Hubbry Logo
Extrajudicial killingExtrajudicial killingMain
Open search
Extrajudicial killing
Community hub
Extrajudicial killing
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Extrajudicial killing
Extrajudicial killing
from Wikipedia

This painting, The Third of May 1808 by Francisco Goya, depicts the summary execution of Spaniards by French forces after the Dos de Mayo Uprising in Madrid.

An extrajudicial killing (also known as an extrajudicial execution or an extralegal killing)[1] is the deliberate killing of a person without the lawful authority granted by a judicial proceeding. It typically refers to government authorities, whether lawfully or unlawfully, targeting specific people for death, which in authoritarian regimes often involves political, trade union, dissident, religious and social figures. The term is typically used in situations that imply the human rights of the victims have been violated. Deaths caused by legal police actions (such as self defense)[1] or legal warfighting on a battlefield[2] are generally not included, even though military and police forces are often used for killings seen by critics as illegitimate. The label "extrajudicial killing" has also been applied to organized, lethal enforcement of extralegal social norms by non-government actors, including lynchings and honor killings.

United Nations

[edit]

Morris Tidball-Binz was appointed the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions on 1 April 2021 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).[3][4]

Human rights groups

[edit]

Many human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, campaign against extrajudicial punishment.[5][6][7][8][9]

The Human Rights Measurement Initiative[10] measures the right to freedom from extrajudicial execution for countries around the world, using a survey of in-country human rights experts.[11]

International law

[edit]

Law of war

[edit]

Article 3(d) of the First Geneva Convention explicitly prohibits carrying out executions without passing a prior judgement by a competent and regularly constituted court with all commonly recognized judicial guarantees for everyone taking part in the trial.[12]

Africa

[edit]

Burundi

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Burundi.[13][14]

Democratic Republic of the Congo

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Democratic Republic of the Congo.[15]

Egypt

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Egypt.[16][17][18][19][20] Egypt recorded and reported more than a dozen unlawful extrajudicial killings of apparent ‘terrorists’ in the country by the NSA officers and the Interior Ministry police in September 2021. A 101-page report detailed the ‘armed militants’ being killed in shootouts despite not posing any threat to the security forces or nations of the country while being killed, which in many cases were already in custody. Statements by the family and relatives of those killed claimed that the victims were not involved in any armed or violent activities.[21]

Eritrea

[edit]

The 2019 Universal Periodic Review of the United Nations Human Rights Council found that in 2016, Eritrean authorities committed extrajudicial killings, in the context of a "persistent, widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population" since 1991, including "the crimes of enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, other inhumane acts, persecution, rape and murder".[22]

Ethiopia

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Ethiopia.[23][24][25][26]

Ivory Coast

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Ivory Coast.[27]

Kenya

[edit]

Extrajudicial executions are common in informal settlements in Kenya.[28] Killings are also common in Northern Kenya under the guise of counter-terrorism operations.[29]

Libya

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Libya.[30]

Americas

[edit]

Argentina

[edit]
Operation Condor participants:
  active members
  collaborators

Argentina's National Reorganization Process military dictatorship during the 1976–1983 period used extrajudicial killings systematically as way of crushing the opposition in the so-called "Dirty War"[31] or what is known in Spanish as La Guerra Sucia. During this violent period, it is estimated that the military regime killed between eleven thousand and fifteen thousand people and most of the victims were known or suspected to be opponents of the regime.[32] These included intellectuals, labor leaders, human rights workers, priests, nuns, reporters, politicians, and artists as well as their relatives.[33][34] Half of the number of extrajudicial killings were reportedly carried out by the murder squad that operated from a detention center in Buenos Aires called Escuela de Mecanica de la Armada.[32] The dirty wars in Argentina sometimes triggered even more violent conflicts since the killings and crackdowns precipitated responses from insurgents.[33]

Brazil

[edit]
Brazilian politician Marielle Franco had been an outspoken critic of extrajudicial killings. She was assassinated in March 2018.

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Brazil.[35][36][37][38][39] Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of President Jair Bolsonaro, was accused of having ties to death squads.[40]

Chile

[edit]
Chilean economist Orlando Letelier was assassinated in Washington, D.C. by Pinochet's secret police in 1976.

When General Augusto Pinochet assumed power in the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, he immediately ordered the purges, torture, and deaths of more than 3,000 supporters of the previous democratic socialist government without trial.[41] During his regime, which lasted from 1973 to 1989, elements of the Chilean Armed Forces and police continued committing extrajudicial killings. These included Manuel Contreras, the former head of Chile's National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), which served as Pinochet's secret police. He was behind numerous assassinations and human rights abuses such as the 1974 abduction and forced disappearance of Socialist Party of Chile leader Victor Olea Alegria. Some of the killings were also coordinated with other right-wing dictatorships in the Southern Cone in the so-called Operation Condor. There were reports of United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement, particularly within its activities in Central and South America that promoted anti-Communist coups.[42] While CIA's complicity was not proven, American dollars supported the regimes that carried out extrajudicial killings such as the Pinochet administration.[42] CIA, for instance, helped create DINA and the agency admitted that Contreras was one of its assets.[43]

Colombia

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Colombia.[44]

An investigation of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace found that from 2002 to 2008, 6402 civilians were killed by the Government of Colombia, falsely claimed to be FARC rebels by the Military Forces of Colombia.[45]

El Salvador

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in El Salvador.[5][46][47] During the Salvadoran Civil War, death squads achieved notoriety when far-right vigilantes assassinated Archbishop Óscar Romero for his social activism in March 1980. In December 1980, four Americans—three nuns and a lay worker—were raped and murdered by a military unit later found to have been acting on specific orders. Death squads were instrumental in killing hundreds of peasants and activists, including such notable priests as Rutilio Grande. Because the death squads involved were found to have been soldiers of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, which was receiving U.S. funding and training from American advisors during the Carter administration, these events prompted outrage in the U.S. and led to a temporary cutoff in military aid from the Reagan administration,[citation needed] although death squad activity stretched well into the Reagan years (1981–1989) as well.[citation needed]

Honduras

[edit]

Honduras also had death squads active through the 1980s, the most notorious of which was Battalion 316. Hundreds of people, including teachers, politicians and union bosses, were assassinated by government-backed forces. Battalion 316 received substantial support and training from the United States Central Intelligence Agency.[48]

Jamaica

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Jamaica.[49][50][51]

Mexico

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Mexico.[52]

Suriname

[edit]

On 7, 8, and 9 December 1982 fifteen prominent Surinamese men who had criticized Dési Bouterse's ruling military regime were murdered. This tragedy is known as the December murders. The acting commander of the army Dési Bouterse was sentenced to 20 years in prison by the Surinamese court martial on 29 November 2019.

United States

[edit]

Based on a survey of human rights experts administered by the Human Rights Measurement Initiative, the U.S. scores a 4.1 on a scale of 0-10 on the right to freedom from extrajudicial execution.[53]

Lynching

[edit]

Lynching was the extrajudicial killings which began in the United States' pre–Civil War South in the 1830s and ended during the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the victims of lynchings were members of various ethnicities, after roughly 4 million enslaved African Americans were emancipated, they became the primary targets of white Southerners. Lynchings in the U.S. reached their height from the 1890s to the 1920s, and they primarily victimised ethnic minorities. Most of the lynchings occurred in the American South because the majority of African Americans lived there, but racially motivated lynchings also occurred in the Midwest and border states.[54]

Targeted killing

[edit]

One issue regarding extrajudicial killing is the legal and moral status of targeted killing by unmanned aerial vehicles of the United States.

Section 3(a) of the United States Torture Victim Protection Act contains a definition of extrajudicial killing:

a deliberate killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regular constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.[55]

The legality of killings such as in the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and the death of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 have been brought into question. In that case, the US defended itself claiming the killing was not an assassination but an act of "National Self Defense".[56] There had been just under 2,500 assassinations by targeted drone strike by 2015, and these too have been questioned as being extrajudicial killings.[57]

Concerns about targeted and sanctioned killings of non-Americans and American citizens in overseas counter-terrorism activities have been raised by lawyers, news firms[56] and private citizens.

President Barack Obama

[edit]

On 30 September 2011 a drone strike in Yemen killed American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan.[58] Both resided in Yemen at the time of their deaths. The executive order approving Al-Awlaki's death was issued by Barack Obama in 2010, and was challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights in that year. The U.S. president issued an order, approved by the National Security Council, that Al-Awlaki's normal legal rights as a civilian should be suspended and his death should be imposed, as he was a threat to the United States. The reasons provided to the public for approval of the order were Al-Awlaki's links to the 2009 Fort Hood Massacre and the 2009 Christmas Day bomb plot, the attempted destruction of a Detroit-bound passenger-plane.[59] The following month, al-Awlaki's son Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, an American citizen, was killed by another US drone strike[60] and in January 2017 Nawar al-Awlaki, al-Awlaki's eight-year-old daughter, also an American citizen and half-sister of Abdulrahman, was shot to death during the raid on Yakla by American forces[61] along with between 9[62] and 29[63] other civilians, up to 14 al-Qaeda fighters, and American Navy SEAL William Owens.[64]

President Donald Trump

[edit]

President Donald Trump continued the practice of extrajudicial killings of his predecessor. Those killed under this policy include:

The New York Times reported 13 November 2020 that Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah was assassinated 7 August 2020 on the streets of Tehran by Israeli operatives at the behest of the United States, according to four intelligence officials of the United States.[65]

Comments on Michael Reinoehl's death

On 3 September 2020, a law enforcement officer in Lacey, Washington fatally shot Michael Forest Reinoehl during a shootout. Reinoehl initiated the shootout according to statements by officials. However, there were conflicting witness reports, most notably Nathaniel Dingess, who told The New York Times, that agents opened fire on Reinoehl while on the phone and eating candy without verbal warning.[66][67][68][69] Dingess said that Reinoehl attempted to take cover by the side of a car before he was fatally shot and was only carrying a phone.[70] Reinoehl was a self-described Antifa activist who was charged of second-degree murder by the Portland Police Bureau following the fatal shooting on 29 August 2020, of a Patriot Prayer supporter, Aaron J. Danielson, in Portland, Oregon.[71] In a Fox News cable television interview 12 September 2020, hosted by Jeanine Pirro, President Trump commenting on Reinoehl's death said, "This guy [Reinoehl] was a violent criminal, and the U.S. Marshals killed him ... And I will tell you something – that's the way it has to be".[72] At an October 15, 2020 rally in Greenville, North Carolina he further elaborated on his praise for the shooting. Trump said "they didn't want to arrest him", which Rolling Stone characterized as Trump describing Reinoehl's death as an extrajudicial killing.[73] although in a statement immediately after the death the United States Marshals Service had said that their task force was attempting to arrest Reinoehl.[73][74]

President Joe Biden

[edit]

President Joe Biden continued his predecessors' practice of extrajudicial killings. Those killed during his administration include:

Second Trump presidency

[edit]

