of Morocco.[190] Beginning in 1970, Mohammad Reza formed an unlikely alliance with the militantly left-wing regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, as both leaders wanted higher oil prices for their nations, leading Iran and Libya to join forces to press for the "leapfrogging" of oil prices.[191]


The U.S.-Iran relationship grew more contentious as the U.S. became more dependent on Mohammad Reza as a stabilising force in the Middle East, under the Nixon Doctrine. In a July 1969 visit to Guam, President Nixon had announced the Nixon Doctrine, which declared that the United States would honour its treaty commitments in Asia, but "as far as the problems of international security are concerned ... the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will increasingly be handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves."[178] The particular Asian nation the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at was South Vietnam, but the Shah seized upon the doctrine, with its message that Asian nations should be responsible for their own defense, to argue that the Americans should sell him arms without limitation, a suggestion that Nixon embraced.[178] A particular dynamic was established in American-Iranian relations from 1969 onward, in which the Americans gave in to whatever Mohammad Reza demanded, as they felt they needed a strong Iran as a pro-American force in the Middle East and could not afford to lose Iran as an ally.[192] Further adding to the Shah's confidence was the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 1969, which forced the Red Army to make a major redeployment to the Chinese border.[193] Mohammad Reza, who always feared the prospect of a Soviet invasion, welcomed the Sino-Soviet war and the resulting reduction of Red Army divisions along the Soviet-Iranian border as giving him more room internationally.[193]

Under Nixon, the United States finally agreed to sever all contact with any Iranians opposed to the Shah's regime, a concession that Mohammad Reza had been seeking since 1958.[187] The often very anti-American tone of the Iranian press was ignored because Mohammad Reza supported the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Likewise, the Americans ignored the Shah's efforts to raise oil prices, even though it cost many American consumers more.[192] After 1969, a process of "reverse leverage" set in, when Mohammad Reza began to dictate to the United States as the Americans needed him more than he needed the Americans.[194] The American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger wrote in 1982 that because of the Vietnam War, it was not politically possible in the 1970s for the United States to fight a major war: "There was no possibility of assigning any American forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such commitment; the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play this role."[194] Consequently, the Americans badly needed Iran as an ally, which allowed Mohammad Reza to dictate to them. This experience greatly boosted the Shah's ego, as he felt he was able to impose his will on the world's most powerful nation.[194]
Iran and Israel vs. Iraq
[edit]The Americans initially rejected Mohammad Reza's suggestion that they join him in supporting the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighting for independence on the grounds that an independent Kurdistan would inspire the Turkish Kurds to rebel, and they had no interest in antagonising the NATO member Turkey.[188] Some of the Shah's advisers also felt it was unwise to support the peshmerga, saying that if the Iraqi Kurds won independence, then the Iranian Kurds would want to join them. When Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran in May 1972, the Shah convinced them to take a larger role in what had, up to then, been a mainly Israeli-Iranian operation to aid Iraqi Kurds in their struggles against Iraq, against the warnings of the CIA and State Department that the Shah would ultimately betray the Kurds. He did this in March 1975 with the signing of the Algiers Accord that settled Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an action taken without prior consultation with the U.S., after which he cut off all aid to the Kurds and prevented the U.S. and Israel from using Iranian territory to provide them assistance.[195]
As a way of increasing pressure on Baghdad, the peshmerga had been encouraged by Iran and the U.S. to abandon guerrilla war for conventional war in April 1974, so the years 1974–75 saw the heaviest fighting between the Iraqi Army and the peshmerga. The sudden cut-off of Iranian support in March 1975 left the Kurds very exposed, causing them to be crushed by Iraq.[196] The British journalist Patrick Brogan wrote that "...the Iraqis celebrated their victory in the usual manner, by executing as many of the rebels as they could lay their hands on."[196] Kissinger later wrote in his memoirs that it was never the intention of the U.S. or Iran to see the peshmerga actually win, as an independent Kurdistan would have created too many problems for both Turkey and Iran; rather, the intention was to "irritate" Iraq enough to force the Iraqis to change their foreign policy.[188]
Middle East oil industry
[edit]
The Shah also used America's dependence on Middle Eastern oil as leverage; although Iran did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo, he purposely increased production in its aftermath to capitalise on the higher prices. In December 1973, only two months after oil prices were raised by 70 per cent, he urged OPEC nations to push prices even higher, which they agreed to do, more than doubling the price. Oil prices increased by 470 per cent over a 12-month period, which also increased Iran's GDP by 50 per cent. Despite personal pleas from President Nixon, the Shah ignored any complaints, claimed the U.S. was importing more oil than at any time in the past, and proclaimed that "the industrial world will have to realise that the era of their terrific progress and even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished."[195]
Modernization and style of governance
[edit]
With Iran's great oil wealth, the Shah became the preeminent leader of the Middle East, and self-styled "Guardian" of the Persian Gulf. In 1961, he defended his style of rule, saying, "When Iranians learn to behave like Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden."[197]
During the last years of his regime, the Shah's government became more autocratic. In the words of a U.S. Embassy dispatch: "The Shah's picture is everywhere. The beginning of all film showings in public theaters presents the Shah in various regal poses accompanied by the strains of the National Anthem ... The monarch also actively extends his influence to all phases of social affairs ... There is hardly any activity or vocation in which the Shah or members of his family or his closest friends do not have a direct or at least a symbolic involvement. In the past, he had claimed to take a two-party system seriously and declared, 'If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organised'."[198]
However, by 1975, Mohammad Reza had abolished the two-party system of government in favour of a one-party state under the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party. This was the merger of the New Iran Party,[199] a centre-right party, and the People's Party,[200] a liberal party. The Shah justified his actions by declaring, "We must straighten out Iranians' ranks. To do so, we divide them into two categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the constitution and the Six Bahman Revolution and those who don't ... A person who does not enter the new political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles will have only two choices. He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organisation, or is related to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words a traitor. Such an individual belongs to an Iranian prison, or if he desires he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees; he can go anywhere he likes, because he is not Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to the law."[201] In addition, the Shah had decreed that all Iranian citizens and the few remaining political parties become part of Rastakhiz.[202]
Image and self-image in the 1970s
[edit]

From 1973 onward, Mohammad Reza had proclaimed his aim as that of the tamaddon-e-bozorg, the "Great Civilisation", a turning point not only in Iran's history, but also the history of the entire world—a claim that was taken seriously for a time in the West.[203] On 2 December 1974, The New Yorker published an article by Paul Erdman that was a conjectural future history entitled "The Oil War of 1976: How The Shah Won the World: The World as We Knew It Came to an End When the Shah Of Iran Decided to Restore The Glory of Ancient Persia with Western Arms".[204] In 1975, U.S. Vice President Nelson Rockefeller declared in a speech: "We must take His Imperial Majesty to the United States for a couple of years so that he can teach us how to run a country."[205] In 1976, a pulp novel by Alan Williams was published in the United States under the title A Bullet for the Shah: All They Had To Do Was Kill the World's Most Powerful Man, whose sub-title reveals much about how the American people viewed the Shah at the time (the original British title was the more prosaic Shah-Mak).[204]
The great wealth generated by Iran's oil encouraged a sense of nationalism at the Imperial Court. Empress Farah recalled her days as a university student in 1950s France about being asked where she was from:[206]
When I told them Iran ... the Europeans would recoil in horror as if Iranians were barbarians and loathsome. But after Iran became wealthy under the Shah in the 1970s, Iranians were courted everywhere. Yes, Your Majesty. Of course, Your Majesty. If you please, Your Majesty. Fawning all over us. Greedy sycophants. Then they loved Iranians.
Mohammad Reza shared the empress's sentiments as Westerners came begging to his court looking for his largesse, leading him to remark in 1976:[206]
Now we are the masters and our former masters are our slaves. Everyday [sic?] they beat a track to our door begging for favors. How can they be of assistance? Do we want arms? Do we want nuclear power stations? We have only to answer, and they will fulfill our wishes.
Because the House of Pahlavi were a parvenu house – as Reza Khan had begun his career as a private in the Persian Army, rising up to the rank of general, taking power in a coup d'état in 1921, and making himself shah in 1925 – Mohammad Reza was keen to gain the approval of the older royal families of the world, and was prepared to spend large sums of money to gain that social acceptance.[207]
Amongst the royalty that came to Tehran looking for the Shah's generosity were King Hussein of Jordan, the former King Constantine II of Greece, King Hassan II of Morocco, the princes and princesses of the Dutch House of Orange, and the Italian Princess Maria Gabriella of Savoy, whom the Shah had once courted in the 1950s.[207] He coveted the British Order of the Garter, and had, prior to courting Maria Gabriella, inquired about marrying Princess Alexandra of Kent, granddaughter of King George V, but in both cases he was rebuffed in no uncertain terms.[208] As an Iranian, Mohammad Reza greatly enjoyed supporting the Greek branch of the House of Glücksburg, knowing the Greeks still celebrated their victories over the Persians in the 5th and 4th centuries BC.[207] He enjoyed close relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the fact that he was the guest of honour at the Persepolis celebrations in 1971. Ethiopia and Iran, along with Turkey and Israel, were envisioned as an "alliance of the periphery" that would constrain Arab power in the greater Middle East.[209]
In an era of high oil prices, Iran's economy boomed while the economies of the Western nations were trapped in stagflation (economic stagnation and inflation) after the 1973–74 oil shocks, which seemed to prove the greatness of Mohammad Reza both to himself and to the rest of the world.[210] In 1975, both the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing made pleading phone calls to Mohammad Reza asking him for loans, which ultimately led the Shah to give a US$1 billion loan to the United Kingdom and another US$1 billion to France.[210] In a televised speech in January 1975 explaining why he was lending Britain a sum equal to US$1 billion, Mohammad Reza declared in his usual grandiose style: "I have known the most dark hours when our country was obliged to pass under the tutelage of foreign powers, amongst them England. Now I find that England has not only become our friend, our equal, but also the nation to which, should we be able, we will render assistance with pleasure," going on to say that since he "belonged to this [European] world," he did not want Europe to collapse economically.[210] As Britain had often dominated Iran in the past, the change in roles was greatly gratifying to Mohammad Reza.[210]
Courtiers at the Imperial court were devoted to stroking the Shah's ego, competing to be the most sycophantic, with Mohammad Reza being regularly assured he was a greater leader than his much admired General de Gaulle, that democracy was doomed, and that based on Rockefeller's speech, that the American people wanted Mohammad Reza to be their leader, as well as doing such a great job as Shah of Iran.[205] According to historian Abbas Milani, all of this praise boosted Mohammad Reza's ego, and he went from being a merely narcissistic man to a megalomaniac, believing himself a man chosen by Allah Himself to transform Iran and create the "Great Civilisation".[204][205] When one of the Shah's courtiers suggested launching a campaign to award him the Nobel Peace Prize, he wrote on the margin: "If they beg us, we might accept. They give the Nobel to kaka siah ["any black face"] these days. Why should we belittle ourselves with this?"[211] Befitting all this attention and praise, Mohammad Reza started to make increasingly outlandish claims for the "Great Civilisation", telling the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in a 1973 interview with L'Europeo:[212]
Halfway measures, compromises, are unfeasible. In other words, either one is a revolutionary or one demands law and order. One can't be a revolutionary with law and order. And even less with tolerance ... when Castro came to power, he killed at least 10,000 people ... in a sense, he was really capable, because he's still in power. So am I, however! And I intend to stay there, and to demonstrate that one can achieve a great many things by the use of force, show even that your old socialism is finished. Old, obsolete, finished ... I achieve more than the Swedes ... Huh! Swedish socialism! It didn't even nationalize forests and water. But I have ... my White Revolution ... is a new original kind of socialism and ... believe me, in Iran we're far more advanced than you and we really have nothing to learn from you.
In an interview with Der Spiegel published on 3 February 1974, Mohammad Reza declared: "I would like you to know that in our case, our actions are not just to take vengeance on the West. As I said, we are going to be a member of your club".[213] In a press conference on 31 March 1974, Mohammad Reza predicted what Iran would be like in 1984, saying:[214]
In the cities, electric cars would replace the gas engines and mass transportation systems would be switched to electricity, monorail over the ground or electric buses. And, furthermore, in the great era of civilization that lies ahead of our people, there will be least two or three holidays a week.
In 1976, Mohammad Reza told the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in an interview: "I want the standard of living in Iran in ten years' time to be exactly on a level with that in Europe today. In twenty years' time we shall be ahead of the United States".[214]

Reflecting his need to have Iran seen as "part of the world" (by which Mohammad Reza meant the western world), all through the 1970s he sponsored conferences in Iran at his expense, with for example in one week in September 1975 the International Literacy Symposium meeting in Persepolis, the International Congress of Philosophy meeting in Mashhad and the International Congress of Mithraic Studies meeting in Tehran.[216] He also sought to hold the 1984 Summer Olympics in Tehran. For most ordinary Iranians, struggling with inflation, poverty, air pollution, having to pay extortion payments to the police who demanded money from even those performing legal jobs such as selling fruits on the street, and daily traffic jams, the Shah's sponsorship of international conferences was just a waste of money and time.[217] Furthermore, conferences on pre-Islamic practices such as the cult of Mithra fuelled religious anxieties.[218] Though Mohammad Reza envisioned the "Great Civilisation" of a modernised Iran whose standard of living would be higher than that of the United States and at the forefront of modern technology, he did not envision any political change, making it clear that Iran would remain an autocracy.[214]
Achievements
[edit]
Women, children, and peasant class
[edit]In his "White Revolution" starting in the 1960s, Mohammad Reza made major changes to modernise Iran. He curbed the power of certain ancient elite factions by expropriating large and medium-sized estates for the benefit of more than four million small farmers. He took a number of other major measures, including extending suffrage to women and the participation of workers in factories through shares and other measures. In the 1970s, the governmental programme of free-of-charge nourishment for children at school known as "Taghziye Rāyegan" (Persian: تغذیه رایگان lit. free nourishment) was implemented. Under the Shah's reign, the national Iranian income showed an unprecedented rise for an extended period.
Education and military
[edit]Improvement of the educational system was made through the creation of new elementary schools. In addition, literacy courses were set up in remote villages by the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, this initiative being called "Sepāh-e Dānesh" (Persian: سپاه دانش) meaning "Army of Knowledge". The Armed Forces were also engaged in infrastructural and other educational projects throughout the country "Sepāh-e Tarvij va Ābādāni" (Persian: سپاه ترویج و آبادانی lit. army for promotion and development) as well as in health education and promotion "Sepāh-e Behdāsht" (Persian: سپاه بهداشت lit. "army for hygiene"). The Shah instituted exams for Islamic theologians to become established clerics. Many Iranian university students were sent to and supported in foreign, especially Western, countries and the Indian subcontinent.
Between 1967 and 1977, the number of universities increased in number from 7 to 22, the number of institutions of advanced learning rose from 47 to 200, and the number of students in higher education soared from 36,742 to 100,000. Iran's literacy programs were among the most innovative and effective anywhere in the world, so that by 1977 the number of Iranians able to read and write had climbed from just 27 percent to more than 80 percent.[219]

In the field of diplomacy, Iran realised and maintained friendly relations with Western and East European countries as well as Israel and China and became, especially through its close friendship with the United States, more and more a hegemonial power in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East.
As to infrastructural and technological progress, the Shah continued and developed further the policies introduced by his father. His programmes included projects in technologies such as steel, telecommunications, petrochemical facilities, power plants, dams and the automobile industry. The Aryamehr University of Technology was established as a major new academic institution.[220][page needed][164][page needed][221][page needed]
International cultural cooperation was encouraged and organised, such as the 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire and Shiraz Arts Festival. As part of his various financial support programmes in the fields of culture and arts, the Shah, along with King Hussein of Jordan made a donation to the Chinese Muslim Association for the construction of the Taipei Grand Mosque.[222]
Nuclear program
[edit]The Shah also led a massive military build-up and began the construction of many nuclear facilities.[161] By 1977, Iran was considered the fifth strongest nation in the world according to a report by Georgetown University.[223] The Shah announced the days of foreign exploitation in Iran were over and exclaimed statements such as: "Nobody can dictate to us", and "Nobody can wave a finger at us because we will wave back."[161]
The Shah sought to protect Iran's interests through various means such as funding foreign rebellions in Iraq, military support in Oman, financial/military action, and diplomacy, promoting the CIA to conclude that:[224]
In summary, thanks to the Shah himself and oil resources, Iran is well on its way to playing a leading role in the Mid East with a modernized elite, large economic resources and strong forces. Succession is always a question in an authoritarian regime, even a benevolent one, but each year reinforces the social and political momentum in the direction the Shah has set. I believe the U.S. can keep close to and benefit from this process and even influence Iran toward a positive regional and world role rather than a bid for area hegemony or other adventurism.
