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Nursultan Nazarbayev
Nursultan Nazarbayev
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Key Information

Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev[2][a] (born 6 July 1940) is a Kazakh politician who served as the first president of Kazakhstan from 1991 to 2019. He also held the special title of Elbasy[b] from 2010 to 2022 and chairman of the Security Council from 1991 to 2022.[3][4][5]

Nazarbayev’s political career began in the Soviet era, where he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1962 while working as a steel factory worker. Rising through the party ranks, he became Prime Minister of the Kazakh SSR in 1984 and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in 1989. In 1990, the Supreme Soviet elected him as the president of Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev played a key role in navigating Kazakhstan through the dissolution of the Soviet Union, leading to the country's independence in 1991. In the country’s first direct 1991 presidential election, Nazarbayev appeared on the ballot without opposition and secured an overwhelming victory. In 1995, ruling by decree, Nazarbayev extended his presidency through a referendum and adopted a new constitution that expanded his powers. He was re-elected in 1999, deemed eligible to run again in 2005 by a Supreme Court ruling, and benefited from a 2007 constitutional amendment solely exempting term limits for him, allowing re-elections in 2011 and 2015.

Under Nazarbayev's rule, Kazakhstan experienced substantial economic growth, driven by high oil prices and market-oriented reforms. His policies focused on modernizing infrastructure, attracting foreign investment, and positioning Kazakhstan as an economic hub in Central Asia. On the international stage, he prioritized strong ties with global powers and Kazakhstan's integration into regional and global organizations, including the Eurasian Economic Union and the World Trade Organization. Nazarbayev also gained recognition for his efforts in nuclear disarmament, renouncing Kazakhstan’s inherited nuclear arsenal, and closing the Semipalatinsk Test Site. However, his presidency was also marked by widespread corruption, nepotism, kleptocracy, and economic challenges, such as the Great Recession, the 2010s oil glut, and economic repercussions from the Russo-Ukrainian War. These issues contributed to inflation and the devaluation of the national currency, the tenge, while undermining transparency and governance.

In March 2019, following a wave of protests and increasing discontent, Nazarbayev announced his resignation, handing over power to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Tokayev was elected president in a snap election in June 2019. While Nazarbayev stepped down from the presidency, he remained a powerful figure in Kazakh politics, retaining influence through his leadership of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan and the Nur Otan party. He also chaired the Security Council until his dismissal in 2022.[6] Nazarbayev’s power was diminished following the 2022 unrest, which led to a constitutional referendum that stripped him of many privileges and titles, including his membership in the Senate and the Constitutional Council. By 2023, he had lost most of his official titles, signaling the end of his political dominance.[7]

Nazarbayev was one of the longest-ruling non-royal leaders in the world, having led Kazakhstan for nearly three decades, excluding chairmanship in the Security Council after the end of his presidency. He has often been referred to as a dictator due to his consolidation of power and autocratic rule. While he is credited with fostering economic growth and political stability in Kazakhstan, his tenure was marred by widespread authoritarianism, significant human rights abuses, and systemic corruption.[8][9][10][11] His leadership was further characterized by a pervasive cult of personality, with his image and influence deeply entrenched in the nation’s political and social landscape.[12][13][14]

Early life and career

[edit]

Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakh pronunciation) was born in Chemolgan, a village near Almaty, when Kazakhstan was one of the republics of the Soviet Union, to parents Äbiş Nazarbayev (1903–1970) and Äljan Nazarbayeva (1910–1978).[15] His father Äbish was a poor labourer who worked for a wealthy local family until Soviet rule confiscated the family's farmland in the 1930s during Joseph Stalin's collectivization policy.[16] Following this, his father took the family to the mountains to live out a nomadic existence.[17] His family's religious tradition was Sunni Islam.[citation needed]

Äbiş avoided compulsory military service due to a withered arm he had sustained when putting out a fire.[18] At the end of World War II, the family returned to the village of Chemolgan where in 1948, Nazarbayev began attending school and being taught the Russian language; while living with his paternal uncle, as his parents had not owned dwelling in the place for a brief period. Nazarbayev later himself chose to settle in the upper part of Chemolgan where mainly ethnic Russians lived, in order to master Russian while communicating with them.[19][20] Despite performing well at school, by the time Nazarbayev was in 10th grade, all the classes in the same grade were called off due to a student shortage and as a result in 1957, he was sent to a boarding school named after Abai Qunanbaiuly in Kaskelen.[20][21] During that time, Nazarbayev's father, Äbiş, wished to create favourable conditions towards his son for studying and living as well as to potentially avoid bad influence from peers by renting himself an apartment for Nazarbayev in the village.[20]

After leaving school, Nazarbayev took up a one-year, government-funded scholarship at the Karaganda Steel Mill in Temirtau.[22] He also spent time training at a steel plant in Dniprodzerzhynsk, and therefore was away from Temirtau when riots broke out there over working conditions.[22] By the age of 20, he was earning a relatively good wage doing "incredibly heavy and dangerous work" in the blast furnace.[23] From there, Nazarbayev married Sara Nazarbayeva on 25 August 1962, who was a dispatcher at the same steel mill that he worked in.[24] Together, both parties would eventually have three daughters: Dariga, Dinara and Aliya, born in 1963, 1968 and 1980, respectively.[24]

On 15 November 1962, Nazarbayev joined the Communist Party, becoming a prominent member of the Young Communist League (Komsomol)[23][25] and full-time worker for the party, while attending the Karagandy Polytechnic Institute.[26] He was appointed secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the Karaganda Metallurgical Kombinat in 1972, and four years later became Second Secretary of the Karaganda Regional Party Committee.[26]

