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Geopolitik
Geopolitik
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Geopolitik was a German school of geopolitics which existed between the late 19th century and World War II.

It developed from the writings of various European and American philosophers, geographers and military personnel, including Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), Alexander Humboldt (1769–1859), Karl Ritter (1779–1859), Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914), Homer Lea (1876–1912), Halford Mackinder (1861–1947) and Karl Haushofer (1869–1946). The ideology of Adolf Hitler adapted, and eventually incorporated some of its tenets.

The defining characteristic of Geopolitik is the inclusion of organic state theory, informed by social Darwinism. It was characterized by clash of civilizations-style theorizing. It is perhaps the closest of any school of geostrategy to a purely nationalistic conception of geostrategy, which ended up masking other more universal elements.

Germany acted as a revisionist state within the international system during both World Wars by attempting to overthrow British domination, and to counter what it saw as rising US and Russian hegemony. As a latecomer to nationhood proper, lacking colonies or reserved markets for industrial output but also experiencing rapid population growth, Germany desired a more equitable distribution of wealth and territory within the international system. Some modern scholars have begun to treat the two World Wars, participated in by Germany, as a single war (1914–1945) in which the revisionist Germany attempted to bid for hegemonic control with which to reorder the international system.[1]

German foreign policy was largely consistent in both wars. The foreign policy of Nazi Germany (1933–1945) was unique insofar as it learned from what it saw as past imperial mistakes but essentially followed the very same designs laid out by German Geopolitik in the historical record of the German Empire.

Geopolitik rises

[edit]

German geopolitik contributed to Nazi foreign policy chiefly in the strategy and justifications for Lebensraum. It contributed five ideas to German foreign policy in the interwar period: the organic state; lebensraum; autarky; pan-regions and the land power/sea power dichotomy.

Geostrategy as a political science is both descriptive and analytical like political geography but adds a normative element in its strategic prescriptions for national policy.[2] While it stems from earlier US and British geostrategy, German geopolitik adopts an essentialist outlook toward the national interest, oversimplifying issues and representing itself as a panacea.[3] As a new and essentialist ideology, geopolitik found itself in a position to prey upon the post–World War I insecurity of the populace.[4]

In 1919, General Karl Haushofer would become professor of geography at the University of Munich. That would serve as a platform for the spread of his geopolitical ideas, magazine articles and books. By 1924, as the leader of the German geopolitik school of thought, Haushofer would establish the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik monthly, devoted to geopolitik. His ideas would reach a wider audience with the publication of Volk ohne Raum by Hans Grimm in 1926, popularizing his concept of lebensraum.[5] Haushofer exercised influence both through his academic teachings, urging his students to think in terms of continents and emphasizing motion in international politics, and through his political activities.[6] While Hitler's speeches would attract the masses, Haushofer's works served to bring the remaining intellectuals into the fold.[7]

Geopolitik was in essence a consolidation and codification of older ideas, given a scientific gloss:

The key reorientation in each dyad is that the focus is on land-based empire rather than naval imperialism.

Ostensibly based upon the geopolitical theory of US naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, and British geographer Halford J. Mackinder, German geopolitik adds older German ideas. Enunciated most forcefully by Friedrich Ratzel and his Swedish student Rudolf Kjellén, they include an organic or anthropomorphized conception of the state, and the need for self-sufficiency through the top-down organisation of society.[4] The root of uniquely German geopolitik rests in the writings of Karl Ritter who first developed the organic conception of the state that would later be elaborated upon by Ratzel and accepted by Hausfhofer. He justified Lebensraum, even at the cost of other nations' existence, because conquest was a biological necessity for a state's growth.[9]

Friedrich Ratzel

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Friedrich Ratzel

Ratzel's writings coincided with the growth of German industrialism after the Franco-Prussian war and the subsequent search for markets that brought it into competition with England. His writings served as welcome justification for imperial expansion.[10] Influenced by Mahan, Ratzel wrote of aspirations for German naval reach, agreeing that sea power was self-sustaining, as the profit from trade would pay for the merchant marine, unlike land power.[11] Haushofer was exposed to Ratzel, who was friends with Haushofer's father, a teacher of economic geography,[12] and would integrate Ratzel's ideas on the division between sea and land powers into his theories by saying that only a country with both could overcome the conflict.[13] Here, Hitler diverged with Haushofer's writings in consigning Germany to sole pursuit of land power.

Ratzel's key contribution was the expansion on the biological conception of geography, without a static conception of borders. States are instead organic and growing, with borders representing only a temporary stop in their movement.[14] It is not the state proper that is the organism but the land in its spiritual bond with the people who draw sustenance from it.[15] The expanse of a state's borders is a reflection of the health of the nation.[16] Haushofer adopts the view that borders are largely insignificant in his writings, especially as the nation ought to be in a frequent state of struggle with those around it.[17]

Ratzel's idea of Raum would grow out of his organic state conception. The early Lebensraum was not political or economic but spiritual and racial nationalist expansion.[18] The Raum-motiv is a historically driving force, pushing peoples with great Kultur to naturally expand.[19] Space for Ratzel was a vague concept, theoretically unbounded just as was Hitler's. Raum was defined by where German people live, where other inferior states could serve to support German people economically and German culture could fertilise other cultures.[20] Haushofer would adopt that conception of Raum as the central program for German geopolitik, and Hitler's policy would reflect the spiritual and cultural drive to expansion.

Rudolph Kjellén

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Rudolph Kjellén was Ratzel's Swedish student who would further elaborate on organic state theory and first coined the term "geopolitics".[21] Kjellén's State as a Form of Life would outline five key concepts that would shape German geopolitik.[22]

  • Reich was a territorial concept that comprised Raum, Lebensraum, and strategic military shape.[23]
  • Volk was a racial conception of the state.[23]
  • Haushalt was a call for autarky based on land, formulated in reaction to the vicissitudes of international markets.[24]
  • Gesellschaft was the social aspect of a nation's organization and cultural appeal,[25] Kjellén going further than Ratzel in his anthropomorphic view of states relative to each other.[26] And finally,
  • Regierung was the form of government whose bureaucracy and army would contribute to the people's pacification and coordination.[27]

Kjellén disputed the solely legalistic characterization of states by arguing that state and society are not opposites but rather a synthesis of the two elements. The state had a responsibility for law and order but also for social welfare/progress, and economic welfare/progress.[28]

Autarky, for Kjellén, was a solution to a political problem, not an economic policy proper. Dependence on imports would mean that a country would never be independent. Territory would provide for internal production. For Germany, Central and Southeastern Europe were key, along with the Near East and Africa. Haushofer was not interested in economic policy, but advocated autarky as well; a nation constantly in struggle would demand self-sufficiency.[29]

Haushofer's contribution

[edit]

Haushofer's geopolitik expands upon that of Ratzel and Kjellén. While the latter two conceive of geopolitik as the state as an organism in space put to the service of a leader, Haushofer's Munich school specifically studies geography as it relates to war and designs for empire.[30] The behavioral rules of previous geopoliticians were thus turned into dynamic normative doctrines for action on lebensraum and world power.[31]

Haushofer defined geopolitik in 1935 as "the duty to safeguard the right to the soil, to the land in the widest sense, not only the land within the frontiers of the Reich but also the right to the more extensive Volk and cultural lands".[32] Culture itself was seen as the most conducive element to dynamic special expansion. It provided a guide as to the best areas for expansion and could make expansion safe, but projected military or commercial power could not.[33] Haushofer even held that urbanisation was a symptom of a nation's decline by giving evidence of a decreasing soil mastery, birth rate and effectiveness of centralized rule.[34]

To Haushofer, the existence of a state depended on living space, the pursuit of which must serve as the basis for all policies. Germany had a high population density, but old colonial powers had a much lower density, a virtual mandate for German expansion into resource-rich areas.[35] Space was seen as military protection against initial assaults from hostile neighbors with long-range weaponry. A buffer zone of territories or insignificant states on one's borders would serve to protect Germany.[36] Closely linked to that need was Haushofer's assertion that the existence of small states was evidence of political regression and disorder in the international system. The small states surrounding Germany ought to be brought into the vital German order.[37] These states were seen as being too small to maintain practical autonomy even if they maintained large colonial possessions and would be better served by protection and organization within Germany. In Europe, he saw Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Switzerland, Greece and the "mutilated alliance" of Austria-Hungary as supporting his assertion.[38]

Haushofer's version of autarky was based on the quasi-Malthusian idea that the earth would become saturated with people and no longer able to provide food for all. There would essentially be no increases in productivity.[39]

