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General Napoleon Bonaparte during the Coup of 18 Brumaire in Saint-Cloud, detail of painting by François Bouchot, 1840
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A coup d'état (/ˌkuːdeɪˈtɑː/ ⓘ; French: [ku deta] ⓘ; lit. 'stroke of state'),[1] or simply a coup,[2] is typically an illegal and overt attempt by a military organization or other government elites to unseat an incumbent person or leadership.[3][4] A self-coup is said to take place when a leader, having come to power through legal means, tries to stay in power through illegal means.[4]

By one estimate, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, half of which were successful.[3] Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.[3] Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups,[5][6][7] though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.[8]

Many factors may lead to the occurrence of a coup, as well as determine the success or failure of a coup. Once a coup is underway, coup success is driven by coup-makers' ability to get others to believe that the coup attempt will be successful.[9] The number of successful coups has decreased over time.[3] Failed coups in authoritarian systems are likely to strengthen the power of the authoritarian ruler.[10][11] The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups, a phenomenon referred to as the "coup trap".[12][13][14][15]

In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military and the fragmenting of military and security agencies.[16] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness as loyalty is prioritized over experience when filling key positions within the military.[17][18][19][20]

Etymology

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The term comes from French coup d'État, literally meaning a 'stroke of state' or 'blow of state'.[21][22][23] In French, the word État (French: [eta]) is capitalized when it denotes a sovereign political entity.[24] Although the concept of a coup d'état has featured in politics since antiquity, the phrase is of relatively recent coinage.[25] It did not appear within an English text before the 19th century except when used in the translation of a French source, there being no simple phrase in English to convey the contextualized idea of a 'knockout blow to the existing administration within a state'.

One early use within text translated from French was in 1785 in a printed translation of a letter from a French merchant, commenting on an arbitrary decree, or arrêt, issued by the French king restricting the import of British wool.[26] What may be its first published use within a text composed in English is an editor's note in the London Morning Chronicle, 1804, reporting the arrest by Napoleon in France, of Moreau, Berthier, Masséna, and Bernadotte: "There was a report in circulation yesterday of a sort of coup d'état having taken place in France, in consequence of some formidable conspiracy against the existing government."

In the British press, the phrase came to be used to describe the various murders by Napoleon's alleged secret police, the Gens d'Armes d'Elite, who executed the Duke of Enghien: "the actors in torture, the distributors of the poisoning draughts, and the secret executioners of those unfortunate individuals or families, whom Bonaparte's measures of safety require to remove. In what revolutionary tyrants call grand[s] coups d'état, as butchering, or poisoning, or drowning, en masse, they are exclusively employed."[27]

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Self-coup

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This section is an excerpt from Self-coup.[edit]

A self-coup, also called an autocoup (from Spanish autogolpe) or coup from the top, is a form of coup d'état in which a political leader, having come to power through legal means, stays in power illegally through the actions of themselves or their supporters.[28] The leader may dissolve or render powerless the national legislature and unlawfully assume extraordinary powers. Other measures may include annulling the constitution, suspending civil courts, and having the head of government assume dictatorial powers.[29][30]

From 1946 to the beginning of 2021, an estimated 148 self-coup attempts took place, 110 in autocracies and 38 in democracies.[31]

Soft coup

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Main articles: Soft coup and Nonviolent revolution

A soft coup, sometimes referred to as a silent coup or a bloodless coup, is an illegal overthrow of a government that – unlike a regular coup d'état – is achieved without the use of force or violence.[32]

Palace coup

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A palace coup or palace revolution is a coup in which one faction within the ruling group displaces another faction within a ruling group.[33] Along with popular protests, palace coups are a major threat to dictators.[34] The Harem conspiracy of the 12th century BC was one of the earliest attempts. Palace coups were common in Imperial China.[35] They have also occurred among the Habsburg dynasty in Austria, the Al-Thani dynasty in Qatar,[36] and in Haiti in the 19th to early 20th centuries.[37] The majority of Russian tsars between 1725 and 1801 were either overthrown or usurped power in palace coups.[38]

Putsch

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The term putsch ([pʊtʃ], from Swiss German for 'knock') denotes the political-military actions of a minority reactionary coup.[39][40] The term was initially coined for the Züriputsch of 6 September 1839 in Switzerland. It was also used for attempted coups in Weimar Germany, such as the 1920 Kapp Putsch, Küstrin Putsch, and Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch.[41]

The 1934 Night of the Long Knives was Hitler's purge to eliminate opponents, particularly the paramilitary faction led by Ernst Röhm, but Nazi propaganda justified it as preventing a supposed putsch planned or attempted by Röhm. The Nazi term Röhm-Putsch is still used by Germans to describe the event, often with quotation marks as the 'so-called Röhm Putsch'.[42]

The 1961 Algiers putsch and the 1991 August Putsch also use the term.

The 2023 Wagner Group rebellion has also been described as a putsch.[43][44]

Pronunciamiento and cuartelazo

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Main article: Pronunciamiento

Pronunciamiento ('pronouncement') is a term of Spanish origin for a type of coup d'état. Specifically the pronunciamiento is the formal declaration deposing the previous government and justifying the installation of the new government by the golpe de estado. Edward Luttwak distinguishes a coup, in which a military or political faction takes power for itself, from a pronunciamiento, in which the military deposes the existing government and hands over power to a new, ostensibly civilian government.[45]

A "barracks revolt" or cuartelazo is another type of military revolt, from the Spanish term cuartel ('quarter' or 'barracks'), in which the mutiny of specific military garrisons sparks a larger military revolt against the government.[46]

Other

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Other types of actual or attempted seizures of power are sometimes called "coups with adjectives". The appropriate term can be subjective and carries normative, analytical, and political implications.[32]

  • Civil society coup
  • Constitutional coup, consistent with the constitution, often by exploiting loopholes or ambiguities
  • Counter-coup, a coup to repeal the result of a previous coup
  • Democratic coup
  • Dissident coup, in which the culprits are nominally protestors without backing from any military or police units (e.g. sometimes used to describe the January 6 United States Capitol attack)[47][48]
  • Electoral coup
  • Judicial coup, a "legal" coup, utilizing the judiciary as the main instrument.
  • Market coup
  • Medical coup, having a leader declared incapacitated by doctors, such as in Tunisia in 1987
  • Military coup
  • Parliamentary coup
  • Presidential coup
  • Royal coup, in which a monarch dismisses democratically elected leaders and seizes all power (e.g. the 6 January Dictatorship by Alexander I of Yugoslavia)[49]
  • Slow-motion (or slow-moving or slow-rolling) coup

Revolution, rebellion

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While a coup is usually a conspiracy of a small group, a revolution or rebellion is usually started spontaneously by larger groups of uncoordinated people.[50] The distinction between a revolution and a coup is not always clear. Sometimes, a coup is labelled as a revolution by its plotters to feign democratic legitimacy.[51][52]

Prevalence and history

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Further information: List of coups and coup attempts and List of coups and coup attempts by country

According to Clayton Thyne and Jonathan Powell's coup data set, there were 457 coup attempts from 1950 to 2010, of which 227 (49.7%) were successful and 230 (50.3%) were unsuccessful.[3] They find that coups have "been most common in Africa and the Americas (36.5% and 31.9%, respectively). Asia and the Middle East have experienced 13.1% and 15.8% of total global coups, respectively. Europe has experienced by far the fewest coup attempts: 2.6%."[3] Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers of coup attempts in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s.[3] From 1950 to 2010, a majority of coups failed in the Middle East and Latin America. They had a somewhat higher chance of success in Africa and Asia.[8] Numbers of successful coups have decreased over time.[3]

A number of political science datasets document coup attempts around the world and over time, generally starting in the post-World War II period. Major examples include the Global Instances of Coups dataset, the Coups & Political Instability dataset by the Center of Systemic Peace, the Coup d'état Project by the Cline Center, the Colpus coup dataset, and the Coups and Agency Mechanism dataset. A 2023 study argued that major coup datasets tend to over-rely on international news sources to gather their information, potentially biasing the types of events included.[53] Its findings show that while such a strategy is sufficient for gathering information on successful and failed coups, attempts to gather data on coup plots and rumors require a greater consultation of regional and local-specific sources.

Predictors

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A 2003 review of the academic literature found that the following factors influenced coups:

  • officers' personal grievances
  • military organizational grievances
  • military popularity
  • military attitudinal cohesiveness
  • economic decline
  • domestic political crisis
  • contagion from other regional coups
  • external threat
  • participation in war
  • collusion with a foreign military power
  • military's national security doctrine
  • officers' political culture
  • noninclusive institutions
  • colonial legacy
  • economic development
  • undiversified exports
  • officers' class composition
  • military size
  • strength of civil society
  • regime legitimacy and past coups

The literature review in a 2016 study includes mentions of ethnic factionalism, supportive foreign governments, leader inexperience, slow growth, commodity price shocks, and poverty.[54]

Coups have been found to appear in environments that are heavily influenced by military powers. Multiple of the above factors are connected to military culture and power dynamics. These factors can be divided into multiple categories, with two of these categories being a threat to military interests and support for military interests. If interests go in either direction, the military will find itself either capitalizing off that power or attempting to gain it back.

