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People's Liberation Army Ground Force
People's Liberation Army Ground Force
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People's Liberation Army Ground Force
中国人民解放军陆军
Emblem of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force
Founded1 August 1927; 98 years ago (1 August 1927)
Country People's Republic of China
Allegiance Chinese Communist Party
TypeArmy
RoleLand warfare
Size960,000 active personnel (2025)[1]
Part of People's Liberation Army
HeadquartersCentral Military Commission
Mottos"Serve the people!" (Chinese: 为人民服务)
"Follow the Party! Fight to win! Forge exemplary conduct!" (Chinese: 听党指挥、能打胜仗、作风优良)[2]
Colors  Red
  Green
MarchMarch of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force
Anniversaries1 August annually
EquipmentList of PLAGF equipment
Engagements
Commanders
CommanderGeneral Li Qiaoming
Political CommissarGeneral Chen Hui
Chief of StaffGeneral Li Zhonglin
Insignia
Symbol
Flag
Sleeve badge

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force[a] (PLAGF), also referred to as the PLA Army,[3] is the land-based service branch of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and also its largest and oldest branch. The PLAGF can trace its lineage from 1927 as the Chinese Red Army; however, it was not officially established until 1948.

History

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In February 1949, the existing large number of armies and divisions were regularized into up to seventy armies of three divisions each. While some, such as the 1st Army, survived for over fifty years, a number were quickly amalgamated and disestablished in the early 1950s. It appears that twenty per cent or even more of the seventy new armies were disestablished up to 1953; in 1952 alone, the 3rd, 4th, 10th, 17th, 18th, and 19th Armies were disbanded.

The PLAGF consist of conventionally armed main and regional units, which in 1987 made up over 70 percent of the PLA. It provided a good conventional defense, but in 1987 had only limited offensive potential and was poorly equipped for nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare. Main forces included about 35 group armies, comprising 118 infantry divisions, 13 armored divisions, and 33 artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, plus 71 independent regiments and 21 independent battalions of mostly support troops.[4] Regional forces consisted of 73 divisions of border defense and garrison troops plus 140 independent regiments.

Under the old system, a field army consisted of three partially motorized infantry divisions and two regiments of artillery and anti-aircraft artillery.[4] Each field army division had over 12,000 personnel in three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, one armored regiment, and one anti-aircraft artillery battalion. Organization was flexible, the higher echelons being free to tailor forces for combat around any number of infantry divisions. At least theoretically, each division had its own armor and artillery — actual equipment levels were not revealed and probably varied — and the assets at the army level and within the independent units could be apportioned as needed.

In 1987 the new, main-force group armies typically included 46,300 soldiers in up to four divisions, believed to include infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, airborne, and air support elements.[4] Although the new group armies were supposed to reflect a move to combined-arms operations, because of a lack of mechanization they continued to consist of infantry supported by armor, artillery, and other units. The 13 armored divisions each had 3 regiments and 240 main battle tanks (MBT) but lacked adequate mechanized infantry support.

There was little evidence of the use of armored personnel carriers during the Sino-Vietnamese border conflict in 1979, and tanks were used as mobile artillery and as support for dismounted infantry. Artillery forces emphasized towed guns, howitzers, and truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers. In the 1980s some self-propelled artillery entered service, but the PLA also produced rocket launchers as a cheaper but not totally effective alternative to self-propelled guns. There was a variety of construction equipment, mobile bridging, trucks, and prime movers. A new multiple rocket launcher for scattering antitank mines appeared in 1979, but mine-laying and mine-clearing equipment remained scarce.

Regional forces consisted of full-time PLA troops organized as independent divisions for garrison missions.[4] Garrison divisions were static, artillery-heavy units deployed along the coastline and borders in areas of likely attack. Regional forces were armed less heavily than their main-force counterparts, and they were involved in training the militia. They were the PLA units commonly used to restore order during the Cultural Revolution. When chairman Mao proclaimed the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the PLAGF was a 4.9 million-strong peasant army. After some time, the demobilization of ill-trained and politically unreliable troops began, resulting in the reduction of army strength.

In the 21st century, the PLAGF are continuing to undergo significant reform, experimentation, modernization, and restructuring to deal with potential threats and enhance their capabilities. Divisions are downsized into combined arms brigades, which reorganized into high-readiness army groups. The division echelon is phased out with only a limited number of division structures remaining existent.[5] While the size of the PLA Ground Force has been reduced over the past few decades, technology-intensive elements such as special operations forces (SOF), army aviation (helicopters), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and electronic warfare units have all been rapidly expanded.[6]

The latest operational doctrine of the PLAGF highlights the importance of information technology, electronic and information warfare, and long-range precision strikes in future warfare. The older generation telephone/radio-based command, control, and communications (C3) systems are being replaced by integrated battlefield information networks featuring local/wide-area networks (LAN/WAN), satellite communications, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-based surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and mobile command and control centers.[6][better source needed]

Structure

[edit]
The five theater commands of the PLA [1]

Organization

[edit]

Command of the Chinese armed forces is exercised by the Central Military Commission (CMC) through the service headquarters, including PLAGF headquarters, and the theater commands (TC). The PLAGF component in each TC is the Theater Command Army. Both PLAGF and TC headquarters exercise control over operational units in peacetime, with the TC taking complete control wartime. The military-political dual-command structure is present throughout.[7]

Units in sensitive areas, like Beijing, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, are subordinated directly to PLAGF headquarters.[8]

After the 2017 reforms, the PLAGF Headquarter structure is a follows:[9]

Functional Departments

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Theater Command Ground Force Units

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Directly Subordinate Military Districts

[edit]

Directly Subordinate Units

[edit]

Subordinate Academic Institutions

[edit]

Branches of service

[edit]

The PLAGF has a standing regular army and a reserve force. Although conscription is employed in China by law, mandatory military service has not been implemented since 1949, as the People's Liberation Army has been able to recruit sufficient numbers voluntarily.[27] Chinese militia is not a component of the People's Liberation Army, however, they could provide a certain degree of reserve function, which was indicated by "Militia Military Training and Evaluation Outline" released by the People's Liberation Army General Staff Department in 2007.[28] The Militia is however explicitly not part of the formal Reserve since the passing of the 2022 Reservist Law.[29]

PLAGF branches of service (Chinese: 兵种; pinyin: Bīngzhǒng) are composed of infantry (including mechanized infantry), armour, artillery, air defense, aviation, military engineering, anti-chemical, communications, special operations, logistics, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, etc. These branches of service have their respective military education institutions.[30]

Operational structure

[edit]

PLA operational structure reflects China's strategic missions, political environment, and geographical circumstances.[31] There are 13 corps sized group armies (Chinese: 集团军; pinyin: Jítuánjūn, also known as combined corps) since the end of April 2017, divided among five Theater commands — Eastern, Southern, Northern, Western and Central. Within the group armies, the old divisions (Chinese: ; pinyin: Shī) are being downsized into brigades (Chinese: ; pinyin: ). Each group army includes six maneuver combined arms brigades, fire support/artillery brigades, air defense brigades, aviation brigades, special operations brigades, combat support brigades, and sustainment brigades.[31][32][33][34]

The maneuver combat components of the group armies are combined arms brigades (Chinese: 合成旅; pinyin: Héchénglǚ), including a mix of heavy combined arms brigades, medium combined arms brigades, light combined arms brigade, amphibious combined arms brigades, and mountain combined arms brigades. The practice is functionally similar to the US Army brigade combat team concept with unique modifications influenced by China's terrain diversity, strategic priority, political system, and military history.[31][32][33][35]

The PLA heavy, medium, and light combined arms brigades share a modular construct, resembling its superior and subordinate units at the corps and battalion level. A typical PLAGF combined arms brigade has the brigade HQ, four maneuver combat battalions, and other support battalions. For instance, a heavy combined arms brigade includes four combined arms battalions (Chinese: 合成营; pinyin: Héchéngyíng), one artillery battalion, one air defense battalion, one reconnaissance battalion, one combat support battalion, and one sustainment battalion.[32][33]

Combined arms battalions apply a structure drawn from the brigade echelon. For example, heavy combined arms battalions consist of battalions HQ company (including subordinate medic, reconnaissance, and air defense platoons),[36][37] four maneuver combat companies including two tank companies (14 tanks per company), and two mechanized infantry companies (14 vehicles per company),[38] one firepower company, and one combat support/sustainment company.[39][40]

Before the 2015 reform, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) attributes the PLA Ground Force with nine active armored divisions consisting of a number of armored brigades, 25 infantry divisions (mechanized or motorized), organized into a number of infantry brigades, and 8 artillery divisions, also organized into field artillery brigades. Dennis Blasko wrote in 2000[41] that the traditional structure of PLA divisions (armored and mechanized) consisted roughly of three regiments – tuan (Chinese: ; pinyin: Tuán) – of the main service arm, each of three battalions (Chinese: ; pinyin: yíng) plus support units, a fourth regiment/brigade of infantry (in an armored division) or armor (in an infantry division), a field artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft defense regiment or battalion, and signals, engineer, reconnaissance, and chemical defense battalions or companies, plus combat service support units.[41][30]

Special operations forces

[edit]

The PLA first became interested in modern special warfare in the mid-1980s when it was shifting from the "People's War" to "active defense."[31] After the reform, PLA special operations forces are organized under the combined corps level, as special operations brigades (Chinese: 特战旅; pinyin: Tèzhànlǚ).[42] Special operation brigades provide organic deep reconnaissance and commando operation capability to the combined arms maneuver operations of their respective group armies, and they are highly specialized to operate in their specific theater. Different from Western-style special operations forces, PLAGF special operations brigades focus on operating in conventional military environments with missions focusing on Special Reconnaissance, target acquisition, Direct Action, sabotage, raids, and search and rescue.[43] The unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and internal security capability in China are covered by People's Armed Police (PAP) special operations units, instead of the military.[43]

Personnel

[edit]

Commissioned officers

[edit]

The current system of officer ranks and insignia was established in 1988. There are several paths to becoming a commissioned officer, such as joining a military academy, attending a reserve officer program, or a cadre selection program.[44]

Officers may use Comrade to formally address another member of the military ("comrade" plus rank or position, as in "comrade Colonel", "comrade battalion leader", or simply "comrade(s)" when lacking information about the person's rank, or talking to several service people.)[45]

Title 上将
Shang jiang
中将
Zhong jiang
少将
Shao jiang
大校
Da xiao
上校
Shang xiao
中校
Zhong xiao
少校
Shao xiao
上尉
Shang wei
中尉
Zhong wei
少尉
Shao wei
学员
Xue yuan
Equivalent translation General Lieutenant general Major general Senior colonel Colonel Lieutenant colonel Major Captain First lieutenant Second lieutenant Officer cadet
Shoulder insignia
Collar insignia

Enlisted personnel

[edit]

The current system of other ranks and insignia dates from 2022.[46] Sergeant and Corporal are referred to as non-commissioned officers. New recruits have no military ranks before the boot camp is completed, and they will be awarded the rank of private after they have graduated from the induction training.[47] According to Article 16 of Chapter 3 of the "Regulations on the Service of Active Soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army" (Chinese: 中国人民解放军现役士兵服役条例), "The lowest enlisted rank is Private".[47]

Conscripts[b] can be promoted to private first class in their second year. At the end of two years, conscripts may retire or become NCOs if they volunteer, though the position requires at least a high school diploma, specialized skills, or undertaking training courses.[50] They can also attend a military academy to become officers after evaluations.[44]

