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Biometric passport
Biometric passport
from Wikipedia

This biometric symbol is usually printed on the cover of biometric (ICAO compliant) passports.

A biometric passport (also known as an electronic passport, e-passport or a digital passport) is a passport that has an embedded electronic microprocessor chip, which contains biometric information that can be used to authenticate the identity of the passport holder. It uses contactless smart card technology, including a microprocessor chip (computer chip) and antenna (for both power to the chip and communication) embedded in the front or back cover, or centre page, of the passport. The passport's critical information is printed on the data page of the passport, repeated on the machine readable lines and stored in the chip. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is used to authenticate the data stored electronically in the passport chip, making it expensive and difficult to forge when all security mechanisms are fully and correctly implemented.

Most countries are issuing biometric passports to their citizens. Malaysia was the first country to issue biometric passports in 1998.[1] By the end of 2008, 60 countries were issuing such passports,[2] which increased to over 150 by mid-2019.[3]

The currently standardised biometrics used for this type of identification system are facial recognition, fingerprint recognition, and iris recognition. These were adopted after assessment of several different kinds of biometrics including retinal scan. Document and chip characteristics are documented in the International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Doc 9303 (ICAO 9303).[4] The ICAO defines the biometric file formats and communication protocols to be used in passports. Only the digital image (usually in JPEG or JPEG 2000 format) of each biometric feature is actually stored in the chip. The comparison of biometric features is performed outside the passport chip by electronic border control systems (e-borders). To store biometric data on the contactless chip, it includes a minimum of 32 kilobytes of EEPROM storage memory, and runs on an interface in accordance with the ISO/IEC 14443 international standard, amongst others. These standards intend interoperability between different countries and different manufacturers of passport books.

Some national identity cards, such as those from Albania, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia are fully ICAO 9303 compliant biometric travel documents. However others, such as the United States passport card, are not.[5]

Data protection

[edit]

Biometric passports have protection mechanisms to avoid and/or detect attacks:

Non-traceable chip characteristics
Random chip identifiers reply to each request with a different chip number. This prevents tracing of passport chips. Using random identification numbers is optional.
Basic Access Control (BAC)
BAC protects the communication channel between the chip and the reader by encrypting transmitted information. Before data can be read from a chip, the reader needs to provide a key which is derived from the Machine Readable Zone: the date of birth, the date of expiry and the document number. If BAC is used, an attacker cannot (easily) eavesdrop transferred information without knowing the correct key. Using BAC is optional.
Passive Authentication (PA)
PA is aimed at identifying modification of passport chip data. The chip contains a file, Document Security Object (SOD), that stores hash values of all files stored in the chip (picture, fingerprint, etc.) and a digital signature of these hashes. The digital signature is made using a document signing key which itself is signed by a country signing key. If a file in the chip (e.g., the picture) is changed, this can be detected since the hash value is incorrect. Readers need access to all used public country keys to check whether the digital signature is generated by a trusted country. Using PA is mandatory.[6] As of January 2017, 55 of over 60 e-passport-issuing countries belong to the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) program.[7]
Active Authentication (AA)
AA prevents cloning of passport chips. The chip contains a private key that cannot be read or copied, but its existence can easily be proven. Using AA is optional.
Extended Access Control (EAC)
EAC adds functionality to check the authenticity of both the chip (chip authentication) and the reader (terminal authentication). Furthermore, it uses stronger encryption than BAC. EAC is typically used to protect fingerprints and iris scans. Using EAC is optional. In the European Union, using EAC is mandatory for all documents issued starting 28 June 2009.[citation needed]
Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
SAC was introduced by ICAO in 2009 for addressing BAC weaknesses. It was introduced as a supplement to BAC (for keeping compatibility), but will replace it in the future.
Shielding the chip
This prevents unauthorised reading. Some countries – including at least the US – have integrated a very thin metal mesh into the passport's cover to act as a shield when the passport cover is closed.[8] The use of shielding is optional.

To assure interoperability and functionality of the security mechanisms listed above, ICAO and German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) have specified several test cases. These test specifications are updated with every new protocol and are covering details starting from the paper used and ending in the chip that is included.[9]

Attacks

[edit]

Since the introduction of biometric passports, several attacks have been presented and demonstrated.

Non-traceable chip characteristics
In 2008, a Radboud/Lausitz University team demonstrated that it is possible to determine which country a passport chip is from without knowing the key required for reading it.[10] The team fingerprinted error messages of passport chips from different countries. The resulting lookup table allows an attacker to determine from where a chip originated. In 2010, Tom Chothia and Vitaliy Smirnov documented an attack that allows an individual passport to be traced,[11][12] by sending specific BAC authentication requests. In 2016, Avoine et al. published a survey on security and privacy issues in passport protocols, where a new technique to track passports is introduced, based on the response time of basic commands.[13]
Basic Access Control (BAC)
In 2005, Marc Witteman showed that the document numbers of Dutch passports were predictable,[14] allowing an attacker to guess/crack the key required for reading the chip. In 2006, Adam Laurie wrote software that tries all known passport keys within a given range, thus implementing one of Witteman's attacks. Using online flight booking sites, flight coupons and other public information it's possible to significantly reduce the number of possible keys. In some early biometric passports BAC wasn't used at all, allowing attacker to read the chip's content without providing a key.[15]
Passive Authentication (PA)
In 2006, Lukas Grunwald demonstrated that it is trivial to copy passport data from a passport chip into a standard ISO/IEC 14443 smartcard using a standard contactless card interface and a simple file transfer tool.[16] Grunwald used a passport that did not use Active Authentication (anti-cloning) and did not change the data held on the copied chip, thus keeping its cryptographic signature valid.
In 2008, Jeroen van Beek demonstrated that not all passport inspection systems check the cryptographic signature of a passport chip. For his demonstration Van Beek altered chip information and signed it using his own document signing key of a non-existing country. This can only be detected by checking the country signing keys that are used to sign the document signing keys. To check country signing keys the ICAO PKD[17] can be used. Only 5 out of 60+ countries are using this central database.[18] Van Beek did not update the original passport chip: instead an ePassport emulator was used.[19]
Also in 2008, The Hacker's Choice implemented all attacks and published code to verify the results.[20] The release included a video clip that demonstrated problems by using a forged Elvis Presley passport that is recognized as a valid US passport.[21]
Active Authentication (AA)
In 2005, Marc Witteman showed that the secret Active Authentication key can be retrieved using power analysis.[14] This may allow an attacker to clone passport chips that use the optional Active Authentication anti-cloning mechanism on chips – if the chip design is susceptible to this attack.
In 2008, Jeroen van Beek demonstrated that optional security mechanisms can be disabled by removing their presence from the passport index file.[22] This allows an attacker to remove – amongst others – anti-cloning mechanisms (Active Authentication). The attack is documented in supplement 7 of Doc 9303 (R1-p1_v2_sIV_0006)[23] and can be solved by patching inspection system software. Note that supplement 7 features vulnerable examples in the same document that – when implemented – result in a vulnerable inspection process.[citation needed]
In 2014, Calderoni et al. show a procedure to bypass the security protocol that is commonly adopted to prove chip authenticity (Active Authentication) within first-generation electronic passports. The discussed breach is related to some metadata files (EF.COM, EF.SOD) and allows the attacker to conceal those data required by the inspection system during the protocol's execution.[24] This breach may facilitate a malicious user in using fake documents cloned from original ones.
Extended Access Control (EAC)
In 2007, Lukas Grunwald presented an attack that can make EAC-enabled passport chips unusable.[25] Grunwald states that if an EAC-key – required for reading fingerprints and updating certificates – is stolen or compromised, an attacker can upload a false certificate with an issue date far in the future. The affected chips block read access until the future date is reached.

Opposition

[edit]

Privacy proponents in many countries question and protest the lack of information about exactly what the passports' chip will contain, and whether they affect civil liberties. The main problem they point out is that data on the passports can be transferred with wireless RFID technology, which can become a major vulnerability. Although this could allow ID-check computers to obtain a person's information without a physical connection, it may also allow anyone with the necessary equipment to perform the same task. If the personal information and passport numbers on the chip are not encrypted, the information might wind up in the wrong hands.

On 15 December 2006, the BBC published an article[26] on the British ePassport, citing the above stories and adding that:

"Nearly every country issuing this passport has a few security experts who are yelling at the top of their lungs and trying to shout out: 'This is not secure. This is not a good idea to use this technology'", citing a specialist who states "It is much too complicated. It is in places done the wrong way round – reading data first, parsing data, interpreting data, then verifying whether it is right. There are lots of technical flaws in it and there are things that have just been forgotten, so it is basically not doing what it is supposed to do. It is supposed to get a higher security level. It is not."

and adding that the Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS) network's research team (a body of IT security experts funded by the European Union) has "also come out against the ePassport scheme... [stating that] European governments have forced a document on its people that dramatically decreases security and increases the risk of identity theft."[27]

Most security measures are designed against untrusted citizens (the "provers"), but the scientific security community recently also addressed the threats from untrustworthy verifiers, such as corrupt governmental organizations, or nations using poorly implemented, unsecure electronic systems.[28] New cryptographic solutions such as private biometrics are being proposed to mitigate threats of mass theft of identity. These are under scientific study, but not yet implemented in biometric passports.