Oftentimes, military spending is an indicator of the likelihood of a coup taking place. Nordvik found that about 75% of coups that took place in many different countries rooted from military spending and oil windfalls.[55][12]

Coup trap

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The accumulation of previous coups is a strong predictor of future coups,[12][13] a phenomenon called the coup trap.[14][15] A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries found that the establishment of open political competition helps bring countries out of the coup trap and reduces cycles of political instability.[15]

Regime type and polarization

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Hybrid regimes are more vulnerable to coups than very authoritarian states or democratic states.[56] A 2021 study found that democratic regimes were not substantially more likely to experience coups.[57] A 2015 study finds that terrorism is strongly associated with re-shuffling coups.[58] A 2016 study finds that there is an ethnic component to coups: "When leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers."[59] Another 2016 study shows that protests increase the risk of coups, presumably because they ease coordination obstacles among coup plotters and make international actors less likely to punish coup leaders.[60] A third 2016 study finds that coups become more likely in the wake of elections in autocracies when the results reveal electoral weakness for the incumbent autocrat.[61] A fourth 2016 study finds that inequality between social classes increases the likelihood of coups.[62] A fifth 2016 study finds no evidence that coups are contagious; one coup in a region does not make other coups in the region likely to follow.[63] One study found that coups are more likely to occur in states with small populations, as there are smaller coordination problems for coup-plotters.[64]

In autocracies, the frequency of coups seems to be affected by the succession rules in place, with monarchies with a fixed succession rule being much less plagued by instability than less institutionalized autocracies.[65][66][67]

A 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th-century study found the legislative powers of the presidency does not influence coup frequency.[15]

A 2019 study found that when a country's politics is polarized and electoral competition is low, civilian-recruited coups become more likely.[68]

A 2023 study found that civilian elites are more likely to be associated with instigating military coups while civilians embedded in social networks are more likely to be associated with consolidating military coups.[69]

Territorial disputes, internal conflicts, and armed conflicts

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A 2017 study found that autocratic leaders whose states were involved in international rivalries over disputed territory were more likely to be overthrown in a coup. The authors of the study provide the following logic for why this is:

Autocratic incumbents invested in spatial rivalries need to strengthen the military in order to compete with a foreign adversary. The imperative of developing a strong army puts dictators in a paradoxical situation: to compete with a rival state, they must empower the very agency—the military—that is most likely to threaten their own survival in office.[70]

However, two 2016 studies found that leaders who were involved in militarized confrontations and conflicts were less likely to face a coup.[71][72]

A 2019 study found that states that had recently signed civil war peace agreements were much more likely to experience coups, in particular when those agreements contained provisions that jeopardized the interests of the military.[73]

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Research suggests that protests spur coups, as they help elites within the state apparatus to coordinate coups.[74]

A 2019 study found that regional rebellions made coups by the military more likely.[75]

Economy, development, and resource factors

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A 2018 study found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries".[76] The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.[76]

A 2020 study found that elections had a two-sided impact on coup attempts, depending on the state of the economy. During periods of economic expansion, elections reduced the likelihood of coup attempts, whereas elections during economic crises increased the likelihood of coup attempts.[77]

A 2021 study found that oil wealthy nations see a pronounced risk of coup attempts but these coups are unlikely to succeed.[78]

On the contrary, a 2014 study of 18 Latin American countries in the 20th century found that coup frequency does not vary with development levels, economic inequality, or the rate of economic growth.[15]

Coup-proofing

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In what is referred to as "coup-proofing", regimes create structures that make it hard for any small group to seize power. These coup-proofing strategies may include the strategic placing of family, ethnic, and religious groups in the military; creation of an armed force parallel to the regular military; and development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that constantly monitor one another.[16] It may also involve frequent salary hikes and promotions for members of the military,[79] and the deliberate use of diverse bureaucrats.[80] Research shows that some coup-proofing strategies reduce the risk of coups occurring.[81][82] However, coup-proofing reduces military effectiveness,[83][17][84][18][85][86][19] and limits the rents that an incumbent can extract.[87] One reason why authoritarian governments tend to have incompetent militaries is that authoritarian regimes fear that their military will stage a coup or allow a domestic uprising to proceed uninterrupted – as a consequence, authoritarian rulers have incentives to place incompetent loyalists in key positions in the military.[20]

A 2016 study shows that the implementation of succession rules reduce the occurrence of coup attempts.[88] Succession rules are believed to hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters by assuaging elites who have more to gain by patience than by plotting.[88]

According to political scientists Curtis Bell and Jonathan Powell, coup attempts in neighbouring countries lead to greater coup-proofing and coup-related repression in a region.[89] A 2017 study finds that countries' coup-proofing strategies are heavily influenced by other countries with similar histories.[90] Coup-proofing is more likely in former French colonies.[91]

A 2018 study in the Journal of Peace Research found that leaders who survive coup attempts and respond by purging known and potential rivals are likely to have longer tenures as leaders.[92] A 2019 study in Conflict Management and Peace Science found that personalist dictatorships are more likely to take coup-proofing measures than other authoritarian regimes; the authors argue that this is because "personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler".[93]

In their 2022 book Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism, political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way found that political-military fusion, where the ruling party is highly interlinked with the military and created the administrative structures of the military from its inception, is extremely effective at preventing military coups. For example, the People's Liberation Army was created by the Chinese Communist Party during the Chinese Civil War, and never instigated a military coup even after large-scale policy failures (i.e. the Great Leap Forward) or the extreme political instability of the Cultural Revolution.[94]

Some scholars have posited that the recruitment of foreign legionnaires into national armies can reduce the probability of military coups.[95]

Outcomes

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Successful coups are one method of regime change that thwarts the peaceful transition of power.[96][97] A 2016 study categorizes four possible outcomes to coups in dictatorships:[6]

  • Failed coup
  • No regime change, as when a leader is illegally shuffled out of power without changing the ruling group or the type of government
  • Replacement of incumbent with another dictatorship
  • Ousting of the dictatorship followed by democratization (also called "democratic coups")[98]

The study found that about half of all coups in dictatorships—both during and after the Cold War—install new autocratic regimes.[6] New dictatorships launched by coups engage in higher levels of repression in the year after the coup than existed in the year before the coup.[6] One-third of coups in dictatorships during the Cold War and 10% of later ones reshuffled the regime leadership.[6] Democracies were installed in the wake of 12% of Cold War coups in dictatorships and 40% of post-Cold War ones.[6]

Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups,[5][6][7] though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism.[8] Coups that occur during civil wars shorten the war's duration.[99]

Impact

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Democracy

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Coups and the end of the Cold War[6][100]
Time period Initial regime type % of regimes facing coups in period*
1950–1990
(Cold War)		 Autocracies 49%
Democracies 35%
1990–2015
 Autocracies 12%
Democracies 12%
Coups and the end of the Cold War[6][100][needs context]
Time period Coup seizes power Change only in leadership New autocratic regime Democratization within 2 years
1950–1990
(Cold War)
223, 5.575 attempts per year		 Successful
125,
3+1⁄8 per year		 32%
40		 56%
70		 12%
15
Unsuccessful
98, 2.45 per year		 75 15 8
1990–2015
49, 1.96 attempts per year		 Successful
20,
0.8 per year		 10%
2		 50%
10		 40%
8
Unsuccessful
29, 1.16/year		 19 3 7

Since the end of the Cold War, coups have become rarer, and more likely to be followed by democratization. Coups still often simply replace one autocracy with another one (with the new autocratic regime usually more repressive, in an attempt to prevent another coup) or have no effect on regime type.[5][6][101][102][103][104][100]

As of 2017, there was debate about whether coups in autocracies should now be considered to promote democratization, on average, or if countries' chances of democratization are still unchanged or worsened by coups (since democratization can take place without a coup). One reason for the increase in the chance of democratization is that a higher proportion of coups (half of post-Cold-War coups) now take place in democracies (a higher percentage of countries are also now democracies). Democratic countries often rebound from coups quickly, restoring democracy, but coups in a democracy are a sign of poor political health, and increase the risk of future coups and loss of democracy. The dataset is small, so statistical significance varies depending on the model used, as of 2017; debate will end if data on more coups makes the pattern clear.[5][6][101][102][103][104][100]

The post-Cold-War increase in the chances of post-coup democratization may partly be due to the incentives created by international pressure and financing.[6][5] US law, for instance, automatically cuts off all aid to a country if there is a military coup.[105] According to a 2020 study, "external reactions to coups play important roles in whether coup leaders move toward authoritarianism or democratic governance. When supported by external democratic actors, coup leaders have an incentive to push for elections to retain external support and consolidate domestic legitimacy. When condemned, coup leaders are apt to trend toward authoritarianism to assure their survival.[106]

But coup conspirators also increasingly say that they chose a coup to save their country from the autocratic incumbents. Successful conspirators may hold free and fair elections simply because they think it is a good idea.[6] A desire for economic growth and legitimacy have also been cited as motivations for democratization.[101]

Legal scholar Ilya Somin believes that a coup to forcibly overthrow a democratic government might sometimes be justified. Commenting on the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, Somin opined,

There should be a strong presumption against forcibly removing a democratic regime. But that presumption might be overcome if the government in question poses a grave threat to human rights, or is likely to destroy democracy itself by shutting down future political competition.[107]

Repression and counter-coups

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It has been argued that failed coups might motivate a regime to reform and reduce repression.[101] Such reforms are not obvious in the data, as of 2017. Coups that fail, or merely shuffle the leadership without changing the system, generally do not change the amount of repression (measured in government-sanctioned and pro-government killings).[6][103]

Research from 2016 suggests that increased repression and violence typically follow both successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.[100] According to a 2019 study, coup attempts lead to a reduction in physical integrity rights.[108]

Coups that lead to democratization unsurprisingly reduce repression, and coups that bring in a new autocratic regime increase it. Post-Cold-War, post-coup autocracies seem to have become more repressive and post-coup democracies less repressive; the gap between them is therefore larger than it was during the Cold War.[6][103]

Averaging across democratic and non-democratic outcomes, most coups seem to tend to increase state repression, even coups against autocrats who were already quite repressive. The time interval in which violence is measured matters. The months after a bloodless coup can be bloody. The small sample size and high variability means that this conclusion again does not reach statistical significance, and a firm conclusion cannot be drawn.[109][6][103]

According to Naunihal Singh, author of Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (2014), it is "fairly rare" for the incumbent government to violently purge the army after a failed coup. If it starts the mass killing of elements of the army, including officers who were not involved in the coup, this may trigger a "counter-coup" by soldiers who are afraid they will be next. To prevent such a desperate counter-coup that may be more successful than the initial attempt, governments usually resort to firing prominent officers and replacing them with loyalists instead.[110]

Notable counter-coups include the Ottoman countercoup of 1909, the 1960 Laotian counter-coup, the Indonesian mass killings of 1965–66, the 1966 Nigerian counter-coup, the 1967 Greek counter-coup, 1971 Sudanese counter-coup, and the coup d'état of December Twelfth in South Korea.

