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| RBMK reactor class | |
|---|---|
View of the Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant site, with three operational RBMK-1000 reactors. A fourth reactor was cancelled before completion. | |
| Generation | Generation II reactor |
| Reactor concept | Graphite-moderated light water-cooled reactor |
| Reactor line | RBMK (Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalniy) |
| Reactor types | RBMK-1000 RBMK-1500 RBMKP-2400 (never built) |
| Status | 26 blocks:
|
| Main parameters of the reactor core | |
| Fuel (fissile material) | 235U (NU/SEU/LEU) |
| Fuel state | Solid |
| Neutron energy spectrum | Thermal |
| Primary control method | Control rods |
| Primary moderator | Graphite |
| Primary coolant | Liquid (light water) |
| Reactor usage | |
| Primary use | Generation of electricity |
| Power (thermal) | RBMK-1000: 3,200 MWth RBMK-1500: 4,800 MWth RBMKP-2400: 6,500 MWth |
| Power (electric) | RBMK-1000: 1,000 MWe RBMK-1500: 1,500 MWe RBMKP-2400: 2,400 MWe |
The RBMK (Russian: Реактор большой мощности канальный, РБМК; reaktor bolshoy moshchnosti kanalnyy, "high-power channel-type reactor") is a class of graphite-moderated nuclear power reactor designed and built by the Soviet Union. It is somewhat like a boiling water reactor as water boils in the pressure tubes. It is one of two power reactor types to enter serial production in the Soviet Union during the 1970s, the other being the VVER reactor.[3] The name refers to its design[3] where instead of a large steel pressure vessel surrounding the entire core, the core is surrounded by a cylindrical annular steel tank inside a concrete vault and each fuel assembly is enclosed in an individual 8 cm (inner) diameter pipe (called a "technological channel"). The channels also contain the coolant, and are surrounded by graphite.
The RBMK is an early Generation II reactor and the oldest commercial reactor design still in wide operation. Certain aspects of the original RBMK reactor design had several shortcomings,[3] such as the large positive void coefficient, the 'positive scram effect' of the control rods[4] and instability at low power levels—which contributed to the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, in which an RBMK experienced an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction, leading to a steam and hydrogen explosion, large fire, and subsequent core meltdown. Radioactive material was released over a large portion of northern and southern Europe—including Sweden, where evidence of the nuclear disaster was first registered outside of the Soviet Union, and before the Chernobyl accident was communicated by the Soviet Union to the rest of the world.[5][6] The disaster prompted worldwide calls for the reactors to be completely decommissioned; however, there is still considerable reliance on RBMK facilities for power in Russia with the aggregate power of operational units at almost 7 GW of installed capacity. Most of the flaws in the design of RBMK-1000 reactors were corrected after the Chernobyl accident and a dozen reactors have since been operating without any serious incidents for over thirty years.[7]
RBMK reactors may be classified as belonging to one of three distinct generations, according to when the particular reactor was built and brought online:[3][8]
- Generation 1 – during the early-to-mid 1970s, before OPB-82 General Safety Provisions were introduced in the Soviet Union.
- Generation 2 – during the late 1970s and early 1980s, conforming to the OPB-82 standards issued in 1982.
- Generation 3 – post Chernobyl accident in 1986, where Soviet safety standards were revised to OPB-88; only Smolensk-3 was built to these standards.
Lifespan
[edit]Initially the service life was expected to be 30 years, later it was extended to 45 years with mid-life refurbishments (such as fixing the issue of the graphite stack deformation), and eventually a 50-year lifetime was adopted for some units (Kursk 1-3 and 1-4, Leningrad 1-3 and 1-4, Smolensk 1-1, 1-2, 1-3). Efforts are underway to extend the licence of all the units. In July 2024, Leningrad unit 3's licence was extended from 2025 to 2030.[9][10][11] In February 2026, the Russian nuclear regulator approved a five year life extension to Leningrad Unit 4 to operate until 2031.[12] Today all the reactors are operated by Rosatom's subsidiary Rosenergoatom.
History
[edit]The RBMK was the culmination of the Soviet nuclear power program to produce a water-cooled power reactor with dual-use potential based on their graphite-moderated plutonium production military reactors. The first of these, Obninsk AM-1 ("Атом Мирный", Atom Mirny, Russian for "peaceful atom," analogous to the American Atoms for Peace) generated 5 MW of electricity from 30 MW thermal power, and supplied Obninsk from 1954 until 1959. Subsequent prototypes were the AMB-100 reactor and AMB-200 reactor both at Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Station.
By using a minimalist design that used regular (light) water for cooling and graphite for moderation, it was possible to use fuel with a lower enrichment (1.8% enriched uranium instead of considerably more expensive 4% enrichment). This allowed for an extraordinarily large and powerful reactor that could be built rapidly, largely out of parts fabricated on-site instead of by specialized factories. The initial 1000 MWe design also left room for development into yet more powerful reactors. For example, the RBMK reactors at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in Lithuania were rated at 1500 MWe each, a very large size for the time and even for the early 21st century. For comparison, the EPR has a net electric nameplate capacity of 1600 MW (4500 MWthermal) and is among the most powerful reactor types ever built.
The RBMK-1000's design was finalized in 1968. At that time it was the world's largest nuclear reactor design, surpassing western designs and the VVER (an earlier Soviet PWR reactor design) in power output and physical size, being 20 times larger by volume than contemporary western reactors. Similarly to CANDU reactors and the Indian IPHWR reactors it could be produced without the specialized industry required by the large and thick-walled reactor pressure vessels such as those used by VVER reactors, thus increasing the number of factories capable of manufacturing RBMK reactor components. No prototypes of the RBMK were built; it was put directly into mass production.
The RBMK was proclaimed by some as the national reactor of the Soviet Union, probably due to nationalism because of its unique design, large size and power output. Meanwhile the VVER design was called the "American reactor" due to the pressurized water (PWR) design shared with many Western reactors. A top-secret invention patent for the RBMK design was filed by Anatoly Aleksandrov from the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, who personally took credit for the design of the reactor, with the Soviet patent office. Because a containment building would have needed to be very large and expensive, doubling the cost of each unit, due to the large size of the RBMK, it was originally omitted from the design. It was argued by its designers that the RBMK's strategy of having each fuel assembly in its own channel with flowing cooling water was an acceptable alternative for containment.
The RBMK was mainly designed at the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy and NIKIET, headed by Anatoly Aleksandrov and Nikolai Dollezhal respectively, from 1964 to 1966. The RBMK was favored over the VVER by the Soviet Union due to its ease of manufacture, due to a lack of a large and thick-walled reactor pressure vessel and relatively complex associated steam generators, and its large power output, which would allow the Soviet government to easily meet their central economic planning targets.[13]
The flaws in the original RBMK design were recognized by others, including from within the Kurchatov Institute before the first units were built, but the orders for construction of the first RBMK units, which were at Leningrad, had already been issued in 1966 by the Soviet government by the time their concerns reached the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Council of Ministers. This prompted a sudden overhaul of the RBMK. Plutonium production in an RBMK would have been achieved by operating the reactor under special thermal parameters, but this capability was abandoned early on.[14] This was the design that was finalized in 1968. The redesign did not solve further flaws that were not discovered until years later. Construction of the first RBMK, which was at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, began in 1970. Leningrad unit 1 opened in 1973.
At Leningrad it was discovered that the RBMK, due to its high positive void coefficient, became harder to control as the uranium fuel was consumed or burned up, becoming unpredictable by the time it was shut down after three years for maintenance. This made controlling the RBMK a very laborious, mentally and physically demanding task requiring the timely adjustment of dozens of parameters every minute, around the clock, constantly wearing out switches such as those used for the control rods and causing operators to sweat. The enrichment percentage was increased to 2.0%, up from 1.8% to alleviate these issues.
The RBMK was considered by some in the Soviet Union to be already obsolete shortly after the commissioning of Chernobyl unit 1. Aleksandrov and Dollezhal did not investigate further or even deeply understand the problems in the RBMK, and the void coefficient was not analyzed in the manuals for the reactor. Engineers at Chernobyl unit 1 had to create solutions to many of the RBMK's flaws such as a lack of protection against no feedwater supply. Leningrad and Chernobyl units 1 both had partial meltdowns that were treated, alongside other nuclear accidents at power plants, as state secrets and so were unknown even to other workers at those same plants.
By 1980 NIKIET realized, after completing a confidential study, that accidents with the RBMK were likely even during normal operation, but no action was taken to correct the RBMK's flaws. Instead, manuals were revised, which was believed to be enough to ensure safe operation as long as they were followed closely. However, the manuals were vague and Soviet power plant staff already had a habit of bending the rules in order to meet economic targets, despite inadequate or malfunctioning equipment. Crucially, it was not made clear that a number of control rods had to stay in the reactor at all times in order to protect against an accident, as loosely articulated by the Operational Reactivity Margin (ORM) parameter.[15] An ORM chart recorder and display were added to RBMK control rooms after the Chernobyl disaster.
Reactor design and performance
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (February 2020) |
Reactor vessel, moderator and shielding
[edit]

The reactor pit or vault is made of reinforced concrete and has dimensions 21.6 m × 21.6 m × 25.5 m. It houses the vessel of the reactor, which is annular, made of an inner and outer cylindrical wall and top and bottom metal plates that cover the space between the inner and outer walls, without covering the space surrounded by the vessel. The reactor vessel is an annular steel cylinder with hollow walls and pressurized with nitrogen gas, with an inner diameter and height of 14.52 m × 9.7 m, and a wall thickness of 16 mm.
In order to absorb axial thermal expansion loads, it is equipped with two annular bellows compensators, one on the top and another on the bottom, in the spaces between the inner and outer walls. The vessel surrounds the graphite core block stack, which serves as moderator. The graphite stack is kept in a helium-nitrogen mixture, providing an inert atmosphere for the graphite, protecting it from potential fires, and facilitating transfer of excess heat from the graphite to the coolant channels.
The moderator blocks are made of nuclear graphite, the dimensions of which are 25 cm × 25 cm on the plane perpendicular to the channels, and with several longitudinal dimensions of between 20 cm and 60 cm depending on the location in the stack. There are holes of 11.4 cm diameter through the longitudinal axis of the blocks for the fuel and control channels. The blocks are stacked, surrounded by the reactor vessel into a cylindrical core with a diameter and height of 14 m × 8 m.[16] The maximum allowed temperature of the graphite is up to 730 °C.[17]
The reactor has an active core region 11.8 m in diameter by 7 m height. There are 1700 tons of graphite blocks in an RBMK-1000 reactor.[15] The pressurized nitrogen in the vessel prevents the escape of the helium-nitrogen mixture used to cool the graphite stack.
The reactor vessel has on its outer side an integral cylindrical annular water tank,[18] a welded structure with 3 cm thick walls, an inner diameter of 16.6 m and an outer diameter of 19 m, internally divided to 16 vertical compartments. The water is supplied to the compartments from the bottom and removed from the top; the water can be used for emergency reactor cooling. The tank contains thermocouples for sensing the water temperature and ion chambers for monitoring the reactor power.[19] The tank, along with an annular sand layer between the outer side of the tank and inner side of the pit,[15] and the relatively thick concrete of the reactor pit serve as lateral biological shields.


The top of the reactor is covered by the upper biological shield (UBS), also called "Schema E", or, after the explosion of Chernobyl Reactor 4, Elena. The UBS is a cylindrical disc of 3 m × 17 m in size and 2000 tons in weight.[15] It is penetrated by standpipes for fuel and control channel assemblies. The top and bottom are covered with 4 cm thick steel plates, welded to be helium-tight, and additionally joined by structural supports. The space between the plates and pipes is filled with serpentinite,[15] a rock containing significant amounts of bound water. The serpentinite provides the radiation shielding of the biological shield and was applied as a special concrete mixture. The disk is supported on 16 rollers, located on the upper side of the reinforced cylindrical water tank. The structure of the UBS supports the fuel and control channels, the floor above the reactor in the central hall, and the steam-water pipes.[19][20]
Below the bottom of the reactor core there is the lower biological shield (LBS), similar to the UBS, but only 2 m × 14.5 m in size. It is penetrated by the tubes for the lower ends of the pressure channels and carries the weight of the graphite stack and the coolant inlet piping. A steel structure, two heavy plates intersecting in right angle under the center of the LBS and welded to the LBS, supports the LBS and transfers the mechanical load to the building.[20]
Above the UBS, there is a space with upper channel piping and instrumentation and control (I&C) or control and monitoring cabling. Above that is Assembly 11, made up of the upper shield cover or channel covers. Their top surfaces form part of the floor of the reactor hall and serve as part of the biological shield and for thermal insulation of the reactor space. They consist of serpentinite concrete blocks that cover individual removable steel-graphite plugs, located over the tops of the channels, forming what resembles a circle with a grid pattern.[20] The floor above the reactor is thus known by RBMK plant workers as pyatachok, referring to the five-kopeck coin.[15] There is one cover (lid/block) per plug, and one plug per channel.