Haushofer and the Munich school of geopolitik would eventually expand their conception of lebensraum and autarky well past the borders of 1914 and "a place in the sun" to a New European Order and then to a New Afro-European Order and eventually to a Eurasian Order.[40] That concept became known as a pan-region, taken from the Monroe Doctrine, and the idea of national and continental self-sufficiency.[41] It was a forward-looking refashioning of the drive for colonies, something that geopoliticians did not see as an economic necessity but more as a matter of prestige and putting pressure on older colonial powers. The fundamental motivating force would be not economic but cultural and spiritual.[42]

Beyond being an economic concept, pan-regions were a strategic concept as well. Haushofer acknowledges the strategic concept of the Heartland, put forward by the British geopolitician Halford Mackinder.[43] If Germany could control Eastern Europe and subsequently Russian territory, it could control a strategic area to which hostile seapower could be denied.[44] Allying with Italy and Japan would further augment German strategic control of Eurasia, with those states becoming the naval arms protecting Germany's insular position.[45]

Contacts with Nazi leadership

[edit]

Evidence points to a disconnect between geopoliticians and the Nazi leadership, although their practical tactical goals were nearly indistinguishable.[7]

Rudolf Hess, Hitler's secretary who would assist in the writing of Mein Kampf, was a close student of Haushofer's. While Hess and Hitler were imprisoned after the Munich Putsch in 1923, Haushofer spent six hours visiting the two, bringing along a copy of Friedrich Ratzel's Political Geography and Carl von Clausewitz's Vom Kriege.[46] After World War II, Haushofer would deny that he had taught Hitler, and claimed that the National Socialist party perverted Hess's study of geopolitik. He viewed Hitler as a half-educated man who never correctly understood the principles of geopolitik passed onto him by Hess, and Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop as the principle distorter of geopolitik in Hitler's mind.[47] While Haushofer accompanies Hess on numerous propaganda missions, and participated in consultations between Nazis and Japanese leaders, he claimed that Hitler and the Nazis only seized upon half-developed ideas and catchwords.[48] Furthermore, the Nazi party and government lacked any official organ that was receptive to geopolitik, leading to selective adoption and poor interpretation of Haushofer's theories. Ultimately, Hess and Von Neurath, Nazi Minister of Foreign Affairs, were the only officials Haushofer judged to have had a proper understanding of geopolitik.[49]

Father Edmund A. Walsh S.J., professor of geopolitics and dean at Georgetown University, who interviewed Haushofer after the allied victory in preparation for the Nuremberg trials, disagreed with Haushofer's assessment that geopolitik was terribly distorted by Hitler and the Nazis.[3] He cites Hitler's speeches declaring that small states have no right to exist and the Nazi use of Haushofer's maps, language and arguments. Even if distorted somewhat, Fr. Walsh felt that was enough to implicate Haushofer's geopolitik.[50]

Haushofer also denied assisting Hitler in writing Mein Kampf, saying that he knew of it only once it was in print and never read it.[51] Fr. Walsh found that even if Haushofer did not directly assist Hitler, discernible new elements appeared in Mein Kampf, as compared to previous speeches made by Hitler. Geopolitical ideas of lebensraum, space for depth of defense, appeals for natural frontiers, balancing land and seapower, and geographic analysis of military strategy entered Hitler's thought between his imprisonment and publishing of Mein Kampf.[3] Chapter XIV, on German policy in Eastern Europe, in particular displays the influence of the materials Haushofer brought Hitler and Hess while they were imprisoned.[52]

Haushofer was never an ardent Nazi, and did voice disagreements with the party, leading to his brief imprisonment. He did profess loyalty to the Führer and make anti-Semitic remarks on occasion. However, his emphasis was always on space over race.[53] He refused to associate himself with anti-Semitism as a policy, especially because his wife was half-Jewish.[54] Haushofer admits that after 1933 much of what he wrote was distorted under duress: his wife had to be protected by Hess's influence; his son was murdered by the Gestapo; he himself was imprisoned in Dachau for eight months; and his son and grandson were imprisoned for two-and-a-half months.[55]

Hitler's geostrategy

[edit]

The name "National Socialism" itself describes the fundamental orientation of Hitler's foreign policy. The nation, as a concept, was historically used almost interchangeably with race or ethnicity. Even under the legalistic framework of the League of Nations for European state relations, states had been drawn upon ethnically determined boundaries, following the tenets of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points speech.[56] The first priority of the National Socialists was to focus on the racial aspects of foreign policy. Socialism, on the other hand, is focused on the equitable distribution and redistribution of material goods within an economic system. As a latecomer to nationhood proper and industrialization, Germany was far behind other older colonial powers in the acquisition of territory abroad. Burdened with a burgeoning population, Germany had lagging ability to raise agricultural production to meet food demands, compete in markets for industrial goods, obtain cheap sources of raw materials, and find an acceptable outlet for emigration. National Socialist foreign policy thus focused on what they perceived as a more equitable international redistribution of material resources and markets.[57]

Hitler's foreign policy strategy can be divided into two main concepts: race and space. In 1928, Hitler dictated the text of a follow-up text to Mein Kampf focused on the elaboration of the foreign policy concepts he had previously set forth.[58] Unedited and unpublished, it allows a clearer picture of Hitler's thoughts than the edited and revised Mein Kampf or his populist and over-simplified speeches. There is a lack of development or major shifts in his worldview between the 1926 volume and his assumption of power in 1933, supporting the idea that Hitler was not a foreign policy opportunist but that his ideas were specific and formed before he had the power to implement his designs.[59]

Hitler outlined eight principles and four goals that were to guide his foreign policy. The principles were concerned with the German military, the League of Nations and the situation with France. Hitler's first concern was the reinvigoration of the German military without which all other aims could not be achieved. The League of Nations was a prohibitive factor in the development and change of Germany because those with influence in the League were the same states that had demanded Germany's crippling.[60] Germany could not hope for allies found outside the League but only discontented states that would be willing to break away. They would not be willing to leave unless Germany established a clear and articulated foreign policy, with clear costs and consequences, which the others could then follow. He cautions, however, that Germany cannot rely upon inferior allies, undesirable either by dint of their race or past military weakness.[61] France and the containment alliance it led against Germany could not be challenged without the strong military that Hitler envisioned and a decisive preemptive strike.[60] He recognized that no matter what path Germany takes to regain its strength, France would always assist or even lead a coalition against it.[62]

Hitler's goals for Nazi foreign policy were more straightforward, focusing on German space rather than the strictly racial aspects of his policy. His designs are meant to give Germany the focus that it lacked in the previous thirty-five years of "aimlessness.".[63] He calls for a clear foreign policy of space, not international trade or industry. The concept of Lebensraum in the East overrided any perceived need for naval power, which would only bring Germany into conflict with England and Italy. Industrial exports and trade would require a merchant marine force, meeting most directly with the enmity of England, and France its willing ally. Therefore, land expansion was Hitler's primary goal, eschewing the borders of 1914; he calls them nationally inadequate, militarily unsatisfactory, ethnically impossible, and insane when considered in light of Germany's opposition in Europe.[64]

Race

[edit]

While the goals and principles Hitler enunciated were primarily focused on the redistribution of space, they grew out of his focus on race. By 1923, Hitler had outlined his basic ideas on race. According to Hitler, the Jews had betrayed Germany in World War I, which necessitated a domestic revolution to remove them from power. He saw history as governed by the racial aspects of society, both internal and national. In his mind, a vulgarized sort of Social Darwinism determined the rise and fall of civilizations.[65] The world was composed not of states but of competing races of different values,[66] and politics was fundamentally a struggle led by those with the greatest capacity for organization, a characteristic held by Germanic peoples more than any other.[67] Nations of pure and strong racial makeup would eventually prosper over those with ideas of racial equality: France is condemned in this regard because of its acceptance of blacks and the use of black units in World War I against German troops. Acceptance of inferior races is intimately connected to the Jewish menace and its threat to the strength of the Germanic race.[68]

The vital strength of a race and its will to survive were the most important conditions which would lead to a resurgence of Germany despite its lack of resources and materiel.[69] The re-establishment of a truly nationalist German army, free from the hired mercenaries of the imperial era, was Hitler's first goal.[70] With the threat or use of force, Germany would be able to move forward in achieving its goals for space. Thus, he implemented the Four Year Plan in order to overcome internal obstacles to military growth. A German army of considerable size would push its neighbors into conciliation and negotiation without the need for actual military adventures.[71] In justifying the need for decisive military action, Hitler cites a lesson from World War I: those that are neutral gain a little in trade but lose their seat at the victor's table and thus their right to decide the structure of the peace to follow. He thus renounced neutrality and committed his country to taking vital risks that would lead to greater gains.[72]

Space

[edit]

Hitler's racial ideas were indirectly expressed in his concept of space for German foreign policy.[68] Space was not a global concept in the same way that older imperial states conceived of it, with their massive colonial empires dividing up the world abroad. Hitler saw value in only adjacent and agriculturally viable land, not in trade and industry outlets that required a maritime orientation. He had no faith in increasing productivity, thus leading to the need to expand within Europe.[73] Lebensraum for Germany required moving beyond the "arbitrary" goal of the border of 1914, expanding into the East and adopting policies toward the Western European nations, Great Powers, and treaty arrangements, which would facilitate this land redistribution.