A number of people oppose this technology citing religion or forced data collection, describing biometrics as "the mark of the beast".[29]

List of biometric passports

[edit]
Map of countries with biometric passports as of June 2025

Africa

[edit]
  • Algeria Algeria: Issued since 5 January 2012.[30] Valid for 10 years for adults, and 5 years for minors. The data page of the passport is from rigid polycarbonate plastic and contains a microchip embedded in which are stored biometric data of the holder including fingerprints, photo and signature. The data is extracted from the chip with wireless RFID technology.
  • Benin Benin: Issued since 2022.[31]
  • Botswana Botswana: Issued since 8 March 2010.[32][33] The Botswana passport, which features 48 pages, is written in English and French. The first page features a map of Botswana superimposed with wildlife.
  • Cameroon Cameroon: Issued since July 2021, costing 110,000 CFA. Valid for 5 years.[34]
  • Cape Verde Cape Verde: Issued since 26 January 2016, costing €50. It is noted that the scheme will gradually expand to Cape Verdean diplomatic missions in Boston and Lisbon in the future.[35]
  • Egypt Egypt: Egypt does not yet issue biometric passports.
  • Gabon Gabon: Issued since 23 January 2014.
  • Ghana Ghana: Issued since 1 March 2010 and costing GH¢ 50–100 for adults and children. The passports contain several other technological characteristics other than biometric technology. However the Ghanaian biometric passports do not carry the "chip inside" symbol (), which is mandatory for ICAO-standard electronic passports.[36][37][38]
    As of February 2020, the application fee for regular 32 page passport booklet is GH₵320 and GH₵550 for regular 48 page passport booklet. The application fee for expedited 32 page passport booklet is GH₵350 and GH₵300 for expedited 48 page passport booklet.[39] To facilitate the application for and acquisition of Ghanaian passports, Passport Application Centers (PACs) have been set up around the major cities of Ghana, including Accra, Kumasi, Tamale, Ho, Sekondi-Takoradi, and in Sunyani.[40] 22 Diplomatic Missions outside Ghana have the mandate as at November 2020, to issue Biometric Passports to Ghanaians who are abroad.[41] Passports issued for applications received starting 31 March 2019 have a validity period of ten years (it was previously five years).[42] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration has introduced a 48-page passport booklet (It was previously 32 pages only) available from 1 February 2020.
  • Kenya Kenya: Issued since 1 September 2017. Contain fingerprints, facials and signature including other vital information, which is all ICAO compliant.
    In mid July 2019, a few foreign embassies such as Berlin, Paris, London, and Washington, DC started processing applications for Kenyans in the diaspora. Kenya plans to invalidate old style passports on 31 December 2021.
  • Lesotho Lesotho: Date of introduction is uncertain. However, the enabling statute was tabled in November 2016.[43]
  • Libya Libya: The Libyan government stated that it will start issuing biometric passports of ordinary passports by the end of 2025, although the biometric passports of Diplomatic and Special passports were issued since 2021.
  • Madagascar Madagascar: Issued since 2014 and costs 110,000 Ariary. Since September 2014, it is mandatory for Malagasy citizens to depart the country with a biometric passport.[44]
  • Mauritania Mauritania: Issued since 6 May 2011,[45] costs US$115.68. Valid for 5 years.
  • Morocco Morocco: Issued since 2008 for trial, and in general since 25 September 2009,[46] costs MAD 500 (approximately US$49).
  • Mozambique Mozambique: Issued since September 2014. The issuance of such passports was suspended 40 days later but was resumed in February 2015.[47]
  • Namibia Namibia: Issued since 8 January 2018.[48][49]
  • Nigeria Nigeria: Issued since 2007 as the first in Africa. The harmonized ECOWAS Smart electronic passport issued by the Nigerian Immigrations Service is powered by biometric technology in tandem with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) specifications for international travels.
    Travelers' data captured in the biometric passport can be accessed instantly and read by any security agent from any spot of the globe through an integrated network of systems configured and linked to a centrally-coordinated passport data bank managed by the Nigerian Immigrations Service.[citation needed]
  • Rwanda Rwanda: Issued since 27 June 2019, and is in compliance with the new East African Community technical specifications as well as International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Among the new features include a microchip making it tamper-proof. The Rwandan passport is issued Rwandan citizens for international travel. Rwanda started issuing East African Community Biometric Passport also known as E-Passport in June 2019 replacing the old ones that will only stay valid until June 2021, The new passports are valid for five years and ten years. Ordinary, service, and diplomatic passports are issued.
  • Sierra Leone Sierra Leone: Issued since 1 September 2015 in compliance with International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). New book design launched at the same time as the switch to e-passport from Machine Readable Passport (MRP). Book re-designed again in 2022 and electronic chip upgraded for faster processing of bio-metric data. Currently issuing e-passports for Ordinary, Diplomatic and Service books.[50]
  • Somalia Somalia: Issued since 10 October 2006, costs US$100 if applied inside of Somalia, and US$150 abroad.[51]
  • South Sudan South Sudan: Issued since 3 January 2012.[52][53] The new passport are valid for five years.
  • Sudan Sudan: Issued since May 2009, costs SDG 250 (approximately USD 100), SDG 200 for students and SDG 100 for children. Valid for 10 years, or 7 years for a commercial passport.[54]
    The new electronic passports are issued in three categories. The citizen's passport (ordinary passport) is issued to ordinary citizens and contains 48 pages. Business men/women who need to travel often have a commercial passport that contains 64 pages. Smaller passports that contain 32 pages only are issued to children. The microprocessor chip contains the holder's information.
  • Tanzania Tanzania: Issued since 1 January 2018. The Bio-metric Tanzanian passport is one of the strongest passports in Africa. It is in compliance with the new East African Community Passport which eases border crossing for east African community member nationals.
  • Togo Togo: Issued since August 2009, cost then was 30,000 CFA francs. For Togolese residing abroad, the price varies.
  • Tunisia Tunisia: The Tunisia ministry of interior stated that it will start issuing biometric passports at the end of year 2016 which did not happen.
  • Zimbabwe Zimbabwe: The Zimbabwean government launched the new e-passports on 15 December 2021 at Chiwashira Building in Harare.[55]