Fuel channels
[edit]The fuel channels consist of welded zircaloy pressure tubes 8 cm in inner diameter with 4 mm thick walls, led through the channels in the center of the graphite moderator blocks. The top and bottom parts of the tubes are made of stainless steel, and joined with the central zircaloy segment with zirconium-steel alloy couplings. The pressure tube is held in the graphite stack channels with two alternating types of 20 mm high split graphite rings. One is in direct contact with the tube and has 1.5 mm clearance to the graphite stack, the other one is directly touching the graphite stack and has 1.3 mm clearance to the tube. This assembly reduces transfer of mechanical loads caused by neutron-induced swelling, thermal expansion of the blocks, and other factors to the pressure tube, while facilitating heat transfer from the graphite blocks. The pressure tubes are welded to the top and bottom plates of the reactor vessel.[20]
While most of the heat energy from the fission process is generated in the fuel rods, approximately 5.5% is deposited in the graphite blocks as they moderate the fast neutrons formed from fission. This energy must be removed to avoid overheating the graphite. About 80–85% of the energy deposited in the graphite is removed by the fuel rod coolant channels, using conduction via the graphite rings. The rest of the graphite heat is removed from the control rod channels by forced gas circulation through the gas circuit.[21]
There are 1693 fuel channels and 170 control rod channels in the first generation RBMK reactor cores. Second generation reactor cores (such as Kursk and Chernobyl 3/4) have 1661 fuel channels and 211 control rod channels.[22] The fuel assembly is suspended in the fuel channel on a bracket, with a seal plug. The seal plug has a simple design, to facilitate its removal and installation by the remotely controlled online refueling machine.
The fuel channels may, instead of fuel, contain fixed neutron absorbers, or be filled completely with cooling water. They may also contain silicon-filled tubes in place of a fuel assembly, for the purpose of doping for semiconductors. These channels could be identified by their corresponding servo readers, which would be blocked and replaced with the atomic symbol for silicon.
The small clearance between the pressure channel and the graphite block makes the graphite core susceptible to damage. If a pressure channel deforms, for example, by too high an internal pressure, the deformation can cause significant pressure loads on the graphite blocks and lead to damage.
Fuel
[edit]

The fuel pellets are made of uranium dioxide powder, sintered with a suitable binder into pellets 11.5 mm in diameter and 15 mm long. The material may contain added europium oxide as a burnable nuclear poison to lower the reactivity differences between a new and partially spent fuel assembly.[23] To reduce thermal expansion issues and interaction with the cladding, the pellets have hemispherical indentations. A 2 mm hole through the axis of the pellet serves to reduce the temperature in the center of the pellet and facilitates removal of gaseous fission products. The enrichment level in 1980 was 2% (0.4% for the end pellets of the assemblies). Maximum allowable temperature of the fuel pellet is 2100 °C.
The fuel rods are zircaloy (1% niobium) tubes 13.6 mm in outer diameter, 0.825 mm thick. The rods are filled with helium at 0.5 MPa and hermetically sealed. Retaining rings help to seat the pellets in the center of the tube and facilitate heat transfer from the pellet to the tube. The pellets are axially held in place by a spring. Each rod contains 3.5 kg of fuel pellets. The fuel rods are 3.64 m long, with 3.4 m of that being the active length. The maximum allowed temperature of a fuel rod is 600 °C.[21]
The fuel assemblies consist of two sets ("sub-assemblies") with 18 fuel rods and 1 carrier rod. The fuel rods are arranged along the central carrier rod, which has an outer diameter of 1.3 cm. All rods of a fuel assembly are held in place with 10 stainless steel spacers separated by 360 mm distance. The two sub-assemblies are joined with a cylinder at the center of the assembly; during the operation of the reactor, this dead space without fuel lowers the neutron flux in the central plane of the reactor. The total mass of uranium in the fuel assembly is 114.7 kg. The fuel burnup is 20 MW·d/kg. This is lower than modern BWRs which have fuel burnup at around 28 MW.d/kg and the PWRs which have it at around 34 MW.d/kg. The total length of the fuel assembly is 10.025 m, with 6.862 m of the active region.
In addition to the regular fuel assemblies, there are instrumented ones, containing neutron flux detectors in the central carrier. In this case, the rod is replaced with a tube with wall thickness of 2.5 mm; and outer diameter of 15 mm.[24]
Unlike the rectangular PWR/BWR fuel assemblies or hexagonal VVER fuel assemblies, the RBMK fuel assembly is cylindrical to fit the round pressure channels.
The refueling machine is mounted on a gantry crane and remotely controlled. The fuel assemblies can be replaced without shutting down the reactor, a factor significant for production of weapon-grade plutonium and, in a civilian context, for better reactor uptime. When a fuel assembly has to be replaced, the machine is positioned above the fuel channel: then it mates to the latter, equalizes pressure within, pulls the rod, and inserts a fresh one. The spent rod is then placed in a cooling pond. The capacity of the refueling machine with the reactor at nominal power level is two fuel assemblies per day, with peak capacity of five per day.
The total amount of fuel under stationary conditions is 192 tons.[22] The RBMK core has a relatively low power density at least partly due to the 25 cm spacing between channels and thus fuel assemblies.
Control rods
[edit]
neutron detector (12)
control rods (167)
short control rods from below reactor (32)
automatic control rods (12)
pressure tubes with fuel rods (1661-1691)(1-2-nd generation cores(RBMK)
The numbers in the image indicate the position of the respective control rods (insertion depth in centimetres) at 01:22:30,[25] 78 seconds before the reactor exploded.
The majority of the reactor control rods are inserted from above; 24 shortened rods are inserted from below and are used to augment the axial power distribution control of the core. With the exception of 12 automatic rods, the control rods have a 4.5 m long graphite section at the end, separated by a 1.25 m long telescope (which creates a water-filled space between the graphite and the absorber), and a boron carbide neutron absorber section. The role of the graphite section, known as "displacer", is to enhance the difference between the neutron flux attenuation levels of inserted and retracted rods, as the graphite displaces water that would otherwise act as a neutron absorber, although much weaker than boron carbide. A control rod channel filled with graphite absorbs fewer neutrons than when filled with water, so the difference between inserted and retracted control rod is increased.
When the control rod is fully retracted, the graphite displacer is located in the middle of the core height, with 1.25 m of water at each of its ends. The displacement of neutron-absorbing water as the rod moves down could cause a local increase of reactivity in the bottom of the core as the graphite part of the control rod passes that section. This "positive scram" effect was discovered in 1983 at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. The control rod channels are cooled by an independent water circuit and kept at 40–70 °C.
The narrow space between the rod and its channel hinders water flow around the rods during their movement and acts as a fluid damper, which is the primary cause of their slow insertion time (nominally 18–21 seconds for the reactor control and protection system rods, or about 0.4 m/s). After the Chernobyl disaster, the control rod servos on other RBMK reactors were exchanged to allow faster rod movements, and even faster movement was achieved by cooling of the control rod channels by a thin layer of water between an inner jacket and the Zircaloy tube of the channel while letting the rods themselves move in gas.
The division of the control rods between manual and emergency protection groups was arbitrary; the rods could be reassigned from one system to another during reactor operation without technical or organizational problems.
Additional static boron-based absorbers are inserted into the core when it is loaded with fresh fuel. About 240 absorbers are added during initial core loading. These absorbers are gradually removed with increasing burnup. The reactor's void coefficient depends on the core content; it ranges from negative with all the initial absorbers to positive when they are all removed.
The normal reactivity margin is 43–48 control rods.
Gas circuit
[edit]The reactor operates in a helium–nitrogen atmosphere (70–90% He, 10–30% N2 by volume).[21] The gas circuit is composed of a compressor, aerosol and iodine filters, adsorber for carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and ammonia, a holding tank for allowing the gaseous radioactive products to decay before being discharged, an aerosol filter to remove solid decay products, and a ventilator stack, the iconic chimney above the space between reactors in second generation RBMKs such as Kursk and Chernobyl 3/4 or some distance away from the reactors in first generation RBMKs such as Kursk and Chernobyl 1/2.[26]
The gas is injected to the core stack from the bottom in a low flow rate, and exits from the standpipe of each channel via an individual pipe. The moisture and temperature of the outlet gas is monitored; an increase of them is an indicator of a coolant leak.[17] A single gas circuit serves two RBMK-1000 reactors or a single RBMK-1500; RBMK reactors were always built in pairs. The gas circuit is housed between two reactors in second generation RBMKs such as Chernobyl 3/4, Kursk 3/4 and Smolensk 1–4.
Primary coolant circuit
[edit]

The reactor has two independent cooling circuits, each having four main circulating pumps (three operating, one standby) that service one half of the reactor. The cooling water is fed to the reactor through lower water lines to a common pressure header (one for each cooling circuit), which is split to 22 group distribution headers, each feeding 38–41 pressure channels through the core, where the coolant boils. The mixture of steam and water is led by the upper steam lines, one for each pressure channel, from the reactor top to the steam separators, pairs of thick horizontal drums located in side compartments above the reactor top; each has 2.8 m (9 ft 2 in) diameter, 31 m (101 ft 8 in) length, wall thickness of 10 cm (3.9 in), and weighs 240 t (260 short tons).[16]
Steam, with steam quality of about 15%, is taken from the top of the separators by two steam collectors per separator, combined, and led to two turbogenerators in the turbine hall, then to condensers, reheated to 165 °C (329 °F), and pumped by the condensate pumps to deaerators, where remains of gaseous phase and corrosion-inducing gases are removed. The resulting feedwater is led to the steam separators by feedwater pumps and mixed with water from them at their outlets. From the bottom of the steam separators, the feedwater is led by 12 downpipes (from each separator) to the suction headers of the main circulation pumps, and back into the reactor.[27] There is an ion exchange system included in the loop to remove impurities from the feedwater.
The turbine consists of one high-pressure rotor (cylinder) and four low-pressure ones. Five low-pressure separators-preheaters are used to heat steam with fresh steam before being fed to the next stage of the turbine. The uncondensed steam is fed into a condenser, mixed with condensate from the separators, fed by the first-stage condensate pump to a chemical (ion-exchange) purifier, then by a second-stage condensate pump to four deaerators where dissolved and entrained gases are removed; deaerators also serve as storage tanks for feedwater. From the deaerators, the water is pumped through filters and into the bottom parts of the steam separator drums.[28]
The main circulating pumps have the capacity of 5,500–12,000 m3/h and are powered by 6 kV electric motors. The normal coolant flow is 8000 m3/h per pump; this is throttled down by control valves to 6,000–7,000 m3/h when the reactor power is below 500 MWt. Each pump has a flow control valve and a backflow preventing check valve on the outlet, and shutoff valves on both inlet and outlet. Each of the pressure channels in the core has its own flow control valve so that the temperature distribution in the reactor core can be optimized. Each channel has a ball type flow meter.
The nominal coolant flow through the reactor is 46,000–48,000 m3/h. The steam flow at full power is 5,440–5,600 t (6,000–6,170 short tons)/h.[17]
The nominal temperature of the coolant at the inlet of the reactor is about 265–270 °C (509–518 °F) and the outlet temperature 284 °C (543 °F), at pressure in the drum separator and reactor of 6.9 megapascals (69 bar; 1,000 psi).[17][15] The pressure and the inlet temperature determine the height at which the boiling begins in the reactor; if the coolant temperature is not sufficiently below its boiling point at the system pressure, the boiling starts at the very bottom part of the reactor instead of its higher parts. With few absorbers in the reactor core, such as during the Chernobyl accident, the positive void coefficient of the reactor makes the reactor very sensitive to the feedwater temperature. Bubbles of boiling water lead to increased power, which in turn increases the formation of bubbles.