In 2014, the position of unit "master chief" or "sergeant major" was established to award experienced NCOs who can assist platoon, company, battalion, and higher commands in leadership and training responsibilities.[44]

Soldiers may use Comrade to formally address another member of the military ("comrade" plus rank or position, as in "comrade Sergeant", "comrade squad leader", or simply "comrade(s)" when lacking information about the person's rank, or talking to several service people.)[45]

Rank group 高级军士
Gāo jí jūn shì
中级军士
Zhōng jí jūn shì
初级军士
Chū jí jūn shì
义务兵
Yì wù bīng
Title 一级军士长
Yī jí jūn shì zhǎng
二级军士长
Er jí jūn shì zhǎng
三级军士长
Sān jí jūn shì zhǎng
一级上士
Yī jí shàng shì
二级上士
Er jí shàng shì
中士
Zhōng shì
下士
Xià shì
上等兵
Shàng děng bīng
列兵
Liè bīng
Equivalent translation Master Sergeant First Class Master Sergeant Second Class Master Sergeant Third Class Staff Sergeant First Class Staff Sergeant Second Class Sergeant Corporal Private First Class Private
Shoulder insignia
Collar insignia


Equipment

[edit]

Heavy equipment

[edit]
Type 99A main battle tank
IS-2 tanks on display at the 10th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 1959

The PLA Ground Force is heavily mechanized with armored platforms, advanced electronic warfare capability, concentrated firepower, and modern weapon systems that are competitive against Western counterparts.[42][43] The PLA ground force is divided into highly mechanized heavy, medium, and light combined arms units. Heavy combined arms brigades are armored with main battle tanks and tracked infantry fighting vehicles, medium combined arms brigades are armed with tracked or wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, and light combined arms brigades are mobilized with armored personnel carriers, MRAP trucks, or armored cars.[5]

At combined corps level, the PLAGF employs combined arms brigades, heavy artillery systems, medium-range air defense systems, special forces, army aviation units, and various engineering, and electronic warfare support systems. Weapon systems at this level include PLZ-05 howitzer, PCL-181 howitzer, PHL-03/16 multiple rocket launcher, and HQ-16 air defense system.[51] Air assets within the aviation brigade include Z-10 attack helicopter, Z-19 recon helicopter, and Z-20 utility helicopter, etc. Unmanned aerial systems are employed extensively in PLA formations of all types.[43]

At combined arms brigade level, brigade HQ can deploy various combined arms battalions composited with tanks, assault guns, and infantry fight vehicles (IFV) such as the ZTZ-99A tank, the ZBD-04A IFV, the ZBL-08 IFV, the ZTL-11 assault gun, and the CSK-181 MRAP fast-attack vehicle. Fire support, reconnaissance, and air defense battalion are equipped with PLZ-07, PLL-09, PCL-161/171 self-propelled artilleries, PHL-11, PHZ-11 multiple rocket launchers, AFT-9/10 missile carriers, PGZ-09/95, PGL-12/625, HQ-17/A air defense systems, and such as large amount of unmanned aerial vehicles.[43][42][52]

At battalion level, battalion HQ can direct tank company, assault gun company, mechanized infantry company, and firepower company (Chinese: 火力连; pinyin: Huǒlìlián) to provide rapid close-combat maneuver, with support assets including the PCP-001 rapid-firing mortar, PLL-05/PLZ-10 self-propelled gun-mortars, AFT-8 missile carrier, MANPADS, and crew-served weapon systems such as QJG-85 heavy machine gun, PP-87 or newer PBP-172 mortar, QLZ-04 automatic grenade launcher, and HJ-8E wire-guided missile.[31][38][53]

Under each mechanized infantry company are standard infantry platoons and a firepower platoon (Chinese: 火力排; pinyin: Huǒlìpái), which is equipped with lightweight mortar, anti-material rifle, 35 mm automatic grenade launcher, various rocket launcher, and heavy machine gun.[37][54] At platoon level, a mechanized infantry squad consists of nine infantrymen, in which seven members are dismounted during combat. Infantry squads vary in composition based on the type of combined arms battalions. Medium and light infantry squads equip reusable rocket launchers to improve anti-armor and anti-fortification capability, whereas heavy infantry squads have no squad-level rockets, instead relying upon fire support from the firepower platoon, or their own ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle.[43][42][53]

Weapons

[edit]

Individual and crew-served weapons

[edit]

The standard-issue rifle of PLA infantrymen is QBZ-95/191 chambered in proprietary 5.8×42mm, and the sidearm is QSZ-92 chambered in 5.8×21mm DAP92. Vehicle crews are equipped with QBZ-95B short-barreled carbine. The QCW-05 is a 5.8 mm submachine gun used by special forces and non-combat personnel. Sharpshooting is provided by the QBU-88/191 marksman rifle and QBU-141/202 sniper rifle. Indirect fire is provided by the QLG-10 grenade launcher. QBS-09 combat shotgun is issued for door breaching and close-quarters battle. The QJB-95 serves as the squad automatic weapon with its 75-round drum magazine.[55][53]

PF-89, PF-97, and DZJ-08 disposable rocket launchers could be distributed on an ad hoc basis to infantry squads for direct-fire applications. Specialized fire support weapons, often equipped with dedicated rocketeers, or members of the firepower platoons, include the HJ-12 anti-tank guided missile,[56] PF-98 rocket launcher, the QLZ-87 and QLZ-04 35 mm automatic grenade launcher, the QBU-10 anti-material rifle, QLU-11 sniper grenade launcher, QJG-02 anti-air machine gun, QJZ-89 heavy machine gun, and the PP-89/93 60 mm mortar.[43][54][53]

Infantry equipment and uniforms

[edit]
A PLAGF soldier armed with a QBZ-191 assault rifle and QSZ-92A pistol with Type-19 uniform in the 2021 International Army Games

In 2014, the cost to equip a single Chinese soldier is about 9,400 yuan (US$1,523). The standard kit includes Type 07 camouflage uniforms, helmet, tactical vest, gas mask, backpack, first-aid kit, infantry weapons, woven belt, rain cap, camouflaged uniform, kettle, and combat boots. However, regular infantrymen rarely use the issued body armor stored in the armory.[57][58] Prior to 2015, only deployed special operation detachments were equipped with body armor.[59]

The infantry equipment such as heavy body armor, personal radio, and knee pads has been seen in the standard kit in 2015 when PLA are deployed into high-risk areas, as observed for units participating in UN Peacekeeping and counter-piracy operations.[60] The PLA has started to procure body armors for soldiers on large scale since March 2020, with 1.4 million body armor on order, which includes 930,000 units of plates for universal bulletproof vests and 467,000 units of plates for an enhanced bulletproof vest.[61]

The Type 19 uniform with new xingkong digital camouflage patterns, tactical vest, backpack, protective gear, and eyewear started to replace Type 07 uniform series since 2019.[62] Along with the uniform, a new communication system, personal computer, tactical interface, and assault rifle family QBZ-191, new variants of the QSZ-92 pistol family, along with whole new sets of weapon systems are also being adopted by the PLAGF since 2019. These new upgrades are components of the new Integrated Soldier Combat System, a program aiming to overhaul the PLA's infantry equipment.[63][53]

Transformation

[edit]

In 1987, the PLAGF, which relied upon obsolescent but serviceable equipment, were most anxious to improve defenses against armored vehicles and aircraft.[4] Most equipments was produced from Soviet designs of the 1950s, but weapons were being incrementally upgraded, some with Western technology. One example of upgraded, Soviet-design equipment was the Type 69 MBT, an improved version of the Type 59 MBT, itself based on the Soviet T-54. The Type 69 had improved armor, a gun stabilizer, a fire control system including a laser rangefinder, infrared searchlights, and a 105 mm smooth-bore gun.

In 1987, the existence of a new, Type 80 MBT was revealed in the Western press. The tank had a new chassis, a 105 mm gun, and a fire control system. The PLA was believed to have atomic demolition munitions, and there were unconfirmed reports that it also had tactical nuclear weapons. In any case, nuclear bombs and missiles in the Chinese inventory could be used in a theater role.

The PLA had a scarcity of antitank guided missiles, tactical surface-to-air missiles, and electronics to improve communications, fire control, and sensors. China began production of the Soviet Sagger antitank missile in 1979 but lacked a more powerful, longer range, semiautomatic antitank guided missile. The PLA required a mobile surface-to-air missile and an infantry shoulder-fired missile for use against helicopters and certain other aircraft.[citation needed]

The PLAGF continues to undergo significant modernization and re-structuring to deal with potential threats and enhance their capabilities.[5] Front line troops such as special forces, marines and paratroopers are given priority in receiving modern weapon systems and equipment. Other areas of improvement are its battlefield C4ISR capabilities, with the introduction of satellite communications, wireless networks, and digital radios, army commanders are now able to maintain constant communications with their front-line units while on the move. The bulk of the ground forces have been regularly asked to operate under severe electronic countermeasures conditions in exercises. Also a network-centric warfare capability connecting different combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance elements to form an integrated network is being developed.[64][better source needed]

Equipment summary

[edit]

The PLAGF inventory maintains an array of military vehicles. All figures below are provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Auxiliary vehicles such as engineering vehicles, logistics vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles, as well as antiquated and reserved equipment are not included.[1]

Type Active
Main battle tanks 4,700[65]
Light tanks 1,250[65]
Assault guns 1,200[65]
Infantry fighting vehicles 8,060[65]
Armored personnel carriers 3,600[65]
Amphibious armored vehicles 750[65]
Anti-tank missile carriers 1,125[65]
Tank destroyers 480[65]
Towed anti-tank guns 1,308[65]
Self-propelled artillery 3,240<[65]
Towed artillery 900[66]
Self-propelled gun-mortars 1,250[66]
Multiple rocket launchers 1,390+[66]
Surface-to-air missile systems 754+[66]
Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns 270[66]
Towed anti-aircraft guns 7,126+[66]
Attack helicopters 320+[66]
Multi-role helicopters 208[66]
Transport helicopters 512[66]

Relationship with other organizations

[edit]
Troops of the People's Armed Police

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force maintains close relationships with several paramilitary organizations within China, primarily the People's Armed Police (PAP) and the Militia (also known as the China Militia). Both of these paramilitary organisations act as a reserve force for the PLAGF during a time of national emergency such as war or natural disaster. The PAP consists of approximately 1.5 million personnel. Their primary mission during peacetime is internal security and counter-terrorism.[67][68]

The Militia is a mass force engaged in daily production under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and forms part of the Chinese armed forces. Under the command of the military organs, it undertakes such jobs as war preparation services, security and defense operation tasks and assistance in maintaining social order and public security. The Militia numbers some 3 million service men and women.[69][70]

See also

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References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), formally designated as the Chinese People's Liberation Army Army (PLAA), constitutes the primary land warfare component of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the uniformed armed forces of the People's Republic of China under the absolute leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Comprising approximately 965,000 active personnel organized into maneuver, combat support, and service support units, it maintains the largest ground force inventory globally, emphasizing territorial defense, border security, and power projection capabilities within the Indo-Pacific theater. Tracing its origins to the 1927 , where communist forces initiated armed resistance against the , the PLAGF evolved through phases as the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' during the and subsequent conflicts, culminating in its formal establishment as the PLA's ground branch following the CCP's 1949 victory. Its historical roles included consolidating CCP control over , repelling invasions, and participating in limited interventions such as the and Sino-Indian border clashes, which underscored early doctrinal reliance on and human-wave tactics over technological superiority. Since the 2015-2016 military reforms initiated by CCP General Secretary , the PLAGF has undergone profound restructuring to transition from a quantity-focused, Soviet-influenced force to a leaner, joint-operations-oriented entity capable of integrated mechanized warfare, featuring 13 combined-arms corps, specialized brigades for amphibious and airborne operations, and enhanced logistics for sustained campaigns. These changes, including the abolition of seven military regions in favor of five theater commands aligned with strategic priorities like the Western Pacific and , prioritize informatization, precision strikes, and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) integration with PLA sister services, though persistent challenges in real-world combat experience and corruption purges highlight uneven progress toward .