A 2017 study finds that the use of state broadcasting by the putschist regime after Mali's 2012 coup did not elevate explicit approval for the regime.[111]

International response

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The international community tends to react adversely to coups by reducing aid and imposing sanctions. A 2015 study finds that "coups against democracies, coups after the Cold War, and coups in states heavily integrated into the international community are all more likely to elicit global reaction."[112] Another 2015 study shows that coups are the strongest predictor for the imposition of democratic sanctions.[113] A third 2015 study finds that Western states react most strongly against coups of possible democratic and human rights abuses.[113] A 2016 study shows that the international donor community in the post-Cold War period penalizes coups by reducing foreign aid.[114] The US has been inconsistent in applying aid sanctions against coups both during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, a likely consequence of its geopolitical interests.[114]

Organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American States (OAS) have adopted anti-coup frameworks. Through the threat of sanctions, the organizations actively try to curb coups. A 2016 study finds that the AU has played a meaningful role in reducing African coups.[115]

A 2017 study found that negative international responses, especially from powerful actors, have a significant effect in shortening the duration of regimes created in coups.[116]

According to a 2020 study, coups increase the cost of borrowing and increase the likelihood of sovereign default.[117]

Current leaders who assumed power via coups

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Leaders are arranged in chronological order by the dates they assumed power, and categorized by the continents their countries are in.

Asia

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Africa

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See also: Coup Belt
Position Post-coup leader Deposed leader Country Event Date
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo  Francisco Macías Nguema Equatorial Guinea  1979 Equatoguinean coup d'état 3 August 1979
President Yoweri Museveni Tito Okello Uganda Ugandan Bush War 29 January 1986
President Denis Sassou Nguesso Pascal Lissouba Congo Republic of the Congo Civil War 25 October 1997
President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi Mohamed Morsi Egypt 2013 Egyptian coup d'état 3 July 2013
President Emmerson Mnangagwa Robert Mugabe[n 3] Zimbabwe 2017 Zimbabwean coup d'état 24 November 2017
Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council  Abdel Fattah al-Burhan Omar al-Bashir Sudan 2019 Sudanese coup d'état 21 August 2019
Chairman of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People of Mali Assimi Goïta Bah Ndaw Mali 2021 Malian coup d'état 25 May 2021
President Kais Saied Hichem Mechichi[n 4] Tunisia 2021 Tunisian self-coup[n 5] 25 July 2021
Chairman of the National Committee of Reconciliation and Development Mamady Doumbouya Alpha Condé Guinea 2021 Guinean coup d'état 5 September 2021
President of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration Ibrahim Traoré Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba  Burkina Faso September 2022 Burkinabé coup d'état  30 September 2022
President of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland Abdourahamane Tchiani Mohamed Bazoum Niger 2023 Nigerien coup d'état 26 July 2023
Head of the Committee for the Transition and Restoration of Institutions Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema Ali Bongo Ondimba Gabon 2023 Gabonese coup d'état 30 August 2023
Chairman of Council of the Presidency of the Republic for Reform Michael Randrianirina Andry Rajoelina Madagascar 2025 Malagasy coup d'état 14 October 2025
  1. ^ Nabiyev was forced to resign by government militia on 7 September 1992, with Emomali Rahmon assumed interim power in November.[118] Emomali Rahmon was, at the time, known as Emomali Rahmonov (see Name changes).
  2. ^ Hadi was forced to resign by Houthi rebels on 22 January 2015, but later renounced his resignation. The coup culminated into a civil war.
  3. ^ Mugabe resigned on 21 November 2017.
  4. ^ Prime Minister, Head of Government (under Tunisian Constitution, Shared Executive Power), Kais Saied Also Abolished the Parliament, which represents the Legislative Power in a representative Democracy)
  5. ^ "Constitutional" Coup, By Activation of Article 80 (full Power Seizure in case of "Imminent Danger"), which is not well-defined, as there is a conflict of interest if the president is the sole arbiter of defining "Danger", and there is no judicial reconciliation (Ex. Constitutional/Supreme Court), Kais Saied removed Head of Government and Parliament

See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Coup d'état

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from Grokipedia
A coup d'état is the sudden, forcible, and illegal removal of a government, typically executed by a small group of military officers or political elites who seize control of key state institutions to replace the incumbent leadership. The term derives from the French phrase coup d'État, literally meaning "stroke" or "blow" of state, originating in the 17th century to describe decisive political maneuvers. Unlike broader revolutions, coups emphasize rapid, targeted action by insiders rather than mass mobilization, often relying on control of the armed forces as a prerequisite for success. Since the mid-20th century, coups d'état have occurred with notable frequency in politically fragile states, particularly in , , and parts of , where weak institutions and economic facilitate such seizures. Empirical datasets record over 1,000 coup events—including attempts, successes, and plots—from 1945 onward, with experiencing more than 200 since , the highest of any region globally. Approximately half of these attempts succeed in ousting the , though outcomes vary by context, with successful coups often entrenching military rule or amid heightened repression. Coups typically arise from underlying political instability, such as ineffective , , or elite factionalism, which erode the barriers to unconstitutional power transfers. While some instances have led to transitional reforms or in low-democracy environments, the preponderance of evidence links them to prolonged instability, reduced , and elevated risks, underscoring their role as symptoms of deeper institutional failures rather than reliable catalysts for positive change. Notable historical examples, like Napoleon's 1799 overthrow of the , illustrate how coups can pivot national trajectories toward centralized authority, often at the expense of democratic norms.

Terminology and Definitions

Etymology and Core Definition

The term coup d'état derives from French, literally meaning "stroke of state" or "blow of state," with coup denoting a "blow" or "stroke" and d'état signifying "of the state." The phrase first appeared in the 1640s to characterize a sudden, decisive political maneuver, typically an abrupt governmental upheaval orchestrated from within the state apparatus. At its core, a coup d'état constitutes the illegal and overt seizure of executive authority by a narrow cadre of domestic actors—often military personnel or civilian elites embedded in state institutions—through the application or threat of force, resulting in the ousting of the sitting regime's leadership. This distinguishes it from external invasions or popular insurrections, as success hinges on rapid control of pivotal levers such as armed forces, communication networks, and administrative centers, without necessitating widespread societal upheaval. Scholarly analyses emphasize its unconstitutional nature and internal provenance, where perpetrators exploit proximity to power rather than mobilizing mass support. Empirical datasets, such as those tracking global political instability, operationalize coups as discrete events involving the replacement of chief executives via non-electoral means, underscoring their brevity and elite-driven character. A coup d'état is distinguished from a putsch primarily by the latter's of a often abortive or ideologically driven attempt by a faction, typically associated with right-wing nationalists, as seen in the 1923 led by , which sought to overthrow the but failed due to lack of broad military support. In contrast, a successful coup relies on swift coordination within existing state structures rather than mass rallies or campaigns characteristic of putsch attempts. Similarly, a pronunciamiento refers to a formal military in Spanish-speaking countries, usually in the , where officers declared against the to install a new , blending legalistic with force but remaining elite-driven like coups. Coups differ fundamentally from revolutions, which involve broad societal upheaval driven by mass participation and ideological transformation, often leftist in orientation, aiming to restructure institutions and culture beyond mere leadership replacement—as in the 1789 , where popular assemblies and mobs dismantled the and over years of conflict. A coup, by comparison, is a top-down executed rapidly by insiders, such as officers, who exploit control over key levers like the armed forces and communications without requiring public consent or altering the underlying . This elite focus minimizes violence and duration, succeeding through paralysis of opposition rather than attritional warfare. In distinction from insurrections or rebellions, which denote organized, armed uprisings by non-elite groups against authority—often localized and failing quickly, as in the 1804 Haitian slave rebellion that escalated into full revolution but began as fragmented resistance—coups presuppose insiders' pre-existing access to state power, bypassing the need for external . , involving sustained interstate-like conflict between domestic factions with comparable forces, contrast sharply with the brevity and asymmetry of coups; for instance, the U.S. Civil War (1861–1865) pitted armies in prolonged battles over and , whereas a coup like Egypt's 1952 event saw officers neutralize the king in days via targeted arrests. These overthrows lack the institutional hijacking central to coups, frequently devolving into broader chaos without guaranteeing power consolidation.

Historical Context and Prevalence

Pre-Modern Instances

In the late Roman Republic, military leaders increasingly resorted to armed interventions against constitutional bodies, establishing patterns akin to modern coups d'état. In 88 BC, consul Lucius Cornelius Sulla, having been assigned command against Mithridates VI of Pontus, faced reassignment to rival Gaius Marius by a Senate-influenced tribune; Sulla responded by marching six legions on Rome, violating the sacred pomerium boundary with armed troops for the first time in Roman history, seizing control to annul the decree, executing opponents like Publius Sulpicius Rufus and 12 other officials, and forcing Marius into exile before departing for his campaign. This action, while temporarily stabilizing Sulla's position, eroded republican norms and invited retaliation, culminating in Marius's brief counter-seizure in 87 BC and Sulla's return in 83–82 BC, where he defeated Marian forces at the Colline Gate (killing ~8,000) and established a dictatorship, proscribing ~500–2,000 enemies. Sulla's tactics influenced subsequent power grabs, notably Julius Caesar's in 49 BC. Ordered by the Senate to disband his Gallic legions or face declaration as enemy of the state, Caesar crossed the Rubicon River on January 10–11 with the 13th Legion (~5,000 men), entering Italy proper illegally and capturing Ariminum (Rimini), thereby defying the Senate's authority and igniting civil war against Pompey the Great's faction. This swift maneuver secured northern Italy, allowed recruitment, and led to Caesar's victory at Pharsalus in 48 BC, enabling his assumption of perpetual dictatorship until his assassination in 44 BC. Under the , such seizures became routine due to unclear succession and praetorian influence, with the often acclaiming or deposing rulers. The overthrow of in 68 AD, prompted by Nymphidius Sabinus shifting support amid revolts, triggered the (69 AD), during which was proclaimed by the Praetorians, assassinated after seven months, succeeded briefly by (who lost to Vitellius's legions), and ultimately , acclaimed by eastern armies, consolidating Flavian rule after ~50,000–100,000 deaths in related conflicts. In the , palace intrigues and military mutinies produced frequent coups, often confined to Constantinople's elite circles. The 602 AD usurpation by exemplifies this: amid Maurice's unpopular Balkan campaigns and tax hikes, mutinous troops proclaimed , marched on the capital, executed Maurice and his sons (totaling ~6 family members), and installed until his overthrow by in 610 AD. These events, recurring across centuries (e.g., ~20 major coups from 330–1453 AD), stemmed from dynastic fragility and guard loyalty shifts, undermining stability without broader societal upheaval.

