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Dysgenics
View on WikipediaDysgenics refers to any decrease in the prevalence of traits deemed to be either socially desirable or generally adaptive to their environment due to selective pressure disfavouring their reproduction.[1]
In 1915 the term was used by David Starr Jordan to describe the supposed deleterious effects of modern warfare on group-level genetic fitness because of its tendency to kill physically healthy men while preserving the disabled at home.[2][3] Similar concerns had been raised by early eugenicists and social Darwinists during the 19th century, and continued to play a role in scientific and public policy debates throughout the 20th century.[4]
More recent concerns about supposed dysgenic effects in human populations were advanced by the controversial psychologist and self-described "scientific racist"[5] Richard Lynn, notably in his 1996 book Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations, which argued that changes in selection pressures and decreased infant mortality since the Industrial Revolution have resulted in an increased propagation of deleterious traits and genetic disorders.[6][7]
Despite these concerns, genetic studies have shown no evidence for dysgenic effects in human populations.[6][8][9][10] Reviewing Lynn's book, the scholar John R. Wilmoth notes: "Overall, the most puzzling aspect of Lynn's alarmist position is that the deterioration of average intelligence predicted by the eugenicists has not occurred."[11]
See also
[edit]- Degeneration theory – Concept from the 18th and 19th centuries
- Devolution (biology) – Notion that species can revert to primitive forms
- Flynn effect – 20th-century rise in intelligence test scores
- Heritability of IQ – Percent of variation in IQ scores in a given population associated with genetic variation
- List of congenital disorders
- List of biological development disorders
- Recent human evolution – Biological evolution of Homo sapiens from 50,000 years ago until present
References
[edit]- ^ Rédei, George P. (2008). Encyclopedia of Genetics, Genomics, Proteomics, and Informatics, Volume 1. Springer. p. 572. ISBN 978-1-4020-6755-6.
- ^ Jordan, David Starr (2003). War and the Breed: The Relation of War to the Downfall of Nations (Reprint ed.). Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific. ISBN 978-1-4102-0900-9.
- ^ Carlson, Elof Axel (2001). The Unfit: A History of a Bad Idea. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press. pp. 189–193. ISBN 9780879695873.
- ^ Carlson, Elof Axel (2001). The Unfit: A History of a Bad Idea. Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press. ISBN 9780879695873.
- ^
- Min, Alex (18 November 2020). "Racist Pseudoscience Has No Place At Harvard". Harvard Political Review.
Lynn is a self-described 'scientific racist'...
- Sehgal, Parul (12 February 2020). "Charles Murray Returns, Nodding to Caution but Still Courting Controversy". The New York Times.
Richard Lynn, for example, a self-described 'scientific racist,' ...
- Evans, Gavin (2 March 2018). "The unwelcome revival of 'race science'". The Guardian.
...Richard Lynn, who has described himself as a 'scientific racist'.
- Min, Alex (18 November 2020). "Racist Pseudoscience Has No Place At Harvard". Harvard Political Review.
- ^ a b Fischbach, Karl-Friedrich; Niggeschmidt, Martin (2022). "Do the Dumb Get Dumber and the Smart Get Smarter?". Heritability of Intelligence. Springer. pp. 37–39. doi:10.1007/978-3-658-35321-6_9. ISBN 978-3-658-35321-6. S2CID 244640696.
Since the nineteenth century, a 'race deterioration' has been repeatedly predicted as a result of the excessive multiplication of less gifted people. Nevertheless, the educational and qualification level of people in the industrialized countries has risen strongly. The fact that the 'test intelligence' has also significantly increased, is difficult to explain for supporters of the dysgenic thesis: they suspect that the 'phenotypic intelligence' has increased for environmental reasons, while the 'genotypic quality' secretly decreases. There is neither evidence nor proof for this theory.
Citations in original omitted. - ^ Lynn, Richard (1997). Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations (PDF). Praeger Publishers. ISBN 9780275949174.