Asia

[edit]
  • Afghanistan Afghanistan: Issued since September 2011. Contains digital images of fingerprints, photo and electronic signature of the passport holder. Valid for up to 10 years.[56][57]
  • Armenia Armenia: Issued since July 2012. Contains digital images of fingerprints, photo and electronic signature of the passport holder. Valid for 10 years.[58][59][60]
  • Azerbaijan Azerbaijan: Issued since September 2013. Contains information about the passport holder's facial features, as well as finger and palm prints.
  • Bahrain Bahrain: Issued since 20 March 2023.[61][62]
  • Bangladesh Bangladesh: Issued since April 2010, biometric machine-readable passports cost 3450 (US$28) for regular delivery, including all taxes, and 6900 (US$57) for express delivery including all taxes.[63] E-passports cost 4025 (US$33) to 13800 (US$110) with all taxes included.[64] The cost varies depending on the number of pages and the validity of the e-passport.[64] The e-passport is valid for either five years or ten years depending on the age of the applicant.[65] Bangladesh is the first country in South Asia to issue e-passports for all eligible citizens. The electronic microprocessor chip embedded e-passport has forty-one different security features, including holographic images embossed in thin film laminate, which change colour under light and appear to move.[66] Demographic and biometric information of the bearer including the fingerprints of all ten fingers, iris scan, color photograph of the face and digital signature are stored on the chip in the e-passport.[67] The Government of Bangladesh issues three different types of e-passports. These are diplomatic passports with a red cover; official passports with a blue cover; and regular or ordinary passports with a green cover.
  • Brunei Brunei: Issued since 17 February 2007. The Bruneian ePassport has the same functions as the other biometric passports.[68]
  • Cambodia Cambodia: Issued since 17 July 2014. The cost for a 5-year passport, issued only to children aged five and under, is US$80; while the 10-year passport, issued to all people older than five, costs US$100.[69]
  • China China: On 30 January 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China launched a trial issuance of e-passports for public affairs. The face, fingerprint and other biometric features of the passport holder will be digitalized and stored in pre-installed contactless smart chip in the passport.[70][71] On 1 July 2011, the Ministry began issuing biometric passports to all individuals conducting public affairs work overseas on behalf of the Chinese government.[72]
    Ordinary biometric passports have been introduced by the Ministry of Public Security starting from 15 May 2012.[73] The cost of a passport is 200 CNY (approximately US$31) for first time applicants in China and CNY 220 (or US$35) for renewals and passports issued abroad.
    Effective from 1 July 2017, cost of a biometric ordinary passport is reduced to CNY 160 (approximately US$24) for both first time applicants and renewal applicants.[74] As of April 2017, China had issued over 100 million biometric ordinary passports.[75]
  • Hong Kong Hong Kong: In 2006, the Immigration Department announced that Unihub Limited (a PCCW subsidiary company heading a consortium of suppliers, including Keycorp) had won the tender to provide the technology to produce biometric passports. In February 2007, the first biometric passport was introduced. The cover of the new biometric passport remains essentially the same as that of previous versions, with the addition of the "electronic passport" logo at the bottom. However, the design of the inner pages has changed substantially. The design conforms with the document design recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization. The new ePassport featured in the 2008 Stockholm Challenge Event and was a finalist for the Stockholm Challenge Award in the Public Administration category. The Hong Kong SAR ePassport design was praised on account of the "multiple state-of-the-art technologies [which] are seamlessly integrated in the sophisticated Electronic Passport System (e-Passport System)".[76] The cost for a HKSAR passport is HKD 370 (or USD 48) for a 32-page passport and HKD 460 (or USD 59) for a 48-page passport.[77]
  • Macau Macao: Issued since 1 September 2009.
  • Georgia (country) Georgia: Issued since 2010. Valid for 10 years to adults, costing 150 lari if issued at tenth business day. The same day issuance will cost 350 lari. The price of the photo (3 Lari) needs to be paid additionally. There are discounts, e.g. a 50% discount for persons under age 18.[78][79]
  • India India: India calls Biometric Passport as ePassport.
    The Government of India issues three different types of passports – Diplomatic passports; Official passports; and regular/ordinary passports.
    India initiated the first phase deployment of Biometric Passports in 2008, only to diplomatic passport holders. On 25 June 2008 Indian Passport Authority issued the first Biometric passport to Pratibha Patil, the then President of India.[80]
    Between 2008 and 2024, Biometric passport rollout for ordinary citizens was in various stages of internal development, testing and tendering.
    In April 2024, the government has finally started the test rollout of Biometric Passports to ordinary citizens. It started with the testing of the project at Regional Passport Offices (RPO) in Bhubaneswar and Nagpur. Post successful pilot launch and requisite certifications, it will be rolled out at remaining Regional Passport Offices across India in a phased manner in 2025.
  • Indonesia Indonesia: 48-page biometric passports cost Rp650,000 (US$43).[81] As of 12 October 2022, the validity of newly issued passports are extended from 5 years to 10 years.[82]
    Diplomatic and service biometric passports are issued since 19 August 2021.[83]
  • Iran Iran: Issued since July 2007 for diplomatic and service passports, 20 February 2011 for ordinary biometric passports. The cost of a new passport was approximately IRR 1,500,000 (less than US$8) if issued inside Iran, 100 euros if issued overseas.[84]
  • Iraq Iraq: Iraq started issuing the biometric passport to the public in March 2023.[85]
  • Israel Israel: Issued since July 2013 for a 2-year pilot project under the Biometric Database Law. This was optional. In August 2013, any passport expiring in more than 2 years could be replaced free of charge with a biometric one upon request. Passports expiring within 2 years were charged the full fee.
    The review of the pilot project (that was supposed to be concluded in 2015) was postponed by order of the Minister of the Interior to a later date, due to the controversy regarding the creation of the Biometric Database rather than storing the biometric data only in the passport's chip, as is the practice in many other countries. In 2015, the duration of the pilot project was extended until 2017. In May 2017, the pilot project ended. Newly issued passports were then required to be biometric.[86]
    To obtain a biometric passport, an applicant must appear in an Interior Ministry office "to be photographed by the special camera which records information such as facial bone structure, distance between one's eyes, ears to eyes and ratio of facial features one from another. The applicant will also be fingerprinted and all this information will be stored in the new high-tech electronic passport."[87]
    As of January 2022, Israeli passports issued in the airport or outside of Israel are not biometric, and are generally valid for 5–10 years (1 year if issued as an emergency passport in the airport).
  • Japan Japan: Issued since March 2006. The passports meet requirements of the U.S Visa Waiver Program which calls for countries to roll out their biometric passports before 26 October 2006.
  • Jordan Jordan: On 1 September 2025, Jordan officially launched its electronic passport (e-passport) service as part of a broader initiative to modernize public services and enhance digital transformation. The e-passport includes advanced security features, biometric data stored on an embedded electronic chip, and a polycarbonate profile page designed for durability and resistance to tampering. It complies with international standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The e-passport is available to all Jordanian citizens for new issuance, renewal, or replacement in cases of loss or damage. Citizens may choose between the traditional passport and the e-passport, with no change in issuance fees. Both passport types remain valid for travel. The service is accessible through the Civil Status and Passports Department’s e-services portal and the Sanad mobile application. Passports are delivered via Jordan Post for a nominal fee. The launch follows a pilot phase attended by government officials, including the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship. The introduction of the e-passport is part of a wider digitalization strategy by the Civil Status and Passports Department, which has launched 25 electronic and 6 digital services out of a total of 58. The share of electronic transactions increased from 4.63% in the first five months of the year to 23% in the subsequent three months.[88]
  • Kazakhstan Kazakhstan: Kazakhstan has presented its concept at implementing biometric passport in 2009.
  • Kuwait Kuwait: Issued since March 2017. By late 2018 older non-biometric passports will no longer be valid for use.
  • Laos Laos: Issued since September 2016.
  • Lebanon Lebanon: Issued since 1 August 2016. Lebanese passports are navy blue, with the Lebanese Cedar emblazoned in the centre of the front cover. "The Lebanese Republic, Passport" is written on the cover page in both Arabic and French. The contents of the passport are in Arabic, French and English.
  • Malaysia Malaysia: Issued since 1998.[1] Malaysia is however not a member of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and its first biometric passport did not conform to the same standards as the VWP biometric document because the Malaysian biometric passport was issued several years ahead of the VWP requirement. The difference lies in the storage of fingerprint template instead of fingerprint image in the chip, the rest of the technologies are the same. Also the biometric passport was designed to be read only if the receiving country has the authorisation from the Malaysian Immigration Department. Malaysia started issuing ICAO compliant passports from February 2010.[89]
    Malaysia used to issue passports with validity for 2 years and 5 years, but the passport with 2 years validity was withdrawn since January 2015.[90]
    The pricing for a Malaysian passport are RM 200 (approximately US$50) with 5 years validity, MYR 100 (approximately US$25) for senior citizens, children below 12, Hajj pilgrims, and students below 21 and studying abroad is MYR 100 and is free for disabled citizens.[91]
  • Maldives Maldives: Issued since 26 July 2006. The new passport follows a completely new design, and features the passport holder's facial and fingerprint information as biometric identifiers. A 32-page Ordinary passport will cost Rf350, while a 64-page Ordinary passport will cost Rf600. Children under the age of 10 years and people applying for passports through diplomatic missions abroad will be issued with a 32-page non-electronic Ordinary passport, which will cost Rf250.
  • Mongolia Mongolia: Issued since the end of 2016.
  • Nepal Nepal: Nepal started issuing E-passport from end of 2021.[92] Nepalese writer Satya Mohan Joshi was the first to receive the e-passport.[93][94] The Nepalis e-passports are produced by IDEMIA, the software that the Passport office uses is also from the same company.[95]
  • Oman Oman: Issued since the end of 2014.[96] It consists of 48 pages and is valid for up to 10 years. Omani passports' cover is red and have inscriptions in golden letters indicating the official name of the country at the top and the word "passport" at the bottom both in Arabic and English divided by the coat of arms. The biometric passport symbol, alerting to the presence of a RFID chip inside the document, is at the very bottom of the cover page.[97]
  • Pakistan Pakistan: The Government of Pakistan issues three different types of passports. These are Diplomatic passports; Official passports; and Ordinary passports. On 30 March 2022, Prime Minister Imran Khan launched the e-passport service, which has twenty-nine new security features added. At this initial stage, the e-passport facility was only available for diplomatic officials and government officials who are issued diplomatic passports and official passports respectively.[98] The issuance of e-passports for Islamabad residents only commenced on 10 June 2023, at DGI&P Headquarters in Islamabad. However, starting from 16 August 2023, the issuance of e-passports extended to all field offices throughout the nation. Over time, this service will also be introduced to Foreign Missions of Pakistan abroad.[99]
  • Palestine Palestine: Issued since 1 September 2022. Costs NIS 200.
  • Philippines Philippines: Issued since 11 August 2009, costs about ₱950.[100][101]
  • Qatar Qatar: Issued since 20 April 2008, costs QAR 200.[102]
  • Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia: On 10 February 2022, the Saudi Arabian ministry of interior has announced that they began issuing the new electronic Saudi Passport, with the same issuing fees as the past (300 SAR for 5 years and 600 SAR for 10 years).[103][104]
  • Singapore Singapore: Issued since 15 August 2006,[105] costs SGD 70 if applied for online, by mail or ICA deposit box and SGD 80 if applied for via a Singapore Overseas Mission. Valid for 10 years. The passport now complies with the U.S Visa Waiver Program.[106]
  • South Korea South Korea: Issued since 25 August 2008, costs 55,000 Won (USD 55). Validity for 5 years for men who have not served in the National Service, and 10 years for everybody else. On 21 December 2021, issuing the next generation biometric passports to South Korean citizens has begun, which was delayed by one year as planned due to the COVID-19 pandemic.[107][108]
  • Syria Syria: Syria has started issuing biometric passports on 21 August 2023 for all new passports. The fee varies from £100 to £700 based on the period of processing. The validity varies between 2 years for young male citizens (due to military service), up to 6 years for other citizens. The current fee for the urgent passport (1–3 days processing time) makes it the most expensive passport globally.[109]
  • Taiwan Taiwan: Issued since 29 December 2008, costs NT$1,300 (approximately US$40) for an ordinary passport with either 3, 5 or 10 years validity.[1]
  • Tajikistan Tajikistan: Issued since 1 February 2010.
  • Thailand Thailand: Diplomats and government officials passports issued from 26 May 2005. From 1 June 2005, a limited quantity of 100 passports a day was issued for Thai citizens, however, on 1 August 2005 a full operational service was installed and Thailand became the first country in Asia to issue an ICAO compliant biometric passport.[110]
  • Turkmenistan Turkmenistan: Turkmenistan became the first country in ex-USSR, in mid-Asia region to issue an ICAO-compliant biometric passport. The passport is available since 10 July 2008.[111]
  • United Arab Emirates United Arab Emirates: The United Arab Emirates Ministry of Interior began to issue biometric passports on 11 December 2011, making it the second GCC state to launch biometric passports after Qatar.[112]
  • Uzbekistan Uzbekistan: In Uzbekistan on 23 June 2009 Islam Karimov issued a Presidential Decree[113] "On measures to further improve the passport system in the Republic of Uzbekistan." On 29 December 2009 the President of Uzbekistan signed a decree to change the dates for a phased exchange of populations existing passport to the biometric passport. In accordance with this decree, biometric passports were phased in, beginning on 1 January 2011. In the first phase, the biometric passport was issued to employees of ministries, departments and agencies of the republic, individuals who travel abroad or outside the country, as well as citizens who receive a passport in connection with the achievement of a certain age or for other grounds provided by law. The second phase was for the rest of the population who were able to get new passports for the period from 2012 to 2015.
  • Vietnam Vietnam: Issued since 1 March 2023, costs VNĐ100000 for a new issue, VNĐ200000 for a reissue due to damage or loss, is valid for 10 years and is only issued to citizens from 14 years old.[114] As of March 2025, the biometric passport is only being issued in Vietnam. Overseas missions are still issuing non-biometric passports.