Despite criticism from Western skeptics, the Shah came to be seen, particularly in the two superpowers and other European powers, as a master statesman through his domestic reforms, popular base in Iran, successful opposition to radical Arab neighbors, and ambitions for regional stability and prosperity. The fall of the Pahlavi order in 1979 removed the Shah's stabilizing efforts, leading to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the destabilization of Pakistani politics, the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a major oil power, the rise of Saddam Hussein and Ba'athists in regional conflicts, and the subsequent Wahhabi-Salafi militancy.[225]
Economic reforms
[edit]Under the Shah's leadership, Iran experienced an impressive transformation of the economy. From 1925 to 1976 Iran's economy had grown 700 times, per capita 200 times, and domestic capital formation 3,400 times most of which occurred during the reign of the second Pahlavi Monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Iran enjoyed an average annual industrial growth rate of over 20% from 1963 to 1976. From 1965 to 1976 Iranian per capita income rose 8 times from $195 to $1,600. By 1978 per capita income surpassed $2,400. Much of the growth was not due to oil income. Among the OPEC oil-producing nations experts agreed only Iran's growth was due to an intelligent development plan while the growth seen in nations such as Saudi Arabia and Libya was solely based upon oil revenues. Iran's growth was expected to continue, with half of the Iranian families expected to own cars by 1985, per capita income reaching $4,500 ($13,156 adjusted for inflation), Iran would produce twenty million tons of steel annually, one million tons of aluminum, one million cars, three million television sets, one million tons of paper, and a large number of engineers.[226]
During the Shah's rule, Iran's average income level was nearing that of Western European nations, and Iranians experienced an unprecedented amount of prosperity and opportunity with an emerging middle class. Iran's growing prosperity coupled with goals of independence allowed for increasing autonomy from Western nations like the US. From 1963 to 1977 Iran experienced an average annual growth rate of 10.5% making it one of the world's fastest-growing economies and Iran experienced its largest GDP growth ever. The economic growth was not simply based on oil, in fact, non-oil revenues grew at a faster rate of 11.5% annually.[227]
During the 1960s and 1970s, Iran's society and the economy experienced a great transformation as a result of rapid industrialization. The state invested in infrastructure to develop industry and provided financial capital resulting in profitable conditions for private Iranian companies. As a result, Iran's development across the industrialization scale, technological advancement, economic growth, urbanization, and per capita income increase was extraordinary compared to other developing nations. World Bank data during this period reveals Iran had an annual real growth rate of 9.6% for middle-income categories which was the highest of any other country in the developing world. Investment, savings, consumption, employment, and per capita income also demonstrated exceptional growth. Gross domestic investment grew at an average yearly rate of 16% and reached 33% of the GDP by 1977–1978. Iranian consumption grew on average by 18% a year. Iran's middle class was far larger than any other developing country. Iran's economic growth was compared to that of rapidly industrializing Asian countries such as South Korea. Since the revolution, Iran's economic growth and rapid industrialization have plummeted, largely due to Western sanctions.[148]
During the early 1970s, with the success of the Shah's White Revolution, Iran had become a country of economic opportunity, and its international status was rising. From 1959 and 1970 the gross national product (GNP) approximately tripled rising from $3.8 to $10.6 billion and by the late 1960s Iran become one of the middle east's most flourishing spots for investment among foreign investors due to financial stability and rise in purchasing power. Many foreign powers struggled to compete for relations with Iran due to the rising potential of its growing marketplace. Iran Air also became one of the fastest growing airlines in the world and many Iranian construction companies some funded by the state had been involved in many construction projects such as Pre-Fab Inc. which created the precast concrete benches for the Āryāmehr Stadium.[228][page needed]
Islamic Revolution
[edit]Background
[edit]The overthrow of the Shah came as a surprise to almost all observers.[229][full citation needed][230] The first militant anti-Shah demonstrations of a few hundred started in October 1977, after the death of Khomeini's son Mostafa.[231] On 7 January 1978, an article "Iran and Red and Black Colonization" was published in the newspaper Ettela'at attacking Ruhollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq at the time; it referred to him as a homosexual, a drug addict, and a British spy, and claimed he was an Indian, not an Iranian.[232] Khomeini's supporters had brought in audio tapes of his sermons, and Mohammad Reza was angry with one sermon, alleging corruption on his part, and decided to hit back with the article, despite the feeling at the court, SAVAK, and Ettela'at editors that the article was an unnecessary provocation that was going to cause trouble.[232] The next day, protests against the article began in the city of Qom, a traditional centre of opposition to the House of Pahlavi.[233]
Reza's cancer diagnosis
[edit]In 1974, the Shah's doctor, Abdol Karim Ayadi, diagnosed the Shah with splenomegaly after he complained of a swollen abdomen. On 1 May 1974, French professor Georges Flandrin flew to Tehran to treat the Shah. On the first visit, Flandrin was able to diagnose the Shah with chronic lymphocytic leukemia. The Shah's diagnosis of cancer would not be revealed to him until 1978. Medical reports given to the Shah were falsified and altered in order to state that the Shah was in good health, to conceal his cancer from him. In 1976, the Shah met with French physicians in Zurich; they were disturbed by his abnormal blood count. They discovered he was being treated with the wrong medication, worsening his condition.[234]

As it worsened, from the spring of 1978, he stopped appearing in public, with the official explanation being that he was suffering from a "persistent cold".[235] In May 1978, the Shah suddenly cancelled a long-planned trip to Hungary and Bulgaria.[235] He spent the entire summer of 1978 in Ramsar Palace in the Caspian Sea resort, where two of France's most prominent doctors, Jean Bernard and Georges Flandrin, treated his cancer.[235] To try to stop his cancer, Bernard and Flandrin had Mohammad Reza take prednisone, a drug with numerous potential side effects including depression and impaired thinking.[235][236]
As nationwide protests and strikes swept Iran, the court found it impossible to get decisions from Mohammad Reza, as he became utterly passive and indecisive, content to spend hours listlessly staring into space as he rested by the Caspian Sea while the revolution raged.[235] The seclusion of the Shah, who normally loved the limelight, sparked all sorts of rumors about the state of his health and damaged the imperial mystique, as the man who had been presented as a god-like ruler was revealed to be fallible.[237] A July 1978 attempt to deny the rumors of Mohammad Reza's declining health (by publishing a crudely doctored photograph in the newspapers of the Emperor and Empress walking on the beach) instead further damaged the imperial mystique, as most people realised that what appeared to be two beach clogs on either side of the Shah were merely substitutes inserted for his airbrushed aides, who were holding him up as he now had difficulty walking by himself.[238]
In June 1978, Mohammad Reza's French doctors first revealed to the French government how serious his cancer was, and in September, the French government informed the American government that the Shah was dying of cancer; until then, U.S. officials had no idea that Mohammad Reza had even been diagnosed with cancer four years earlier.[239] The Shah had created a very centralised system in which he was the key decision-maker on all issues, and as historian Abbas Milani noted, he was mentally disabled in the summer of 1978 owing to his tendency to be indecisive when faced with a crisis which, combined with his cancer and the effects of the anti-cancer drugs, made his mood "increasingly volatile and unpredictable. One day, he was full of verve and optimism and the next day or hour he fell into a catatonic stupor", bringing the entire government to a halt.[240] Milani wrote that the Shah was in 1978 "beset with depression, indecision and paralysis, and his indecision led to the immobilisation of the entire system."[241] Empress Farah grew so frustrated with her husband that she suggested numerous times that he leave Iran for medical treatment and appoint her regent, saying she would handle the crisis and save the House of Pahlavi. Mohammad Reza vetoed this idea, saying he did not want Farah to be a "Joan of Arc", and it would be too humiliating for him as a man to flee Iran and leave a woman in charge.[241]
Black Friday massacre
[edit]The Shah-centred command structure of the Iranian military and the lack of training to confront civil unrest were marked by disaster and bloodshed. There were several instances where army units had opened fire, the most significant being the events on 8 September 1978. That day, at least 64 and perhaps 100 or more people were shot dead, and the Pahlavi military injured 205 in Jaleh Square. The deaths were described as the pivotal event in the Iranian Revolution that ended any "hope for compromise" between the protest movement and the regime of Reza.[242][243][failed verification][244][245][246][247][248]
Collapse of the regime
[edit]
Hoping to calm the situation, on 2 October 1978, the Shah granted a general amnesty to dissidents living abroad, including Ayatollah Khomeini.[249] But by then it was too late. October 1978 was characterized by extreme unrest and open opposition to the monarchy; strikes paralyzed the country, and in early December, a "total of 6 to 9 million"—more than 10% of the country—marched against the Shah throughout Iran.[250] In October 1978, after flying over a huge demonstration in Tehran in his helicopter, Mohammad Reza accused the British ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons and the American ambassador William H. Sullivan of organising the demonstrations, screaming that he was being "betrayed" by the United Kingdom and the United States.[251] The fact that the BBC's journalists tended to be very sympathetic towards the revolution was viewed by most Iranians, including Mohammad Reza, as a sign that Britain supported the revolution. This impression turned out to be crucial, as the Iranian people had a very exaggerated idea about Britain's capacity to "direct events" in Iran.[252] In a subsequent internal inquiry, the BBC found many of its more left-wing journalists disliked Mohammad Reza as a "reactionary" force and sympathised with a revolution seen as "progressive".[253]
Reza spent much of his time working out various conspiracy theories about who was behind the revolution, with his favourite candidates being some combination of Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.[254] Milani wrote that Mohammad Reza's view of the revolution as a gigantic conspiracy organised by foreign powers suggested that there was nothing wrong with Iran, and the millions of people demonstrating against him were just dupes being used by foreigners, a viewpoint that did not encourage concessions and reforms until it was too late.[241] For much of 1978, Mohammad Reza saw his enemies as "Marxist" revolutionaries rather than Islamists.[251] The Shah had exaggerated ideas about the power of the KGB, which he thought of as omnipotent, and often expressed the view that all of the demonstrations against him had been organised in Moscow, saying only the KGB had the power to bring out thousands of ordinary people to demonstrate.[255]
In October 1978, the oil workers went on strike, shutting down the oil industry and Mohammad Reza's principal source of revenue.[256] The Iranian military had no plans in place to deal with such an event, and the strike pushed the regime to the economic brink.[256]
The revolution had attracted support from a broad coalition ranging from secular, far-left nationalists to Islamists on the right, and Khomeini, who was temporarily based in Paris after being expelled from Iraq, chose to present himself as a moderate able to bring together all the different factions leading the revolution.[257] On 3 November, a SAVAK plan to arrest about 1,500 people considered to be leaders of the revolution was submitted to Mohammad Reza, who at first tentatively agreed, but then changed his mind, disregarding not only the plan, but also dismissing its author, Parviz Sabeti.[258] On 5 November 1978, Mohammad Reza went on Iranian television to say, "I have heard the voice of your revolution" and promise major reforms.[259] In a major concession to the opposition, on 7 November 1978, Mohammad Reza freed all political prisoners while ordering the arrest of the former prime minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda and several senior officials of his regime, a move that both emboldened his opponents and demoralised his supporters.[232]
On 21 November 1978, the Treasury Secretary of the United States W. Michael Blumenthal visited Tehran to meet Mohammad Reza and reported back to President Jimmy Carter, "This man is a ghost", as by now the ravages of his cancer could no longer be concealed.[260]
In late December 1978, the Shah learned that many of his generals were making overtures to the revolutionary leaders, and the loyalty of the military could no longer be assured.[261] In a sign of desperation, Mohammad Reza reached out to the National Front the following month, asking if one of their leaders would be willing to become prime minister.[262] The Shah was especially interested in having the National Front's Gholam Hossein Sadighi as prime minister.[262] Sadighi had served as interior minister under Mosaddegh, had been imprisoned after the 1953 coup, and pardoned by Mohammad Reza on the grounds that he was a "patriot".[263] Sadighi remained active in the National Front and had often been harassed by SAVAK but was willing to serve as prime minister under Mohammad Reza in order to "save" Iran, saying he feared what might come after if the Shah was overthrown.[263]
Despite the opposition of the other National Front leaders, Sadighi visited the Niavaran palace several times in December 1978 to discuss the terms under which he might become prime minister, with the main sticking point being that he wanted the Shah not to leave Iran, saying he needed to remain in order to ensure the loyalty of the military.[262]
On 7 December 1978, it was announced that President Carter of the U.S., President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany and Prime Minister James Callaghan of the United Kingdom would meet in Guadeloupe on 5 January 1979 to discuss the crisis in Iran.[264] For Mohammad Reza, this announcement was the final blow, and he was convinced that the Western leaders were holding the meeting to discuss how best to abandon him.[265]
Islamic Republic
[edit]

On 16 January 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah made a contract with Farboud and left Iran at the behest of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (a longtime opposition leader himself), who sought to calm the situation.[266] As Mohammad Reza boarded the plane to take him out of Iran, many of the Imperial Guardsmen wept while Bakhtiar did little to hide his disdain and dislike for the Shah.[267] Spontaneous attacks by members of the public on statues of the Pahlavis followed, and "within hours, almost every sign of the Pahlavi dynasty" was destroyed.[268][full citation needed] Bakhtiar dissolved SAVAK, freed all political prisoners, and allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to return to Iran after years in exile. He asked Khomeini to create a Vatican-like state in Qom, promised free elections, and called upon the opposition to help preserve the constitution, proposing a "national unity" government including Khomeini's followers. Khomeini rejected Bakhtiar's demands and appointed his own interim government, with Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister, stating that "I will appoint a state. I will act against this government. With the nation's support, I will appoint a state."[269] In February, pro-Khomeini revolutionary guerrilla and rebel soldiers gained the upper hand in street fighting, and the military announced its neutrality. On the evening of 11 February, the dissolution of the monarchy was complete.[270]
Exile
[edit]
During his second exile, Mohammad Reza traveled from country to country seeking what he hoped would be temporary residence. First, he flew to Aswan, Egypt, where he received a warm and gracious welcome from President Anwar El-Sadat. He later lived in Marrakesh, Morocco, as a guest of King Hassan II. Mohammad Reza loved to support royalty during his time as Shah and one of those who benefitted had been Hassan, who received an interest-free loan of US$110 million from his friend.[271] Mohammad Reza expected Hassan to return the favour, but he soon learned Hassan had other motives. Richard Parker, the U.S. ambassador to Morocco, reported, "The Moroccans believed the Shah was worth about $2 billion, and they wanted to take their share of the loot".[272] After leaving Morocco, Mohammad Reza lived in Paradise Island, in the Bahamas, and in Cuernavaca, Mexico, near Mexico City, as a guest of president José López Portillo. Richard Nixon, the former US president, visited the Shah in summer 1979 in Mexico.[273]
Decline of health
[edit]A U.S. doctor, Benjamin Kean, who examined Mohammad Reza in Cuernavaca later wrote:[274]
There was no longer any doubt. The atmosphere had changed completely. The Shah's appearance was stunningly worse ... Clearly he had obstructive jaundice. The odds favored gallstones, since his fever, chills and abdominal distress suggested an infection of the biliary tract. Also he had a history of indigestion. Besides the probable obstruction—he now had been deeply jaundiced for six to eight weeks—he was emaciated and suffering from hard tumor nodes in the neck and a swollen spleen, signs that his cancer was worsening, and he had severe anemia and very low white blood [cell] counts.
The Shah suffered from gallstones that required prompt surgery. He was offered treatment in Switzerland but insisted on treatment in the United States. President Carter did not wish to admit Mohammad Reza to the U.S. but came under pressure from Henry Kissinger, who phoned Carter to say he would not endorse the SALT II treaty that Carter had just signed with the Soviet Union unless the former Shah was allowed into the United States, reportedly prompting Carter more than once to hang up his phone in rage in the Oval Office and shout "Fuck the Shah!".[275] Because many Republicans were attacking the SALT II treaty as a U.S. give-away to the Soviet Union, Carter desired the endorsement of a Republican elder statesman like Kissinger to fend off this criticism. Mohammad Reza had decided not to tell his Mexican doctors he had cancer, and the Mexican doctors had misdiagnosed his illness as malaria, giving him a regime of anti-malarial drugs that did nothing to treat his cancer, which caused his health to go into rapid decline as he lost 30 pounds (14 kg).[275]
In September 1979, a doctor sent by David Rockefeller reported to the State Department that Mohammad Reza needed to come to the United States for medical treatment, an assessment not shared by Kean, who stated that the proper medical equipment for treating Mohammad Reza's cancer could be found in Mexico and the only problem was the former Shah's unwillingness to tell the Mexicans he had cancer.[276] The State Department warned Carter not to admit the former Shah into the U.S., saying it was likely that the Iranian regime would seize the U.S. embassy in Tehran if that occurred.[277] Milani suggested there was a possible conflict of interest on the part of Rockefeller, noting that his Chase Manhattan Bank had given Iran a $500 million loan under questionable conditions in 1978 (several lawyers had refused to endorse the loan) which placed the money in an account with Chase Manhattan; that the new Islamic Republic had been making "substantial withdrawals" from its account with Chase Manhattan; and that Rockefeller wanted Mohammad Reza in the US, knowing full well it was likely to cause the Iranians to storm the U.S. embassy, which in turn would cause the U.S. government to freeze Iranian financial assets in America—such as the Iranian account at Chase Manhattan.[277]
Treatment in the United States
[edit]On 22 October 1979, President Jimmy Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah into the United States to undergo surgical treatment at the Weill Cornell Medical Center. While there, Mohammad Reza used the name of "David D. Newsom", Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at that time, as his temporary code name, without Newsom's knowledge. The Shah was taken later by U.S. Air Force jet to Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and from there to Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base.[278] It was anticipated that his stay in the United States would be short; however, surgical complications ensued, which required six weeks of confinement in the hospital before he recovered. His prolonged stay in the United States was extremely unpopular with the revolutionary movement in Iran, which still resented the United States' overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh and the years of support for the Shah's rule. The Iranian government demanded his return to Iran, but he stayed in the hospital.[279] Mohammad Reza's time in New York was highly uncomfortable; he was under a heavy security detail as every day, Iranian students studying in the United States gathered outside his hospital to shout "Death to the Shah!", a chorus that Mohammad Reza heard.[280] The former Shah was obsessed with watching news from Iran, and was greatly upset at the new order being imposed by the Islamic Republic.[280] Mohammad Reza could no longer walk by this time, and for security reasons had to be moved in his wheelchair under the cover of darkness when he went to the hospital while covered in a blanket, as the chances of his assassination were too great.[280]
There are claims that Reza's admission to the United States resulted in the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the kidnapping of U.S. diplomats, military personnel, and intelligence officers, which soon became known as the Iran hostage crisis.[281] In the Shah's memoir, Answer to History, he claimed that the United States never provided him any kind of health care and asked him to leave the country.[282] From the time of the storming of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and the taking of the embassy staff as hostages, Mohammad Reza's presence in the United States was viewed by the Carter administration as a stumbling block to the release of the hostages, and as Zonis noted "... he was, in effect, expelled from the country".[283] Mohammad Reza wanted to go back to Mexico, saying he had pleasant memories of Cuernavaca, but was refused.[284] Mexico was a candidate to be a rotating member of the UN Security Council, but needed the vote of Cuba to be admitted, and the Cuban leader Fidel Castro told President José López Portillo that Cuba's vote was conditional on Mexico not accepting the Shah again.[284]
He left the United States on 15 December 1979 and lived for a short time in the Isla Contadora in Panama. This caused riots by Panamanians who objected to the Shah being in their country. General Omar Torrijos, the dictator of Panama, kept Mohammad Reza Shah as a virtual prisoner at the Paitilla Medical Center, a hospital condemned by the former Shah's U.S. doctors as "an inadequate and poorly staffed hospital", and in order to hasten his death allowed only Panamanian doctors to treat his cancer.[285] General Torrijos, a populist left-winger, had only taken in Mohammad Reza under heavy U.S. pressure, and he made no secret of his dislike of Mohammad Reza, whom he called after meeting him "the saddest man he had ever met".[286] When he first met Mohammad Reza, Torrijos taunted him by telling him "it must be hard to fall off the Peacock Throne into Contadora" and called him a chupon, a Spanish slang term for "someone who is finished".[286]
Torrijos added to Mohammad Reza's misery by making his chief bodyguard a militantly Marxist sociology professor who spent much time lecturing Mohammad Reza on how he deserved his fate because he had been a tool of the "American imperialism" that was ostensibly oppressing the Third World, and charged Mohammad Reza a monthly rent of US$21,000, making him pay for all his food and the wages of the 200 National Guardsmen assigned as his bodyguards.[286] The interim government in Iran still demanded his and his wife's immediate extradition to Tehran. A short time after Mohammad Reza's arrival in Panama, an Iranian ambassador was dispatched to the Central American nation carrying a 450-page long extradition request. That official appeal alarmed both the Shah and his advisors. Whether the Panamanian government would have complied is a matter of speculation amongst historians.[287]
In January 1980, the Shah gave his last television interview to British journalist David Frost on Contadora Island,[288] re-broadcast by ABC in the U.S. on 17 January.[289] The Shah talks about his wealth, his illness, the SAVAK, the torture during his reign, his own political mistakes, Khomeini and his threat of extradition to Iran.[290]
The only consolation for Mohammad Reza during his time in Panama were letters from Princess Soraya saying that she still loved him and wanted to see him one last time before he died.[291] Mohammad Reza, in the letters he sent to Paris, declared he wanted to see Soraya one last time as well but said that the Empress Farah could not be present, which presented some complications as Farah was continually by his deathbed.[292]
CIA assassination conspiracy and Morocco
[edit]While the Shah was in Panama, one of Ruhollah Khomeini's close advisors, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, had a meeting with Hamilton Jordan, Jimmy Carter's Chief of Staff.[293] Ghotbzadeh requested that the CIA kill the Shah while he was in Panama. Fearing for his life, the Shah left Panama, delaying further surgery. He fled to Rabat, Morocco, where he stayed with King Hassan II, and then to Cairo, Egypt, with his condition worsening.[294][295]
Asylum in Egypt and botched operation
[edit]After that event, the Shah again sought the support of Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat, who renewed his offer of permanent asylum in Egypt to the ailing monarch. He returned to Egypt in March 1980, where he received urgent medical treatment. Michael DeBakey, an American heart surgeon, was called to perform a splenectomy. Although DeBakey was world-renowned in his field, his experience performing this surgery was limited. On 28 March 1980, Mohammad Reza's French and U.S. doctors finally performed an operation meant to have been performed in the fall of 1979.[296] During the operation, the tail of the pancreas was injured. This led to infection.[297][298][299] Dr. Kean recalled:[300]
The operation went beautifully. That night, however, was terrible. The medical team–U.S., Egyptian, French–was in the pathology lab. The focus was on the Shah's cancerous spleen, grotesquely swollen to 20 times normal. It was one-foot long, literally the size of a football. But I was drawn to the liver tissues that had also been removed. The liver was speckled with white. Malignancy. The cancer had hit the liver. The Shah would soon die ... The tragedy is that a man who should have had the best and easiest medical care had, in many respects, the worst.
By that point, it was arranged by Sadat that Soraya would quietly visit Mohammad Reza on his deathbed in Egypt without Farah present, but Milani noted the two were "star-crossed lovers." Soraya was unable to come to Egypt in time from her home in Paris.[292]
Death and funeral
[edit]The infection caused by the splenectomy operation led to the final decline of Mohammad Reza.[297][298] In his hospital bed, the Shah was asked to describe his feelings for Iran and its people and to define the country. The Shah, a fervent nationalist, responded "Iran is Iran." After pausing for minutes, he said "Its land, people, and history," and "Every Iranian has to love it." He continued on to repeat "Iran is Iran" over and over.[301] Shortly after, the Shah slipped into a coma and died at 09:15 a.m. on 27 July 1980 at age 60. He kept a bag of Iranian soil under his death bed.[295]
Egyptian state funeral
[edit]Egyptian President Sadat gave the Shah a state funeral.[302] In addition to members of the Pahlavi family, Anwar Sadat, Richard Nixon and Constantine II of Greece attended the funeral ceremony in Cairo.[303]
Mohammad Reza Shah is buried in the Al Rifa'i Mosque in Cairo, a mosque of great symbolic importance. Also buried there is Farouk of Egypt, Mohammad Reza Shah's former brother-in-law. The tombs lie to the left of the entrance. Years earlier, his father and predecessor, Reza Shah, had also initially been buried at the Al Rifa'i Mosque.
Criticism of reign and causes of his overthrow
[edit]American inaction
[edit]The U.S. State Department drew criticism for doing little to communicate with Tehran or discourage protest and opposition to the Shah. The intelligence community within the US has also been subject to criticism particularly for reporting to President Jimmy Carter, "Iran is not in a revolutionary or even a 'pre-revolutionary' situation." Carter was also blamed for his lack of support for the Shah while failing to deter opposition. Within Iran, the revolution is widely believed to have been a British plot to overthrow the Shah. This theory would come to be known as the 1979 Iranian Revolution conspiracy theory. The notion was supported by the Shah of Iran, who believed his increasing control over oil markets and his 1973 nationalization of Iranian oil prompted international oil companies to unseat him.[304] The Carter administration in the US also refused to sell non-lethal tear gas and rubber bullets to Iran.[305][306]
An Amnesty International assessment on Iran for 1974–1975 stated: "The total number of political prisoners has been reported at times throughout the year to be anything from 25,000 to 100,000".[307][308]
At the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike wrote in 2000:[309]
In 1978 the deepening opposition to the Shah erupted in widespread demonstrations and rioting. Recognising that even this level of violence had failed to crush the rebellion, the Shah abdicated the Peacock Throne and fled Iran on 16 January 1979. Despite decades of pervasive surveillance by SAVAK, working closely with CIA, the extent of public opposition to the Shah, and his sudden departure, came as a considerable surprise to the US intelligence community and national leadership. As late as 28 September 1978 the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah "is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years."