- ^ Conley, Dalton; Laidley, Thomas; Belsky, Daniel W.; Fletcher, Jason M.; Boardman, Jason D.; Domingue, Benjamin W. (14 June 2016). "Assortative mating and differential fertility by phenotype and genotype across the 20th century". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 113 (24): 6647–6652. Bibcode:2016PNAS..113.6647C. doi:10.1073/pnas.1523592113. PMC 4914190. PMID 27247411.
- ^ Bratsberg, Bernt; Rogeberg, Ole (26 June 2018). "Flynn effect and its reversal are both environmentally caused". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 115 (26): 6674–6678. Bibcode:2018PNAS..115.6674B. doi:10.1073/pnas.1718793115. PMC 6042097. PMID 29891660.
- ^ Neisser, Ulric (1998). The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures. American Psychological Association. pp. xiii–xiv. ISBN 978-1557985033.
There is no convincing evidence that any dysgenic trend exists. . . . It turns out, counterintuitively, that differential birth rates (for groups scoring high and low on a trait) do not necessarily produce changes in the population mean.
- ^ Wilmoth, John R. (1997). "Review of Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations". Population and Development Review. 23 (3): 664–666. doi:10.2307/2137584. ISSN 0098-7921. JSTOR 2137584.
Dysgenics
View on GrokipediaDefinition and Conceptual Foundations
Core Principles
Dysgenics describes the genetic deterioration of populations through natural or relaxed selection pressures that favor the reproduction of individuals with lower-quality alleles for heritable traits, particularly those influencing cognitive ability and overall fitness. This process arises when modern societal interventions—such as advanced healthcare, welfare systems, and reduced mortality—equalize survival rates across genotypes while fertility differentials persist, allowing less adaptive traits to increase in frequency over generations. Coined in 1915 by Caleb Saleeby to denote the inverse of eugenic improvement, dysgenics emphasizes empirical patterns of reproduction rather than intentional policy.[10][11] Central to the concept is the high heritability of intelligence, estimated at 0.7–0.8 from twin, adoption, and genomic studies in adulthood, indicating that genetic factors substantially determine variance in cognitive traits. In parallel, robust evidence documents a negative correlation between intelligence and fertility: higher-IQ individuals consistently produce fewer offspring, a pattern observed across Western cohorts born from 1900 to 1979 in the United States, where the relation between IQ and completed family size remained inverse for both sexes but stronger in females.[12] Internationally, this manifests as a -0.73 correlation between national average IQ and total fertility rates, exerting downward selective pressure on genotypic intelligence.[5] Consequently, dysgenic fertility implies a gradual erosion of population-level genetic quality, with models estimating a decline of approximately 0.5–1 IQ point per generation in industrialized nations due to these unchecked differentials. This is compounded by assortative mating among high-ability pairs, which concentrates but does not offset the broader reproductive imbalance favoring lower-ability groups, as evidenced by persistent class-based fertility gradients where lower socioeconomic strata—correlating with reduced cognitive metrics—exhibit higher birth rates. Such trends, documented in meta-analyses spanning decades, underscore the principle that absent countervailing mechanisms like migration or policy interventions, heritable advantages diminish under relaxed selection.[8][13]Relation to Eugenics and Fitness
Dysgenics represents the converse process to eugenics, whereby genetic quality in a population deteriorates rather than improves through differential reproduction favoring less adaptive traits. The term "dysgenics" was coined in 1915 by Caleb Saleeby as an antonym to "eugenics," denoting the proliferation of genetically inferior or "ill-bred" characteristics in contrast to the "well-bred" enhancement sought by eugenic policies.[1] While eugenics, as formulated by Francis Galton in the late 19th century, advocated selective breeding or incentives to increase the prevalence of desirable heritable traits such as intelligence and health, dysgenics describes the inverse outcome where environmental and social factors enable higher reproduction among individuals with lower genetic fitness.[10] In biological terms, fitness refers to an organism's capacity to survive and reproduce, thereby propagating its genes to subsequent generations; dysgenics arises when this fitness metric decouples from genotypic quality due to relaxed natural selection.