History

Founding and Civil War Role (1927–1949)

The (CCP) established its first armed forces on August 1, 1927, during the , when communist elements within the mutinied against (KMT) leadership following the CCP-KMT alliance's collapse. Led by commanders including , , and , approximately 20,000 troops seized the city of in Province for several days before withdrawing southward amid KMT counterattacks; this event, though militarily unsuccessful, marked the inception of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army as the CCP's primary ground force precursor. The uprising's survivors, reduced to a few thousand, regrouped and expanded through subsequent actions, such as Mao Zedong's in September 1927, which mobilized peasants in and to form the First Workers' and Peasants' Army, emphasizing rural guerrilla warfare over urban proletarian focus. By 1928, disparate CCP units coalesced into the unified Chinese Workers' and Peasants' , operating from base areas like the established in 1931, where it grew from roughly 5,000 troops in 1929 to over 200,000 by 1933 through peasant recruitment and land redistribution policies that eroded KMT rural control. Facing five KMT encirclement campaigns from 1930 to 1934, the Red Army employed mobile defense tactics but suffered heavy losses, prompting the 1934–1935 —a 6,000-mile retreat of about 86,000 troops from to , where only around 8,000 survived, consolidating Mao's leadership and ideological emphasis on protracted . This period solidified the ground force's reliance on infantry-centric operations, political indoctrination, and adaptability in rugged terrain against superior conventional forces. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), the reorganized nominally under KMT command as the and , totaling about 50,000 at the 1937 truce, but operated independently in northern and , expanding to over 900,000 by 1945 via guerrilla ambushes and base area consolidation while avoiding direct confrontation with Japanese mechanized units. Postwar truce efforts collapsed by mid-1946, resuming the civil war; in 1947, CCP forces were redesignated the (PLA), focusing ground operations on encircling and annihilating KMT divisions through superior manpower and logistics derived from captured equipment. The PLA's decisive phase unfolded in 1948–1949 via three major campaigns: Liaoshen (September–November 1948), where 700,000 PLA troops defeated 550,000 KMT forces in , capturing key cities like ; Pingjin (November 1948–January 1949), securing and with minimal destruction; and Huaihai (November 1948–January 1949), involving 600,000 PLA soldiers against 800,000 KMT, resulting in over 500,000 KMT casualties or defections through coordinated infantry assaults and civilian militias disrupting supply lines. These victories, enabled by KMT overextension, , and command fragmentation, propelled the PLA—now exceeding 2 million regular troops—to cross the River in April 1949, capturing and forcing KMT remnants to by December, culminating in the CCP's mainland control.

Korean War and Early Cold War Expansion (1950–1976)

The Chinese intervention in the Korean War began on October 19, 1950, when units of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), re-designated as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (CPVA) to maintain plausible deniability against direct confrontation with the United States, crossed the Yalu River to support North Korean forces facing defeat by United Nations Command troops. Commanded by Peng Dehuai, the initial CPVA force consisted of approximately 250,000–300,000 personnel drawn primarily from PLAGF field armies, organized into infantry-heavy formations emphasizing human-wave tactics, night infiltration, and close-quarters combat suited to their light infantry equipment and limited mechanization. Over the course of the war, the total CPVA commitment reached about 1.35 million troops rotated through the theater, suffering heavy losses from UN air superiority, artillery, and frostbite, with official Chinese figures reporting 360,000 total casualties including 115,000 deaths. The intervention halted the UN advance at the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir in late 1950 and pushed forces south to the 38th parallel, though subsequent offensives stalled amid logistical strains and superior UN firepower, culminating in the armistice on July 27, 1953. Following the , the PLAGF underwent significant reorganization and expansion to address vulnerabilities exposed in Korea, such as inadequate mechanization and air support, while adopting Soviet-influenced structures amid heightened tensions with both the and the . By the mid-1950s, the PLAGF had demobilized some units to economic reconstruction needs but maintained a core strength of around 3 million active personnel, restructured into 13 military regions for territorial defense and rapid mobilization, with emphasis on mass infantry divisions capable of "" against potential invasions. Expansion continued into the , peaking at over 6 million troops by the mid-1970s, incorporating militia reserves and border defense forces to counter threats like U.S. alliances in and growing Soviet presence along the northern frontier. During the Crises of 1954–1955 and 1958, PLAGF units mobilized for potential amphibious assaults on Nationalist-held islands, conducting bombardments and supporting naval operations, though limited capacity prevented full-scale invasion. The PLAGF demonstrated operational effectiveness in high-altitude warfare during the of October–November 1962, launching coordinated offensives across the disputed and sectors with approximately 80,000 troops against outnumbered Indian forward positions. Employing surprise, superior acclimatization, and rapid maneuvers, PLAGF forces overran Indian defenses in days, advancing up to 50 kilometers in some areas before a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962, securing territorial gains while exposing India's logistical unpreparedness. Tensions escalated further in the 1969 , where on March 2, PLAGF troops ambushed a Soviet border patrol on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River, killing dozens and prompting Soviet counterattacks that inflicted hundreds of Chinese casualties over subsequent clashes. This calculated provocation, involving reinforced PLAGF divisions, aimed to assert border claims and deter perceived Soviet invasion threats amid the , leading to de-escalation through diplomacy but heightening PLAGF deployments along the 4,000-kilometer frontier. From 1966 to 1976, the PLAGF played a pivotal role in quelling domestic chaos during the , as directed military units to suppress Red Guard factions and restore order after widespread factional violence disrupted governance and production. Under Defense Minister , the PLAGF assumed administrative control over factories, schools, and revolutionary committees, expanding its political influence and integrating civilian-military structures, though this led to internal factionalism and purges following Lin's death in a 1971 plane crash. By Mao's death in 1976, the PLAGF had grown into a bloated, ideologically oriented force prioritizing loyalty over modernization, with its interventionist role underscoring the military's dual function in external defense and internal stability amid ideological campaigns that diverted resources from professional training.

Deng Era Reforms and Downsizing (1978–2000)

Following the and Mao Zedong's death in 1976, prioritized economic reforms, subordinating the (PLA) to civilian control by appointing loyalists to senior positions and curtailing the military's political autonomy. The PLA Ground Force, comprising the vast majority of personnel, faced scrutiny for inefficiencies exposed during the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, where outdated tactics, poor logistics, and inadequate training resulted in high casualties despite numerical superiority, prompting Deng to accelerate modernization efforts focused on quality over mass mobilization. In June 1985, Deng announced a 1 million troop reduction—approximately 25% of the PLA's active strength of 4.2 million, predominantly from the Ground Force—to streamline bloated structures, eliminate redundant headquarters, and redirect resources toward economic development while fostering a leaner, more professional force. This downsizing, completed by 1987, reduced Ground Force divisions from over 120 to about 80, emphasizing combined-arms brigades and cutting non-combat personnel, though implementation revealed persistent issues like corruption and resistance from entrenched officers. Accompanying the cuts, Deng shifted doctrine from Maoist "people's war" to preparing for "local wars under modern conditions," prioritizing mobility, firepower, and technological integration over human-wave assaults. Throughout the and , Ground Force reforms included enhanced officer training via expanded military academies, reduced emphasis on political relative to technical skills, and initial efforts at , though equipment upgrades lagged due to post-Tiananmen Western sanctions and budget constraints that dropped defense spending to under 2% of GDP. The Ground Force supplemented funds through commercial enterprises, which generated revenue but diverted focus from until partial divestment in the late . By 1997, under Deng's influence persisting into Jiang Zemin's leadership, an additional 500,000 cut was ordered, bringing total PLA strength to 2.5 million by 2000, with the Ground Force at roughly 2 million personnel organized into 40 active equivalents, setting the stage for further amid ongoing challenges in and high-tech capabilities.

Hu and Xi Era Modernization (2000–Present)

Under Hu Jintao's leadership from 2002 to 2012, the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) emphasized informatization as a core driver of modernization, shifting from manpower-intensive structures toward technology-enabled joint operations. In 2002, updated military strategic guidelines prioritized "local wars under informatized conditions," focusing on information superiority and system-of-systems integration to address perceived gaps exposed by conflicts like the . Hu's 2004 articulation of the PLA's "new historic missions" expanded ground force roles beyond territorial defense to include safeguarding overseas interests and non-traditional security tasks, such as and relief, while reinforcing loyalty to the . This era saw incremental equipment upgrades, including the 2001 introduction of the Type 99 main battle tank, which improved firepower, mobility, and protection over legacy systems like the Type 88, though production remained limited to elite units. Personnel numbered approximately 1.6 million active troops, with reforms targeting through enhanced officer education, standardized outlines in 2008, and anti-corruption measures to improve cadre quality. Training evolved to include multiservice exercises like the "LIANHE" series, emphasizing realistic scenarios under complex electromagnetic environments, though the PLAGF retained a continental defense orientation with persistent reliance on quantity over full technological parity. Xi Jinping's tenure from 2012 onward marked a profound restructuring of the PLAGF, prioritizing streamlined, -capable forces amid ambitions for mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization by 2027. In September 2015, Xi announced a 300,000-personnel cut—disproportionately impacting the ground forces—to eliminate redundancies and reallocate resources to high-tech domains, reducing active PLAGF strength from about 1.6 million to 965,000 by 2017. Structural reforms abolished the seven military regions in favor of five theater commands in 2016, aligning ground units under unified operations and subordinating the PLAGF as a distinct service to the Central Military Commission for better campaign-level coordination. "Brigadization" converted division-centric formations into 80 modular combined-arms brigades across 13 group armies, reducing corps from 18 to 13 to enable scalable, expeditionary maneuvers, while transferring non-combat functions like logistics to specialized forces. advanced to "informatized local wars" by 2014 and intelligentized warfare thereafter, integrating multi-domain operations with emphasis on information dominance and rapid strikes, as evidenced by 2023 Sword exercises showcasing long-range fires and amphibious assaults supported by unmanned systems. Equipment procurement accelerated, fielding indigenous systems like the for , PCH-191 multiple-launch rocket systems, and hybrid air defenses, alongside an inventory of 3,800 tanks and 7,600 pieces as of 2024, concentrated in theater commands facing . Six amphibious brigades—four in the —underwent specialized training for island-seizing operations, reflecting prioritization of cross-strait contingencies. Xi's drives, including the 2014 Gutian Conference revival of political work and removals of over 15 senior officers in 2023 alone, aimed to purge disloyalty but introduced leadership instability, potentially delaying implementation amid Xi's 2049 "world-class" military vision. By 2023, the PLAGF demonstrated enhanced mobility and firepower in trans-theater drills, though challenges persist in achieving full joint interoperability and combat-tested experience.