Explanations for the overthrow of Mohammad Reza include his status as a dictator put in place by a non-Muslim Western power, the United States,[310][full citation needed][311][full citation needed] whose foreign culture was seen as influencing that of Iran. Additional contributing factors included reports of oppression, brutality,[312][full citation needed][313] corruption, and extravagance.[312][314][full citation needed] Basic functional failures of the regime have also been blamed—economic bottlenecks, shortages and inflation; the regime's over-ambitious economic programme;[315] the failure of its security forces to deal with protests and demonstrations;[316] and the overly centralised royal power structure.[317] International policies pursued by the Shah in order to increase national income by remarkable increases in the price of oil through his leading role in the Organization of the Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) have been stressed as a major cause for a shift of Western interests and priorities, and for a reduction of their support for him reflected in a critical position of Western politicians and media, especially of the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter regarding the question of human rights in Iran, and in strengthened economic ties between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.[318]
Change of Calendar
[edit]
In October 1971, Mohammad Reza celebrated the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy; The New York Times reported that $100 million was spent on the celebration.[319] Next to the ancient ruins of Persepolis, the Shah gave orders to build a tent city covering 160 acres (0.65 km2), studded with three huge royal tents and fifty-nine lesser ones arranged in a star-shaped design. French chefs from Maxim's of Paris prepared breast of peacock for royalty and dignitaries from around the world, the buildings were decorated by Maison Jansen (the same firm that helped Jacqueline Kennedy redecorate the White House), the guests ate off Limoges porcelain and drank from Baccarat crystal glasses. This became a major scandal, as the contrast between the dazzling elegance of the celebration and the misery of the nearby villages was so dramatic that no one could ignore it. Months before the festivities, university students went on strike in protest. Indeed, the cost was so sufficiently impressive that the Shah forbade his associates to discuss the actual figures. However, he and his supporters argued that the celebrations opened new investments in Iran, improved relationships with the other leaders and nations of the world and provided greater recognition of Iran.[320][321]

Other actions thought to have contributed to his downfall include antagonising formerly apolitical Iranians—especially merchants of the bazaars—with the creation in 1975 of a single-party political monopoly (the Rastakhiz Party), with compulsory membership and dues, and general aggressive interference in the political, economic, and religious concerns of people's lives;[322] and the 1976 change from an Islamic calendar to an Imperial calendar, marking the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus as the first day, instead of the migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina. This supposed date was designed so that the year 2500 would fall on 1941, the year when his own reign started. Overnight, the year changed from 1355 to 2535.[323] During the extravagant festivities to celebrate the 2500th anniversary, the Shah was quoted as saying at Cyrus's tomb: "Rest in peace, Cyrus, for we are awake".[324]
It has been argued that the White Revolution was "shoddily planned and haphazardly carried out", upsetting the wealthy while not going far enough to provide for the poor or offer greater political freedom.[325] In 1974, Mohammad Reza learned from his French doctors that he was suffering from the cancer that was to kill him six years later.[192] Though this was such a carefully guarded secret that not even the Americans were aware of it (as late as 1977, the CIA submitted a report to President Carter describing the Shah as being in "robust health"), the knowledge of his impending death left Mohammad Reza depressed and passive in his last years, a man no longer capable of acting.[192]
Unemployment
[edit]Some achievements of the Shah—such as broadened education—had unintended consequences. While school attendance rose (by 1966, the school attendance of urban seven- to fourteen-year-olds was estimated at 75.8%), Iran's labour market was slow to absorb the high number of educated youth. In 1966, high school graduates had "a higher rate of unemployment than did the illiterate", and the educated unemployed often supported the revolution.[326]
Legacy
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In 1969, Mohammad Reza sent one of 73 Apollo 11 Goodwill Messages to NASA for the historic first lunar landing.[327] The message still rests on the lunar surface today. He stated in part, "we pray the Almighty God to guide mankind towards ever increasing success in the establishment of culture, knowledge and human civilisation". The Apollo 11 crew visited Mohammad Reza during a world tour.[327]
Shortly after his overthrow, Mohammad Reza wrote an autobiographical memoir Réponse à l'histoire (Answer to History). It was translated from the original French into English, Persian (as Pasokh be Tarikh), and other languages. However, he had already died by the time of its publication. The book is Mohammad Reza's personal account of his reign and accomplishments, as well as his perspective on issues related to the Iranian Revolution and Western foreign policy toward Iran. He places some of the blame for the wrongdoings of SAVAK, and the failures of various democratic and social reforms (particularly through the White Revolution), upon Amir Abbas Hoveyda and his administration.[328][329]
Recently, Mohammad Reza's reputation has experienced something of a revival in Iran, with some people looking back on his era as a time when Iran was more prosperous[330][328] and the government less oppressive.[331] Journalist Afshin Molavi reported that some members of the uneducated poor—traditionally core supporters of the revolution that overthrew the monarchy—were making remarks such as, "God bless the Shah's soul, the economy was better then", and found that "books about the former Shah (even censored ones) sell briskly", while "books of the Rightly Guided Path sit idle".[332] On 28 October 2016, thousands of people in Iran celebrating Cyrus Day at the Tomb of Cyrus, chanted slogans in support of him, and against the current Islamic regime of Iran and Arabs, and many were subsequently arrested.[329]

Religious beliefs
[edit]
From his mother, Mohammad Reza inherited an almost messianic belief in his own greatness and that God was working in his favour, which explained the often passive and fatalistic attitudes that he displayed as an adult.[333] In 1973, Mohammad Reza told the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci:[334]
A king who does not need to account to anyone for what he says and does is unavoidably doomed to loneliness. However, I am not entirely alone, because a force others can't perceive accompanies me. My mystical force. Moreover, I receive messages. I have lived with God besides me since I was 5 years old. Since, that is, God sent me those visions.
Mohammad Reza often spoke in public and in private from childhood onward of his belief that God had chosen him for a "divine mission" to transform Iran, as he believed that dreams he had as a child of the Twelve Imams of Shia Islam were all messages from God.[335] In his 1961 book Mission for My Country, Mohammad Reza wrote:[336]
From the time I was six or seven, I have felt that perhaps there is a supreme being, who is guiding me. I don't know. Sometimes the thought disturbs me because then, I ask myself, what is my own personality, and am I possessed of free will? Still, I often reflect, if I am driven-or perhaps I should say supported-by another force, there must be a reason.
In his biography of the Shah, Marvin Zonis argued that Mohammad Reza really believed in these claims of divine support. Shia Islam has no tradition of describing Shahs being favoured with messages from Allah; very few Shahs had ever claimed that their dreams were divine messages, and most people in the West laughed at Mohammad Reza's claim that his dreams were messages from God.[337] Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza's father, who was less religious, dismissed these visions as nonsense, and told his son to have more common sense.[338]
Fereydoon Hoveyda, a veteran diplomat who served as the Iranian ambassador to the United Nations (1971–1979), and the brother of Amir-Abbas Hoveyda, the Prime Minister under the Shah (1965–1977) executed after the Islamic revolution, and himself a critic of the régime who died in exile, says that "when it comes to religion and spirituality, many passages of the monarch's and Khomeini's publications are interchangeable", which he perceives as the continuity of the Iranian civilization, where the religion changes but the spirit remains.[339]
Wealth
[edit]Mohammad Reza inherited the wealth built by his father Reza Shah, who preceded him as king of Iran and became known as the richest person in Iran during his reign, with his wealth estimated to be higher than 600 million rials[340] and including vast amounts of land and numerous large estates especially in the province of Mazandaran[341] obtained usually at a fraction of their real price.[342] Reza Shah, facing criticism for his wealth, decided to pass on all of his land and wealth to his eldest son Mohammad Reza in exchange for a sugar cube, known in Iran as habbe kardan.[341] However, shortly after obtaining the wealth Mohammad Reza was ordered by his father and then king to transfer a million toman ($500,000) to each of his siblings.[343] By 1958, it was estimated that the companies possessed by Mohammad Reza had a value of $157 million (in 1958 USD) with an estimated additional $100 million saved outside Iran.[344] Rumours of his and his family's corruption began to surface which greatly damaged his reputation. This formed one of the reasons for the creation of the Pahlavi Foundation and the distribution of additional land to the people of some 2,000 villages inherited by his father, often at very low and discounted prices.[345] In 1958, using funds from inherited crown estates, Mohammad Reza established the Pahlavi Foundation, which functioned as a tax-exempt charity and held all his assets, including 830 villages spanning a total area of 2,500,000 million hectares (6,200,000 million acres).[346] According to Business Insider, Mohammad Reza had set up the organisation "to pursue Iran's charitable interests in the U.S."[347] At its height, the organisation was estimated to be worth $3 billion; however, on numerous occasions, the Pahlavi Foundation was accused of corruption.[348][349] Despite these charges, in his book Answer to History Pahlavi affirms that he "never made the slightest profit" out of the Foundation.[350]
In a 1974 interview which was shown in a documentary titled Crisis in Iran, Mohammad Reza told Mike Wallace that the rumours of corruption were "the most unjust thing that I have heard," calling them a "cheap accusation" whilst arguing the allegations were not as serious as those regarding other governments, including that of the United States.[351] In November 1978, after Pahlavi dismissed Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and appointed a military government, he pledged in a televised address "not to repeat the past mistakes and illegalities, the cruelty and corruption."[352] Despite this, the royal family's wealth can be seen as one of the factors behind the Iranian revolution. This was due to the oil crises of the 1970s which increased inflation resulting in economic austerity measures which made lower class workers more inclined to protest.[353]
Mohammad Reza's wealth remained considerable during his time in exile. While staying in the Bahamas he offered to purchase the island that he was staying on for $425 million (in 1979 USD); however, his offer was rejected by the Bahamas which claimed that the island was worth far more. On 17 October 1979, again in exile and perhaps knowing the gravity of his illness, he split up his wealth amongst his family members, giving 20% to Farah, 20% to his eldest son Reza, 15% to Farahnaz, 15% to Leila, 20% to his younger son, in addition to giving 8% to Shahnaz and 2% to his granddaughter Mahnaz Zahedi.[354]
On 14 January 1979, an article titled "Little pain expected in exile for Shah" by The Spokesman Review newspaper found that the Pahlavi dynasty had amassed one of the largest private fortunes in the world; estimated then at well over $1 billion. It also stated that a document submitted to the ministry of justice, in protest of the royal family's activity in many sectors of the nation's economy, detailed the Pahlavis dominating role in the economy of Iran. The list showed that the Pahlavi dynasty had interests in, amongst other things, 17 banks and insurance companies, including a 90 per cent ownership in the nation's third-largest insurance company, 25 metal enterprises, 8 mining companies, 10 building-materials companies, including 25 per cent of the largest cement company, 45 construction companies, 43 food companies, and 26 enterprises in trade or commerce, including a share of ownership in almost every major hotel in Iran; the Pahlavis also had major interests in real estate.[355] Mohammad Reza was also known for his interest in cars and had a personal collection of 140 classic and sports cars including a Mercedes-Benz 500K Autobahn cruiser, one of only six ever made.[356] The first Maserati 5000 GT was named the Shah of Persia, and was built for Mohammad Reza, who had been impressed by the Maserati 3500 and requested Giulio Alfieri, Maserati's chief engineer, to use a modified 5-litre engine from the Maserati 450S on the 3500GT's chassis.[357] There was also a 2019 car named in his honour.
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The newly crowned Shah with his Pahlavi Crown
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The Shah of Persia, body by Carrozzeria Touring
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Touring Superleggera Scià Di Persia
Titles, styles, honours, and emblems
[edit]Titles, styles, and honours
[edit]| Styles of Mohammad Reza Shah of Iran | |
|---|---|
| Reference style | His Imperial Majesty |
| Spoken style | Your Imperial Majesty |
| Alternative style | Aryamehr |
Mohammad Reza was Sovereign of many orders in Iran and received honours and decorations from around the world. Mohammad Reza used the style His Majesty until his imperial coronation in 1967, ascending to the title of Shahanshah, when he adopted the style His Imperial Majesty. Mohammad Reza also held many supplementary titles such as Bozorg Artestaran, a military rank superseding his prior position as captain. On 15 September 1965, Mohammad Reza was granted the title of Aryamehr ('The Light of the Aryans') by an extraordinary session of the joint Houses of Parliament.[358]
Coats of arms
[edit]From 24 April 1926, until his accession, Mohammad Reza's arms notably consisted of two Shahbaz birds in the centre, a common symbol during the Achaemenid period, with the Pahlavi Crown placed above them. Upon his accession, he adopted his father's coat of arms which included a shield composed of the Lion and the Sun symbol in first quarter, the Faravahar in the second quarter, the two-pointed sword of Ali (Zulfiqar) in third quarter and the Simurgh in the fourth quarter. Overall, in the centre is a circle depicting Mount Damavand with a rising sun, the symbol of the Pahlavi dynasty. The shield is crowned by the Pahlavi crown and surrounded by the chain of the Order of Pahlavi. Two lions rampant regardant, holding scimitars supports the coat of arms on either side. Under the whole device is the motto: "Mara dad farmud va Khod Davar Ast" ('Justice He bids me do, as He will judge me' or, alternatively, 'He gave me power to command, and He is the judge').
Imperial standards
[edit]The Pahlavi imperial family employed rich heraldry to symbolise their reign and ancient Persian heritage. An image of the imperial crown was included in every official state document and symbol, from the badges of the armed forces to paper money and coinage. The image of the crown was the centerpiece of the imperial standard of the Shah.
The personal standards consisted of a field of pale blue, the traditional colour of the Iranian imperial family, at the centre of which was placed the heraldic motif of the individual. The Imperial Iranian national flag was placed in the top left quadrant of each standard. The appropriate imperial standard was flown beside the national flag when the individual was present. In 1971, new designs were adopted.[359]
Books
[edit]Mohammad Reza published several books in the course of his kingship and two later works after his downfall. Amongst others, these include:
- Mission for My Country (1960)
- The White Revolution (1967)
- Toward the Great Civilisation (Persian version: Imperial 2536 = 1977 CE; English version: 1994)
- Answer to History (1980)
- The Shah's Story (1980)
See also
[edit]- 1953 Iran coup
- 1979 Iranian Revolution, also known as Islamic Revolution and 1979 Revolution
- 2,500-year celebration of the Persian Empire, a luxurious and extravagant celebration at Persepolis in 1971
- Answer to History, 1980 memoir by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
- Conspiracy theories about the Iranian Revolution
- Farah Pahlavi, wife of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
- Guadeloupe Conference
- History of Iran
- Human rights in the Imperial State of Iran
- Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of World War II
- Monarchism in Iran
- National Car Museum of Iran, showcases the cars of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
- Nuclear program of Iran
- Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979)
- "The Shah Is Gone", iconic headline of the Iranian newspaper Ettela'at when the Shah left Iran
- Timeline of the Iranian revolution
- Trans-Iranian Railway
- White Revolution
Notes
[edit]References
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[edit]- Afkhami, Gholam Reza (2009). The Life and Times of the Shah. University of California Press. p. 4. ISBN 978-0-520-25328-5.
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[edit]- Ansari, Ahmad Ali Massoud (1992). Me and the Pahlavis.[full citation needed]
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Historiography
[edit]- Shannon, Matthew K. (2018). "Reading Iran: American academics and the last shah". Iranian Studies. 51 (2): 289–316. doi:10.1080/00210862.2017.1407238.
External links
[edit]- Decadence and Downfall: The Shah of Iran's Ultimate Party – Storyville, 2015–2016
- Liberation on YouTube, a motion picture about the Shah of Iran
- IranNegah.com, video archive of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
- I Knew the Shah on YouTube
- Interview with Mike Wallace on YouTube
- ISNA interview with Dr. Mahmood Kashani, The Iranian (in Persian)
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- James Risen: "Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran – A special report; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79)", The New York Times, 16 April 2000
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- Fereydoun Hoveyda: "Free elections in 1979, my last audience with the Shah", The Iranian
- Newspaper clippings about Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 20th Century Press Archives of the ZBW
- "History of Iran, a short account of the 1953 coup", IranChamber.com
- The Last Shah - Iran History BBC Documentary, 1996 by Tim Kirby
- "The Shah's Photo Gallery", TheShah.org
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
View on GrokipediaEarly Life and Family Background
Birth and Ancestry
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was born on 26 October 1919 in Tehran, Iran, as the eldest child of Reza Khan Sardar-e Homaayoon (later Reza Shah Pahlavi) and his second wife, Nimtaj Ayromlou (later known as Taj ol-Molouk).[7] He shared his birthdate with his fraternal twin sister, Ashraf Pahlavi, marking the first instance of twins in the immediate Pahlavi line.[8] On the paternal side, Reza Khan originated from the rural village of Alasht in Mazandaran province, born around 1878 to Abbas-Ali Khan, a local landowner of modest means, and a mother from the same region; the family traced its roots to Mazandarani ethnicity without ties to prior nobility or ancient dynasties.[9] Reza Khan's rise from a low-ranking officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade to power reflected the non-aristocratic foundations of the Pahlavi dynasty, which he established in 1925 by deposing the Qajar monarchy.[10] Maternally, Taj ol-Molouk was born Nimtaj Ayromlou on 17 March 1896 in Baku, then part of the Russian Empire (present-day Azerbaijan), to Brigadier General Teymuras Khan Ayromlou, an officer of Azerbaijani Turkic descent serving in the Persian army, and his wife Malik os-Soltan.[8] This union linked Mohammad Reza to military elites of the late Qajar era but introduced Azerbaijani ethnic elements into the Pahlavi lineage, contrasting with the dynasty's predominantly Iranian provincial origins.[11]Family Dynamics and Influences
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was born on November 15, 1919, as the eldest son of Reza Shah Pahlavi and his second wife, Taj ol-Molouk Ayromlu, within a family structure emphasizing dynastic continuity and strict hierarchy.[12] Reza Shah, who had eleven children from four wives, restricted succession eligibility to sons from Taj ol-Molouk to avoid Qajar lineage claims, positioning Mohammad Reza as crown prince from age seven during his father's 1926 coronation.[13] The family resided initially in modest Tehran quarters before relocating to palaces, reflecting Reza Shah's rapid ascent from military officer to monarch.[14] Reza Shah's relationship with Mohammad Reza was marked by authoritarian discipline and political grooming rather than overt affection, shaping the prince's sense of duty and restraint. From age seven, Mohammad Reza was separated from his mother and sisters, housed independently under tutors like Madame Arfa', and subjected to rigorous military and academic training to embody Pahlavi reforms.[12] [13] Weekly letters exchanged between 1931 and 1936 reveal Mohammad Reza's expressions of reverence and longing, addressing his father as a "divine emissary," while Reza Shah intervened personally in his education, prioritizing mastery of Persian literature, languages, and statecraft over familial warmth.[12] This dynamic instilled a blend of fear, pride, and commitment to secular modernization, evident in Mohammad Reza's later emulation of paternal authoritarianism tempered by personal contemplation.[12] Taj ol-Molouk exerted a more emotional but indirect influence, fostering Western cultural exposure amid her assertive yet superstitious nature, though she reportedly favored her younger son Ali Reza over Mohammad Reza.[13] Married to Reza Shah in 1916, she bore four children—Shams (1917), Ashraf (October 26, 1919), Mohammad Reza, and Ali Reza (1922)—and promoted European-style receptions and education, influencing the family's shift from traditional veiling to public unveilings by 1934.[14] Her later political support, including aid against Prime Minister Mossadegh, underscored her role in sustaining Pahlavi influence post-Reza Shah's 1941 exile, though her early impact on Mohammad Reza was overshadowed by paternal control.[14] Among siblings, Mohammad Reza maintained a particularly close bond with his near-twin sister Ashraf Pahlavi, born days earlier, who served as a lifelong ally and defender of his rule.[15] This relationship provided emotional support amid the family's controlled environment, contrasting the competitive dynamics with half-siblings from Reza Shah's other unions. Ashraf's ambition and political acumen later amplified her influence, but in childhood, the siblings' shared upbringing under strict protocols reinforced Mohammad Reza's isolation and reliance on select kin for counsel.[13] Overall, these dynamics cultivated in Mohammad Reza a disciplined, nationalist outlook prioritizing state legacy over personal indulgences, directly informing his approach to governance.[12]Childhood and Upbringing
<xai:function_call name="web_search">Mohammad Reza Pahlavi childhood upbringing Reza Shah influence sources </xai:function_call> <xai:function_call name="web_search">
"crown prince" Mohammad Reza "childhood" OR "upbringing" -wikipedia -britannica </xai:function_call>
Education and Formative Years
Formal Education in Iran and Abroad
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's early formal education in Iran occurred within a custom-designed private school environment, curated to provide the crown prince with structured learning alongside hand-picked classmates, simulating peer interaction while maintaining security protocols under his father Reza Shah's oversight.[13] This setup emphasized discipline and preparation for leadership, reflecting the Pahlavi regime's push for modernization and military readiness from a young age.[16] In September 1931, at age 11, Mohammad Reza departed Iran for Switzerland, enrolling at the elite Institut Le Rosey boarding school in Rolle and later Gstaad, where he pursued secondary studies incognito as "Ardeshir" to evade assassination risks amid regional instability.[1] This marked the first instance of an Iranian crown prince receiving overseas education, spanning approximately five years until his return in 1936, during which he acquired proficiency in French, mathematics, and Western academic norms.[13][17] Back in Iran, Mohammad Reza entered the Tehran Military Academy in 1936, focusing on cavalry tactics and officer training as part of his grooming for command roles.[16] He graduated in 1938 as a second lieutenant, having demonstrated aptitude in horsemanship and strategic subjects, thereby completing his formal military education before assuming inspectorate duties in the armed forces.[1][18]Exposure to Western Ideas and Military Training
In 1931, at the age of 12, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was sent by his father, Reza Shah, to Switzerland to attend the Institut Le Rosey, an elite boarding school in Rolle, to acquire knowledge of Western culture and education in a neutral environment.[19] His four years there exposed him to Western concepts, including ideas of democracy that contrasted sharply with his father's authoritarian methods of governance.[20] At Le Rosey, he performed well academically but formed few close friendships, as his status as crown prince imposed restrictions on social interactions with peers.[1] Upon returning to Iran around 1935, Mohammad Reza enrolled in the Tehran Military Academy (also known as the Officer's College or Madrasa Nezam), where the curriculum was modeled after the French École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr to prepare elite officers.[13] He entered as a cadet in 1936 and underwent rigorous training emphasizing discipline, strategy, and leadership, completing his studies by 1938.[2] This military education reinforced his commitment to modernization while instilling a sense of duty as the heir apparent, blending Western-influenced tactical knowledge with Iranian martial traditions.[13]Early Political Awareness