[1] Modern advancements in medicine, welfare systems, and public health have increased survival and fertility rates among those with heritable disadvantages—such as lower cognitive ability, higher disease susceptibility, or reduced impulse control—while high-fitness individuals often delay or limit reproduction due to socioeconomic pressures.[10] This results in a net accumulation of deleterious alleles, or genetic load, diminishing average population fitness over generations.[1] For instance, psychologist Richard Lynn's analysis of fertility differentials in industrialized nations documents dysgenic trends, including an estimated 0.9 to 1.5 IQ point decline per generation attributable to higher birth rates among lower-IQ cohorts, as IQ exhibits substantial heritability (around 0.8 in adulthood) and correlates with overall life-history fitness.[10][1] The relation underscores a reversal of evolutionary pressures: whereas eugenics sought artificial alignment with natural selection to elevate fitness, dysgenics reflects anthropogenic overrides that prioritize phenotypic survival over genotypic propagation, potentially eroding adaptations honed over millennia.[10] Empirical patterns, such as inverse correlations between socioeconomic status (a proxy for genetic fitness via traits like conscientiousness and intelligence) and fertility since the 19th century, illustrate this dynamic across Western populations, with similar observations in studies of educational attainment and completed family size.[1] Although critics attribute such trends partly to environmental confounders, the persistence of heritability estimates for affected traits supports a genetic component to the deterioration.[10]Scope of Affected Traits
Dysgenics encompasses heritable traits subject to negative selection, where lower-quality variants proliferate due to higher fertility among carriers of those variants. The scope primarily includes polygenic traits with substantial genetic components and established inverse correlations with reproductive success, such as general cognitive ability, certain personality dimensions, and aspects of physical and mental health. Traits unaffected or positively selected, like those enhanced by modern medical interventions without fertility penalties, fall outside this scope. Empirical focus has centered on intelligence due to its high heritability (around 0.8 in adulthood) and consistent dysgenic gradients observed globally.[14][8] General intelligence, measured by IQ or g-factor loadings, exhibits the strongest evidence of dysgenic decline, with meta-analyses confirming a negative correlation between cognitive ability and fertility across diverse populations, including Western, Asian, and developing countries. For instance, completed fertility data from cohorts born between 1900 and 1960 show women with IQs above 130 producing about 20-30% fewer children than those below 70, yielding selection differentials of -0.2 to -0.4 standard deviations per generation. Richard Lynn's analysis of such patterns estimates a genotypic IQ loss of 0.9 to 1.5 points per decade in industrialized nations during the 20th century, driven by educational and socioeconomic barriers to reproduction among high-IQ individuals. This effect persists into the 21st century, as polygenic scores for educational attainment—a strong proxy for IQ—reveal similar fertility disadvantages.[8][1][15] Personality traits, particularly those in the Big Five framework, extend the scope beyond cognition. Conscientiousness, which encompasses self-discipline and work ethic (heritability ~0.4-0.5), shows dysgenic trends, as lower scores align with higher unplanned fertility and reduced impulse control. Lynn documents this through twin studies and cohort data, linking it to broader behavioral genetics where impulsivity and low future orientation predict larger family sizes. Extraversion may exhibit milder negative selection, while agreeableness shows inconsistent patterns. These traits often covary with intelligence, amplifying compound declines via assortative mating.[1][16] Health and physical traits represent a secondary but significant domain, influenced by relaxed natural selection and rising genetic load from de novo mutations. Polygenic risk scores for conditions like depression, cardiovascular disease, and autoimmune disorders indicate higher fertility among carriers of deleterious alleles, as modern welfare reduces mortality penalties without curbing reproduction. Anthropometric traits, such as height (heritability ~0.8), display weak dysgenic signals in some datasets, though nutrition confounds phenotypic trends. Lynn argues that overall mutation load increases by 1-3% per generation under reduced selection, elevating heritable disease prevalence beyond intelligence or personality effects.[15][17][1]Historical Development
Early Theoretical Roots