19th and Early 20th Century Developments

In the , coups d'état proliferated in amid the instability of post-colonial state-building, where centralized authority often dissolved into regional factionalism and military adventurism by caudillos. , for instance, saw orchestrate multiple seizures of power between 1823 and 1855, exploiting federalist-unitary divides to install personalist regimes. Similarly, in , consolidated control through armed force in the 1829–1832 period, suppressing federal rivals and establishing a quasi-dictatorship that endured until 1852. These events underscored how fragile constitutions and economic underdevelopment enabled small military cliques to override civilian governance, often with minimal popular resistance due to sparse communication networks and localized loyalties. Europe witnessed fewer but symbolically potent coups, exemplified by Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte's self-coup on December 2, 1851, against the French Second Republic's legislature. Bonaparte, as president, deployed troops to dissolve the and , arresting over 100 deputies and declaring a in to quash uprisings that claimed around 400 lives. A plebiscite held December 20–21, 1851, garnered 7,439,216 votes in favor of expanded executive powers versus 640,737 against, out of 9.6 million eligible voters, paving the way for his proclamation as Emperor in 1852. This maneuver highlighted the vulnerability of parliamentary systems to executive-military alliances, particularly when bolstered by rural plebiscitary support against urban elites. Into the early 20th century, coups evolved with imperial decline and modernization efforts, as seen in the Ottoman Empire's 1913 Raid on the Sublime Porte. On January 23, 1913, (CUP) leaders, including and Talât Bey, exploited a political crisis over the to assassinate War Minister and compel Kâmil Pasha's resignation, installing Mahmut Şevket Pasha as head of a CUP-dominated cabinet. This bloodless yet coercive takeover centralized authority among a nationalist-military faction, sidelining liberal opponents and foreshadowing authoritarian consolidation amid wartime pressures. Such instances reflected growing military professionalism enabling rapid, targeted interventions against perceived ineffective civilian rule, a pattern that intensified post-World War I in fragile multi-ethnic states. Overall, this era marked a transition from palace seizures to structured military-political operations, driven by the expansion of standing armies and weak institutional checks, though comprehensive tallies remain elusive due to inconsistent historical recording before systematic 20th-century datasets. In regions like , recurrence stemmed from caudillo patronage networks overriding legal succession, while European and Ottoman cases demonstrated how external threats amplified coup viability.

Post-World War II Surge and Patterns

Following the end of in 1945, coup d'états proliferated worldwide, with estimates indicating that armed forces led between 407 and 471 such events through the late 20th century. This surge coincided with , the Cold War's geopolitical tensions, and the emergence of fragile post-colonial states lacking robust institutions. Data compilations identify over 900 coup attempts across 77 countries with populations exceeding 500,000 from 1945 onward, with the highest frequency occurring in the and . Africa experienced the most intense concentration, accounting for approximately 220 attempted or successful coups since 1950, of which 109 succeeded, surpassing other regions like and . in particular saw repeated instances, driven by ethnic divisions, resource dependencies, and weak governance structures inherited from colonial withdrawals. followed with notable patterns in countries like (25 events) and (37 attempts, 16 successful), often involving military factions amid economic instability and ideological conflicts. Key patterns include military predominance as coup initiators, with success rates hovering around 50% globally since 1950, as regimes collapsed when key defected or public opposition failed to materialize. Coups clustered in low-income, authoritarian-leaning states with recent or prior instability, where personalist rule and eroded legitimacy. External influences, including superpower rivalries during the , exacerbated vulnerabilities, though empirical data emphasizes internal cohesion and elite fractures as proximal causes over ideological pretexts alone.
RegionAttempted/Successful Coups (Since 1950)Successful
220109
~150 (estimated from country aggregates)~70
~100~50
Note: Regional aggregates derived from cross-country data; exact figures vary by dataset definitions. By the 1980s, frequencies began declining amid waves and international norms against interventions, though pockets persisted in unstable peripheries. From 2000 to 2019, the global incidence of coup d'état attempts declined relative to earlier decades, with successful coups totaling approximately 40 worldwide according to datasets tracking events since 1990. This trend aligned with broader post-Cold War stabilization in some regions, though remained a hotspot with events such as the 2004 overthrow in , Mauritania's coups in 2005 and 2008, Guinea's 2008 takeover, and in 2009. In the , notable successes included in 2012, in 2013, in 2014, and in 2015, but the overall annual average stayed below ten attempts globally. A marked resurgence emerged after 2020, driven primarily by , where nine successful military coups occurred between 2020 and 2023, alongside numerous failed attempts and plots. These concentrated in and the , often involving juntas citing civilian governments' failures to address jihadist insurgencies, , and economic stagnation; examples encompass Mali's May 2020 and 2021 coups under Colonel , Guinea's September 2021 ouster of President , Burkina Faso's January and September 2022 takeovers, Niger's July 2023 removal of President , and Gabon's August 2023 coup against . Sudan saw dual events in 2019 and 2021, while Chad's 2021 transition followed President Idriss Déby's battlefield death. This regional spike contributed to 2021 recording five military coups globally, the highest for the century to that point. Beyond , featured Myanmar's February 1, 2021, coup by the , which detained leaders like following election disputes, sparking widespread protests and . Success rates for attempts hovered near 50 percent, mirroring 1950–2010 patterns from comprehensive datasets. No successful coups occurred in established democracies during this period, underscoring regime vulnerability in fragile states with weak institutions and external pressures like foreign aid dependencies. By 2025, the post-pandemic uptick persisted amid geopolitical shifts, though international responses, including sanctions, yielded mixed deterrence effects.

Causal Factors and Predictors

Empirical Predictors from Data

Empirical studies utilizing comprehensive datasets, such as the Powell and Thyne global coup dataset covering 1950 to 2010 and extended in subsequent analyses up to 2019, have quantified patterns in over 450 coup attempts worldwide, enabling identification of statistical risk factors through methods like extreme bounds analysis and hazard modeling. These analyses, drawing on monthly or annual country-level data across 150+ nations, reveal that coups cluster in regions like and , with predictors varying by context but consistently highlighting structural vulnerabilities and short-term stressors. Economic underperformance emerges as a core predictor, with slow or negative GDP growth rates robustly elevating coup probability; for instance, extreme bounds tests on 1952–2011 data show a statistically significant negative association (β = -0.0148), while conjunctural analyses link coups to growth contractions exceeding 1% in the prior year globally and 2% in low-income or states. Low further amplifies risk, serving as the top structural factor in per assessments of 1970–2019 events. Resource dependence, such as oil reliance, correlates with higher incidence by fostering networks vulnerable to elite defection. Prior coup experience and political instability strongly forecast recurrence, with recent coups raising hazard rates via weakened institutions and demonstration effects; years since the last coup rank as a leading global predictor in 2000–2019 data, and previous events show near-universal robustness (β = 0.0132) across fixed-effects models. crises and social unrest, including protests or , heighten short-term vulnerability (β = 0.0057 for crises), often interacting with repression levels (β = 0.0012 on political terror scales). Structural elements like young demographics, short duration, and low inclusion—measured by inequality or gaps—compound these, as do weaker indicators such as rule-of-law deficits. (β = 0.0014) and smaller populations also associate positively in country-fixed analyses, underscoring internal fragmentation. Conversely, factors like secure property rights or neighboring democracies exert protective effects, though less robustly.

Theoretical Frameworks and First-Principles Analysis

Theoretical frameworks for analyzing coups d'état emphasize rational incentives among key actors, particularly elites, who weigh the potential rewards of power seizure against risks of failure and retribution. In rational choice models, coup plotters act as maximizers, initiating action when perceived benefits—such as resource control, status elevation, or influence—exceed costs like execution or demotion, often in contexts of economic or regime favoritism that heighten grievances. Game-theoretic approaches formalize this as coordination dilemmas, where officers join a coup only if confident others will follow, transforming potential plots into via focal points like shared or prior signals; failure to coordinate leads to and collapse. From causal fundamentals, coups arise when regimes fail to align agent incentives with principal goals, manifesting as principal-agent frictions in autocratic : rulers empower subordinates for security but risk betrayal if monitoring weakens or side-payments falter, prompting opportunistic grabs amid power vacuums. This dynamic underscores that coups are not random but equilibrium outcomes of asymmetric and commitment problems, where plotters exploit informational advantages over divided elites or publics. Empirical patterns, such as higher coup incidence in praetorian states with fragmented militaries, reflect these incentives rather than exogenous shocks alone. First-principles reasoning reveals coups as breakdowns in mechanisms that sustain rule: stable requires credible threats against , but when loyalty erodes—due to resource diversion, ethnic exclusions, or external threats— the of drops, enabling small cabals to cascade into takeovers via rapid control of command nodes. Unlike revolts, coups leverage specialized assets, succeeding when plotters internalize over individual risk-aversion, often amplified by learning from past failures that refine tactics without altering core payoff structures. Theories attributing coups solely to structural inevitability overlook this agency, as evidenced by variance in outcomes under similar conditions, where resilient institutions raise coordination hurdles through divided commands or . Academic emphases on socioeconomic correlates, while useful, sometimes underweight these micro-foundations, potentially due to institutional preferences for aggregate over behavioral explanations.

Role of Regime Characteristics

Authoritarian regimes, including closed and electoral autocracies, have hosted approximately 92 percent of all coups d'état recorded globally since 1950, with a success rate of 53 percent among those attempts, underscoring their disproportionate exposure to such events relative to democracies. This pattern stems from inherent structural weaknesses, such as limited accountability mechanisms and reliance on coercive institutions like the for regime maintenance, which create opportunities for elite defection. Democratic regimes exhibit markedly lower coup vulnerability due to entrenched civilian control over armed forces, electoral alternation of power, and transparent that aligns elite incentives with institutional norms rather than personal loyalty. from cross-national datasets confirms an inverse relationship between levels and coup incidence, with advanced democracies recording near-zero attempts in recent decades. These characteristics foster coup resistance by raising the organizational costs of plotting and enabling rapid societal mobilization against irregular power seizures. Among authoritarian subtypes, military regimes display acute fragility, as politicized invite intra-military rivalries and frequent challenges to , distinguishing them from more institutionalized autocracies. Personalist dictatorships, by contrast, often mitigate risks through power centralization and of , which disrupts coordination among potential coup perpetrators and binds to the individual leader rather than the state. Once consolidated, this approach reduces coup probability, though transitional phases of personalization can trigger short-term backlash from sidelined elites. Regimes featuring —high involvement in —or low institutionalization amplify coup risks by normalizing armed intervention as a tool and weakening alternative dispute-resolution channels. Structurally robust autocracies, however, achieve relative invulnerability via coup-proofing tactics like parallel security units or ideological , which fragment threats without fully eroding efficacy. Overall, regime characteristics thus act as foundational predictors, with empirical patterns revealing that coups thrive in environments deficient in impartial institutions and prone to factional coercion.