A lack of space for a race's growth would lead to its decay through degenerate population control methods and dependence upon other nations' imports.[73] Expansion is directly correlated to the race's vitality, space allowing for larger families that would repopulate the nation from the losses it incurs fighting wars for territory. Where Hitler's expansionism differed most from that of imperial nations was his idea of racial purity, which required driving out or exterminating the native populations of any conquered territory.[74] Industry and trade were only transient solutions, subject to the vicissitudes of the market, likely leading to war as economic competition escalates.[75] Lebensraum was thus the only permanent solution for securing the German race's vitality.[76] Colonies would take far too long to solve the Reich's agriculture and space problem; furthermore, they constitute a naval and industrial policy rather than a land-based agricultural policy, which is where Germany's strength lies.[77] Thus, Hitler committed Germany to a role as a land power rather than a sea power and focused his foreign policy on attaining the highest possible concentration of land power resources for a future that lay in Europe.[78]

The racial struggle for space envisioned by Hitler was essentially unlimited, a policy that could only have two results: total defeat or total conquest. Hess discovered in 1927, while the two were imprisoned at Landsberg prison, that Hitler believed only one race with total hegemony could bring about world peace.[79] Hitler confirmed this attitude, regarding Europe specifically, in August 1943 speaking to his naval advisors and declaring, "Only if all of Europe is united under a strong central power can there be any security for Europe from now on. Small sovereign states no longer have a right to exist".[32] In Mein Kampf, Hitler states his view that the total (but, as he saw it, temporary) destruction of civilization was, to him, an acceptable condition of final Aryan victory.

Lebensraum as a foreign policy concept was based upon domestic considerations, especially that of population growth and the pressure it placed upon existing German resources. War, for Lebensraum, was justified by the need to re-establish an acceptable ratio between land and people.[80] Whereas the Weimar Republic foreign policy was based on borders, the National Socialist foreign policy would be based on space and expansionism and point to fundamentally different conceptions of world order: the bourgeois saw in terms of states and law, but Hitler maintained an image of ethnic or racially defined nationhood.[81] Lebensraum served to create the economic condition of autarky in which the German people would be self-sufficient, no longer dependent on import or subject to demand shifts in international markets, which had been forcing industry to struggle against other nations.[82]

To achieve Lebensraum, Hitler cautioned against what he saw as a dangerous Weimar policy of demanding a return to the 1914 borders. Foremost and inexcusable in his mind, the borders would not unite all ethnic Germans under the Reich.[83] To commit to a nation of all German-speaking peoples, the borders of 1914 must be abandoned as incompatible with racial unity and their arbitrary nature.[84] Open advocacy of border restoration would only urge a coalition to form against Germany before it could raise an army to achieve its ends.[85] Further, he believed that empty saber rattling on this issue would shift public opinion against Germany in support of France's anti-German measures, and even if it was achieved, it would guarantee only instability without achieving the racial goals that he sees as so central to German vitality.[86]

The doctrine of space focused on Eastern Europe, taking territory from the ethnically inferior Slavs.[87] While Western European nations were despised for allowing racial impurity, they were still essentially Aryan nations, but the small and weak Slavic nations to the East were legitimate targets. In talking to the Associated Press, Hitler commented that if Germany acquired Ukraine, Urals and territory into the heartland of Siberia, it would be able to have surplus prosperity.[57] Thus, Germany would have to be concerned about the newly independent states to the East, sitting between Germany and its goal of Russian territory. Such states, especially the reconstituted Poland, were viewed as Saisonstaat, or states that exist for no enduring reason.[88] No alliance with Russia would be possible either because of German designs on Eastern territory.[89] Still, Hitler maintained faith that if Germany were to make clear its aspirations for space in the inferior East, the Great Powers in Europe would not intervene, with the possible exception of France.[78]

Race contra space

[edit]

Hitler's persistence to ally with Britain and conquer Russia marks radical difference with geopolitik which overwhelmingly designed a Eurasian continental combination between Germany, Russia and Japan.[90] Some of them have repeatedly expressed their hope that the Soviet Union would only stay out of the impending war. Others, including the Munich geopolitical school of Haushofer, sought not just neutrality of the Soviet Union but a military alliance with it.[91][92][93] Endorsing the “prophetic statements” of Homer Lea and Mackinder, the "Haushoferites" proudly proclaim that such a combination of land Powers would certainly “liberate” not only Eurasia but the entire Western Pacific region from “hateful Anglo-American hegemony.”[94]

Three famous contemporary observers noted in 1942 that in the past year Hitler had "sharply" departed from Haushofer's doctrine.[95] “The German attack upon Russia in 1941 ended the hope of voluntary cooperation between the two nations feared by Mackinder and hoped by Haushofer.”[96] “But neither Germany nor Japan listened to their would-be mentor. On June 22, 1941, Haushofer's dreams were smashed by another dreamer of the Bavarian mountains.”[97] For Hans Weigert, Barbarossa marked the break between Haushoferism and Hitlerism, with Hitler deliberately ignoring advice of his would-be mentor.[98] Barbarossa, wrote John O'Loughlin, completely contradicted the argument of Haushofer about mutually beneficial Continental bloc between Germany and the Soviet Union and represented a decisive political event demonstrating that the Nazis used geopolitics only as the tool of propaganda but not as science defining their politics.[99]

A British banker with headquarters in Berlin, Eric Archdeacon, traced down the payments from German industry and discovered that they went to the Munich Institute fur Geopolitik, run by Haushofer. The institute, it was reported, sent many field expeditions all over the world to collect geopolitical data. “At Munich this data was worked out by a staff estimated at 1000 experts and much of it found its way into Institute’s Journal, Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik.”[100] This report led to the famous article in Reader's Digest, “The Thousand Scientists behind Hitler,” published in 1941. Those hypothetical “Thousand” were concentrated at the hypothetical Munich Institute of Geopolitik headed by Haushofer. This was the supposed significance of the geopolitik research for the Nazis. After the War, instead of the institute, the Allies found only Haushofer's cabinet and the Professor himself, assisted by his wife.[101] “It is nicely ironic" that the article appeared on virtually the same time that Hitler invaded Russia, a country with which Haushofer in his writings had consistently advocated peace and alliance.[101]

There is no doubt, wrote Mackinder's biographer William Parker, that Haushofer adopted Mackinder's ideas, but there is no direct evidence to prove that Hitler adopted Haushofer's ideas.[91] Hitler's reaction on Rapallo Treaty (1922) between Germany and Russia was negative,[102] while Haushofer's positive.[103] The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, it was asserted, marked the triumph of geopolitik over the racist school.[104] Geopolitik cannot adequately explain Hitler's decision of Barbarossa and Hitler's racial ideology must be taken into account as a determining factor.[105]

A passage in Mein Kampf states: “This colossal empire in the east is ripe for dissolution … We have been chosen by Fate to be the witnesses of a catastrophe which will be the strongest confirmation of the soundness of the nationalist theory of race.”[106][107] The evidence suggests that Hitler framed his decision to invade Russia not in geopolitik terms but in racial ones.[108] Barbarossa contradicted the logic of Haushofer's whole position.[109] Geopolitical concepts and terms did not provide some sort of blueprint for Hitler's war. Hitler's ethnic hatred of Jews and Slavs had nothing to do with geopolitik. There is little evidence of a global geopolitical blueprint derived from Mackinder's work underlying his ambition. "Hitler’s decision to turn on Russia in 1941 clearly violated the precepts of geopolitik as propounded by Haushofer and derived from Mackinder."[92]