Europe

[edit]

European Union/EFTA

[edit]

It was planned that, except for Denmark and Ireland, EU passports would have digital imaging and fingerprint scan biometrics placed on their RFID chips.[115] This combination of biometrics aims to create an unrivaled level of security and protection against fraudulent identification papers.[vague] Technical specifications for the new passports have been established by the European Commission.[116] The specifications are binding for the Schengen agreement parties, i.e. the EU countries, except Ireland, and the four European Free Trade Association countries—Iceland, Liechtenstein,[117][118] Norway and Switzerland.[119] These countries are obliged to implement machine readable facial images in the passports by 28 August 2006, and fingerprints by 26 June 2009.[120] The European Data Protection Supervisor has stated that the current legal framework fails to "address all the possible and relevant issues triggered by the inherent imperfections of biometric systems".[121]

Irish biometric passports only used a digital image and not fingerprinting. German passports printed after 1 November 2007 contain two fingerprints, one from each hand, in addition to a digital photograph. Romanian passports will also contain two fingerprints, one from each hand. The Netherlands also takes fingerprints and was[122] the only EU member that had plans to store these fingerprints centrally.[123] According to EU requirements, only nations that are signatories to the Schengen acquis are required to add fingerprint biometrics.[124]

In the EU nations, passport prices will be:

  • Austria Austria (available since 16 June 2006): a passport for citizens aged 12 or older costs €112,[125] while a chip-free version for children aged 2-11 costs €44.[126] As of March 2009 all newly issued passports for citizens aged 12 or older contain fingerprints.[127] Passports are valid for 2 years after issuance for children up to the age of 1; 5 years for children aged 2–11; 10 years for citizens aged 12 and older.
  • Belgium Belgium (introduced in October 2004): €71 or €41 for children + local taxes. As of May 2014, passports for adults are valid for 7 years.
  • Bulgaria Bulgaria (introduced in July 2009; available since 29 March 2010): BGN 40 (€20) for adults. Passports are valid for 5 years.[128]
  • Croatia Croatia (available since 1 July 2009): HRK 390 (€53). The chip contains two fingerprints and a digital photo of the holder. Since 18 January 2010 only biometric passports can be obtained at issuing offices inside Croatia. Diplomatic missions and consular offices must implement new issuing system until 28 June 2010.
  • Cyprus Cyprus (available since 13 December 2010): €70, valid for 10 years
  • Czech Republic Czech Republic (available since 1 September 2006): CZK 600 for adults (valid 10 years), CZK 100 for children (valid 5 years). Passports contain fingerprints.
  • Denmark Denmark (available since 1 August 2006): DKK 890 for adults (valid for 10 years), DKK 150 for children 0–11 (valid for 2 years [age 0–2] or 5 years), DKK 178 for children 12–17 (valid for 5 years), and DKK 378 retirement age (from July 2021 67 years) (valid for 10 years). A new and standardised photo must be supplied too. As of January 2012 all newly issued passports contain fingerprints.[129][130]
  • Estonia Estonia (available since 22 May 2007): EEK 450 (€28.76) (valid for 5 years). As of 29 June 2009, all newly issued passports contain fingerprints.[131]
  • Finland Finland (available since 21 August 2006): €53 (valid for up to 5 years). As of 29 June 2009, all newly issued passports contain fingerprints.[132]
  • France France (available since April 2006): €86 or €89 (depending whether applicant provides photographs), valid for 10 years. As of 8 June 2022, all newly issued passports contain fingerprints with the exception of emergency passports that hold a validity of 1 year.[133][134][135]
  • Germany Germany (available since November 2005): ≤23 year old applicants (valid for 6 years) €37.50 and >24 years (valid 10 years) €70.[136] Passports issued from 1 November 2007 onwards include fingerprints.[137][138]
  • Greece Greece (available since 26 August 2006): €84.40 (valid for 3 years for children up to 14, valid for 10 years for adults).[139] Since June 2009, passports contain fingerprints.[140]
  • Hungary Hungary (available since 29 August 2006): HUF 7,500 (€26), valid for 5 years, HUF 14,000 (€48.50) valid for 10 years. As of 29 June 2009, all newly issued passports contain fingerprints.[141][142][143]
  • Republic of Ireland Ireland: Biometric passport booklets have been available since 16 October 2006, and Biometric passport cards since October 2015. 34-page passport booklets are priced at €75, 66-page booklets at €105,[144] both valid for 10 years. For children aged between 3 and 18 years the price is €26.50 and the passport booklets are valid for 5 years. Infants' passport booklets for those under 3 years cost €16 and expire 3 years after issue. Irish biometric passport cards are only available to adults of 18 years and over who already have an Irish passport booklet and cost €35. They expire on the same date as the holder's Irish passport booklet or 5 years after issue, whichever is the shorter period. (Ireland is not a signatory to the Schengen Acquis and has no obligation or plans to implement fingerprint biometrics.)
  • Italy Italy (available since 26 October 2006): €116,[145] valid for 10 years. As of January 2010 newly issued passports contain fingerprints.[146]
  • Latvia Latvia (available since 20 November 2007): an adult passport costs €30, or €20 if received together with eID,[147] valid for 10 or 5 years.
  • Lithuania Lithuania (available since 28 August 2006): €43.[148] For children up to 16 years old, valid max 5 years. For persons over 16 years old, valid for 10 years.[149]
  • Malta Malta (available since 8 October 2008): €70 for persons over 16 years old, valid for 10 years, €35 for children between 10 and 16 years (valid for 5 years) and €14 for children under 10 years (valid for 2 years).
  • Netherlands Netherlands (available since 28 August 2006): Approximately €11 on top of regular passport (€38.33) cost €49.33. Passports issued from 21 September 2009 include fingerprints. Dutch identity cards are lookalike versions of the holder's page of the passport but do not contain fingerprints.[150]
  • Poland Poland (available since 28 August 2006): PLN 140 (€35) for adults, PLN 70 for children aged under 13, free for seniors 70+ years, valid 10 years (5 years for children aged below 13). Passports issued from 29 June 2009 include fingerprints of both index fingers.[151]
  • Portugal Portugal (available since 31 July 2006 – special passport; 28 August 2006 – ordinary passport): €65 for all citizens valid for 5 years. All passports have 32 pages.[152]
  • Romania Romania (available since 31 December 2008): RON 258 for citizens over the age of 12, RON 234 for citizens under the age of 12,[153] valid for 10 years for those over the age of 18, 5 years for those over the age of 12 to 18, and for 3 years for those under 12. As of 19 January 2010, new passport includes both facial images and fingerprints.[154] Temporary passports valid for only one year can be issued for the price of RON 96 and is issued in less than 3 working days.
  • Slovakia Slovakia (available since 15 January 2008): an adult passport (>13 years) costs €33.19 valid for 10 years, while a chip-free child's (5–13 years) version costs €13.27 valid for 5 years and for children under 5 years €8.29, but valid only for 2 years. The latest version was issued in 2014 and contains a contactless chip in the biodata card that meets ICAO specifications.[155]
  • Slovenia Slovenia (available since 28 August 2006): €42.05 for adults, valid for 10 years. €35.25 for children from 3 to 18 years of age, valid for 5 years. €31.17 for children up to 3 years of age, valid for 3 years. All passports have 32 pages, a 48-page version is available at a €2.50 surcharge. As of 29 June 2009, all newly issued passports contain fingerprints.[156]
  • Spain Spain (available since 28 August 2006) at a price of €26 (price at 2018), free passports are issued for citizens that hold a "Familia Numerosa" document. They include fingerprints of both index fingers as of October 2009. (Aged <30 a Spanish passport is valid for 5 years, otherwise they remain valid for 10 years).
  • Sweden Sweden (available since October 2005): SEK 400 (valid for 5 years). As of 1 January 2012, new passport includes both facial images and fingerprints.[157]

In the EFTA, passport prices will be:

  • Iceland Iceland Issued since 23 May 2006 and costing ISK 5,100 (ISK 1,900 for under 18 and over 67).
  • Liechtenstein Liechtenstein biometric passports issued since 26 October 2006.[158] The technical specifications are binding for Liechtenstein[117][118] as it became part of the Schengen area in 2011.[159] The cost of the passport ranges from CHF 50 (children under 12) to CHF 250 for adults.
  • Norway Norway Issued since 2005, costs NOK 450 for adults, or c. €50, NOK 270 for children. Increased to NOK 570/342 in 2020.[160] In 2007 the Norwegian government launched a ‘multi-modal’ biometric enrolment system supplied by Motorola. Motorola's new system enabled multiple public agencies to digitally capture and store fingerprints, 2D facial images and signatures for passports and visas.[161] The Norwegian biometrics company IDEX ASA has begun development of electronic ID cards (eID) with fingerprint security technology for use throughout the EU.[162]
  • Switzerland Switzerland Issued since 4 September 2006, costs CHF 140 for adults and CHF 60 for children under 18 years.[163] Since 1 March 2010, all issued passports are biometric, containing a photograph and two fingerprints recorded electronically.[164]