In his role as a bureaucrat, Nazarbayev dealt with legal papers, logistical problems, and industrial disputes, as well as meeting workers to solve individual issues.[26] He later wrote that "the central allocation of capital investment and the distribution of funds" meant that infrastructure was poor, workers were demoralised and overworked, and centrally set targets were unrealistic; he saw the steel plant's problems as a microcosm for the problems for the Soviet Union as a whole.[27]

Rise to power

[edit]
Nazarbayev (front row, second from left) at the signing of the Alma-Ata Protocol, 21 December 1991

In 1984, at the age 43, Nazarbayev became the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan (Chairman of the Council of Ministers), the youngest-ever officeholder in the Soviet Union to serve the post, under Dinmukhamed Kunaev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.[28][29] During that period, the Perestroika policies slowly began to take place under Mikhail Gorbachev while Nazarbayev himself was viewed to be more of experienced policy maker as his views and stances had already been formed during the Khrushchev Thaw and 1965 Soviet economic reform.[30] Kazakhstan at that time was seen as a backwater republic within the Soviet Union with its industry being heavily reliant upon rich raw materials, specifically in mining sectors and was forced upon to import its consumer goods from other Soviet republics. It faced problems especially in countryside with a need for state farm repairs, as well as housing for farmers, lack of available preschools for rural children which Nazarbayev during his tenure raised issues in regard to these problems that was reportedly met with disagreements amongst the republic's leadership.[31]

Growing frustrated over the problems within the Kazakh SSR, at the 16th Session of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan held in January 1986, Nazarbayev criticized Askar Kunayev, head of the Academy of Sciences, for not reforming his department. Dinmukhamed, Nazarbayev's boss and Askar's brother, felt deeply angered and betrayed. Kunayev went to Moscow and demanded Nazarbayev's dismissal while Nazarbayev's supporters campaigned for Kunayev's dismissal and Nazarbayev's promotion.[citation needed]

Kunayev was ousted in 1986 and replaced by Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian, who despite his office, had little authority in Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev was named party leader and the top position (First Secretary of the Communist Party) on 22 June 1989,[28] only the second Kazakh (after Kunayev) to hold the post. He was the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet (head of state) from 22 February to 24 April 1990.[citation needed]

On 24 April 1990, Nazarbayev was elected as the first President of Kazakhstan by the Supreme Soviet. He supported Russian President Boris Yeltsin against the attempted coup in August 1991 by Soviet hardliners.[32] Nazarbayev was close enough to Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev for Gorbachev to consider him for the post of Vice President of the Soviet Union; however, Nazarbayev turned the offer down. However, on 29 July, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Nazarbayev discussed and decided that once the New Union Treaty was signed, Nazarbayev would replace Valentin Pavlov as Premier of the Soviet Union.[33]

The Soviet Union began disintegrating following the failed coup, though Nazarbayev was highly concerned with maintaining the close economic ties between Kazakhstan and Russia.[34] In the country's first presidential election, held on 1 December, he appeared alone on the ballot and won 95% of the vote.[35] On 16 December, Nazarbayev signed the Constitutional Law "On the State Independence of the Republic of Kazakhstan", which had been adopted earlier that day by the Supreme Soviet, formally establishing Kazakhstan as a sovereign state and making it the last Soviet republic to declare independence. Five days later, he joined other leaders in signing the Alma-Ata Protocol on 21 December, bringing Kazakhstan into the Commonwealth of Independent States.[36]

Presidency (1990–2019)

[edit]

1991–1999: First term

[edit]
Nazarbayev (three rows from left) at the 1992 World Economic Forum chaired by Henry Kissinger in Davos

Nazarbayev renamed the former State Defense Committees as the Ministry of Defense and appointed Sagadat Nurmagambetov as Defense Minister on 7 May 1992.

The Supreme Soviet, under the leadership of Chairman Serikbolsyn Abdilin, began debating over a draft constitution in June 1992. Opposition political parties Azat, Jeltoqsan and the Republican Party, held demonstrations in Alma-Ata from 10 to 17 June 1992 calling for the formation of a coalition government, resignation of Sergey Tereshchenko's government and the Supreme Soviet which, at that time, was composed of former Communist Party legislators who had yet to stand in an election.[37] The first constitution of Kazakhstan, adopted on 28 January 1993, created a strong executive branch with limited checks on executive power.[38]

On 10 December 1993, the Supreme Soviet voted to dissolve itself and that same day, a presidential decree was signed which set changes in local representative and executive bodies with elections of the mäslihats (local legislatures) taking place every five years and äkims (local heads) being appointed by the president. In March 1994, Kazakhstan for the first time since independence, held a legislative election which was boycotted by the Azat and Jeltoqsan parties. From there, the pro-presidential People's Union of Kazakhstan Unity party won a majority of 30 seats with independent candidates who were on presidential-list won 42 seats. The OSCE observers called the elections unfair, reporting an inflated voter turnout.[39] Nevertheless, the new composition of the Parliament was considered to be "professional" with different various political factions that functioned. In May 1994, the Supreme Council passed a vote of no confidence against Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko amidst political scandals evolving Tereshchenko and government ministers. Nazarbayev objected to the change, arguing that the Constitution gave the president the right to appoint the PM with already existing parliamentary confirmation regardless of the motion of confidence.[40] However, he eventually backed down, dismissing Tereshchenko's government in October 1994 and appointing ethnic-Kazakh Akezhan Kazhegeldin as the new PM.[40]