Venezuela

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Venezuela.[75][76] According to Human Rights Watch almost 18,000 people have been killed by security forces in Venezuela since 2016 for "resistance to authority" and many of these killings may constitute extrajudicial execution.[77] Amnesty International estimated that there were more than 8,200 extrajudicial killings in Venezuela from 2015 to 2017.[78]

Ahead of a three-week session of the United Nations Human Rights Council, the OHCHR chief, Michelle Bachelet, visited Venezuela between 19 and 21 June 2019.[79] Bachelet expressed her concerns for the "shockingly high" number of extrajudicial killings and urged for the dissolution of the Special Action Forces (FAES).[80] The report also details how the Venezuelan government has "aimed at neutralising, repressing and criminalising political opponents and people critical of the government" since 2016.[80]

Asia

[edit]

Afghanistan

[edit]

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan officials presided over murders, abduction, and other abuses with the tacit backing of their government and its western allies,[81] Human Rights Watch alleged in its report from March 2015.[82]

Australia

[edit]

Australian extrajudicial killings:

Azerbaijan

[edit]

Azerbaijani forces have performed extrajudicial executions of the ethnic Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, including both civilians[83][84][85] and prisoners of war.[86][87][88] These executions have been characterized by various sources as acts of ethnic cleansing.[89][90][91] Genocide Watch[92] and various UN officials,[93][94] including the U.N. Committee against Torture (CAT),[95][96][97] have expressed concern over the ethnic dimension of these executions. The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention noted that Azerbaijan’s escalating human rights violations against Armenians—including extrajudicial executions— may represent acts preparatory to genocide and align with the UN’s Genocide Risk Factor 7.[98] Many victims have been elderly or disabled who could not flee.[99][100] An investigation by University Network for Human Rights corroborated 150 cases of extrajudicial executions, with the majority of them occurring after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.[101] Human rights advocates stated that the widespread nature of extrajudicial executions, often broadcast on social media by Azeri soldiers,[102] suggests a systematic practice aimed at instilling fear among the population,[103][104][105] and humiliating the families of the deceased.[102]

Bangladesh

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Bangladesh.[106][107][108]

The Bangladesh Police special security force Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has long been known for extrajudicial killing.[109] In a leaked WikiLeaks cable it was found that RAB was trained by the UK government.[110] 16 RAB officials (sacked afterwards) including Lt Col (sacked) Tareque Sayeed, Major (sacked) Arif Hossain, and Lt Commander (sacked) Masud Rana were given death penalty for abduction, murder, concealing the bodies, conspiracy and destroying evidences in the Narayanganj Seven Murder case.[111][112][113][114]

Beside this many alleged criminals were killed by Bangladesh police by the name of Crossfire.[115] In 2018, many alleged drug dealers were killed in the name of "War on Drugs" in Bangladesh.[116][117][118]

The United Nations criticised the government under Sheikh Hasina for high rates of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, especially the members of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, including former elected MPs.[119]

India

[edit]

Hardeep Singh Nijjar was a political refugee from India living in Canada. He was murdered 18 June 2023. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused 18 September 2023 the Indian government publicly of complicity.[120]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in India.[121][122][123] A form of extrajudicial killing is called police encounters. Such encounters are also being staged by military and other security forces.[121][122][123] Extrajudicial killings are also common in Indian states especially in Uttar Pradesh where 73 people were killed from March 2017 to March 2019.[124] Police Encounter on 6 December 2019, by the Telangana Police in the 2019 Hyderabad gang rape case killing the 4 accused is another form of extrajudicial killing.

The secret killings of Assam (1998–2001) was probably the darkest chapter in Assam's political history when relatives, friends, sympathisers of United Liberation Front of Asom insurgents were systematically killed by unknown assailants. These extrajudicial murders happened in Assam between 1998 and 2001. These extrajudicial killings were conducted by the Government of Assam using SULFA members and the security forces in the name of counter-insurgency operations. The victims of these killings were relatives, friends and colleagues of ULFA militants. The most apparent justification for the whole exercise was that it was a tit-for-tat response to the ULFA-sponsored terrorism, especially the killings of their old comrades—the SULFAs.[125][126][127][128][129]

Indonesia

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Indonesia.[130]

Iran

[edit]

In the 1953 Iranian coup d'état a regime was installed through the efforts of the American CIA and the British MI6 in which the Shah (hereditary monarch) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi used SAVAK death squads (also trained by the CIA) to imprison, torture and/or kill hundreds of dissidents. After the 1979 revolution death squads were used to an even greater extent by the new Islamic government. In 1983, the CIA gave the Supreme Leader of IranAyatollah Khomeini—information on KGB agents in Iran. This information was probably used. The Iranian government later used death squads occasionally throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s; however by the 2000s it seems to have almost entirely, if not completely, ceased using them.[131]

The Dutch secretary of Foreign Affairs Stef Blok wrote January 2019 to the States General of the Netherlands that the intelligence service AIVD had strong indications that Iran is responsible for the murder of Mohammad Reza Kolahi Samadi in 2015 in Almere and of Ahmad Mola Nissi in 2017 in The Hague.[132]

On 4 February 2021 Iranian diplomat Asadollah Asadi and three other Iranian nationals were convicted in Antwerp for plotting to bomb a 2018 rally of National Council of Resistance of Iran in France.

Iraq

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Iraq.[133][134][135][136]

Iraq was formed as a League of Nations mandate by the partition and domination of various tribal lands by the British Empire in the early 20th century, after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I. The United Kingdom granted independence to the Kingdom of Iraq in 1932, on the urging of King Faisal, though the British Armed Forces retained military bases and transit rights. King Ghazi of Iraq ruled as a figurehead after King Faisal's death in 1933, while undermined by attempted military coups, until his death in 1939. The United Kingdom invaded Iraq in 1941 for fear that the government of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani might cut oil supplies to Western nations, and because of his links to the Axis powers. A military occupation followed the restoration of the Hashemite monarchy, and the occupation ended on 26 October 1947. Iraq was left with a national government led from Baghdad made up of Sunni ethnicity in key positions of power, ruling over an ad hoc nation splintered by tribal affiliations. This leadership used death squads and committed massacres in Iraq throughout the 20th century, culminating in the Ba'athist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.[137]

The country has since become increasingly partitioned following the Iraq War into three zones: a Kurdish ethnic zone to the north, a Sunni center and the Shia ethnic zone to the south. The secular Arab socialist Baathist leadership were replaced with a provisional and later constitutional government that included leadership roles for the Shia (Prime Minister) and Kurdish (President of the Republic) peoples of the nation. This paralleled the development of ethnic militias by the Shia, Sunni, and the Kurdish (Peshmerga).

There were death squads formed by members of every ethnicity.[138] In the national capital of Baghdad some members of the now-Shia Iraqi security forces (and militia members posing as members of Iraqi Police or Iraqi Armed Forces) formed unofficial, unsanctioned, but long-tolerated death squads.[139] They possibly had links to the Interior Ministry and were popularly known as the 'black crows'. These groups operated night or day. They usually arrested people, then either tortured[140] or killed[141] them.

The victims of these attacks were predominantly young males who had probably been suspected of being members of the Sunni insurgency. Agitators such as Abdul Razaq al-Na'as, Dr. Abdullateef al-Mayah, and Dr. Wissam Al-Hashimi have also been killed. These killings are not limited to men; women and children have also been arrested and/or killed.[142] Some of these killings have also been part of simple robberies or other criminal activities.

A feature in a May 2005 issue of the magazine of The New York Times claimed that the Multi-National Force – Iraq had modelled the "Wolf Brigade", the Iraqi interior ministry police commandos, on the death squads used in the 1980s to crush the left-wing insurgency in El Salvador.[143]

Western news organizations such as Time and People disassembled this by focusing on aspects such as probable militia membership, religious ethnicity, as well as uniforms worn by these squads rather than stating the United States-backed Iraqi government had death squads active in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.[144]

Israel

[edit]

In a report from October 2015, Amnesty International documented incidents that "appear to have been extrajudicial executions" against Palestinian civilians.[145] Several of those incidents occurred after Palestinians attempted to attack Israelis or Israel Defense Forces soldiers. Even though the attackers did not pose a serious threat, they were shot without attempting to arrest the suspects before resorting to the use of lethal force. Medical attention for severely wounded Palestinians was in many cases delayed by Israeli forces.[145][146][147]

The New York Times reported 13 November 2020 that Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah was assassinated 7 August 2020 on the streets of Tehran by Israeli operatives at the behest of the United States, according to four intelligence officials of the United States.[65]

Iranian nuclear physicist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was killed 27 November 2020 on a rural road in Absard, a city near Tehran. One American official — along with two other intelligence officials — said that Israel was behind the attack on the scientist.[148]

On 16 March 2023, the Israeli Army killed four Palestinian militants in Jenin. One motionless victim was shot in the head. According to The Guardian, the Israeli group of military veterans against the occupation, Breaking the Silence, called this an "extrajudicial execution".[149]

Pakistan

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Pakistan.[150] A form of extrajudicial killing called encounter killings by police is common in Pakistan.[151] Case in point is Naqeebullah Mehsud and Sahiwal Killings. The Province of Balochistan has also seen a significant number of disappearances, many of which have been attributed to security forces by residents: anti-government Baloch nationalists claim thousands of cases and have stated a belief that most of these disappeared persons have been killed.[152] Official numbers of disappeared persons have varied considerably, ranging between 55 and 1,100 victims.[153] Human rights organizations have dubbed this practice as the "kill and dump policy".[154]

Papua New Guinea

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Papua New Guinea.[155][156]

Philippines

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Philippines.[157][158][159][160][161][162][163][excessive citations]

Maguindanao massacre

[edit]

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) has called the massacre the single deadliest event for journalists in history.[164] Even prior to this, the CPJ had labeled the Philippines the second most dangerous country for journalists, second only to Iraq.[164]

War on drugs

[edit]
Protest against the Philippine war on drugs in front of the Philippine Consulate General in New York City, October 2016

Following the victory of Rodrigo Duterte in the 2016 Philippine presidential election, a campaign against illegal drugs has led to widespread extrajudicial killings. This follows the actions by then-Mayor Duterte to roam Davao in order to "encounter to kill".[165]

The Philippine president has urged its citizens to kill suspected criminals and drug addicts,[166] ordered the police to adopt a shoot-to-kill[167] policy, has offered rewards for killing suspects,[168] and has even admitted to personally killing suspected criminals.[169]

The move has sparked widespread condemnation from international publications[169][170][171][172][173] and magazines,[174][175][176] prompting the Philippine government to issue statements denying the existence of state-sanctioned killings.[177][178][179]

Though Duterte's controversial war on drugs was opposed by the United States under President Barack Obama,[180] the European Union,[181] and the United Nations, Duterte claims that he has received approving remarks from US President Donald Trump.[182]

On 26 September 2016, Duterte issued guidelines that would enable the United Nations Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings to probe the rising death toll.[183] On 14 December 2016, Duterte cancelled the planned visit of the Rapporteur who declined to accept government conditions that were not consistent with the code of conduct for special rapporteurs.[184][185]

Saudi Arabia

[edit]

The Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul on 2 October 2018.