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's early political awareness developed under the dominant influence of his father, Reza Shah, whose rule from 1925 to 1941 prioritized ruthless centralization, secular modernization, and suppression of internal dissent to forge a unified Iranian state. Exposed from childhood to his father's campaigns against tribal warlords, clerical authority, and leftist agitators, the young Crown Prince internalized a worldview centered on strong executive leadership as essential for national sovereignty and progress, viewing fragmentation as a perennial threat rooted in Iran's historical vulnerabilities to foreign interference and domestic division. His four years at Switzerland's Institut Le Rosey boarding school, beginning in 1931 at age 12, introduced contrasting perspectives through immersion in European society, where he encountered notions of constitutional governance, parliamentary debate, and personal freedoms that diverged markedly from Reza Shah's autocratic model. U.S. historical analyses highlight how this period fostered an appreciation for Western institutional balances, even as it reinforced his cultural pride in Persian heritage amid observations of Europe's interwar instabilities.[20][21] Returning to Iran in 1936, Mohammad Reza's commissioning into the military via Tehran's War College honed his conviction that disciplined armed forces under monarchical oversight were indispensable for political stability, particularly amid rising global tensions and Reza Shah's strategic balancing between Axis and Allied powers. By 1938, as a newly graduated artillery lieutenant and Inspector General of the Armed Forces, he gained practical insight into the interplay of domestic control and international diplomacy, shaping his early realism about power's causal role in state preservation.[16]Ascension to the Throne
Reza Shah's Deposition and World War II Context
Reza Shah Pahlavi, who had ruled Iran since 1925, maintained a policy of strict neutrality following the outbreak of World War II in Europe, declaring Iran's non-belligerent status in 1939 despite growing Allied suspicions of Axis sympathies.[22] His regime had fostered extensive economic and technical ties with Germany, including the employment of thousands of German advisors and engineers in key infrastructure projects, which by 1940 accounted for a significant portion of Iran's foreign trade and industrial expertise.[22] As the war escalated with Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Britain and the USSR issued an ultimatum on August 19 demanding the expulsion of all German nationals within two weeks to neutralize potential fifth-column activities; Reza Shah's partial compliance, expelling only about 1,000 out of an estimated 3,000 Germans, failed to satisfy the Allies.[23] No specific British conditions or instructions regarding minorities, Jews, or religious freedom were imposed during Mohammad Reza's accession; the Anglo-Soviet demands centered on expelling German nationals, securing Allied supply lines (Persian Corridor), and protecting oil fields. The Anglo-Soviet invasion, codenamed Operation Countenance, commenced on August 25, 1941, with British forces landing in the south near the oil-rich Khuzestan province and Soviet troops advancing from the north, overwhelming Iran's poorly equipped and disorganized army within days.[23] Iranian resistance collapsed rapidly, with Tehran falling under effective Allied control by early September, prompting widespread mutinies and surrenders that minimized prolonged fighting but exposed the military's vulnerabilities after Reza Shah's emphasis on modernization had prioritized cavalry over mechanized units.[24] Facing imminent occupation of the capital and to avert total national humiliation, Reza Shah abdicated on September 16, 1941, formally transferring the throne to his 21-year-old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, via a hand-written decree witnessed by Prime Minister Mohammad-Ali Foroughi; the succession proceeded without documented stipulations on internal religious policies.[24] Reza Shah departed into exile aboard a British vessel, initially to Mauritius and later South Africa, where he died in 1944, his deposition marking the end of his autocratic era amid Allied strategic imperatives.[24] Mohammad Reza's ascension occurred against the backdrop of tripartite occupation, as the Tripartite Treaty signed on January 29, 1942, formalized British, Soviet, and later American presence to secure the Persian Corridor for Lend-Lease supplies to the USSR, transporting over 5 million tons of materiel by war's end.[23] The Allies, prioritizing logistical stability over regime change beyond the Shah's removal, tacitly endorsed the young monarch's installation on September 17, 1941, viewing him as a pliable figurehead amenable to cooperation, though his initial power was circumscribed by occupation authorities and a revived Majlis.[20] This wartime context thrust Mohammad Reza into leadership during a period of economic disruption, inflation, and famine exacerbated by Allied requisitions, setting the stage for his early reign as a constitutional sovereign navigating foreign dominance and internal factionalism.[20]Mohammad Reza's Initial Reign as Figurehead
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ascended to the throne on September 17, 1941, at the age of 21, following his father Reza Shah's abdication on September 16 amid the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran that began on August 25.[25][22] The invasion, justified by the Allies as necessary to secure supply lines to the Soviet Union and Iranian oil fields against perceived Axis sympathies under Reza Shah, divided the country into Soviet-occupied zones in the north and British control in the south, with Tehran under joint oversight.[22][20] This occupation severely curtailed the young Shah's authority, rendering him a constitutional figurehead whose powers were nominally defined by the 1906 constitution but effectively subordinated to the Majlis (parliament), successive prime ministers, and Allied directives.[26] Initial prime minister Mohammad Ali Foroughi, who had facilitated the abdication, led a government focused on compliance with Allied demands, including the expulsion of approximately 1,000 German nationals and facilitation of the Persian Corridor for Lend-Lease aid to the USSR, through which over 5 million tons of supplies passed by war's end.[22] The Shah, lacking control over the fragmented military—much of which was disarmed or repurposed by occupiers—attempted to rebuild his influence through ceremonial duties and limited diplomatic engagements, such as hosting the 1943 Tehran Conference where he met Allied leaders including Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin.[7] However, real executive power resided with figures like Foroughi (1941–1942) and subsequent premiers Ali Soheili and Mohammad Sa'ed, who navigated internal tribal unrest, inflation from wartime logistics, and foreign pressures while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company remained under British dominance.[25] By 1945–1946, as World War II concluded, the Shah's position remained precarious amid Soviet reluctance to withdraw from northern Iran, fostering separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan backed by Moscow.[20] Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam's negotiations, leveraging UN pressure and oil concessions, secured Soviet exit by May 1946, marking a tentative shift but underscoring the Shah's dependence on diplomatic maneuvering rather than sovereign command.[7] Throughout this period, economic strains from occupation— including hyperinflation and disrupted agriculture—affected an estimated 15–20 million Iranians, with the monarchy's prestige tied more to paternal legacy than autonomous governance.[26] The Shah focused on personal military training and court protocols, yet systemic constraints from Allied oversight and parliamentary dominance perpetuated his role as a symbolic rather than substantive ruler until post-occupation stabilization.[20]Relationship with Father and Views on Paternal Legacy
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's relationship with his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi, exemplified a rigorous, paternalistic dynamic centered on grooming the heir for autocratic rule amid Iran's turbulent interwar modernization. Reza Shah, who seized power in a 1921 coup and declared himself monarch in 1925, imposed a spartan regimen on his eldest son, born in 1919, prioritizing military discipline over emotional warmth; the crown prince underwent intensive training at Iran's Military Academy and later at Switzerland's Institut Le Rosey, where Reza Shah's oversight extended to personal letters enforcing accountability. This approach reflected Reza Shah's Cossack origins and belief in control as foundational to legacy, with public displays of affection rare and interactions structured around duty rather than intimacy.[27][13] In his 1961 memoir Mission for My Country, Mohammad Reza portrayed his father as "one of the most frightening men" he had encountered, citing instances of physical correction for minor lapses, yet countered this image by insisting Reza Shah was "kind and affectionate in private," contrary to public perceptions shaped by the shah's authoritarian persona. Letters from Mohammad Reza to his father during Swiss exile, such as one expressing that paternal correspondence felt like physical presence, underscored a bond of respect amid the emotional distance. Reza Shah's most pivotal act toward his son came during the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran on August 25, 1941; facing deposition for perceived Axis sympathies, he abdicated on September 16, 1941, explicitly naming Mohammad Reza—then aged 21—as successor, thereby preserving the Pahlavi dynasty's continuity.[28][27] Mohammad Reza consistently viewed his father's legacy as the bedrock of Iran's 20th-century resurgence, crediting Reza Shah's unification of fragmented tribal territories, construction of over 20,000 kilometers of roads and railways by 1941, expansion of the military from 40,000 to 127,000 troops, and establishment of secular education systems that boosted literacy from near-zero to foundational levels in urban areas. These reforms, enforced through suppression of feudal lords and clerical influence, transformed a semi-feudal society into a centralized state capable of resisting foreign domination, a causal foundation Mohammad Reza explicitly inherited as his "dream of national progress." Publicly, he honored this inheritance by perpetuating the Pahlavi emphasis on secular nationalism and infrastructure, such as initiating projects echoing his father's Trans-Iranian Railway completed in 1938; privately, however, he acknowledged Reza Shah's "coarse" Cossack methods as products of necessity in a "barbaric" era, diverging by pursuing softer social engineering like the 1963 White Revolution while consolidating similar autocratic controls post-1953. Reza Shah's death in exile on July 26, 1944, in Johannesburg, South Africa, prompted Mohammad Reza to repatriate the remains by 1950 for reburial in Tehran, symbolizing enduring filial reverence for the paternal blueprint despite its unyielding realism.[20][29]Consolidation of Power Amid Cold War Pressures
Nationalization of Oil and Mossadegh Crisis
In the late 1940s, Iran sought to renegotiate the terms of the 1933 concession granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), under which Iran received approximately 16% of gross profits while the British firm controlled operations and extracted the majority of revenues.[30] Prime Minister Ali Razmara proposed a supplemental agreement in 1950 offering Iran 50% of profits net of foreign taxes and greater participation, but the Majlis rejected it amid nationalist opposition.[31] On March 7, 1951, Razmara was assassinated by a member of the fundamentalist Fada'iyan-e Islam group, intensifying calls for full nationalization.[31] The Majlis passed a nine-point oil nationalization law on March 15, 1951, followed by the Senate's approval on March 17, asserting Iranian sovereignty over its resources.[31] Mohammad Mosaddegh, leader of the National Front coalition advocating secular nationalism and oil independence, was appointed prime minister by Mohammad Reza Shah on April 28, 1951, amid Majlis pressure and public demonstrations.[32] The Shah, acting in his constitutional role, signed the nationalization decree into law on May 1, 1951, though he privately expressed reservations about Mosaddegh's uncompromising approach, favoring negotiated compensation to Britain to avoid economic retaliation.[7] Britain responded aggressively, referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice in May 1951, which ruled it lacked jurisdiction, and securing a United Nations Security Council debate in October 1951 without resolution.[31] The British imposed an embargo on Iranian oil, withdrew technical personnel from the Abadan refinery in October 1951, and pressured international companies to boycott purchases, halting exports almost entirely.[32] Iranian oil production plummeted from 664,000 barrels per day in 1950 to near zero by mid-1952, depleting foreign reserves from $400 million to under $20 million, sparking inflation, unemployment, and budget deficits that forced currency devaluation and austerity measures.[33] Mosaddegh's government attempted to sustain operations with limited success, selling oil covertly at discounted rates, but the crisis eroded public support as economic hardship mounted without a settlement. Tensions escalated into a constitutional crisis between Mosaddegh and the Shah. On July 16, 1952, the Shah dismissed Mosaddegh and appointed Ahmad Qavam as prime minister, citing Mosaddegh's demand for control of the War Ministry to curb royal influence.[34] Widespread protests erupted on July 21, known as the Siyeh Tir uprising, forcing Qavam's resignation and reinstating Mosaddegh with expanded powers, including oversight of the military.[31] [32] Mosaddegh increasingly consolidated authority, rejecting U.S. and British mediation proposals that included compensation, while accusing the Shah of undermining nationalization through alleged ties to foreign interests.[35] In August 1953, facing opposition in the Majlis, Mosaddegh held a referendum yielding a 99.9% vote to dissolve parliament and grant him emergency powers, further centralizing control and alienating moderates amid growing influence from the communist Tudeh Party.[34] The Shah, viewing these moves as violations of the constitutional monarchy, warned of dictatorship, setting the stage for direct confrontation.[7]1953 Coup d'État and U.S.-British Involvement
The 1953 Iranian coup d'état, known as Operation Ajax to the CIA and Operation Boot to MI6, aimed to overthrow Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh following his nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, which deprived Britain of control over Iranian oil resources.[36][37] British policymakers viewed the nationalization as an existential threat to their economic interests, prompting initial unilateral efforts that evolved into joint Anglo-American action by late 1952, driven by fears of Soviet influence and potential communist takeover in Iran amid the Cold War.[36][38] The United States, initially reluctant, joined after diplomatic negotiations failed and concerns mounted over Mossadegh's governance weakening Iran's stability, with President Eisenhower approving the operation in July 1953 at Britain's urging.[39][40] Planning involved CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt Jr. coordinating with MI6, Iranian military officers, and paid agitators, including propaganda campaigns via newspapers and bribes to politicians and clergy to foment anti-Mossadegh sentiment.[37][41] MI6, taking a lead role, recruited agents among Islamists and transported cash in biscuit tins to suborn members of Iran's parliament and military, while the CIA provided $1 million in funding for street protests and logistical support.[42][43] Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, though hesitant and preferring constitutional means, agreed to issue a royal decree (farman) dismissing Mossadegh on August 15, 1953, appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister, but the initial delivery failed amid Mossadegh loyalists' resistance.[44][32] The initial phase of the coup attempt collapsed on August 15 when pro-Mossadegh forces arrested the courier delivering the Shah's dismissal decree, prompting the Shah to fly to Baghdad and then Rome on August 16; this led CIA headquarters to issue an abort order citing failure, yet field operative Kermit Roosevelt persisted in Tehran, coordinating intensified mob actions and contributing to military defections that enabled the successful phase on August 19.[45][46] On August 19, pro-Shah tanks under Zahedi's command shelled Mossadegh's residence, leading to his arrest after a firefight that killed over 200, with orchestrated crowds and military units securing Tehran.[46][33] The Shah returned on August 22, consolidating authority with Zahedi as prime minister, marking a shift toward greater monarchical power backed by Western intelligence operations that declassified records later confirmed as pivotal.[43] This intervention, while restoring oil access via a consortium agreement favoring Western firms, entrenched foreign influence in Iranian affairs for decades.[36]Shift from Constitutional Monarchy to Centralized Authority
On August 15, 1953, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi issued a decree under Article 46 of the 1907 Supplementary Fundamental Laws dismissing Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who refused to step down and arrested the royal envoy, constituting insubordination after Mossadegh's earlier referendum dissolving the Majlis. The events of the coup culminated successfully on August 19, enforcing the dismissal despite the initial failure of Operation Ajax by CIA and MI6—with a CIA cable on August 16 declaring the operation tried and failed, prompting withdrawal—driven instead by Iranian actors, including Ayatollah Kashani's fatwa mobilizing crowds, Ayatollah Behbahani's funding of protests, bazaar merchants, and royalist military elements under General Fazlollah Zahedi. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi then appointed Zahedi to lead a new government, marking the initial restoration of monarchical influence after a period of parliamentary dominance.[47][40][48] This event enabled the Shah to begin reasserting executive authority, though he initially operated within constitutional bounds by relying on Majlis (parliament) approval for key policies.[20] Over the subsequent years, however, persistent opposition from political factions, including remnants of the National Front, prompted measures to curb legislative independence, as the Shah viewed fragmented parliamentary politics as obstructive to national stability and development.[49] A pivotal step in centralization occurred in 1957 with the establishment of SAVAK, Iran's National Intelligence and Security Organization, tasked with internal security and countering perceived threats from communists, nationalists, and clerics; its creation involved assistance from the United States' CIA and Israel's Mossad, reflecting Cold War imperatives to safeguard the regime.[50][5] SAVAK's expansive surveillance and arrest powers, which by the 1960s included an estimated 5,000 agents and informants, effectively neutralized dissent, allowing the Shah to bypass traditional checks on executive power.[51] Tensions escalated during the 1960-1961 elections, marred by widespread allegations of fraud, leading the Shah to dissolve the Majlis and Senate on January 14, 1961, under emergency provisions of the constitution.[52][53] He then governed by decree for over a year, appointing prime ministers directly and enacting policies without legislative debate, a practice that diminished the Majlis's role from co-equal branch to advisory body.[54] This pattern intensified in 1963 when the Shah circumvented the reconstituted Majlis by holding a national referendum on January 26, in which 5,598,711 votes (99.9%) endorsed the White Revolution reforms, granting him a popular mandate to implement land redistribution, industrialization, and other measures independently of parliamentary veto.[55] The referendum's structure—framed as a yes/no on the reform package—bypassed the constitution's requirement for Majlis initiation of laws, effectively shifting authority from deliberative institutions to plebiscitary mechanisms under royal control.[56] By the mid-1960s, these actions had transformed the system from one where the Shah shared power with an elected assembly into a centralized monarchy where royal decrees and security apparatus dominated governance, justified by the Shah as necessary for rapid modernization amid external threats.[57] Critics, including exiled National Front leaders, argued this eroded constitutionalism, but empirical outcomes included streamlined decision-making that facilitated economic planning, though at the cost of political pluralism.[33]Domestic Reforms and Modernization Efforts
Launch of the White Revolution
On January 26, 1963, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi announced the launch of the White Revolution, a comprehensive reform program aimed at accelerating Iran's modernization and economic development through targeted social, agricultural, and industrial changes.[58] The initiative, described by the Shah as a "revolution of the Shah and the people," sought to redistribute power from traditional elites to the broader populace, including peasants and workers, while promoting literacy and women's participation in society.[59] This announcement followed a period of political instability and economic planning under Prime Minister Ali Amini, during which the Shah assumed greater direct control over policy to bypass parliamentary resistance.[60] To legitimize the program, a national referendum was held concurrently on January 26, 1963, where voters approved the reforms with 5,598,711 votes in favor and only 4,115 against, representing approximately 99.9% support according to official tallies.[61][59] The high approval rate reflected the Shah's mobilization of public sentiment through state media and rural outreach, though critics later questioned the referendum's independence amid the monarchy's centralized authority.[62] The vote extended suffrage to women for the first time, marking an immediate expansion of electoral participation.[61] The core of the White Revolution comprised six initial points, outlined as follows:- Land reform: Redistribution of large estates to tenant farmers, capping ownership at a single village per landlord and providing compensation through state bonds and shares in industrial enterprises.[62]
- Nationalization of forests: Transfer of woodland resources from private feudal owners to the state for sustainable management and public benefit.[63]
- Privatization of state factories: Auction of government-owned enterprises to private investors to foster entrepreneurship and reduce state bureaucracy.[63]
- Profit-sharing for workers: Entitlement of industrial employees to 20% of factory profits, distributed via elected committees to enhance labor incentives.[63]
- Women's suffrage and rights: Granting women the right to vote and eligibility for public office, alongside raising the minimum marriage age and improving divorce protections.[61]
- Literacy Corps: Deployment of high school graduates to rural areas as teachers to combat illiteracy, with service counting toward military obligations.[62]
Land Redistribution and Agricultural Reforms
The land redistribution initiative, enacted via the Land Reform Act of January 1962, sought to dismantle Iran's feudal agrarian structure by expropriating surplus holdings from large landowners and reallocating them to tenant farmers and sharecroppers. Landlords were compensated based on historical rental values multiplied by a factor, typically allowing retention of one village's worth of land (around 500-1,000 hectares depending on fertility), while excess was purchased by the state for resale to cultivators at below-market prices payable over 15 years through subsidized loans from the Agricultural Bank. This first phase emphasized voluntary transactions but transitioned to compulsory measures, targeting absentee owners who controlled over 50% of arable land prior to reform. By design, the program aimed to foster a class of independent smallholders loyal to the monarchy, reducing the political influence of traditional elites and religious endowments that held significant waqf properties.[64][65] Implementation proceeded in three phases, with Phase II (1963 onward) enforcing sales from estates exceeding one village and Phase III (1968-1971) addressing fragmented holdings and waqf lands, culminating in the redistribution of approximately 2 million hectares to around 1.8 million tenant families by 1971. Beneficiaries, who previously paid up to 50-75% of harvests as rent, received deeds to plots averaging 7-8 hectares, comprising 74% of eligible cultivators and half of all rural households. State-backed cooperatives were mandated to provide seeds, fertilizers, and machinery, while the reform corpus included irrigation projects and price supports to boost output. Proponents within the Pahlavi administration, drawing on U.S. advisory reports like that of Joseph Motheral, argued this would modernize subsistence farming into commercial agriculture, with early data showing a 20-30% rise in some cash crop yields in pilot areas by 1965.[66][67][68] Despite these intentions, the reforms yielded mixed economic results, as small plot sizes often precluded mechanization—tractors required viable holdings of at least 20-50 hectares—and many recipients lacked capital or technical knowledge, leading to land sales back to emerging capitalist farmers or abandonment. Agricultural productivity grew anemically at 1-2% annually from 1963-1972, insufficient to offset population growth, resulting in a per capita output decline by 1972 and a drop in agriculture's GDP share from 23% in 1960 to 12% by 1977. Rural exodus intensified, with over 4 million peasants migrating to urban centers between 1966-1976, exacerbating food import dependency from 10% of needs in 1960 to 30% by the late 1970s. Academic analyses, often from Western-trained economists skeptical of top-down interventions, highlight causal factors like inadequate extension services and water scarcity, though regime-aligned reports emphasized gains in equity over output metrics.[69][70][71]Women's Emancipation and Social Rights Initiatives
During the White Revolution launched on January 26, 1963, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi introduced reforms granting Iranian women the right to vote and to stand for election, marking a significant expansion of political participation.[72] This measure, approved via national referendum, aimed to integrate women into the democratic process and was part of broader modernization efforts to reduce clerical influence over social norms.[73] Women's enfranchisement faced opposition from conservative religious leaders, who viewed it as a threat to traditional Islamic family structures, yet it enabled female candidates to enter parliament by 1963.[74] These reforms aligned with social freedoms allowing women optional clothing without a mandatory hijab, facilitating active societal roles including participation in music, cinema, and modern urban life in cities like Tehran.[75] The Family Protection Law enacted in 1967 further advanced women's legal rights by raising the minimum marriage age to 15 for females and 18 for males, restricting polygamy through requirements for spousal consent and court approval, and mandating judicial oversight for divorces to prevent unilateral repudiation by husbands.[76] [77] Custody decisions shifted from automatic paternal rights to considerations of the child's best interests, allowing courts to award guardianship to mothers in certain cases.[77] These provisions, lobbied for by women's organizations, sought to curb practices like child marriage and arbitrary divorce, though implementation relied on state enforcement amid cultural resistance.[76] Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's twin sister and president of the Women's Organization of Iran, played a key role in advocating for these social reforms, promoting women's education, employment, and political involvement through international and domestic campaigns.[78] Her efforts included establishing institutions for female literacy and health, aligning with the regime's push for gender equity in public life.[79] Education initiatives under the Pahlavi era emphasized female enrollment, with the Literacy Corps—established as part of the White Revolution—deploying volunteers to rural areas, resulting in women's literacy rates rising from under 10% in the early 1950s to approximately 35% by 1976 for females over age six.[80] Co-educational schools proliferated, and university access for women expanded, fostering professional opportunities in fields previously restricted.[81] These programs prioritized empirical progress in human capital development, though disparities persisted between urban and rural women.[82]Education Expansion and Literacy Campaigns