1993 Kazakh postage stamp of Nazarbayev

In 1994, Nazarbayev suggested relocating the capital city from Almaty to Astana, and the official changeover of the capital happened on 10 December 1997.[41]

In March 1995, the Constitutional Court ruled that 1994 legislative elections were held unconstitutionally and as a result, Nazarbayev dissolved the Supreme Council.[42] From that period, all bills were adopted on the basis of presidential decrees such as outlawing any civic participation in an unregistered and/or illegal public association who would be punished with 15-day jail sentence or fines from 5 to 10 times the minimum monthly wage in an effort "to fight organized crime."[39] An April 1995 referendum extended Nazarbayev's term, originally set to end in 1996, to until 2000. In August 1995, a referendum was held which allowed for greater presidential powers and established a bicameral Parliament as well. Both the elections for Mazhilis (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) were held in December 1995 which convened in January 1996.[43] Nazarbayev dismissed the accusations from critics of him personally dissolving the legislature by claiming that it was under Constitutional Court's orders, saying "the law is the law, and the President is obliged to abide by the constitution, otherwise, how will we build a rule-of-law state?" and that the cancellation of the 1996 presidential elections was made by the decision of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan arguing that "Western schemes do not work in our Eurasian expanses."[39]

In October 1997, Nazarbayev dismissed Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin from his post, which according to political experts was seen as a "power grab".[44] In his address, he criticized Kazhegeldin over his record reforms and in his place, Nazarbayev appointed Nurlan Balgimbayev, an oil engineer who prior served as an Oil and Gas Minister.[45]

1999–2006: Second term

[edit]
William Cohen and Nazarbayev in November 1997

On 7 October 1998, a number of amendments were made to the Constitution of Kazakhstan in which the term of office of the president was increased from 5 to 7 years as well as term limits. The changes also removed restriction on the maximum required age of a presidential candidate.[46] The following day on 8 October, Nazarbayev signed decree setting the election date for January 1999. He was reelected for second term by winning 81% of the vote in the first round, defeating his main challenger and former Supreme Council chairman Serikbolsyn Abdildin.[47] Abdildin himself in response refused to acknowledge the official results, insisting that they were falsified.[48]

In February 1999, several pro-presidential parties formed into one party named Otan.[49] At the Founding Congress of the party which was held on 1 March 1999, Nazarbayev was elected as the chairman. From there, he suggested that former PM Sergey Tereshchenko should take over the leading role, noting the constitutional limits on president's affiliation with political parties while Nazarbayev himself remained as de facto party leader.[50] In July 1999, Nazarbayev signed decree setting the date for the legislative elections.[51] The Otan, for the first time, participated in the elections, winning 23 seats. In the aftermath on 1 October 1999, Nazarbayev appointed Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as the PM after his predecessor Nurlan Balgimbayev had faced an increasing unpopularity amidst worsening economy and scandal revolving around an arms deal with North Korea.[52]

Nazarbayev appointed Altynbek Sarsenbayev, who at the time served as the Minister of Culture, Information and Concord, the Secretary of the Security Council, replacing Marat Tazhin, on 4 May 2001. Tazhin became the Chairman of the National Security Committee, replacing Alnur Mussayev. Mussayev became the head of the Presidential Security Service.[53]

In January 2002, Prime Minister Kassym-Jomart Tokayev resigned from his post and was subsequently appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary. Imangali Tasmagambetov took over Tokayev's role as the new PM which viewed as a response towards a political crisis which occurred following the formation of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan in November 2001 by several prominent Kazakh officials who called for political and democratic reforms.[54] Tasmagambetov's government was short-lived, facing opposition by the Parliament over his proposed policies on land privatisation which led to a motion of no confidence against him.[55] Tasmagambetov resigned in June 2003 and Nazarbayev appointed Daniyal Akhmetov to lead the government citing the reason "to intensify the pace of social and economic development."[56]

2006–2011: Third term

[edit]

In June 2000, the Constitutional Council announced its resolution which declared that Nazarbayev's second term was, in fact, his first due to the adaptation of the new Kazakh Constitution which took place in 1995 during Nazarbayev's first term. This allowed him the opportunity to run for another election as his term was set to end in 2007.[57]

On 4 December 2005, new presidential elections were held where Nazarbayev won by an overwhelming majority of 91.15% (from a total of 6,871,571 eligible participating voters) in the first round. Nazarbayev was sworn in for another seven-year term on 11 January 2006.[58]

In 2006, the Otan increased its ranks as all pro-presidential parties began merging into one. Nazarbayev supported the move, stating the need for there to be fewer, but stronger parties that "efficiently defend the interests of the population."[59] In December 2006, the Otan renamed itself into Nur Otan and on 4 July 2007, Nazarbayev was re-elected as the party's chairman.[49][60]

Amidst the political shakeup, Nazarbayev dismissed Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov in January 2007 and appointed Deputy PM Karim Massimov to the post. He stated that Massimov had the "sufficient knowledge and experience" to "develop Kazakhstan's successes."[61]

Nazarbayev with U.S. President George W. Bush at the White House in September 2006