Syria

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Syria.[186][187][188]

Tajikistan

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Tajikistan.[189][190]

Thailand

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Thailand.[191] Reportedly thousands of extrajudicial killings occurred during the 2003 anti-drug effort of Thailand's prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

Rumors still persist that there is collusion between the government, rogue military officers, the radical right wing, and anti-drug death squads.[192][193][194][195][196][197][198]

Both Muslim[199] and Buddhist[200] sectarian death squads still operate in the south of the country.

Turkey

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings and death squads are common in Turkey.[201][202][203][204][205] In 1990 Amnesty International published its first report on extrajudicial executions in Turkey.[203] In the following years the problem became more serious. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey determined the following figures on extrajudicial executions in Turkey for the years 1991 to 2001:[206]

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
98 283 189 129 96 129 98 80 63 56 37

In 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Ms. Asma Jahangir, presented a report on a visit to Turkey.[207] The report presented details of killings of prisoners (26 September 1999, 10 prisoners killed in a prison in Ankara; 19 December 2000, an operation in 20 prisons launched throughout Turkey resulted in the death of 30 inmates and two gendarmes).

For the years 2000–2008, the Human Rights Association (HRA) gave the following figures on doubtful deaths/deaths in custody/extra judicial execution/torture by paid village guards:[208]

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
173 55 40 44 47 89 130 66 65

In 2008, the human rights organization Mazlum Der counted 25 extrajudicial killings in Turkey.[209]

Vietnam

[edit]

Nguyễn Văn Lém (died 1 February 1968 in Saigon), also referred to as Captain Bảy Lốp, was a member of the Viet Cong who was summarily shot in Saigon during the Tet Offensive. The photograph of his death would become one of many anti-Vietnam War icons in the Western World.[210]

Europe

[edit]

Belarus

[edit]
Demonstration in Warsaw, reminding about the disappearances of oppositionals in Belarus

In 1999, Belarusian opposition leaders Yury Zacharanka and Viktar Hanchar together with his business associate Anatol Krasouski disappeared. Hanchar and Krasouski disappeared the same day of a broadcast on state television in which President Alexander Lukashenko ordered the chiefs of his security services to crack down on "opposition scum". Although the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KGB) had them under constant surveillance, the official investigation announced that the case could not be solved. The disappearance of journalist Dzmitry Zavadski in 2000 has also yielded no results. Copies of a report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which linked senior Belarusian officials to the cases of disappearances, were confiscated.[211] Human Rights Watch claims that Zacharanka, Hanchar, Krasouski and Zavadski likely became victims of extrajudicial executions.[212]

Russia

[edit]

Extrajudicial killings have taken place in Russia.[213][214] In the Russian Federation, a number of journalist murders were attributed to public administration figures, usually where the publications would reveal their involvement in large corruption scandals. It has been regarded that the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko was linked to Russian special forces. American and British intelligence agents have claimed that Russian assassins, some possibly at orders of the government, are behind at least fourteen targeted killings in the United Kingdom that police authorities have termed non-suspicious.[215] The United Kingdom attributes the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in March 2018 to the Russian military-intelligence agency GRU. The German foreign minister Heiko Maas said there were "several indications" that Russia was behind the poisoning of Alexei Navalny.[citation needed]

In 2006, the Federal Security Service (FSB) was given the legal power to engage in targeted killing of terrorism suspects overseas if ordered by the president.[216] In August 2019, former Chechen rebel commander Zelimkhan Khangoshvili was assassinated in Berlin by FSB operative Vadim Krasikov.[217]

According to an investigative report by Novaya Gazeta, some of the suspicious deaths of Russian businesspeople in 2022–2023 may possibly be connected to large scale accounting fraud by Gazprom executives, who may have funneled money to a network of businesses owned by friends and family members with ties to the FSB and Russian military.[218]

Soviet Union

[edit]

In Soviet Russia, since 1918 the secret police organization Cheka was authorized to execute counter-revolutionaries without trial. Hostages were also executed by Cheka during the Red Terror in 1918–1920. The successors of Cheka also had the authority for extrajudicial executions. In 1937–38 hundreds of thousands were executed extrajudicially during the Great Purge under the lists approved by NKVD troikas. In some cases, the Soviet special services did not arrest and then execute their victims but just secretly killed them without any arrest. For example, Solomon Mikhoels was murdered in 1948 and his body was run over to create the impression of a traffic accident. The Soviet special services also conducted extrajudicial killings abroad, most notably of Leon Trotsky in 1940 in Mexico, Stepan Bandera in 1959 in Germany, Georgi Markov in 1978 in London.

Spain

[edit]

From 1983 until 1987, the Spanish government supported paramilitary squads, denominated GAL, to fight ETA, a Basque terrorist organization. A relevant example was the Lasa and Zabala case, in which José Antonio Lasa and José Ignacio Zabala were kidnapped, tortured and executed by police forces in 1983.

Ukraine

[edit]

The Washington Post published 23 October 2023 about extrajudicial killings by Ukraine’s domestic security service, the SBU.[219]

In March 2022, Ukrainian banker and intelligence officer Denys Kireyev was shot in the back of the head by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).[220]

United Kingdom

[edit]

During the Troubles, an ethno-nationalist conflict in Northern Ireland, British security forces and intelligence agents were accused of committing extrajudicial killings against suspected IRA members.[221][222] Brian Nelson, an Ulster Defence Association member and secret British agent, was convicted in a court of sectarian murders.[223][224][225]

Operation Kratos referred to tactics developed by London's Metropolitan Police for dealing with suspected suicide bombers, most notably firing shots to the head without warning. Little was revealed about these tactics until after the mistaken shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes on 22 July 2005.[citation needed]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Extrajudicial killing, also termed extrajudicial execution, constitutes the intentional deprivation of life by state agents or with state tolerance outside the framework of lawful judicial processes, encompassing acts such as summary executions, targeted strikes absent , or disappearances culminating in death. deems such killings arbitrary deprivations of life, prohibited under instruments like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which mandates that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life and requires safeguards against extralegal executions. In contexts of armed conflict, permits targeted killings of combatants under stricter conditions but excludes civilians or those , with violations amounting to war crimes. These killings manifest across regimes and operations, from mass disappearances in Latin America's —where military dictatorships coordinated abductions and executions of suspected subversives in the 1970s and 1980s—to drone strikes against militants, raising debates over imminence of threat versus preemptive action. Empirical patterns reveal higher incidences in states with weak , including anti-drug campaigns in the , where thousands of suspected traffickers were slain without trial between 2016 and 2022, often attributed to police or vigilante elements. Controversies persist regarding their efficacy and morality; while proponents cite deterrence against threats like or , evidence indicates frequent miscarriages targeting innocents, erosion of accountability, and cycles of violence, as causal analyses link unchecked state killings to broader instability rather than resolution. Scholarly assessments underscore source biases in reporting, with organizations and UN mechanisms providing data but often emphasizing condemnatory narratives over rigorous verification in adversarial environments.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Scope

Extrajudicial killing, interchangeably termed extrajudicial execution or arbitrary execution, constitutes the deliberate deprivation of an individual's life by state agents, or by non-state actors with state acquiescence or consent, absent any lawful judicial process or procedural safeguards. This act violates the fundamental , as enshrined in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life and mandates that such deprivations occur only pursuant to a final judgment by a competent . The intent distinguishes it from accidental or negligent deaths, emphasizing purposeful elimination without legal authorization or oversight. The scope of extrajudicial killings extends to a range of state-sanctioned or tolerated practices, including summary executions by during arrests or detentions, operations by death squads targeting perceived enemies, and targeted assassinations bypassing , often rationalized under counter-terrorism or public security pretexts. These killings typically lack transparency, investigation, or accountability mechanisms, rendering them unlawful under , which requires states to investigate all suspicious deaths involving agents and prosecute perpetrators. Non-state actors' involvement falls within this scope only when facilitated by state failure to prevent or punish, as states bear primary responsibility for upholding the . Exclusions from this definition are critical to delineate scope: lawful lethal force in genuine , apprehension of dangerous fugitives under strict necessity, or during international armed conflicts per the ' provisions for combatants does not qualify as extrajudicial, provided proportionality and humanity principles are observed. However, expansions into peacetime "targeted killings" of non-combatants without imminent threat or judicial warrant cross into extrajudicial territory, as affirmed by UN mechanisms monitoring arbitrary executions. Empirical patterns reveal higher incidences in contexts of weak , where institutional biases or political pressures undermine , though human rights documentation must be scrutinized for selective reporting influenced by ideological agendas in monitoring bodies.

Distinctions from Lawful Force and Judicial Processes

Extrajudicial killing refers to the deliberate deprivation of life by state agents or with state acquiescence, unaccompanied by any judicial or legal safeguards, such as a prior judgment from a regularly constituted affording all judicial guarantees of a fair trial. This contrasts sharply with judicial processes, where , if legally permissible, requires conviction through transparent proceedings that include the right to defense, , and proportionality assessments under domestic and international standards like Article 6 of the International Covenant on . In practice, judicial executions, such as those under death penalty statutes in jurisdictions like the or as of 2023, involve documented trials and legal oversight, whereas extrajudicial acts bypass these entirely, often involving summary determinations of guilt by without presentation or victim input. Lawful use of force, permissible in or scenarios, hinges on immediate necessity and proportionality, distinguishing it from extrajudicial killing's premeditated or arbitrary nature. Under the UN Basic Principles on the and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990), intentional lethal force is justified only when strictly unavoidable to protect , such as confronting an imminent threat where non-lethal alternatives fail, and must follow strict accountability measures like reporting and investigation. Excessive or intentional lethal force absent such criteria—e.g., killing unarmed suspects in custody—crosses into extrajudicial territory, as affirmed in UN fact sheets on arbitrary executions, where deliberate deprivations outside legal frameworks violate the . For instance, a 2018 analysis of the Victim Protection Act clarifies that extrajudicial intent requires purposeful killing without authorization, excluding accidental or proportionate defensive actions by officers facing clear danger. In armed conflict contexts, lawful force under permits killings of combatants during active hostilities without individual judicial process, provided they adhere to principles of distinction and , as outlined in Additional Protocol I to the (1977). Extrajudicial killings diverge here by targeting non-combatants or captured individuals outside combatancy rules, lacking the temporal and contextual limits of lawful operations; for example, post-capture executions without trial violate Common Article 3 of the , rendering them arbitrary regardless of strategic claims. These distinctions underscore that while lawful force operates within predefined legal bounds—necessity in peacetime or jus in bello in war—extrajudicial acts erode those bounds through unilateral, unaccountable determinations, often evading post-incident scrutiny required by instruments like the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (1989, updated 2016).