Organization and Command

Central Military Commission Oversight

The Central Military Commission (CMC) of the () serves as the supreme military command authority over the (PLA), including the (), ensuring direct leadership and operational control. Chaired by since 2012, the CMC maintains a organ under the constitution, but effective authority resides with the party structure, which directs all PLA activities through 15 subordinate functional departments. Current vice chairmen include , a combat veteran focused on modernization, and , promoted in October 2025 to oversee efforts after the expulsion of . The CMC's Joint Staff Department manages joint operations and training directives, while the Political Work Department enforces ideological loyalty via political commissars at units from level upward, embedding party committees to align forces with priorities. Oversight of the PLAGF, comprising approximately 965,000 personnel as of 2023, occurs through the PLAGF —established in —which handles force generation, equipping, and training under direct CMC guidance, separate from operational command. The PLAGF's 13 group armies and over 80 brigades are subordinated to five theater commands (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, Central), established in , which integrate ground forces with other services for regional contingencies like Taiwan scenarios, reporting tactical execution back to the CMC's Joint Operations Command Center. This structure emphasizes operations, with the CMC directing modernization toward mechanization and informatization, including upgrades to artillery and units like airborne brigades. CMC-directed reforms since 2015 have centralized authority by dissolving the PLA's former general departments and elevating theater-level joint control, reducing service branches' independent operational roles to enhance responsiveness. Recent adjustments, including the 2024 dissolution of the Strategic Support Force and creation of specialized forces like the Information Support Force, indirectly bolster PLAGF integration into , though corruption purges—such as the 2023 removal of over 15 senior officers—have disrupted equipment oversight and readiness. These measures underscore the CMC's dual focus on and capability, with annual mandates prioritizing realism to address identified deficiencies in "fake capabilities."

Theater Command Ground Forces

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) underwent significant reorganization in 2015–2016, transitioning from seven military regions to five theater commands to prioritize joint operations and regional contingencies. This reform established dedicated Ground Force headquarters under each theater command, subordinating operational control of group armies and brigades to theater leaders for wartime missions while maintaining administrative oversight by the PLAA headquarters in Beijing. The five theater commands—Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central—each oversee Ground Force components tailored to geographic threats. The , headquartered in , directs the 71st, 72nd, and 73rd Group Armies, focusing on potential operations across the and , with capabilities including amphibious and airborne units integrated for cross-strait contingencies. The in manages the 74th and 75th Group Armies, emphasizing patrols and amphibious training against Southeast Asian disputes. The , based in , controls the 76th and 77th Group Armies alongside Xinjiang and Military Districts (equivalent to 84th and 85th), prioritizing high-altitude warfare and border reinforcements against and Central Asian instability, with specialized and SOF units like Snow Leopards. in oversees the 78th, 79th, and 80th Group Armies, oriented toward Korean Peninsula tensions and Russian borders, incorporating heavy mechanized forces for cold-weather operations. The in commands the 81st and 82nd Group Armies as a , defending the capital and enabling rapid reinforcement to other theaters.
Theater CommandGroup ArmiesPrimary Focus Areas
Eastern71st, 72nd, 73rd,
Southern74th, 75th,
Western76th, 77th (plus Xinjiang/Tibet Districts) border,
Northern78th, 79th, 80thKorean Peninsula,
Central81st, 82ndCapital defense, strategic reserve
Each group army typically includes six combined-arms brigades (heavy, medium, or light ), supported by , air defense, , , and sustainment brigades, totaling around 40,000–50,000 personnel per army. Across all theaters, the PLAGF maintains approximately 80 combined-arms brigades and 965,000–1,040,000 active personnel, with theater-specific adaptations such as 30 combined-arms brigades and 427,000 troops allocated to Eastern and Southern commands for Taiwan-related preparations. This structure facilitates integrated joint maneuvers, as evidenced in exercises like Joint Sword 2023, though challenges persist in seamless inter-service coordination under centralized Central Military Commission authority.

Corps, Brigade, and Unit Structure

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) reorganized its structure during reforms launched in late 2015 and largely completed by 2017, transitioning from a division-based to a corps-brigade model to enhance modularity, joint operations, and rapid deployment capabilities under five s. Group armies function as the corps-level echelons, with 13 established and numbered from the 71st to the 83rd, each aligned to a specific for regional missions such as contingencies in the Eastern Theater or border defense in the Western Theater. These group armies oversee brigades (CABs) and supporting formations, integrating liaison elements from other PLA services like the and to facilitate combined-arms maneuvers. Combined arms brigades form the core maneuver units, totaling 76 to 81 across the PLAGF as of 2024, with each brigade typically comprising 4,500 to 5,000 personnel and structured for balanced integration of , armor, , , and anti-tank elements. CABs are classified by type to match terrain and operational needs:
TypeApproximate NumberCharacteristics
Heavy19Tracked armored vehicles for mechanized assaults; emphasized in flat terrains.
Medium19Wheeled armored platforms for balanced mobility and firepower.
38High-mobility for mountainous or airborne roles; includes motorized variants.
Amphibious6–11 (including )Specialized for littoral and island operations, concentrated in Eastern and Southern Theaters; three brigades transferred from PLAGF to PLA Navy Marine Corps in 2023.
Supporting brigades augment CABs at the group army level, including 15 artillery brigades for , 13 army aviation brigades for rotary-wing operations, and specialized units for , , air defense, sustainment, and forces. Distribution varies by theater, with the Eastern Theater holding about 18 CABs focused on amphibious capabilities and the Western Theater emphasizing and units for high-altitude borders. At the unit level, CABs incorporate combined arms battalions that blend homogeneous elements into modular subunits, typically including a headquarters company, or companies, an , reconnaissance elements, and logistics support to enable self-sustained operations. These battalions prioritize informatized warfare integration, with embedded unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare detachments, and anti-tank guided missiles for layered defense and offensive flexibility. Reforms have separated some engineer and chemical brigades for dedicated roles, reflecting adaptations observed in exercises like those along the since 2020.

Branches and Specialized Arms

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) organizes its forces into branches of service (兵种, bīngzhǒng), comprising for direct engagement and support arms for enabling operations. These include , armor, , air defense artillery, and as primary combat branches, alongside , communications, , and other specialized support elements. Following the 2015-2017 reforms, these branches are typically structured as dedicated brigades within the 13 group armies, facilitating modular combined-arms operations rather than rigid divisions. For instance, a standard group army includes an , air defense brigade, engineer brigade, and service support brigade, in addition to maneuver brigades integrating and armor. Infantry remains the core of PLAGF maneuver forces, emphasizing light, mechanized, and motorized variants equipped with small arms, anti-tank weapons, and increasingly networked systems for urban and mountainous terrain. Mechanized infantry, often paired with armored units in combined-arms brigades, utilizes vehicles like the ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle to enhance mobility and firepower. As of 2024, infantry brigades prioritize high-mobility tactics, with training focused on platoon-level combined-arms integration. Armored forces provide breakthrough and exploitation capabilities, fielding over 5,000 main battle tanks including modern Type 99 and Type 96 variants upgraded for beyond-visual-range engagements via active protection systems and networked sensors. Armored brigades, reduced from divisional structures post-reform, emphasize rapid deployment in theater commands, with recent introductions like the supporting amphibious and high-altitude operations. Artillery delivers precision fire support through field, rocket, and multi-launch systems, such as the capable of 300 km ranges with guided munitions. Each group army maintains a dedicated with self-propelled howitzers like the PCL-191, integrated into informatized warfare for real-time targeting via drones and satellites. Air defense artillery counters aerial threats with surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, including systems analogous to the Russian Tor-M1 for short-range protection of ground forces. These units operate in formations to shield maneuver elements, with emphasis on countering low-altitude drones and helicopters in contested environments. , established as a full in , operates over 1,000 helicopters including Z-20 utility, Z-10 attack, and Z-19 reconnaissance models for , transport, and electronic warfare. Aviation brigades support rapid insertion and fire coordination, with expansions enabling brigade-level organic air assets since the mid-2010s reforms. Support arms include engineering troops, which construct obstacles, bridges, and fortifications using equipment like the GSL-130 armored engineering vehicles; communications and electronic warfare units for secure networks and jamming; and forces trained in decontamination and protection. These specialized arms ensure operational sustainment, with engineering brigades per group army averaging 2,000-3,000 personnel focused on mobility in diverse terrains.

Doctrine and Operations

Evolution of Ground Force Doctrine

The doctrine of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) initially derived from Mao Zedong's principles of , which prioritized guerrilla tactics, protracted engagements, and the strategic of superior enemy forces through and mobile battles, as demonstrated in the . This approach emphasized luring enemies deep into Chinese territory to exploit terrain, logistics vulnerabilities, and numerical superiority via irregular formations, with limited due to resource constraints. Soviet advisory influence during the Korean War (1950–1953) prompted a temporary shift toward conventional, division-scale operations with integrated artillery and armor, incorporating positional defense and counteroffensives, though core reliance on human-wave assaults persisted amid equipment shortages. The 1960s Cultural Revolution reinforced Maoist irregular warfare tenets, de-emphasizing professionalization in favor of politically indoctrinated militia integration. However, the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict revealed doctrinal obsolescence against a mobile, mechanized adversary, resulting in high casualties from outdated infantry tactics and poor combined-arms coordination, catalyzing post-Mao reforms under Deng Xiaoping toward "active defense" for limited border wars with reduced emphasis on total mobilization. By the , PLAGF doctrine evolved to incorporate mechanized maneuver and forward defense at key points, framed as "people's war under modern conditions," integrating limited high-technology elements like improved tanks and artillery while retaining political work as a core enabler. The Gulf War's demonstration of precision-guided munitions and joint air-ground operations accelerated this shift, prompting Jiang Zemin's 1993 guidelines for "winning local wars" through combined-arms teams emphasizing depth, speed, and firepower over mass. Under , the 2004 update to "winning local wars under informatized conditions" prioritized , with ground forces integrating C4ISR systems for real-time data sharing, reconnaissance-strike complexes, and campaign-level systems destruction to disrupt enemy command structures. Xi Jinping's reforms since 2015 have further refined PLAGF doctrine within a joint framework, redefining active defense to enable offensive operations in regional contingencies like unification, emphasizing multi-domain integration where ground forces conduct mechanized assaults supported by precision fires, electronic warfare, and amphibious capabilities. This progression toward intelligentized warfare incorporates AI-driven decision aids, autonomous systems, and dissipative strategies to overwhelm adversaries through information dominance and adaptive algorithms, transitioning from mechanized attrition to systemic confrontation. Ground force exercises, such as those simulating high-intensity island seizures, reflect this doctrine's focus on rapid, joint maneuver against peer competitors, with theater commands directing brigade-level units in distributed operations.

Active Defense and People's War Concepts

The concept of , originating from Mao Zedong's theories during the and Anti-Japanese War, emphasizes protracted conflict through mass mobilization, guerrilla tactics, and luring superior enemies deep into Chinese territory to exhaust them before launching counteroffensives. This doctrine underpinned the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) from the of China's founding in 1949 through the early 1980s, prioritizing the integration of regular forces with militia and civilian support to achieve asymmetric advantages in total war. Core phases included strategic defensive operations, stalemate via attrition, and eventual counteroffensive, with the PLAGF relying on terrain familiarity and popular resistance rather than conventional superiority. In the , has evolved into a "new people's war" framework, incorporating informatization, cyber operations, and whole-of-nation mobilization, including reserves and civilian infrastructure, to sustain operations against high-tech adversaries. The PLAGF applies this through enhanced integration and national defense mobilization systems, established in 2016, enabling rapid scaling for territorial defense scenarios such as contingencies or coercion campaigns. PLA assessments describe it as an "ace weapon," shifting emphasis from sheer manpower to technological augmentation while retaining mass-based resilience. Active Defense, formalized as the PLA's overarching strategy in 1956 following the , maintains a defensive posture at the national strategic level while permitting offensive actions at operational and tactical levels to preempt or counter threats. Its guiding principle, reiterated in the 2019 , is "not to attack unless attacked, but to surely counterattack if attacked," focusing on rapid response, strategic deterrence, and integrated joint operations to safeguard . For the PLAGF, this translates to mobile warfare doctrines, where ground units conduct initial strategic defenses before transitioning to counteroffensives, as seen in doctrinal shifts toward combined-arms brigades optimized for high-mobility fires and precision strikes. These concepts interlink within PLAGF doctrine, with People's War providing the societal depth for Active Defense's operational execution, evolving from Mao-era guidelines through post-1991 adaptations to "local wars under informatized conditions" by 2004 and further to intelligentized warfare under Xi Jinping since 2014. The PLAGF's 80 combined-arms brigades, including 30 positioned near the Taiwan Strait as of 2023, exemplify this by training for trans-theater mobility, system-of-systems destruction, and joint integration with other services, prioritizing border defense and anti-access/area-denial roles over expeditionary offensives. Reforms since the 2015-2016 theater command restructuring have modularized PLAGF units for flexible deployment, balancing defensive preparations with capabilities for limited offensive campaigns in scenarios like the 2023 Joint Sword exercises.