On 18 May 2007, the Parliament of Kazakhstan approved a constitutional amendment which allowed the incumbent president—himself—to run for an unlimited number of five-year terms. This amendment applied specifically and only to Nazarbayev: the original constitution's prescribed maximum of two five-year terms will still apply to all future presidents of Kazakhstan.[62] That same year in August, legislative elections were held from which the Nur Otan won all the contested seats in the Mazhilis, eliminating any form of opposition which sparked controversy and criticism from international organizations and groups within the country.[63] In response, Kazakhstan introduced an amendment by allowing for a two-party system since any party that wins second place in race—regardless or not if it passes the 7% electoral threshold—would be guaranteed to have representation in the Parliament.[64]

Nazarbayev has always emphasized the role of education in the nation's social development. In order to make education affordable, on 13 January 2009, he introduced educational grant "Orken" for the talented youth of Kazakhstan. This decree was amended on 23 September 2016.[65]

In 2009, former UK Cabinet Minister Jonathan Aitken released a biography of the Kazakh leader entitled Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan. The book took a generally pro-Nazarbayev stance, asserting in the introduction that he is mostly responsible for the success of modern Kazakhstan.[66]

2011–2015: Fourth term

[edit]
Nazarbayev holding a speech in 2012

In April 2011, Nazarbayev ran for a fourth term, winning 95.5% of the vote during the first round with virtually no opposition candidates. Following his victory, he announced the need in finding an "optimal way of empowering parliament, increasing the government's responsibility and improving the electoral process."[67]

On 11 June 2011, Daniel Witt, Vice Chairman of the Eurasia Foundation, acknowledged the role of Nazarbayev and his political reforms:

"[President] Nazarbayev has led Kazakhstan through difficult times and into an era of prosperity and growth. He has demonstrated that he values his U.S. and Western alliances and is committed to achieving democratic governance."[68]

In December 2011, opponents of Nazarbayev rioted in Mangystau, described by the BBC as the biggest opposition movement of his time in power.[69] On 16 December 2011, demonstrations in the oil town of Zhanaozen clashed with police on the country's Independence Day.[70] Fifteen people were shot dead by security forces[71] and almost 100 people were injured. Protests quickly spread to other cities but then died down. The subsequent trial of demonstrators uncovered mass abuse and torture of detainees.[69]

Nazarbayev at the 2012 CSTO meeting in Moscow, Russia
Painting of Elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev in 2014

On 24 September 2012, Nazarbayev appointed Serik Akhmetov as the PM, a close-ally of Nazarbayev who served as First Deputy PM under Massimov's cabinet and the Äkim of Karaganda Region.[72] Massimov in turn, became the new head of the Presidential Administration.[73]

In December 2012, Nazarbayev outlined a forward-looking national strategy called the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy.[74]

In 2014, Nazarbayev proposed that Kazakhstan should change its name to "Kazakh Eli" ("Country of the Kazakhs"), for the country to attract better and more foreign investment, since "Kazakhstan" by its name is associated with other "-stan" countries. Nazarbayev suggested Mongolia receives more investment than Kazakhstan because it is not a "-stan" country, even though it is in the same neighborhood, and not as stable as Kazakhstan. However, he noted that decision should be decided by the people on whether the country should change its name.[clarification needed][75][76]

After Kazakhstan faced an economic downturn of which was caused by low oil prices and devaluation of the tenge, Nazarbayev on 2 April 2014 dismissed PM Serik Akhmetov and reappointed Karim Massimov to the post.[77] Akhmetov subsequently was appointed as a Defence Minister while Massimov's government was aimed at dealing with the economic crisis.[78]

2015–2019: Fifth and final term

[edit]

Nazarbayev for the last time ran again in the 2015 presidential election for the fifth term. From there, he gathered 97.7% of the vote share in the first round, making it one of the biggest in Kazakhstan's history.[79] In his victory speech, he emphasized the top priority in Nurly Zhol stimulus package that was designed in softening the social blow caused by economic troubles.[80] At a later news conference, Nazarbayev speaking about the electoral results remarked, "I apologize that for superdemocratic states such figures are unacceptable. But I could do nothing. If I had interfered, I would have looked undemocratic, right?"[81] The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe criticized the election as falling short of international democratic standards.[82]

In early 2016, it was announced that 1.7 million hectares of agricultural land would be sold at an auction. This sparked rare protests around the country which called for Nazarbayev to stop the momentum on land sales and solve the nation's problems as well. In response to the fears of the lands being sold to foreigners, especially Chinese, Nazarbayev fired back at claims, calling them "groundless" and warned that any provocateur would be punished.[83] On 1 May 2016, at the Kazakhstan People's Unity Day, Nazarbayev warned that without unity and stability, a crisis similarly in Ukraine would happen.[84] In June 2016, armed attacks in Aktobe took place resulting in deaths of 25 people. Nazarbayev called the incident as terrorist attacks which were orchestrated from abroad to destabilize the country similarly in a colour revolution to which he accused of being infiltrated by the ISIS militants.[85]

Nazarbayev with Vladimir Putin and Shavkat Mirziyoyev in October 2018

On 8 September 2016, Nazarbayev appointed Karim Massimov as the National Security Committee Chairman and Bakhytzhan Sagintayev to the post of the PM.[86] Days later on 13 September, Nazarbayev's daughter Dariga was appointed as the member of the Senate. This suggested that Nazarbayev was preparing for his succession to be taken over by Dariga as the cabinet reshuffling had occurred after Uzbek President Islam Karimov's death which created political uncertainty in the neighboring country.[87] Nazarbayev dismissed the claims of hereditary succession in an interview to the Bloomberg News in November 2016, saying that the "transfer of power is spelled out by the Constitution."[88]