Mechanics of Execution

Stages of a Coup

Coups d'état typically unfold in three sequential phases: planning and preparation, execution or attack, and consolidation. This framework, derived from strategic analyses of historical coups, emphasizes the need for , speed, and control to overcome regime defenses. Empirical studies of over 500 coup attempts since 1950 confirm that failures often occur due to breakdowns in one of these phases, particularly when plotters fail to secure cohesion or neutralize counter-coups swiftly. The planning phase involves covert recruitment of co-conspirators, primarily from mid- to high-ranking officers who control loyal units, alongside assessments of regime vulnerabilities such as divided loyalties or weak intelligence. Plotters must evaluate logistical needs, including arms stockpiles and communication blackouts, while minimizing leaks that could trigger preemptive arrests; historical data shows that detected plots succeed less than 10% of the time compared to undetected ones. This stage can span months or years, as in the 1973 Chilean coup where General Pinochet built alliances gradually before striking. Execution demands simultaneous strikes on critical nodes of power, including palaces, media outlets, transportation hubs, and headquarters in the capital, to paralyze resistance and project inevitability. Military coups, which comprise about 75% of attempts, rely on seizing these points with minimal violence to avoid alienating potential supporters; success hinges on surprise and the plotters' control of at least 20-30% of armed forces without immediate defections. For instance, in the 1963 Iraqi coup, Ba'athist officers rapidly occupied Baghdad's key sites, detaining the president within hours. Consolidation follows successful seizure, focusing on neutralizing loyalist remnants, securing international recognition, and establishing provisional to prevent counter-coups, which succeed in roughly 40% of cases post-overthrow. Plotters often broadcast announcements via captured media to claim legitimacy, purging opponents while co-opting institutions; data indicates that coups consolidating power within 48 hours have higher survival rates, as delays allow opposition mobilization. The 1999 Pakistani coup by Musharraf exemplified this by quickly imposing emergency rule and allying with judiciary elements. Failures in consolidation, such as the 1991 Soviet coup, stem from inadequate control over peripheral regions or public backlash.

Common Methods and Tactics

Coups d'état are executed primarily through swift, coordinated operations that target the state's central mechanisms, aiming to immobilize opposition before it can mobilize. Unlike revolutions, which seek broad societal upheaval, coups prioritize the paralysis of government functions via limited, precise actions, often involving a small cadre of officers who leverage institutional access to achieve disproportionate impact. This approach exploits the inertia of bureaucratic systems and the reluctance of peripheral forces to intervene without clear directives from the center. Central to coup tactics is the principle of surprise and rapidity, ensuring that plotters act before loyalist countermeasures can coalesce. Edward Luttwak outlines that successful execution demands meticulous intelligence on government vulnerabilities, recruitment confined to essential personnel—typically no more than 1% of military leadership—and operational flexibility to adapt to unfolding events. Speed minimizes the window for resistance, as delays allow incumbents to rally support or activate defenses, a pattern observed in failed attempts like the 1991 Soviet coup where hesitation permitted counter-narratives. Key operational tactics include:
  • Neutralization of executive leadership: Immediate isolation or arrest of the head of state, cabinet members, and security chiefs to decapitate decision-making, preventing orders to loyal forces. Historical instances, such as the 1971 Ugandan coup, involved rapid assaults on presidential residences to secure this objective.
  • Seizure of communications nodes: Control of radio, television stations, and telecommunication hubs to broadcast declarations of success and suppress rival messaging, creating a perception of inevitability. This tactic proved pivotal in the 1953 Iranian coup, where allied forces dominated airwaves to legitimize the overthrow.
  • Occupation of strategic infrastructure: Simultaneous takeover of airports, ports, bridges, and government buildings in the capital to isolate the regime and block reinforcements, as demonstrated in the 1973 Chilean coup with military blockades around Santiago.
  • Military unit coordination: Securing or neutralizing key army garrisons and elite units through pre-positioned loyalists or feigned compliance, avoiding pitched battles by relying on orders from compromised headquarters.
  • Propaganda and fait accompli: Issuing communiqués asserting control and continuity, often under the guise of restoring order, to deter defection and coerce passive acceptance from civil servants and international actors.
These methods favor coups led by senior officers, who wield authority to issue binding directives without widespread combat, contrasting with junior-led insurrections that risk escalation. Empirical data from post-1950 attempts indicate that such targeted operations correlate with higher success rates when executed in urban centers where power is concentrated.

Variations by Actor (Military, Elite, Foreign-Influenced)

coups, the most prevalent form of coup d'état, entail the —typically senior officers—directly seizing executive control through coordinated actions such as occupying , neutralizing opposition, and imposing curfews or states of . These differ from other variants by leveraging the military's monopoly on coercive force, often justified by claims of threats, , or , though empirical analyses reveal underlying motives like personal ambition or factional rivalries within the officer corps. from comprehensive coup catalogs indicate that military-initiated attempts dominate post-1950 records, comprising over 70% of events, with success rates around 40-50% depending on institutional cohesion and public response. Notable examples include the September 12, 1980, Turkish coup under General , which dissolved parliament and banned amid rising , leading to a until 1983; and the October 25, 1969, Libyan coup by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's Free Officers Movement, which ousted King Idris I and established a revolutionary council that nationalized oil industries. Elite or palace coups, by contrast, involve intra-regime power shifts among or political insiders—such as party leaders, bureaucrats, or royal courtiers—without widespread mobilization, relying instead on procedural manipulations, coerced resignations, or judicial pretexts to replace the while preserving the broader system. These are rarer and often bloodless, occurring predominantly in authoritarian or monarchical contexts where access to levers of power like intelligence networks or systems enables rapid, low-visibility transfers; they succeed more frequently (up to 60% in some datasets) due to minimal disruption and buy-in but risk fragility from unresolved grievances. Historical instances include the October 14, 1964, ouster of Soviet Premier by Politburo members and through a party plenum vote, framed as a restoration amid policy failures; and the August 8, 1983, Guatemalan coup, where junior officers and allies deposed General , installing Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores to consolidate power amid . Such events highlight causal dynamics where cohesion fractures under economic strain or leadership incompetence, though sources like declassified archives underscore that apparent "" actions often involve tacit acquiescence. Foreign-influenced coups integrate external actors—typically great powers via intelligence operations, funding, or diplomatic pressure—with domestic plotters, amplifying resources for , defections, or logistics but introducing dependencies that can undermine legitimacy if exposed. Unlike purely domestic variants, these often target regimes perceived as threats to foreign interests, such as resource or alliances, yet require local agency for execution, as foreign forces alone rarely suffice without risking international backlash; success hinges on aligning with domestic grievances, with post-Cold War declines linked to sanctions against coup perpetrators. Declassified records document cases like the August 19, 1953, Iranian coup (Operation Ajax), where U.S. CIA and British orchestrated the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh—via bribes to military officers and mob mobilizations—restoring Mohammad Reza after oil disputes; and the June 18, 1954, Guatemalan coup (Operation PBSuccess), in which CIA-backed and arms supplies enabled Colonel to topple President Guzmán over land reforms affecting holdings. More recent patterns include alleged Russian support in the August 2020 Malian coup against President , providing mercenaries and funding to junta leaders amid jihadist insurgencies, though causal attribution remains contested due to opaque operations and domestic military autonomy.

Determinants of Success and Failure

Factors Favoring Success

Successful coups d'état depend on the plotters' capacity to achieve rapid coordination and control over critical state apparatus, creating a of inevitability that prompts defections from loyalists. Empirical studies of coups from to 2000 emphasize that success hinges less on ideological alignment and more on actors joining the faction perceived as dominant, a dynamic rooted in coordination theory where military officers and elites align with expected victors to avoid repercussions. Leadership by high-ranking officers significantly boosts success rates, as senior generals wield greater to mobilize units and suppress dissent without widespread fragmentation. Analysis of historical cases shows coups initiated by top brass succeed more frequently than those by junior officers, who struggle to secure broad military adherence. Seizing control of media and communication infrastructure enables plotters to broadcast narratives of triumph, fostering self-fulfilling prophecies that erode incumbent support; for instance, in failed attempts like the 1991 Soviet coup, opponents' counter-narratives via uncontrolled channels rallied resistance. Well-resourced militaries, while deterring attempts through loyalty incentives, paradoxically enhance success odds for plotters by providing capable forces for swift execution once initiated. The element of surprise remains pivotal, allowing plotters to isolate leaders and occupy strategic sites such as the capital, presidential palaces, and airports before countermeasures coalesce; global datasets confirm that expedited operations minimize opportunities for loyalist rallies or foreign intervention. In the 1799 , Bonaparte's forces exploited legislative disarray to dissolve assemblies, illustrating how decisive neutralization of consolidates gains.