As part of the White Revolution launched in January 1963, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi prioritized education to address Iran's high illiteracy rates, estimated at over 80 percent in the rural population and around 67 percent for men and 88 percent for women aged over 15 in the mid-1960s according to UNESCO data.[83] The reforms aimed to extend basic literacy and schooling to underserved rural areas, where traditional education was minimal, by mobilizing national service personnel as instructors.[82] The Literacy Corps (Sepah-e Danesh), established in 1963, formed the core of these efforts, deploying approximately 100,000 high school graduates annually—serving two-year compulsory terms as teachers in villages with populations under 1,000—to provide free literacy classes to adults and children.[83][82] Participants, often urban youth, taught basic reading, writing, and arithmetic using standardized curricula, while also promoting hygiene and agricultural techniques, which indirectly supported educational uptake.[83] By 1978, the Corps had reached over 2.2 million adults and established thousands of rural schools, contributing to a rise in overall literacy from about 26 percent in the early 1960s to 42 percent by the late 1970s.[64] Women's participation in the Corps, though limited, helped increase female literacy from under 10 percent in the 1950s to over 35 percent by 1976, per World Bank figures.[82] Beyond literacy drives, the regime expanded formal education infrastructure, building over 15,000 new schools between 1963 and 1978 and making primary education compulsory and free, which boosted enrollment from 1.6 million students in 1960 to nearly 6 million by 1978.[7] In 1975, the government extended free education and daily meals through the eighth grade, while university enrollment surged from 24,000 in 1965 to over 100,000 by 1978, with new institutions like Aryamehr University focusing on technical training.[7] These measures, funded partly by oil revenues, narrowed urban-rural disparities—urban literacy reached 65.5 percent by 1976—but faced challenges like teacher shortages and uneven implementation in remote areas.[84] Critics, including some rural landowners affected by related land reforms, argued the Corps politicized education by inculcating pro-regime values, potentially fostering resentment among instructors exposed to local grievances.[82] Nonetheless, empirical gains in literacy and school access laid foundations for broader human capital development, with Iran's adult literacy rate climbing to 37 percent by 1976 amid rapid population growth. The program's emphasis on practical skills over ideological indoctrination reflected a pragmatic approach to modernization, though its sustainability was tested by economic strains and opposition in the late 1970s.[85]Industrialization, Urbanization, and Infrastructure Development
Under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule, industrialization accelerated through state-directed five-year development plans, with the third (1962–1968) and fourth (1968–1973) plans prioritizing heavy industry, manufacturing, and import-substitution strategies to reduce reliance on oil exports. [86] These efforts built on earlier foundations, establishing key sectors such as steel production at the Esfahan complex (operational from 1967), petrochemical facilities, and automobile assembly, including the Iran National company's Peykan model launched in 1968. Industrial output expanded rapidly, contributing to overall GDP growth averaging around 10% annually in the 1960s and early 1970s, though much of this was driven by oil revenue reinvestment rather than broad-based productivity gains. [87] The White Revolution, initiated in 1963, incorporated industrialization by promoting private-sector incentives, worker shareholding in factories, and technical training to support factory-based employment, aiming to transform Iran from an agrarian economy into an industrial power. [60] By the mid-1970s, manufacturing and mining sectors accounted for approximately 20% of GDP, with cement production rising from 1.5 million tons in 1960 to over 10 million tons by 1977, and steel capacity reaching 2.5 million tons annually. Critics, including some economic analyses, attributed part of the growth to inflationary pressures and foreign technology imports, but empirical data show a diversification into machine tools, chemicals, and textiles, with over 8,000 industrial units established by 1978. [87] [86] Urbanization surged as a direct consequence of land reforms and industrial pull factors, with rural-to-urban migration displacing agricultural laborers and drawing them to factory jobs in expanding cities. [88] The urban population share rose from 31.7% in 1956 to 47.3% by 1976, supported by an annual urban growth rate of 5.4% between 1966 and 1976, fueled by natural increase and net migration. [88] Tehran, the primary hub, grew from about 2 million residents in 1956 to over 4.5 million by 1976, straining housing but enabling labor pools for industries; secondary cities like Esfahan and Shiraz also expanded, with Esfahan's population doubling to around 670,000 by the 1970s due to steel and textile mills. [89] This shift correlated causally with White Revolution policies, as redistributed land reduced rural viability for smallholders, pushing migration and informal settlements on urban peripheries. [90] Infrastructure development underpinned these changes, with government budgets allocating over 90% of transport and communications funds to inter-city roads, railways, and electrification from the 1950s onward. [91] The road network expanded from 12,000 kilometers of gravel roads in 1938 to over 40,000 kilometers of paved highways by 1978, facilitating goods transport and urban connectivity. [63] Key projects included the Dez Dam (Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi Dam), construction of which began in 1961 and completed in 1963 at a cost of $33 million, generating 520 megawatts of hydroelectric power and irrigating 325,000 acres to support agro-industry. [92] [93] Power capacity grew from 500 megawatts in 1960 to over 4,000 megawatts by 1977, enabling factory electrification, while railway extensions linked industrial zones to ports, though bottlenecks persisted due to rapid scaling. [86] These investments, often financed by oil consortia loans, boosted capacity but highlighted dependencies on imported expertise and equipment. [94]Economic Transformation and Growth
Oil Revenue Management and OPEC Role
Following the 1954 consortium agreement, which granted Western oil companies operational control over Iran's fields while allocating the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 50% of profits, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi pursued greater sovereignty through diplomatic leverage and international coordination.[95] The agreement stabilized production, with output reaching pre-nationalization levels by 1957 and gradually increasing thereafter, generating revenues that rose from modest levels in the early 1960s to support initial development plans.[96] However, the Shah viewed the arrangement as transitional, advocating for revised terms to capture more value amid rising global demand.[97] Iran's participation in the founding of OPEC on September 14, 1960, in Baghdad marked a pivotal shift, with the Shah's government joining Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to counterbalance the dominance of the major oil majors.[98] As a key proponent, Iran used the organization to negotiate higher royalties and profit shares, securing a 55% profit split from consortium companies by the early 1970s, up from previous terms.[99] This collective bargaining enabled Iran to influence posted prices and production quotas, transitioning from concession-based dependency toward state-directed management. By 1971, OPEC's Tehran Agreement further elevated Iran's bargaining power, setting the stage for revenue surges.[97] The 1973 oil crisis amplified the Shah's assertive role within OPEC, as he pressed for a quadrupling of prices from approximately $3 per barrel to over $12, declaring that past underpricing had subsidized industrialized nations at developing producers' expense.[100] [101] Iran's influence, backed by its production capacity of over 6 million barrels per day, helped enforce the hike despite Saudi reluctance, resulting in export revenues jumping from $3.6 billion in 1972 to nearly $21 billion in 1974. The Shah continued advocating increases, favoring a 15-20% rise in 1975 discussions, prioritizing long-term fiscal stability over short-term market disruptions.[102] In parallel, the Shah orchestrated the 1973 Sale and Purchase Agreement, effectively nationalizing operations by requiring consortium firms to buy crude exclusively from NIOC at government-set prices, ending foreign managerial control while retaining technical expertise.[103] Revenues were channeled through the central government budget and the Plan and Budget Organization, funding five-year development plans that allocated funds to infrastructure, industry, and military modernization, with oil comprising up to 80% of foreign exchange by the mid-1970s.[104] Annual oil income peaked at $22.9 billion in 1976 and $23.6 billion in 1977, though volatility—averaging 35.5% year-to-year from 1960-1978—posed management challenges, exacerbated by rapid expenditure growth outpacing absorption capacity. [105] Economists and ministers, including Alinaghi Alikhani and Houshang Ansari, warned the Shah in forums such as the 1974 Ramsar Economic Conference and Plan Organization meetings that rapid injection of oil revenues risked inflation, economic overheating, and Dutch Disease effects; they advised gradual spending and partial foreign reserves. The Shah rejected these warnings, insisting on full immediate domestic spending to achieve rapid development and his "Great Civilization" vision, emphasizing acceleration without restraint despite potential imbalances.[106] Critics, including some Western analysts, attributed inefficiencies to centralized decision-making under the Shah, yet empirical data indicate revenues drove GDP growth rates exceeding 10% annually in the early 1970s before inflationary pressures mounted.[107]GDP Expansion, Per Capita Income Rises, and Industrial Output
During the period following the 1953 coup and particularly after the launch of the White Revolution in 1963, Iran's GDP experienced robust expansion, driven by oil revenues, state-led investments, and reforms aimed at diversification. Annual real GDP growth averaged approximately 9.6% from 1960 to 1977, outpacing many developing economies and reflecting effective mobilization of petroleum income into infrastructure and productive sectors. Between 1962 and 1972, even with relatively modest oil revenues, GDP growth exceeded 10% per year, enabling structural shifts from agriculture toward industry and services. This momentum continued into the 1970s, though it tapered amid rising inflation and overreliance on hydrocarbons by the late decade. Per capita income rose substantially in real terms during Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's later reign, tripling over the three decades preceding the 1979 revolution as population growth was outpaced by overall economic gains. Specifically, GDP per capita doubled between 1962 and 1972, supported by non-oil sector productivity improvements and urban employment expansion. By the mid-1970s, per capita figures reached around $1,492 (in nominal terms), underscoring improved living standards for much of the population, though disparities persisted between urban elites and rural areas. These increases were empirically linked to policy-induced capital accumulation rather than mere resource windfalls, as evidenced by sustained growth during periods of stable oil prices. Industrial output expanded rapidly, with manufacturing fixed investment growing at an average annual real rate of 14% from 1965 to 1977, fueled by government incentives, foreign technology transfers, and protectionist measures. This translated into a shift where industry's share of GDP, while fluctuating, saw absolute production surges in sectors like steel, petrochemicals, and automobiles, reducing import dependency. State-owned enterprises and private initiatives under the regime's framework contributed to this output boom, positioning Iran as a regional manufacturing hub by the 1970s, though critiques from some economists highlight vulnerabilities from uneven sectoral development and external shocks.Challenges: Inflation, Inequality, and Dependency Critiques
Despite robust GDP growth averaging around 8-10% annually in the 1960s and early 1970s, fueled by oil revenues and industrialization, the Iranian economy under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi faced mounting inflationary pressures, particularly after the 1973 oil crisis. Oil prices quadrupled from approximately $3 to $12 per barrel, propelling export revenues from $4.3 billion in 1972 to over $20 billion by 1976, but this surge overwhelmed absorptive capacity, leading to excessive government spending on imports, infrastructure, and military modernization.[104] Inflation, which hovered at 2-4% in the early 1970s, escalated to 15-20% by 1976 and peaked above 25% in 1977-1978 as liquidity flooded the economy without corresponding productivity gains, eroding real wages and contributing to social discontent among fixed-income groups like civil servants and workers. Critics, including domestic economists, attributed this to fiscal mismanagement and over-reliance on oil windfalls rather than structural reforms to curb monetary expansion.[108] Income inequality intensified alongside rapid urbanization and elite capture of state resources, despite White Revolution measures like land redistribution that aimed to broaden wealth distribution. Per capita GDP rose from about $200 in 1960 to roughly $2,200 by 1978 (in constant dollars), yet benefits skewed toward urban industrialists and regime-connected contractors who secured lucrative deals in oil-linked sectors, while rural areas—home to over half the population—saw persistent poverty and migration to cities straining informal economies.[109] Empirical assessments indicate a Gini coefficient likely exceeding 0.45 in the late 1970s, reflecting high disparities comparable to other oil-dependent states, with top deciles capturing disproportionate shares through corruption in public tenders and subsidies.[110] Rural-urban income gaps widened as agricultural output stagnated post-land reforms, displacing smallholders without adequate credit or markets, a point highlighted in critiques from agrarian economists who argued that elite land consolidations perpetuated feudal-like structures under modern guise.[111] Dependency critiques centered on Iran's transformation into a classic rentier economy, where oil constituted over 80% of export earnings and government revenue by the mid-1970s, fostering vulnerability to price volatility and disincentivizing non-hydrocarbon diversification.[112] Heavy importation of capital goods and technology for industrialization—totaling billions in Western contracts—created structural reliance on foreign expertise and financing, as domestic manufacturing remained assembly-oriented rather than innovative, leading to "Dutch disease" effects like real exchange rate appreciation that undercut agriculture and light industry.[99] Observers, including international analysts, noted that this oil-centric model prioritized short-term grandeur projects over sustainable human capital investment, rendering the economy susceptible to external shocks and internal graft, as state elites siphoned rents without building resilient institutions.[104] Such dependencies, compounded by geopolitical alignments, were seen as causal in limiting sovereignty and fueling opposition narratives of neocolonialism, though proponents countered that strategic oil leverage via OPEC enhanced Iran's bargaining power.[108]Military and Security Apparatus
Armed Forces Modernization and Regional Power Projection
Following the 1953 restoration of his authority, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi prioritized the modernization of Iran's armed forces, leveraging increasing oil revenues to fund extensive acquisitions of advanced weaponry primarily from the United States and United Kingdom. Military expenditures rose dramatically, from approximately $80 million annually in 1953 to billions by the 1970s, accounting for up to 32% of total government spending in 1974 amid quadrupled oil income reaching $20.9 billion that year.[99][113][101] This buildup transformed Iran into the region's preeminent military power, with the Imperial Iranian Army amassing 1,800 tanks by 1978 to support three armored divisions, alongside expansions in air and naval capabilities.[114] Between 1970 and 1978, Iran imported $20 billion in arms, ammunition, and hardware from the U.S., including sophisticated systems that enhanced operational reach to patrol seas as far as Madagascar and airspace to Cairo.[115][116] The Shah's strategy aligned with the U.S. Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which designated Iran as a "regional policeman" to counter Soviet influence and radical threats in the Persian Gulf, prompting unrestricted American arms sales short of nuclear weapons during President Nixon's 1972 Tehran visit.[117][118][119] This policy enabled Iran to project power independently, with the Shah viewing his forces as a bulwark against communist subversion and Arab radicalism, including ambitions to secure Gulf stability.[120][121] A key demonstration of this projection occurred during the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (1972–1975), where Iran deployed an Imperial Iranian Brigade Group of about 1,200 troops, supported by helicopters and artillery, to aid Sultan Qaboos against Marxist insurgents backed by South Yemen and the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman.[122][123][124] The intervention, requested by the Sultan and coordinated with British forces, proved decisive in reclaiming rebel-held territory through combined arms operations, culminating in the rebels' defeat by 1976 and solidifying Iran's role as a counter to leftist insurgencies threatening Gulf monarchies.[122][125] This success underscored the efficacy of the Shah's modernized forces, trained with U.S. assistance, in expeditionary roles beyond Iran's borders.[122]Establishment and Operations of SAVAK
SAVAK, the Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (Organization of National Intelligence and Security), was formally established on January 20, 1957, when the relevant bill passed the Iranian Senate, consolidating fragmented intelligence functions under a unified national security agency to counter internal threats such as communist infiltration by the Tudeh Party and other subversive elements following the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.[126] The agency was modeled on Western intelligence structures and received foundational training, organizational blueprints, and operational support from the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Israel's Mossad, and to a lesser extent the FBI, reflecting Iran's alignment with anti-communist powers during the Cold War.[127] [128] General Teymour Bakhtiar, a career military officer, served as its first director until 1961, overseeing the integration of military intelligence units into a civilian-led apparatus reporting directly to the Shah.[129] SAVAK's structure comprised six main departments focused on domestic security, foreign intelligence, counter-espionage, technical operations, personnel, and administrative functions, with a network extending into universities, labor unions, and religious institutions through paid informants estimated to number in the tens of thousands beyond its core personnel of around 3,000 full-time agents as acknowledged by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the early 1970s.[130] This pervasive informant system enabled comprehensive surveillance of opposition groups, including Marxists, clerical dissidents, and ethnic separatists, effectively infiltrating and disrupting plots such as Tudeh Party cells and early Islamist networks aiming to destabilize the monarchy.[51] Operations emphasized preventive detention and interrogation to neutralize threats before they escalated, contributing to relative internal stability for over two decades by preempting coups and uprisings, though this came at the expense of civil liberties through arbitrary arrests and prolonged detentions without trial.[131] In practice, SAVAK employed harsh interrogation techniques, including physical coercion, psychological pressure, and isolation, to extract confessions and intelligence, methods that were systematized with foreign advisory input but drew international criticism from human rights observers in the 1970s for fostering a climate of fear.[132] [133] Despite claims of reform under later directors like Nasser Moghadam, who emphasized legal procedures, documented abuses persisted, including the use of facilities like Evin Prison for high-value detainees, alienating segments of the urban intelligentsia and fueling resentment that coalesced in the 1978-1979 revolution.[130] SAVAK's budget, drawn from state oil revenues, supported advanced surveillance technology and overseas stations, enhancing its role in regional counter-intelligence against Soviet-backed proxies, though its domestic focus ultimately proved insufficient against mass mobilization driven by economic grievances and ideological opposition.[134]Counterinsurgency Against Communists and Islamists
The Shah's regime confronted Islamist threats primarily through the suppression of Fada'iyan-e Islam, a Shia fundamentalist group founded in 1946 by Navvab Safavi (Mojtaba Mir-Lohi), which advocated violent enforcement of Islamic law and carried out assassinations, including that of intellectual Ahmad Kasravi in 1946.[135] The group attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Hossein Ala in 1951 and plotted against other officials, prompting intensified security measures; Safavi and three associates were arrested in 1955 and executed by firing squad on January 16, 1956, effectively dismantling the organization's leadership and curtailing its activities during the 1950s.[135] Communist insurgencies, led by the Tudeh Party—formed in 1941 as Iran's primary Marxist-Leninist organization—faced systematic crackdowns following the 1953 coup that restored the Shah's authority, as Tudeh had initially supported Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh but later opposed the monarchy.[136] In 1954, trials convicted over 40 Tudeh leaders, resulting in four executions and long prison terms for others, driving the party underground while SAVAK, established in 1957 with CIA and Mossad assistance, conducted pervasive surveillance, infiltration, and arrests to neutralize its network.[137] By the late 1960s, urban guerrilla warfare emerged as a hybrid threat, with groups like the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (Fedayan-e Khalq), a Marxist outfit founded in 1971, launching armed attacks on military posts and gendarmes, killing over 100 personnel by 1974.[138] SAVAK responded aggressively, infiltrating cells, assassinating leaders such as Mansour Rastegar Dabbagh in 1974, and executing dozens, which fragmented the group and limited its operational capacity until the 1979 revolution.[138] Similarly, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), blending Islamist and Marxist ideologies since its 1965 founding, initiated bombings and assassinations from 1971, prompting a 1975 crackdown that arrested hundreds, executed 11 central committee members including founders Ahmad Rezaei and Kazem Delafrooz, and imposed death sentences on most leadership, severely weakening the organization.[139] These operations, coordinated by SAVAK's intelligence and counterterrorism units, emphasized preemptive arrests, torture for confessions, and public trials to deter recruitment, successfully containing both ideologies' militant wings through the mid-1970s despite occasional escapes and exiles.[137] The regime's focus on communists stemmed from Cold War alignments, viewing Tudeh and its offshoots as Soviet proxies, while Islamists were targeted for direct threats to secular reforms, though underlying grievances like economic inequality fueled periodic resurgence.[136]Foreign Policy and Geopolitics
Alignment with the West and Anti-Communism
Following the Allied occupation of Iran during World War II and the subsequent Soviet-backed separatist movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in 1945–1946, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi sought Western assistance to reassert central authority and counter communist influence. The United States played a pivotal role in pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces by May 1946, enabling Iranian troops to reclaim the northern provinces and suppressing pro-communist regimes there.[140] This early alignment positioned Iran as a frontline state against Soviet expansion in the Cold War era. The 1953 coup d'état against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized Iran's oil industry in 1951, marked a turning point in solidifying the Shah's pro-Western orientation. Orchestrated by the CIA under Operation Ajax and supported by MI6, the coup on August 19, 1953, restored Pahlavi's full authority amid fears that Mossadegh's government could succumb to Tudeh Party (Iranian communist) infiltration, thereby threatening Western access to Iranian oil and regional stability.[141][46] Post-coup, the United States provided substantial military and economic aid, including the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in 1950, to fortify the regime against internal communist threats.[142] In 1955, Iran acceded to the Baghdad Pact—renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959 after Iraq's withdrawal—a mutual defense alliance with Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, backed by the United States, explicitly designed to contain Soviet aggression in Southwest Asia.[143][144] The Shah's government pursued stringent anti-communist measures, including the banning of the Tudeh Party and vigilant monitoring of Soviet subversion, while leveraging CENTO for economic cooperation and intelligence sharing to counter Moscow's influence.[145] Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this alignment deepened through escalating U.S. arms sales and training, transforming Iran's military into a regional power capable of deterring communist advances. Under the Nixon Doctrine formalized in 1969, the United States lifted prior restraints on advanced weaponry transfers, supplying Iran with over $16 billion in military equipment by 1978 to serve as a proxy enforcer of Western interests in the Persian Gulf amid Vietnam-era retrenchment.[146][121] Despite occasional rhetoric of non-alignment, Pahlavi's policies consistently prioritized anti-communism, rejecting significant Soviet military aid and viewing the USSR as an existential threat to Iran's sovereignty and modernization efforts.[147][148]Relations with the United States and Europe