In January 2017, Nazarbayev proposed constitutional reforms, which would allow for the Parliament to have greater role in decision making, calling it "a consistent and logical step in the development of the state".[89] The Parliament approved several amendments to the Constitution on 5 March 2017, making the president no longer able to override parliamentary votes of no-confidence, while giving the legislative branch to form a government cabinet, implementing state programs and policies. The move was seen as way by Nazarbayev to ensure the potential of a peaceful transfer of power.[90]

Nazarbayev, along with seventeen heads of state and government from around the world, which included Felipe VI of Spain and leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries, consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and India, attended the opening ceremony of Expo 2017 which was held in Astana.[91] An estimated 3.86 million people visited the site with Nazarbayev at the closing ceremony on 10 September 2017 calling it as "Kazakhstan's most brilliant achievements since its independence."[92]

Senate Chairman Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in an interview to BBC News in June 2018, suggested that Nazarbayev's term presidential from 2015 was in fact, the last one as he hinted the possibility that Nazarbayev would not run for re-election which was scheduled for 2020.[93] Minister of Information and Communications Dauren Abaev responded to Tokayev's statements claiming that "there's still a lot of time" for Nazarbayev to decide on whether to run for re-election pointing out that the decision will be primarily based on his. He also added that the country would only benefit if Nazarbayev chooses to run for sixth term.[94]

Resignation

[edit]

On 19 March 2019, following unusually persistent protests in cities across the country,[95] Nazarbayev announced his resignation as President of Kazakhstan, citing the need for "a new generation of leaders".[96] The announcement was broadcast in a televised address in Astana after which he signed a decree ending his powers from 20 March 2019.[96] Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, speaker of the upper house of parliament, was appointed as president of the country until the end of the presidential term.[96]

Notwithstanding his resignation as president, he continued to head the ruling Nur Otan party and remains a member of the Constitutional Council. In his televised address Nazarbayev pointed out that he had been granted the honorary status of elbasy (leader of the nation, leader of the people),[c] the title bestowed upon him by parliament in 2010.[95][97] The title was later removed due to the cancellation of the Law on the First President.[98]

Various colleagues of Nazarbayev reacted within hours of the announcement, with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev holding a telephone conversation with Nazarbayev, calling him a "great politician".[99][100] In a cabinet meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin praised Nazarbayev's leadership, even going as far as to say that the Eurasian Economic Union was Nazarbayev's "brainchild".[101] Other world leaders who sent messages to Nazarbayev included Ilham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan,[102] Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, and Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan.

According to Nazarbayev himself, he described his intention for stepping down was due to "peak of trust" by the people and that it was "necessary to leave", recalling his memories in attending funerals of Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko, embarking that "there is still a limit of human capabilities."[103]

Allegations of corruption

[edit]
Nazarbayev with Lee Myung-bak in Seoul, 2010

Over the course of Nazarbayev's presidency, an increasing number of accusations of corruption and favoritism were directed against Nazarbayev and his circle. Critics said that the country's government came to resemble a clan system.[104]

According to The New Yorker, in 1999 Swiss banking officials discovered $85 million in an account apparently belonging to Nazarbayev; the money, intended for the Kazakh treasury, had in part been transferred through accounts linked to James Giffen.[105] Subsequently, Nazarbayev successfully pushed for a parliamentary bill granting him legal immunity, as well as another designed to legalise money laundering, angering critics further.[105] When Kazakh opposition newspaper Respublika reported in 2002 that Nazarbayev had in the mid-1990s secretly stashed away $1 billion of state oil revenue in Swiss bank accounts, the decapitated carcass of a dog was left outside the newspaper's offices, with a warning reading "There won't be a next time"; the dog's head later turned up outside editor Irina Petrushova's apartment, with a warning reading "There will be no last time."[106][107][108] The newspaper was firebombed as well.[108]

Nazarbayev with President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, President of Finland Tarja Halonen and Prime Minister of Spain José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in 2011

In May 2007, the Parliament of Kazakhstan approved a constitutional amendment which would allow Nazarbayev to seek re-election as many times as he wishes. This amendment applies specifically and only to Nazarbayev, since it states that the first president will have no limits on how many times he can run for office, but subsequent presidents will be restricted to a five-year term.[109]

As of 2015, Kazakhstan has never held an election meeting international standards.[110][111]

In May 2018, the Parliament of Kazakhstan passed a constitutional amendment allowing Nazarbayev to serve as Chairman of the Security Council for life. These reforms, which were approved by the Constitutional Council on 28 June, also expanded the powers of the Security Council, granting it the status of a constitutional body. The amendment states that, "The decisions of the security council and the chairman of the security council are mandatory and are subject to strict execution by state bodies, organisations and officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan."[112]

In December 2020, according to an investigative report by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, it identified at least $785 million in European and U.S. real estate purchases made by Nazarbaev's family members and their in-laws in six countries over a 20-year span. This figure includes a handful of properties that have since been sold, including multimillion-dollar apartments in the United States bought by Nazarbaev's brother, Bolat. It does not include a sprawling Spanish estate owned by Kulibaev, for which a purchase price could not be found.[113]

Domestic policy

[edit]

Economic issues

[edit]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan faced mass unemployment and emigration.[114] Nazarbayev was viewed to have followed Russia's economic reforms starting with price liberalisations.[115] On 3 January 1992, he signed a decree "On measures to liberalise prices", an attempt to stabilise the country's socio-economic situation and form a market economy within Kazakhstan.[116] This resulted in a rapid inflation of goods, causing discontent amongst citizens, thus forcing Nazarbayev on 12 January to sign a "On additional measures for social protection of the population in the context of price liberalisation" which established partial state-regulated prices on bread, bakery products and flour.[116]