If the coolant temperature is too close to its boiling point, cavitation can occur in the pumps and their operation can become erratic or even stop entirely. The feedwater temperature is dependent on the steam production; the steam phase portion is led to the turbines and condensers and returns significantly cooler (155–165 °C (311–329 °F)) than the water returning directly from the steam separator (284 °C). At low reactor power, therefore, the inlet temperature may become dangerously high. The water is kept below the saturation temperature to prevent film boiling and the associated drop in heat transfer rate.[16]
The reactor is tripped in cases of high or low water level in the steam separators (with two selectable low-level thresholds); high steam pressure; low feedwater flow; loss of two main coolant pumps on either side. These trips can be manually disabled.[19]
The level of water in the steam separators, the percentage of steam in the reactor pressure tubes, the level at which the water begins to boil in the reactor core, the neutron flux and power distribution in the reactor, and the feedwater flow through the core have to be carefully controlled. The level of water in the steam separator is mainly controlled by the feedwater supply, with the deaerator tanks serving as a water reservoir.
The maximum allowed heat-up rate of the reactor and the coolant is 10 °C (18 °F)/h; the maximum cool-down rate is 30 °C (54 °F)/h.[17]
ECCS
[edit]The reactor is equipped with an emergency core cooling system (ECCS), consisting of dedicated water reserve tank, hydraulic accumulators, and pumps. ECCS piping is integrated with the normal reactor cooling system. The ECCS has three systems, connected to the coolant system headers. In case of damage, the first ECCS subsystem provides cooling for up to 100 seconds to the damaged half of the coolant circuit (the other half is cooled by the main circulation pumps), and the other two subsystems then handle long-term cooling of the reactor.[19]
The short-term ECCS subsystem consists of two groups of six accumulator tanks, containing water blanketed with nitrogen under pressure of 10 megapascals (1,500 psi), connected by fast-acting valves to the reactor. Each group can supply 50% of the maximum coolant flow to the damaged half of the reactor. The third group is a set of electrical pumps drawing water from the deaerators. The short-term pumps can be powered by the spindown of the main turbogenerators.[19]
ECCS for long-term cooling of the damaged circuit consists of three pairs of electrical pumps, drawing water from the pressure suppression pools; the water is cooled by the plant service water by means of heat exchangers in the suction lines. Each pair is able to supply half of the maximum coolant flow. ECCS for long-term cooling of the intact circuit consists of three separate pumps drawing water from the condensate storage tanks, each able to supply half of the maximum flow. The ECCS pumps are powered from the essential internal 6 kV lines, backed up by diesel generators. Some valves that require uninterrupted power are also backed up by batteries.[19]
Reactor control/supervision systems
[edit]

The distribution of power density in the reactor is measured by ionization chambers located inside and outside the core. The physical power density distribution control system (PPDDCS) has sensors inside the core; the reactor control and protection system (RCPS) uses sensors in the core and in the lateral biological shield tank. The external sensors in the tank are located around the reactor middle plane, therefore do not indicate axial power distribution nor information about the power in the central part of the core.
There are over 100 radial and 12 axial power distribution monitors, employing self-powered detectors. Reactivity meters and removable startup chambers are used for monitoring of reactor startup. Total reactor power is recorded as the sum of the currents of the lateral ionization chambers. The moisture and temperature of the gas circulating in the channels is monitored by the pressure tube integrity monitoring system.
The PPDDCS and RCPS are supposed to complement each other. The RCPS system consists of 211 movable control rods. Both systems, however, have deficiencies, most noticeably at low reactor power levels. The PPDDCS is designed to maintain reactor power density distribution between 10 and 120% of nominal levels and to control the total reactor power between 5 and 120% of nominal levels. The LAC-LAP (local automatic control and local automatic protection) RPCS subsystems rely on ionization chambers inside the reactor and are active at power levels above 10%.
Below those levels, the automatic systems are disabled and the in-core sensors are not accessible. Without the automatic systems and relying only on the lateral ionization chambers, control of the reactor becomes very difficult; the operators do not have sufficient data to control the reactor reliably and have to rely on their intuition. During startup of a reactor with a poison-free core this lack of information can be manageable because the reactor behaves predictably, but a non-uniformly poisoned core can cause large nonhomogenities of power distribution, with potentially catastrophic results.
The reactor emergency protection system (EPS) was designed to shut down the reactor when its operational parameters are exceeded. The design accounted for steam collapse in the core when the fuel element temperature falls below 265 °C, coolant vaporization in fuel channels in cold reactor state, and sticking of some emergency protection rods. However, the slow insertion speed of the control rods, together with their design causing localized positive reactivity as the displacer moves through the lower part of the core, created a number of possible situations where initiation of the EPS could itself cause or aggravate a reactor runaway.
The SKALA or SCALA computer system for calculation of the reactivity margin was collecting data from about 4,000 sources. Its purpose was to assist the operator with steady-state control of the reactor. Ten to fifteen minutes were required to cycle through all the measurements and calculate the results. SKALA could not control the reactor, instead it only made recommendations to the operators, and it used 1960s computer technology.[29]
The operators could disable some safety systems, reset or suppress some alarm signals, and bypass automatic scram, by attaching patch cables to accessible terminals. This practice was allowed under some circumstances.
The reactor is equipped with a fuel rod leak detector. A scintillation counter detector, sensitive to energies of short-lived fission products, is mounted on a special dolly and moved over the outlets of the fuel channels, issuing an alert if increased radioactivity is detected in the steam-water flow.
In RBMK control rooms there are two large panels or mimic displays representing a top view of the reactor. One display is made up mostly or completely (in first generation RBMKs) of colored dials or rod position indicators: these dials represent the position of the control rods inside the reactor and the color of the housing of the dials matches that of the control rods, whose colors correspond to their function, for example, red for automatic control rods. The other display is a core map or core channel cartogram and is circular, is made of tiles, and represents every channel on the reactor. Each tile is made of a single light cover with a channel number[30] and an incandescent light bulb, and each light bulb illuminates to represent out-of-spec (higher or lower than normal) channel parameters.
Operators have to type in the number of the affected channel(s) and then view the instruments to find exactly what parameters are out of spec. The core map represented information from the SKALA computer. Each unit had its own computer housed in a separate room. The control room also has chart or trend recorders. Some RBMK control rooms have been upgraded with video walls that replace the mimic displays and most chart recorders and eliminate the need to type in channel numbers and instead operators lay a cursor over a (now representative) tile to reveal its parameters that are shown on the lower side of the video wall.[31] The control room is located below the floor of the deaerator room. Both rooms are in the space between the reactor and turbine buildings.
Containment
[edit]The RBMK design was built primarily to be powerful, quick to build and easy to maintain. Full physical containment structures for each reactor would have more than doubled the cost and construction time of each plant, and since the design had been certified by the Soviet nuclear science ministry as inherently safe when operated within established parameters, the Soviet authorities assumed proper adherence to doctrine by workers would make any accident impossible. RBMK reactors were designed to allow fuel rods to be changed at full power without shutting down, as in the pressurized heavy water CANDU reactor, and the Indian IPHWR reactor, both for refueling and for plutonium production for nuclear weapons. This required large cranes above the core.
As the RBMK reactor core is very tall (about 7 m (23 ft 0 in)), the cost and difficulty of building a heavy containment structure prevented the building of additional emergency containment structures for pipes on top of the reactor core. In the Chernobyl accident, the pressure rose to levels high enough to blow the top off the reactor, breaking open the fuel channels in the process and starting a massive fire when air contacted the superheated graphite core. After the Chernobyl accident, some of the older RBMK reactors were retrofitted with an accident containment system, akin to that boasted by Chernobyl Unit 4.
The bottom part of the reactor is enclosed in a watertight compartment. There is a space between the reactor bottom and the floor. The reactor cavity overpressure protection system consists of steam relief assemblies embedded in the floor and leading to Steam Distributor Headers covered with rupture discs and opening into the Steam Distribution Corridor below the reactor, on level +6. The floor of the corridor contains entrances of a large number of vertical pipes, leading to the bottoms of the Pressure Suppression Pools ("bubbler" pools) located on levels +3 and +0. In the event of an accident, which was predicted to be at most a rupture of one or two pressure channels, the steam was to be bubbled through the water and condensed there, reducing the overpressure in the leaktight compartment. The flow capacity of the pipes to the pools limited the protection capacity to simultaneous rupture of two pressure channels; a higher number of failures would cause pressure buildup sufficient to lift the cover plate ("Structure E", after the explosion nicknamed "Elena", not to be confused with the Russian ELENA reactor), sever the rest of the fuel channels, destroy the control rod insertion system, and potentially also withdraw control rods from the core.[32]
The containment was designed to handle failures of the downcomers, pumps, and distribution and inlet of the feedwater. The leaktight compartments around the pumps can withstand overpressure of 0.45 MPa (65 psi). The distribution headers and inlets enclosures can handle 0.08 MPa (12 psi) and are vented via check valves to the leaktight compartment. The reactor cavity can handle overpressure of 0.18 MPa (26 psi) and is vented via check valves to the leaktight compartment. The pressure suppression system can handle a failure of one reactor channel, a pump pressure header, or a distribution header.[19]
Leaks in the steam piping and separators are not handled, except for maintaining slightly lower pressure in the riser pipe gallery and the steam drum compartment than in the reactor hall. These spaces are also not designed to withstand overpressure. The steam distribution corridor contains surface condensers. The fire sprinkler systems, operating during both accident and normal operation, are fed from the pressure suppression pools through heat exchangers cooled by the plant service water, and cool the air above the pools. Jet coolers are located in the topmost parts of the compartments; their role is to cool the air and remove the steam and radioactive aerosol particles.[19]
Hydrogen removal from the leaktight compartment is performed by removal of 800 m3 (28,000 cu ft)/hour of air, its filtration, and discharge into the atmosphere. The air removal is stopped automatically in case of a coolant leak and has to be reinstated manually. Hydrogen is present during normal operation due to leaks of coolant (assumed to be up to 2 t (2.2 short tons) per hour).[19]
Other systems
[edit]For the nuclear systems described here, the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant is used as the example.
Electrical systems
[edit]The power plant is connected to the 330 kV and 750 kV electrical grid. The block has two electrical generators connected to the 750 kV grid by a single generator transformer. The generators are connected to their common transformer by two switches in series. Between them, the unit transformers are connected to supply power to the power plant's own systems; each generator can therefore be connected to the unit transformer to power the plant, or to the unit transformer and the generator transformer to also feed power to the grid. The 330 kV line is normally not used, and serves as an external power supply, connected by a station transformer to the power plant's electrical systems.[19]
The plant can be powered by its own generators, or get power from the 750 kV grid through the generator transformer, or from the 330 kV grid via the station transformer, or from the other power plant block via two reserve busbars. In case of total external power loss, the essential systems can be powered by diesel generators. Each unit transformer is connected to two 6 kV main power boards, A and B (e.g. 7A, 7B, 8A, 8B for generators 7 and 8), powering principal non-essential drivers and connected to transformers for the 4 kV main power and the 4 kV reserve busbar.[19]
The 7A, 7B, and 8B boards are also connected to the three essential power lines, namely for the coolant pumps, each also having its own diesel generator. In case of a coolant circuit failure with simultaneous loss of external power, the essential power can be supplied by the spinning down turbogenerators for about 45–50 seconds, during which time the diesel generators should start up. The generators are started automatically within 15 seconds at loss of off-site power.[19]
Turbogenerators
[edit]The electrical energy is generated by a pair of 500 MW hydrogen-cooled turbogenerators. These are located in the 600 m (1,968 ft 6 in)-long machine hall, adjacent to the reactor building. The turbines, the venerable five-cylinder K-500-65/3000, are supplied by the Kharkiv turbine plant. The electrical generators are the TVV-500. The turbine and the generator rotors are mounted on the same shaft. The combined weight of the rotors is almost 200 t (220 short tons) and their nominal rotational speed is 3000 rpm.[16]
The turbogenerator is 39 m (127 ft 11 in) long and its total weight is 1,200 t (1,300 short tons). The coolant flow for each turbine is 82,880 t (91,360 short tons)/h. The generator produces 20 kV 50 Hz AC power. The generator's stator is cooled by water while its rotor is cooled by hydrogen. The hydrogen for the generators is manufactured on-site by electrolysis.[16] The design and reliability of the turbines earned them the State Prize of Ukraine for 1979.
The Kharkiv turbine plant (now Turboatom) later developed a new version of the turbine, K-500-65/3000-2, in an attempt to reduce use of valuable metal. The Chernobyl plant was equipped with both types of turbines; Block 4 had the newer ones.