Other European countries

[edit]
  • Albania Albania: Issued since May 2009, costs 7500 Lekë (€75). Valid for 10 years. Contains fingerprints, the bearer's photo and all the data written on the passport.
  • Belarus Belarus: Issued since 1 September 2021, Valid for 10 years. Contains fingerprints and facial photo, the bearer's photo and all the data written on the passport.
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina: Issued since 15 October 2009 and costing 50 KM (€25.65). Valid 10 years for adults and 5 years for younger than 18. On 1 June 2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina issued its first EAC passport.
  • Kosovo Kosovo: Issued since 31 October 2011.
  • Moldova Moldova: Issued since 1 January 2008, costing approximately 760 MDL (€45)[165] and is obligatory from 1 January 2011. The passport of the Republic of Moldova with biometric data contains a chip which holds digital information, including the holder's signature, as well as the traditional information. It is valid for 7 years (for persons over 7) and 4 years (for persons less than 7) respectively.
    It was introduced as a request of European Union to safeguard the borders between the E.U. and Republic of Moldova.
  • Montenegro Montenegro: Issued since 2008, costing €33.
  • North Macedonia North Macedonia: Issued since 2 April 2007, costs MKD 1,500 or c. €22.
  • Russia Russia: Issued since 2006. Since 3 August 2018, they cost 6,000 rubles (approximately US$75) and use printed data, photo and fingerprints and are BAC-encrypted.[166] Biometric passports issued after 1 March 2010 are valid for 10 years. Russian biometric passports are currently issued within Russia and in all of its consulates. From 1 January 2015, the passports contain fingerprints.
  • Serbia Serbia: Issued since 7 July 2008, costs RSD 3,600 or approximately €32.[167] Valid for 10 years, 5 years for children aged 3 to 14, and for 3 years for children aged 3 or less.
  • Turkey Turkey: Turkish passports which are compatible with European Union standards have been available since 1 June 2010.[168] Colours of the new biometric passports have also been changed. Accordingly, regular passports; claret red, special passports; bottle green and diplomatic passports wrap black colours.[169]
    Turkish Minister of the State announced that the government is printing the new passports at government minting office since the private contractor failed to deliver in March 2016.[170]
    As of January 2025, cost of issuing a 10-year passport in Turkey is 12,409.00 (approximately 340).[171]
  • Ukraine Ukraine: It was first planned to issue biometric passports and identity cards on 1 January 2013.[172] They started being issued since January 2015.[citation needed]
    Starting August 2021, Ukrainian citizens can use digital passports and identity cards in the Diia app for all legal purposes within Ukraine.[173]
    In Ukraine, the term "digital passport" is used to denote only the fully digital version of the biometric passport accessible via the Diia mobile app.[173]
  • United Kingdom United Kingdom: United Kingdom introduced it in March 2006, initially costing £72.50 for adults (valid for 10 years) and £46[174] for children under the age of 16 (valid for 5 years).[175]
  • Sovereign Military Order of Malta Sovereign Military Order of Malta: Issued since 2005 the SMOM diplomatic and service passports include biometric features and are compliant with ICAO standards.

North America

[edit]
  • Barbados Barbados: Issued since September 2018.[176][177]
  • Belize Belize: Issued since 24 October 2022.[178]
  • Canada Canada: Issued since 1 July 2013. It contains the bearer's name, gender, and date and place of birth and a digital portrait of their face.[179]
  • Costa Rica Costa Rica: Issued since 7 March 2022.[180]
  • Dominica Dominica: Issued since 26 July 2021.[181]
  • Honduras Honduras: Issued since 22 March 2022. Available to all citizens, biometric passports replaced regular passports. Regular passports are valid until expiry date. The price has remained the same at US$35 for a 5-year period and US$50 for a 10-year period. The passport is ICAO-Compliant with the biometric symbol () printed on the biographical data page as well as at the bottom on the front cover.[182]
  • Mexico Mexico: Issued since 5 October 2021.
  • Panama Panama: Issued since 2014, costs $100.
  • Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Saint Vincent and the Grenadines: Issued since 4 March 2014.[183]
  • United States United States: The biometric version of the U.S. passport (sometimes referred to as an electronic passport) has descriptive data and a digitized passport photo on its contactless chips, and does not have fingerprint information placed onto the contactless chip. However, the chip is large enough (64 kilobytes) for inclusion of biometric identifiers. The U.S. Department of State first issued these passports in 2006,[184] and since August 2007 issues biometric passports only. Non-biometric passports are valid until their expiration dates.[185]
    Although a system able to perform a facial-recognition match between the bearer and his or her image stored on the contactless chip is desired,[186] it is unclear when such a system will be deployed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security at its ports of entry.[187][188]
    A high level of security became a priority for the United States after the attacks of 11 September 2001. High security required cracking down on counterfeit passports. In October 2004, the production stages of this high-tech passport commenced as the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) issued awards to the top bidders of the program. The awards totaled to roughly $1,000,000 for startup, development, and testing. The driving force of the initiative is the U.S. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (also known as the "Border Security Act"), which states that such smartcard identity cards will be able to replace visas. As for foreigners travelling to the U.S., if they wish to enter U.S. visa-free under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), they are now required to possess machine-readable passports that comply with international standards. Additionally, for travellers holding a valid passport issued on or after 26 October 2006, such a passport must be a biometric passport if used to enter the U.S. visa-free under the VWP.[189]
    In November 2018, Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and Delta Air Lines opened the nation's first curb-to-gate biometric terminal, which promised to improve aviation security while moving travelers faster through screening.[190]

Oceania

[edit]
  • Australia Australia: Issued since October 2005, where as of 1 January 2025 non-urgent passports costs AU$412 for adults and AU$208 for minors aged under 16 years and adults aged 75 years and over.[191] The Passport contains the same personal information that is on the colour photo PVC page, which includes a large and small digitized photograph. Australia does not use fingerprinting of incoming passengers (fingerprinting is required for visa's for travelers from many countries). Valid for 10 years for adults and 5 years for minors under 16 years and optional for adults 75 years and over.
  • Fiji Fiji: Issued since 19 September 2019.[192]
  • New Zealand New Zealand: Issued since November 2005, like Australia and the US, New Zealand is also using the facial biometric identifier. There are two identifying factors: the small symbol on the front cover (), indicating that an electronic chip has been embedded in the passport and the polycarbonate leaf in the front (version 2009) of the book, inside which the chip is located. Like Australia, New Zealand has installed SmartGates into airports to allow New Zealand ePassport and ePassport holders of 4 other countries (Australia, Canada, UK, and US) to clear immigration controls more rapidly, (recently more countries have been added on to the list, but still not all ePassports) and facial recognition technology has been installed at immigration gates. The cost for a non-urgent passport is NZ$247 (when applying online or in person in New Zealand) for adults, and NZ$144 for children.[193] Passport were valid for five years if issued before December 2015. However, in 2015 the New Zealand government approved for the reinstatement of a 10-year validity period for passports, with all adult passports issued after December 2015 being valid for 10 years.

South America

[edit]
  • Argentina Argentina: Issued since June 2012, costs 35,000 pesos (USD 34). Valid for 10 years[194]
  • Bolivia Bolivia: Issued since 1 February 2019 and costing BOB 550 (USD 79.13). Valid 6 years. The Bolivian ePassport has the same functions as the other biometric passports as regulations from OASI.
  • Brazil Brazil: Issued since December 2006. However, just in December 2010 it began to issue passports with microchips, first in the capital Brasília and Goiás state. Since the end of January 2011, this last is available to be issued all over Brazil. Valid for 10 years for adults and costs R$156.07 (approximately €35).[195] In December 2014, the Federal Police Department extended the validity of the document, from five to ten years.[196]
  • Chile Chile: Issued since 2 September 2013. Valid for 5 years and since 1 February 2020 10 years.[197]
  • Colombia Colombia: Issued since 1 September 2015, costing COP 169,000 (approx. USD 48).[198]
  • Ecuador Ecuador: Issued since 14 September 2020.
  • Paraguay Paraguay: The Paraguayan Ministry of Foreign Affairs began issuing biometric passports in April 2010, initially only to Paraguayan citizens who applied through consulates and embassies abroad.[199] As of July 10, 2023, the Paraguayan government has standardized the biometric passport for all citizens within the national territory.[200]
  • Peru Peru: On 21 February 2016, the Superintendencia Nacional de Migraciones announced that the first Peruvian biometric passports would be delivered by 26 February 2016.[201][202] It features a new cover, along with several security improvements, in order to be exempted for visas for the Schengen Area.[203] It will cost PEN 98.50, approximately USD 28, making it the cheapest passport in Latin America.[204]
  • Uruguay Uruguay: The Uruguayan Ministry of the Interior started to issue biometric passports to Uruguayan citizens on 16 October 2015. The new passport complies with the standards set forth by the Visa Waiver Program of the United States.[205] However for naturalised citizens, the passport is not ICAO 9303 compliant as the country of birth is used in the "nationality" field and associated MRZ leading to errors being returned on usage (as noted in section 7.1 of ICAO 9303 part 3).
  • Venezuela Venezuela: Issued after July 2007, Venezuela was the first Latin American country issuing passports including RFID chips along other major security improvements. The chip has photo and fingerprints data.[206]

Biometric passport photo requirements

[edit]

The ICAO standard sets a 35x45 mm image with adequate resolution with the following requirements:

  • The facial image shall depict a true likeness of the rightful holder of the passport and shall not be digitally altered or enhanced to change the subject's appearance in any way
  • A close up of the head and shoulders with the subject facing square on and looking directly at the camera with both eyes visible and with a neutral expression with the mouth closed
  • Both edges of the face must be clearly visible. The subject shall not be looking, portrait-style, over one shoulder
  • The eyes must be open, and there must be no hair obscuring them
  • Glasses: the photograph must show the eyes clearly with no lights reflected in the glasses. The glasses shall not have tinted lenses. Avoid heavy frames if possible and ensure that the frames do not cover any part of the eyes. Glasses should appear only if permanently worn.
  • Head coverings shall not be accepted except in circumstances that the issuing State specifically approves. The face must be visible from the hairline to the chin and forward of the ears.
  • A uniform light-coloured background shall be used to provide a contrast to the face and hair. For colour portraits, light blue, beige, light brown, pale grey or white are recommended for the background

Though some countries like USA use a 2x2 inch photo format (51x51 mm), they usually crop it to be closer to 35:45 in ratio when issuing a passport.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
A biometric passport, also known as an e-passport, is an internationally standardized that incorporates a contactless (RFID) chip embedded in its data page, storing the holder's digitized personal information—including name, date of birth, , and a high-resolution biometric image—to enable automated identity verification and reduce . The chip's data is protected by (PKI) digital signatures, ensuring integrity and authenticity during border inspections via basic access control or chip authentication protocols. Standardized by the (ICAO) in Document 9303 since 2003, these passports facilitate machine-readable zone (MRZ) scanning and electronic gates for faster processing while linking the document to the bearer's physical attributes. Malaysia pioneered the issuance of biometric passports in 1998, with widespread global adoption accelerating post-9/11 to enhance ; by 2025, over 170 countries issue them, covering the majority of international travelers and integrating optional additional like fingerprints or iris patterns where national policies permit. The technology's core achievement lies in its resistance to tampering—far surpassing non-biometric predecessors—through cryptographic safeguards that prevent unauthorized data extraction without physical document presentation, thereby curbing and illegal migration. However, biometric passports have sparked debates over risks, as the stored data could theoretically be skimmed by proximity readers if Basic Access Control is inadequately enforced, and centralized biometric databases raise long-term concerns despite ICAO-mandated protections. Critics argue that while forgery is mitigated, the irrevocable nature of biometric templates introduces irreversible vulnerabilities if compromised, underscoring a between enhanced border efficiency and individual .