Throughout the 1990s, privatisation and banking reforms took place in Kazakhstan. In June 1994, Nazarbayev amended the Parliament's Economic Memorandum for the next three years, which has been defined as an economic strategy. It included strict measures to reform the economy and establish macroeconomic stability and set the task of carrying out rapid and vigorous privatization. During the introduction of the National Bank of Kazakhstan in December 1993, significant changes were made in which all specialized banks were transformed into a joint stock company, and the National Bank was granted a number of powers. In March 1995, Nazarbayev signed decree setting the National Bank as an independent entity that is accountable only for the head of state.[117]

Kazakhstan managed to avoid full impact from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 1998 Russian financial crisis, due to lack of high liquid investments. Nazarbayev pledged for to continue in advancing for an "independent, open and free market economy."[118] Starting from early 2000's, the Kazakh economy faced huge growth thanks to its development in energy sector and high oil prices. Nazarbayev published his manifesto: Prosperity, Security and the Ever-Growing Welfare of all Kazakhstanis in 2000, where he wrote that "today we are building a new state, a new market economy and a new democracy, and this—at the very time when many other independent states have already trodden that path similar enough."[119]

In October 2008, during the 2008 financial crisis, Nazarbayev assured the nation that it would deal with the crisis by introducing a rescue package amounted to 10% of the country's GDP, of which was funded thanks in part to the national sovereign wealth fund.[120] In his state of address on 6 March 2009, he announced 350,000 jobs for workers in the spheres of infrastructure projects as well as the creation of the Eurasian Land Bridge.

Since 2014, Nazarbayev has set strategic priority in Kazakhstan for economic diversification which would maintain the country's stability by avoiding the effects from its oil export reliance that would affect the economy through its constant price downfalls.[121]

Eurasian Economic Union
[edit]
The signing ceremony of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union (in Astana, Kazakhstan, on 29 May 2014)

In 1994, Nazarbayev suggested the idea of creating a "Eurasian Union" during a speech at Moscow State University.[122][123][124] On 29 May 2014, alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, Nazarbayev signed the founding treaty of the Eurasian Union (EEU) in Astana, paving the way for the transition from their current customs union to the full-fledged EEU on 1 January 2015.[125] Nazarbayev named Honorary Chairman of Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in May 2019.[126]

Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy
[edit]
Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy logo

Nazarbayev unveiled in his 2012 State of the Nation the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, a long-term strategy to ensure future growth prospects of Kazakhstan, and position Kazakhstan as one of the top 30 most developed nations in the world.[127]

Nurly Zhol
[edit]

President Nazarbayev unveiled in 2014 a multibillion-dollar domestic modernization and reformation plan called Nurly Zhol – The Path to the Future.[128] It was officially approved by the Decree of the President on 6 April 2015. The goal of the plan was for development and improvement of tourist, industrial and housing infrastructure, create 395,500 new jobs, and increase the GDP growth rate 15.7 by 2019.[129]

In March 2019, it was announced that the program would be extended to 2025 with its new agenda being focused on developing road infrastructure.[130] According to Minister of Infrastructure and Development Beibut Atamkulov, it is planned that 27,000 kilometres of local roads will be repaired, with 21,000 kilometres of national roads being reconstructed and repaired.[131]

Digital Kazakhstan
[edit]

President Nazarbayev unveiled this technological modernization initiative to increase Kazakhstan's economic competitiveness through the digital ecosystem development.[132]

Environmental issues

[edit]

In his 1998 autobiography, Nazarbayev wrote that "The shrinking of the Aral Sea, because of its scope, is one of the most serious ecological disasters being faced by our planet today. It is not an exaggeration to put it on the same level as the destruction of the Amazon rainforest."[133] He called on Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and the wider world to do more to reverse the environmental damage done during the Soviet era.[134]

Nuclear disarmament

[edit]

Kazakhstan inherited from the Soviet Union the world's fourth-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons. Within four years of independence, Kazakhstan possessed zero nuclear weapons.[135] In one of the new government's first major decisions, Nazarbayev closed the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk (Semei), where 456 nuclear tests had been conducted by the Soviet military.[136][137][138]

During the Soviet era, over 500 military experiments with nuclear weapons were conducted by scientists in the Kazakhstan region, mostly at the Semipalatinsk Test Site, causing radiation sickness and birth defects.[139] As the influence of the Soviet Union waned, Nazarbayev closed the site.[140] He later claimed that he had encouraged Olzhas Suleimenov's anti-nuclear movement in Kazakhstan, and was always fully committed to the group's goals.[141] In what was dubbed "Project Sapphire", the Kazakhstan and United States governments worked closely together to dismantle former Soviet weapons stored in the country, with the Americans agreeing to fund over $800 million in transportation and "compensation" costs.[142]

Nazarbayev encouraged the United Nations General Assembly to establish 29 August as the International Day Against Nuclear Tests. In his article he has proposed a new Non-Proliferation Treaty "that would guarantee clear obligations on the part of signatory governments and define real sanctions for those who fail to observe the terms of the agreement."[143] His foreign minister signed a treaty authorizing the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone on 8 September 2006.[144]

In an oped in The Washington Times, Nazarbayev called for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to be modernized and better balanced.[145]