Design variants
[edit]RBMK-1500
[edit]The primary difference between RBMK-1000 and RBMK-1500 reactors is that the RBMK-1500 is cooled with less water, which adopts a helical laminar flow instead of a linear laminar flow through the channels. The RBMK-1500 also uses less uranium. The helical flow is created by turbulators in the fuel assembly and increases heat removal.[33][34] Because of the RBMK's positive void coefficient, the reduced cooling water volume causes a higher power output. As the name suggests, it was designed for an electrical power output of 1500 MW. The only reactors of this type and power output are the ones at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.[35]
RBMK-2000 and RBMK-3600
[edit]The RBMK-2000[33] and RBMK-3600[36] were designed to produce 2000 and 3600 MW of electrical power respectively. The RBMK-2000 would have had an increased channel diameter and number of fuel rods per fuel assembly while maintaining the same dimensions of the reactor core as the RBMK-1000 and RBMK-1500. The RBMK-3600 presumably similarly to the RBMK-1500 would have added turbulators to the RBMK-2000 design to increase heat removal.
RBMKP-2400
[edit]The RBMKP-2400 is rectangular instead of cylindrical, and it was a modular, theoretically infinitely longitudinally expandable design with vertical steam separators, intended to be made in sections at a factory for assembly in situ. It was designed to have a power output of 2400 MWe, and a higher thermal efficiency due to steam superheating directly in the reactor core in special fuel channels with fuel rods with stainless steel cladding instead of the more common Zircaloy cladding, for a steam outlet temperature of 450 °C. No reactor with this power output has ever been built, with the most powerful one currently being as of 2018 the 1750 MWe EPR.[35] The development of this design was cancelled in the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster. An RBMKP-4800 would have had an increased number of evaporating and superheating channels thus increasing power output.[37][38] Two RBMKP-2400s were planned for the Kostroma Nuclear Power Plant.[39]
Design flaws and safety issues
[edit]As an early Generation II reactor based on 1950s Soviet technology, the RBMK design was optimized for speed of production but sacrificed redundancy. Several of its design characteristics would prove to be dangerously unstable when operated outside their design specifications. The decision to use a graphite core with natural uranium fuel allowed for massive power generation at only a quarter of the expense of heavy water reactors, which were more maintenance-intensive and required large volumes of expensive heavy water for startup. However, its unintended consequences would not reveal themselves fully until the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
High positive void coefficient
[edit]Light water (ordinary H2O) is both a neutron moderator and a neutron absorber. This means that not only can it slow down neutrons to velocities in equilibrium with surrounding molecules ("thermalize" them and turn them into low-energy neutrons, known as thermal neutrons, that are far more likely to interact with the uranium-235 nuclei than the fast neutrons produced by fission initially), but it also absorbs some of them.
In the RBMK series of reactors, light water functions as a coolant, while moderation is mainly carried out by graphite. As graphite already moderates neutrons, light water has a lesser effect in slowing them down, but could still absorb them. This means that the reactor's reactivity (adjustable by appropriate neutron-absorbing rods) must take into account the neutrons absorbed by light water.
In the case of vaporisation of water to steam, the place occupied by water would be occupied by water vapor, which has a density vastly lower than that of liquid water (the exact number depends on pressure and temperature; at standard conditions, steam is about 1⁄1350 as dense as liquid water). Because of this lower density (of mass, and consequently of atom nuclei able to absorb neutrons), light water's neutron-absorption capability practically disappears when it boils. This allows more neutrons to fission more U-235 nuclei and thereby increase the reactor power, which leads to higher temperatures that boil even more water, creating a thermal feedback loop.
In RBMK reactors, generation of steam in the coolant water would then in practice create a void: a bubble that does not absorb neutrons. The reduction in moderation by light water is irrelevant, as graphite still moderates the neutrons. However, the loss of absorption dramatically alters the balance of neutron production, causing a runaway condition in which more and more neutrons are produced, and their density grows exponentially. Such a condition is called a "positive void coefficient", and the RBMK reactor series has the highest positive void coefficient of any commercial reactor ever designed.
A high void coefficient does not necessarily make a reactor inherently unsafe, as some of the fission neutrons are emitted with a delay of seconds or even minutes (post-fission neutron emission from daughter nuclei), and therefore steps can be taken to reduce the fission rate before it becomes too high. This situation, however, does make it considerably harder to control the reactor, especially at low power. Thus, control systems must be very reliable and control-room personnel must be rigorously trained in the peculiarities and limits of the system. Neither of these requirements was in place at Chernobyl: since the reactor's actual design bore the approval stamp of the Kurchatov Institute and was considered a state secret, discussion of the reactor's flaws was forbidden, even among the actual personnel operating the plant. Some later RBMK designs did include control rods on electromagnetic grapples, thus controlling the reaction speed and, if necessary, stopping the reaction completely. The RBMK reactor at Chernobyl, however, had manual clutch control rods.
All RBMK reactors underwent significant changes following the Chernobyl disaster. The positive void coefficient was reduced from +4.5 β to +0.7 β,[40][41] decreasing the likelihood of further reactivity accidents, at the cost of higher enrichment requirements of the uranium fuel.[42]
Improvements since the Chernobyl accident
[edit]In his posthumously published memoirs, Valery Legasov, the First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, revealed that the institute's scientists had long known that the RBMK had significant design flaws.[43][44] Legasov's suicide in 1988, following frustrated attempts to promote nuclear and industrial safety reform, caused shockwaves throughout the scientific community. The RBMK's design problems were discussed increasingly openly.[45]
Following the accident at Chernobyl, all remaining RBMK reactors were retrofitted with a number of updates for safety. The largest of these updates fixed the RBMK control rod design. The control rods have 4.5-metre (14 ft 9 in) graphite displacers, which prevent coolant water from entering the space vacated as the rods are withdrawn. In the original design, those displacers, being shorter than the height of the core, left 1.25-metre (4.1 ft) columns of water at the bottom (and 1.25 metres [4.1 ft] at the top) when the rods were fully extracted.[4]
During insertion, the graphite would first displace that lower water, locally increasing reactivity. Also, when the rods were in their uppermost position, the absorber ends were outside the core, requiring a relatively large displacement before achieving a significant reduction in reactivity.[46] These design flaws were likely the final trigger of the first explosion of the Chernobyl accident, causing the lower part of the core to become prompt critical when the operators tried to shut down the highly destabilized reactor by reinserting the rods. The updates are:
- An increase in fuel enrichment from 2% to 2.4% to compensate for control rod modifications and the introduction of additional absorbers.
- Manual control rod count increased from 30 to 45.
- 80 additional absorbers inhibit operation at low power, where the RBMK design is most dangerous.
- AZ-5 (emergency reactor shutdown or SCRAM) sequence reduced from 18 to 12 seconds.
- Addition of the БАЗ or BAZ* system,[47] (rapid reactor emergency protection) which would insert 24 uniformly distributed rods into the reactor core via a modified drive mechanism within 1.8 to 2.5 seconds.
- Precautions against unauthorized access to emergency safety systems.
In addition, RELAP5-3D models of RBMK-1500 reactors were developed for use in integrated thermal-hydraulics-neutronics calculations for the analysis of specific transients in which the neutronic response of the core is important.[48]
*BAZ button is intended as a preemptive measure to bring down reactivity before AZ-5 is activated, to enable the safe and stable emergency shutdown of a RBMK.
Deformed graphite moderator blocks
[edit]From May 2012 to December 2013, Leningrad-1 was offline while repairs were made related to deformed graphite moderator blocks. The 18-month project included research and the development of maintenance machines and monitoring systems. Similar work will be applied to the remaining operational RBMKs.[49] Graphite moderator blocks in the RBMK can be repaired and replaced in situ, unlike in the other current large graphite moderated reactor, the advanced gas-cooled reactor.[50]
Longitudinal cutting in some of the graphite columns during lifetime extension refurbishment work can return the graphite stack to its initial design geometry.[51]
Further development
[edit]A post-Soviet redesign of the RBMK is the MKER (Russian: МКЭР, Многопетлевой Канальный Энергетический Реактор [Mnogopetlevoy Kanalniy Energeticheskiy Reaktor], which means Multi-loop pressure tube power reactor), with improved safety and a containment building.[52][53] A MKER-800, MKER-1000 and MKER-1500 were planned for the Leningrad nuclear power plant.[54][55][56]
List of RBMK reactors
[edit]Color key:
– Operational reactor (including reactors currently offline) – Reactor decommissioned – Reactor destroyed in accident – Abandoned or cancelled reactor construction
| Location[57] | Current Country |
Reactor type | Online | Status | Net Capacity (MWe) |
Gross Capacity (MWe) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chernobyl-1 | RBMK-1000 | 1977 | shut down in 1996 | 740 | 800[A] | |
| Chernobyl-2 | RBMK-1000 | 1978 | shut down in 1991 due to turbine fire | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Chernobyl-3 | RBMK-1000 | 1981 | shut down in 2003 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Chernobyl-4 | RBMK-1000 | 1983 | destroyed in 1986 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Chernobyl-5 | RBMK-1000 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1988 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Chernobyl-6 | RBMK-1000 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1988 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Ignalina-1 | RBMK-1500 | 1983 | shut down in 2004 | 1,185 | 1,300[B] | |
| Ignalina-2 | RBMK-1500 | 1987 | shut down in 2009 | 1,185 | 1,300[B] | |
| Ignalina-3 | RBMK-1500 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1988 | 1,380 | 1,500 | |
| Ignalina-4 | RBMK-1500 | N/A | plan cancelled in 1988 | 1,380 | 1,500 | |
| Kostroma-1 | RBMKP-2400 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1980s | 2,260 | 2,400 | |
| Kostroma-2 | RBMKP-2400 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1980s | 2,260 | 2,400 | |
| Kursk-1 | RBMK-1000 | 1977 | shut down in 2021 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Kursk-2 | RBMK-1000 | 1979 | shut down in 2024 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Kursk-3 | RBMK-1000 | 1984 | operational until 2033[10] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Kursk-4 | RBMK-1000 | 1985 | operational until 2035[10] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Kursk-5[52] | RBMK-1000[B] | N/A | construction cancelled in 2012 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Kursk-6 | RBMK-1000 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1993 | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Leningrad-1 | RBMK-1000 | 1974 | shut down in 2018[58] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Leningrad-2 | RBMK-1000 | 1976 | shut down in 2020[59] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Leningrad-3 | RBMK-1000 | 1979 | operational until 2030 (extended by 5 years in 2025)[60] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Leningrad-4 | RBMK-1000 | 1981 | operational until 2031 (extended by 5 years in 2026)[61] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Smolensk-1 | RBMK-1000 | 1983 | operational until 2028[60] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Smolensk-2 | RBMK-1000 | 1985 | operational until 2030[60] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Smolensk-3 | RBMK-1000 | 1990 | operational until 2034[60] | 925 | 1,000 | |
| Smolensk-4 | RBMK-1000 | N/A | construction cancelled in 1993 | 925 | 1,000 |
| A Built with 1,000 MWe gross electric power, Reactor 1 was derated to 800MWe following the 1982 partial meltdown incident. |
| B Built with 1,500 MWe gross electric power, the RBMK-1500 were de-rated to 1,360 MW after the Chernobyl disaster. |
A graphite-moderated Magnox reactor exists in North Korea at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center.[62] While the gas cooled Magnox, AGR and pebble bed reactors (Such as the Dragon reactor at Winfrith) use graphite as moderators their use of gases (carbon dioxide for Magnox and AGR, while helium for Dragon) as heat transfer fluids causes them to have no void coefficient.
4 EGP-6 graphite water reactors which are a scaled down version of the RBMK were operating at the world's second northern most nuclear power plant i.e. the Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant. One reactor was shut down permanently in 2020. The remaining three were shutdown permanently in December 2025.