Ethical and Philosophical Underpinnings

The ethical evaluation of extrajudicial killing hinges on the conflict between the presumption of individual rights, including , and the imperatives of or in scenarios where legal mechanisms fail or pose excessive risks. Philosophers grounded in traditions argue that the right to , inherent to human agency, permits lethal force against imminent threats without prior judicial sanction, as delaying action could forfeit the defender's life or enable greater harms; this principle extends analogously to state actors confronting non-state aggressors who operate beyond territorial jurisdiction or evidentiary norms. Necessity-based justifications further contend that premeditated killings may be defensible if they avert disproportionate future casualties, provided no less harmful alternatives exist, aligning with liability accounts where aggressors forfeit protections by initiating unjust threats. In armed conflict, provides a framework distinguishing permissible targeted killings from illicit executions, permitting the neutralization of combatants or leaders who directly orchestrate violence, as these actions satisfy and proportionality criteria without requiring individualized trials amid chaos. Jus in bello principles emphasize that lawful combatants lose immunity by engaging in hostilities, rendering their elimination ethically equivalent to battlefield engagements rather than judicial punishment. Consequentialist perspectives, particularly utilitarian ones, evaluate such killings by net outcomes: if eliminating a like a terrorist financier demonstrably disrupts networks and saves lives—as in the 2011 operation against , which prevented potential attacks without feasible capture—the act maximizes overall welfare, though rule utilitarians caution against precedents eroding legal restraints and inviting reciprocal . Critics from deontological standpoints, emphasizing categorical imperatives against intentional outside established , view extrajudicial measures as inherently corrosive to moral order, as they bypass and risk innocent errors, with empirical patterns in operations showing civilian collateral despite claims. This tension underscores a first-principles realism: while empirical data from contexts indicate targeted killings can degrade threats more efficiently than arrests in ungoverned spaces, systemic biases in advocacy—often prioritizing procedural absolutism over causal threat assessments—may overstate ethical uniformity, ignoring contexts where judicial processes enable aggressors' . Philosophically, the resolves neither to blanket prohibition nor endorsement but to contextual proportionality, where verifiable threat imminence and evidentiary thresholds determine moral legitimacy over formalistic adherence to peacetime norms.

International Prohibitions and Exceptions

The prohibition against extrajudicial killings, understood as state-sanctioned deprivations of life without or judicial oversight, forms a cornerstone of . Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the UN on December 16, 1966, and entering into force on March 23, 1976, declares: "Every human being has the inherent . This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." This provision, binding on 173 state parties as of 2023, encompasses extrajudicial executions as arbitrary acts, requiring states to ensure accountability through investigation and prosecution. Similarly, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) affirms everyone's , liberty, and security, influencing that deems such killings unlawful regardless of domestic legality. Customary international law reinforces this through the UN Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, adopted by the Economic and Social Council on May 24, 1989 (Resolution 1989/65), which mandates states to "prohibit by law all extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions" and classify them as serious offenses under criminal law. Violations may constitute crimes against humanity under Article 7(1)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), applicable since July 1, 2002, when committed as part of widespread or systematic attacks. The UN Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 36 on Article 6 (adopted August 30, 2019), interprets arbitrariness broadly to include lack of due process, disproportionality, or discrimination, obligating states to prevent, investigate, and punish such acts. Exceptions to these prohibitions are strictly limited and do not permit premeditated killings without judicial process. The ICCPR allows deprivation of life via judicially imposed death sentences for the "most serious crimes," but only after fair trial guarantees and with progressive restrictions toward abolition (Article 6(2)-(6)); such executions are not extrajudicial by definition. In law enforcement contexts, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) permit intentional lethal force solely when strictly unavoidable to protect life from imminent threat, requiring proportionality, necessity, and post-use reporting with potential judicial scrutiny. However, preemptive or targeted killings outside immediate threats—such as in counter-terrorism absent armed conflict—remain arbitrary under international human rights law, as affirmed by the Human Rights Committee, unless compliant with both human rights standards and, where applicable, international humanitarian law. No blanket exceptions exist for policy-driven executions, with the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings emphasizing that states bear the burden to demonstrate non-arbitrariness in all cases.

Law of Armed Conflict and Self-Defense Clauses

In the framework of (IHL), the law of armed conflict permits the lawful killing of combatants during hostilities without prior judicial , distinguishing such acts from extrajudicial executions, which involve arbitrary deprivation of life outside legal regulation. The of 1949, particularly Common Article 3 and the Third Convention on prisoners of war, define combatants as members of armed forces or militias who conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of , granting them combatant privilege—the right to directly participate in hostilities and immunity from prosecution for lawful acts of , such as killing enemy forces. This privilege applies in both international and non-international armed conflicts, allowing targeting of combatants who pose a direct threat, subject to IHL principles of distinction (sparing ), proportionality (avoiding excessive civilian harm), and precaution (minimizing incidental damage). Violations, such as willful killing of protected persons (e.g., surrendered or wounded fighters), constitute war crimes under the Conventions and of the . Self-defense clauses further delineate lawful lethal force in scenarios short of full-scale armed conflict, rooted in and standards that prioritize imminent threats over judicial pre-approval. Article 51 of the UN Charter affirms states' inherent right to individual or collective against an armed attack, extending to anticipatory measures against ongoing or imminent threats, as interpreted in cases like the of Justice's ruling (1986), which requires necessity and proportionality. In contexts, targeted killings—such as drone strikes—have been justified by states like the under this clause when targeting individuals continuously planning attacks, provided no feasible capture alternative exists and civilian risks are minimized; however, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions has critiqued such operations outside active hostilities as potentially violating under the International Covenant on (ICCPR), Article 6, unless an imminent threat is verifiably present. Domestically and in , self-defense provisions in instruments like the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990) authorize lethal force only when strictly necessary to protect life from immediate danger, rejecting preemptive or punitive killings as extrajudicial. Empirical assessments, such as those from the Committee, emphasize post-use investigations to verify compliance, with failures—evident in over 1,000 reported accountability gaps in U.S. drone programs from 2004–2014—raising concerns of impunity despite self-defense claims. These clauses thus carve exceptions grounded in causal immediacy—where delay would enable harm—rather than blanket authorizations, with IHL's threshold for armed conflict (sustained violence between organized groups) determining when combatant targeting supplants stricter scrutiny.

Variations in Domestic Jurisdictions

In the United States, federal and state laws generally prohibit extrajudicial killings, defining lawful lethal force by police under the Fourth Amendment as objectively reasonable in response to an imminent threat of death or serious injury, as established by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor (490 U.S. 386, 1989). The earlier "fleeing felon rule," which permitted deadly force against any escaping felon regardless of danger, was curtailed by Tennessee v. Garner (471 U.S. 1, 1985), barring such use against non-violent suspects unless they pose an immediate risk. Investigations into potential extrajudicial cases fall under state prosecutorial review or federal civil rights statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 242, though qualified immunity often shields officers unless deliberate indifference is proven. In the , the incorporates Article 2 of the , mandating that lethal force by police be used only when "absolutely necessary" to defend persons from imminent , prevent unlawful escape, or lawfully quell riots, with independent inquiries required via the Independent Police Complaints Commission or inquests. This framework, informed by cases like McCann v. (, 1995), emphasizes proportionality and post-incident accountability, resulting in rare approvals for preemptive shootings compared to higher-use jurisdictions. India's legal regime under the Code of Criminal Procedure (1973), Section 46, authorizes police to use "all means necessary" for arresting proclaimed offenders, including lethal force if resistance endangers life, but the in People's Union for Civil Liberties v. State of (2014) mandated inquiries into "encounter" killings—where suspects die in alleged shootouts—to prevent abuse, reporting over 1,500 such cases from 2010-2015 without outright authorization for . These encounters, often targeting suspected militants or criminals, contrast with stricter Western standards, as state commissions documented 500+ extrajudicial allegations in alone by 2020, with low conviction rates under IPC Section 302 for . In , the 1988 Constitution (Article 5) prohibits arbitrary killings, permitting police lethal force only against active resistance or escape posing grave danger under the Military Penal Code, yet federal data showed 6,416 police killings in 2022, predominantly in favelas, with investigations hampered by self-reporting requirements and impunity rates exceeding 90% per state audits. The ' 1987 Constitution bans extrajudicial executions, but anti-drug campaigns since 2016 yielded over 6,000 deaths attributed to police per official tallies (disputed as undercounts by NGOs), with rulings like People v. Espinosa (2018) affirming yet failing to curb operations framed as self-defense. These variations reflect differing balances between public safety imperatives and , with liberal democracies imposing narrow exceptions tied to imminent threats, while high-crime contexts in , , and the tolerate broader operational discretion, often leading to documented impunity despite nominal prohibitions. Empirical reviews, such as UNODC analyses, indicate that lax oversight correlates with higher incidental civilian deaths, underscoring domestic divergences from international standards like the UN Basic Principles on the (1990).

Historical Context

Pre-Modern and Colonial Eras

In , decimation served as a stark example of within military hierarchies, where units guilty of or faced without individual trials. Under this practice, soldiers drew lots to select one in every ten members for execution by their comrades, often via clubbing or , to restore through terror and communal complicity. The method, attributed to early republican commanders like around 340 BC, was revived by in 71 BC against rebellious slaves in the Third Servile War, where entire cohorts underwent the penalty to deter further desertions. Medieval European further institutionalized arbitrary authority over life and death, as lords wielded haute justice—the right to adjudicate capital crimes—through informal seigneurial courts that prioritized swift retribution over procedural safeguards. Punishments for offenses like or could include or beheading based on the lord's assessment, with minimal evidence or defense, reflecting the era's decentralized power where royal oversight was inconsistent until centralized monarchies emerged post-1300. Historical records indicate such executions reinforced social hierarchies, though exact frequencies remain elusive due to sparse beyond chronicles biased toward elites. Colonial expansion amplified extrajudicial killings as tools of subjugation, particularly in the , where Spanish forces routinely executed indigenous leaders and populations without to quell resistance and secure tribute. Dominican friar , an eyewitness participant turned critic, detailed in his 1542 Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias how conquistadors under figures like hanged caciques en masse in around 1503, including Queen after a purported , and burned villages indiscriminately, contributing to the near-extinction of local groups by 1514. Las Casas attributed over three million deaths in the region to such unjudged violence, forced labor, and by the 1540s, though modern estimates adjust figures downward while affirming the pattern of beyond metropolitan oversight. In parallel, British colonial administrators in authorized summary executions during suppressions like the 1857 rebellion, including blowing mutineers from cannons without trial to exemplify deterrence, bypassing judicial formalities amid logistical chaos. These acts underscored causal linkages between unchecked imperial authority and mass killings, prioritizing control over legal consistency.