Charles Darwin laid foundational concerns for dysgenics in his 1871 work The Descent of Man, where he highlighted how civilized societies disrupt natural selection by preserving and enabling reproduction among the physically and mentally weak. Darwin noted that practices like asylums, poor laws, vaccination, and advanced medicine prevent the elimination of unfit individuals, contrasting this with savage societies where the weak perish early, thereby stating, "Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind. No one who has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be highly injurious to the race of man." He analogized this to the rapid degeneration observed in poorly managed domestic breeds, warning that unchecked sympathy and aid could erode human vigor without compensatory measures. Preceding Darwin, French psychiatrist Bénédict Augustin Morel introduced degeneration theory in his 1857 treatise Traité des dégénerescences physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l'espèce humaine, positing a hereditary mechanism where environmental insults—such as alcoholism, poor nutrition, or urban squalor—initiate a downward spiral of physical, intellectual, and moral decline across generations. Morel's framework emphasized progressive deterioration from an initial "primitive" state, framing mental illnesses as heritable outcomes of such degeneration, influencing later evolutionary interpretations of population decline.[18] Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin, built on these ideas by coining "eugenics" in 1883 to advocate deliberate positive selection as a counter to dysgenic drift in modern populations, recognizing that fertility patterns favored the less capable amid relaxed natural pressures. Galton argued for societal incentives to boost reproduction among the intellectually and physically superior, viewing unchecked trends as eroding inherited quality, a perspective rooted in statistical analyses of eminent families and their reproductive rates.[10] The explicit term "dysgenics" emerged later in 1915, coined by Caleb Saleeby to denote genetic deterioration opposing eugenic improvement.[1]20th Century Formulation and Concerns
The term dysgenics was coined in 1915 by British physician Caleb Saleeby to denote the process of genetic deterioration resulting from the disproportionate loss of higher-quality individuals during World War I, as combat casualties selectively removed fitter men from the reproductive pool while the physically or mentally unfit were often exempt from service and left to propagate.[10] This formulation built on the broader eugenics framework established by Francis Galton in the late 19th century, but shifted emphasis to the active unraveling of genetic fitness under modern conditions, including relaxed natural selection due to medical advances and welfare systems that enabled survival and reproduction of those with deleterious traits.[1] Saleeby's usage highlighted causal mechanisms like differential mortality, where "the less endowed fellows, medically rejected from military service, because of defects in stature, eyesight, hearing, mentality, &c, are left at home at stud," potentially lowering population averages for adaptive qualities.[19] Empirical concerns crystallized around dysgenic fertility differentials, with data from the United States and Europe showing consistently higher birth rates among lower socioeconomic classes and intelligence levels from the late 19th century onward. For instance, analyses of U.S. birth cohorts from 1900 to 1950 confirmed a negative relationship between intelligence and fertility, with the trend intensifying in the early 20th century as urban-industrial changes amplified class-based reproductive disparities—higher-status families averaged fewer children while lower-status groups reproduced more prolifically.[20] Similar patterns emerged in Britain, where biometrician Karl Pearson documented inverse correlations between social class and family size as early as 1903, projecting a gradual decline in national intelligence if unchecked.[1] These observations fueled alarms within eugenics organizations, such as the U.S. Eugenics Record Office founded in 1910, which amassed pedigrees demonstrating elevated reproduction among those classified as "feeble-minded" or criminally inclined, estimating potential IQ losses of 1-2 points per generation.[10] Broader apprehensions encompassed immigration and wartime losses as accelerators of dysgenics, with proponents arguing that unrestricted influxes from regions with lower average cognitive abilities—evidenced by army testing data like the U.S. Alpha and Beta exams during World War I showing disparities among immigrant groups—threatened host populations' genetic stock.