Known incidents
[edit]Many incidents occurred at various power plants operating the RBMK reactor. Most of them were covered up. Incidents such as thefts of materials, equipment malfunction, repeated shut down due to them, etc. occurred. The most serious incidents such as the Partial meltdown of Leningrad unit 1 and Chernobyl unit 1 were not taken seriously and the recommendations of the scientist and experts were not implemented, which paved the path to the 1986 disaster.[citation needed] These are some of the known incidents at the RBMK reactors:
- Explosion of a tank holding radioactive gases at the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant unit 1 in January 1975
- Partial meltdown at Leningrad unit 1 in 1975
- Power outage at the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant in 1980
- Partial meltdown at Chernobyl unit 1 in 1982
- Discovery of the positive scram effect at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant unit 1 in 1983 and at unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
- Shifting of the concrete cross bars at Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant units 3 and 4 in 1984
- Chernobyl disaster in 1986
- Turbine fire at Chernobyl unit 2 in 1991 resulting in its permanent shutdown
- Melting of cables at Chernobyl unit 1 in 1991 while testing of the ion chambers during a maintenance shutdown and the automatic control rods didn't respond during the AZ-MM signal, the low power protection system fails
- Radioactive water was released when a seal plug of one of the Main Circulation Pump of Chernobyl unit 1 failed
- Chernobyl unit 3 scrammed following high level of water in the steam separator drums in March 1993
- Chernobyl unit 3 scrammed in 1994 following a short circuit resulting in pumping of the Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water into the steam separator drums
- Chernobyl unit 3 scrammed following detection of a steam leak in one of the fuel channel due to defective welding during assembly in 1981
- Chernobyl unit 1 scrammed after the refueling machine got stuck in one of the channels in 1995
- On 27 August 2009, the third unit of the Leningrad Nuclear Power plant was stopped when a hole was found in the discharge header of a pump.[63] According to the automated radiation control system, the radiation situation at the plant and in its 30-kilometre (19 mi) monitoring zone was normal.[63] The plant's management refuted rumors of an accident and stated that the third unit was stopped for a "short-term unscheduled maintenance", with a restart scheduled for 31 August 2009.[64]
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- ^ N. A. Dollezhal, I. Ya. Emelyanov. Channel nuclear power reactor // Chapter 11. Prospects for the development of channel uranium-graphite reactors. (http://elib.biblioatom.ru/text/dollezhal_kanalnyy-yadernyy-reaktor_1980/go,189 Archived 2021-08-27 at the Wayback Machine), - Moscow, Atomizdat, 1980. (Н. А. Доллежаль, И. Я Емельянов. Канальный ядерный энергетический реактор // Глава 11. Перспективы развития канальных уран-графитовых реакторов. — Москва: Атомиздат, 1980.)
- ^ Dollezhal N.A. At the origins of the man-made world: Notes of the designer - M .: Knowledge, 1989 - Academician's Tribune - 256s.(Доллежаль Н. А. У истоков рукотворного мира: Записки конструктора — М.: Знание, 1989 — Трибуна академика — 256с.)
- ^ Kingery, Thomas (2011). "Boiling Water-Cooled Graphite-Moderated Reactors (RBMK)". Nuclear Energy Encyclopedia: Science, Technology, and Applications. John Wiley & Sons. ch 20.6. ISBN 978-1-118-04348-6.
- ^ Steed, Roger (2006). Nuclear Power: In Canada and Beyond. General Store Publishing House. p. 274. ISBN 978-1-897113-51-6.
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- ^ "The Ukrainian Weekly, page 2, Sunday January 26, 2003" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on February 18, 2012. Retrieved September 28, 2009.
- ^ History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Forty Years Archived 2019-08-04 at the Wayback Machine, page 194, David Fischer
- ^ The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1993, page 40.
- ^ "The Chernobyl Incident" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 2019-12-14. Retrieved 2019-12-13.
- ^ RBMK SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS. Vienna, Austria: IAEA. June 1995. p. 9.
- ^ "Development of Ignalina NPP RBMK-1500 reactor RELAP5-3D model" (PDF). www.inl.gov. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2012-09-24. Retrieved 2012-06-25.
- ^ "Restored RBMK back on line". World Nuclear News. 2 December 2013. Archived from the original on 16 December 2019. Retrieved 3 December 2013.
- ^ "Concerns Persist Over Safety of Cracking Inside Reactor in Scotland: Nuclear Safery Expert". RIA Novosti. 7 October 2014. Archived from the original on 16 October 2014. Retrieved 10 October 2014.
- ^ "Russia completes upgrade of third Smolensk RBMK". World Nuclear News. 28 March 2019. Archived from the original on 6 April 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2019.
- ^ a b "Russia's Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Russian Nuclear Fuel Cycle – World Nuclear Association". world-nuclear.org. Archived from the original on 2013-02-13. Retrieved 2008-09-27.
- ^ "NIKET – Department of Pressure-Tube Power Reactors". Archived from the original on October 10, 2006.
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- ^ "Bellona – Statistics from Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant". Archived from the original on July 4, 2009.
- ^ *Chernobyl 1
- Chernobyl 2
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- Chernobyl 5 Archived 2011-06-04 at the Wayback Machine
- Ignalina 1
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- Table 31. Technology and Soviet Energy Availability – November 1981 – NTIS order #PB82-133455 Archived 2015-09-24 at the Wayback Machine (For Ignalina 4)
- ^ "Russia shuts down Soviet-built nuclear reactor – The Washington Times". The Washington Times. Archived from the original on 2019-05-28. Retrieved 2019-05-28.
- ^ "На Ленинградской АЭС после 45 лет успешной работы окончательно остановлен энергоблок № 2". rosatom.ru. Archived from the original on 2020-11-10. Retrieved 2020-11-10.
- ^ a b c d "Nuclear Power in Russia". World Nuclear Association. 15 April 2016. Archived from the original on 4 August 2019. Retrieved 26 April 2016.
- ^ "Leningrad 4 given five-year life extension licence". World Nuclear Association. 15 January 2026. Retrieved 15 January 2026.
- ^ Belfer Center (2013-09-10), Nuclear 101: How Nuclear Bombs Work" Part 2/2, archived from the original on 2019-05-20, retrieved 2019-06-01 [a slide at 00:33:00]
- ^ a b The third unit of Leningrad NPP has been stopped[permanent dead link], Rosenergoatom, 28 August 2009
- ^ Leningrad NPP refutes rumors about accident[permanent dead link], Rosenergoatom, 28 August 2009
Sources and external links
[edit]- Technical data on RBMK-1500 reactor at Ignalina nuclear power plant – a decommissioned RBMK reactor.
- Chernobyl – A Canadian Perspective – A brochure describing nuclear reactors in general and the RBMK design in particular, focusing on the safety differences between them and CANDU reactors. Published by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.
Design and Technical Specifications
Core Structure and Moderator
The RBMK reactor core is a vertical cylindrical graphite-moderated structure designed to house fuel assemblies within individual pressure tubes, enabling direct boiling of light water coolant. The core measures approximately 11.8 meters in equivalent diameter and 7 meters in height, comprising a stack of closely packed graphite blocks arranged into columns with axial openings for pressure tubes, control rods, and instrumentation channels.[3][4] The graphite stack, consisting of around 2488 columns, forms the primary moderator, slowing fast neutrons from fission to thermal velocities to sustain the chain reaction using low-enriched uranium dioxide fuel enriched to about 2% U-235.[5][6] The moderator blocks, typically high-purity graphite to minimize parasitic neutron absorption, surround and separate the zirconium alloy pressure tubes, which are 7 meters long and contain the fuel bundles and boiling water. This channel-type configuration isolates the coolant flow in each tube, with graphite providing neutron moderation independent of the water, which also contributes modestly to moderation but primarily serves as coolant. The core assembly rests on a heavy steel support plate at the bottom, capped by a 1000-tonne steel upper plate, through which extensions of the 1661 fuel channels and additional non-fuel channels penetrate.[1][7] This design facilitates online refueling and accommodates a total of approximately 1900-2000 channels, including 1661 for fuel assemblies in the standard RBMK-1000 configuration.[1] Graphite's role as moderator exploits its low neutron absorption cross-section and high scattering efficiency, but the material's dimensional stability under irradiation and temperature gradients influences core reactivity; Soviet design specifications called for graphite with specific thermo-mechanical properties to maintain stack integrity over operational lifetimes exceeding 20 years. The absence of a robust containment vessel around the core, relying instead on individual channel integrity, stems from the modular graphite structure, which prioritizes accessibility for maintenance in graphite-moderated, pressure-tube reactors.[8][1]Fuel Channels and Assemblies
The RBMK reactor core consists of vertical pressure tubes, known as fuel channels, that penetrate the graphite moderator stack. These channels, numbering 1,661 in the RBMK-1000 design, are constructed from zirconium-niobium alloy tubes with an inner diameter of 88 millimeters.[4] Each channel serves as a pressure boundary for coolant flow and houses the fuel assemblies, allowing boiling water to ascend through the core while maintaining separation from the moderator.[1] The channels are approximately 7 meters long, matching the active core height, and are connected to inlet and outlet piping for coolant circulation.[1] Fuel assemblies in the RBMK are cylindrical bundles designed to fit within the pressure channels. Each assembly comprises 18 fuel rods arranged around a central zirconium support tube, secured by steel grids at the ends and 10 intermediate positions.[9] The fuel rods, 3.65 meters in length and 13.6 millimeters in diameter, contain uranium dioxide pellets clad in zirconium alloy.[7] Two such assemblies are stacked end-to-end within each channel, with a 20-millimeter gap at the joint to accommodate thermal expansion and facilitate handling.[9] This configuration enables on-line refueling, as individual assemblies can be replaced without shutting down the reactor.[10] The design of the fuel channels and assemblies supports the RBMK's high power density and operational flexibility but introduces challenges related to pressure tube integrity and reactivity effects during refueling. Channels are subjected to coolant pressures around 6.9 MPa, with boiling occurring within the tubes to generate steam for the turbine.[4] Fuel assemblies for later variants, such as the RBMK-1500, incorporate modifications for increased burnup and power output without altering channel dimensions.[11] Overall, the pressure tube architecture distinguishes the RBMK from vessel-contained reactors, prioritizing modularity over integrated containment.[1]Control Rods and Reactivity Management
The RBMK reactor employs 211 control rods constructed primarily from boron carbide (B₄C) for neutron absorption, inserted vertically into channels within the graphite moderator stack to regulate fission rates and maintain criticality.[1] These rods include main control rods inserted from the top for automatic, manual, or emergency operation, alongside shorter rods inserted from the bottom to promote even axial power distribution across the core.[1] Graphite displacers, approximately 4.5 meters long and attached to most rods (excluding certain automatic ones), extend below the absorber sections to fill the lower channel voids when rods are withdrawn, thereby displacing water coolant and minimizing neutron absorption in those regions during normal operation.[1][12] Reactivity management relies on the operational reactivity margin (ORM), typically maintained at 43–48 equivalent control rods in modified designs to ensure sufficient shutdown capacity under varying conditions such as xenon poisoning or power transients.[1][4] Control rod drives enable stepwise or continuous adjustment, with automatic rods responding to computerized or operator inputs for fine-tuned power control, while emergency systems trigger full insertion on scram signals.[1] The fast-acting emergency protection (FAEP) subsystem deploys 24 dedicated rods to insert at least 2β (where β is the delayed neutron fraction) of negative reactivity within 2.5 seconds, supplementing the primary scram sequence whose full insertion time was originally 18 seconds.[1] A critical design feature involved a 1.25-meter water column at the bottom of control rod channels when fully withdrawn; during scram insertion from above, the leading graphite displacer would first replace this water—graphite's lower neutron absorption cross-section compared to water initially boosts local moderation and reactivity, known as the positive scram effect.[1] This effect, quantified in simulations as potentially adding up to +396 pcm (percent mille) of reactivity under high xenon loading (4.6 × 10¹⁵ atoms/cm³), exacerbates power excursions in low-power, voided states by enhancing neutron flux in the lower core before the B₄C absorber takes effect.[12] First identified in 1983 during tests at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, it stemmed from the hybrid absorber-displacer configuration intended to optimize channel filling but overlooked in initial safety analyses.[1] Post-1986 modifications addressed these vulnerabilities by redesigning rods to eliminate bottom water columns and extend absorber sections, reducing insertion time to 12 seconds, and incorporating 80–90 additional fixed absorbers alongside fuel enrichment increases from 2.0% to 2.4% U-235 to suppress the void coefficient and ORM deviations.[1][4] These changes, verified through in-pile tests at Ignalina and Leningrad plants in 1987–1988, ensured negative reactivity insertion during scram across operational regimes, though inherent graphite-water interactions in channel-type moderation retained some positive feedback risks absent in alternative reactor designs.[1]Primary Coolant and Circulation Systems