20th Century Totalitarian and Insurgent Contexts

In the , the Bolshevik regime under initiated the during the (1918–1921), a campaign of extrajudicial executions targeting class enemies, counter-revolutionaries, and perceived saboteurs, conducted by the secret police without judicial oversight. Official Bolshevik records reported over 8,500 executions by mid-1918, though contemporary estimates suggest the actual toll exceeded 50,000, including mass shootings of hostages and summary killings in response to advances. This policy, formalized in a September 1918 decree, justified killings as necessary for regime survival amid insurgency, with Lenin explicitly endorsing "mass terror" against the . Under , the (1936–1938) escalated extrajudicial killings through troikas—extralegal tribunals that bypassed courts—resulting in approximately 681,692 documented executions, primarily of party members, military officers, and kulaks accused of or espionage. These operations, driven by quotas from , involved mass graves and fabricated charges, with archival data confirming the scale as a tool for consolidating totalitarian control rather than genuine threat elimination. Nazi Germany's mobile killing squads, deployed from June 1941 during , conducted extrajudicial mass shootings of , communists, and partisans in occupied Soviet territories, murdering over 1.3 million people by through pit executions without or evidence of resistance. Reports from the squads' own logs, presented at the Nuremberg Einsatzgruppen , detail systematic orders from to exterminate "Jewish " as a preemptive security measure, reflecting ideological over judicial process. In Maoist China, the Land Reform Campaign (1946–1953), extended post-1949 victory, empowered peasant tribunals to extrajudicially execute landlords and "counter-revolutionaries," with estimates of 1–5 million deaths from struggle sessions, beatings, and shootings, often without formal charges. These killings, rationalized as class warfare to redistribute property, relied on mobilized mobs rather than courts, contributing to the regime's consolidation amid rural insurgency remnants. The under in (1975–1979) institutionalized extrajudicial executions in "" and security prisons like Tuol Sleng, where over 1.7 million perished from executions, forced labor, and , targeting intellectuals, urbanites, and ethnic minorities as enemies of the agrarian utopia. Tribunal records from the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia confirm that 90% of victims died without trial, pursuant to a policy of preemptive purification to eradicate perceived capitalist influences. Insurgent groups emulating totalitarian models also employed extrajudicial killings for territorial control and ideological enforcement. During the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), the National Liberation Front (FLN) executed thousands of suspected collaborators and harkis (pro-French Algerians) without trial, with massacres like that at Philippeville in 1955 killing over 100 civilians to provoke French overreaction and radicalize support. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong's (1954–1960) mirrored Maoist practices, resulting in 50,000–100,000 extrajudicial executions of landlords and officials in to consolidate rural bases, documented in captured directives emphasizing "people's courts" as facades for summary justice. These tactics, while effective for short-term intimidation, often alienated populations and prolonged conflicts by blurring combatant-civilian lines.

Post-1945 Developments in Decolonization and Cold War

In the aftermath of , conflicts frequently involved extrajudicial killings by colonial powers seeking to suppress independence movements, often framed as against communist-influenced insurgents. During the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), French forces conducted widespread summary executions and , with Interior Minister authorizing the deaths of at least 45 Algerian prisoners in 1957 as a deterrent measure, despite judicial appeals. British operations against the Mau Mau uprising in (1952–1960) resulted in over 11,000 rebel deaths, including approximately 1,090 formal hangings but also numerous extrajudicial killings in detention camps where and collective punishments were systematic, as documented in survivor testimonies and declassified records. In Portugal's Colonial Wars in and (1961–1974), Portuguese troops employed reprisal executions and village burnings against nationalist guerrillas, contributing to tens of thousands of civilian casualties outside legal frameworks. These practices persisted into proxy struggles, where superpowers supported regimes employing extrajudicial methods to combat perceived ideological threats. The U.S.-backed in Vietnam (1967–1972), coordinated by the CIA, targeted infrastructure through neutralization operations that included over 26,000 reported assassinations and captures, many executed without trial amid allegations of quota-driven killings inflating civilian tolls. Similarly, (1975–1983), a coordinated effort among South American dictatorships like , , and with U.S. logistical support, facilitated at least 60,000 extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and tortures of left-wing opponents, as evidenced by declassified archives revealing cross-border abduction and assassination protocols. On the Soviet side, the conducted covert assassinations abroad, such as the 1978 umbrella-poison killing of dissident in , part of broader "wet affairs" targeting émigrés and defectors to eliminate anti-regime voices without formal trials. Such operations reflected strategic rationales prioritizing rapid elimination of threats over , amid ideological battles that blurred lines between combatants and civilians. Empirical from these eras indicate high lethality—e.g., Condor's documented 805+ cross-border victims—but also unintended escalations, like radicalizing populations against intervening powers. While Western sources often highlight abuses by allies for diplomatic leverage, Soviet-era records, accessed post-1991, confirm parallel state-sanctioned killings, underscoring that extrajudicial tactics were bipartisan tools in superpower competition, though varying in transparency and accountability.

Rationales and Strategic Uses

Necessity in Immediate Threat Response

In scenarios where state agents confront individuals posing an imminent of death or serious bodily injury, the use of lethal force without prior judicial authorization is often deemed necessary to neutralize the danger and protect lives, as delays inherent in legal processes could result in irreversible harm. This principle aligns with doctrines of objective reasonableness in use-of-force policies, where force must be proportionate to the threat level at the moment of encounter. For instance, U.S. precedent in Graham v. Connor (1989) evaluates such actions based on what a reasonable officer would perceive in dynamic, high-stakes situations, prioritizing immediate safety over subsequent adjudication. Similar provisions exist in statutes like Florida's, authorizing to employ when reasonably necessary to prevent escape or harm under exigent circumstances. Empirical analyses of police-involved shootings substantiate this necessity, revealing that the majority involve suspects armed with firearms or other weapons presenting direct, immediate risks to officers or bystanders. A review of over 1,000 fatal encounters found that most decedents posed an active , such as brandishing or discharging weapons, at the time of engagement, underscoring the infeasibility of or arrest without escalating peril. Data from a 2015–2018 sample of 813 killings indicated that only 5.4% lacked evidence of an immediate , with the remainder tied to active like assaults on officers. Classifications in databases tracking incidents further categorize approximately 25–30% as "attacks"—the highest threat level involving direct assaults—demonstrating that lethal responses frequently avert broader casualties in split-second decisions. From a causal standpoint, requiring judicial oversight in real-time threats ignores the temporal mismatch between unfolding and protracted legal timelines, potentially enabling attackers to inflict harm before intervention. protocols emphasize that s must assess threat signals—such as proximity, aggressive posture, or verbal cues—integrating them instantaneously to mitigate risks, as has historically correlated with officer fatalities in ambushes or pursuits. Defensive force analyses argue that restricting lethal options to non-imminent scenarios would undermine agent efficacy, as empirical patterns show threats often resolve lethally only when preempted. This framework extends to military contexts under , where immediate neutralization of hostiles in zones prevents chain-reaction casualties, though domestic applications remain bounded by protections.

Counter-Terrorism and Decapitation Strategies

Decapitation strategies in counter-terrorism entail the of high-ranking terrorist leaders to sever command-and-control structures, impair operational planning, and erode group cohesion. These operations, often executed via drone strikes, raids, or precision airstrikes, aim to exploit hierarchical dependencies within organizations, where the loss of a central figure can cascade into reduced attack capabilities and internal fragmentation. Empirical analyses indicate that such tactics are more efficacious against smaller, centralized groups reliant on charismatic or operational leaders, as opposed to diffuse, ideologically driven networks that can rapidly replace personnel. The has extensively employed in its post-9/11 campaigns against and affiliates. For instance, the May 2, 2011, raid killing in , , disrupted al-Qaeda core's strategic direction, forcing remaining leaders into prolonged isolation and contributing to a decline in high-profile plots originating from the group. Similarly, the October 27, 2019, raid eliminating caliph in accelerated the territorial collapse of ISIS's self-proclaimed , which had peaked at controlling over 100,000 square kilometers by 2014. U.S. drone campaigns from 2004 to 2018 conducted over 500 strikes in , , and , eliminating key figures such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's on September 30, 2011, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's on August 5, 2009, resulting in measurable short-term drops in attack volumes—up to 50% in some regional datasets. Quantitative assessments reveal mixed outcomes, with decapitation correlating to increased group mortality rates—defined as cessation of major attacks within years— in approximately 30-40% of cases involving hierarchical jihadist entities, per longitudinal studies of over 200 terrorist organizations from 1970 to 2010. Captured al-Qaeda documents from Abbottabad corroborate that sustained strikes compelled leaders to prioritize survival over offensive operations, degrading recruitment and logistics. However, regenerative capacity persists in resilient groups; al-Qaeda affiliates, for example, sustained global operations post-bin Laden through decentralized cells, underscoring that decapitation yields tactical gains but seldom ideological defeat without complementary ground efforts or intelligence dominance. Israel's operations against Palestinian militants, such as the January 2, 2024, drone strike killing Hamas deputy leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut, have similarly induced operational pauses but provoked retaliatory escalations, highlighting risks of leadership vacuums filled by more radical successors.

Crime Suppression in High-Violence Environments

In environments characterized by rampant , such as drug cartels or street gangs dominating urban slums, extrajudicial killings have been employed as a mechanism to disrupt criminal networks and restore state authority where judicial processes are overwhelmed or corrupted. Proponents argue that in high-violence settings—often with rates exceeding 20 per 100,000 inhabitants—the immediate elimination of high-value targets, including and enforcers, severs command structures, reduces operational capacity, and instills deterrence through credible threat of lethal retribution, bypassing protracted trials that may fail due to witness intimidation or . This approach draws on causal logic that violent actors impose externalities on society via predation and turf wars; their removal directly lowers the incidence of associated crimes, as evidenced by temporal correlations in implementation data. The under President (2016–2022) exemplifies this strategy in combating methamphetamine-fueled syndicates that contributed to widespread , , and . Launched in June 2016, the campaign involved police operations and actions resulting in over 6,000 deaths attributed to authorities and additional thousands by unidentified actors, targeting suspected dealers and users in poor neighborhoods. Coinciding with these killings, the national homicide rate declined from 11.02 per 100,000 in 2016 to 8.4 in 2017 and further to 4.32 in 2019, reflecting a roughly 60% drop in intentional killings over the period. data reported a 63% reduction in overall index crimes from 2010 levels by 2022, with drug-related offenses plummeting due to dismantled distribution networks and heightened among perpetrators. Similar dynamics appeared in El Salvador's anti-gang efforts under President , where a 2022 state of emergency authorized aggressive interventions, including reported instances of lethal force against and Barrio 18 members amid prior extrajudicial practices. Homicide rates fell from 38 per 100,000 in 2019 to 2.4 in 2023, the lowest in , as mass detentions (over 80,000) combined with targeted eliminations disrupted gang finances from and trafficking, yielding safer public spaces and economic reactivation in formerly no-go zones. Independent assessments attribute part of the deterrence to the regime's willingness to employ overwhelming force, reducing gang recruitment and retaliatory violence, though official statistics may undercount due to reclassifications. Empirical patterns across these cases suggest extrajudicial measures can yield short-term suppression by exploiting criminals' —high probability of outweighing gains—particularly where conventional policing yields low clearance rates below 10% for homicides. However, hinges on complementary reforms like intelligence-led targeting to avoid to adjacent areas, as unchecked risks escalating cycles if perceived as indiscriminate. Sources critiquing these tactics, such as reports, emphasize abuses but often overlook the pre-intervention baseline of unchecked predation, reflecting institutional preferences for procedural norms over outcome metrics in violence-plagued contexts.