Geopolitik, as Kjellen and Ratzel founded, was imbued with scientific materialism and environmental determinism. National Socialism took a fundamental inspiration that runs directly and explicitly counter to this approach: the anti-rationalist, anti-materialist, “volkish” one. Through stressing the primary importance of inherited genetic qualities and immutability of races, environmental conditions become logically irrelevant. The character of society and the individual was neither determined, nor even influenced by the physical environment, but was entirely pre-determined through racial inheritance. By infusing the Volk with racial qualities, emphasis was moved from external influence to innate, inherited biological qualities which were supreme and could not be affected through environmental factors. This radical difference laid the groundwork for conflict between geopolitics and National Socialism.[110]

After the Nazis came to power in 1933, their divergences with geopolitik became increasingly problematic, and resulted in official attacks upon geopolitik. A minor party functionary, Wilhelm Seddin, published an article in 1936 entitled “The Mistaken Ways of “Geopolitics' as a View.”[111] The next year, publisher of the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, Kurt Vowinckel, had to write to Haushofer that there was a lot of criticism and distrust of geopolitik emanating from several party and state departments, including the pro-Russian attitude and overemphasis on the influence of space that neglects the race doctrine.[112]

In the contest race contra space, Hitler was more influenced by race, while Haushofer by space. Haushofer's biographer, Andreas Dorpalen, distinguished between the uncultured elements of the Nazi Party, with their racial doctrines, and the cultural Professor, who firmly holds that “space rather than race is the touchstone of mankind’s destiny.”[113] Regarding the policy towards Russia, Haushofer advised: The worse the situation appears, the more reason for Germany "to think in global terms without regard for mistaken racial prejudices.”[114] "The editors of Zeitshcrift fur Geopolitik had stubbornly advocated the reconciliation and friendship with Russia from the beginning, and Hitler's noisy crusade against the arch-enemy, Bolshevism, made no impression on them.”[115]

Hitler held the opposite view, based on the racial superiority of the Germans.[116] Haushofer's geopolitics, concludes another historian, provided neither the model nor the inspiration for Hitler's campaign and the disparity between the two men's political philosophies should not be underestimated. Hitler downgraded geopolitical terms in favor of racial. There “is no substance in the claim that the geopoliticians helped … to determine the goals of Hitler’s foreign policy. Hitler merely utilized geopolitical arguments to reinforce his own predetermined schemes.” Ultimately, he found the racial concept regarding Russia more convincing than geopolitical assessments of the value of future German-Russian collaboration.[117]

The racial doctrines that defined so much of the Nazi ideology were ultimately incompatible with the environmental determinism and materialism of geopolitik. This incompatibility influenced the demise of the geopolitik.[118] Haushofer himself continued to lose favor, and by the end of the 1930s some of his work was banned. At last, Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik was suspended by the Nazi regime.[119] Thus, concludes Mark Bassin his "Race contra space," it is clear that, despite all intentions, geopolitik did not play the role of state science under the Nazis and could not have done so. The “familiar and unbridgeable opposition between race and environment remained dominant.”[120] Hitler paid homage by kissing the hand of a dying racialist Philosopher, Houston Stuart Chamberlain,[121] but he did not even see Haushofer since 1938.[122]

The founder of the Paneuropean Union, Hitler's compatriot Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, had years-long personal contact with Haushofer, who described Hitler “as a typical product of half-education.” Coudenhove-Kalergi remembered that in his Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik Haushofer had always found room for a friendly word about Pan-Europe which seemed to him to accord with his own ideas.”[123] For Hitler, by contrast, his Austrian compatriot was just a “cosmopolitan bastard.”[124]

Great Power relationships

[edit]

Because of French opposition, it was crucial for Germany's plans to defeat France before moving against the states in the East and Russia.[125] As France was an ally of Poland and Yugoslavia, a supporter of racial equality and a constant opponent of German designs, action against France was deemed the highest priority in allowing German designs to come to fruition. By allying with states hostile to France and its coalition, Germany's military first strike would be quickly successful.[126]

Britain was supposed to be Germany's natural ally, according to Hitler. It maintained good relations with Italy and shared key German interests, the foremost of which was that neither country desired a French continental hegemon.[127] Since Hitler had decided to abandon Germany's naval power, trade and colonial ambitions, he believed that the British would be likely to ally with Germany against France, which still maintained conflicting interests with Britain. Because Russia threatened British interests in Middle Eastern oil and India, action against Russia ought to also find German and Britain on the same side.[128]

Italy would serve as Germany's other natural ally. Hitler perceived that their interests as being far enough apart that they would not come into conflict.[129] Germany was concerned primarily with Eastern Europe, and Italy's natural domain was the Mediterranean. Still, their divergent interests both led them into conflict with France. Ideological ties were supposed to ease their relations, providing something more than simply shared interests to bind them together.[130] The major sticking point between the two countries was the province of South Tyrol. Hitler believed, incorrectly in retrospect, that if he were to cede the territory, Italy would drop its objections to the Anschluss.[131]

Hitler repeatedly stressed another long term fear, apparently driving his desire for German economic domination of European resources, which was the rise of the United States of America as a great power. Underlining his lack of faith in the ability to increase agricultural or industrial productivity, he cites America's vast size as the reason that economic policy will fail, and expansionism can be the only route for Germany.[132] He rejects popular conceptions of a Pan-European economic union designed to counter American economic power by saying that life is not measured by quantity of material goods but by the quality of a nation's race and organization.[133] Instead of the Pan-Europe, Hitler desires a free association of superior nations bound by their shared interest in challenging America's domination of the world. In his mind, US economic power is more threatening than British domination of the world.[78] Only after defeating France and Russia could Germany establish its Eurasian empire that would lead nations against the US, whose power he saw as undermined by its acceptance of Jews and Blacks.[134]

Bases for Hitler's strategies

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In constructing the designs for Europe, Hitler realized that treaties would serve him as only short-term measures. They could be used for immediate space-gaining instruments, partitioning third countries between Germany and another power, or they could function as a means of delaying a problem until it could be dealt with safely. Treaties of alliance were regarded as viable only if both parties clearly gained; otherwise, they could legitimately be dropped. Multilateral treaties were to be strenuously avoided.[135] Even among countries that shared interests, alliances could never be planned on being permanent, as the allied state could become the enemy at short notice.[136] Still, Hitler realized that Germany would need allies in order to successfully leave the League of Nations and pursue its goals.[137]

Hitler had not traveled abroad or read extensively, and as such, his foreign policy grew out of his domestic concerns.[138] Foreign policy's ultimate goal was the sustenance of its people and so domestic concerns were tightly connected and complementary to foreign policy initiatives.[139] Thus, the traditional separation of domestic and foreign policy do not apply in the same way to German policy under the National Socialists. The domestic situation informed foreign policy goals, and foreign policy requirements demanded certain domestic organization and mobilization.[140] It is clear, however, that what appears as opportunism in the conduct of Nazi foreign policy was actually the result of plans conceived well before Hitler assumed power, in line with his long-term theories of political vitality based on historical experience.[141]

Hitler idolized Germany in the times of Bismarck's Prussia, before the democratic Reich botched treaties and alliances, ultimately undermining German ethnic goals.[142] Bismarck succeeded in giving Germany a suitably "organic" state, such that the German race could realize its "right to life".[143] Bismarck achieved prestige for Germany by uniting the varied German states into the Reich, but he was unable to unite the whole German nation or pursue a truly ethnic foreign policy.[144] Hitler perceived the Reich's rallying cry of peace as giving it no goal, consistency or stability in foreign policy, allowing it no options to take aggressive steps to realize the goals.[145] He cites the warning of the Pan-German League against the "disastrous" policy of the Wilheminian period.[146] The borders of the Reich were inherently unstable in his opinion, allowing for easy avenues of attack by hostile powers, with no natural geographic barriers for protection and incapable of feeding the German people.[147] His central criticism of the Reich was that it failed to unify the German people and or to pursue a policy that would solve the agricultural problem, in lieu of policies aimed at attaining international prestige and recognition.[148]

The Weimar government, which could do no good in Hitler's eyes, was centrally responsible for the treasonous act of signing the Treaty of Versailles, which he held crippled Germany and placed it at the mercy of hostile powers. In fact, Versailles had not significantly weakened Germany, as it still had the largest population in Europe, with skilled workers and substantial resources. Russia, which Bismarck had feared and allied with Austro-Hungary against, had been defeated in World War I and then underwent a destabilizing revolution. Austria-Hungary itself had been divided into a number of small weak states. Germany was in a relatively if not absolutely, better position than most other states after World War I.[149]

Overview

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Hitler's National Socialist foreign policy contained four broad goals (racial unification, agricultural autarky, lebensraum in the East) culminating in a Eurasian land-based empire. Not justified by strategic or realpolitik considerations, Hitler's ideas stemmed almost exclusively from his conception of racial struggle and the natural consequences of the need for German expansion. The historical record shows that German geopoliticians, among them chiefly General Karl Haushofer, were in contact with and taught Nazi officials, including Hitler, Rudolf Hess and Konstantin von Neurath. Furthermore, Nazi leaders used the language of geopolitik, along with Haushofer's maps, and reasoning in their public propaganda. How receptive they were to the true intent of Haushofer's geopolitik and what that intent was exactly are unclear. The ideas of racial organic states, Lebensraum and autarky clearly found their way into Hitler's thinking, and pan-regions and the landpower-seapower dichotomy did not appear prominently, much less correctly, in National Socialist strategy. Examination of Germany's pre-World War I imperial aims demonstrates that many of the ideas which would later surface in Nazi thought were not novel but simply continuations of the same revisionist strategic aims. Racially motivated autarky, achieved by annexation, especially in the East, found its way into National Socialist policy as a continuous and coherent whole.