The primary coolant in RBMK reactors is demineralized light water, which flows through individual zirconium-alloy pressure tubes housing the fuel assemblies and graphite moderator blocks. This design employs a single-circuit configuration, allowing for boiling within the channels, where the water absorbs heat from fission and partially evaporates, generating a steam-water mixture that exits the core and is directly supplied to the turbines without a secondary loop or intermediate heat exchanger.[1][4] The circulation system employs forced convection via two independent loops, each cooling approximately half of the reactor core to ensure redundancy and balanced heat removal. Each loop includes four main circulation pumps—typically three active and one standby—along with associated piping, headers, and valves to maintain flow through the pressure tubes.[1][4] The pumps drive the coolant upward from the lower headers into the bottom of the channels at a subcooled state, achieving saturation and boiling as it ascends through the heated core sections. After exiting the core at the top, the steam-water mixture separates in drum separators, with steam directed to the turbine for power generation and water recirculated back to the pumps after mixing with feedwater. The primary circuit operates at a nominal pressure of about 7 MPa, corresponding to saturated steam conditions at core outlet temperatures around 285°C.[13][14] This pressure is maintained by the closed loop design, though the lack of a robust pressure vessel enclosing the entire core distinguishes it from Western boiling water reactors. Water chemistry in the primary circuit is tightly controlled to minimize corrosion and deposition, with parameters such as pH adjusted using ammonia or potassium hydroxide and dissolved oxygen limited to low levels through deaeration and hydrazine dosing. Circulation rates are designed to handle the reactor's thermal output of approximately 3,200 MWt for RBMK-1000 units, with flow velocities in channels optimized to prevent excessive void fractions under normal operation.[15] Post-Chernobyl modifications included enhancements to pump reliability and flow monitoring to mitigate risks from partial blockages or pump trips.[16]Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Features
The RBMK reactor's emergency core cooling system (ECCS) comprises both short-term and long-term components to mitigate loss-of-coolant accidents by injecting water into the core. The short-term system includes fast-acting hydroaccumulators that provide passive cooling via pressurized water tanks discharging directly into the pressure tubes upon detection of low pressure, typically activating within seconds of a circuit rupture.[17] The long-term cooling relies on six emergency pumps drawing from the accident localization system (ALS) basins, capable of delivering up to 20,000 cubic meters per hour of water to flood the core and remove decay heat, though this requires electrical power and operator intervention for sustained operation.[4] In design-basis scenarios, such as a guaranteed two-sided coolant loss, the ECCS is engineered to prevent core melting by maintaining fuel cladding temperatures below 1200°C, based on Soviet analyses assuming intact pressure tubes.[18] However, the ECCS design has limitations, including dependency on the main circulation pumps for initial rundown cooling and potential vulnerabilities to multiple failures, as evidenced by pre-Chernobyl evaluations indicating inadequate coverage for certain beyond-design-basis events like simultaneous pump seizures.[17] The system also features redundant loops for each reactor half, with separate suction from deaerators and ALS volumes, but lacks the high-pressure injection capabilities of pressurized water reactors, relying instead on boiling light water circulation.[1] Regarding containment, the RBMK employs no full pressure-retaining dome structure akin to Western reactor designs, which contributed to the severity of radionuclide releases in severe accidents.[1] The core resides in a dry, reinforced concrete-lined shaft approximately 21 meters deep, serving primarily as a radiation shield and structural support rather than a leak-tight barrier, with the reactor hall providing partial secondary confinement through negative pressure ventilation.[1] Steam suppression is handled by the ALS, consisting of water-filled compartments and suppression pools beneath the reactor cavity that condense vapor from pressure tube ruptures, designed to localize up to 450 tons of steam at pressures below 0.2 MPa, though this system proved insufficient for explosive power excursions.[4] Post-1986 modifications added spray systems and enhanced ALS capacity, but the original configuration prioritized operational flexibility over robust confinement, reflecting Soviet design emphases on refueling without shutdown.[17]Historical Development
Origins in Soviet Nuclear Program
The RBMK (Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalnyy) reactor type originated in the Soviet Union's nuclear program as an extension of earlier graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled channel reactors initially developed for plutonium production and experimental power generation during the 1940s and 1950s. These production reactors, deployed at sites like Mayak, featured individual fuel channels within a graphite stack, allowing separation of coolant flow from moderation while enabling isotopic separation for weapons material. The transition to power-focused designs began with the Obninsk Atomic Power Station's AM-1 prototype in 1954, a 30 MWth (5 MWe) graphite-moderated boiling light-water reactor that marked the world's first grid-connected nuclear power plant and demonstrated channel-type feasibility for electricity production.[1][19] Subsequent prototypes at the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant further refined the concept: Unit 1 (AMB-100), a 100 MWe boiling channel reactor, achieved criticality on April 1, 1964, followed by Unit 2 (AMB-200) in 1967, incorporating higher power density and improved fuel assemblies. These units, totaling around 300 MWe, served as direct precursors to the RBMK by validating scalable graphite moderation with pressure tubes for fuel and coolant, distinct from the parallel VVER pressurized-water designs that relied on large containment vessels. The RBMK addressed Soviet priorities for baseload power in remote regions amid fuel shortages in the European USSR, emphasizing on-load refueling to minimize downtime—a capability inherited from production reactors but optimized for commercial output.[1][19] Development of the standardized RBMK-1000 (1,000 MWe per unit) was led by Nikolay A. Dollezhal, chief designer at the N.A. Dollezhal Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technologies (NIKIET), founded in 1952 as a hub for nuclear engineering under the Soviet atomic ministry. Collaborating with figures like A.P. Aleksandrov, then head of the Kurchatov Institute, Dollezhal's team finalized the core design between 1964 and 1966, prioritizing modularity without a massive pressure vessel—limited by Soviet forging capabilities at the time—and leveraging low-enriched uranium (about 2% U-235) for economic fuel cycles. This approach enabled twin-unit plants up to 2,000 MWe, selected for serial construction alongside VVERs to rapidly expand nuclear capacity, with the first RBMK unit at Leningrad (now Sosnovy Bor) reaching initial criticality in 1973.[1][20][19]Prototypes and Initial Deployments
The RBMK design originated from Soviet graphite-moderated, channel-type reactors developed for plutonium production starting in 1948, with early power generation experiments incorporating light water cooling.[4] Precursor prototypes included a 5 MWe experimental light water graphite-moderated reactor (LWGR) at Obninsk, operational since 1954, and the AMB-100 (100 MWe) and AMB-200 (200 MWe) loop-type prototypes at Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant, which began operation in 1964 and 1968, respectively.[1] These units tested core components such as pressure channels, graphite stacking, and coolant circulation, informing the scalable RBMK configuration designed between 1964 and 1966 for commercial power output exceeding 1000 MWe.[1] No dedicated full-scale prototype preceded production; the initial RBMK-1000 units functioned as de facto prototypes. Construction of the first unit at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant began on March 1, 1970, achieving criticality in September 1973 and grid connection on December 21, 1973, with full commercial operation in November 1974.[21] [22] This deployment validated the design's online refueling, high burnup potential, and integration with the Soviet electrical grid, producing 925 MWe net power.[1] Subsequent initial deployments at Leningrad included Unit 2 in 1975, Unit 3 in 1979, and Unit 4 in 1981, establishing the RBMK-1000 as a cornerstone of Soviet nuclear expansion.[1] Early operations demonstrated the reactor's capacity for baseload electricity generation using low-enriched uranium fuel assemblies, with each unit housing 1900-2000 pressure channels.[1] These units prioritized economic scalability over iterative testing, reflecting Soviet industrial priorities for rapid energy infrastructure buildup during the Cold War.[1]Expansion and Variants During Cold War Era
The expansion of RBMK reactors commenced in the early 1970s after development from earlier prototypes such as those at Obninsk and Beloyarsk, with the first commercial RBMK-1000 unit at the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant entering operation on December 21, 1973.[1] This marked the beginning of serial production aimed at bolstering Soviet electrical capacity through scalable, graphite-moderated channel-type reactors capable of on-load refueling. Subsequent units followed in quick succession: Leningrad Unit 2 in 1975, Kursk Unit 1 in 1976, and Chernobyl Unit 1 in 1977, reflecting a strategic push to deploy standardized designs across multiple sites to meet growing energy demands in the USSR.[1] [23] By 1991, 17 RBMK units had been commissioned in Soviet republics, comprising 15 RBMK-1000 reactors (nominal 1000 MWe, actual output around 925 MWe) and two RBMK-1500 units (1185 MWe each) at Ignalina.[1] These were distributed as follows: 11 units in the Russian SFSR at Leningrad (4 units, 1973–1981), Kursk (4 units, 1976–1986), and Smolensk (3 units, 1983–1990); 4 units in the Ukrainian SSR at Chernobyl (1977–1983); and 2 units in the Lithuanian SSR at Ignalina (1983 and 1987).[1] The reactors were grouped into three generations based on construction eras and evolving safety standards: first-generation units (e.g., early Leningrad and Kursk) from the mid-1970s, second-generation from the late 1970s incorporating OPB-82 guidelines (e.g., later Chernobyl and Ignalina units), and third-generation like Smolensk-3 in 1990 under enhanced post-1986 criteria.[1] The primary variant, RBMK-1000, featured a core with 1891 pressure channels for uranium dioxide fuel assemblies, graphite moderation, and boiling light water cooling, optimized for dual civilian and plutonium production potential in early designs.[1] The RBMK-1500 variant, deployed exclusively at Ignalina, increased thermal power to 4500 MWt from the RBMK-1000's 3200–3840 MWt through denser fuel loading and core modifications, enabling higher electrical output while retaining the channel-type architecture but with adjustments for elevated specific power density.[1] [24] These variants supported the USSR's nuclear expansion without full containment structures, prioritizing cost-effective scalability over Western pressurized water reactor paradigms.[1]Operational Performance and Achievements
Power Output and Capacity Factors
The RBMK-1000, the most common variant, is rated at 1000 MWe gross electrical output and 3200 MWth thermal power.[25][6] Larger RBMK-1500 units, such as those at Ignalina NPP, were originally designed for 1500 MWe and 4800 MWth but had thermal power restricted to 4200 MWth after 1986 safety modifications to mitigate positive void reactivity effects.[26][4] Some post-2000 upgrades at Russian RBMK plants allowed modest thermal power increases of up to 5%, enhancing electrical output while adhering to revised safety limits.[27] RBMK reactors demonstrated high operational capacity factors, enabled by online refueling that avoided lengthy shutdowns typical of batch-refueled designs, resulting in fewer unplanned outages compared to contemporary Soviet VVER pressurized water reactors.[28][11] Pre-1986 data indicate peak annual installed capacity factors reaching 91% at Leningrad NPP Unit 4, 90% at Chernobyl NPP Unit 2, and 87% at other units like Smolensk NPP Unit 2.[29] Equilibrium cycle analyses assumed sustainable operation at around 80% capacity factor.[9] Long-term performance varied by plant and era; for instance, a Leningrad RBMK unit averaged 76% capacity factor over 30 years of operation ending in 2011.[30] Post-modification operations at Leningrad NPP achieved 88.85% load factor in early 2015.[31] These figures reflect empirical reliability under Soviet and post-Soviet management, though safety-driven deratings and inspections periodically reduced effective output.[1]Refueling Capabilities and Uptime
The RBMK reactor's design permits online refueling at full power, a feature distinguishing it from light-water reactors that typically require complete shutdowns for batch fuel replacement.[1] This process involves a refueling machine that positions over an individual fuel channel, temporarily isolating it from the coolant circuit by sealing the top, equalizing internal pressure to prevent radiation release, and extracting the spent fuel assemblies before inserting fresh ones, all without scram or power reduction.[1] Each pressure tube accommodates two stacked fuel assemblies, with each assembly consisting of 18 zircaloy-clad uranium dioxide fuel rods arranged around a central carrier, enabling precise handling via the machine's grapple.[1] Refueling campaigns replace approximately one-quarter of the core annually—around 400-500 assemblies in a standard RBMK-1000 with 1,661 fuel channels—to compensate for burnup while maintaining the operational reactivity margin above 30 equivalent control rods, as required for safe power operation.[17] Spent assemblies are transferred directly to on-site cooling ponds adjacent to the reactor hall for decay heat dissipation, minimizing logistical downtime.[1] This incremental approach allows continuous adjustment of fuel loading to optimize neutron economy and power distribution, supporting load-following capabilities without full outages.[11] The online refueling capability inherently boosts plant uptime by eliminating extended shutdown periods for fuel cycles, yielding higher capacity factors than comparable graphite-moderated designs with offline refueling; analyses attribute this to flexible fuel management and reduced forced outages from fuel-related constraints.[11] Operational data from Russian RBMK units indicate average capacity factors of 60-70% over their lifetimes, influenced by periodic maintenance, regulatory-mandated inspections, and post-1986 modifications that extended refueling intervals for enhanced safety but occasionally increased ancillary downtime.[1] For instance, units like those at Leningrad and Kursk have sustained long-term availability through this system, contributing to Russia's nuclear fleet providing about 25% of electricity from RBMK designs as of 2021, though overall uptime remains below Western pressurized water reactors due to unique design-specific overhauls.[1]Economic and Strategic Contributions