[1] World War I intensified these fears, as eugenicists in Europe and the U.S. calculated dysgenic gradients from casualty statistics: in Britain, officer death rates exceeded enlisted men's by factors of 2-3, implying a net reduction in heritable leadership and vigor traits.[21] Such concerns underpinned policy advocacy, including sterilization statutes enacted in over 20 U.S. states by the mid-1920s to restrict reproduction by the hereditarily impaired, as upheld in the 1927 Supreme Court case Buck v. Bell, where Justice Holmes invoked preventing "three generations of imbeciles" from perpetuating dysgenic cycles.[10] These formulations prioritized heritable causation over environmental explanations, positing that unchecked differentials would erode traits like intelligence and impulse control essential for civilizational maintenance.[20]Post-1945 Evolution and Suppression
Following World War II, the discreditation of eugenics due to its association with Nazi racial hygiene programs extended to dysgenics, as both concepts emphasized differential genetic selection pressures on human populations. The Nuremberg trials (1945–1946) publicized coerced sterilizations and genocidal applications, prompting international bodies like UNESCO to issue statements in 1950 and 1951 rejecting biological determinism in human variation, which indirectly marginalized discussions of dysgenic fertility patterns.[22] Despite this, population geneticists continued to document inverse correlations between socioeconomic status, intelligence, and fertility in developed nations, attributing potential genetic decline to relaxed natural selection under modern welfare systems.[1] In Britain, the Galton Professorship of Eugenics at University College London, established in 1911, was assumed by Lionel Penrose in 1945, who reframed it as the Professorship of Human Genetics to excise eugenic connotations and rejected claims of dysgenic deterioration in intelligence or mental health, emphasizing multifactorial causation including environment.[23] Penrose's influence contributed to the British Eugenics Society's rebranding as the Galton Institute by 1989, signaling a shift from advocacy to neutral genetic research, though internal debates persisted on fertility differentials into the 1960s.[1] Similarly, in the United States, eugenics organizations like the American Eugenics Society dissolved or pivoted by the 1970s, amid growing emphasis on phenotypic IQ gains (later termed the Flynn effect, observed from the 1930s onward) as evidence against genotypic decline.[22] Prominent post-war proponents faced institutional resistance. Nobel laureate William Shockley, in lectures and a 1972 paper, argued for dysgenic trends driven by higher reproduction rates among lower-IQ groups, estimating a 5–10 IQ point generational loss without intervention, and advocated voluntary sperm banks for high-ability donors; his views led to protests, denied promotions at Stanford, and accusations of racism, culminating in professional isolation by the late 1970s.[24] Shockley's experience exemplified broader suppression, where hereditarian research encountered publication barriers and funding cuts, often reframed as environmental artifacts despite heritability estimates exceeding 0.5 for intelligence from twin studies resuming in the 1950s.[1] By the 1980s–1990s, dysgenics discourse revived marginally through syntheses like Richard Lynn's 1996 book, which cataloged fertility data showing negative gradients with IQ (e.g., 0.2–0.3 fewer children per IQ point in U.S. and European cohorts from 1950–1990), but such works were published by specialized outlets amid mainstream dismissal as ideologically tainted.[1] Academic gatekeeping, including historians like Daniel Kevles declaring eugenics "dead" in 1985, prioritized nurture-based explanations, sidelining empirical fertility-IQ correlations documented in national surveys (e.g., U.S. National Longitudinal Surveys from 1979).[1] This suppression reflected a post-war consensus favoring egalitarian interpretations, despite persistent data on dysgenic selection in economically developed populations, where total fertility rates fell below replacement (e.g., 1.8 in the U.S. by 1976) while class-based differentials widened.[25]Underlying Mechanisms
Heritability of Key Traits