However, Hitler, along with the geopoliticians, would drop the imperial focus on industry, trade and naval power. The practical outcomes of imperial, geostrategic, and Nazi foreign policy plans were all largely the same.

See also

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References

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
is a theoretical framework in and that analyzes how , spatial relationships, and natural resources causally shape the power dynamics, territorial expansion, and strategic policies of states, treating the state as an organic entity requiring vital space for growth and survival. Originating from the works of German geographer , who emphasized the state's Darwinian struggle for Lebensraum (living space) in his 1897 Politische Geographie, the term was formally coined by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen around 1905 in his book Stormakterna (The Great Powers), where he categorized state studies into geopolitik, demopolitik, and others, prioritizing geography's deterministic role. Kjellen's conception integrated Ratzel's ideas of the state as a biological adapting to environmental imperatives, positing that optimal state power derives from control over fertile lands, strategic locations (topopolitik), and maritime access, influencing early 20th-century imperial strategies across . In Germany, adapted Geopolitik into a doctrine blending it with Mackinder's "Heartland" theory, advocating and continental dominance, which informed Nazi and the pursuit of eastern territories for resource security. This association led to the field's post-World War II stigmatization in Western academia as pseudoscientific justification for aggression, despite its empirical insights into geographic constraints on , such as the enduring relevance of pivot areas in Eurasian conflicts. While discredited in many institutional narratives due to ideological misuse, Geopolitik's core causal realism—geography's unyielding influence on alliances, trade routes, and —persists in pragmatic statecraft, evident in contemporary analyses of resource competition or Indo-Pacific chokepoints, underscoring that power vacuums in undergoverned spaces invite conquest regardless of normative prohibitions.

Definition and Core Principles

Organic State Theory

The Organic State Theory, developed by German geographer , analogizes the state to a biological organism that undergoes processes of growth, nourishment, and spatial expansion to ensure survival and vitality. Ratzel introduced this framework in his 1897 work Politische Geographie, where he described the state as exhibiting organic characteristics rooted in its territory, subject to environmental influences and competitive pressures akin to those in nature. Influenced by and thinkers like and , Ratzel viewed states as dynamic entities that must adapt and expand or face decline, rejecting static conceptions of political boundaries. Central to the theory are the "laws of the spatial growth of states," which outline how territorial size correlates with cultural and civilizational advancement. Ratzel observed that expansive states, such as the Persian Empire covering approximately 5,000,000 square kilometers, typify advanced societies, primarily in and their colonies, while smaller polities reflect lesser development. Growth occurs through of neighboring areas, strengthening the bond between population and land, often propelled by via , migration, or . He emphasized, "In the state we are dealing with an organic nature," underscoring the imperative for continuous territorial assimilation to sustain state health. The concept of (living space) encapsulates the state's need for sufficient territory and resources to thrive, driving pursuits of strategically valuable locations like coastlines, rivers, and resource-rich interiors. Ratzel illustrated this with examples such as Britain's 19th-century expansion beyond the in 1867 to access diamond fields, highlighting how states instinctively seek positions enhancing power and sustenance. Boundaries function as "peripheral organs," not mere lines but active interfaces for defense, , and further growth, as seen in France's historical concentration of military strength along its German and Italian frontiers. This theory implies a Darwinian among states for , where larger, more adaptive entities dominate, fostering an understanding of as governed by spatial imperatives rather than abstract ideals. Ratzel's ideas, while rooted in empirical observations of historical expansions, provided a foundation for analyzing state behavior through causal links between , , and power dynamics.

Spatial Determinism and Lebensraum

Spatial determinism in geopolitical theory asserts that the extent, quality, and configuration of a state's territory exert a primary causal influence on its political organization, cultural evolution, and capacity for power projection. Friedrich Ratzel, developing anthropogeography in the late 19th century, framed states as organic entities analogous to living organisms, whose survival and growth depend on continuous spatial expansion and assimilation of surrounding "nutrients" in the form of land and resources. This perspective, infused with Social Darwinist principles, posits that stagnation in territorial acquisition leads to atrophy, much like a biological organism deprived of sustenance. Ratzel formalized these ideas in his 1897 work The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States, enumerating six principles, including that borders function as living membranes permeable to growth, that generates new political spaces, and that larger states exhibit greater migratory vitality. While secondary interpretations often attribute strict geographical to Ratzel—implying environment solely dictates human outcomes—his framework actually balanced spatial imperatives with human agency, cultural , and historical contingency, rejecting pure environmental . Empirical observations from colonial expansions and migrations supported his view that spatial deficits correlate with societal pressures for outward movement. Central to this doctrine is the concept of , which Ratzel coined in a 1901 article to describe the indispensable habitat volume required for a (people) or state to flourish biologically and politically. Envisioned as fertile soil supporting and agricultural self-sufficiency, emphasized agrarian primacy, where urban-industrial growth alone proves insufficient without expansive rural territories for food production and demographic vitality. Ratzel drew from historical precedents like medieval German eastward settlements () and contemporary colonial endeavors, arguing that spatial constriction fosters internal decay and external competition. In Ratzel's causal realism, operates as a dynamic necessity rather than static possession; states must periodically renew it through or assimilation to counteract from overpopulation or resource depletion. This principle underpinned early geopolitical strategies prioritizing continental interiors over maritime peripheries, influencing thinkers like who integrated it into systematic state analysis. Though later distorted in expansionist ideologies, Ratzel's original formulation grounded spatial needs in observable patterns of and state resilience, verifiable through demographic data from 19th-century showing correlations between land scarcity and rates exceeding 1 million annually in the .

Continental Power Blocks and Pan-Movements

In the framework of Geopolitik, continental power blocks represent expansive territorial aggregations dominated by a core land power, designed to achieve economic and strategic self-sufficiency against maritime-oriented rivals. , building on Friedrich Ratzel's organic state theory and Rudolf Kjellén's power-political analysis, conceptualized these blocks as "pan-regions" (Pan-Regionen), large-scale geopolitical units encompassing multiple states or peoples under a unifying hegemon. These regions were envisioned as counterweights to sea powers like Britain and the , which Haushofer viewed as encircling continental masses through naval dominance and colonial networks. Haushofer outlined four primary pan-regions in his 1931 work Geopolitik der Pan-Ideen: Pan-Europa (led by Germany, extending from the Atlantic to the Urals), Pan-America (under U.S. hegemony), Pan-Russia (or Pan-Eurasia, centered on Soviet Russia), and Pan-Pacific (dominated by Japan). Each block would integrate complementary resources, populations, and spaces to form a closed economic sphere resistant to blockade, drawing from social-Darwinist notions of states as organisms expanding into Lebensraum. This division reflected a bipolar global struggle between land-based "telluric" powers and thalassocratic sea powers, with continental blocks enabling the former to project influence without overreliance on vulnerable sea lanes. Pan-movements, or Pan-Ideen, served as ideological instruments to forge these blocks, transcending national borders through ethnic, cultural, or civilizational unity. Haushofer adapted earlier pan-nationalisms—such as Pan-Germanism's concept from the early —into broader continental ideologies, including (allied with Japan's expansion) and potential Eurasian pacts. In Der Kontinentalblock (1941), he advocated a tripartite alliance of , the , and as a Eurasian super-block, leveraging Russia's heartland resources, Germany's industrial core, and Japan's Pacific flank to challenge Anglo-American encirclement. This vision prioritized Raumordnung (spatial ordering) over ideological purity, though it clashed with Nazi racial doctrines by tolerating Soviet inclusion for pragmatic . Critics within and outside Geopolitik noted tensions between these blocks and Lebensraum expansionism, as pan-regions implied negotiated alliances rather than outright conquest, yet Haushofer's framework influenced Axis strategies like the 1940 . Empirical assessments, such as wartime resource shortages in despite continental ambitions, underscore the causal limits of block formation amid internal rivalries and overextension. Post-1945 analyses, drawing from declassified diplomatic records, confirm Haushofer's ideas shaped interwar policy debates but were subordinated to Hitler's eastward focus, diluting pan-regional potential.