The RBMK design facilitated cost-effective nuclear power generation in the Soviet Union by avoiding the need for a large, thick-walled reactor pressure vessel required in pressurized water reactors (PWRs), enabling on-site construction with standardized components and leveraging domestic graphite and zirconium production capabilities.[32] This approach reduced capital costs relative to Western designs, with RBMK-1000 units achieving approximately 1,000 MW of electrical output per reactor while utilizing low-enriched uranium fuel that minimized reliance on advanced enrichment facilities.[33] By the early 1980s, RBMK reactors contributed to the Soviet nuclear fleet's total installed capacity of 18 GW, supporting about 6.5% of the nation's electricity consumption and providing baseload power to industrial regions. Their channel-type architecture allowed for online refueling, yielding capacity factors often exceeding 80% during routine operations, which enhanced economic viability by maximizing energy output over the reactor lifecycle.[1] Strategically, the RBMK evolved from earlier Soviet uranium-graphite reactors originally developed for plutonium production to support the nuclear weapons program, inheriting a graphite-moderated, pressure-tube configuration that permitted dual civilian-military applications.[4] This design's high neutron economy and use of slightly enriched uranium enabled efficient breeding of plutonium-239, potentially at weapons-grade quality if fuel burnup was limited, thereby sustaining the USSR's fissile material supply without dedicated production reactors for power-generating units.[34] During the Cold War, deploying RBMK plants like those at Leningrad and Chernobyl bolstered energy independence, reducing vulnerability to fossil fuel imports and aligning with centralized planning goals for rapid industrialization in remote areas.[35] Post-1986 modifications further extended operational life, preserving strategic depth in Russia's nuclear infrastructure where RBMKs accounted for roughly 35% of nuclear electricity and critical heat supply in the 2010s.[36]Safety Characteristics and Analyses
Inherent Reactor Physics: Void Coefficient and Stability
The void coefficient of reactivity in a nuclear reactor quantifies the change in reactivity caused by the formation of steam voids in the coolant. In light water reactors, a negative void coefficient is typically desirable, as it provides inherent negative feedback: increased boiling reduces reactivity, helping to stabilize power output. However, the RBMK design exhibits a positive void coefficient under certain conditions, primarily because its graphite moderator continues to thermalize neutrons effectively while voids in the light water coolant reduce neutron absorption by water, which acts as a weak absorber in this configuration.[1][2] This positive void effect arises from the separation of moderation (graphite) and cooling/absorption (water), allowing voids to disproportionately decrease parasitic absorption relative to fission neutron production. At full power and equilibrium burnup, the overall power coefficient remains slightly negative due to the dominating negative Doppler (fuel temperature) effect, but the void component is positive and can exceed +0.1 β per 10% void fraction increase in aged cores.[37][1] In fresh cores with low burnup, the void coefficient may be negative, but it shifts positive as fuel depletes and control rod positions affect local spectra.[25] The IAEA's INSAG-7 report notes that this inherent characteristic renders the RBMK "grossly sensitive" to coolant flow disruptions or power rises, amplifying transient risks.[2] Reactor stability in the RBMK is compromised by this positive feedback loop, particularly at low power levels below 20% of nominal (around 700-1000 MW thermal), where small perturbations can trigger xenon-induced spatial power oscillations or void-driven excursions. The design's large core volume (about 14 m height, 11.8 m diameter) exacerbates azimuthal and axial instabilities, as neutron flux tilts can concentrate power in peripheral channels, further promoting localized boiling.[6][12] Empirical data from operational transients indicate that without rapid control rod insertion, reactivity insertions from void formation can lead to power surges exceeding 100% per second, underscoring the need for stringent operational limits.[1] Post-accident analyses confirm that while high-power stability is manageable with active controls, the inherent physics favor prompt criticality risks under voided conditions, distinguishing RBMK from stabilized Western light water designs with negative void coefficients.[2][6]Pre-Chernobyl Operational Risks
The RBMK reactor's positive void coefficient of reactivity, where steam void formation in the coolant increased neutron moderation by graphite and thus boosted fission rates, created inherent operational instability, particularly during low-power transients or coolant flow disruptions.[2] This design feature, dominant in the overall power coefficient, rendered the reactor sensitive to pumping failures or boiling onset, potentially amplifying power surges beyond operator control without prompt corrective action.[1] Soviet designers acknowledged the positive void but prioritized online refueling and high output over mitigating its risks through measures like enhanced absorbers, leading to operational protocols that avoided low-power states where voids could accumulate unchecked.[3] Early operational experience revealed vulnerabilities in pressure channel integrity, as differential thermal expansion between graphite blocks and zirconium-niobium tubes risked ruptures under uneven heating or manufacturing defects.[38] On January 7, 1974, at Leningrad Unit 1, a steam volume compensator exploded due to a technical malfunction during startup, damaging equipment but contained without core breach, highlighting risks from unproven scaling of prototype designs to full-scale units.[38] Such incidents underscored the challenges of managing the reactor's 1,600+ independent channels, where localized faults could propagate if not isolated swiftly, compounded by the lack of a robust secondary containment to limit radiological consequences from leaks.[2] More severe power control issues emerged from xenon-135 poisoning after shutdowns, where rapid restarts demanded precise rod insertion to counteract reactivity swings, but inadequate instrumentation and operator training led to fuel damage.[3] In November 1975 at Leningrad Unit 1, following an erroneous shutdown and xenon buildup, operators withdrew control rods excessively during power ascension, causing localized overheating and partial melting of fuel in multiple channels, with approximately 2-3% core damage before emergency measures halted the excursion.[39] Similarly, on September 9, 1982, at Chernobyl Unit 1, a control rod malfunction during low-power operation triggered a reactivity insertion, resulting in cladding failures and dispersal of fission products into the coolant, damaging about 3.6% of the fuel assembly.[2] These events, classified as state secrets by Soviet authorities, exposed the reactor's proneness to positive feedback loops at reduced power—exacerbated by the void coefficient—but prompted no fundamental design overhauls, only procedural tweaks that operators often bypassed under production pressures.[3] Operational risks were further aggravated by the reactor's reliance on manual interventions for xenon override and the absence of automated fast-acting protection against void-induced spikes, fostering a culture where deviations from safety envelopes occurred to meet grid demands.[2] By 1986, with 15 RBMK units operational across the USSR, cumulative data from these precursors indicated systemic underestimation of low-power hazards, yet institutional opacity delayed dissemination of lessons, prioritizing capacity expansion over risk abatement.[3]Comparative Safety with Western Designs
The RBMK reactor's positive void coefficient represents a key divergence from Western light-water reactor (LWR) designs, such as pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and boiling water reactors (BWRs). In the RBMK, steam voids in the coolant channels reduce moderation by water while the graphite moderator remains largely unaffected, leading to decreased neutron absorption and increased reactivity, which can amplify power excursions during transients like coolant loss.[1] Conversely, LWRs exhibit a negative void coefficient, as voids diminish both moderation and thermalization by light water, reducing fission rates and providing self-limiting feedback that enhances stability.[1] This inherent instability in the RBMK necessitated stringent operational limits, particularly at low power levels where the overall power coefficient could turn positive, unlike the consistently negative coefficients in Western designs that prioritize passive safety.[1] Containment philosophy further underscores the comparative vulnerabilities. Western LWRs incorporate full-pressure containment structures—prestressed concrete domes or steel vessels capable of withstanding overpressurization from core melt scenarios and retaining fission products for decay heat management.[40] The original RBMK, however, omitted such a dedicated containment, relying instead on the reactor vault's concrete liner as a secondary barrier, which offered limited protection against high-energy releases or graphite fires.[1] This design choice reflected Soviet priorities for on-load refueling and cost efficiency over robust accident mitigation, resulting in a lower defense-in-depth against severe accidents compared to Western standards that mandate multiple engineered barriers.[4] Control and reactivity management systems in the RBMK introduced additional risks absent in Western equivalents. The control rods featured graphite-tipped displacers that temporarily displaced water and boosted local reactivity upon scram initiation, potentially delaying shutdown in xenon-poisoned states.[1] Western LWR control rods, typically boron carbide or silver-indium-cadmium absorbers without such followers, ensure prompt and uniform reactivity reduction without initial spikes.[40] Combined with the RBMK's large core volume—facilitating uneven power distributions and stronger xenon oscillations—these features elevated the potential for design-basis accidents to escalate, whereas LWRs' smaller cores and integrated safety systems, including emergency core cooling, provide greater predictability and redundancy.[1] Empirical safety assessments by international bodies highlight these disparities. Pre-Chernobyl RBMK units demonstrated higher susceptibility to reactivity-initiated accidents in probabilistic risk analyses, with core damage frequencies estimated an order of magnitude above those for Western LWRs due to the interplay of void effects, partial containment, and operator-dependent safeguards.[4] Post-accident IAEA reviews confirmed that while modifications mitigated some flaws—such as reducing the void coefficient—the baseline RBMK design lagged Western LWRs in passive safety margins and accident tolerance, reflecting trade-offs for graphite-moderated flexibility over light-water inherent safeguards.[41]Major Incidents and Lessons
Chernobyl Unit 4 Event: Sequence and Causes
The Chernobyl Unit 4 accident took place at 01:23:47 local time on 26 April 1986, when operators initiated a test to verify whether the coasting turbine generator could supply sufficient power to reactor coolant pumps during the rundown phase following an emergency shutdown.[42] The RBMK-1000 reactor had been operating at near full power of approximately 3200 MW thermal earlier on 25 April, when power reduction began at 14:05 to prepare for the test, which had been postponed multiple times due to grid demands and other operational constraints.[42] Power was reduced to around 1600 MWth by evening, but xenon-135 buildup—a neutron absorber produced during operation—necessitated further adjustments, dropping power to an unintended low of about 30 MWth before operators increased it to roughly 200 MWth for the test.[2] This low power level exacerbated the reactor's inherent instability, as the RBMK design exhibited a positive void coefficient under such conditions, where steam bubble formation in the coolant increased reactivity rather than decreasing it.[25] To proceed with the test despite the suboptimal conditions, the night shift operators disabled several automatic safety systems, including the local automatic control (ARS) and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), violating operational procedures that prohibited low-power testing and required stable conditions.[2] Additionally, to maintain power, nearly all control rods were withdrawn, leaving only 18 of the 211 rods in the core—far below the minimum operational limit of 30 rods—further heightening the reactor's sensitivity to reactivity changes.[25] At 01:23:04, the test commenced with the turbine trip, reducing coolant pump speeds and flow rates, which generated more steam voids and inserted positive reactivity.[42] Three seconds later, at 01:23:07, the senior reactor control engineer, seeing rising power and pump cavitation, pressed the AZ-5 emergency shutdown button to fully insert all control rods.[2] The SCRAM initiated a catastrophic power excursion due to a critical design flaw in the RBMK control rods: each rod featured a graphite displacer at its lower end, intended to improve neutron economy when withdrawn, but upon insertion, the graphite tips—entering the core first—temporarily displaced water (a neutron absorber) and moderated neutrons, causing an initial surge in reactivity estimated at +1.7 to +3.0% Δk/k in the lower core region.[2] Combined with the existing voids and low xenon suppression, this led to power rising from 200 MWth to over 30,000 MWth within seconds, vaporizing the coolant water into steam and triggering a destructive steam explosion that ruptured the reactor pressure vessel and fuel channels.[25] A subsequent thermal-chemical reaction produced hydrogen, which ignited in a second explosion, ejecting burning graphite and fuel fragments, destroying the reactor building roof, and initiating a graphite fire that released radionuclides.[2][25] Root causes encompassed both inherent RBMK design deficiencies and human factors. The reactor's positive void coefficient at low power and burn-up states, stemming from its graphite-moderated, light-water-cooled configuration with insufficient fast neutron absorbers like gadolinium, allowed uncontrolled reactivity feedback.[25] The control rod design flaw amplified this vulnerability during SCRAM, a scenario unaddressed in Soviet safety analyses that assumed negative reactivity insertion from rod drop.[2] Operationally, procedural violations—such as bypassing safety interlocks, inadequate training on low-power dynamics, and a culture prioritizing test completion over caution—enabled the sequence, though the design's lack of robust negative feedbacks and absence of a containment structure permitted the partial meltdown to become a major release event.[2] The International Atomic Energy Agency's INSAG-7 report, drawing on Soviet investigations and international analyses, concluded that while operator errors contributed, the accident was "an unforeseen combination of reactor traits and operator errors," underscoring design shortcomings that made the event possible under flawed procedures.[2]Other RBMK Incidents and Near-Misses