Joint and Informatized Warfare Integration

The People's Liberation Army (PLAGF) has undergone significant structural changes since the 2015 military reforms to enable operations across services, shifting from a historically army-centric model to one where ground forces operate as components of theater-level integrated campaigns. These reforms abolished the seven military regions, establishing five theater commands that oversee from the , , Air Force, Rocket Force, and support elements under unified operational control, with the PLAGF providing maneuver elements subordinate to headquarters. This integration aims to facilitate campaign-level coordination, including ground assaults supported by air superiority, naval fires, and missile strikes, as evidenced by the PLA's emphasis on "integrated operations" in doctrinal publications. Informatized warfare, a core PLA concept since the early 2000s, drives PLAGF adaptation by prioritizing information dominance through networked systems-of-systems, where ground units leverage C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) for fusion and precision engagement. The PLAGF has incorporated digital command platforms, battlefield management systems, and integrated sensors into brigade-level structures, enabling "systems confrontation" that pits opposing networks against each other rather than isolated units. Reforms have embedded information support forces—derived from the Strategic Support Force—within theater commands to provide PLAGF units with cyber, electronic warfare, and space-based enablers, enhancing ground maneuver under contested electromagnetic conditions. Joint exercises, such as the 2023 Joint Sword series around , have tested PLAGF integration by simulating multi-domain operations, including long-range joint fires where ground forces coordinate with Rocket Force missiles and assets for suppression of enemy air defenses. Despite progress, assessments indicate persistent challenges in seamless , including command friction between services and vulnerabilities in PLAGF's legacy systems to network disruption, as highlighted in U.S. analyses of PLA training limitations. The 2024 establishment of specialized information and joint logistics support forces further aligns PLAGF operations with informatized principles, aiming for data-driven decision cycles in high-intensity conflicts.

Large-Scale Combat Preparations

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) has prioritized combat realism in training since the early 2010s, shifting from scripted drills to live-fire exercises under "actual combat conditions" that incorporate opposition forces, electronic warfare, and integration with civilian assets such as roll-on/roll-off vessels for amphibious rehearsals. This includes trans-regional maneuvers like the Stride series, with Stride-2009 mobilizing approximately 50,000 troops across four military regions for long-distance deployments, and Stride-2015 pitting mechanized brigades against simulated NATO-style opponents to test tactics. More recent efforts, such as the Eastern Theater Command's 2023 long-distance live-fire drills and the Southern Theater Command's amphibious operations near the , emphasize rapid mobilization and joint fires with the PLA Rocket Force and . In preparation for potential large-scale contingencies, particularly Taiwan-related scenarios, the PLAGF maintains 80 brigades, including six amphibious units (four in the Eastern Theater), trained for beach assaults and airborne insertions as part of island-landing campaigns that coordinate first-echelon seizures with second-echelon reinforcements via civilian shipping. Exercises like Joint Sword in April 2023 demonstrated this through coordinated strikes east of using PCH-191 rocket systems and long-range fires, while Strait Thunder-2025A in April 2025 evaluated operations spanning the , incorporating ground force elements in gray-zone and high-intensity simulations. The force's 965,000 active personnel, bolstered by transfers of three brigades to the PLA Navy Marine Corps in 2023, support doctrines of "systems confrontation" and multidomain precision warfare, focusing on disrupting enemy command, control, and in protracted conflicts. Bilateral drills, such as Zapad-2021 with involving large-scale airborne operations by PLAGF special operations forces and Northern/Interaction-2023 for Pacific patrols, enhance and expeditionary readiness, while domestic reforms like the 2023 military training system address deficiencies in joint competency. initiatives, including the 2016 Defense Transportation Law, enable scaling to over 3 million total forces for sustained operations through civilian integration. These preparations align with active defense principles, combining strategic posture defense with tactical offensives under theater commands established in 2016, though assessments note persistent challenges in untested high-intensity environments.

Special Operations Capabilities

PLA SOF Structure and Commands

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force special operations forces (PLAGF SOF) are organized into 15 brigades, each typically manned by 2,000 to 3,000 personnel and attached to one of the 13 group armies or select military districts under the five theater commands. These brigades lack a dedicated national-level command headquarters and instead fall under the operational control of theater army headquarters, which direct their employment in support of joint campaigns. Following the 2016 military reforms, authority over PLAGF SOF shifted to theater commanders, emphasizing integration with combined-arms units, aviation assets for insertion, and air force elements for airborne operations, though primary airborne responsibility remains with the PLA Air Force Airborne Corps.
Theater CommandAffiliated Group Army or Military DistrictSOF Brigade Designation
Northern78th Group ArmyTigers of the Northeast
Northern79th Group ArmyLions
Northern80th Group ArmyFalcons
Eastern71st Group ArmySharks
Eastern72nd Group ArmyThunderbolts
Eastern73rd Group ArmyDragons
Southern74th Group ArmyUnknown (coastal training noted)
Southern75th Group ArmySword
Western76th Group ArmySirius
Western77th Group ArmyCheetahs
WesternSnowy Owls
WesternSnow Leopards
Central81st Group ArmySacred Sword
Central82nd Group ArmyWhistling Arrows
CentralFormer 83rd Group ArmyFerocious Tigers
Brigade-level commands enable self-sufficient operations in , raids, and target designation, with each unit tailored to regional threats—such as high-altitude missions for Western Theater brigades or amphibious elements in the Southern Theater. Theater-level oversight facilitates joint exercises but excludes coordination with SOF, limiting broader internal security integration. As of late 2023, the reorganized at least one additional SOF from existing PLAGF units to bolster operational depth.

Missions and Training Regimens

The missions of People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) forces (SOF) focus on tactical and operational-level tasks to support conventional units, including to track and monitor key targets, raids to seize or disrupt critical nodes, and harassment of enemy rear areas, hostage rescue, and strikes against command-and-control elements or leadership. These units, comprising approximately 15 SOF brigades integrated into group armies across theater commands, prioritize infiltrating limited-defensive areas to paralyze enemy systems and guide precision firepower, with team sizes typically ranging from two or more personnel for to larger formations for . In contingency scenarios, PLAGF SOF are oriented toward clandestine infiltration for infrastructure attacks or leadership targeting, though their effectiveness remains constrained by dependence on conventional force enablers and absence of recent combat experience. Training regimens for PLAGF SOF emphasize "triphibious" capabilities—airborne, land, and maritime insertion—alongside physical endurance, weapons proficiency, and small-unit tactics conducted at specialized facilities such as the Queshan Combined Arms Training Base. Recruits and operators undergo airborne parachuting, rappelling, reconnaissance navigation, demolition, hand-to-hand combat, and secure communications drills, often spanning over one year and incorporating live-fire exercises with equipment like QBZ-191 rifles and unmanned aerial vehicles. Physical selection standards include cross-country running, climbing, swimming under load, and operating at least 15 advanced weapon systems, with all personnel required to qualify as airborne. Officer training occurs at the PLA Army Special Operations Academy in Guilin, which selected fewer than 270 high school graduates for entry in 2024 and hosts international forums to refine doctrines. Regimens integrate operations with conventional PLAGF elements, as seen in 73rd Group Army drills using helicopters in September 2020 and 74th Group Army coastal maneuvers in 2022, alongside multinational exercises with partners including (e.g., ) to build . Despite this emphasis on realistic scenarios, training prioritizes tactical support over independent strategic operations, reflecting doctrinal reliance on theater-level integration rather than autonomous deep-penetration missions.

Recent Reforms and Integration

In 2015, the (PLA) initiated sweeping structural reforms under , abolishing the seven military regions and establishing five theater commands to enhance joint operational across services, including the (PLAGF). This shift subordinated PLAGF units to theater-level joint commands, reducing the army's traditional dominance and promoting integration with the , , Rocket Force, and other branches for coordinated campaigns, particularly in regional contingencies like scenarios. The PLAGF underwent a parallel reorganization, transitioning from a division-centric structure to 13 group armies comprising modular brigades optimized for mobility, firepower, and . Between 2015 and 2017, approximately 300,000 personnel were cut, streamlining and emphasizing over , while brigades incorporated aviation, artillery, and reconnaissance elements for self-sustained operations within joint frameworks. Amphibious brigades, for instance, were modernized post-2017 to support island-seizing missions, integrating with naval and air assets through standardized training regimens. Integration efforts intensified with a focus on informatized and , including the placement of rotary-wing aviation assets under PLAGF command to enable organic in ground-centric operations, contrasting with air force-dominated models in other . Exercises since 2017 have tested PLAGF units in multi-domain scenarios, such as air-ground coordination and network-centric maneuvers, though official PLA assessments acknowledge persistent weaknesses in seamless inter-service synergy. By April 2024, further reforms established specialized forces like the Information Support Force to unify cyber, electronic warfare, and data operations across PLA branches, embedding PLAGF units into theater-level networks for "intelligentized" warfare incorporating AI and unmanned systems. These changes, building on 2025 adjustments to officer training, aim to elevate PLAGF contributions in large-scale joint combat, though implementation challenges persist due to entrenched service loyalties and untested real-world efficacy.

Personnel System

Officer Commissioning and Ranks

Officers in the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) are commissioned primarily through graduation from PLA military academies, where candidates undergo combined academic, technical, and military training tailored to ground force roles such as , armor, , and engineering. High school graduates are recruited annually via competitive national examinations, tests, and political reliability assessments, entering four-year undergraduate programs that award bachelor's degrees upon completion; successful cadets are then commissioned as second lieutenants (少尉) or (中尉), with assignments based on specialization and performance rankings. College graduates and civilians with relevant degrees are also recruited for abbreviated training programs, typically 1-2 years, focusing on leadership and tactical skills before commissioning at or level. Enlisted personnel can ascend to officer ranks via promotion pathways, including part-time study at military institutions or dedicated NCO-to-officer programs, though this route emphasizes demonstrated or operational experience alongside . Post-2015 reforms under the Central Military Commission have prioritized educational quality in commissioning, mandating higher entry standards and integrating advanced degrees for mid- and senior-level officers to foster technical expertise in areas like informatized warfare and joint operations. These changes, implemented progressively through , adjusted officer grade structures to better align ranks with command responsibilities in theater commands, reducing redundancies from the prior military region system and curbing by tying promotions more strictly to merit, completion, and performance evaluations rather than seniority or connections. By 2025, commissioning processes incorporated enhanced recruitment quotas for specialized tracks, such as cyber and engineering officers, with new academies like the PLA Ground Forces Academy in established to centralize ground force-specific . The PLAGF rank structure mirrors the PLA's unified officer hierarchy, divided into junior, field-grade, and general categories, with featuring stars on shoulder boards and collar patches denoting ground force affiliation. Promotions occur through centralized reviews by the CMC, requiring minimum service times—typically 2-3 years per junior rank and longer for seniors—combined with mandatory rotations, education, and loyalty oaths to the .
CategoryEnglish RankChinese RankInsignia Description
Junior Officers少尉One star on shoulder
中尉Two stars on shoulder
上尉Three stars on shoulder
Field OfficersMajor少校One broad stripe with stars
中校Two broad stripes with stars
上校Three broad stripes with stars
General OfficersMajor General少将One star with wreath
中将Two stars with wreath
General上将Three stars with wreath
This system, restored in after a without formal ranks, supports a total active officer corps estimated at around 200,000 in the PLAGF as of 2023, with billets capped to streamline command layers.