Empirical Assessments

Data on Crime Deterrence and Reduction

In the , the launch of President Duterte's "" in mid-2016, characterized by widespread extrajudicial killings of suspected narcotics traffickers and users, coincided with a marked decline in reported . According to data from the Office on Drugs and , the intentional rate decreased from 6.51 per 100,000 population in 2015 to 3.82 per 100,000 in 2019. statistics further documented a reduction in index crimes—encompassing , , , , physical injury, and damage to property—from an average monthly rate of approximately 1.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 to 0.4 per 100,000 by 2019, representing a roughly 67% drop in volume over the campaign's initial phase. This temporal correlation supports arguments for a deterrent , as the policy emphasized swift, certain removal of high-risk offenders, contrasting with protracted judicial processes that empirical studies on associate with negligible deterrence due to rarity and delay. Over 6,000 deaths were attributed to police operations by 2019, with additional vigilante-style killings, creating a pervasive atmosphere of that surveys indicated reduced petty drug-related offenses and activity in urban slums. Proponents, including local officials, attribute the decline to disrupted criminal networks and generalized deterrence through publicized executions, though critics from groups contend underreporting and misattribution inflate the gains. Similar patterns emerged in under President Nayib Bukele's 2022 targeting gangs, where policies permitting lethal force against resisting suspects contributed to extrajudicial elements amid mass arrests. Homicide rates fell from 18 per 100,000 in 2021 to 1.9 per 100,000 in 2024, with official figures recording only 114 murders nationwide in 2024—the lowest in . This 90% reduction exceeded prior incarceration-focused efforts, suggesting that the credible threat of immediate death amplified deterrence in environments of entrenched , where judicial incapacity allows rates exceeding 70%. Cross-context analyses, such as data from , indicate that reduced enforcement capacity correlates with spikes in —up 45% during temporary halts—implying active suppression via lethal means can sustain lower baseline rates in high-violence settings. However, long-term evaluations remain sparse due to methodological challenges in isolating from factors like economic shifts or undercounted killings, with peer-reviewed often prioritizing ethical concerns over quantitative outcomes. Overall, observational from these cases points to short-term crime suppression through EJK, driven by offender incapacitation and fear-induced behavioral changes, though depends on complementary institutional reforms to prevent resurgence.

Effectiveness Against Terrorist Networks

Targeted killings of terrorist leaders have demonstrated capacity to disrupt command structures, compel operational adaptations, and degrade network capabilities, particularly through the removal of experienced personnel and the imposition of security burdens. In the U.S. drone campaign against in from 2004 onward, over 400 strikes targeted militants, including senior figures, leading to a thinning of qualified personnel in external operations branches and forcing the group to evacuate its safe haven by early 2011, as evidenced by captured documents from Osama bin Laden's compound showing succession challenges and restricted communications. Qualitative assessments from al-Qaeda correspondences indicate that sustained pressure eroded efficiency, with leaders prioritizing evasion over planning, though quantitative data reveal short-term spikes in attacks as groups dispersed. Empirical studies on decapitation strategies yield mixed results, with effectiveness varying by group characteristics. Jenna Jordan's analysis of 207 terrorist organizations from 1945 to 2010 found that leadership removal contributed to the end of only a small fraction, performing better against young, small, secular groups but failing against larger, older, religious ones like or , where ideological resilience enables rapid succession and adaptation. Against , U.S. and coalition strikes eliminated key drone experts and planners, correlating with territorial losses and reduced high-profile attacks by 2019, though affiliates persisted due to decentralized structures. Recent Israeli operations illustrate short-term network degradation. The September 27, 2024, killing of leader induced command disarray, enabling Israeli advances that destroyed rocket stockpiles and mid-level cadres, sharply reducing launch rates from thousands monthly to sporadic by late 2024. Similarly, Yahya Sinwar's death on October 16, 2024, eroded Hamas's Gaza governance, diminishing centralized control over fighters and population, though succession by figures like his brother Mohammed sustained low-level resistance into 2025. These cases underscore causal disruptions in logistics and morale, yet highlight limits against entrenched ideologies, where killings alone seldom prevent regeneration without complementary ground efforts.

Unintended Consequences and Cost-Benefit Analyses

Extrajudicial killings, while aimed at rapid threat neutralization, have produced including casualties, institutional , and societal fear that can undermine long-term security. In the ' anti-drug campaign launched in July 2016 under President , official data reported 6,252 deaths in police operations by May 2022, with groups estimating totals exceeding 12,000 including vigilante killings, disproportionately affecting impoverished urban communities. These actions correlated with an initial drop in index crimes—such as a 30-40% reduction in homicide and theft rates in 2017 per statistics—but studies attribute much of this to compliance through terror rather than dismantled networks, with evidence of police fabricating evidence and engaging in shakedowns for quotas. Longer-term analyses reveal rebound effects, including disrupted community dynamics, increased vulnerability to displacement, and entrenched police impunity, as investigations into abuses like the 2016 killing of Rolando Espinosa confirmed extrajudicial elements without accountability. In counter-terrorism, targeted killings via drone strikes have demonstrated short-term operational disruptions but often at the cost of fostering resentment. U.S. drone operations in from 2004-2018 killed an estimated 2,200-3,500 militants alongside 150-900 s per Bureau of Investigative Journalism , temporarily reducing attack frequencies in strike vicinities by forcing organizational adaptations like enhanced . However, empirical reviews find these strikes correlate with heightened local anti-state sentiment and sporadic upticks in retaliatory violence, as deaths—often from faulty intelligence—erode community cooperation and amplify recruitment narratives in regions like and . A study of strikes using communication showed anomalous drops in cell activity post-strike, indicating terror-induced suppression rather than gains, potentially exacerbating underground . Cost-benefit assessments reveal a precarious balance, where immediate threat elimination—such as decapitating leadership in groups like —yields measurable deterrence against specific plots, but systemic risks like norm erosion and blowback often predominate absent rigorous oversight. Peer-reviewed analyses of high-incentive policing, as in quota-driven killing programs, document increased abuse rates, with unintended empowerment violations (e.g., reduced ) persisting post-campaign. In counter-terrorism, while strikes prevent an estimated dozens of attacks annually per U.S. government claims, the opacity of targeting—lacking verifiable minimization—incurs diplomatic isolation and legal liabilities under , with net societal costs amplified by radicalization feedback loops documented in from conflict zones. Overall, evidence suggests benefits accrue in acute, high-threat scenarios with precise , but in sustained campaigns, human and institutional tolls— including 20-30% error rates in identifications—frequently outweigh gains, promoting resilient adversaries over eradication.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Human Rights Frameworks and Absolute Bans

The is protected under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ratified by 173 states as of 2023, which states that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life and requires states to protect this right by law. This provision explicitly encompasses extrajudicial killings—defined as deliberate executions by state agents without judicial or administrative oversight—as arbitrary deprivations, imposing an absolute prohibition without exceptions for policy or expediency. The UN Human Rights Committee, in General Comment No. 36 adopted on October 30, 2018, reinforces this by obligating states to prevent such killings, conduct prompt and impartial investigations, and prosecute perpetrators, while deeming targeted killings via drones or other means in counter-terrorism operations presumptively unlawful unless compliant with strict necessity and proportionality tests. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), proclaimed on December 10, 1948, similarly declares that everyone has the , liberty, and security of person, serving as a foundational non-binding norm influencing subsequent treaties. Regional instruments echo this absolutism, such as Article 2 of the (1950), which prohibits intentional deprivation of life except in strictly defined circumstances like lawful arrests or quelling riots, with the consistently ruling extrajudicial actions as violations in cases like McCann and Others v. (1995), involving a Gibraltar operation against IRA suspects. The Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (1969) under Article 4 likewise bans arbitrary executions, with the Inter-American Court applying it to condemn state-sponsored killings in , as in the Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras case (1988). These frameworks treat the prohibition as non-derogable, even during public emergencies, as affirmed in ICCPR Article 4(2), meaning states cannot suspend protections against extrajudicial killings amid or unrest. UN mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions established in , monitor compliance through annual reports and country visits, documenting over 1,000 alleged cases globally in 2022 alone, often attributing patterns to state security forces in conflict zones. Fact Sheet No. 11 (Rev. 1) from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for outlines investigative principles derived from these norms, requiring identification of victims, forensic analysis, and to deter . Counterarguments highlight tensions with operational realities, particularly where human rights law (HRL) intersects with international humanitarian law (IHL) in non-international armed conflicts, under which IHL's lex specialis permits direct participation targeting of armed actors without prior adjudication, as combatants lose protections upon engaging hostilities—contrasting HRL's emphasis on arrest over lethal force when feasible. States like the United States, in submissions on General Comment 36, critiqued expansive HRL interpretations as overreaching into self-defense prerogatives under customary law, arguing that non-derogability unduly hampers responses to imminent threats where capture risks agent lives or enables further attacks, as in the 2011 operation against Osama bin Laden. In high-violence civilian contexts, such as urban gang warfare, rigid absolutism may incentivize under-enforcement, empirically correlating with higher overall homicide rates in jurisdictions prioritizing process over decisive action, though direct causal data remains contested due to confounding variables like institutional capacity. Proponents of frameworks counter that allowances erode rule-of-law foundations, risking escalatory abuses, yet implementation often reflects interpretive biases in UN bodies, which have faced accusations of selective scrutiny favoring non-Western state critiques while downplaying symmetric threats from non-state actors.

Risks of State Overreach and Abuse

Extrajudicial killings inherently risk state overreach due to the absence of , enabling to expand targeting criteria beyond verified threats to include perceived enemies or innocents misidentified through faulty . This lack of can foster a culture of , where officials fabricate or inflate suspect status to justify lethal actions, as documented in operations where police planted drugs on victims to retroactively validate killings. In during the 1970s, exemplified such abuse, as military dictatorships in countries including , , and coordinated cross-border extrajudicial executions and disappearances targeting political dissidents, resulting in an estimated 60,000 deaths and widespread under the pretext of anti-communist security. These actions deviated from into systematic , with state intelligence agencies sharing lists of opponents for elimination without trial, eroding legal norms and enabling authoritarian consolidation. The ' anti-drug campaign under President , launched in June 2016, illustrated modern risks, with police conducting over 6,000 killings by March 2017, many involving summary executions of low-level suspects or bystanders, often followed by staged evidence like planted firearms to simulate resistance. Investigations revealed patterns of abuse, including operations and incentives for kills, disproportionately affecting poor urban slums where vendettas or quotas supplanted evidence-based targeting, leading to thousands of unresolved cases of potential innocents. U.S. drone strikes in , while often framed as precise, have incurred collateral deaths—estimated in the hundreds in alone from 2004 to 2018—stemming from errors or permissive rules allowing strikes near non-combatants, raising concerns of overreach into non-imminent threats and normalization of remote killing without capture options. Such incidents, including the 2021 Kabul strike killing 10 civilians including children due to misidentification, underscore how technological distance can lower thresholds for lethal force, potentially extending to domestic surveillance abuses absent strict oversight. Broadly, these practices incentivize , as seen in bounty systems or promotions tied to kill counts, diverting resources from investigation and enabling where powerful actors shield allies or eliminate rivals. Over time, unchecked authority erodes public trust in institutions, fosters cycles of retaliation, and blurs lines between state security and , as evidenced by rising disappearances and unprosecuted abuses in high-violence contexts.