Barriers and Coup-Proofing Strategies

Structural barriers to coups d'état encompass economic and institutional factors that empirically correlate with lower incidence. Higher reduces coup frequency, with quantitative analyses indicating a negative association, albeit modest in magnitude, particularly pronounced in developing states. The elapsed time since a prior coup further diminishes recurrence probability, as regimes institutionalize lessons and reinforce hierarchies. Reduced similarly deters coups by mitigating grievances that could mobilize factions. Coup-proofing strategies represent proactive regime efforts to neutralize military threats, often prioritizing loyalty over operational efficacy. Counterbalancing, a prevalent method, entails establishing parallel coercive entities—such as presidential guards, paramilitaries, or intelligence units—outside standard military command to rival and surveil the armed forces. In practice, Saddam Hussein's deployed overlapping security apparatuses, while François Duvalier's relied on the Tonton Macoutes militia, and Saudi Arabia's maintained distinct royal and national guards. This fractionalization disrupts plotter recruitment and coordination, compelling potential coup participants to anticipate intervention by counterweights, thereby elevating participation costs. Empirical evidence from datasets spanning 110 countries (1946–2011) demonstrates counterbalancing's in slashing coup success rates by complicating execution, though it exerts negligible influence on attempt frequency and may incite resentment-driven plots. Structural variants, including expansion and fractionalization, yield success reductions of 31%–72% by eroding cohesion ( -0.194, p<0.1). Financial inducements form another pillar, with elevated per-soldier military spending serving as to deter ; analyses (1961–2008) reveal up to 87% fewer attempts from minimum-to-maximum expenditure shifts, alongside 43% reductions across typical ranges. , as a subset, curbs attempts by 31% via signaling. Purges targeting disloyal officers, whether merit- or ethnicity-based, aim to excise threats but produce inconsistent outcomes: military purges correlate with lower likelihood (coefficient -0.089), yet ethnic variants risk heightening grievances without reliably curbing activity (coefficient -0.014, insignificant). These measures engender trade-offs, undermining professionalism, , and —effective organizations alone reduce success (coefficient -0.348, p<0.1), but overall proofing hampers advanced tactics and transparency. In autocracies, spoils prioritize graft over capability, curtailing interstate aggression by 63% while inflating onset risk by 78% (20th–80th percentile). Approximately 22% of from 1946–2011 stemmed from coup dynamics, underscoring how proofing can destabilize regimes against internal insurgencies or external foes. Thus, coup-proofing secures short-term survival at the expense of long-term state resilience. Empirical analyses of coup d'état attempts, drawing primarily from the Powell and Thyne dataset covering 1950 to 2023, indicate an overall success rate of approximately 49.8 percent across 491 documented cases globally. Success is typically defined as the coup perpetrators ousting the executive and holding power for at least seven days, excluding mere plots or conspiracies without overt action. This near-even split between successful and failed attempts holds across the dataset's span, reflecting the inherent risks and contingencies involved, such as military loyalty, rapid mobilization, and regime resilience. The frequency of coup attempts has exhibited distinct temporal patterns, peaking in the mid-20th century with up to a dozen or more annually during the and , often amid and proxy dynamics. Attempts declined sharply post-1990, averaging fewer than five per year in the and early , attributable to factors like strengthened international norms against military intervention, democratization waves, and improved coup-proofing in some states. Success rates during this period hovered around or slightly below 50 percent, with early data showing a dip to about 25 percent for the subset of attempts up to 2017, possibly linked to faster international condemnation and media exposure. A notable resurgence occurred from 2020 onward, particularly in , where at least nine successful coups were recorded by , including in (2020 and 2021), (2021), (2021), (2021), (2022, twice), (2023), and (2023). This wave contributed to five successful coups globally in alone, exceeding prior decade maxima. Recent analyses of Powell and Thyne data suggest elevated success rates in this period compared to earlier decades, exceeding 50 percent in for attempts since , driven by fragile governance, insurgencies, and cohesive junior officer networks in the . Such trends contrast with stable or declining rates elsewhere, underscoring regional variations tied to institutional weakness rather than universal decline.

Immediate and Long-Term Outcomes

Short-Term Political and Social Effects

Successful coups d'état typically result in the rapid centralization of executive power under a provisional or elite-led , often involving the dissolution of legislative bodies, suspension of constitutions, and declaration of states of emergency to legitimize . This shift enables immediate purges of political rivals, civil servants, and officers loyal to the ousted regime, as seen in the 2021 coup where over 10,000 arrests occurred within months of the February 1 takeover. Empirical analyses confirm that such actions consolidate control but erode institutional checks, with successful coups linked to declines in and regulatory quality in the year following the event. State repression intensifies short-term, as coup leaders prioritize security over pluralism; studies of coups since 1950 show successful attempts correlate with heightened use of , disappearances, and restrictions on political participation, particularly when targeting democratic incumbents. Control of and indicators drop significantly post-coup, reflecting arbitrary and favoritism toward loyalists, as evidenced in cross-national data from the IMF's post-coup assessments. While some coups promise reforms, immediate political effects favor authoritarian consolidation, with cabinets reshuffled to exclude opposition and media outlets censored or shuttered to suppress dissent. Socially, the aftermath features widespread disruption, including curfews, blackouts, and mass arrests that instill fear and limit public mobilization, as in Mali's 2020 and 2021 coups where social unrest preceded but subsided under military-enforced order. Physical integrity rights deteriorate, with empirical evidence indicating spikes in extrajudicial killings and arbitrary detentions in the months following success, exacerbating societal polarization along ethnic or ideological lines. and supply chains suffer immediate setbacks, such as disrupted medical access and policy reversals, contributing to short-term humanitarian strains in regions like . Overall, these effects foster a climate of uncertainty, with reduced and elevated risks of localized until the new regime stabilizes control.

Economic and Developmental Impacts

Successful coups d'état typically induce significant short-term economic disruptions, including , reduced foreign investment, and immediate contractions in output due to political and potential . Empirical analyses indicate that these events lead to an average decline in real per capita GDP of 10-12% within five years post-coup, with effects persisting without signs of reversal by that horizon. Other studies corroborate this, estimating a 2-3% reduction in overall rates following coups, attributed to halted economic activities and withdrawal. Mechanisms driving these impacts include reversals under new regimes, often prioritizing spending over productive investments, and heightened premiums that elevate borrowing costs. For instance, coups frequently result in increased sovereign debt spreads and downgraded credit ratings, exacerbating fiscal strains in already vulnerable economies. In developing contexts, such as post-coup , real GDP has shown persistent negative responses, underscoring how institutional instability compounds these effects. Developmentally, coups hinder long-term progress by eroding institutional quality and accumulation, with successful overthrows linked to elevated state repression that deters and . In , where coups have surged since 2020, they trigger sanctions, aid suspensions, and outflows, worsening and insecurity while blocking access to international financing. Aggregate evidence from low-income states reveals no developmental shortcut via military intervention; instead, coups perpetuate cycles of weak and stagnating economies, as seen in repeated failures to sustain growth post-overthrow. Countries experiencing coups exhibit lower inflows and higher inequality persistence, reinforcing underdevelopment traps.

Governance and Stability Results

Successful coups d'état frequently lead to regimes characterized by centralized or control, which empirical analyses indicate correlate with substantial declines in quality. Indicators such as regulatory quality, control of , , government effectiveness, and voice and accountability typically deteriorate markedly in the years following a coup, as measured by World Bank datasets. This pattern holds across a sample of coup-affected countries from 1996 onward, where post-coup scores drop by averages of 0.2 to 0.5 standard deviations compared to pre-coup levels, reflecting weakened institutional and coherence. Judicial independence and anti-corruption mechanisms suffer particularly, with studies of coups from 1950 to 2010 showing consistent increases in perceived levels and erosion of autonomy under new military-led administrations. These shifts stem causally from the incentives of coup perpetrators, who prioritize loyalty over merit-based systems, often consolidating power through networks rather than transparent institutions. While some academic sources attribute such outcomes to pre-existing frailties, the temporal association post-coup—evident in regressions controlling for prior conditions—supports a direct causal link to the itself. Regarding political stability, successful coups yield mixed but predominantly negative long-term effects. Short-term consolidation may suppress immediate unrest, yet data reveal heightened vulnerability to subsequent coups or , with post-coup states experiencing elevated political fragility indices. For instance, among 92% of coups occurring in since , successful instances have amplified repression and instability cycles, reducing the median time between attempts. Even in cases where initial order is restored, such as interventions against perceived dysfunctional rule, the absence of broad legitimacy fosters recurrent challenges, as loyalty within remains contingent on personalist rule rather than institutionalized norms. Empirical models indicate that this dynamic contributes to lower rates, with post-coup scores averaging below -5 (indicating ) for over a in most cases.

Broader Impacts and Consequences

Effects on Democratic Institutions

Successful coups d'état invariably suspend or abolish key democratic institutions in the short term, including constitutions, legislatures, and electoral processes, as or elite actors seize control to consolidate power. For instance, in the immediate aftermath, juntas typically dissolve parliaments and impose emergency rule, halting competitive elections and to prevent opposition. This disruption stems from the coup's reliance on extralegal force rather than electoral legitimacy, directly inverting democratic norms of and consent. Empirical data from 491 coups since 1950 indicate that nearly half succeed in , often entrenching oversight over civilian institutions. Long-term effects frequently involve sustained erosion of democratic foundations, with post-coup regimes exhibiting declines in , regulatory quality, and corruption control, as governance shifts toward centralized authoritarian control. Studies analyzing global coup data reveal that coups against democratic regimes lead to decreased respect for physical integrity rights and heightened state repression, even when targeting autocratic elements within democracies. Historically, over 61% of that collapsed between 1789 and 2008 ended via military coup, underscoring coups as a primary vector for democratic breakdown rather than restoration. While some research highlights rare democratizing effects—such as 14% of successful coups against dictatorships from 1950–1989 yielding within two years, rising to 40% post-1990—these outcomes depend on factors like popular and are outweighed by cases of autocratic consolidation. Exceptions, termed "democratic coups," occur when plotters pledge to restore or establish electoral processes, as in Portugal's 1974 , which transitioned to within two years. However, such instances are outliers; three-quarters of democracy failures trace to successful coups, with post-coup uncertainty deterring institutional rebuilding and fostering cycles of repression. Academic analyses, often from institutions with potential ideological leanings toward viewing anti-incumbent coups favorably, emphasize these positive cases but understate the causal primacy of force in undermining consent-based legitimacy. Overall, coups prioritize regime survival over institutional pluralism, leading to diminished in democratic mechanisms and heightened to future undemocratic seizures.