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's relations with the United States solidified after his ascension to the throne on September 16, 1941, following the Anglo-Soviet invasion that ousted his father Reza Shah amid World War II. The U.S. viewed Iran as a strategic buffer against Soviet expansion and a key oil supplier, providing initial support through lend-lease aid during the war and subsequent diplomatic engagement. In 1949, the U.S. expanded the Shah's powers via economic and military assistance, aiming to stabilize his rule against internal communist threats from the Tudeh Party.[149][150] The pivotal moment came with the 1953 coup d'état, known as Operation Ajax, where the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in coordination with British MI6, orchestrated the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh on August 19, 1953, after his nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company threatened Western interests and raised fears of a Soviet-aligned government. The Shah, who had briefly fled to Baghdad and then Rome, returned to power with enhanced authority, cementing U.S.-Iran ties as the Shah became a reliable anti-communist ally. This intervention, funded by the U.S. at approximately $1 million for propaganda and mob organization, restored the monarchy and ensured continued Western access to Iranian oil, though it later fueled anti-American sentiment in Iran.[46][141][150] Post-coup, U.S. support intensified through military and economic aid, including Iran's joining of the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) in 1955 as a Western-aligned security framework. President Richard Nixon's 1972 visit to Tehran pledged unrestricted arms sales—short of nuclear weapons—to bolster Iran's regional military capabilities, resulting in over $16 billion in U.S. arms purchases by Iran between 1972 and 1977, transforming the Iranian military into one of the world's largest. This partnership emphasized Iran's role as a U.S. proxy in containing Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf, with annual U.S. military advisory missions training Iranian forces. Economic ties grew via oil-for-arms deals, though by the late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter's human rights advocacy introduced tensions, criticizing the Shah's SAVAK secret police for suppressing dissent.[151][150][146] Relations with Europe mirrored this Western alignment, with the United Kingdom playing a dual role: as a co-participant in the 1953 coup but also facing earlier strains from Mossadegh's oil nationalization, which led to a 1951-1954 boycott. Post-restoration, the UK resumed oil consortium involvement and arms sales, though the Shah diversified suppliers to assert independence. France maintained cultural and economic links, with the Shah fostering educational exchanges and purchasing Mirage jets in the 1960s; by the 1970s, Iran invested in French firms, reflecting mutual interests in energy and technology. West Germany emerged as a major arms exporter, supplying Leopard tanks and frigates, as the Shah sought alternatives to U.S. restrictions, viewing Britain, France, and Germany as key partners for military modernization amid regional threats. These ties, grounded in anti-communist solidarity and economic interdependence, positioned Europe as a supplementary pillar to U.S. support, with Iran emerging as a significant buyer of European weaponry and a participant in multilateral forums like the European Economic Community dialogues.[147][98]Middle Eastern Stances: Israel, Arab States, and Iraq
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Iran pursued pragmatic, albeit covert, ties with Israel, prioritizing shared strategic interests against Soviet expansionism and radical Arab nationalism over ideological solidarity with the Muslim world. Lacking formal diplomatic recognition, the regime nonetheless supplied Israel with oil—bypassing the Arab embargo following the 1967 Six-Day War—and facilitated technical cooperation in agriculture and infrastructure. Intelligence collaboration between SAVAK and Mossad further underscored this alliance, which the Shah balanced with public rhetorical support for Palestinian Arabs to mitigate regional backlash.[152][153] Relations with Arab states reflected Pahlavi's emphasis on Iran's non-Arab identity and opposition to pan-Arabist threats, particularly from Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic, which claimed Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan province as Arab territory. The Shah fostered alliances with moderate monarchies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, cooperating on Gulf security against leftist insurgencies, though competition over Persian Gulf dominance strained ties with Riyadh. Hostility toward revolutionary regimes in Iraq and Egypt persisted, as Iran positioned itself as a bulwark against Ba'athist and Nasserist subversion, including support for anti-regime elements in those states.[154][155] Tensions with Iraq centered on unresolved border disputes, notably the Shatt al-Arab waterway, formalized in the 1937 treaty but contested after Iraq's 1969 nationalization attempts. To counter Iraqi aggression and irredentism, Pahlavi's government backed Iraqi Kurdish rebels under Mustafa Barzani from the early 1960s, providing an estimated $16 million annually in financial aid by 1974 alongside arms and sanctuary, exploiting ethnic fissures to weaken Baghdad's Ba'athist regime. This proxy strategy escalated during the 1974–1975 Shatt al-Arab crisis, but Iran abruptly terminated support following the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975, mediated by Algeria, in exchange for Iraq's recognition of the thalweg (deepest channel) as the maritime boundary—yielding Iran navigational rights and averting full-scale war.[156][157][158]Tensions with the Soviet Union and Non-Alignment Facade
Following World War II, tensions between Iran under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Soviet Union escalated due to the latter's occupation of northern Iran, justified under Articles VI and XIII of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship. Soviet forces, initially present to secure supply routes, supported the establishment of the communist Azerbaijan People's Government in December 1945 and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in January 1946, while refusing to withdraw after the agreed deadline of March 2, 1946. Under international pressure, particularly from the United States via the United Nations Security Council and the Truman Doctrine, the Soviets announced their withdrawal on March 24, 1946, completing it by May 1946 after Iran rejected oil concession demands.[159][148] These events solidified the Shah's anti-communist orientation, leading to the suppression of the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party, Iran's communist organization. The party was banned in 1949 following an assassination attempt on the Shah in which it was implicated, with leaders arrested and underground activities curtailed through SAVAK surveillance.[160][161] Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the regime viewed Tudeh as a proxy for Soviet subversion, integrating its crackdown into broader counterinsurgency efforts against leftist elements.[148] Iran's entry into the Baghdad Pact in 1955, later reorganized as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1959, further intensified Soviet antagonism, as Moscow perceived it as an encirclement threat coordinated with the West. Soviet propaganda condemned the alliance, warning of retaliation, while conducting military maneuvers near Iranian borders to signal displeasure.[143][162] Despite this, the Shah prioritized Western military aid and intelligence cooperation to counter Soviet influence, hosting U.S. listening posts for monitoring missile activity.[148] Amid these hostilities, the Shah pursued a facade of non-alignment through episodic diplomatic overtures to the USSR, aiming to mitigate border vulnerabilities and diversify dependencies without abandoning Western commitments. His first visit to Moscow from June 25 to July 12, 1956, yielded a three-year commercial agreement, boosting Soviet imports of Iranian goods to 21% of total exports by 1957, yet tensions persisted over ideological differences.[148] In 1959, negotiations for a Soviet-Iranian non-aggression pact, initiated in late January, collapsed by February 14 due to Soviet insistence on prohibiting foreign bases and alliances—clashing with Iran's CENTO obligations—and pressure from the U.S. and Britain, who feared a neutralist shift; the Shah instead signed a U.S. defense agreement in March 1959.[163] Subsequent pragmatism included a 1962 pledge against permitting foreign missiles on Iranian soil, easing immediate rhetoric, and economic pacts like the 1963 border river agreement during Leonid Brezhnev's Tehran visit, alongside Soviet technical aid for a steel mill and a 700-mile gas pipeline.[148] The Shah's 1965 Moscow trip produced a joint communique emphasizing trade, yet these initiatives masked underlying distrust, as Iran continued arms buildups via CENTO and U.S. support, prompting Soviet warnings, such as Alexei Kosygin's 1974 critique of regional militarization.[148] This pattern—rhetorical balance paired with firm Western alignment—reflected causal imperatives of geography and ideology, where northern proximity necessitated caution without compromising anti-communist security architecture.[163][148]Cultural and Ideological Policies
Promotion of Pre-Islamic Persian Heritage
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime systematically elevated Iran's pre-Islamic heritage, particularly the Achaemenid Empire (c. 550–330 BCE) and Zoroastrian traditions, as foundational to modern Iranian identity, framing these eras as exemplars of imperial grandeur, tolerance, and innovation in contrast to the perceived stagnation following the Arab conquests of the 7th century CE. This ideological emphasis, building on Reza Shah's foundational nationalism, aimed to cultivate secular patriotism by minimizing Islamic historical narratives in favor of ancient Persian achievements, such as Cyrus the Great's administrative innovations and Zoroaster's ethical monotheism. State-sponsored historiography portrayed pre-Islamic Persia as a civilized precursor to global empires, with the shah himself invoking Cyrus as a symbol of enlightened rule in public addresses and writings.[164][165] Educational reforms under Mohammad Reza integrated pre-Islamic history into school curricula from the 1940s onward, prioritizing texts on Achaemenid satrapies, Persepolis architecture, and Zoroastrian fire temples over medieval Islamic dynasties, thereby instilling a narrative of ethnic Persian continuity and resilience. The regime supported archaeological excavations and restorations at key sites, including Pasargadae (Cyrus's tomb) and Persepolis, with funding allocated through the Ministry of Culture starting in the 1950s to unearth artifacts that underscored ancient Iran's technological and artistic prowess, such as cuneiform inscriptions detailing royal decrees. Translations of Old Persian inscriptions, like those from Darius I's Behistun relief (c. 520 BCE), were systematically rendered into modern Farsi during the 1960s–1970s, making them accessible for public dissemination and reinforcing claims of cultural superiority predating Islam.[166] Cultural policies incorporated pre-Islamic motifs into state symbolism, including the adoption of Zoroastrian-derived emblems like the Faravahar (a winged disk representing the soul's divinity) in official seals and architecture from the 1960s, signaling a revival of indigenous iconography over Arabic-Islamic calligraphy. Annual celebrations of Nowruz, rooted in Zoroastrian renewal rites dating to at least the Achaemenid period, received amplified state patronage, with Mohammad Reza presiding over ceremonies featuring ancient rituals to evoke national unity. These efforts, however, drew criticism from Shia clergy for diluting Islamic orthodoxy, as they implicitly critiqued the post-conquest era as a deviation from Persia's "Aryan" heritage.[167][164]Secularization and Westernization Drives
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi advanced secularization by diminishing the clergy's influence over state institutions and promoting a rational, state-controlled legal framework. Through the White Revolution, initiated on January 26, 1963, following a national referendum, the shah implemented reforms that centralized authority and curtailed traditional religious prerogatives, including state oversight of religious endowments and the expansion of secular judiciary systems that limited sharia's application in civil matters.[168] These measures built on his father's centralization efforts but emphasized modernization without outright confrontation, aiming to foster a technocratic bureaucracy less beholden to ulama interpretations.[20] A core component of these drives was the enfranchisement of women, granting them the right to vote and stand for election as part of the 1963 White Revolution reforms, which challenged clerical doctrines restricting female public participation. The Family Protection Law of 1967, further amended in 1975, raised the minimum marriage age to 18 for males and 15 for females, restricted polygamy by requiring court approval, and mandated judicial oversight for divorces, thereby elevating women's legal status and aligning family law with secular principles over traditional Islamic jurisprudence.[73][168] These policies sought to integrate women into the workforce and society, with female literacy rates rising from approximately 8% in 1966 to over 35% by 1976 through expanded access to secular education.[169] Westernization efforts manifested in cultural emulation, education, and lifestyle adoption, with the Literacy Corps—established in 1963—deploying over 100,000 young teachers annually to rural areas to impart standardized, secular curricula that prioritized science and nationalism over religious instruction, thereby eroding clerical educational monopolies. Urban elites and the middle class were encouraged to adopt European attire and social norms, including co-educational universities and exposure to Western media, arts, and technology, facilitated by oil-funded infrastructure projects that imported European architectural and engineering standards.[170] Unlike his father's coercive 1936 unveiling decree, Mohammad Reza permitted veiling as personal choice post-1941 but promoted unveiled Western dress as a marker of progress, evident in state media and public ceremonies.[171] This cultural shift, coupled with tolerance for alcohol consumption, flourishing music and cinema industries—producing over ninety films annually at their peak—and modern urban life in cities like Tehran featuring theaters and cafes, aimed to align Iran with global modernity, though it deepened rural-urban divides and clerical resentment.[172][173]Calendar Change and Nationalist Symbolism
In March 1976, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi decreed the replacement of Iran's Solar Hijri calendar, which dated from the Prophet Muhammad's Hijra in 622 CE, with the Shahanshahi (Imperial) calendar, whose epoch was set at 559 BCE to mark the traditional founding of the Achaemenid Empire by Cyrus the Great.[174][175] This adjustment caused the official year to advance abruptly from 1355 to 2535, aligning the calendar with solar cycles while shifting its symbolic origin to pre-Islamic Persia.[176] The reform was implemented nationwide in official documents, stamps, and coinage, though it retained the familiar 12-month solar structure of the prior system. The calendar change embodied Pahlavi's broader nationalist agenda to revive ancient Iranian identity, positioning the monarchy as a direct successor to the Achaemenid legacy and emphasizing Zoroastrian-era grandeur over Islamic historical markers.[177] By anchoring time reckoning to Cyrus—portrayed as a tolerant conqueror and empire-builder—the Shah sought to foster a secular, ethno-nationalist pride that highlighted Persia's imperial past, including motifs of Aryan origins and pre-Islamic achievements, as part of cultural policies like the 1971 Persepolis celebrations.[175] This symbolism extended to public rhetoric framing Iran as the heir to a 2,500-year-old civilization, intended to unify diverse populations under a non-religious historical narrative amid modernization drives.[176] However, the reform provoked backlash from religious conservatives, who viewed it as an erasure of Islamic temporal authority and a promotion of pagan symbolism, exacerbating clerical grievances already simmering over secularization efforts.[174] The calendar's brief tenure—from 1976 until its abolition in February 1978 following revolutionary unrest—underscored its role in polarizing society, with opponents decrying it as hubristic detachment from the ummah's shared chronology.[177] Proponents, aligned with the regime, defended it as a logical extension of national sovereignty, free from foreign (Arab-Islamic) impositions, though empirical evidence of widespread popular embrace remains limited to state propaganda metrics.Coronation and 2,500-Year Celebrations
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's coronation took place on October 26, 1967, in Tehran, 26 years after his accession to the throne in 1941 following his father's abdication.[178][179][180] The delay reflected the shah's initial precarious position amid World War II Allied occupation and domestic instability, with the ceremony serving to affirm his consolidated authority after reforms like the White Revolution.[180] In a break from tradition, the shah crowned himself using a new imperial crown commissioned for the occasion, then placed a separate crown on his third wife, Farah Diba, designating her Shahbanu (empress)—a symbolic act intended to underscore women's elevated status amid ongoing modernization and legal advancements for females.[179][181] The event drew international attention, broadcast globally, and incorporated elements evoking ancient Persian kingship, such as heraldic scepters, to project monarchical continuity and national revival.[178][182] Critics within Iran, including clerical factions, viewed it as an ostentatious display alien to Islamic norms, but the shah framed it as a restoration of pre-Islamic grandeur aligned with his secular nationalist vision.[180] Four years later, in October 1971, the shah orchestrated the 2,500-year celebrations of the founding of the Persian Empire at Persepolis, marking the purported anniversary of Cyrus the Great's conquest of Media in 550 BCE.[183][184] The six-day event featured a tent city housing 60 rulers and dignitaries from 83 countries, including Emperor Haile Selassie and foreign ministers, with lavish banquets, military parades, and Zoroastrian-inspired rituals emphasizing Iran's imperial heritage over Islamic history.[185][186] Costs sparked debate, with official Iranian figures around $22 million for catering and infrastructure like a $20 million stadium, though independent estimates ranged from $100-300 million, including imported luxuries and site preparations; the shah dismissed higher claims of up to $2 billion as unfounded.[187][188][189] These extravagances, amid rural poverty and oil revenue dependence, fueled domestic resentment, with opponents labeling it the "Devil's Feast" for its perceived decadence and disconnection from public needs.[183][184] The shah defended the outlays as an investment in national prestige and tourism infrastructure, arguing they showcased Iran's modernization and ancient legacy to the world.[184]Governance Style and Personal Rule
Court and Elite Circles
The royal court of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi served as the epicenter of political and social influence, encompassing immediate family, high-level appointees, and select confidants who facilitated access and shaped counsel to the monarch. The Minister of Court occupied a critical position as head of the royal household, managing protocol, security, and communications with government entities. Hossein Ala held this office from 1943 to 1951, playing a key role in navigating the Shah's interactions with foreign powers and domestic politics during the turbulent post-World War II era.[190] His tenure ended amid escalating conflicts with Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who sought to curtail court influence.[191] Asadollah Alam emerged as a central figure in later court dynamics, appointed Court Minister in 1966 and retaining the role until his death on 23 August 1978 from leukemia. A scion of a prominent Tabrizi family, Alam had previously served as Prime Minister from 1962 to 1964 and Interior Minister, earning the Shah's trust through loyalty demonstrated during the 1953 coup restoration.[192] His confidential diary, spanning 1969 to 1977, records over 300 private meetings with the Shah, covering topics from foreign policy to internal reforms, underscoring Alam's status as the monarch's most intimate advisor.[193] Alam's influence extended to anticorruption drives and suppressing tribal unrest, though critics attributed to him favoritism toward elite networks.[194] Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah's twin sister born on 26 October 1919, exerted substantial sway within court circles through her roles in philanthropy, women's rights advocacy, and covert diplomacy, including her pivotal 1953 visit to persuade the Shah to endorse the coup against Mossadegh. Appointed head of the Red Lion and Sun Society and later Iran's delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights, Ashraf leveraged her proximity to broker international ties, yet faced repeated accusations of corruption, including involvement in smuggling and profiteering from state contracts, which tarnished perceptions of court integrity. Her ambitions and intrigues, often conducted independently of the Shah, fueled rivalries among elites.[195] Ernest Perron, a Swiss national born in 1908, joined the Pahlavi entourage in the 1930s as tutor and personal secretary to the young crown prince, fostering a bond that persisted into the Shah's reign. Perron wielded informal power over appointments and finances in the immediate postwar years, prompting envy and plots from Iranian courtiers who viewed him as an outsider dominating access to the monarch.[196] By the mid-1950s, following scandals and the Shah's consolidation of authority, Perron's influence waned, confining him to ceremonial duties until his death in 1961; U.S. diplomatic assessments noted his early role as a stabilizing "father figure" amid the Shah's insecurities.[196] Elite circles extended beyond family to military officers, aristocrats, and emerging industrialists bound by personal loyalty rather than institutional checks, fostering an environment historically associated with influence peddling and nepotism. U.S. analyses from the 1960s observed that the court had once epitomized depravity and corruption but underwent purges under the Shah's direction, elevating technocrats while sidelining notorious figures.[20] This insularity, reliant on a narrow cadre vetted for allegiance, amplified the Shah's autocratic style but also bred resentment among excluded societal segments, as favoritism in resource allocation—tied to oil revenues exceeding $20 billion annually by 1977—concentrated wealth among court affiliates.[20] Despite reforms, persistent allegations against figures like Ashraf highlighted underlying tensions in these privileged networks.Decision-Making Processes and Advisory Reliance
Following the 1953 coup d'état that ousted Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi centralized authority, transitioning from a constitutional monarchy to a system of personal rule characterized by direct oversight of government functions.[25][197] This shift amplified the Shah's veto power over policies while diminishing the role of elected bodies like the Majlis, with major decisions increasingly filtered through his office rather than broad cabinet deliberations.[20] The Shah relied heavily on a small cadre of court ministers and personal confidants for counsel, bypassing traditional bureaucratic channels in favor of informal, trusted relationships. Hossein Ala, appointed Minister of Court in 1951, served as the primary intermediary between the Shah and the government until his death on July 14, 1964, at age 81, handling diplomatic communications and advising on administrative matters.[198][199] Succeeding him, Asadollah Alam assumed the role from 1966 to 1977, engaging in near-daily private audiences with the Shah that shaped policy on domestic reforms and foreign affairs, as documented in Alam's confidential diaries covering 1969–1977.[192] Alam's influence extended to political strategy, with U.S. intelligence assessments noting his death in 1978 deprived the Shah of his most perceptive advisor, contributing to later indecisiveness.[200] Family members also exerted notable advisory sway, particularly the Shah's twin sister, Ashraf Pahlavi, who advocated for decisive actions during crises, including pressuring the Shah to authorize the 1953 operation against Mossadegh when he hesitated. Her interventions often focused on modernization initiatives and international alliances, though her involvement drew criticism for nepotism. Over time, the Shah's processes grew more insular, with reliance on technocratic experts for economic planning under the White Revolution but ultimate authority resting with him, occasionally leading to abrupt policy reversals without wide consultation.[25] This personalized approach, while enabling rapid implementation of reforms, isolated the regime from broader societal feedback mechanisms.Public Image Cultivation in the 1960s-1970s
During the 1960s, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi intensified efforts to project an image of himself as a visionary reformer through the White Revolution, a series of modernization initiatives launched on January 26, 1963, following a national referendum that officially recorded 99.9% approval from over 5.5 million voters.[201] The program, encompassing land redistribution, rural literacy corps, women's enfranchisement, and industrialization, was framed in state media as the Shah's direct gift to the Iranian people, bypassing traditional elites to foster direct loyalty and portray him as the architect of national progress.[201] This narrative was disseminated via controlled outlets, including the Ministry of Information, which licensed publications and pre-approved content to emphasize economic gains, such as the redistribution of over 2 million hectares of land to peasants by 1964, while suppressing reports of implementation challenges like rural displacement.[202] In the 1970s, these efforts evolved into a more pronounced cult of personality, aligned with the Shah's vision of a "Great Civilization" (Tamaddon-e Bozorg), proclaimed around 1973 as Iran's path to global preeminence by 1984.[203] State propaganda saturated public spaces with the Shah's portraits, posters, and mandatory displays in schools and offices, reinforcing his role as an enlightened despot guiding Iran toward secular modernity and technological supremacy, often drawing parallels to ancient Persian empires.[204] Foreign assistance bolstered this image; from the early 1960s, British intelligence via the Information Research Department provided propaganda materials to counter leftist critiques and highlight anti-communist stability, aiding the regime's portrayal as a Western-aligned bulwark.[205] Domestically, SAVAK's surveillance ensured media compliance, with outlets like Kayhan and Ettela'at publishing laudatory editorials on reforms, such as the 1975 expansion of the White Revolution to 19 points including profit-sharing and environmental protection, despite growing socioeconomic disparities.[202] Queen Farah Pahlavi contributed to cultural image-building by promoting arts and Western-oriented events in the 1960s and 1970s, commissioning museums and hosting international exhibitions to symbolize Iran's cultural renaissance under the monarchy.[206] Internationally, state visits and alliances, including arms deals totaling over $16 billion with the United States from 1972 to 1977, reinforced the Shah's stature as a strategic partner, with U.S. media often echoing narratives of Iranian stability and progress.[151] However, this curated image increasingly clashed with realities of censorship and repression, as independent voices were marginalized, contributing to underlying public disillusionment by the late 1970s.[202]Precipitants of the Revolution