In January 1974, at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, an explosion of a steam-water-air mixture destroyed the ferroconcrete gasholder in the steam retention system, resulting from operational pressures during startup testing and leading to significant radiation exposure for personnel involved in the response.[3] This early incident highlighted vulnerabilities in auxiliary systems tied to the RBMK's pressure tube design, though it did not involve core damage.[38] On November 30, 1975, Leningrad Unit 1 experienced a major power excursion during a post-maintenance power ascent, initiated by erroneous shutdown of the sole operating turbine-generator at around 500 MW thermal, followed by uncontrolled reactivity insertion as operators attempted to raise power without adequate margin.[39] The operating reactivity margin (ORM) fell critically low to 3.5 rods equivalent, exacerbated by neutron flux instability and the positive scram effect from control rod displacement zones, damaging approximately 30 fuel assemblies and one technological channel before emergency shutdown averted further escalation.[39][38] Unlike the rapid thermohydraulic failure at Chernobyl Unit 4, this event stemmed primarily from neutronic instability during deliberate power maneuvering at night with reduced staffing, prompting initial mitigations such as zoning control rod systems and raising minimum ORM requirements to 15 rods, though these proved insufficient for inherent design flaws.[39] In October 1982, Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 suffered a partial core meltdown when insufficient coolant flow caused a fuel channel to overheat, rupturing the tube and igniting a zirconium fire that melted most of the fuel assembly within it, with high radiation doses to cleanup workers but containment of the event without off-site release.[3][2] The incident exposed risks from localized flow disruptions in the RBMK's individual pressure tubes, which lacked robust secondary containment, and details remained classified until 1985.[3] Subsequent RBMK events included a 1983 incident at Chernobyl involving fuel channel issues, contributing to a pattern of 11 accidents and 4 incidents across the fleet by the mid-1980s, often tied to reactivity control deficiencies and operational errors under low-power conditions.[38] Post-Chernobyl modifications reduced such occurrences, but earlier near-misses underscored the reactor's positive void coefficient and control rod geometry as causal factors in potential excursions, independent of operator training alone.[2]Empirical Outcomes Post-Incidents
Following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, all remaining RBMK reactors underwent extensive modifications, including the addition of 80-90 fixed neutron absorbers in the core, retrofitting of control rods with graphite displacers to eliminate positive scram effects, increased uranium-235 enrichment from 2% to 2.4%, and enhanced emergency core cooling systems, collectively reducing the void reactivity coefficient and improving low-power stability.[1] These changes, implemented under revised Soviet (later Russian) safety standards (OPB-88), addressed key design flaws exposed by the incident, such as the positive void coefficient and inadequate control mechanisms.[4] Empirically, no core-disruptive accidents equivalent to Chernobyl's INES Level 7 event have occurred in modified RBMK units since 1986, with over a dozen reactors accumulating thousands of reactor-years of operation across Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania until their respective shutdowns.[25] From 1986 to 2018, Russian RBMK plants recorded seven emergency events (four classified as accidents and three as incidents), primarily involving automatic shutdowns due to technical malfunctions (53%) or personnel errors (33%), often accompanied by minor fires or localized radioactive releases but without widespread containment failure or significant off-site contamination.[38] Notable post-1986 events include a 1992 fire and shutdown at Leningrad Unit 1 (resulting in a brief 50 mSv release, contained within plant boundaries) and incidents in 2004 (Leningrad), 2008 (Kursk), and 2018 (Kursk), all resolved without core damage or exceeding INES Level 2 thresholds.[38] These outcomes indicate that modifications mitigated catastrophic risks, though inherent design limitations—such as partial containment and residual positive void effects at certain operating regimes—necessitated ongoing vigilance and contributed to conservative power reduction protocols (e.g., derating to 70-80% capacity in some units).[1] Operational reliability improved post-modifications, with Russian RBMK units demonstrating capacity factors averaging 70-80% in the decades following implementation, supported by online refueling capabilities that minimized downtime compared to batch-refueled Western designs. For instance, Leningrad NPP Unit 1 achieved a 76% capacity factor over 30 years of operation through 2011, producing 114 TWh while incorporating progressive upgrades like enhanced fuel burn-up. Deterministic accident analyses for modernized RBMKs confirm that design-basis events, such as coolant loss or reactivity insertions, remain within engineered safeguards' capacity, with probabilistic risk assessments showing core damage frequencies reduced by orders of magnitude relative to pre-1986 configurations.[43] However, the absence of full Western-style containments leaves vulnerability to severe accidents, as noted in IAEA reviews, underscoring that empirical safety relies heavily on operational discipline and redundant systems rather than passive design features.[4] Overall, these outcomes reflect effective short-term risk aversion but highlight the challenges of retrofitting an aging graphite-moderated fleet, with no evidence of systemic failure modes recurring under normal or transient conditions.[38]Post-Chernobyl Modifications and Enhancements
Control System Upgrades
Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, control systems in remaining RBMK reactors were retrofitted to enhance scram reliability and mitigate reactivity excursions during rod insertion. A critical flaw in the original design was the graphite displacer at the lower end of control rods, which displaced moderating water and initially increased reactivity upon scram initiation; this was addressed by redesigning rods to extend the boron carbide absorber section, eliminating the graphite tip effect and ensuring negative reactivity feedback from the outset of insertion.[1] Control rod drive mechanisms were upgraded with faster servomotors and reinforced electrical circuits, reducing full insertion time from approximately 18-20 seconds to under 8 seconds for emergency rods, while limit switches were added to prevent complete rod withdrawal beyond safe limits.[4] The total number of control rods per reactor was increased by adding roughly 40-50 short and fast-acting rods, distributed to improve xenon override capability and core power distribution control, with these changes implemented starting in 1987 across units at plants like Leningrad and Ignalina.[1] Instrumentation enhancements incorporated redundant sensors for core parameters such as local power density, coolant void fraction, and neutron flux, integrated into upgraded I&C circuits that trigger automatic shutdowns on earlier thresholds for transients like power surges or flow anomalies.[16] These modifications, completed in phases through the early 1990s, also included computer-assisted reactivity margin monitoring to preempt instabilities, substantially improving overall shutdown system efficiency as verified in post-upgrade safety analyses.[4]Void Coefficient Reductions and Structural Changes
One key modification to mitigate the positive void coefficient involved the installation of 80 to 90 additional fixed neutron absorbers within the reactor core, typically placed in dedicated channels that previously held fuel assemblies, thereby enhancing overall neutron absorption and limiting reactivity excursions during coolant voiding.[1] These absorbers, often composed of materials like dysprosium titanate or boron carbide, were distributed to optimize core neutron economy, particularly at low power levels where void effects are more pronounced.[4] To compensate for the increased absorption and sustain nominal power output of 1000 MWe, uranium fuel enrichment was raised from 2.0% to 2.4% U-235 across fresh fuel assemblies, which helps flatten the neutron flux profile and reduces the sensitivity to steam void fractions in the graphite-moderated lattice.[1] [4] Concurrently, the operational reactivity margin (ORM)—defined as the difference between available control rods and those needed for steady-state operation—was expanded from 26-30 equivalent rods to 43-48 rods by mandating higher minimum rod insertions during routine operation.[1] These combined adjustments reduced the void coefficient from values exceeding +0.01 Δk/k per percent void to approximately +β, where β (the delayed neutron fraction) is about 0.0065, rendering it comparable to some Western light-water reactors under nominal conditions while still requiring careful operational limits.[1] [4] Structural alterations supported these reactivity controls through core lattice reconfiguration, including the addition of up to 80 extra control rod channels integrated into the zirconium-alloy pressure tubes and graphite stack, which altered the spatial distribution of fissile material and moderators to suppress local power peaking and void-induced feedback.[1] At most plants, excluding Smolensk Unit 3, entire fuel channel assemblies were systematically replaced to incorporate these channels, enhancing structural integrity against hydride cracking and improving long-term coolant flow uniformity.[1] Control rod designs were also reengineered by shortening graphite displacers and eliminating water-following gaps at rod bottoms, preventing the initial positive reactivity insertion during scram that exacerbated the Chernobyl event; rod drop times were shortened from 18-19 seconds to 12 seconds via upgraded drive mechanisms.[4] These changes, implemented progressively from 1987 onward across all remaining RBMK units in Russia, Ukraine, and Lithuania, were verified through zero-power criticality tests and operational transients, confirming improved stability without full core recriticality risks under design-basis accidents.[1]Regulatory and Operational Protocol Revisions
Following the Chernobyl accident on April 26, 1986, Soviet authorities revised nuclear safety regulations for RBMK reactors, culminating in the adoption of OPB-88 safety standards, which emphasized enhanced operational limits and automated protections to prevent recurrence of the event's contributing factors.[1] These standards applied to subsequent units like Smolensk-3, operational from 1990, and retroactively influenced protocols across existing plants by mandating stricter adherence to reactivity controls and prohibiting unsafe test configurations.[2] Regulatory oversight intensified through centralized reviews of operational procedures, with requirements for pre-approval of any deviations from standard limits to ensure defense-in-depth principles.[4] Operational protocols were updated to prioritize the operational reactivity margin (ORM), a measure of available control rods for reactivity insertion, raising the minimum permissible ORM from 15 to 30 equivalent rods during steady-state operation and to 43-48 rods overall.[2] Control rooms received real-time ORM displays and automated shutdown signals if the margin fell below trip points, with recalculation frequency increased from 15 minutes to every 5 minutes to detect xenon buildup or other transients promptly.[2] A ban was imposed on operating below 700 MW thermal power without manual reactor trip, alongside prohibitions on running four main circulating pumps at such low levels to avoid flow instabilities.[2] Emergency protection system (EPS) protocols were revised to restrict bypassing via a two-key interlock mechanism, eliminate operator-dependent shutdowns for exceeding parameters, and mandate automatic scrams without reliance on manual intervention.[2] Testing procedures, such as turbine rundown simulations, now required full safety system engagement, with changes evaluated through formalized risk assessments and computational validation to preclude disabling local automatic protections.[2] These protocols, implemented across all RBMK units by the early 1990s, shifted operations toward conservative margins, reducing vulnerability to positive void effects at low power.[4]| Parameter | Pre-1986 Limit | Post-1986 Limit |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum ORM (equivalent rods) | 15 | 30 |
| Steady-state ORM (equivalent rods) | 26-30 | 43-48 |
| Minimum thermal power for sustained operation | None specified | 700 MW |
| EPS bypass during operation | Permitted | Restricted (two-key) |
| ORM monitoring interval | 15 minutes | 5 minutes |
Current Status and Future Outlook
Operating Units as of 2025
As of October 2025, seven RBMK-1000 reactors remain in operation, all located in Russia at the Leningrad, Kursk, and Smolensk nuclear power plants. These units have undergone post-Chernobyl modifications, including enhanced safety systems and fuel loading adjustments, enabling license extensions beyond original design lifetimes. No RBMK reactors operate outside Russia, with units in Ukraine decommissioned following the 1986 Chernobyl disaster and those in Lithuania shut down in 2004 and 2009 as a condition of European Union accession due to safety concerns associated with the design.[44][1] The Smolensk Nuclear Power Plant operates three RBMK-1000 units: Unit 1 commissioned in December 1982, Unit 2 in January 1985, and Unit 3 in January 1990, each with a net capacity of approximately 925 MWe after uprating. In June 2025, Russia's Rostechnadzor granted a five-year extension for Unit 2, allowing operation until at least 2030, contingent on compliance with upgraded safety protocols. Similar extensions apply to Units 1 and 3, supporting continued electricity generation amid Russia's nuclear fleet expansion with VVER designs.[45][30] At the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, Units 3 and 4 are active, having entered commercial operation in 1980 and 1981, respectively. Unit 3 received an extension in February 2025 to operate until 2030, while plans exist to extend Unit 4 similarly, replacing output from decommissioned Units 1 and 2 (shut in 2018 and 2020). These extensions reflect assessments confirming structural integrity and void coefficient improvements post-modifications. The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant maintains two operational RBMK-1000 units (Units 3 and 4, commissioned in 1985 and 1986), with Units 1 and 2 phased out for replacement by newer VVER-TOI reactors at the adjacent Kursk II site, where Unit 1 is slated for commissioning by late 2025.[44][46][47]| Plant | Operating Units | Commissioning Years | Net Capacity (MWe each) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leningrad NPP | 3, 4 | 1980, 1981 | 925 |
| Kursk NPP | 3, 4 | 1985, 1986 | 925 |
| Smolensk NPP | 1, 2, 3 | 1982, 1985, 1990 | 925 |