Conscription, Enlistment, and Retention

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) maintains a personnel system grounded in compulsory law, though implementation emphasizes voluntary enlistment due to adequate applicant pools. China's Military Service Law mandates registration for active service among male citizens reaching age 18 by December 31 annually, with a standard two-year term for army conscripts, reduced from three years via amendments to address shortfalls. In practice, selective has not been broadly enforced since 1949, as volunteer numbers suffice to meet quotas, particularly for the PLAGF as the PLA's largest branch. Recruitment occurs biannually—spring for university graduates and fall for high school completers—to align with academic cycles, a shift formalized in 2020. Enlistment criteria prioritize physical fitness, educational attainment (typically or higher), and political reliability, including loyalty to the , assessed through background checks and ideological vetting. Applicants undergo medical examinations, aptitude tests, and interviews, with preferences for those from rural areas or with technical skills amid modernization drives. Recent 2023 revisions to regulations expanded flexibility, permitting the Central Military Commission to adjust requirements post-mobilization orders and allowing retired personnel re-enlistment for specialized roles like cyber and operations, though ground force intake remains focused on and mechanized units. Corruption in recruitment persists, with reports of undermining , prompting intensified oversight. Retention strategies aim to transition conscripts into long-term volunteers or non-commissioned officers, offering incentives such as cash bonuses, housing subsidies, and promotion pathways after initial service, with eligible personnel able to extend up to 16 years total. The PLAGF faces persistent challenges, including talent attrition as skilled graduates opt for lucrative civilian jobs amid slowing economic growth, leading to shortfalls in technical roles despite propaganda campaigns and benefit hikes. U.S. assessments highlight ongoing difficulties in attracting and retaining educated personnel capable of operating advanced systems, exacerbated by a two-year conscript cycle limiting expertise development. Beginning in 2025, targeted reforms for special operations units seek to bolster non-commissioned officer retention through enhanced training and accessions.

Training, Education, and Professionalization Challenges

Despite significant reforms since 2015, the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) faces persistent challenges in achieving a fully professionalized force, particularly in balancing conscript reliance with noncommissioned officer (NCO) development and prioritizing combat skills over political indoctrination. Conscription remains central, with approximately 700,000 conscripts comprising a substantial portion of the roughly 2 million active-duty personnel, serving two-year terms following only three months of basic training, which limits operational experience and unit cohesion. The shift to semiannual recruitment cycles in 2021 has improved year-round readiness to about 75% minimally trained troops but introduces disruptions, as spring and fall cohorts often exhibit interpersonal frictions and varying competency levels, resulting in only 50-75% of units being fully competent at any given time. NCO professionalization lags, with PLAGF NCOs averaging less field experience than counterparts in peer militaries; for instance, intermediate-grade NCOs have about three fewer years of service compared to U.S. equivalents, as noted in a 2022 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission assessment. Initial NCO training lasts 6-12 months, focused more on technical certifications—such as weapon repair since 2009—than , with promotion courses adding just 1-5 months, amid concerns over reduced educational capacity due to systemic cuts. Retention remains problematic, particularly for college-educated personnel enticed by civilian hiring preferences, leading to NCO ranks often filled by underperformers with limited prospects outside the military. Corruption in exacerbates issues, persisting despite campaigns, and is worsened by economic factors like 19.3% in June 2022, which affects enlistee caliber. Professional military education (PME) access for NCOs is deficient, with reforms attempting to expand it but constrained by the Chinese Communist Party's emphasis on political loyalty, which diverts resources from tactical and strategic training. The PLAGF's last major combat experience was the 1979 , leaving a legacy of untested doctrines and debatable training realism, as training prioritizes upholding rule over high-intensity warfighting proficiency. This tension—requiring professionalization for effectiveness while subordinating the military to Party control—creates inherent dilemmas, as deeper risks diluting ideological fidelity. Recent 2022 regulations on NCO ranks and promotions aim to address these gaps by clarifying paths and incentives, but implementation challenges, including low leadership efficacy, indicate slow progress toward a capable enlisted backbone.

Equipment Inventory

Armored Vehicles and Main Battle Tanks

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) maintains an inventory of approximately 3,800 tanks, encompassing main battle tanks and light tanks, as of mid-2024. This fleet supports the PLAGF's 80 combined-arms brigades, with heavy emphasis on tracked vehicles in mechanized units for high-intensity operations. Modernization prioritizes enhanced firepower, protection, and mobility, transitioning from legacy systems like the Type 59 to indigenous third-generation designs, though exact breakdowns by variant remain classified and subject to varying open-source estimates. Main battle tanks form the core of PLAGF armored capabilities, with the Type 99 series serving as the most advanced platform. The Type 99A variant, operational since the early , features a 125 mm gun with , composite/reactive armor, and laser-based active protection systems for countering anti-tank guided missiles. Estimates indicate over 1,300 Type 99 tanks produced since 2001, primarily equipping elite heavy combined-arms brigades. The Type 96 series, an upgraded second-generation design derived from the Type 88, equips the bulk of PLAGF tank units with similar 125 mm armament but less advanced fire control and protection; production estimates exceed 2,000 units, making it the numerical mainstay for . Light tanks complement heavy MBTs in terrain-specific roles. The Type 15 (ZTQ-15), introduced around 2018, weighs approximately 33-36 tons and mounts a 105 mm rifled gun, prioritizing air-transportability and rapid deployment in mountainous or island scenarios; estimates range from 500 to 1,000 units, reflecting expansion for high-altitude and amphibious contingencies. Beyond tanks, the PLAGF employs and for troop mobility and . The series, a tracked IFV, carries seven with a 30 mm and HJ-73/89 anti-tank missiles, supporting in combined-arms formations; several hundred are estimated in service. The amphibious ZBD-05, used in select units, enables water-crossing operations with similar armament scaled for marine environments. Wheeled vehicles like the ZBL-08 /IFV provide versatility in medium combined-arms brigades, armed with 30 mm guns and missiles for lighter, faster deployments. Overall tracked armored fighting vehicles number in the thousands, though legacy platforms persist in reserves.
Vehicle TypeRoleKey FeaturesEstimated Inventory
Type 99AMBT125 mm gun, active protection~1,300
Type 96MBT125 mm gun, improved Type 88 base>2,000
Type 15105 mm gun, air-transportable500–1,000
IFV30 mm cannon, ATGMHundreds

Artillery Systems and Heavy Weapons

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) fields an extensive array of systems integral to its of integrated joint fires, with an estimated total of 7,600 pieces across the as of 2024, including tube and multiple launch systems (MLRS). These assets are organized into 15 brigades subordinate to group armies, emphasizing mobility, precision, and long-range strike capabilities to support theater operations, particularly in scenarios like cross-strait contingencies. Modernization efforts prioritize self-propelled and wheeled systems over legacy towed guns, incorporating anti-drone measures and modular designs informed by observations of conflicts such as . Self-propelled howitzers constitute a core component, enabling rapid deployment and sustained fire in combined-arms maneuvers. The , a 155 mm tracked , serves as the primary system, featuring a 52-caliber barrel capable of firing NATO-standard with ranges up to 40 km using conventional rounds and extended reach with rocket-assisted projectiles. Complementing it is the , a 6x6 wheeled 155 mm/52-caliber mounted on a truck chassis, weighing 25 tons and crewed by six personnel, with a maximum range of 40 km for standard projectiles and up to 45 km with base-bleed rounds; its elevation from -3° to +70° supports high-angle fire. These systems have been integrated into Marine Corps training exercises, demonstrating interoperability with and armor. Towed artillery, such as older 152 mm systems, persists in reserves but is being phased out in favor of mobile platforms to enhance survivability against . MLRS provide standoff precision strikes, with the (also designated PCH-191) representing a modular advancement deployable from platforms. This system launches 300 mm rockets to 130 km or 370 mm guided variants to 300 km, and 750 mm missiles reaching 500 km, outranging equivalents like the U.S. HIMARS and enabling saturation of area targets or deep strikes, as demonstrated in 2022-2023 exercises simulating scenarios. Its flexibility supports both unguided salvos and guided munitions for reduced collateral effects. Heavy weapons augment with anti-armor and close-support roles, including the ZTL-11 105 mm self-propelled , which integrates into light mechanized units for against armored threats. Overall, PLAGF modernization aligns with 2049 goals for mechanized forces, though challenges like probes in 2023 have delayed some procurements.
SystemTypeCaliberMax RangeKey Features
Tracked SPH155 mm40+ km52-cal barrel, NATO ammo compatible
Wheeled SPH155 mm40-45 km6x6 chassis, 6-8 rpm fire rate
Truck MLRS300-750 mm130-500 kmModular pods, precision-guided options

Small Arms, Gear, and Uniforms

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) employs a mix of legacy and modernized small arms, with ongoing transitions reflecting efforts to enhance lethality and modularity. The primary remains the family, a 5.8x42mm design adopted in 1995, though fielding of the conventional-layout began in 2019 for select units, expanding to regular ground forces by 2023. The , chambered in the same but with improved DBP-191 for better terminal performance, features Picatinny rails for and accessories, addressing limitations in the 's and customization. Support weapons include the QJB-95/QJB-201 light machine guns and /QBU-191 rifles, with the latter variants integrated into the ecosystem for unified logistics. Standard sidearms consist of the , introduced in the late 1990s in 9mm or 5.8mm variants, equipped with a rail for aiming devices. Officers and specialized personnel may carry the compact QSZ-11, adopted around 2011 for and reduced weight. While full replacement of older systems like the Type 56 AK variant persists in reserves, frontline units prioritize indigenous 5.8mm calibers to optimize penetration and controllability over 5.56mm standards. Infantry gear emphasizes modular protection and load-bearing systems, with procurement accelerating post-2015 beyond forces. In , the PLAGF initiated acquisition of 1.4 million plate sets, capable of stopping 7.62mm rounds, to equip frontline brigades amid Taiwan contingency preparations. Helmets have shifted from steel GK80 models to Kevlar-based Type 19 (QGF-19) designs, resembling MICH standards with rails for and modular liners for enhanced ballistic resistance. Load-bearing vests, such as Type 19 iterations, integrate plate carriers with webbing for ammunition, radios, and medical kits, though widespread adoption varies by unit readiness. Uniforms transitioned to the Type 21 series in late 2021, featuring the Xingkong ("Starry Sky") multi-terrain camouflage pattern developed in 2019 for , , and urban environments across PLA branches. These flame-retardant, quick-drying fabrics include combat shirts, trousers, and specialized variants like cold-weather parkas, paired with improved boots for mobility. The design prioritizes concealment over the prior digital patterns, with simplified variants reducing logistical variants while maintaining durability in diverse operational theaters.
CategoryKey EquipmentCaliber/FeaturesAdoption Notes
Assault Rifle5.8x42mm DBP-191; modular railsFielding from 2019, replacing in priority units
Pistol9mm/5.8mm; 15-20 roundsStandard issue since 1990s
HelmetType 19 (QGF-19) composite; NVG compatibleModern replacement for steel helmets
Body ArmorType 19 platesNIJ Level IV equivalent1.4M units procured 2020+
UniformType 21 XingkongMulti-spectrum camoIssued from December 2021