Socioeconomic Discontents and Rural Disruptions
The White Revolution's land reform program, launched in 1963, redistributed approximately 1.5 to 2 million hectares of land from large estates to over 2.5 million peasant families, aiming to dismantle feudal structures and empower rural cultivators by granting them ownership of small plots averaging 5 to 10 hectares each.[55] However, many recipients received parcels too fragmented or lacking irrigation and credit access to sustain viable farming, leading to widespread crop failures and debt accumulation; by the early 1970s, up to 40 percent of beneficiaries had resold their land to urban investors or former elites, exacerbating rural proletarianization.[207] [208] This agrarian upheaval triggered massive rural-to-urban migration, with rural populations declining from 65 percent of Iran's total in 1960 to about 45 percent by 1976, as displaced peasants sought wage labor in cities; Tehran's population, for instance, swelled from 2.5 million in 1966 to over 4.5 million by 1976, fueled largely by this influx comprising more than 35 percent of urban growth.[209] [210] The migrants, often unskilled and arriving without social networks, formed an underclass in sprawling shantytowns on urban peripheries, where inadequate housing and sanitation bred resentment toward the regime's modernization promises.[211] Compounding these disruptions, the 1970s oil boom—quadrupling revenues to $20 billion annually by 1977—drove hyper-industrialization and defense spending that inflated consumer prices by 20-30 percent yearly, eroding real wages for low-skilled workers and widening income disparities; while per capita GDP surged from $170 in 1963 to $2,060 in 1977, rural and migrant urban poor saw minimal gains, with Gini coefficients reflecting persistent inequality around 0.50.[108] [151] Corruption in state-linked enterprises further alienated the populace, as elite cronies captured oil windfalls, fostering perceptions of a regime prioritizing urban cosmopolitans over traditional rural lifeways.[212] These socioeconomic strains, rooted in top-down reforms that outpaced institutional capacity, cultivated discontents that rural migrants carried into urban protest networks by the late 1970s.[213]Clerical Opposition and Islamist Mobilization
The Shah's White Revolution, launched on January 26, 1963, through a national referendum, included land redistribution that confiscated clerical waqf endowments, depriving the ulema of significant revenue streams and economic influence derived from rural properties.[213] These reforms, alongside literacy campaigns and enfranchisement of women, were perceived by traditionalist clerics as assaults on Islamic authority and social order, prompting public denunciations from figures like Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who argued they promoted Western secularism over Sharia governance.[55] Khomeini's June 1963 sermon in Qom explicitly condemned the reforms as a capitulation to foreign powers, leading to his arrest on June 5, 1963, and sparking riots in Tehran and other cities that killed dozens, marking an early flashpoint of clerical-led resistance.[214] Escalation occurred in October 1964 when Khomeini opposed legislation granting legal immunity to American military personnel in Iran, viewing it as a humiliation of sovereignty and further erosion of clerical oversight.[215] Arrested again on November 4, 1964, he was exiled first to Turkey and then to Najaf, Iraq, where he continued issuing fatwas against the regime, framing the Pahlavi state as un-Islamic and tyrannical.[214] From exile, Khomeini's influence persisted through an underground network of sympathetic clerics and bazaar merchants, who disseminated his messages despite SAVAK suppression, fostering a narrative of the Shah as a puppet of imperial powers.[151] In the 1970s, Islamist mobilization intensified as cassette tapes of Khomeini's sermons—smuggled from Iraq and later France—circulated widely, with estimates of millions duplicated and played in mosques, reaching urban and rural audiences alienated by rapid modernization.[216] Mosques, numbering around 90,000 by the late 1970s, served as safe havens for distribution and gatherings, where tapes urged tax boycotts, strikes, and rejection of the regime's legitimacy, blending religious revivalism with anti-monarchical fervor.[217] This audio network, leveraging affordable technology, bypassed state media controls and unified disparate opposition, with speeches arriving in Iran within hours of recording, amplifying calls for velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) as an alternative to Pahlavi rule.[218] Clerical alliances with bazaaris, who faced economic strains from state industrialization, provided financial backing, transforming latent discontent into organized protests by 1977-1978.[219]Leftist and Nationalist Critiques
Leftist groups, including the communist Tudeh Party, portrayed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime as subservient to Western imperialism, especially following the 1953 coup d'état that ousted Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and reinstated the Shah with covert U.S. and British backing, which dismantled progressive nationalist elements.[220] The Tudeh specifically faulted the government for aligning with foreign powers—such as accepting U.S. support and Soviet arms deals in 1967—while failing to assert true national sovereignty against external economic dominance.[220] Economic critiques from the Tudeh emphasized how regime policies privileged international capital and a narrow elite, exacerbating disparities amid oil revenues; workers' strikes in the 1970s reflected widespread hostility toward this capitalist orientation, which neglected proletarian interests and perpetuated feudal remnants.[220] Repression formed another core indictment, with approximately 3,000 Tudeh militants arrested after the 1953 coup, the exposure of over 500 party members in the military in 1954, and extrajudicial actions like the 1974 murder of Tudeh leader Parviz Hekmatjoo while imprisoned.[220] Marxist guerrilla organizations, such as the Fedayeen-e Khalq, escalated these grievances through armed operations starting in the early 1970s, decrying the Pahlavi state as a repressive dictatorship that stifled class struggle and labor organizing.[200] Nationalist opposition framed the Shah as detached from indigenous roots due to his heavy dependence on Western intellectual and developmental models, which opposition narratives exploited to depict him as an inauthentic "foreign Shah" emblematic of capitulation to outsiders.[221] This emulation of European modernity in projects like the White Revolution alienated segments of society attached to traditional Iranian cultural and social frameworks, undermining the regime's attempts to construct a cohesive national identity and fueling perceptions of imposed foreign dominion over local agency.[221] Groups like the National Front, rooted in Mossadegh-era nationalism, sustained critiques of the Shah's post-1953 power consolidation as a betrayal of sovereign democratic aspirations, viewing his rule as propped up by imperial interventions that prioritized monarchical absolutism over popular self-determination.[222]Shah's Health Decline and Perceived Weakness
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was diagnosed with lymphoma in late 1974, a fact kept secret from the public and most of his inner circle to prevent perceptions of vulnerability in a ruler expected to embody strength and vigor.[223] The diagnosis came after persistent symptoms including fatigue and abdominal pain, initially misattributed or downplayed by physicians to maintain the Shah's image of invincibility.[224] Secrecy extended to his family, with only a handful of doctors and close advisors aware, as the Shah feared that disclosure would erode his authority amid rising domestic tensions.[225] By 1977, the cancer's progression manifested in visible physical decline, including jaundice, weight loss, and chronic exhaustion, which increasingly hampered his stamina for governance.[226] These effects coincided with escalating protests, where the Shah's delayed or inconsistent responses—such as initial leniency toward demonstrators followed by sporadic crackdowns—were interpreted by opponents and even some supporters as indecisiveness stemming from illness-induced frailty.[227] Military leaders and court officials noted his growing reliance on pain medication and reluctance to confront unrest head-on, fostering a sense of regime hesitation that emboldened revolutionaries.[228] This perceived weakness amplified existing fractures, as Islamist and leftist groups exploited rumors of the Shah's deteriorating health to portray the monarchy as moribund, accelerating mobilization against it.[227] External pressures, including U.S. demands under President Carter for human rights reforms, further constrained decisive action, with the Shah's compromised physical state limiting his ability to project resolve.[228] By early 1979, amid widespread strikes and mutinies, the cumulative impact of his concealed illness contributed to the rapid unraveling of loyalty within the armed forces and elite, culminating in his departure from Iran on January 16.[226]The 1978-1979 Revolution
Protests, Black Friday, and Escalation
Protests against Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime escalated throughout 1978, triggered by an article published in the state-aligned newspaper Ettela'at on January 7 that criticized exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a foreign agent. Demonstrations erupted in the religious city of Qom on January 9, where security forces killed several protesters, with estimates ranging from 6 to 20 deaths depending on opposition and official accounts.[229] This incident initiated a pattern of unrest fueled by Shia Islamic mourning rituals held every 40 days, commemorating the dead and drawing larger crowds to denounce the shah's secular reforms and perceived authoritarianism. The cycle of protests spread to major cities, culminating in violent clashes in Tabriz on February 18, where troops fired on demonstrators, killing scores—opposition reports cited over 100 deaths, marking a shift toward broader urban involvement and economic grievances among workers and bazaar merchants.[229] By summer, demonstrations during the holy month of Ramadan in August drew tens of thousands in Tehran and other centers, protesting inflation, corruption, and the shah's White Revolution land reforms, which had disrupted rural economies and clerical influence. Between March and May, unrest affected over three dozen cities, with police repressing gatherings in at least 24 towns by May 10, escalating tactics from tear gas to live ammunition.[230][231] On September 8, 1978—known as Black Friday—martial law was declared that morning, yet thousands assembled in Tehran's Jaleh Square for what began as a religious procession, unaware of the curfew. Imperial Iranian Army and security forces, including Imperial Guard units, opened fire on the crowd with machine guns and tanks, killing demonstrators in a massacre that shocked the nation. Official government reports claimed 87-88 deaths, attributing many to armed infiltrators, while revolutionary opposition, including Khomeini's networks, alleged up to 4,000 slain to mobilize support; contemporary Western diplomatic estimates and later analyses suggest 64 to 100 fatalities, with evidence of unarmed civilians among the victims.[232][229][233] Black Friday radicalized the opposition, transforming largely nonviolent protests into a sustained challenge to regime authority by shattering the military's restraint and public faith in the shah's promises of reform. The event prompted immediate international condemnation and domestic defections, with soldiers refusing orders in subsequent clashes, while strikes by oil workers and others from September onward crippled exports and the economy, amplifying demands for the shah's ouster. Over 300 protests occurred nationwide in 1978 alone, building momentum that exposed the regime's inability to contain dissent without further bloodshed.[234][235]Government Responses and Regime Collapse
In response to escalating protests throughout 1978, the Iranian government under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi imposed martial law on September 7, effective the following day, authorizing troops to disperse gatherings by force.[236] [237] This measure followed widespread demonstrations that had paralyzed major cities, with the regime aiming to restore order amid strikes in the oil sector and public sector that reduced oil production by up to 40% by late summer.[231] On September 8, known as Black Friday, security forces opened fire on unarmed protesters in Tehran's Jaleh Square, resulting in dozens to hundreds of deaths according to official and eyewitness accounts, though opposition estimates claimed thousands killed across the capital.[238] [232] [234] The incident, broadcast internationally and condemned by human rights groups, eroded military morale and public support for the regime, as soldiers increasingly refused orders to shoot civilians.[238] Subsequent government strategies combined repression with concessions to opposition figures. In November 1978, the Shah appointed General Gholam-Reza Azhari to lead a military government, which intensified arrests and curfews but failed to quell nationwide strikes involving over 6 million workers by December.[229] On January 3, 1979, facing imminent collapse, the Shah named Shapour Bakhtiar, a secular nationalist from the National Front opposition, as prime minister, granting him authority to release political prisoners, abolish the SAVAK secret police, and lift press censorship in a bid for democratic transition.[239] [240] Bakhtiar's 37-day tenure emphasized constitutional monarchy reforms, but it was undermined by ongoing mass protests, economic shutdowns, and defections within the military, where units began fraternizing with demonstrators.[241] The regime's final unraveling accelerated after the Shah's departure on January 16, 1979, ostensibly for medical treatment abroad amid his undisclosed cancer diagnosis, leaving effective power with Bakhtiar while signaling abdication to loyalists.[174] [242] Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return from exile on February 1 drew millions into the streets, prompting Bakhtiar to order airlifts of revolutionary forces from Paris, but this only deepened divisions. By February 9, armed clashes erupted between loyalist troops and guerrillas, including Fedayeen and Mujahedin fighters, leading to the capture of key installations like the state broadcaster.[229] On February 11, the military high command declared neutrality, Bakhtiar resigned and fled into hiding, and revolutionary committees seized control, marking the collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy after 2,500 years of Persian imperial rule.[229] Total revolutionary casualties exceeded 2,000, with the regime's inconsistent use of force—alternating crackdowns and restraint—contributing to its rapid downfall as institutional loyalty evaporated.[243]Flight into Exile and Establishment of Islamic Republic
On January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi departed Tehran aboard a royal aircraft, marking the effective end of his 37-year reign amid escalating revolutionary unrest, army mutinies, and widespread protests that had rendered governance untenable.[174] [242] He did not formally abdicate, instead entrusting executive authority to Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar and a Regency Council while framing the exit as a temporary vacation to Egypt, where he arrived in Aswan under the hospitality of President Anwar Sadat.[229] [174] This departure followed Bakhtiar's appointment as prime minister on January 6, a last-ditch effort by the shah to appease opposition by installing a secular nationalist from the National Front, who conditioned his acceptance on the monarch's exit and pledged moderate reforms including civil liberties and an end to martial law.[229] Bakhtiar's interim government, however, proved short-lived, lasting only 37 days as it struggled against mass strikes, defections in the security forces, and the rising influence of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose Islamist networks coordinated protests from exile in France.[229] On January 31, Bakhtiar reluctantly permitted Khomeini's return to Tehran, hoping to avert total anarchy by co-opting revolutionary momentum, but this decision accelerated the regime's collapse as millions greeted Khomeini at Mehrabad Airport on February 1, with crowds chanting for an Islamic government and the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty.[244] [229] By February 5, Khomeini appointed his own provisional prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, bypassing Bakhtiar, while revolutionary committees seized control of key institutions; the military's declaration of neutrality on February 11 formalized the monarchy's fall, prompting Bakhtiar to flee into exile.[245] [229] In the ensuing power vacuum, Khomeini's forces consolidated authority through a March 30–31 referendum on establishing an "Islamic Republic," which official tallies reported as 98.2% approval amid limited campaigning for alternatives and suppression of dissent, leading Khomeini to proclaim the new regime on April 1, 1979.[245] This transition replaced the constitutional monarchy with a theocratic system under the doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist), vesting supreme authority in Khomeini as the unelected guardian, while a constituent assembly drafted a constitution embedding Shia Islamist principles into state structures.[245] The shah's flight thus paved the way for this radical reconfiguration, ending Pahlavi secular modernism and initiating policies of clerical dominance, revolutionary purges, and anti-Western alignment that diverged sharply from the interim government's secular intentions.[229]Exile, Illness, and Death
Initial Exile and International Asylum Struggles
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi departed Iran on January 16, 1979, en route to Aswan, Egypt, where President Anwar Sadat promptly granted him and his family asylum despite the intensifying revolutionary turmoil back home.[246] This initial refuge reflected Egypt's longstanding alliance with the Pahlavi regime, forged through military and economic ties, but proved temporary as the Shah's deteriorating health and the need for discretion prompted a swift relocation.[247] On January 22, 1979, he accepted an invitation from Moroccan King Hassan II and flew to Rabat, marking the beginning of a peripatetic exile driven by diplomatic sensitivities and personal vulnerabilities.[248] The Shah's stay in Morocco lasted approximately two months, ending on March 31, 1979, when he transferred to Paradise Island in the Bahamas for a planned extended respite of at least one month.[249] Throughout these early months, the nascent Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini exerted relentless pressure on host nations, demanding the Shah's extradition for trial on allegations of treason, corruption, and economic mismanagement, which Iranian authorities framed as justification for revolutionary justice.[250] Such demands, coupled with threats of severed diplomatic ties and economic reprisals—particularly in oil-dependent regions—rendered the Shah an unwelcome figure, compelling frequent moves to evade both Iranian ire and local unrest.[251] By mid-1979, the pattern continued with asylum in Mexico, where the government initially permitted entry into Cuernavaca despite similar international frictions, highlighting the Shah's reliance on a shrinking circle of sympathetic states amid widespread reluctance from Western and neutral powers wary of antagonizing Tehran's new clerical leadership.[252] These asylum struggles underscored the causal fallout of the revolution: the Pahlavi dynasty's ouster not only dismantled domestic stability but isolated its figurehead globally, as former allies prioritized emerging realpolitik over historical obligations, leaving the ex-monarch in a limbo of transient hospitality without prospects for repatriation or permanence.[248]Cancer Treatment and U.S. Visit Controversies
Following his exile from Iran on January 16, 1979, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's lymphatic cancer, diagnosed secretly as early as 1974 after he detected an abdominal lump during a skiing trip, progressed amid repeated displacements across Egypt, Morocco, the Bahamas, and Mexico.[253] By late October 1979, while in Cuernavaca, Mexico, severe complications including jaundice, gallstones, and advancing lymphoma necessitated urgent specialized intervention beyond local capabilities, prompting appeals from his physicians, including Benjamin Kean of Cornell University, for U.S. admission.[252] The Carter administration, after internal deliberations spanning months, approved entry on October 22, 1979, on humanitarian grounds for treatment at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center, where he arrived via military transport on October 23.[254] Pahlavi underwent emergency surgery on October 25 to remove his gall bladder and address biliary obstruction, followed by chemotherapy regimens including MOPP (mechlorethamine, vincristine, procarbazine, prednisone), though his condition remained precarious due to the cancer's chronic lymphocytic leukemia variant and prior secrecy, which had delayed aggressive intervention.[253] Security was intensified around the hospital amid protests chanting "Death to the Shah," reflecting fears of assassination attempts by Iranian expatriates or revolutionaries.[255] He departed New York on December 2, 1979, transferring to Lackland Air Force Base in Texas for convalescence before further exile, as prolonged stay risked escalating tensions.[252] The U.S. decision ignited fierce controversies, directly precipitating the November 4, 1979, seizure of the American embassy in Tehran by Islamist students demanding Pahlavi's extradition, an act endorsed by Ayatollah Khomeini and evolving into the 444-day hostage crisis.[256] Administration officials were divided: National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski advocated admission to honor alliance commitments and counter Soviet influence, while Secretary of State Cyrus Vance warned of diplomatic rupture with Iran's revolutionary provisional government under Mehdi Bazargan, prioritizing stabilization over humanitarian claims.[254] Critics, including State Department cables from Tehran, contended the move underestimated revolutionary fervor—fueled by perceptions of U.S. meddling—and ignored Bazargan's fragile authority, effectively undermining moderate elements in favor of symbolic loyalty to a deposed ally whose illness had eroded his regime's resilience years earlier.[257][258] Defenders, including Pahlavi's U.S.-based doctors and some administration figures, emphasized the ethical imperative of denying care would betray decades of strategic partnership, including Iran's role as a Cold War bulwark, and noted prior assurances to the Shah of refuge if needed; however, declassified records reveal awareness of the high risks, with Iranian contacts explicitly cautioning against admission as a "provocation" likely to empower hardliners.[252][254] The episode underscored causal tensions between short-term moral gestures and long-term geopolitical calculus, as the influx of untreated resentment solidified anti-Americanism under the nascent Islamic Republic, with no extradition forthcoming due to U.S. non-extradition treaties and Pahlavi's terminal state.[256]Final Months in Egypt and Assassination Attempts
Following his departure from Panama on March 22, 1980, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi arrived in Cairo, Egypt, on March 24, where President Anwar Sadat granted him asylum and provided residence in a state villa near the Pyramids of Giza.[259] Sadat, a personal friend who viewed the shah as a fellow anti-communist leader, ensured medical care and security amid ongoing enmity from Iran's new Islamist regime under Ayatollah Khomeini, which had issued fatwas calling for his death.[260] Despite persistent threats from Iranian agents and Islamist militants—evident in the regime's pattern of extraterritorial assassinations against exiles—no verified attempts materialized during his four months in Egypt, though Egyptian intelligence maintained heightened vigilance.[261] Pahlavi's health, ravaged by non-Hodgkin lymphoma diagnosed in 1974, deteriorated rapidly upon arrival. On March 28, four days after landing, he underwent surgery at Maadi Armed Forces Hospital to remove his cancer-infected spleen, a procedure complicated by prior treatments including chemotherapy and radiation during his U.S. stay in late 1979.[260] [262] Further complications arose, including pancreatic injury from the operation leading to a subphrenic abscess, necessitating additional interventions in June 1980.[263] By mid-1980, he was bedridden, suffering severe pain, weight loss exceeding 50 pounds since exile began, and lymphatic blockages that rendered further chemotherapy ineffective.[226] In his final weeks, Pahlavi dictated memoirs reflecting on his reign and the revolution's causes, expressing no regret over modernization efforts but lamenting Western betrayal in asylum denials.[264] He died on July 27, 1980, at age 60, from lymphangitic carcinomatosis and related organ failure at Maadi Hospital, surrounded by family including Empress Farah and son Reza.[262] [264] Sadat accorded him a state funeral on July 29 with military honors, interring his body in Cairo's Al-Rifa'i Mosque alongside Egyptian royalty; annual commemorations continue there under Egyptian protection, underscoring Sadat's defiance of Iranian protests.[265]Wealth, Personal Life, and Religious Views
Accumulation of Assets and Economic Policies' Personal Impact
The Mohammad Reza Shah's accumulation of assets centered on his absolute control over the Pahlavi Foundation, established in 1961 as a nominally charitable entity that invested in Iranian enterprises, real estate, banks, and international properties, amassing control over an estimated 300 companies by the late 1970s. The foundation received direct annual government appropriations of approximately $10 million, alongside revenues from its commercial activities, which blurred lines between state, royal, and private interests.[266] [267] Additional sources included a personal budget drawn from the national treasury, fluctuating between $43 million and $1 billion annually depending on oil revenue availability, and family holdings in land inherited or acquired through state mechanisms.[268] [269] Contemporary banker assessments placed the Shah's personal fortune above $1 billion by January 1979, largely tied to foundation transfers and state diversions totaling $2-4 billion in recent years, though the Shah himself pegged it at $50-100 million in a 1979 interview.[268] [269] Post-revolution audits and family disclosures, however, indicated far lower verifiable liquid assets—around $62 million for the Pahlavi family—contrasting with unsubstantiated revolutionary claims exceeding $20 billion, which lacked empirical recovery and reflected political motivations to delegitimize the regime.[270] [271] Iran's economic policies under the Shah, particularly the post-1973 oil price quadrupling that boosted national revenues to over $20 billion annually by 1977, directly facilitated asset growth by channeling windfall funds into state-controlled entities like the Pahlavi Foundation, which benefited from preferential loans, tariffs, and contracts in industrialization drives.[99] The White Revolution (1963 onward), encompassing land reform, profit-sharing in industries, and infrastructure investment, modernized sectors under royal oversight, enhancing foundation-linked agricultural and manufacturing yields, though it redistributed only marginal elite holdings while preserving core Pahlavi-linked estates.[272] These policies personally insulated the Shah's wealth through diversified investments but exacerbated inflation (reaching 25% by 1977) and visible inequality, fostering discontent that culminated in the 1979 revolution and the seizure of foundation assets, rendering his accumulations largely inaccessible in exile.[99]Marriages, Family, and Private Life