Historical Origins

Friedrich Ratzel's Anthropogeography

Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), a German geographer and ethnologist, established anthropogeography as the systematic examination of human societies' interactions with their physical environments. Drawing from his travels across Europe, North America, and observations of indigenous cultures, Ratzel argued that geographical factors—such as climate, soil fertility, topography, and resource availability—condition human settlement patterns, migrations, and cultural adaptations without rigidly determining them. His approach integrated Darwinian evolutionary principles, treating human populations as dynamic entities responding to environmental stimuli, akin to biological organisms expanding or contracting based on spatial opportunities. In Anthropogeographie, published in two volumes (Volume I in 1882, Volume II in 1891), Ratzel detailed how the earth's surface influences population distribution and societal organization. He emphasized empirical data from global case studies, positing that humans actively modify and are modified by their milieu, with offering a framework of possibilities rather than fatalistic constraints. For instance, Ratzel highlighted how continental interiors foster expansive agrarian societies, while coastal positions enable maritime trade and , supported by historical examples like the migrations of Germanic tribes. This relational view rejected anthropocentric isolation, underscoring causal links between terrestrial features and human vitality. Ratzel's anthropogeography laid the empirical groundwork for political applications by conceptualizing the state as an organic entity embedded in space, requiring territorial nourishment for growth and survival. He introduced notions of spatial extension as essential to state health, influencing later geopolitical frameworks, though Ratzel himself focused on descriptive analysis over prescriptive policy. Academic sources often link these ideas selectively to 20th-century expansionism, yet Ratzel's original texts prioritize biogeographical observation over ideological advocacy, with concepts like spatial dynamics derived from natural sciences rather than political nationalism. By 1901, in Der Lebensraum, Ratzel extended these principles biogeographically, framing living space as a neutral ecological imperative for species, including human collectives. This causal realism in human geography provided first-principles tools for analyzing power distribution, distinguishing Ratzel's contributions from deterministic misreadings in biased institutional narratives.

Rudolf Kjellén's Coinage and Systematization

, a Swedish political scientist born on June 13, 1864, introduced the term () in 1899 during a series of lectures on Swedish , framing it as the study of a state's spatial conditions and geographic influences on its power dynamics. Building on Friedrich Ratzel's anthropogeography, Kjellén conceptualized the state as an organic entity whose vitality depended on its adaptation to environmental factors, including territory and location, rather than viewing as an absolute determinant. This coinage marked a shift from descriptive toward an integrative that analyzed how physical space shaped state behavior and international competition. Kjellén systematized geopolitics within a broader framework of state sciences in his major work Staten som Lifsform (The State as a Form of Life), published in 1916, where he delineated five interdependent "polities": geopolitik (spatial and territorial factors), oecopolitik (economic resources and productivity), demopolitik (population dynamics and human capital), sociopolitik (social cohesion and class structures), and kratsopolitik (governmental organization and military capacity). He distinguished between "proper geopolitics," which examined a state's inherent geographic delimitations by natural boundaries, and "special geopolitics," which focused on expansionist strategies and power projection in global rivalries. This holistic model emphasized causal interactions among these elements, positing that a state's survival required balanced growth akin to biological organisms, with geography providing foundational constraints but not overriding human agency or policy choices. Through his Stormaktsstudier (Studies of the Great Powers) series, initiated around 1905 and covering nations like , the , , and , Kjellén applied this system empirically, assessing each power's geopolitical strengths—such as Russia's vast Eurasian expanse enabling defensive depth or Britain's insular position favoring naval dominance—and weaknesses, while integrating economic and demographic data for predictive analysis. His approach prioritized realist observation of interstate competition over ideological prescriptions, influencing conservative political thought in and beyond by underscoring the need for states to secure defensible territories and resource bases amid imperial declines observable in the early . Kjellén's framework thus established as a systematic tool for dissecting great-power mechanics, distinct from later militaristic appropriations, grounded in verifiable geographic and historical patterns rather than deterministic .

Karl Haushofer's Expansion and Institutionalization

Karl Ernst Haushofer (1869–1946), a German general, geographer, and former in , advanced geopolitics as an in the by synthesizing prior theories into a more applied framework emphasizing spatial competition and continental alliances. Appointed professor of geography at the University of in 1921, he began lecturing on Geopolitik, expanding Kjellén's state-as-organism model with Ratzel's and Mackinder's Eurasian heartland concept to argue for Germany's alignment with and against maritime powers like Britain and the . His teachings attracted students such as , fostering a geopolitical school that prioritized empirical analysis of geography's role in power distribution over purely ideological assertions. In 1924, Haushofer co-founded and edited the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, a monthly journal published by Kurt Vowinckel Verlag in Heidelberg that became the central organ for geopolitical discourse in Germany, continuing until 1944 and featuring contributions from allied scholars on topics like pan-regional blocs. That same year, he released Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans, a seminal work applying geopolitical principles to analyze Japan's expansion and the balance between land and sea powers in East Asia, drawing on his diplomatic experience to highlight causal links between territorial control and national vitality. By the 1930s, the journal's circulation surpassed 700,000 copies annually, institutionalizing geopolitics through widespread dissemination of maps, demographic data, and strategic forecasts that influenced military and foreign policy debates. Haushofer's institutionalization efforts extended beyond publications to academic networks, though exaggerated postwar claims of a sprawling Institut für Geopolitik in with over 1,000 personnel—often portrayed as a Nazi —lack substantiation and stem from Allied intelligence myths rather than archival evidence; in reality, his platform was the university chair and journal , which coordinated research on topics like Eurasian integration. Over three decades, he produced or co-authored more than 500 works combining , , and to model state expansion as a biological imperative driven by , , and access, while cautioning against overextension as seen in . This body of output elevated Geopolitik from theoretical treatise to policy-relevant science, though Haushofer later distanced himself from National Socialist distortions, emphasizing defensive alliances over aggressive conquest.

Applications in Interwar Germany

Integration into National Strategy

Geopolitik principles were incorporated into Nazi 's national strategy through the emphasis on as a foundational imperative for territorial expansion, positing that Germany's survival required acquiring agricultural land and resources in to sustain its population and . This concept, derived from Ratzel's spatial determinism and systematized by Haushofer, aligned with Hitler's pre-1933 writings in (1925), where he argued for eastward to resolve demographic pressures and economic dependencies on imports. The strategy framed as a continental land power necessitating a Großraum (greater space) bloc, prioritizing alliances with pan-Asian and pan-Slavic movements against Anglo-American sea power dominance, as evidenced by the with in 1936 and initial overtures to the . Haushofer's Institute for Geopolitics at University, established in 1921, facilitated this integration by training military officers and disseminating maps and analyses that rationalized revisionist claims, such as reclaiming lost territories from the (1919) and beyond. , Hitler's deputy, credited Haushofer's seminars for shaping his worldview, indirectly channeling geopolitical doctrines into party ideology via Hess's role in editing early drafts of . Empirical alignment appeared in policy execution, including the remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, which tested encirclement fears, and the with on March 12, 1938, expanding the German without immediate . Strategic planning under this framework prioritized autarkic self-sufficiency, as outlined in the Four-Year Plan of 1936, which aimed to reduce reliance on overseas trade through synthetic fuel production and conquest-driven resource acquisition, reflecting Haushofer's advocacy for pan-regions insulated from global maritime blockades. Foreign policy maneuvers, such as the Axis alliance with Italy formalized in the Pact of Steel on May 22, 1939, embodied the continental bloc theory, seeking to counter British naval supremacy and secure Mediterranean access. However, integration was selective; while providing justificatory rhetoric for the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, as a prelude to eastward Drang nach Osten, Nazi decisions often prioritized racial ideology over pure spatial analysis, subordinating geopolitical calculus to ideological imperatives. Academic assessments note that Haushofer's influence, though propagandized post-war, was marginal in high-level decisions, with Hitler demonstrating pre-existing alignment through independent reasoning on power blocks and expansion.