Debunking Exaggerated Narratives on Systemic Violations

Claims of systemic extrajudicial killings frequently aggregate lawful defensive actions with alleged executions, overstating state culpability. In the ' anti-drug campaign launched in 2016, official statistics report approximately 6,252 suspects killed in police operations through 2022, with most classified as "nanlaban" (resisted arrest), involving armed confrontations evidenced by recovered firearms and ballistic matches in over 80% of cases examined by internal reviews. groups' estimates exceeding 12,000 total deaths, including vigilante actions, often attribute indirect state encouragement without forensic or causal proof for a majority, conflating independent criminal violence with policy-driven executions. Disputes over death tolls highlight methodological issues; for example, a using AI on police reports and media data challenged claims of 30,000 casualties as inflated by unverified inclusions of non-drug-related and pre-2016 baselines. Philippine officials have countered reports by noting reliance on "alternative facts" from advocacy sources, with independent audits finding no disproportionate wave beyond baseline urban rates adjusted for operation scale. In U.S. drone strikes, narratives of rampant civilian harm ignore comparative precision; from 2004 to 2011 in , tracking by the Long War Journal documented 108 civilian deaths against 1,816 militants, yielding a 1:17 far below manned airstrikes' historical 10:1 or higher collateral rates. Bureau of Investigative Journalism figures, often cited for higher tallies (424-969 civilians in 2,200-3,500 total deaths through 2018), incorporate unconfirmed local reports prone to militant , while U.S. post-strike audits and policy shifts under Obama reduced monthly civilian incidents from 12 to under one by 2017. Such exaggerations stem partly from source biases; organizations like and , while documenting abuses, have been critiqued for overreliance on partisan or unverified eyewitness accounts, selective omission of resistance contexts, and framing that amplifies state intent over empirical causation, as seen in inconsistent methodologies across global cases. Accountability mechanisms, including internal investigations yielding rare but existent prosecutions (e.g., two U.S. drone operators charged for falsified targeting in ), counter claims of unbridled systemic .

Global Examples

Africa

In , vigilante groups such as the (CJTF) have conducted extrajudicial killings of suspected members since 2009, particularly in , where formal state capacity was overwhelmed by . These actions, often in collaboration with the military, contributed to recapturing urban centers like from control by 2015, reducing suicide bombings and raids in affected areas through community intelligence and direct confrontations that deterred fighters via heightened risk of immediate elimination. However, the CJTF has perpetrated arbitrary executions, , and , exacerbating ethnic tensions and undermining long-term stability in the Basin. The Nigerian military itself faced accusations of mass extrajudicial killings of detainees, with estimates of thousands executed between 2012 and 2015, though such practices have been linked to intelligence failures rather than sustained deterrence. In Kenya, police forces have carried out extrajudicial executions targeting suspected criminals in informal settlements like and , with at least 104 such killings documented in 2022 alone, often framed as responses to gang violence and muggings in high-density urban zones. These operations, including "shoot-to-kill" policies, have been justified by authorities as necessary in environments where judicial processes are protracted and high, yet empirical assessments indicate limited reduction, as killings frequently target petty offenders rather than organized networks, perpetuating cycles of and distrust. Between 2019 and 2022, over 500 extrajudicial killings and dozens of enforced disappearances were attributed to police units, correlating with spikes in protest-related violence but no proportional decline in overall urban homicide rates. During South Africa's apartheid era (1948–1994), state security apparatus, including police death squads under the Security Branch, executed extrajudicial killings of at least 50 anti-regime activists between 1977 and 1989, often disguised as criminal acts to suppress perceived threats from the and other groups. These operations, involving assassinations and cross-border raids, temporarily neutralized insurgent cells but fueled broader resistance, contributing to the regime's collapse without achieving lasting pacification. Post-1994, extrajudicial policing by units persists in townships plagued by , with informal "instant justice" by officers responding to and gang activity, though official data shows no systematic deterrence amid annual murder rates exceeding 20,000. In , forces and Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops have engaged in summary executions of al-Shabaab suspects during counter-insurgency sweeps since 2007, particularly in rural strongholds, as a means to disrupt the group's guerrilla tactics and IED networks. Such killings, numbering in the dozens annually per UN reports, have supported territorial gains—al-Shabaab lost control of by 2011—but correlate with retaliatory civilian targeting by the group, with U.S. drone strikes exacerbating this by increasing al-Shabaab rates fivefold in affected districts. Effectiveness remains mixed, as al-Shabaab retains influence over 40% of territory as of 2023, exploiting vacuums for .

Americas

In the , extrajudicial killings peaked during the era military dictatorships in , where regimes targeted left-wing insurgents, intellectuals, and suspected communists through state-sponsored death squads and disappearances. , a coordinated campaign from the mid-1970s to early 1980s involving , , , , , and , facilitated cross-border abductions, , and executions, resulting in at least 805 documented victims, though broader estimates suggest tens of thousands affected across the region. The U.S. provided logistical and intelligence support to these anti-communist efforts, viewing them as bulwarks against Soviet influence. Argentina's (1976–1983) under the military junta saw systematic extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances of up to 30,000 individuals, many flown out to sea and dumped from aircraft in "death flights" after at centers like the Navy Mechanics School (ESMA). Victims included armed guerrillas from groups like the and , alongside non-combatants labeled as subversives, with the junta justifying actions as necessary to dismantle terrorist networks responsible for bombings and kidnappings that killed hundreds. In , Augusto Pinochet's regime (1973–1990) accounted for 3,197 executions, disappearances, and killings, primarily against supporters of the overthrown Allende government and leftist militants, as documented by the Rettig Commission. These operations suppressed insurgencies but entrenched authoritarian control through widespread terror. In , the "false positives" scandal from 2002 to 2008 involved army units killing at least 6,402 civilians—often poor youths lured with promises of jobs—and staging them as guerrillas killed in combat to inflate success metrics against FARC rebels, incentivized by promotions and bonuses under President Uribe's security policies. Investigations revealed systemic pressure on commanders to produce bodies, with forensic alterations to simulate combat deaths. Mexico's war, launched in 2006, has seen federal police and military forces implicated in extrajudicial killings, including the 2011 Watch-documented cases of 24 probable executions disguised as cartel confrontations, amid over 35,000 organized crime-related deaths by 2010. In , police operations in favelas have led to 6,393 killings in 2023 alone, predominantly of males (87.8% of identified victims), often in raids against traffickers where remains low despite judicial oversight efforts. These patterns reflect causal links between aggressive anti-crime tactics and reduced insurgent activity, though at the cost of civilian lives and eroded trust in state institutions.

Asia-Pacific

In the Philippines, the campaign against illegal drugs initiated by President Rodrigo Duterte upon taking office on June 30, 2016, involved thousands of deaths attributed to police operations and unidentified gunmen, widely described as extrajudicial killings by human rights organizations. The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency reported 6,252 individuals killed in anti-drug operations from July 2016 to May 2022, while independent estimates from groups like Human Rights Watch placed the total exceeding 12,000 by 2023, including vigilante-style executions. In September 2025, the International Criminal Court alleged Duterte's direct involvement in at least 76 such killings as part of crimes against humanity charges. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., "drug war" killings persisted with near impunity into 2025, though at a reduced scale compared to the Duterte era. In Indonesia's Papua region, Indonesian security forces have engaged in extrajudicial killings amid ongoing conflict with separatist groups seeking . The U.S. State Department documented numerous reports of such killings by security officials in 2024, often in response to insurgent activities by groups like the . The expressed concern in March 2024 over systematic extrajudicial executions and excessive use of force against indigenous Papuans, citing patterns of impunity. reported continued unlawful killings and torture in Papua as of 2024, linked to counter-insurgency efforts. India has a documented history of "fake encounters," where security forces stage killings of civilians as militants, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Notable cases include the 2000 Pathribal incident, where five civilians were killed by n forces and presented as Pakistani militants infiltrating the region. and other monitors have reported ongoing concerns about extrajudicial executions by security personnel in counter-terrorism operations, with the U.S. State Department noting arbitrary and unlawful deprivations of life in custody as of 2006, though comprehensive recent statistics remain limited due to restricted access. In , security forces conducted extrajudicial killings during operations against militants, particularly in regions like Swat Valley. A 2010 Human Rights Watch report detailed executions by the Pakistani Army of individuals suspected of ties, labeling them as unlawful killings outside judicial processes. The U.S. State Department reported numerous instances of arbitrary or unlawful killings by authorities in 2023, including in counter-terrorism contexts. Thailand's southern provinces have seen extrajudicial actions by government forces in response to the Malay Muslim insurgency that intensified in 2004. documented unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions by security personnel targeting suspected insurgents between 2004 and 2011. Reports indicate that special laws like the 2005 Emergency Decree facilitated such practices, contributing to cycles of violence alongside insurgent attacks on civilians.

Europe and Middle East

In , extrajudicial killings by state actors have been infrequent in Western democracies adhering to robust judicial oversight, with annual human rights reports from bodies like the U.S. State Department noting no credible instances in countries such as or during recent years. However, in regions involving ongoing insurgencies or counter-terrorism operations, allegations persist, particularly in and . Russian federal forces and pro-Moscow Chechen militias have been implicated in extrajudicial executions during conflicts in and the , with documenting cases of summary killings, , and forced disappearances targeting suspected rebels and civilians since the 1990s, including over 100 verified disappearances leading to presumed executions by 2005. reported ongoing patterns into 2017, such as staged "crossfire" killings to eliminate detainees without trial. Turkey, spanning and the , has faced accusations of extrajudicial killings in its decades-long conflict with the (PKK), designated a terrorist group by , the , and the U.S. investigations from the 1990s detailed "actor unknown" murders and village raids resulting in civilian deaths without judicial process, often attributed to security forces or state-linked paramilitaries, with estimates of thousands unresolved by 2016. A 2021 court case exposed a gang leader's involvement in over 100 such killings disguised as anti-PKK operations between 2002 and 2006, highlighting potential state complicity or tolerance. The U.N. reported hundreds of arbitrary killings of by Turkish forces in southeast and cross-border operations by 2017, though maintains these occur in active combat zones under lawful self-defense. In the , extrajudicial killings remain more prevalent amid authoritarian governance and armed conflicts, often rationalized as counter-terrorism but frequently lacking . Israel's targeted killings of suspected militants, initiated post-Second Intifada (2000–2005), involve preemptive strikes on individuals deemed active threats in ; the Israeli ruled in 2006 that such operations are permissible under if based on reliable intelligence, proportionality assessments, and post-action , distinguishing them from unlawful executions by requiring combatant status verification rather than blanket prohibition. Critics, including some groups, label them extrajudicial due to the absence of prior arrest warrants, but empirical data shows reduced suicide bombings following peaks in operations, with over 2,300 killed in Gaza and strikes from 2000–2010, many combatants per Israeli assessments. Arab states exhibit higher documented rates, driven by security apparatus impunity. In Syria, the Assad regime and affiliated forces conducted at least 46 extrajudicial executions of civilians in Suwayda province on July 25–26, 2025, involving deliberate shootings and mock executions without trial, as verified by through witness testimonies and video evidence. Egypt's security forces have used fabricated "shootouts" to cover at least 87 suspicious killings of Islamist militants between 2013 and 2020, per analysis of forensic inconsistencies and coerced confessions. Saudi Arabia's 2018 murder of journalist in Istanbul's exemplified state-orchestrated extrajudicial killing, with a U.N. rapporteur concluding premeditated execution by agents acting on Mohammed bin Salman's orders, corroborated by audio recordings and defector accounts; broader patterns include mass shootings of Ethiopian migrants at the border, killing hundreds since 2022 via indiscriminate fire without judicial oversight. Iran's 1988 prison massacres, executing up to 5,000 political prisoners without trial, remain unprosecuted, classified as by due to deliberate, widespread deprivation of life.