Heritability estimates for general cognitive ability, often measured via IQ tests, range from approximately 50% in childhood to 80% in adulthood, based on meta-analyses of twin studies encompassing over 14 million individuals across thousands of traits.[26] These figures derive from comparisons of monozygotic and dizygotic twins, where genetic similarity explains a substantial portion of variance after accounting for shared environments.[27] Recent genome-wide association studies (GWAS) corroborate this, identifying polygenic scores that predict up to 10-15% of cognitive variance directly from genetic data, with broader heritability likely underestimated due to incomplete variant capture.[28] Personality traits relevant to reproductive fitness and social functioning, such as those in the Big Five model (e.g., conscientiousness, extraversion), show moderate to high heritabilities of 40-60%, as synthesized from twin and adoption studies.[29] These estimates hold across diverse populations and measurement methods, indicating genetic influences on traits like impulsivity and agreeableness that correlate with fertility patterns and life outcomes.[30] GWAS efforts further reveal hundreds of associated loci, underscoring a polygenic architecture akin to cognitive ability.[31] Behavioral traits linked to dysgenic concerns, including antisocial behavior and criminality, exhibit heritabilities of 30-50%, with genetic factors interacting with environmental triggers like early adversity.[32] Impulsivity, a component of externalizing behaviors, similarly shows around 40% heritability from twin designs, predicting risks for maladaptive reproduction and societal costs.[33] Meta-analyses of aggression, often overlapping with criminality, estimate 50% genetic variance, emphasizing additive genetic effects over dominance or epistasis.[34] Physical health and longevity traits display lower heritabilities, typically 20-30%, though recent analyses adjusting for assortative mating and cohort effects suggest up to 50% intrinsic genetic contribution to lifespan variation.[35][36] Disease resistance and metabolic health indicators, such as cardiovascular resilience, follow similar patterns, with GWAS identifying variants explaining modest fractions of variance amid strong gene-environment interplay.[37] These estimates imply that while environmental factors dominate phenotypic expression, genetic selection on such traits can accumulate over generations under differential fertility.Fertility Differentials and Selection Pressures
Fertility differentials refer to systematic variations in reproductive rates across populations stratified by traits such as intelligence, education, and socioeconomic status (SES), where lower-performing groups consistently exhibit higher fertility. In modern developed societies, empirical data indicate a persistent negative correlation between intelligence—often measured by IQ—and number of children, with correlations typically ranging from -0.05 to -0.09 in U.S. cohorts from 1900 to 1979.[12] This pattern extends globally, with a cross-national correlation of -0.73 between average IQ and total fertility rates, implying stronger dysgenic pressures in lower-IQ nations.[5] Education serves as a proxy for cognitive ability, and women with college education experience approximately 12% fewer children by age 41 compared to those without, reinforcing the inverse relationship.[38] These differentials generate selection pressures that favor traits associated with higher fertility, often at the expense of heritable qualities like intelligence, which has a heritability estimate of 0.5–0.8 in adulthood. In pre-industrial societies, higher SES and intelligence correlated positively with fertility due to resource advantages, but industrialization and welfare systems have inverted this, decoupling survival from reproductive success and allowing lower-IQ individuals to have more surviving offspring.[5] A 2025 international meta-analysis of 47 studies across regions found consistent negative fertility-IQ associations, projecting an average national IQ decline of 0.35 points per decade, with steeper drops in Latin America, Iran, and Turkey.[39] U.S.-specific analyses estimate genotypic IQ losses of 0.3–1.2 points per generation from such patterns, as lower-IQ groups contribute disproportionately to the next generation's gene pool.[6] SES further amplifies these pressures, with lower-income and less-educated strata showing higher fertility rates; for instance, state-level data in the U.S. reveal negative correlations between SAT-derived IQ estimates and fertility indicators from 2000 onward.[40] While some studies note weak or absent dysgenic effects in isolated populations like Sweden, the preponderance of evidence across diverse cohorts supports ongoing negative selection on cognitive traits, potentially eroding population-level genetic quality absent countervailing forces like assortative mating or immigration.[8] This reversal of historical selection—where intelligence once enhanced fitness—arises from modern disincentives for high-ability reproduction, including delayed childbearing and opportunity costs, leading to a gradual accumulation of alleles disadvantageous for complex problem-solving.[4]Role of Genetic Load and Mutations