In March 2016, Nazarbayev released his "Manifesto: The World. The 21st century."[146] In this manifest he called for expanding and replicating existing nuclear weapon-free zones and stressed the need to modernise existing international disarmament treaties.[147]

Religion

[edit]
During a visit to the central mosque of the Aktobe Region, 2008

Nazarbayev put forward the initiative of holding a forum of world and traditional religions in Astana. Earlier the organisers of similar events were only representatives of leading religions and denominations. Among other similar events aimed at establishing interdenominational dialogue were the meetings of representatives of world religions and denominations held in Assisi, Italy, in October 1986 and January 2002.[148] The first Congress of World and Traditional Religions which gathered in 2003 allowed the leaders of all major religions to develop prospects for mutual cooperation.[149]

Nazarbayev initially espoused anti-religious views during the Soviet era;[150] he later made attempts to support Muslim heritage by performing the Hajj pilgrimage,[150] and supporting mosque renovations.[151]

Under the leadership of Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan enacted some degrees of multiculturalism in order to retain and attract talents from diverse ethnic groups among its citizenry, and even from nations that are developing ties of cooperation with the country, in order to coordinate human resources onto the state-guided path of global market economic participation. This principle of the Kazakh leadership has earned it the name "Singapore of the Steppes".[152]

However, in 2012, Nazarbayev proposed reforms, which were later enacted by the parliament, imposing stringent restrictions on religious practices.[153] Religious groups were required to re-register, or face closure.[154] The initiative was explained as an attempt to combat extremism. However, under the new law, many minority religious groups are deemed illegal. In order to exist on a local level, a group must have more than 50 members: more than 500 on a regional level, and more than 5,000 on the national level.[153]

Nationalism

[edit]

In 2014, Vladimir Putin's remarks regarding the historicity of Kazakhstan, in which he stated that Nazarbayev "created a state on a territory that never had a state ... Kazakhs never had any statehood, he has created it" led to a severe response from Nazarbayev.[155][156][157] Four years later, in February 2018, Reuters reported that "Kazakhstan further loosened cultural ties with its former political masters in Moscow ... when a ban on speaking Russian in cabinet meetings took effect ... [Nazarbayev] has also ordered all parliamentary hearings to be held in Kazakh, saying those who are not fluent must be provided with simultaneous translations."[158]

Human rights record

[edit]

Kazakhstan's human rights situation under Nazarbayev is uniformly described as poor by independent observers. Human Rights Watch says that "Kazakhstan heavily restricts freedom of assembly, speech, and religion. In 2014, authorities closed newspapers, jailed or fined dozens of people after peaceful but unsanctioned protests, and fined or detained worshippers for practicing religion outside state controls. Government critics, including opposition leader Vladimir Kozlov, remained in detention after unfair trials. In mid-2014, Kazakhstan adopted new criminal, criminal executive, criminal procedural, and administrative codes, and a new law on trade unions, which contain articles restricting fundamental freedoms and are incompatible with international standards. Torture remains common in places of detention."[159]

Kazakhstan is ranked 161 out of 180 countries on the World Press Freedom Index, compiled by Reporters Without Borders.[160]

Rule of law

[edit]

According to a US government report released in 2014, in Kazakhstan:

The law does not require police to inform detainees that they have the right to an attorney, and police did not do so. Human rights observers alleged that law enforcement officials dissuaded detainees from seeing an attorney, gathered evidence through preliminary questioning before a detainee’s attorney arrived, and in some cases used corrupt defense attorneys to gather evidence. [...] The law does not adequately provide for an independent judiciary. The executive branch sharply limited judicial independence. Prosecutors enjoyed a quasi-judicial role and had the authority to suspend court decisions. Corruption was evident at every stage of the judicial process. Although judges were among the most highly paid government employees, lawyers and human rights monitors alleged that judges, prosecutors, and other officials solicited bribes in exchange for favorable rulings in the majority of criminal cases.[161]

Kazakhstan's global rank in the World Justice Project's 2015 Rule of Law Index was 65 out of 102; the country scored well on "Order and Security" (global rank 32/102), and poorly on "Constraints on Government Powers" (global rank 93/102), "Open Government" (85/102) and "Fundamental Rights" (84/102, with a downward trend marking a deterioration in conditions).[162] Kazakhstan's global rank in the World Justice Project's 2020 Rule of Law Index rose and was 62 out 128. Its global rank on "Order and Security" remained high (39/128) and low on "Constraints on Government Powers" (102/128), "Open Government" (81/128) and "Fundamental Rights" (100/128).

The 100 Concrete Steps national plan introduced by President Nazarbayev included measures to reform the court system of Kazakhstan, including the introduction of mandatory jury trials for certain categories of crimes (Step 21)[163] and the creation of local police service (Step 30).[164] The implementation of the national plan resulted in Kazakhstan's transition from a five-tier judicial system to a three-tier one in early 2016 yet it severely restricted access to the cassation review of cases by the Supreme Court.[165] However, the expansion of jury trials has not been implemented. Furthermore, Nazarbayev abolished the local police service in 2018 following the public outrage over the murder of Denis Ten in downtown Almaty.[164]

Foreign policy

[edit]
Nazarbayev (center) at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit with U.S. President Barack Obama (left) and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev (right)

During Nazarbayev's presidency the main principle of Kazakhstan's international relations was multi-vector foreign policy, which was based on initiatives to establish friendly relations with foreign partners.[166][167] His government's policies were considered moderate by maintaining a balance between the world powers of United States and Russia.