History and Development

Origins and Initial Standards

issued the world's first biometric passport, known as the MyKad-integrated passport, in March 1998, incorporating an embedded chip with facial biometric data developed by the local firm IRIS Corporation Berhad. This innovation preceded widespread global adoption but lacked initial international standardization, limiting . The push for biometric passports accelerated after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which exposed vulnerabilities in traditional paper-based travel documents prone to forgery and identity fraud. In response, the (ICAO) formalized standards for electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTDs) in 2003 through updates to Doc 9303, mandating a contactless RFID chip compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 for storing digitized and . Initial ICAO specifications in Doc 9303 designated the holder's facial as the primary biometric, encoded in format within a logical defined in Part 10, to enable automated verification against the visual image on the data page. Fingerprints and iris scans were permitted as optional secondary under Parts 11 and 12, respectively, but not required, reflecting a balance between enhancement and implementation feasibility across member states. Security features included Basic Access Control (BAC) using machine-readable zone (MRZ) data to prevent unauthorized chip reads, with provisions for stronger (PKI) authentication. These standards aimed to facilitate global while minimizing risks of skimming or cloning, though early chips stored only static biometric templates without real-time matching capabilities.

Global Standardization and Early Adoption

The (ICAO) established global standards for biometric passports, known as electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTDs), through its Doc 9303 specifications, which outline requirements for embedded contactless chips, biometric data formats, and interoperability protocols to ensure secure international travel verification. These standards, building on earlier frameworks from the 1960s and 1990s, incorporated such as facial images in or formats following ICAO's 2003 guidelines for e-passports, with formal adoption of enhanced biometric elements by the ICAO Council in March 2005 to promote universal issuance. Doc 9303 emphasizes proximity contactless IC technology compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 for global readability, facilitating fraud-resistant border controls without mandating specific biometric types beyond facial recognition as the minimum. Malaysia pioneered biometric passport issuance on March 24, 1998, embedding chips with basic electronic data ahead of widespread ICAO biometric mandates, marking the initial practical adoption despite lacking full global standardization at the time. Following ICAO's 2003 standards, adoption accelerated in via Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, which required member states to integrate biometric features including facial images and fingerprints or iris scans into passports by 2006-2007 timelines. The began issuing biometric passports on November 5, 2006, aligning with these requirements and ICAO protocols, while other early adopters included in 2005 and shortly thereafter, driven by post-9/11 security imperatives for enhanced identity verification. By the end of , approximately 60 countries had implemented biometric passports, reflecting rapid uptake in , , and select others to comply with ICAO interoperability and leverage automated border systems, though full global penetration lagged due to varying national capacities and costs. Early programs prioritized biometrics for chip storage to minimize concerns while enabling e-gates, with interoperability tested via ICAO's for digital signatures. This phase established biometric passports as a international norm, though initial implementations varied in optional biometrics like fingerprints, highlighting ICAO's flexible yet binding framework for causal security enhancements over traditional documents.

Evolution Post-2010

The transition to biometric passports accelerated after the International Organization's (ICAO) April 1, 2010, deadline for machine-readable travel documents, with the emphasis shifting to widespread implementation of electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTDs) incorporating data. By late 2010, 170 of ICAO's 190 member states were issuing compliant machine-readable passports, and features became the norm in new issuances, driven by enhanced interoperability requirements under ICAO Doc 9303. This period marked a phase of maturation, where initial deployments focused on basic facial expanded to include optional fingerprints and iris scans in second-generation ePassports, first standardized around 2009 but seeing broader rollout post-2010 for improved identity verification resilience. Security protocols evolved with greater adoption of Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), an upgrade over Basic (BAC), offering resistance to skimming and relay attacks through dynamic based on MRZ-derived values or chip-derived challenges. Extended (EAC) mechanisms, enabling selective release of sensitive via country-specific certificates validated through ICAO's Public Key Directory (PKD), saw increased implementation, with PKD participation rising to support real-time certificate revocation and authenticity checks at borders. These advancements addressed vulnerabilities identified in early eMRTDs, such as potential during Basic Access Control sessions, by prioritizing and standards updated in subsequent Doc 9303 revisions. Global issuance expanded notably in emerging economies, supported by international assistance; for example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) facilitated biometric passport programs in participating states starting in 2010, aiding integration with ICAO's PKD and enhancing cross-border security. By the mid-2010s, automated systems leveraging ePassport chips proliferated at major airports, with biometric e-gates verifying facial matches against chip data in seconds, reducing manual inspections. Market data reflect this proliferation, with ePassport production scaling to accommodate demand; over 20 million units were supplied by select providers alone since 2010, underscoring infrastructure maturation. Recent standards updates emphasize future-proofing biometric data storage. ICAO mandates that contracting states update facial image encoding in eMRTDs to conform to ISO/IEC 39794-5 by January 1, 2030, replacing legacy formats with standardized biometric exchange formats for higher quality, compression efficiency, and interoperability across verification systems. This requirement, outlined in evolving Doc 9303 specifications, addresses limitations in older Logical Data Structure (LDS) versions, such as suboptimal image resolution for automated recognition, and supports emerging applications like post-issuance biometric additions where feasible. Compliance preparations, accelerated since the early 2020s, involve chip firmware upgrades and testing, ensuring sustained anti-forgery efficacy amid rising travel volumes.

Technical Specifications

Embedded Chip and Data Storage


Biometric passports incorporate a contactless chip, typically based on (RFID) technology, embedded within the document's cover or pages to store electronic data securely. This chip operates under standards defined by the (ICAO) in Doc 9303, which specifies the logical for electronic Machine Readable Travel Documents (eMRTDs), including data groups (DGs) such as DG1 for the machine-readable zone equivalent and DG2 for the facial image. The chip uses non-volatile memory, with a minimum capacity of 32 kilobytes of electrically erasable programmable read-only memory () to accommodate biographical details, biometric templates, and cryptographic elements.
The stored data mirrors the printed biographical information on the passport's data page—such as the holder's name, nationality, date of birth, , and passport details—along with a digitized biometric image compliant with ICAO requirements. Additional optional biometrics, like fingerprints or iris scans, may be included in advanced implementations under Extended Access Control (EAC), but the image remains the mandatory biometric element for global . Data is organized into standardized logical data groups protected by digital signatures generated using the issuing country's private key, enabling verification of integrity and authenticity via (PKI) during reading. Security features integral to the chip's include Basic Access Control (BAC), which requires knowledge of the MRZ or equivalent to unlock read access and prevent unauthorized skimming, and PKI-based digital signatures to ensure has not been tampered with post-issuance. The chip's passive RFID design allows short-range interrogation (typically up to 10 cm) via (NFC) readers at border controls, without an internal power source, relying on the reader's for operation. These mechanisms collectively mitigate risks of or , though vulnerabilities like relay attacks have been demonstrated in controlled tests.

Biometric Data Types

Biometric passports, as standardized by the (ICAO) in Doc 9303, store three principal types of biometric data on an embedded RFID chip: a image, which is mandatory, and fingerprints and iris scans, which are optional. These data types are organized into Logical Data Structure (LDS) groups within the chip's secure storage, enabling automated verification against the passport holder at border controls. The biometric, captured as a digital photograph, must comply with ICAO for frontal view, neutral expression, and sufficient resolution to support recognition algorithms, typically encoded in format with interoperability ensured by ISO/IEC 19794-5. Fingerprints, when included, are stored in Data Group 3 (DG3) and generally consist of minutiae templates from two fingers—often the left and right index fingers—to minimize template size while maximizing distinctiveness, encoded per ISO/IEC 19794-4 standards for exchangeable formats. This optional biometric enhances verification accuracy beyond facial data alone, as fingerprints provide high entropy with error rates below 0.1% in controlled matching, though implementation varies by issuing authority, with some nations like the incorporating them since 2006 for second-generation e-passports. Iris recognition data, housed in Data Group 4 (DG4), captures textured patterns from one or both eyes, encoded via ISO/IEC 19794-6, offering resistance to spoofing due to its internal physiological nature but requiring specialized enrollment equipment. ICAO limits biometrics to these three modalities to balance , storage constraints (e.g., DG3 capped at around 15 KB per set), and global adoption feasibility, explicitly excluding others like patterns or as non-standard. Issuing states must declare inclusion of optional biometrics in the passport's machine-readable zone or chip metadata to facilitate reader compatibility.