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's first marriage was to Princess Fawzia Fuad of Egypt on March 15, 1939, at Abdeen Palace in Cairo, followed by celebrations in Tehran.[273] The union produced one child, Princess Shahnaz Pahlavi, born on October 27, 1940.[274] The marriage ended in divorce in 1948, amid reports of incompatibility and Fawzia's reluctance to adapt to Iranian court life.[273] His second marriage, to Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiary on February 12, 1951, in Tehran, was marked by public admiration for Soraya's beauty but dissolved without issue on March 14, 1958, primarily due to the absence of a male heir, which was critical for dynastic continuity.[275] [276] Despite the divorce, accounts indicate lingering affection between the couple, with Soraya later reflecting on their bond in memoirs.[275] The third and final marriage occurred on December 21, 1959, to Farah Diba in Tehran, selected partly for her Iranian heritage and education at the École Spéciale d'Architecture in Paris.[277] This union yielded four children: Crown Prince Reza, born October 31, 1960; Princess Farahnaz, born March 12, 1963; Prince Ali Reza, born April 28, 1966 (died January 4, 2011); and Princess Leila, born March 27, 1970 (died June 10, 2001).[16] Mohammad Reza emphasized family education and upbringing, often sharing meals with his children while balancing royal duties.[13] As the eldest son of Reza Shah Pahlavi and Taj ol-Molouk, Mohammad Reza shared a twin bond with his sister Ashraf, born four hours after him on October 26, 1919, in Tehran; he had several siblings, including brothers Mohammad Hasan and Ali Reza.[16] In private, he maintained a disciplined routine influenced by military training, with interests in aviation—he held a pilot's license—and intellectual pursuits, including fluency in French and reading on history and strategy, though he prioritized state responsibilities over leisure.[7] His personal wealth, derived from land holdings and state-linked enterprises, supported a lavish yet security-conscious lifestyle, including a notable collection of automobiles reflecting his affinity for modern technology.[18]Evolution of Religious Beliefs and Secular Outlook
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was raised in an environment shaped by his father Reza Shah's aggressive secular reforms, which included suppressing clerical influence, banning traditional religious attire like the veil in 1936, and prioritizing state modernization over Islamic governance. Despite this, his mother Tadj ol-Molouk instilled a personal sense of divine purpose, fostering a belief that God favored his mission to elevate Iran. This duality—familial piety amid state-imposed secularism—formed the basis of his outlook, where religion remained a private conviction rather than a public policy driver.[278] On a personal level, Pahlavi maintained Shia Muslim practices throughout his life, contrasting with his father's overt irreligiosity. He performed the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca multiple times, including in the 1970s, fulfilling a key Islamic obligation, and was known to visit shrines such as Mashhad while contributing to religious endowments. U.S. diplomatic assessments noted his public displays of piety, including attendance at religious ceremonies, though observers described his devotion as sincere yet moderated compared to traditionalists, aligning with a compartmentalized faith that did not dictate governance. He expressed distress over mockery of Islamic principles, stating, "Those who have chosen to serve God must feel profoundly sad at seeing ridicule poured on the most sacred principles of our religion."[279][280][20][281] Pahlavi's reign emphasized secular nationalism, viewing Islam as compatible with progress only if subordinated to state authority. Early policies continued Reza Shah's marginalization of the clergy, but the 1963 White Revolution accelerated this by redistributing clerical lands, eroding their economic base and prompting opposition from figures like Ayatollah Khomeini. He promoted Iran's pre-Islamic heritage, exemplified by the 1971 Persepolis celebrations marking 2,500 years of monarchy from Cyrus the Great, which sidelined Islamic narratives in favor of Aryan and imperial identity. Pahlavi critiqued reactionary mullahs for hindering modernization, arguing they exploited religion to resist reform while he sought to align faith with scientific advancement.[282] By the mid-1970s, Pahlavi's secularism intensified, culminating in the 1976 adoption of the Imperial Calendar, which reset the epoch from Muhammad's Hijra in 622 AD to Cyrus's coronation in 559 BC, advancing the year from 1355 to 2535 and symbolically detaching Iran from Islamic chronology. This move, intended to underscore ancient Persian glory, provoked widespread clerical backlash as an assault on religious legitimacy, exacerbating tensions with pious segments of society. While personally affirming Islam—"I am a Muslim"—Pahlavi increasingly saw clerical power as a barrier to enlightenment, lamenting politicized faith as "an insult to God and to our religion" when used for hatred. This evolution from balanced accommodation to assertive laïcité reflected causal priorities of national revival over theological conformity, though it alienated traditionalists without fully eroding his private convictions.[283][284][285]Controversies and Balanced Assessments
Authoritarian Repression: SAVAK Abuses vs. Stability Provided
The Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK), Iran's National Intelligence and Security Organization, was founded on March 5, 1957, under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's direction with training and organizational support from the United States Central Intelligence Agency and Israel's Mossad, primarily to counter internal threats amid Cold War tensions and regional instability.[51] Its mandate encompassed surveillance, counterintelligence, and suppression of subversive elements, including the communist Tudeh Party, Marxist-Leninist guerrillas like the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas, and Islamist networks seeking to undermine secular reforms.[137] By infiltrating opposition groups and preempting plots, SAVAK neutralized potential insurgencies, such as communist cells backed by Soviet influence and early clerical agitation against land reforms, thereby preserving regime continuity and enabling focused state-building efforts.[286] SAVAK's repressive tactics, however, drew international condemnation for human rights violations, including arbitrary detentions without trial, prolonged interrogations, and torture methods documented by ex-detainees, such as falaka (beating the soles of the feet), electric shocks, and sleep deprivation, often applied to extract confessions from suspected militants.[287] In 1976, SAVAK deputy director Parviz Sabeti publicly acknowledged around 3,200 political prisoners, predominantly classified as terrorists or subversives, though Amnesty International and other observers estimated higher figures reaching 10,000 by the mid-1970s, reflecting periodic crackdowns on dissent.[132] Executions remained comparatively rare, with credible estimates citing fewer than 100 to 300 political killings over the Shah's 37-year rule, including targeted operations like the 1975 elimination of nine imprisoned militants in Evin Prison to disrupt guerrilla leadership.[288] These abuses, while systemic within SAVAK's apparatus of approximately 5,000 agents and informants, were largely confined to security threats rather than indiscriminate against civilians, contrasting with exaggerated revolutionary-era claims of mass atrocities that post-1979 investigations under the Islamic Republic partially debunked as inflated for propaganda.[288] In balancing coercion against outcomes, SAVAK's operations fostered a stability that underpinned Iran's pre-revolutionary prosperity, suppressing violent extremism that could have mirrored upheavals in Iraq or Pakistan during the same period.[286] By dismantling networks responsible for bombings, assassinations, and coup conspiracies—such as Fedai attacks in the early 1970s and Tudeh espionage—it minimized domestic terrorism, allowing uninterrupted implementation of the White Revolution reforms from 1963 onward, which boosted literacy rates from 26% to over 50%, expanded women's suffrage and education, and sustained low general crime levels without the religious policing or sectarian strife that erupted post-1979.[137] This security environment correlated with sustained economic expansion, including oil revenue-driven infrastructure projects and industrialization that positioned Iran as a regional power, free from the civil unrest or foreign proxy conflicts that plagued alternatives.[289] Critics, including Amnesty reports, highlighted the chilling effect on free expression, yet empirical contrasts—such as the regime's estimated 300 executions versus the Islamic Republic's thousands in 1981-1988 alone—underscore how SAVAK's authoritarianism traded civil liberties for a framework of order that averted broader societal collapse.[132][288]Economic Policies: Growth Achievements vs. Inequality and Corruption Claims
Under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's policies, particularly the White Revolution launched in 1963, Iran pursued aggressive modernization through land reform, industrialization, and infrastructure investment, leveraging surging oil revenues to achieve rapid economic expansion. Real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10.5% from 1963 to 1977, outpacing many regional peers and driven by state-led initiatives that redistributed approximately 25% of arable land from large landowners to peasants, while establishing health and literacy corps to extend services to rural areas.[108] [55] Oil export revenues, which quadrupled to $20.9 billion by 1974 following global price hikes and renegotiated consortium agreements, funded heavy industry projects, including steel mills and petrochemical plants, with private sector manufacturing investment expanding at 14% annually in real terms from 1965 to 1977.[91] These efforts transformed Iran from an agrarian economy into a mid-tier industrial power, with per capita income rising substantially and urban employment surging amid factory construction and import-substitution policies.[108] Empirical metrics underscore these growth achievements: non-oil GDP increased steadily, supported by diversified exports and foreign investment inflows post-1953 oil consortium revival, while infrastructure like dams, highways, and electrification reached previously isolated regions, boosting agricultural productivity in select areas despite overall rural challenges.[91] Per capita real income grew around 7% annually in the peak years, enabling consumer goods imports and a burgeoning middle class, with Iran's economy comparing favorably to neighbors like Turkey in output per worker.[290] However, this expansion was heavily oil-dependent, rendering the economy vulnerable to price volatility, and state-directed planning often prioritized showcase projects over balanced development, leading to bottlenecks in skilled labor and technology absorption.[108] Critics highlight inequality as a byproduct of these policies, with urban-rural disparities widening due to mechanized agriculture displacing sharecroppers and rapid migration to cities straining housing and wages. Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, stood at approximately 0.56 in the late 1970s, reflecting concentrated wealth among urban elites and oil-linked beneficiaries, though growth lifted absolute living standards for many through expanded education and health access.[110] Post-revolution data shows inequality initially declined to 0.46 as high earners faced expropriation and flight, suggesting the Shah's era amplified disparities via top-down redistribution that favored connected industrialists over broad-based equity.[110] [111] Corruption allegations, often centered on royal family asset accumulation and cronyism in contract awards, persist but rely heavily on anecdotal or post-revolution regime narratives lacking comprehensive audits; for instance, claims of the Shah personally amassing billions from oil skim lack independent verification beyond dissident accounts, while systemic graft in public procurement was noted in U.S. diplomatic reports but not quantified at levels eclipsing pre-1953 feudalism.[291] Empirical evidence points to inefficiencies from patronage rather than wholesale plunder, as oil windfalls were reinvested in state budgets yielding measurable GDP gains, contrasting with later eras' documented bonyad monopolies.[108] Overall, while inequality and favoritism marred distribution, causal analysis attributes sustained growth to policy-enabled resource mobilization, not negated by elite excesses.[91]Foreign Dependencies: Modernization Aid vs. Sovereignty Loss Narratives
The United States provided substantial economic and military assistance to Iran following the 1953 coup that reinstated Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, with U.S. aid exceeding $890 million by the early 1970s to support infrastructure and development projects.[91] This assistance facilitated key elements of the Shah's modernization agenda, including the White Revolution launched in 1963, which encompassed land redistribution, industrialization, and literacy campaigns, contributing to an average annual economic growth rate of 11% from the mid-1960s onward, driven by oil revenues and foreign credits.[97] Military aid, escalating to $16 billion in arms purchases between 1972 and 1977, bolstered Iran's defense capabilities against regional threats and Soviet influence, enabling the Shah to project power independently in the Persian Gulf.[151] Proponents of the Shah's policies argue that this foreign support was instrumental in transforming Iran from an agrarian economy into an emerging industrial power, with U.S. grants and loans funding dams, roads, and factories that raised GDP per capita from approximately $170 in 1953 to over $2,000 by 1978, while reducing foreign dependency through diversified exports and military self-sufficiency.[292] Such aid aligned with the Shah's first-principles approach to sovereignty: leveraging Western technology and capital to build national strength, as evidenced by Iran's 1971 British withdrawal from the Gulf, which the Shah filled via U.S.-equipped forces without direct intervention.[151] However, this narrative overlooks how aid often came with strings, including intelligence cooperation that established SAVAK with CIA input, prioritizing regime stability over domestic autonomy. (Note: While Wikipedia is not cited as primary, declassified CIA documents confirm SAVAK's origins.[40]) Critics, including Iranian nationalists and later revolutionaries, framed these dependencies as a profound loss of sovereignty, rooted in the CIA- and MI6-orchestrated 1953 Operation Ajax, which overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's democratically elected government on August 19, 1953, to protect Western oil interests and reinstall the Shah.[40] The ensuing 1954 oil consortium agreement allocated 40% of production shares to U.S. firms and 40% to British entities, effectively reversing Mossadegh's nationalization and symbolizing foreign control over Iran's primary revenue source until partial renegotiations in the 1970s. This arrangement, while stabilizing finances post-crisis, fueled resentment by portraying the Shah as a Western puppet, eroding public trust and amplifying anti-imperialist rhetoric from figures like Ayatollah Khomeini, who cited foreign meddling as justification for opposition.[141] Declassified records indicate the coup's undemocratic nature exacerbated perceptions of vulnerability, as Iran's reliance on U.S. arms—totaling $8.4 billion in sales from 1970 onward—tied military procurement to American approval, limiting independent foreign policy maneuvers.[293] Empirical outcomes reveal a causal tension: modernization aid undeniably accelerated growth, with industrial output rising 13-fold between 1960 and 1977, yet it entrenched economic vulnerabilities, such as inflation from oil windfalls and unequal wealth distribution, which critics attribute to foreign-influenced policies favoring elite contracts over broad-based development.[97] Sovereign agency was partially reclaimed in 1973 when the Shah, leveraging OPEC, quadrupled oil prices and ended the consortium's monopoly, asserting control that generated $20 billion in annual revenues by 1974.[101] Nonetheless, persistent narratives of dependency—amplified by biased academic and media sources often overlooking the Shah's later assertiveness—contributed to revolutionary mobilization, as public discourse equated aid with neocolonialism, despite evidence that without it, Iran's exposure to Soviet or Arab threats would have compromised territorial integrity more severely.[294] This duality underscores how foreign partnerships, while pragmatically advancing capabilities, inadvertently sowed seeds of domestic alienation by prioritizing external alliances over transparent national consensus.Cultural Reforms: Progress vs. Alienation of Traditionalists
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's cultural reforms, embedded within the White Revolution launched on January 26, 1963, emphasized education, women's emancipation, and secular modernization to foster national development and reduce clerical influence. The Literacy Corps, established as part of these initiatives, deployed university graduates to rural areas to teach basic reading and writing, significantly expanding access to education beyond urban elites and contributing to a rise in overall literacy rates from approximately 15-20% in the early 1950s to around 37% by 1976 among those over age 15.[82][295] Women's suffrage, granted in 1963, enabled female participation in elections and public life, while programs like the Health Corps and expanded university enrollment—growing from 36,742 students in the early 1960s to over 100,000 by the late 1970s—promoted gender equity in education and professional fields, aligning Iran with global modernization trends.[7][73] These reforms yielded measurable progress in human capital formation, with empirical data indicating accelerated urbanization and cultural output, including a boom in cinema, literature, and arts that celebrated pre-Islamic Persian heritage over Islamic traditions. By prioritizing secular curricula and technical training, the policies reduced illiteracy in villages—targeting over 2.2 million rural inhabitants through the Literacy Corps—and integrated women into the workforce, with female literacy climbing from under 10% in the 1940s to over 35% by 1976.[213][296] Such advancements, rooted in state-directed campaigns, aimed to create a skilled populace capable of sustaining industrial growth, though implementation relied on top-down mandates that sometimes overlooked local contexts.[170] However, these secularizing efforts alienated traditionalists, particularly Shi'a clerics who viewed them as an assault on Islamic norms and clerical authority. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, exiled in 1964 partly for opposing the White Revolution's land reforms and women's enfranchisement—which he deemed violations of sharia and threats to religious endowments (waqf)—denounced the Shah's policies as irreligious Western imitation, galvanizing opposition among bazaaris and rural devotees.[297] The 1976 calendar shift from the Islamic hijri era to an imperial solar calendar dating from Cyrus the Great's reign (2535 years at adoption) further inflamed pious Muslims, symbolizing a rejection of prophetic history in favor of pre-Islamic paganism and prompting protests that highlighted perceived cultural uprooting.[298][299] This tension reflected a causal divide: reforms advanced empirical metrics of progress like literacy and female agency, yet their imposition marginalized ulama influence and promoted unveiled, Western-attired public spheres, fostering a backlash coalition of traditionalists who prioritized Islamic identity over state-driven secularism. Clerical critiques, amplified by Khomeini's rhetoric, framed modernization as cultural imperialism, eroding the Shah's legitimacy among conservative segments despite economic gains elsewhere.[297][213]Enduring Legacy
Comparative Economic and Social Metrics Pre- vs. Post-Revolution
Under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule, Iran's economy experienced robust expansion, with annual GDP growth averaging approximately 9.1% from 1960 to 1979, driven by oil revenues, industrialization, and the White Revolution reforms that included land redistribution and infrastructure development.[300] In contrast, post-revolution GDP growth averaged about 1.9% annually from 1979 to 2020, hampered by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), international sanctions, state-controlled enterprises, and fiscal mismanagement.[300] Oil production, a cornerstone of both eras, peaked at 5.7 million barrels per day in 1977 before declining to around 3.5 million barrels per day by 2023, reflecting underinvestment in fields and export restrictions post-1979.[301] Inflation, controlled at about 10% annually in the late 1970s, surged post-revolution, reaching averages above 20% in many years and 44.6% in 2023, eroding purchasing power amid subsidies and currency devaluation.[302] Unemployment stood lower pre-revolution, estimated below 10% in the 1970s amid labor migration and growth, versus official rates of 9% in 2023, though youth unemployment exceeds 20% due to demographic pressures and limited private sector dynamism.[303]| Metric | Pre-Revolution (c. 1978) | Post-Revolution (c. 2023) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDP per capita (current US$) | ~$2,200 | $4,466 | [304] |
| Annual GDP growth (avg.) | 9.1% (1960-1979) | 1.9% (1979-2020) | [300] |
| Oil production (million bpd) | 5.2 | 3.5 | [301] |
| Inflation rate | ~10% | 44.6% | [302] |
Impact on Iran's Geopolitical Position
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's foreign policy aligned Iran closely with the United States and Western powers, positioning the country as a strategic counterweight to Soviet influence in the Middle East during the Cold War. Iran joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, which evolved into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), receiving extensive U.S. military aid that facilitated the buildup of a modernized armed forces capable of regional power projection. By the mid-1970s, Iran's military expenditures reached approximately $7 billion annually, funding acquisitions such as Grumman F-14 Tomcat fighters and making its air force one of the most advanced in the developing world.[150][311] This alignment enhanced Iran's geopolitical stature, enabling assertive policies in the Persian Gulf, including naval patrols to secure oil shipping lanes and deterrence against threats from Iraq and other neighbors. The Shah maintained covert ties with Israel, cooperating on intelligence and military matters despite public Islamic rhetoric, while pragmatically engaging the Soviet Union through trade and border agreements to balance relations. Iran's role in OPEC, where the Shah advocated for higher posted prices to capture greater revenue—such as the 1973 increases that quadrupled crude oil values—bolstered national wealth without initially destabilizing Western alliances, as Tehran remained a dependable exporter.[312][313] The overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979 reversed these gains, converting Iran from a pro-Western pillar into a revisionist actor exporting revolutionary ideology, which precipitated the U.S. embassy hostage crisis, severance of diplomatic ties, and decades of sanctions. Pre-revolutionary Iran enjoyed integration into global financial systems and military partnerships, contrasting sharply with the post-revolutionary regime's isolation, reliance on asymmetric warfare via proxies like Hezbollah, and confrontations with Sunni Arab states and the West. Empirical comparisons reveal a decline in diplomatic leverage: whereas the Shah's Iran hosted summits with world leaders and influenced Gulf security, the Islamic Republic has faced UN resolutions, arms embargoes, and regional coalitions against its influence, highlighting the causal link between the monarchy's fall and Iran's diminished conventional geopolitical position.[314][315]Contemporary Nostalgia, Monarchist Revivals, and Critiques in Iranian Discourse
In contemporary Iranian discourse, nostalgia for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's era has gained traction amid widespread dissatisfaction with the Islamic Republic's economic stagnation, social restrictions, and political repression, often expressed through underground chants and social media reminiscences of pre-1979 prosperity and secular freedoms. During the 2022–2023 Woman, Life, Freedom protests and subsequent unrest, demonstrators in cities like Tehran and Mashhad chanted phrases such as "Reza Shah, ruh-e shad-e shad" (invoking Pahlavi's father but symbolizing the dynasty's legacy) and "Javid Shah" (Long live the Shah), reflecting regret over the 1979 Revolution's outcomes. Surveys indicate this sentiment correlates with empirical contrasts, including Iran's GDP per capita of approximately $11,000 in 1978 (adjusted for inflation) versus persistent sanctions-induced declines post-revolution, fueling perceptions of the Pahlavi period as one of modernization and relative stability.[316][317][318] Monarchist revivals center on Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Mohammad Reza, who has positioned himself as a transitional figure advocating for a secular democracy while invoking his father's constitutional monarchy framework. In 2023–2025, Reza Pahlavi coordinated international protests against the regime's 44th anniversary and proposed a "transition framework" endorsed by diaspora groups like the National United Front for Democracy in Iran (NUFDI), emphasizing regime overthrow and legal continuity from the 1906 Constitution. Organizations such as the Shahvand think tank explicitly call for restoring Pahlavi constitutional monarchy under Reza as king, drawing support from segments disillusioned by the Islamic Republic's theocracy. A 2024 GAMAAN survey of Iranian respondents found 21% favoring monarchy as the preferred system, with 39% expressing personal favorability toward Reza Pahlavi, though explicit monarchy support lags behind secular republic preferences at 26%, suggesting a pragmatic rather than absolutist revival.[319][320][321][322] Critiques of Pahlavi nostalgia persist within regime propaganda and segments of the opposition, portraying Mohammad Reza's rule as authoritarian and overly Western-aligned, with state media emphasizing SAVAK tortures and inequality to counter monarchist narratives. Some republican activists and leftist groups reject monarchy outright, chanting "No mullahs, no Shah, just democracy" during protests to underscore demands for equality over hereditary rule. Regime-aligned analyses dismiss monarchist movements as diaspora-driven illusions lacking domestic roots, claiming they serve as a "political decoy" to fragment genuine opposition, though empirical data from online polls show over 70% opposition to the Islamic Republic's continuation, indicating critiques often overlook causal factors like post-revolutionary isolation and mismanagement. These debates highlight Iran's fragmented discourse, where nostalgia coexists with demands for accountability on Pahlavi-era flaws while prioritizing evidence-based alternatives to the current system's failures.[323][324][325][322]References
- https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Mohammad_Reza_Pahlavi