Genetic load refers to the cumulative reduction in a population's mean fitness attributable to the presence of deleterious alleles, including those arising from recurrent mutations.[41] In the context of dysgenics, genetic load accumulates when purifying selection is weakened, as occurs in modern environments with advanced healthcare, sanitation, and social welfare systems that enable individuals carrying higher loads to survive and reproduce at rates closer to those without such burdens.[42] This relaxation permits the persistence and transmission of mildly deleterious variants that would otherwise be culled, exacerbating the load over generations.[43] De novo mutations, occurring at a rate of approximately 50-100 per diploid genome per generation in humans, predominantly contribute to this load, with estimates indicating that 70-80% of new mutations are deleterious to fitness.[44] These mutations often affect complex traits via polygenic effects, subtly eroding heritable components of intelligence, physical health, and behavioral adaptability rather than causing outright lethal disorders.[45] Empirical genomic analyses reveal an increasing mutational load in contemporary human populations, with per-generation accumulation of deleterious variants detectable across diverse cohorts, supporting the hypothesis of ongoing load buildup independent of selection differentials.[45] For instance, slightly deleterious mutations, which comprise the majority, fix at rates that imply a high variance in individual fitness, potentially slowing adaptive evolution while amplifying dysgenic pressures.[42] The interplay between mutation input and load manifests in observable declines; models incorporating realistic human mutation rates (U_d > 1 deleterious per generation) predict substantial fitness erosion unless offset by rare beneficial variants or strong linkage disequilibrium, neither of which fully mitigates the trend in low-selection regimes.[46] Studies estimate that paternal age alone introduces additional mutations correlating with reduced offspring cognitive ability, compounding load effects on population-level traits like general intelligence (g), where each extra de novo mutation may subtract measurable IQ points.[43] This mechanism underscores a "mutation load paradox," wherein unchecked accumulation could theoretically render much of the population reproductively unfit within centuries, though real-world buffering via residual selection tempers but does not eliminate the risk.[47]Empirical Evidence
Declines in Intelligence Metrics
Empirical observations indicate a reversal of the Flynn effect, whereby average IQ scores in several developed nations have declined following decades of gains. In Norway, analysis of over 700,000 male military conscripts born between 1962 and 1991 revealed an average IQ increase from 99.5 to 102.3 up to the 1975 cohort, followed by a decline of approximately 7 IQ points by the 1991 cohort, equating to about 0.3 points per year.[48] Similar trends appear in the United States, where a Northwestern University study of a large sample from 2006 to 2018 documented declines in verbal reasoning, matrix reasoning, and letter/number sequencing tasks, with gains only in one subcategory (figure weights).[49] A meta-analysis of nine studies confirmed reverse Flynn effects ranging from -0.38 to -4.3 IQ points per decade in various cohorts.[50] These phenotypic declines align with dysgenic pressures from negative correlations between intelligence and fertility. Richard Lynn estimated a global genotypic IQ reduction of 0.86 points from 1950 to 2000, driven by a -0.73 correlation between national IQ and fertility rates, with lower-IQ groups exhibiting higher reproduction.[5] In the United States, Lynn's examination of birth cohorts from 1900 to 1979 showed consistent negative fertility-IQ relations, projecting a dysgenic loss of roughly 0.5-1 IQ point per generation after accounting for the Flynn effect.[51] Studies in Iceland, the UK, and the US corroborate this, estimating generational IQ declines of 0.3 to 0.9 points attributable to differential fertility, where higher-IQ individuals have fewer children.[6]| Study/Region | Estimated IQ Decline | Time Period/Key Cohorts | Attribution to Dysgenics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Norway (Conscripts) | ~7 points total (post-1975 cohorts) | 1975–1991 births | Partial; phenotypic, but consistent with selection pressures[48] |
| Global (Lynn) | 0.86 points genotypic | 1950–2000 | Dysgenic fertility (-0.73 IQ-fertility correlation)[5] |
| US Cohorts (Lynn) | 0.5–1 point/generation | 1900–1979 births | Negative fertility-IQ link across cohorts[51] |
| US Sample (Northwestern) | Declines in multiple subtests | 2006–2018 | Reverse Flynn; dysgenic contribution inferred from fertility data[49] |