Security and Authentication Mechanisms

Biometric passports incorporate an embedded contactless (IC) chip compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 standards, which stores digitized , biometric templates (primarily facial images, optionally fingerprints or iris scans), and cryptographic keys to enable secure . The chip's data is protected through (PKI), where a document signer certificate, issued under a country signing certificate (CSCA), digitally signs the stored logical data groups (LDGs) to ensure integrity and origin authenticity during verification at border controls. This PKI chain allows inspection systems to validate signatures against a public key directory (PKD) maintained by ICAO, preventing undetected tampering or forgery. Authentication begins with access control protocols to prevent unauthorized skimming of chip data via (RFID). Basic Access Control (BAC), mandated in early ICAO specifications, requires a reader to derive session keys from the machine-readable zone (MRZ) data—printed on the passport's data page—before accessing the chip, limiting readability to authorized devices with optical MRZ scanning capabilities. For enhanced privacy and resistance to eavesdropping, newer implementations adopt Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), which uses a chip access number (CAN) or MRZ to negotiate stronger Diffie-Hellman keys, supporting chip versions since 2010 and ensuring with BAC. These protocols establish a secure messaging channel using algorithms like 3DES or AES for and during data exchange. Further mechanisms include chip authentication and active authentication to verify the document's genuineness. Chip Authentication (CA) proves the chip's authenticity by challenging it to demonstrate knowledge of a private key corresponding to a static public key stored in the chip, using protocols like PACE-integrated variants to counter attacks. Active Authentication (AA) employs a unique asymmetric key pair per chip: the private key signs a random challenge from , allowing verification against the chip's public key to confirm it is not a copy, as duplicates would lack the genuine private key. For passports supporting Extended Access Control (EAC), Terminal Authentication (TA) additionally certifies the reader's authorization via country-specific certificates, enabling access to sensitive like fingerprints while restricting basic readers to facial data only. Biometric authentication integrates these cryptographic layers by comparing live-captured biometrics (e.g., facial recognition at e-gates) against chip-stored templates, with one-to-one matching verified post-successful chip authentication to mitigate spoofing. Empirical tests, such as those under evaluations, certify chips at EAL4+ or higher assurance levels, incorporating tamper-resistant hardware like secure elements to protect keys from extraction. Despite these features, vulnerabilities like side-channel attacks on older BAC implementations have prompted migrations to PACE and AA, with ICAO recommending regular PKI updates to address evolving threats.

Operational Benefits

Fraud Prevention and Border Security

Biometric passports incorporate an embedded (RFID) chip storing digitized biometric data, such as facial images, alongside biographic details, all protected by (PKI) digital signatures compliant with (ICAO) Doc 9303 standards. This cryptographic mechanism ensures that any alteration to the chip data invalidates the signature, enabling border inspectors to detect forgeries or attempts during verification. Access to sensitive biometric data requires protocols like Basic Access Control (BAC), which uses machine-readable zone (MRZ) data to generate session keys, preventing unauthorized skimming or . These features reduce fraud by linking electronic and visual elements, where discrepancies between the chip's signed and printed passport details trigger alerts. For instance, in 2006, U.S. and Protection intercepted over 21,000 fraudulent U.S. passports and visas, prompting enhanced electronic verification that has since improved fraud detection through real-time cross-checks with issuing authorities. Australian implementation of fraud risk checks during e-passport issuance has similarly aimed to lower incidence rates by verifying applicant identities against records before embedding . Empirical assessments indicate that biometric matching thwarts impersonation, as live scans at borders confirm the holder's identity against stored templates, rendering stolen or forged documents ineffective without physiological matches. At borders, e-passports facilitate automated e-gates and kiosks, where facial recognition or fingerprint scanners verify travelers in seconds, minimizing manual s and . This interoperability, mandated by ICAO standards, allows seamless data exchange between issuing and inspecting systems, enhancing detection of watchlisted individuals or visa overstays via integrated biometric networks. Case studies, such as the U.S. Biometric Exit Program, demonstrate reduced processing times and improved oversight of departures, though challenges persist in full-scale deployment across high-traffic points. Overall, these systems bolster causal links between identity verification and outcomes by enforcing tamper-evident chains from issuance to , though depends on consistent global compliance and inspector training.

Efficiency in Travel and Verification

Biometric passports facilitate automated systems, such as electronic gates (eGates), which verify travelers' identities by matching scans or fingerprints against stored in the passport's embedded chip, bypassing manual inspections by officers. These systems, compliant with (ICAO) standards, enable interoperability across borders, allowing rapid processing without physical contact beyond presentation. In practice, eGates reduce verification times to 3-6 seconds per traveler in implementations at U.S. airports, compared to traditional manual checks that often exceed 30 seconds. Empirical outcomes demonstrate substantial efficiency gains: biometric lanes operated by the U.S. (TSA) have cut processing durations by up to 75% at security checkpoints, minimizing queues and enhancing throughput during peak travel periods. Similarly, automated systems in locations like Mumbai's process passengers through in under one minute using biometric , alleviating congestion for high-volume routes. Surveys indicate broad traveler acceptance, with nearly 90% of U.S. respondents favoring biometric explicitly for time savings, reflecting real-world reductions in wait times that support smoother international mobility. For verification integrity, the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) provides a centralized repository for certificate validation, ensuring efficient, real-time authenticity checks of ePassport chips without repeated bilateral data exchanges between nations. This cryptographic framework minimizes false positives in biometric matching—typically below 1% in controlled tests—while accelerating clearance for legitimate travelers, as gates automatically cross-reference chip data with live biometrics against watchlists. Overall, these mechanisms have streamlined global travel flows, with ICAO-compliant systems handling millions of verifications annually across adopting airports, though efficacy depends on infrastructure investment and uniform biometric enrollment.

Risks and Challenges

Technical Vulnerabilities and Attacks

Biometric passports utilize RFID chips compliant with ICAO Doc 9303 standards, incorporating mechanisms such as Basic Access Control (BAC), Extended Access Control (EAC), and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) to protect data transmission and access. However, these systems exhibit persistent technical vulnerabilities stemming from protocol design flaws, low-entropy keys, and side-channel exposures, enabling attacks like skimming, eavesdropping, and traceability despite cryptographic safeguards. Skimming attacks involve unauthorized reading of the chip's without the holder's , feasible at short ranges (up to a few feet) due to the passive nature of RFID tags and optional or weak initial in early ICAO guidelines. BAC, intended to prevent such access by deriving session keys from the machine-readable zone (MRZ), relies on low-entropy inputs—often 25-35 bits in practice—rendering it susceptible to brute-force using off-the-shelf hardware, as demonstrated in analyses of first-generation ePassports. Later protocols like PACE improve resistance by diffusing MRZ more robustly, but legacy BAC implementations in widespread use remain exploitable, particularly for passports without mandatory upgrades. Eavesdropping targets legitimate reader-passport communications, allowing of unencrypted or weakly protected flows; passive attacks can occur at distances up to 30 feet with directional antennas, bypassing Faraday pouch mitigations during active sessions. While digital signatures ensure via Passive Authentication, they do not inherently encrypt transmissions, exposing biometric templates (e.g., images) to capture and potential spoofing in automated border systems. Adversary attacks, a variant, employ network sniffers to extract chip-stored directly, exploiting gaps in . Cloning threats arise from the inability of standard signatures to uniquely bind data to the physical chip without optional Active Authentication, permitting data transfer to blank chips if initial access is gained; side-channel attacks on cryptographic keys further enable key extraction in controlled settings. Man-in-the-middle (MITM) relays extend this by impersonating readers to hijack sessions, feasible against BAC due to its challenge-response vulnerabilities identified through like bisimilarity, which reveal equivalence failures allowing unauthorized data access. Traceability attacks exploit protocol timing discrepancies and nonce handling flaws, enabling identification of specific passports without decrypting contents; by replaying eavesdropped encrypted messages, attackers distinguish targets via response delays (e.g., 2.8 ms for passports versus faster MAC failures on mismatches), as verified experimentally on models from the , , and others using inexpensive readers. Denial-of-service disruptions, such as jamming RFID signals or overwhelming readers with malformed queries, can render chips unresponsive without physical damage, though countermeasures like throttling are inconsistently implemented. These vulnerabilities, largely demonstrated in laboratory conditions rather than widespread real-world breaches, underscore implementation dependencies on national PKI robustness and protocol adoption; for instance, infrequent key revocation cycles (up to 10 years) amplify risks from compromised country signing keys. Ongoing ICAO updates address some flaws, but heterogeneous global compliance perpetuates exposure in older passports comprising billions in circulation.

Privacy Implications and Surveillance Debates

Biometric passports store sensitive , including digitized images and sometimes fingerprints or iris scans, on embedded RFID chips, raising concerns about unauthorized access through skimming attacks where readers remotely extract data without the holder's knowledge. To mitigate this, ICAO standards mandate Basic Access Control (BAC), requiring physical scanning of the machine-readable zone (MRZ) to unlock the chip, and optional Passive to verify against digital signatures. However, empirical demonstrations have shown vulnerabilities, such as attacks extending the chip's read range or exploits if MRZ data is compromised, though widespread real-world skimming incidents remain undocumented due to these layered protections. Surveillance debates center on governments' capacity to track individuals via centralized biometric databases and cross-border , enabled by protocols like those in ICAO Doc 9303, which facilitate for verification but risk function creep into broader monitoring. For instance, U.S. Department of programs collect and share fingerprints and facial scans with international partners through Biometric Data Sharing Partnerships, potentially enabling persistent movement profiling without explicit consent. Critics, including privacy researchers, argue this creates a "cybersurveillance" where biometric templates, once leaked or aggregated, enable indefinite linkage across systems, amplifying risks from state overreach or breaches over traditional document fraud prevention. Proponents counter that such systems have empirically reduced illegal entries, as evidenced by U.S. Customs and Border Protection intercepts of over 1,800 imposters using facial matching against passport records by March 2023, though this assumes databases remain secure and unmisused. Academic analyses highlight systemic trade-offs, noting that while ICAO-compliant chips resist casual cloning, the irrevocable nature of —unlike resettable passwords—means compromised data offers permanent identification vectors, with studies estimating higher long-term risks from than isolated chip hacks. Debates persist over empirical outcomes, as large-scale breaches are rare but theoretically catastrophic; for example, a European study found 10% of biometric passports fraudulently obtained in some contexts, underscoring verification gaps that could extend to evasion or abuse. Sources from advocacy often emphasize worst-case scenarios, potentially overstated relative to verified incidents, while government reports prioritize security gains, reflecting institutional incentives toward expansion over restriction. Overall, protections like public-key infrastructure (PKI) enhance authenticity but do not eliminate debates on and proportionality in an era of expanding digital borders.