Logistics and Support Equipment

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) relies on a diverse fleet of logistical vehicles exceeding 121,000 units to enable mobility, supply distribution, and sustainment for its mechanized brigades and group armies. Primary transport assets include the (Mengshi) series light utility vehicles, which offer 4x4 high-mobility configurations with a 1.5-ton , diesel , and adaptations for troop carriage, , or towed support; these entered widespread service post-2000, drawing design cues from foreign high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles while incorporating indigenous enhancements for rough terrain. Heavier logistics are handled by third-generation trucks from manufacturers like and Dongfeng, with 8x8 models achieving 20-ton , central tire inflation systems, and nuclear-biological-chemical protection; deliveries to units such as the commenced around 2020 to address high-altitude and long-haul requirements. These vehicles support multimodal operations, including rail-to-road transfers, but exercises reveal supplementary use of requisitioned civilian flatbed trucks for oversized loads like main battle tanks, indicating gaps in dedicated heavy-lift capacity. Engineering and construction equipment forms a critical subset, integrated within dedicated engineer brigades across the PLAGF's 13 group armies, emphasizing rapid obstacle breaching, bridging, and for multi-domain assaults. Tracked systems predominate, often chassis-derived from Type 59 or Type 79 tanks, including minefield breaching vehicles equipped with rocket-assisted line charges for explosive gap creation up to 100 meters; wheeled variants handle mobility tasks like route clearance. Pontoon and assault bridging units enable river crossings for armored formations, with modular designs supporting 50-ton loads over 100-meter spans, as tested in theater-level drills. Fuel and carriers, typically soft-skinned or configurations, prioritize volume over protection, with capacities scaled to brigade-level needs—e.g., 10,000-liter tankers for diesel resupply. Recovery vehicles, such as those based on hulls with 70-ton winches, facilitate battlefield repairs, though maintenance remains hampered by over 40 legacy vehicle types spanning decades, leading to skill shortages among junior technicians and practices like manual logging. Under the 2016-established Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), with roughly 100,000 personnel across five regional centers, PLAGF support equipment benefits from centralized procurement and integration, allowing civilian firms to augment transport via rail, road, and modified ferries for amphibious or Taiwan-oriented scenarios. Modernization efforts emphasize digital inventory tracking and modular repairs, reducing engine overhaul times by over two hours through standardized teams, yet U.S. assessments highlight enduring weaknesses: insufficient long-haul sustainment for expeditionary campaigns, dependency on fixed , and corruption-driven disruptions, with 15 senior logistics officers purged in 2023 alone. These limitations stem from historical prioritization of mass over projection, constraining PLAGF effectiveness beyond regional theaters despite numerical scale.

Modernization and Reforms

Key Reform Milestones (2015–2025)

In November 2015, Chinese leader announced sweeping military reforms, establishing the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), also known as the PLA Army, as a distinct service under the Central Military Commission while initiating troop reductions and structural reorganization to prioritize joint operations and mechanization. These changes abolished the four general departments and replaced seven military regions with five joint theater commands—Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central—to streamline for regional contingencies. The reforms deactivated five of the existing 18 group armies, shifting emphasis from large-scale divisions to modular combined-arms brigades capable of rapid deployment. By 2017, the PLAGF completed a major downsizing, cutting approximately 300,000 personnel primarily from ground forces, reducing active-duty strength to around 965,000 by 2023. The force restructured into 13 group armies (numbered 71st to 85th), each comprising 80 combined-arms brigades nationwide, alongside 15 brigades and 13 brigades, designed for integrated mechanized operations and theater-level joint fires. This brigadization enhanced flexibility, with five group armies allocated to the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands for potential operations, including specialized amphibious and forces. In 2022, three PLAGF brigades were transferred to the Marine Corps, expanding it to 11 brigades and adding roughly 55,000 personnel, reflecting a broader shift toward maritime and expeditionary capabilities while streamlining ground force specialization. By April 2024, Xi directed further restructuring to bolster information dominance, integrating advanced elements into PLAGF units for multi-domain operations. Beginning in 2025, the PLAGF introduced adjustments to officer commissioning and retention policies, particularly for forces, to address personnel quality and sustainment amid ongoing modernization toward 2049 goals. These milestones, drawn from U.S. Department of Defense assessments, underscore a transition from quantity-focused to quality-driven, technology-enabled forces, though implementation challenges persist in achieving full operational integration.

Technological and Structural Changes

In 2015, the (PLA) launched sweeping structural reforms under , abolishing the seven military regions and establishing five theater commands to enhance joint operational , with the (PLAGF) reorganized into 13 corps designed for integrated rather than rigid regional defense. These changes reduced the overall PLA by 300,000 personnel, disproportionately cutting ground forces from approximately 2.3 million active troops to emphasize multi-domain capabilities, while centralizing authority under the Central Military Commission to streamline decision-making and reduce bureaucratic silos. By April 2024, further restructuring focused on information dominance, integrating PLAGF units more deeply into network-centric structures to support "system-of-systems" operations across services. Technologically, the PLAGF achieved full by 2020, transitioning from infantry-heavy formations to armored and wheeled vehicle-equipped brigades, with over 6,000 main battle tanks including upgraded Type 99A variants featuring advanced fire-control systems, composite armor, and 125mm smoothbore capable of firing guided projectiles. The introduction of the Type 15 in 2018, weighing 33-36 tons with a 105mm and high-altitude adaptations, addressed terrain-specific needs in regions like the , enabling rapid deployment via . Prototypes of hybrid-electric Type 99A derivatives emerged by mid-2025, incorporating diesel-electric propulsion for reduced thermal signatures and extended endurance in stealth-oriented maneuvers. Digitization efforts have advanced C4ISR integration, with PLAGF units adopting tactical data links, satellite communications, and unmanned aerial systems for real-time battlefield awareness, though challenges persist due to legacy equipment and fragmented networks. The shift toward "intelligentized" warfare since 2020 emphasizes AI-driven decision aids, autonomous ground vehicles, and , tested in exercises like the 2023 Joint Sword drills, aiming to offset qualitative gaps in combat experience through algorithmic superiority. U.S. assessments note hardware parity with Western systems in select areas but highlight shortfalls in reliable integration under contested conditions.

Indigenous Development and Acquisitions

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) has accelerated indigenous development of ground combat systems since the mid-2010s, driven by national policies emphasizing in military technology to support joint operations and regional contingencies. State-owned enterprises like have led efforts to produce advanced armored vehicles, , and support equipment, integrating domestic engines, sensors, and munitions that reduce dependence on imported components. This shift aligns with the 2015 military reforms, which restructured to prioritize from Chinese research institutes and factories, enabling rapid iteration based on operational testing. Key advancements include main battle tanks, with the Type 99A (ZTZ-99A) exemplifying mature domestic design capabilities. Initiated under China's eighth five-year plan in 1989 and refined through iterative upgrades, the Type 99A features a 125mm gun, composite-reactive armor, and active protection systems, achieving speeds over 80 km/h with a 1,500 hp engine. Serial production ramped up post-2011, yielding an estimated 350 units by 2025, supplemented by 2025 trials of hybrid-electric powertrains for enhanced stealth and torque. These tanks equip elite combined-arms brigades, reflecting PLAGF doctrine for high-mobility mechanized warfare. Artillery modernization has focused on wheeled and tracked rocket systems for precision fires, such as the (), a modular truck-mounted multiple launch developed by a Chinese ground weapons firm. Capable of firing 300mm or 370mm guided rockets up to 350 km, it supports rapid reloads and network-centric targeting, with variants demonstrated in 2025 exercises simulating strikes on distant targets. The wheeled PCH191 variant extends PLAGF reach for cross-strait operations, marking an evolution from older systems through improved mobility and munitions. Acquisitions remain predominantly domestic, with PLAGF procuring thousands of indigenous platforms annually from production lines in facilities like those in and . Foreign imports have dwindled since the , limited to niche components amid export controls, though reverse-engineering of past systems informs designs; for instance, no major recent army-specific buys from or others are reported, underscoring a pivot to in-house supply chains for sustainability. Infantry modernization includes the rifle family, adopted in 2025 parades with 5.8mm caliber and modular optics, produced at scale for brigade-level issue.

Assessments of Progress and Shortfalls

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) has achieved notable progress in structural reforms since the 2015-2016 reorganization, transitioning from seven military regions to five joint theater commands to enhance operational coordination and joint operations across domains. This restructuring reduced active personnel to approximately 1,040,000, with a focus on modular brigades—totaling 80 such units, including 13 group armies—and emphasized and informatization toward a 2027 benchmark for integrated capabilities. Equipment modernization has advanced, with inventories including 3,800 tanks and 7,600 artillery pieces, alongside fielding of indigenous systems like the rifle, howitzers, and PGZ-07 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, supporting enhanced firepower and mobility in theater commands such as the Eastern and Southern. Training reforms have prioritized realistic joint exercises, including amphibious assaults, long-range fires demonstrations (e.g., PCH-191 launches in the 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise), and forces (SOF) integration, with all PLAGF SOF units now airborne-capable and supported by Y-20 transports. These efforts, coupled with transfers of three brigades to the Marine Corps in 2023, have bolstered amphibious readiness, with six dedicated brigades for high-priority operations. Progress toward "intelligentization" includes adoption of drones, electronic warfare systems, and multi-domain tactics in exercises like Lianqin Shiming and Landun, aiming to address gaps in informationized warfare. Despite these advances, shortfalls persist in proficiency, as evidenced by the "Five Incapables"—officers' inability to accurately situations, understand higher intentions, make operational decisions, deploy forces, or unexpected events—which undermines decentralized command in complex scenarios. has eroded trust, with investigations removing 15 senior PLAGF officers between and December 2023, delaying equipment modernization (e.g., transferred Marine Corps units retaining legacy gear until 2024 updates) and potentially jeopardizing 2027 goals. vulnerabilities remain acute, particularly for sustained operations beyond garrisons or the , due to reliance on nascent joint support forces, limited long-distance sustainment, and opaque decision-making that fosters over adaptive . Qualitative deficiencies include inadequate urban warfare capabilities, insufficient commander experience in joint operations, and persistent "peacetime diseases" like lax training attitudes, limiting effectiveness in high-intensity conflicts such as a Taiwan contingency where force attrition, landing constraints, and international responses pose risks. Bureaucratic inertia and ideological oversight further constrain proactive reforms, with unclear command hierarchies impeding horizontal coordination across services.