Human Rights, Repression, and Counter-Coups

Successful coups d'état frequently precipitate a surge in state repression, as interim regimes prioritize consolidation of power through measures that curtail and physical integrity . Empirical analyses indicate that post-coup governments exhibit reduced respect for protections against extrajudicial killings, , disappearances, and political , driven by political uncertainty that prompts preemptive crackdowns to signal strength and deter opposition. This pattern holds particularly when non-democratic actors depose democratic governments, leading to measurable declines in standards, whereas coups facilitating correlate with improvements in these areas. Quantitative research exploiting the quasi-random variation between successful and failed coup attempts demonstrates that successful takeovers elevate repression levels, as new juntas employ and arbitrary detention to neutralize threats and prevent immediate reversal. Such repression manifests in suspended constitutions, media blackouts, and mass arrests, often justified as necessary for stability but resulting in widespread abuses; for instance, in autocratic contexts, these measures hinder economic recovery and exacerbate refugee outflows due to heightened insecurity. While some coups against highly repressive autocracies have occasionally yielded marginal reductions in certain abuses if transitioning toward pluralism, the predominant outcome across datasets from onward involves entrenched authoritarian practices, with only about 14% of such interventions against dictatorships fostering democratic gains that might alleviate repression. Counter-coups, or subsequent attempts to overthrow the installed , intensify this cycle of repression, as coup leaders respond to perceived disloyalty with purges, heightened , and targeted violence against military rivals and civilian dissenters. Failed counter-coups in post-coup autocracies trigger immediate escalations in government coercion, including loyalty tests and institutional dismantling, to forestall further challenges. In regions like , where coups have recurred since 2020, such dynamics have perpetuated derogations, with juntas suspending rights under emergency pretexts and failing to prosecute prior violations, thereby normalizing and eroding rule-of-law norms. These responses not only suppress immediate threats but also institutionalize repressive apparatuses, such as expanded , that outlast the initial crisis and impede accountability mechanisms.
Coup TypeImpact on Physical Integrity RightsKey Mechanism
Successful against democraciesDecreasePreemptive repression to consolidate non-democratic rule
Successful against autocraciesMixed; often no improvement without democratizationEntrenched juntas prioritize control over reform
Failed attempts (potential counter-coups)Increase in immediate aftermathRetaliatory purges and loyalty enforcement

International Relations and Responses

International responses to coups d'état are characterized by a mix of condemnation, diplomatic measures, and economic pressures, though consistency is limited by geopolitical calculations and national interests. Democratic governments and multilateral organizations often denounce coups as violations of constitutional order, imposing suspensions from regional bodies, targeted sanctions on coup leaders, and halts to foreign aid to incentivize restoration of civilian rule. For instance, U.S. law under Section 7008 of annual foreign aid appropriations mandates the suspension of most assistance to governments resulting from coups, applied to cases including since July 2023, since 2022, and since the February 2021 military takeover. Similarly, the has developed sanctions regimes post-coup, such as asset freezes and travel bans following the 2021 Myanmar events, while suspending and security cooperation in affected states. These measures aim to deter plotters by raising the costs of seizure, but empirical analyses indicate that correlate with reduced coup success rates only when broadly coordinated, as isolated actions often fail to alter regime trajectories. Regional organizations in Africa have pioneered more normative approaches, with the (AU) enforcing a zero-tolerance policy toward unconstitutional changes of government since ratifying the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in 2012. The AU automatically suspends states after coups, as occurred with in August 2020, Guinea in September 2021, in October 2021, and in September 2022, often conditioning reinstatement on timelines for elections. The (ECOWAS) has escalated responses in West Africa's "coup belt," imposing border closures, asset freezes, and trade embargoes after the July 2023 coup, though these sanctions disproportionately impacted civilians and were partially lifted by February 2024 amid regional divisions. In contrast, the rarely intervenes decisively, hampered by veto powers and ; it issued statements condemning coups in (2019) and Myanmar (2021) but avoided binding resolutions, reflecting divisions among permanent members. Coups frequently reshape bilateral ties, prompting shifts toward alternative patrons less averse to military rule. In nations like and , post-coup juntas expelled French forces and pivoted to Russian mercenaries for security support, exploiting Western sanctions to gain leverage against perceived neocolonial influences. Such realignments exacerbate great-power competition, with and offering recognition or without democratic preconditions, as evidenced by Moscow's diplomatic overtures to Niger's 2023 coup leaders. Over time, stabilized post-coup regimes may secure recognition if they deliver security gains, but persistent isolation risks economic contraction; studies show coup-affected states experience average GDP declines of 1-2% in the first year due to suspensions and investor flight. Responses thus hinge on the coup's context—against entrenched autocrats versus elected leaders—with weaker pushback in the former, underscoring driven by strategic priorities over universal norms.

Controversies and Ideological Perspectives

Coups Versus Revolutions: Structural Differences and Biases

A coup d'état typically involves a small cadre of elites, frequently officers or personnel, who exploit internal access to state institutions to rapidly seize control of the executive branch, often through targeted arrests, control of communication centers, and minimal disruption to administrative continuity. This process emphasizes speed and precision, aiming to replace without necessitating broad societal upheaval or alterations to underlying economic or social structures. In contrast, revolutions mobilize large-scale popular participation, driven by mass discontent, to challenge and dismantle core institutional frameworks, frequently resulting in prolonged conflict and attempts at wholesale systemic reconfiguration, such as shifts in property relations or ideological paradigms. Key structural distinctions can be summarized as follows:
AspectCoup d'ÉtatRevolution
ParticipantsElite insiders (e.g., military factions)Broad masses and organized groups
ScopeTargeted seizure of power centersFundamental societal and institutional overhaul
DurationSwift (hours to days)Extended (months to years)
MethodsCoordinated internal action, low public involvementWidespread protests, insurgencies, civil strife
Outcome FocusLeadership replacement, continuity in bureaucracyIdeological transformation, potential for radical policy shifts
Empirical patterns underscore these differences: since 1950, approximately 488 coup attempts have occurred globally, with a success rate of about 50%, far outpacing the incidence of successful revolutions, which remain rare and often follow or incorporate coup-like elite maneuvers. Data indicate a 47:1 ratio of successful coups to mass rebellions achieving , highlighting coups' efficiency in autocratic contexts due to their reliance on pre-existing state leverage rather than diffuse popular coordination. Biases in classification arise from ideological incentives, where actors and analysts selectively apply labels to confer legitimacy. Military-led takeovers in Cold War-era , such as in (1976), (1964), and , were officially framed as "revolutions" or "national movements" to evoke transformative , despite their elite-driven, top-down nature akin to standard coups. This self-labeling reflects a strategic blurring to align with revolutionary prestige, which carries connotations of absent in pure elite seizures. Scholarly and media narratives, influenced by preferences for mass-mobilization stories, disproportionately emphasize revolutions—despite their empirical scarcity and higher associated instability—over coups, potentially amplifying a toward romanticized accounts of bottom-up change while undervaluing elite interventions that stabilize dysfunctional regimes. Such tendencies are evident in institutional sources, where left-leaning historiographies critique conservative coups harshly but contextualize leftist revolutionary excesses as inevitable birthing pains, distorting causal assessments of outcomes like prolonged in post-revolutionary states.

Justifications for Coups in Dysfunctional Regimes

In regimes exhibiting severe dysfunction—characterized by inability to maintain internal security, rampant , economic collapse, or erosion of institutional —proponents of intervention argue that coups can serve as a corrective mechanism to restore basic functions. Such justifications often invoke the 's role as a professional institution less prone to partisan capture, capable of temporarily assuming power to stabilize failing states and pave the way for renewed constitutional order. For instance, the concept of a "democratic coup" posits that armed forces, representing national interests over factional ones, may oust corrupt or ineffective civilian leaders to reinstitute democratic processes, as articulated by legal scholar , who highlights historical instances where militaries acted against authoritarian drift in nominal democracies. This rationale draws on empirical observations that dysfunctional governments frequently fail to uphold , particularly Hobbesian imperatives like monopoly on legitimate violence, leading to that justifies intervention to avert or state failure. A primary justification centers on security vacuums, where civilian regimes prove incapable of countering insurgencies, , or , thereby forfeiting legitimacy. In such cases, military leaders cite operational necessity, arguing that coups prevent territorial disintegration and mass atrocities; for example, justifications in West African coups have emphasized the prior government's of defense responsibilities amid jihadist advances, positioning the intervention as a patriotic duty to safeguard . Complementary arguments highlight corruption's corrosive effects, where entrenched elites siphon resources, undermine , and provoke public unrest, rendering democratic facades hollow. Coup proponents contend that uncorrupted militaries can dismantle kleptocratic networks, enforce , and enable technocratic reforms, as seen in rationales for ousting leaders who manipulate constitutions to perpetuate power, a pattern observed in multiple African states where pre-coup featured and patronage-driven decay. Critics of unchecked civilian rule in dysfunctional contexts further argue that coups address institutional weaknesses exacerbated by weak checks and balances, such as politicized judiciaries or captured legislatures, which perpetuate inefficiency and inequality. Empirical defenses point to scenarios where post-coup stabilization has facilitated economic recovery or institutional rebuilding, though such claims require scrutiny against broader data on variable outcomes. These justifications, however, hinge on the military's commitment to transitional timelines and popular support, distinguishing them from power grabs; failure to transition risks entrenching , but in acute dysfunction, inaction may yield worse humanitarian costs. Sources advancing these views, often from military or regional analysts, counter mainstream —frequently influenced by democratic normative biases—by prioritizing causal evidence of regime failure over ideological aversion to extra-electoral change.

Criticisms and Risks of Entrenched Authoritarianism

Successful coups d'état often consolidate power in the hands of military leaders or juntas, leading to authoritarian regimes that entrench over time due to the absence of institutional checks and competitive elections. Empirical analyses indicate that from 1950 to 2010, the majority of successful coups against autocratic governments resulted in continued or deepened authoritarian rule rather than democratization, with only a minority—estimated at around 14% in earlier decades—transitioning to democracy within two years. This entrenchment arises from the military's incentives to prioritize regime survival over broader governance reforms, fostering personalized rule and suppressing rival factions through co-optation or coercion. A primary is heightened state repression, as post-coup leaders eliminate perceived threats to consolidate control, resulting in elevated levels of against civilians. Studies exploiting the in coup outcomes show that successful takeovers correlate with immediate and sustained increases in repression, including arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings, contrasting with failed attempts that sometimes prompt . In autocratic contexts, such regimes exacerbate and policy failures, with indicators like regulatory quality, control, and deteriorating significantly after coups, hindering investment and growth. surges post-coup, particularly under low-ranking officers, as erodes and networks solidify elite loyalty over public accountability. In and , historical patterns illustrate these risks: Myanmar's 2021 military coup entrenched the Tatmadaw's rule, reversing partial democratic gains and triggering widespread protests met with lethal force, perpetuating a cycle of isolation and underdevelopment. Similarly, in , the 2017 ouster of —framed as a coup—preserved ZANU-PF dominance under , yielding authoritarian continuity marked by electoral manipulation and economic collapse rather than reform. African cases like Sudan's 2019 coup initially promised transition but devolved into factional strife and renewed military entrenchment amid , underscoring how coups disrupt fragile institutions without replacing them with durable alternatives. Critics argue that while dysfunctional democracies may invite intervention, the causal reality is that military rule amplifies risks of indefinite authoritarianism, as juntas lack mechanisms for peaceful power transfer and often exploit to justify perpetual emergency powers, leading to long-term societal costs outweighing short-term stabilizations.