Implementation Criticisms and Empirical Outcomes

Implementation of biometric passports has encountered significant logistical and financial hurdles across multiple jurisdictions. In the , the introduction of ePassports necessitated passport fee increases exceeding rates since September 2003, primarily to finance the technology and associated security enhancements, leading to public and ary scrutiny over cost-effectiveness. Developing nations have faced budget constraints that delay rollouts, with infrastructure limitations exacerbating issuance backlogs and integration failures between legacy systems and new biometric databases. For instance, South Africa's ePassport program experienced prolonged delays due to issues and technical problems, resulting in extended processing times beyond initial targets set in 2015. Technical implementation challenges include high failure rates in biometric matching and RFID chip vulnerabilities. Early ePassport deployments revealed issues with chip readability and data leakage, as documented in analyses of Basic Access Control protocols, where unauthorized scanning risks persisted despite standards. Airport case studies, such as those at major hubs, reported system disruptions from biometric scanner malfunctions, causing verification delays and temporary reversion to manual checks, which undermined efficiency gains. A cryptographic review highlighted empirical tests showing non-negligible probabilities of data skimming attacks on unshielded ePassports, prompting retrospective shielding mandates but not eliminating all risks. Empirical outcomes on fraud prevention remain inconclusive, with limited peer-reviewed data quantifying reductions attributable to biometric features. U.S. Government Accountability Office assessments from 2003 noted potential for duplicate application detection in issuance but lacked post-implementation metrics showing sustained declines. User surveys in biometric systems indicated that while 37.4% of respondents acknowledged benefits in strength, concerns over reliability persisted, correlating with observed error rates in facial recognition matching under varied lighting or aging conditions. Successful cases, such as Uzbekistan's 2015-2017 end-to-end ePassport rollout, achieved operational without major reported spikes, yet broader global analyses critique the absence of rigorous before-after studies proving causality in security improvements. Critics, including groups, argue that governments have not provided verifiable evidence linking ePassports to measurable drops in , attributing perceived successes to concurrent non-biometric measures like enhanced vetting.

Global Adoption

Regional Rollouts

In , biometric passports were among the earliest to be widely adopted following ICAO standards, with initial issuances in countries such as , , and between 2004 and 2006. The required member states to begin issuing compliant e-passports by August 2006 to enhance security and facilitate automated border controls. By 2010, all EU countries had transitioned to biometric formats, integrating facial recognition data stored on embedded chips. North America saw coordinated rollouts in the mid-2000s, driven by post-9/11 security enhancements. The began issuing biometric passports in 2007, incorporating RFID chips with digital photographs and facilitating compatibility with systems like ESTA for visa waivers. followed suit around the same period, with full implementation by 2010, while and joined later, aligning with regional standards for hemispheric travel. In , adoption varied, with issuing early chip-enabled passports in the late 1990s, though full biometric compliance accelerated in the 2000s. and implemented them by 2006, emphasizing advanced against cloning. initiated a pilot for chip-based e-passports in April 2024 under Passport Seva 2.0, expanding nationwide by mid-2025 to over 30 passport offices, aiming to reduce fraud in high-volume issuance. began in 2022, and in 2023. Oceania led with launching biometric passports in October 2005, integrated with SmartGate kiosks for facial verification at borders. adopted similar technology shortly after, supporting seamless travel. Africa's rollout has been more recent and uneven, often tied to infrastructure upgrades. introduced chip-embedded versions in April 2025 as the first in the to enhance existing . In 2025, the , , and —unveiled a common biometric passport following their exit, issued from centralized facilities to assert sovereignty. Other nations like have issued them since the early , though challenges in rural access persist. By mid-2025, over 40 African countries had implemented or planned biometric systems, spurred by ICAO deadlines and anti-forgery needs.

Recent Advancements and Integration

In 2023–2025, biometric passports have incorporated advanced AI-driven facial recognition and multimodal biometrics, such as combining facial scans with iris or data, to improve verification accuracy amid rising global travel volumes. These enhancements address limitations in single-modality systems by reducing false positives in diverse lighting or masking conditions, as demonstrated in trials where error rates dropped below 0.1%. The (ICAO) updated its Doc 9303 specifications in 2024 to support these, mandating a transition to ISO/IEC 39794-5 biometric data formats for all new electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTDs) by January 1, 2030, enabling standardized, higher-fidelity storage of biometric templates on RFID chips. Integration with broader digital ecosystems has accelerated, particularly through digital travel credentials (DTCs), which leverage biometric passport data for app-based identity verification without physical documents. In , airlines like those partnering with biometric providers have deployed systems matching ePassport chips to pre-flight manifests via contactless readers, cutting boarding times by up to 40% in pilots at major hubs. The European Union's (EES), set for phased enforcement starting October 2025, requires non-EU travelers to submit fingerprints and facial images linked to biometric passports upon first entry, automating overstays tracking through centralized databases. Similarly, the U.S. showcased AI-enhanced biometric gates at CES 2025, integrating ePassport data with real-time surveillance for seamless processing. These developments have driven market expansion, with the ePassport sector projected to grow from $69.6 billion in 2025 to $479 billion by 2035, fueled by demand for fraud-resistant integration in smart borders and IoT-enabled verification. However, implementation varies; while ICAO-compliant chips now feature quantum-resistant in select issuances to counter emerging cyber threats, adoption lags in developing regions due to costs. Ongoing ICAO public key directory (PKD) tools further facilitate cross-border validation by enabling real-time certificate revocation checks, reducing reliance on manual inspections.

Standards and Requirements

ICAO Guidelines and Compliance

The (ICAO), a specialized agency of the , establishes global standards for machine-readable travel documents (MRTDs), including biometric passports, primarily through Document 9303 (Doc 9303), which outlines specifications for passports, visas, and other identity documents to ensure interoperability and security. Doc 9303, first developed in the 1980s and updated iteratively, mandates that biometric data—primarily facial images, with fingerprints and iris scans as optional—be stored on an embedded contactless RFID chip compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 standards, using a Logical Data Structure (LDS) to organize data into secure compartments. The guidelines emphasize passive authentication via digital signatures verified against public keys, with Basic Access Control (BAC) or Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) to prevent unauthorized chip access and skimming. Security protocols in Doc 9303 incorporate a (PKI) framework, where issuing states generate Country Signing (CSCA) master lists and document signer certificates, shared via the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD) to enable border authorities to validate ePassport authenticity without relying on bilateral agreements. Compliance requires states to implement at least facial biometrics for one-to-one verification, with data encoded per ISO/IEC 19794 standards for facial images and optional minutiae templates for fingerprints, ensuring global readability by inspection systems. ICAO's standards, approved by member states in , transitioned from non-biometric machine-readable passports (MRPs) to eMRPs, with full implementation targeted by , though extensions were granted for developing nations. To enforce compliance, ICAO conducts Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) and facilitation audits, assessing states' adherence to Doc 9303 through metrics like issuance of compliant documents and border verification capabilities, with non-compliance risking aviation security disruptions. As of 2024, over 150 countries issue ICAO-compliant ePassports, facilitated by PKD participation, which by 2023 hosted certificates from more than 120 states, though challenges persist in regions with limited technical infrastructure, leading to hybrid issuance of biometric and legacy documents. Recent updates to Doc 9303, such as Part 10 revisions in June 2024, refine LDS applications for emerging threats like , mandating extended for sensitive where fingerprints or iris data are included. Non-adherence can result in failures, as seen in early deployments where mismatched PKI chains delayed verifications, underscoring the causal link between standardized PKI uptake and effective detection.

Passport Photo and Issuance Protocols

The passport photograph for biometric passports serves dual purposes: as a printed visual identifier and as digital biometric data stored on the embedded chip for automated verification. ICAO Document 9303 mandates a full frontal image captured with a live , featuring a neutral expression, open eyes, and the imaginary horizontal line between eye centers parallel to the top edge of the image frame to enable precise alignment in recognition systems. The image must exhibit high resolution, adequate brightness, contrast, and natural skin tones, with the face typically occupying 70-80% of the photo height from chin base to forehead for optimal machine readability. Digital specifications require encoding in JPEG or JPEG2000 formats compliant with ISO/IEC 14496-2, ensuring interoperability for facial matching; the file size should meet a minimum of approximately 12 kB for reliable recognition, with 15-20 kB preferred for accuracy. From January 1, 2030, facial images must adhere to ISO/IEC 39794-5 standards for capture, quality assessment, and template extraction. Printed versions follow a standardized size of 35 mm by 45 mm, centered within the passport's data page without shadows, patterns, or obstructions. Issuance protocols commence with applicant identity verification against official records, followed by in-person biometric enrollment at authorized facilities to mitigate fraud. During enrollment, the facial image is live-captured, processed into a template via algorithms with embedded quality controls, and optionally supplemented by fingerprints or iris scans per national policy, though facial data remains mandatory. The data is then securely encoded into the Logical Data Structure (LDS) of the contactless IC chip, compliant with ISO/IEC 14443 Type A or B for read ranges up to 10 cm, and stored in Data Group 2 for the facial image alongside the machine-readable zone in Data Group 1. Chip personalization occurs in controlled environments, incorporating digital signatures in the Security Object (EF.SOD) under a (PKI) framework to verify and authenticity. Access to chip data is restricted via mechanisms like Basic Access Control (BAC) or Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), requiring MRZ-derived keys to prevent unauthorized skimming. Post-personalization, the chip is locked, and the complete document—integrating the visual photo, chip, and security features—is issued with a recommended maximum validity of 10 years to align with biometric aging considerations. These protocols ensure global while addressing forgery risks through end-to-end .

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