Capabilities Assessment

Quantitative Strengths and Force Posture

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF), designated as the PLA Army (PLAA), comprises approximately 1,040,000 active personnel as of 2024, forming the largest service within the (PLA). This personnel strength supports a force posture oriented toward territorial defense and regional power projection, primarily through five theater commands: Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central. The structure prioritizes joint operations, with ground forces integrated into theater-level commands to address contingencies such as those in the and along the with . PLAGF organization centers on 13 group armies subdivided into modular combined-arms brigades, enabling flexible deployment and combined-arms maneuver. These include 80 combined-arms brigades, 15 artillery brigades, 13 army aviation brigades, and additional specialized units such as , airborne, and forces. Distribution across theaters reflects strategic priorities, with the allocating 18 combined-arms and amphibious brigades across its three group armies, and the fielding 12 combined-arms brigades plus two amphibious and two brigades. Key equipment inventories underscore quantitative advantages in armored and fires capabilities:
Equipment CategoryEstimated Inventory (2024)
Main Battle Tanks3,800
Artillery Pieces7,600
These assets equip heavy, medium, and light brigades for mechanized operations, with concentrations in forward theaters enabling rapid massing of forces. Reserve forces add depth, though their equipment remains largely outdated, contributing to an overall ground force posture of approximately 3 million personnel including reserves and paramilitaries.

Qualitative Factors: Training and Readiness

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) has intensified efforts to improve realism and joint operational proficiency as part of broader military reforms initiated in the , with a new system introduced in 2021 to emphasize actual conditions, confrontation exercises, and multi-domain integration involving , armor, , and aviation assets. These reforms address historical deficiencies in , shifting from scripted drills to scenarios, including live-fire exercises and airborne operations, as evidenced by the April 2023 JOINT SWORD exercise, which demonstrated coordinated long-range fires using PCH-191 rocket launchers in response to contingencies. Joint maneuvers with other PLA services, such as the August 2023 integration of PLAGF units with PLAN and PLAAF for anti-submarine and vessel-aircraft operations, further underscore progress in tactics. Amphibious and training have received particular emphasis, with six dedicated brigades—four in the and two in the —conducting large-scale assaults in 2023 to refine rapid loading, beach landings, and integration with civilian shipping for potential operations. forces (SOF) training incorporates advanced skills like close-quarters combat, survival, and drone usage, supported by equipment such as rifles and CSK-series vehicles, though centralized command structures limit tactical flexibility. International engagements, including the 2021 ZAPAD exercise with featuring Y-20 airborne drops and multinational drills in November 2023, provide additional exposure, yet these remain limited in scope compared to unilateral efforts. Regulations approved in July 2022 aimed to bolster management and recruiting to sustain these initiatives. Despite these advancements, U.S. assessments identify persistent qualitative gaps in PLAGF readiness, including the "Five Incapables"—deficiencies in situational judgment, decision-making, deployment, command, and staff work—along with challenges in long-distance logistics, , and joint proficiency under combat stress. The absence of recent combat experience since the 1979 hampers evaluation of performance in high-intensity conflict, while extensive political , mandated by Central Military Commission directives following the October 2022 20th Party Congress, diverts time from tactical drills and reinforces loyalty to the over warfighting skills. purges, such as the removal of 15 senior leaders between July and December 2023, have disrupted equipment procurement and training continuity, exacerbating doubts about operational effectiveness. Reserve forces, centralized under the CMC in 2020, suffer from outdated gear, further limiting surge capacity. Analysts argue that the PLA's foundational orientation toward regime protection, rather than external aggression, inherently constrains incentives for true combat preparation. Recent drills like Strait Thunder-2025A in April 2025 highlight ongoing focus on scenarios but reveal reliance on scripted joint operations that may not fully replicate adversarial conditions.

Combat Experience and Historical Performance

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) gained its primary post-1949 combat experience through interventions in the (1950–1953), where it operated as the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, conducting large-scale human-wave infantry assaults that initially overwhelmed UN forces through surprise and numerical superiority, recapturing in January 1951 and stabilizing the front near the 38th parallel, though at the cost of disproportionate casualties from lacking mechanized support, air cover, and modern . These operations demonstrated the PLAGF's effectiveness in mass mobilization and night attacks but exposed vulnerabilities in sustained offensive operations against technologically superior opponents, contributing to a prolonged stalemate rather than decisive victory. In the of October–November 1962, PLAGF units executed coordinated high-altitude offensives across the disputed and sectors, overrunning poorly prepared Indian defenses in rugged terrain through superior acclimatization, logistics preparation, and envelopment tactics, capturing key positions like within days and inflicting approximately 1,400 Indian fatalities before a unilateral on November 21. This limited conflict showcased the PLAGF's proficiency in border warfare under Maoist doctrine emphasizing manpower and terrain exploitation, achieving territorial objectives with minimal Chinese losses estimated under 2,000, though it relied on dominance without significant armored or air involvement. The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War marked the PLAGF's last major conventional engagement, involving roughly 200,000 troops invading on February 17 to punish Hanoi's invasion of , but encountering fierce resistance from battle-hardened Vietnamese forces equipped with Soviet-supplied and anti-tank weapons, resulting in stalled advances, heavy PLAGF casualties (Chinese estimates around 20,000 killed or wounded, independent analyses up to 60,000), and failure to dismantle Vietnam's regional military posture. Performance was hampered by outdated equipment, inadequate combined-arms integration, poor junior officer initiative, and logistical breakdowns in contested terrain, prompting internal PLA critiques of complacency from decades of peacetime inertia and spurring Deng Xiaoping's military modernization drive. Since 1979, PLAGF combat exposure has been confined to sporadic border skirmishes, including the 1969 Sino-Soviet clashes along the Ussuri River and recent India-facing incidents such as the June 2020 Galwan Valley , where hand-to-hand fighting under no-firearm agreements killed at least four Chinese and 20 Indian soldiers, followed by unreported 2022 confrontations involving 40–50 PLA troops repelled in sector. These low-intensity engagements, emphasizing restraint to avoid escalation, have tested troop discipline and non-lethal tactics but provided negligible experience in high-tempo, peer-level warfare involving integrated fires, electronic warfare, or maneuver at scale.

Criticisms and Controversies

Internal Corruption and Purges

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force has been plagued by systemic corruption, including in officer promotions, from budgets, and falsification of and records, which have compromised operational readiness and equipment quality. These practices, rooted in factional networks from prior administrations, persisted despite structural reforms initiated in 2015–2016 that reduced intermediate headquarters and aimed to centralize control under the Central Military Commission. scandals in the Ground Force have involved kickbacks on contracts for armored vehicles and systems, leading to substandard or components, as evidenced by broader PLA investigations revealing similar fraud in defense spending. Under , anti-corruption purges targeting the military intensified after 2012, with the affected through the dismissal of senior commanders implicated in "serious violations" of discipline, a euphemism for graft and disloyalty. In 2015, investigations into former Central Military Commission vice chairmen and —both with oversight of army promotions—uncovered networks selling ranks for bribes exceeding millions of yuan, resulting in their expulsion and trials that exposed pay-to-promote schemes permeating units. By 2023–2025, the campaign accelerated, with at least nine generals expelled from the in October 2025 alone, including , a veteran who commanded the 13th Group Army and later served as Central Military Commission vice chairman, charged with handling "large amounts" of illicit funds. 's purge, the first of a sitting vice chairman since the , highlighted ongoing vulnerabilities in leadership, as he had risen through theater commands responsible for army deployments. These purges, while framed officially as purifying the force, have also raised questions about political reliability, with analysts attributing some dismissals to efforts to eliminate factional rivals rather than solely graft, potentially eroding and expertise. In the , repeated investigations have led to the removal of over a dozen senior officers since 2017, including theater command heads like Lin Xiangyang of the Eastern Theater in 2025, disrupting command chains and delaying modernization initiatives. Official Chinese statements emphasize that no corrupt elements will find shelter in the PLA, yet the scale—encompassing equipment and loyalty probes—suggests entrenched issues that reforms have failed to eradicate, contributing to assessments of weakened combat preparedness.

Operational Readiness Doubts

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) faces persistent skepticism regarding its operational readiness, primarily from U.S. Department of Defense assessments and independent analyses, which highlight systemic issues in training, leadership stability, and integration of political loyalty with combat effectiveness. Corruption scandals, including high-level purges since 2023, have eroded confidence in the force's ability to execute complex operations, as evidenced by the removal of multiple senior officers implicated in graft that compromised equipment procurement and unit cohesion. These disruptions have reportedly delayed modernization timelines, with the Pentagon noting in its 2024 China Military Power Report that such internal rot may hinder the PLA's overall 2027 goals, including ground force capabilities for amphibious or border contingencies. Training regimens within the PLAGF emphasize political indoctrination and scripted exercises over realistic, high-intensity simulations, leading analysts to question the force's preparedness for peer-level conflicts. Conscript-heavy units suffer from abbreviated basic training periods—often just three months—leaving up to 50% of new recruits initially incapable of supporting core tasks like maneuver or , a exacerbated by rapid turnover and limited professional development. While joint exercises have increased since 2020, focusing on scenarios like operations, opaque command structures foster and inhibit candid feedback, potentially masking deficiencies in ground force logistics and integration. The absence of recent combat experience further amplifies doubts, as the PLAGF's last major engagements were in against , where it underperformed against a smaller force due to outdated tactics and poor coordination. Ongoing campaigns, while acknowledged by PLA outlets as essential for "winning wars," have induced leadership instability, with frequent rotations disrupting unit-level readiness and morale. RAND analyses argue that the PLAGF prioritizes regime loyalty over warfighting proficiency, with unverified claims of advanced planning lacking empirical validation, suggesting overreliance on quantitative force size rather than qualitative edge. External observers, including U.S. planners, thus view the PLAGF as potentially brittle in sustained operations, vulnerable to attrition from frailties and untested doctrines.

Geopolitical Implications and External Views

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) underpins China's capacity to exert pressure across multiple regional flashpoints, particularly in the oriented toward and the facing . With approximately 965,000 to 1,040,000 personnel organized into 13 group armies and 80 brigades, the PLAGF enables sustained deployments and rapid reinforcement in contingencies such as a potential Taiwan invasion, where Eastern Theater units including four amphibious brigades and six airborne brigades would secure beachheads and conduct joint island landing operations following naval and air assaults. In the , the PLAGF maintains brigade-level presence along the (LAC) post-2020 Galwan Valley clashes, supporting infrastructure buildup and deterrence against Indian advances, thereby complicating India's strategic calculus in the . These postures contribute to a multi-domain threat environment, elevating risks of escalation and prompting regional states to enhance defenses and alliances to counter China's land . United States assessments portray the PLAGF as a formidable regional force optimized for "systems confrontation" in large-scale operations, with strengths in precision fires, amphibious training, and numerical superiority—such as 427,000 personnel and 1,000 tanks arrayed opposite —but hampered by shortfalls in long-distance logistics, urban combat proficiency, and proven joint command execution. In a scenario, U.S. analyses emphasize the PLAGF's role in airborne and phases to seize key terrain, yet highlight vulnerabilities like limited capacity and sustainment challenges that could lead to high attrition rates during cross-strait assaults. purges, including the removal of senior officers in 2023, are viewed as potentially delaying modernization goals and eroding readiness, though ongoing reforms toward informatization and integration signal persistent advancement. Indian evaluations of the PLAGF, informed by the 2020 Galwan incident where China acknowledged four fatalities amid melee combat, underscore concerns over aggressive forward positioning and rapid reinforcement capabilities in Ladakh, prompting India to deploy over 100,000 troops and accelerate border infrastructure like roads and airfields. Despite a October 2024 disengagement pact reducing immediate frictions at key LAC points, persistent PLAGF brigade rotations and dual-axis threats in Arunachal Pradesh sustain Indian apprehensions about escalation risks, leading to doctrinal shifts toward integrated theater commands and enhanced high-altitude acclimatization. Other external observers, including European think tanks, note the PLAGF's evolution into a more expeditionary force through structural reforms since 2015, yet question its untested performance in peer-level conflicts beyond border skirmishes.

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