Influence on Key Figures and Policy

Rudolf Hess, Adolf Hitler's deputy and a student of at the University of starting in 1919, absorbed Geopolitik's emphasis on spatial expansion and organic state growth, forging a close mentor-student bond that extended to collaborative writings on the subject. Hess transmitted these ideas to Hitler during their shared imprisonment in from November 1923 to December 1924, where Hitler drafted and Hess served as his secretary, reportedly discussing Haushofer's concepts of and geopolitical blocs. Hitler explicitly adopted the framework—traced to Friedrich Ratzel's organic state theory but amplified in Haushofer's writings—as a core justification for territorial expansion, articulating in (published 1925) the need for Germany to acquire eastern lands for agrarian settlement and security to sustain its , a view he had refined between 1921 and 1925. This geopolitical rationale underpinned Nazi foreign policy directives, including the 1937 , which outlined preparations for war to seize in , , and Poland through military conquest. Haushofer's promotion of pan-regional movements and alliances between continental powers influenced Nazi overtures toward , culminating in the 1936 , framed as a counter to Anglo-American and Soviet influence in line with 's heartland thesis. Following the Nazi seizure of power in January 1933, Haushofer's Institute for Geopolitics received state funding and his journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik became a platform for discourse, with Hess reportedly shielding Haushofer from internal party rivals. These elements shaped the ideological underpinnings of policies like the 1938 with Austria and the 1939 , presented as necessities for spatial consolidation against encirclement.

Divergences Between Theory and Practice

In the application of Geopolitik during the Nazi era, theoretical emphases on geographic and spatial expansion were frequently subordinated to racial ideology, marking a core divergence. Classical Geopolitik, as systematized by and expanded by , viewed the state as an organic entity requiring for survival, with geography as the primary causal force shaping power dynamics. In contrast, Adolf Hitler's National Socialist framework prioritized Rasse (race) over Raum (space), integrating geopolitical concepts into a where racial purity dictated territorial policy, often leading to the adaptation or rejection of purely spatial strategies. This "race contra space" tension manifested in policies like the , which combined acquisition in with systematic racial extermination and Germanization, deviating from Geopolitik's amoral, deterministic focus on resource without explicit ethnic hierarchies. Foreign policy implementations further highlighted practical deviations from theoretical prescriptions. Haushofer advocated a grand alliance with the to form an "" pan-region, leveraging Eurasian heartland control for continental dominance and resource security, drawing from Ratzelian and Mackinder-inspired land-power doctrines. Hitler, however, terminated this orientation with on June 22, 1941, invading the USSR despite the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, prioritizing racial conquest over strategic partnership and igniting a catastrophic that contradicted Geopolitik's emphasis on avoiding overextension. Haushofer himself critiqued this eastern aggression as a "deadly sin against both geopolitics and correct statesmanship," reflecting the theory's preference for pragmatic alliances, such as sustained pan-Asian ties with , which Nazis undermined through racial doctrines questioning non-Aryan partners. Institutionally, Geopolitik's influence waned as Nazi practice favored ideological conformity over academic rigor, marginalizing figures like Haushofer after Rudolf Hess's flight to Britain on May 10, 1941, which exposed rifts and diminished the field's role in decision-making. While early Nazi strategy incorporated rhetoric for annexations like (March 12, 1938) and the (October 1, 1938), broader deviations—such as neglecting African or Middle Eastern opportunities for in favor of racially targeted eastern settlement—led to empirical failures, including resource shortages that hastened Germany's defeat by May 1945. These misalignments underscore how Geopolitik served more as justificatory than operational blueprint, with causal realism revealing geography's role diluted by unchecked ideological imperatives.

Criticisms and Intellectual Debates

Accusations of Determinism

Critics of Geopolitik have frequently accused it of embodying geographical determinism, asserting that its foundational theories reduce state actions and historical outcomes to inexorable dictates of physical environment, thereby diminishing the role of human agency, culture, and contingency. This critique centers on Friedrich Ratzel's anthropogeography, which depicted the state as an organic entity subject to spatial imperatives like Lebensraum, implying expansion as a biological necessity driven by geographical laws akin to Darwinian struggle. Such interpretations portray Ratzel's framework as mechanistic, where terrain, climate, and resources causally override volitional factors in political evolution. These charges intensified in interwar and post-World War II analyses, particularly among Anglo-American geographers, who linked Geopolitik's spatial emphasis to National Socialist justifications for territorial aggression as geographically fated, conflating theoretical influence with ideological . Rudolf Kjellén's coinage of "geopolitics" and Karl Haushofer's expansions were similarly indicted for prioritizing environmental constraints over socioeconomic or diplomatic variables, fostering a where states' power and hinge predeterminately on and . Reexaminations of primary sources, however, reveal that Ratzel stressed reciprocal dynamics between peoples and milieu, integrating anthropological studies of folk migrations and adaptations rather than unilateral environmental causation, thus dismissing claims of strict geodeterminism as a postwar myth detached from his ecological holism. Kjellén balanced with complementary disciplines like demopolitics, acknowledging multifaceted state determinants, while Haushofer incorporated pan-regional alliances responsive to human . Empirical cases, such as Japan's post-Meiji industrialization overcoming arable land scarcity (comprising only 12% of territory) through and technology, illustrate geography's constraining yet non-absolute influence, supporting classical ' nuanced causal realism over caricatured . Defenses of the tradition emphasize its analytical utility in identifying enduring spatial patterns—e.g., continental interiors' vulnerability to —without negating adaptive agency.

Ethical and Ideological Misattributions

Geopolitik has frequently been ethically misattributed as an inherently endorsing aggressive and , with critics portraying its organic state theory—derived from Friedrich Ratzel's Anthropogeographie (1882–1891)—as a blueprint for imperial domination that justified violence against weaker states. However, Ratzel's framework emphasized the state's adaptive growth in response to environmental pressures, akin to biological organisms seeking nourishment for , without prescribing as the primary mechanism; he advocated for cultural and demographic expansion through settlement and assimilation, viewing as a secondary, often inefficient outcome of mismatched territorial needs. This misreading stems from post-World War II scholarly interpretations that retroactively conflated descriptive analysis with , ignoring Ratzel's explicit warnings against overextension leading to state decline, as seen in his critique of historical empires like . Ideologically, Geopolitik is often mislinked to Nazi racial doctrines and policy, with Karl Haushofer's Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans (1925) and his Institute accused of directly shaping Adolf Hitler's worldview through . Yet, historical evidence reveals limited personal interaction—Hitler and Haushofer met fewer than a dozen times, mostly publicly—and strategic divergences: Haushofer prioritized alliances with pan-Asian powers for and critiqued unilateral aggression, concepts Hitler selectively adapted while rejecting Haushofer's visions for . Haushofer's son Albrecht's involvement in the 1944 anti-Hitler plot and Karl's post-1933 marginalization further underscore that Geopolitik was co-opted rather than causative, a pattern amplified by Allied propaganda and academic biases equating geographic with to delegitimize realist statecraft. Such misattributions reflect a causal overreach, attributing ethical culpability to analytical tools without distinguishing theory from practice; Rudolf Kjellén's original formulation in Statsvetenskapliga grundlinjer (1899) treated as a value-neutral subdiscipline of , focused on spatial factors influencing power, not moral imperatives for domination. Contemporary critiques, often from institutionally left-leaning departments, perpetuate this by framing Geopolitik as proto-totalitarian, sidelining empirical validations like its predictive utility in resource-driven conflicts, while overlooking analogous Anglo-American variants (e.g., Mackinder's Heartland thesis) that escaped similar ethical condemnation despite parallel applications. This selective scrutiny highlights systemic biases in academia, where is undermined by ideological filters prioritizing anti-nationalist narratives over causal geographic realities.