Western Hypocrisy and Global Double Standards

The United States government, through agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, actively supported the 1953 coup d'état in Iran that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had nationalized the oil industry, installing Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in a pro-Western monarchy. Similarly, in 1954, the CIA orchestrated Operation PBSuccess to depose Guatemala's democratically elected President Jacobo Árbenz, whose land reforms threatened United Fruit Company interests, leading to decades of authoritarian rule under Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. These interventions prioritized geopolitical and economic advantages over democratic norms, reflecting a pattern where Western powers endorsed military seizures of power when they aligned with anti-communist objectives during the Cold War. In Chile, declassified documents reveal U.S. efforts under President and Secretary of State to destabilize socialist President Salvador Allende's administration, culminating in the September 11, 1973, coup by General , which the U.S. subsequently recognized and supported despite widespread abuses. This approach extended to other Latin American cases, such as tacit U.S. backing for coups in (1964) and support for , a network of South American dictatorships that eliminated left-wing opponents. Such actions underscore a selective application of principles, where coups against perceived leftist threats were not only tolerated but facilitated, contrasting sharply with post-Cold War rhetoric emphasizing democratic transitions. Contemporary responses to African coups highlight ongoing double standards, as Western governments, including the U.S. and , have imposed sanctions and threats of military intervention following takeovers in (2020 and 2021), (2022), (2023), and (2023), framing them as threats to stability and . Yet, U.S. training programs, such as the International Education and Training initiative, have equipped officers who later led these coups, with at least four West African overthrows involving American-trained leaders since 2012, including in and . This inconsistency persists despite evidence that many ousted African regimes were corrupt or ineffective, suggesting motivations tied to resource access and countering Russian or Chinese influence rather than consistent opposition to undemocratic power grabs. Critics, including analysts from non-Western perspectives, argue that Western condemnation of African coups ignores historical precedents of self-interested interventions, while and academic sources often amplify narratives of universal democratic without acknowledging how prior Western-backed changes sowed seeds of . For instance, the rapid international isolation of Myanmar's 2021 military coup against Suu Kyi's government contrasted with muted responses to allied authoritarian shifts, revealing alignments based on strategic utility over principled consistency. Empirical data from coup tracking shows that Western reactions correlate more with the ideological orientation of the post-coup than the act of overthrow itself, with pro-Western juntas historically receiving despite their extralegal origins. This pattern erodes credibility in Western for global norms, as affected regions perceive it as neocolonial selectivity rather than genuine commitment to standards.

Contemporary Examples and Leaders

African Coups in the 21st Century

Africa experienced a decline in successful coups d'état following the post-independence era, with only sporadic instances in the early , including on August 3, 2005, when Colonel overthrew President amid allegations of ; on December 23, 2008, where Captain seized power after President Lansana Conté's death; on February 18, 2010, led by against President Mamadou Tandja's extended rule; on March 22, 2012, with Captain deposing President during a Tuareg ; and the on March 24, 2013, when rebel leader ousted President . These events often stemmed from institutional weaknesses, resource mismanagement, and security breakdowns, though international responses varied, with some transitions leading to elections while others entrenched military rule. A sharp resurgence began in 2019, concentrated in the and adjacent areas, with nine to ten successful coups by 2023, driven primarily by jihadist insurgencies, governance failures, and public discontent with civilian leaders' inability to maintain order. In , on April 11, 2019, the , led by General , removed long-ruling President amid mass protests against and . saw Colonel orchestrate a coup on August 18, 2020, ousting President due to disputed elections and escalating Islamist violence, followed by a second takeover on May 24, 2021, against transitional President Bah N'Daw to consolidate junta control. In Chad, on April 20, 2021, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno assumed power after his father, President , died fighting rebels, suspending the constitution and promising elections later unmet. Guinea's Colonel overthrew President on September 5, 2021, citing constitutional violations and economic woes after Condé's controversial third term. Sudan's al-Burhan dissolved the transitional government on October 25, 2021, arresting Prime Minister amid disputes over military-civilian power-sharing. Burkina Faso endured two coups in 2022: Lieutenant Colonel deposed President on January 23 over jihadist threats, only to be replaced by Captain on September 30 for inadequate security responses. The pattern continued with on July 26, 2023, where General Abdourahamane Tchiani's Presidential Guard ousted President , blaming ties to ineffective Western counterterrorism; and on August 30, 2023, as General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema annulled results and removed President Ali Bongo Ondimba, ending a dynastic rule marred by health concerns and alleged . These coups frequently garnered initial domestic support for addressing acute crises, though they prompted regional sanctions from bodies like and AU suspensions, highlighting tensions between local security imperatives and external democratic norms. Empirical data indicate over 20 coup attempts continent-wide since 2020, with success often linked to military frustration over ungoverned spaces exploited by groups like and al-Qaeda affiliates.

Asian and Other Regional Cases

In , the Tatmadadaw military seized control on February 1, 2021, detaining State Counsellor and President following the National League for Democracy's landslide victory in the November 2020 general elections, which the military claimed were marred by widespread fraud despite international observers noting no evidence of irregularities sufficient to alter outcomes. Senior General , commander-in-chief, assumed leadership of the , declaring a one-year that has since been extended multiple times, resulting in over 5,000 deaths from military crackdowns and sparking armed resistance from ethnic militias and the People's Defense Force, escalating into widespread civil conflict. In , General led the Royal Thai Army in a coup on , , dissolving the caretaker government of Yingluck amid months of anti-government protests and judicial rulings that had paralyzed , with the military citing the need to end that had claimed over 20 lives since late 2013. The National Council for Peace and Order, under Prayut, suspended the , imposed , and censored media, ruling directly until 2019 elections under a military-drafted charter that reserved significant influence for unelected bodies; Prayut remained until 2023, when he was removed by amid ongoing factional rivalries between royalist-military elites and populist forces aligned with the . In , Commodore orchestrated the fourth military coup since independence on December 5, 2006, ousting Laisenia Qarase's government over allegations of , ethnic favoritism toward indigenous Fijians, and proposed that would coup perpetrators from 2000. Bainimarama's regime abrogated the , dismissed the , and ruled by decree until 2014 elections, which he won; re-elected in 2018, his government emphasized multiracial policies but faced criticism for suppressing dissent, with Bainimarama losing power in 2022 to a led by , who had backed earlier coups. Beyond Asia-Pacific, Egypt's military, commanded by then-Defense Minister , removed President of the on July 3, 2013, following mass protests against Morsi's governance, including economic failures and power consolidation attempts that had drawn millions to . Sisi suspended the Islamist-drafted , appointed an interim civilian government, and won the presidency in 2014 with 97% of the vote amid suppressed opposition; his rule has since featured extensive crackdowns, with over 60,000 political prisoners reported and a 2019 extending his term until 2030. In , the armed forces ousted President on June 28, , exiling him to after he defied orders against holding a non-binding on constitutional assembly, which critics viewed as a bid for re-election prohibited by law. installed as interim president, who governed until November elections boycotted by Zelaya supporters; the event, condemned internationally but defended domestically as constitutional enforcement, correlated with a surge in violence, with rates reaching 86 per 100,000 in 2011 before declining under subsequent administrations.

Ongoing Regimes Originating from Coups

As of October 2025, several governments worldwide maintain authority following successful military coups d'état, with a concentration in and isolated cases in . These regimes frequently justify their seizures of power by pointing to predecessor governments' failures in addressing insecurity, , and economic mismanagement, though transitions to rule have often been deferred. In , eight countries have experienced successful coups since 2020, leading to military-led administrations that have collectively distanced themselves from Western partnerships in favor of ties with . In , the military, known as the , executed a coup on February 1, 2021, detaining State Counsellor and members of the after alleging electoral irregularities in the 2020 vote. Senior General assumed leadership of the , which has governed amid widespread civil unrest and insurgencies by ethnic armed organizations and People's Defense Forces. The junta extended its in January 2025 for an additional six months, despite plans for elections criticized internationally for lacking credibility. African examples dominate recent instances, particularly in the . In , Colonel led coups in August 2020 and May 2021, ousting President and later transitional president Bah N'Daw, respectively, amid jihadist threats and political instability. The military transitional government remains in place, with elections repeatedly delayed as of 2025. saw two coups in 2022: the first in January under Lieutenant Colonel , followed by Captain Ibrahim Traoré's overthrow in September, citing inadequate security measures against Islamist insurgents. Traoré's Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Development continues to rule without a timeline for democratic transition. In , General Abdourahamane Tchiani's Presidential Guard detained President on July 26, 2023, forming the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland; the junta has rejected demands for restoration and deepened relations with . Other African cases include Guinea, where Colonel Mamady Doumbouya ousted President Alpha Condé on September 5, 2021, promising constitutional reform but maintaining military oversight. In Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno assumed power after his father Idriss Déby's battlefield death on April 20, 2021, establishing a transitional military council that has postponed elections. Gabon's General Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema removed President Ali Bongo on August 30, 2023, following disputed elections; Oligui won a subsequent presidential vote in 2023 but the regime retains military foundations. These juntas, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, formed the Alliance of Sahel States in 2023 and withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2025, signaling regional realignment. Longer-enduring regimes include , where orchestrated the July 2013 ouster of President amid mass protests, later winning elections as a but retaining military dominance. In , has ruled since a August 1979 coup against his uncle, , marking over four decades of authoritarian control sustained through oil revenues and repression. Such entrenched systems highlight patterns where initial coups against dysfunctional or tyrannical predecessors evolve into prolonged military governance, often with limited .
CountryCoup DateLeaderKey Justification
February 2021Alleged election fraud
2020, 2021Insecurity,
2022Failure to combat insurgents
July 2023Economic mismanagement, security
September 2021Constitutional violation
July 2013Mass protests against Morsi
August 1979Teodoro Obiang NguemaOverthrow of tyrannical uncle

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