Other Regions

In , security forces have been implicated in multiple arbitrary killings, particularly targeting the Pamiri minority in the (GBAO). During clashes in November 2021 and May 2022, government agents killed at least 16 civilians, including an unarmed man shot during a in Khorugh on November 25, 2021, in what described as a potential extrajudicial execution. documented no accountability for these deaths two years later, with investigations stalled despite UN principles requiring prompt probes into extra-legal executions. The U.S. State Department reported several such unlawful killings in 2024, amid broader repression including and arbitrary detentions of Pamiri activists. Uzbekistan has seen credible reports of extrajudicial killings by state agents, including in custody and during protest suppression. The U.S. State Department noted several arbitrary killings in 2024, building on patterns from prior years where nongovernmental monitors alleged government involvement in deaths without . Historical precedents include the 2005 Andijan massacre, where security forces killed hundreds of unarmed protesters, an event attributes to deliberate use of lethal force against civilians. Domestic NGOs have raised concerns over uninvestigated deaths in detention, often linked to charges of or religious activity. In , while 2024 saw no confirmed extrajudicial killings per official reports, the January protests resulted in 238 deaths, many from security forces' excessive use of live ammunition against demonstrators in and other cities. verified at least 12 unlawful killings by police and national guard units, who fired into crowds without warning, contravening international standards on proportionate . Government inquiries attributed most deaths to "rioters," but independent analyses, including video evidence, indicate state agents initiated lethal engagements. Turkmenistan recorded one confirmed arbitrary killing by state agents in late 2023, involving a subjected to extrajudicial execution, as reported by monitors and corroborated by the U.S. State Department. Activist accounts detail the case of Allamurad Khudayramov, who died in custody under suspicious circumstances consistent with , with no transparent investigation. Such incidents occur in a context of opaque conditions and suppression of dissent, where deaths are rarely adjudicated independently. Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian states show fewer documented cases, with U.S. State Department assessments indicating no arbitrary killings by agents in 2024, though historical ethnic violence in involved unprosecuted deaths. Regional patterns often tie extrajudicial actions to counter- efforts, where extremism laws enable detentions leading to custodial deaths without judicial oversight.

Contemporary Developments (Post-2020)

Ongoing Conflicts and Policy Shifts

In the , the transition from President to Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in June 2022 marked a rhetorical policy shift toward emphasizing in anti-drug campaigns, with Marcos assuring international bodies of prioritization; however, police-conducted operations continued to result in extrajudicial killings, including 332 documented deaths across the country in 2024 according to independent monitoring by the Dahas Project. Accountability remained limited, with only four convictions for such killings from the prior decade reported by the U.S. State Department, reflecting persistent despite the administration's pledges. El Salvador's adoption of a prolonged in March 2022 under President represented a aggressive policy pivot against gang violence, involving mass arrests of over 80,000 suspects and suspension of certain constitutional rights, which correlated with a dramatic reduction in homicides—from 38 per 100,000 in 2019 to under 3 per 100,000 by 2024—though security forces faced credible allegations of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions amid the crackdown. This approach, dubbed the "Territorial Control Plan," prioritized rapid incapacitation of networks over traditional judicial processes, yielding measurable declines in gang-perpetrated killings but prompting concerns from observers about overreach. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russian forces have engaged in systematic extrajudicial executions of captured military personnel, with the UN Monitoring Mission documenting 79 such incidents across 24 sites since August 2024, adding to 177 investigated cases of prisoner-of-war killings since 2022; Ukrainian authorities initiated 53 criminal probes into these acts by November 2024. No corresponding policy shift toward restraint was evident from Russian state practices, which aligned with patterns of summary executions reported in occupied territories. Amid Gaza's internal strife during the broader - war, authorities conducted multiple public extrajudicial executions of accused of collaboration with , theft of aid, or spreading dissent in 2025, including incidents in October that involved gunmen killing civilians in streets and markets, condemned by the Palestinian Authority as "heinous" and by international mediators as threats to prospects. These acts, often framed by as purges against "traitors," reflected no formal policy evolution post-2020 but intensified amid aid shortages and factional tensions, with reports indicating a shift from private to public spectacles to deter perceived enemies. In Ethiopia's Tigray and Amhara conflicts, Ethiopian federal forces carried out summary executions of civilians, such as the , , killing of dozens in Merawi town by soldiers seeking suspected , as detailed in survivor testimonies and , underscoring limited policy adjustments toward accountability following the 2022 Pretoria peace deal's partial implementation. Similarly, in , military operations against and bandits post-2020 have involved recurrent extrajudicial killings by security forces, often without legal sanction, as affirmed in judicial analyses of litigation cases. These examples highlight a global pattern where policy shifts in high-violence contexts—ranging from intensified securitization in to nominal reforms in the —have yielded mixed outcomes, with empirical reductions in some criminal homicides offset by state-attributed extrajudicial deaths reported by monitors like , whose assessments warrant scrutiny for institutional biases favoring expansive interpretations over security imperatives.

Technological Advances in Targeting

Advancements in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, have significantly enhanced the precision and scalability of targeted strikes since 2020, particularly through improved sensors, extended range, and integration with components. In the Russia-Ukraine conflict starting in 2022, both sides adapted first-person-view (FPV) drones—originally hobbyist models—for real-time and precision attacks on personnel and vehicles, achieving hit rates exceeding 80% in some operations due to onboard video feeds and GPS guidance upgrades. These modifications, including AI-assisted stabilization and autonomous navigation, have lowered for state and non-state actors conducting extrajudicial operations, as seen in non-state groups using similar tech for assassinations beyond conflict zones. Artificial intelligence (AI) systems have emerged as key enablers for automating target identification and prioritization, reducing human workload while raising questions about accuracy in high-volume operations. The U.S. military's Project Maven, expanded post-2020, employs algorithms to analyze drone and for detecting objects and patterns indicative of threats, aiding operators in identifying targets during missions without full autonomy. Similarly, the (IDF) deployed AI tools like "Lavender" during Gaza operations from late 2023, which processed vast datasets to generate lists of suspected militants, with human reviewers applying varying scrutiny levels based on target rank—minimal for lower-level individuals to accelerate strikes. IDF officials have described such systems as decision-support aids that sift intelligence for military objectives, though reports from intelligence sources indicate Lavender flagged over 37,000 individuals with a claimed 90% accuracy rate, corroborated by cross-checks but reliant on probabilistic scoring rather than definitive evidence. Surveillance technologies, including facial recognition integrated with mobile and CCTV data, have further refined individual targeting by enabling real-time identification in urban or populated areas. Israeli firm AnyVision (now Oosto), tested in operations pre-2020 but scaled post-conflict, uses facial recognition to track and nominate persons for potential strikes or arrests, drawing on algorithms trained on local datasets for higher precision in diverse environments. U.S. providers like Palantir have supplied AI analytics to allies for similar , fusing with to predict militant behavior and justify preemptive actions. These tools, while improving strike efficiency—evidenced by reduced collateral estimates in declassified U.S. drone reports from 2021-2023—depend on , with empirical studies showing facial recognition error rates up to 35% for certain demographics, potentially inflating false positives in extrajudicial contexts. Emerging drone swarm capabilities represent a in mass targeting, where coordinated groups of low-cost UAVs overwhelm defenses for simultaneous strikes. U.S. initiatives post-2020, including Anduril's Lattice platform, integrate AI for swarm orchestration, allowing semi-autonomous coordination to prosecute multiple targets in denied areas, as tested in exercises simulating scenarios. While not yet deployed for confirmed extrajudicial killings, prototypes demonstrated in Pacific trials achieved coordinated hits on simulated high-value individuals, signaling potential for scalable, deniable operations by states. Overall, these technologies prioritize speed and volume over exhaustive verification, aligning with doctrinal shifts toward data-driven lethality in asymmetric threats.

International Responses and Accountability Efforts

The United Nations maintains ongoing mechanisms to address extrajudicial killings through the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, who has issued reports post-2020 emphasizing the need for thorough investigations into unlawful deaths, as outlined in document A/79/172 presented in 2024. The UN General Assembly has adopted annual resolutions condemning such executions and urging states to prevent them, including Resolution 77/218 in December 2023 and Resolution 79/176 in December 2024, which recognize that these acts may constitute crimes against humanity or genocide under certain conditions. These efforts focus on strengthening national investigations, protecting witnesses, and ensuring accountability, though enforcement relies on state cooperation. A prominent example of judicial accountability is the International Criminal Court's investigation into the , authorized by Pre-Trial Chamber I on September 15, 2021, targeting alleged including in the context of the anti-drug campaign from November 2011 to March 2019. Despite the ' withdrawal from the ICC in 2019, the court retained jurisdiction over pre-withdrawal events; the investigation resumed in 2023 after rejecting a deferral request, culminating in the arrest of former President on March 12, 2025, and his transfer to ICC custody for charges of , , and as . This case represents one of the few instances of high-level prosecution, though domestic convictions for related killings remain rare, with only a handful of police officers held accountable by 2025. In other contexts, UN fact-finding missions have documented violations and recommended prosecutions, such as the 2020 report on identifying over 2,000 extrajudicial executions and calling for accountability through national and international mechanisms. Similarly, in April 2025, the UN High Commissioner for condemned extrajudicial killings by Sudanese forces in , labeling them violations of and demanding individual accountability. However, broader patterns indicate persistent , with reports noting that international responses often fail to deter state-sponsored killings due to sovereignty barriers and inconsistent enforcement, as evidenced by rising renditions and assassinations without repercussions in multiple regions since 2020. These mechanisms, while providing frameworks for scrutiny, have yielded limited tangible reductions in global incidences, highlighting enforcement gaps in practice.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.