Empirical Validity and Causal Realism

Classical Geopolitik's core tenets, including the influence of spatial factors on state vitality and , demonstrate partial empirical validity when examined through historical outcomes and quantitative analyses of . For instance, Ratzel's conception of states as organic entities requiring expansive aligns with evidence from imperial expansions where resource scarcity and population pressures correlated with territorial aggression; the British Empire's control over oceanic chokepoints facilitated dominance over 25% of global routes by 1913, underscoring geography's role in enabling sustained power without deterministic inevitability. Similarly, Kjellén's emphasis on geopolitical positioning finds support in data showing that landlocked states face 20-30% higher conflict risks due to dependency on neighbors for and , as evidenced in post-colonial where geographic isolation hampered and state consolidation. These patterns reflect causal mechanisms rooted in physical constraints—such as terrain impeding , with Napoleon's 1812 Russian campaign failing partly due to overextended supply lines across 1,000+ km of , resulting in 90% army losses—rather than abstract alone. Causal realism in Geopolitik posits that enduring geographic features impose opportunity costs and strategic imperatives, verifiable through large-N studies of interstate wars and alliances. Haushofer's adaptation of Mackinder's Heartland thesis, advocating control of Eurasian pivot areas, is empirically borne out in 20th-century conflicts: Soviet survival in leveraged vast territorial depth, absorbing 27 million casualties while denying decisive victories, with geographic buffers enabling that turned the tide by 1943. Quantitative models in confirm this, revealing that proximity to great power cores increases alliance formation probabilities by factors of 2-5, as states mitigate vulnerabilities through spatial adjacency rather than mere cultural affinity. However, overemphasis on falters empirically; Japan's post-1945 economic ascent despite island constraints illustrates how technological adaptation and human agency can offset geographic liabilities, with GDP growth averaging 9% annually from 1950-1973 through export-oriented strategies circumventing resource deficits. Critiques dismissing Geopolitik as overly reductive overlook hybrid causal chains where interacts with and , yet post-war academic suppression—often in institutions exhibiting ideological skews toward environmental constructivism—has understated its predictive utility. For example, contemporary analyses of Russia's 2022 incursion highlight enduring spatial logics: control of ports and resources mirrors Kjellén's state-organism model, with terrain features like the River complicating advances and inflating costs, as seen in stalled mechanized offensives amid mud seasons. Empirical datasets from the project further validate causal influence, showing triples war initiation odds between neighbors, independent of regime type or economic parity. While not monocausal—ideological miscalculations, as in Nazi divergences from Haushofer's pan-Asian alliances, led to strategic overreach—Geopolitik's framework aids realist forecasting by prioritizing verifiable spatial incentives over normative overlays.

Post-War Legacy and Modern Relevance

Suppression and Academic Taboo

Following the defeat of in 1945, Geopolitik underwent institutional suppression in Germany as part of Allied efforts. The Munich-based Institute for Geopolitics, founded by in 1921 and integral to disseminating Geopolitik ideas, was dissolved, and its associated journal Zeitschrift für Geopolitik had ceased publication in 1944 amid wartime scrutiny. Haushofer himself was interned by Allied forces from 1945 to 1946 but released without prosecution, dying by suicide shortly thereafter on March 10, 1946; his son , executed by the in 1945 for anti-Hitler activities, exemplified the personal toll on the field. This dismantling targeted Geopolitik's role in rationalizing Lebensraum policies, though evidence indicates the doctrine's influence was more inspirational than prescriptive, with Nazi leaders selectively adapting rather than rigidly following it. In Western academia, particularly in Anglophone , Geopolitik encountered a profound lasting over four decades post-1945, driven by associations with Nazi and . Scholars deliberately eschewed the term "geopolitics" to distance the discipline from perceived fascist undertones, casting doubt on the integrity of as a whole and marginalizing of power dynamics. This avoidance persisted into the , with quantitative and behavioral paradigms in further sidelining realist geographic interpretations in favor of idealist or constructivist approaches aligned with post-war . Although not absolute—some U.S. strategists engaged geopolitical concepts covertly during the —the taboo effectively suppressed open discourse, impoverishing empirical assessments of 's causal role in state behavior. This academic reticence stemmed partly from ideological aversion to power-centric realism, amplified by systemic biases in post-war institutions favoring narratives of human agency over geographic constraints, which mainstream academia and media often framed without critically distinguishing Geopolitik's analytical foundations from its wartime perversion. Such overreach neglected first-principles insights into , resources, and proximity as enduring drivers of conflict, as evidenced by persistent interstate wars clustering along geographic fault lines despite the . Revival began tentatively in the 1960s with renewed interest in classical thinkers like Mackinder, but full reintegration awaited the amid Soviet threats and globalization's spatial realities.

Resurgence in Contemporary Analysis

Following the decline of classical Geopolitik after 1945 due to its associations with National Socialist ideology, a revival emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, with further resurgence in recent decades amid rising , , and territorial security concerns. This renewed interest recognizes the state's geographical attributes—such as location, resources, and spatial extent—as enduring determinants of power, challenging post-war dismissals that prioritized ideological or economic factors over physical constraints. Analysts now apply these frameworks to explain patterns in state expansion and rivalry, drawing on Ratzel's conception of the state as an organic entity requiring vital space for growth. Key contributors to this resurgence include strategic thinkers like Colin S. Gray, who integrated classical geopolitical principles into assessments of contests, asserting that provides an immutable context for policy even in the nuclear era. Gray's works, such as The Geopolitics of Super Power (1988), emphasized control of pivotal regions like the Eurasian to counter land-power dominance, echoing Haushofer's pan-regional alliances without endorsing . Contemporary scholars extend this to evaluate defensive postures, where terrain and proximity dictate vulnerabilities, as seen in analyses of buffer zones and maritime chokepoints. In modern great-power dynamics, Geopolitik informs interpretations of U.S.-China rivalry in the , where Haushofer's ideas on continental-maritime friction are invoked to assess strategic and resource access. Empirical observations, including Russia's 2022 invasion of highlighting the defensive value of geography and 's island-building to project power beyond the , underscore the causal role of spatial factors in state behavior. This revival contrasts with earlier academic marginalization, prioritizing verifiable geographic influences over constructivist narratives that downplay material realities.

Comparisons to Anglo-American Geopolitics

German Geopolitik, as developed by thinkers like Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Haushofer, emphasized the state as an organic entity requiring spatial expansion (Lebensraum) for survival and growth, drawing on anthropogeographic principles where geography causally shaped national vitality through land-based autarky and continental dominance. In contrast, Anglo-American geopolitical thought, exemplified by Halford Mackinder's Heartland theory (1904), prioritized maritime control and peripheral containment to prevent any single power from dominating the Eurasian "World-Island," reflecting the strategic imperatives of island and oceanic empires reliant on naval supremacy and global trade routes. This divergence stemmed from positional realities: Germany's central European landlocked vulnerabilities fostered a focus on territorial consolidation and alliances with continental powers like Russia, whereas Britain's and America's maritime orientations underscored balance-of-power diplomacy and rimland strategies to encircle potential hegemons. Haushofer adapted Mackinder's Heartland concept into a utopian vision of pan-regions, advocating German-led Eurasian blocs to counter Anglo-American , inverting Mackinder's defensive warning against land-power consolidation into an offensive blueprint for autarkic spheres that prioritized racial and spatial imperatives over fluid alliances. Anglo-American theorists like Nicholas Spykman (1940s) countered with primacy, arguing that control of coastal fringes—rather than inner heartlands—determined global influence, enabling policies like post-World War II containment that empirically checked Soviet expansion through naval blockades and forward basing, as evidenced by the U.S. Navy's role in the Airlift (1948–1949) and logistics (1950–1953). German Geopolitik's organic , however, implied inevitable conflict for , influencing Nazi pan-region schemes but yielding practical failures like Operation Barbarossa's overextension (1941), where logistical geography negated expansionist theory. Methodologically, Geopolitik integrated Social Darwinist causality, viewing national decline as a function of spatial constriction absent expansion, a framework critiqued for oversimplifying human agency compared to Anglo-American realism's emphasis on volitional and technological , such as Alfred Mahan's (1890) advocacy for fleets that empirically secured British until 1914. Yet both traditions converged on geography's enduring causal weight: Mackinder's prediction of rail-enabled heartland power prefigured Haushofer's pan-Asian visions, and U.S. policy under Truman (1947 Doctrine) echoed containment logics akin to German but inverted for defensive encirclement, sustaining American primacy through 1991 via alliances like , which controlled 70% of global GDP by 2020.
AspectGerman GeopolitikAnglo-American Geopolitics
Core FocusLand power, organic expansion, , rimland containment, trade
Key Theorist ExemplarHaushofer (pan-regions, )Mackinder/Spykman (Heartland/)
Causal EmphasisDeterministic geography drives state vitalityStrategic agency modulates geographic constraints
Policy Outcome ExampleNazi Eastern Front failures (1941–1945) containment success (1947–1991)
Post-war, Anglo-American frameworks persisted in institutions like the U.S. , informing doctrines with measurable efficacy—e.g., carrier strike groups deterring Soviet naval projection—while Geopolitik faced suppression for its imperial associations, though its spatial realism resurfaced in analyses of resource chokepoints like the .

References

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