From 1990 to 1994, Nazarbayev paid official visits to the United States, United Kingdom, China, Germany, Russia, Turkey, Japan and other nations. By 1996, 120 nations had recognized Kazakhstan, and it had established diplomatic relations with 92 countries. The first major diplomatic initiatives by Nazarbayev were dealing with strategic issues, such as obtaining international security guarantees in the aftermath of nuclear disarmament as a result of pressure from Western nations.[168] Nazarbayev called on Russia, the United States, and China to conclude a non-aggression pact with Kazakhstan that would also guarantee the country's sovereignty. On 5 December 1994, Russia, U.S., and U.K. signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances to Kazakhstan based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[169][170] Later, the governments of China and France added their signatures to the Memorandum.[169]

Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev became co-founders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001.[171]

Nazarbayev with Nikol Pashinyan, Anna Hakobyan, Igor Dodon and Dmitry Medvedev at the FIFA World Cup in Russia, 2018

In January 2019, Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa conducted a state visit to Astana to meet with Nazarbayev, in the first visit by an African leader to the country in years. This would be the last foreign head of state that Nazarbayev would receive while in office.[172] Nazarbayev's last state visit to a foreign country took place five days prior to his resignation, visiting the United Arab Emirates to meet Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed.[173]

China

[edit]

Nazarbayev prioritized strengthening relations with China through a pragmatic approach focused on economic cooperation, regional security, and border stability. Kazakhstan resolved longstanding border disputes with China through agreements in 1994, 1997, and 2002, finalizing their 1,700-kilometer boundary.[174][175]

He played a central role in founding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001, deepening regional cooperation with China on security and trade.[176] Economic ties grew substantially during his presidency, with China becoming a major trading partner and investor.[177]

Energy and infrastructure cooperation were key pillars of the bilateral relationship.[178] In 2006, Kazakhstan and China completed the first stage of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, the first direct pipeline between China and a foreign country.[179][180] This was followed by the Central Asia–China gas pipeline, launched in 2009, linking gas fields in Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into western China.[181][182][183] Nazarbayev also supported Chinese President Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposal in 2013, which he aligned with Kazakhstan's domestic Nurly Zhol infrastructure program beginning in 2014.[184] This coordination facilitated large-scale Chinese investments in transport corridors, logistics centers, and industrial zones across Kazakhstan, further embedding the country in transcontinental trade routes.[185]

Despite close ties with China, Nazarbayev's government remained discreet about the Xinjiang internment camps and persecution of Uyghurs in China. As international concern grew in the late 2010s, Kazakhstan faced domestic pressure and consular issues but opted not to publicly criticize Beijing.[186]

Iran

[edit]

In a speech given in December 2006 marking the fifteenth anniversary of Kazakhstan's independence, Nazarbayev stated he wished to join with Iran in support of a single currency for all Central Asian states and intended to push the idea forward with the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on an upcoming visit. In one of his speeches however, Nazarbayev criticised Iran as one of the countries that provides support for terrorism. The Kazakh Foreign Ministry however, released a statement on 19 December, saying his remarks were not "what he really meant," and his comments were "mistakes."[187]

During an announcement of a railway link in 2007, Nazarbayev expressed a religious solidarity with Iran, as he was quoted as saying, "Today I will pay a visit to Turkmenistan where we will agree on the construction of a railway through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Iran with access to the Persian Gulf. This will bring us closer to our Muslim brothers."[188]

Israel

[edit]

Notwithstanding Kazakhstan's membership in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (now the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation), under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan had good relations with Israel. Diplomatic relations were established in 1992 and Nazarbayev paid official visits to Israel in 1995 and 2000.[189] Bilateral trade between the two countries amounted to $724 million in 2005.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conducted his first ever visit to Kazakhstan in mid-December 2016, when he met with Nazarbayev. The two countries signed agreements on research and development, aviation, civil service commissions and agricultural cooperation, as well as a declaration on establishing an agricultural consortium.[190]

Russia

[edit]
Nazarbayev with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kremlin, May 2015

Kazakhstan maintained close and multifaceted relations with Russia, grounded in shared history, culture, and economic ties as neighboring former Soviet republics.[191] Both countries were founding members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1991, which aimed to facilitate political, economic, and security cooperation among post-Soviet states.[192] This partnership further deepened with Kazakhstan's participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) from 2015, promoting economic integration and free movement within the region.[193] Security collaboration was conducted through frameworks like the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), addressing regional stability and counterterrorism.[194]

Nazarbayev pursued a multi-vector foreign policy, balancing Kazakhstan's relations with Russia through high-level meetings with Russian leaders—including Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev. Cooperation with Russia focused on trade, energy, security, and border management.[195]

Energy cooperation was a key aspect of the relationship.[196][197] Kazakhstan's oil and natural gas exports relied heavily on routes passing through Russia, such as those of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.[198] While the energy partnership was generally stable, disputes occasionally arose over tariffs and transit terms, prompting Kazakhstan to explore alternative export routes and support the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.[199][200]

Amid Russia's growing geopolitical assertiveness, including the Russo-Georgian War, the 2014 annexation of Crimea and conflict in eastern Ukraine, and military involvement in the Syrian civil war, Nazarbayev consistently emphasized adherence to international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, seeking to preserve Kazakhstan's strategic partnership with Moscow while avoiding entanglement in regional conflicts.[201][202]

United States

[edit]
Nazarbayev and U.S. President George H. W. Bush pitching horseshoes at the White House, May 1992

The United States was among the first countries to recognize Kazakhstan's independence in December 1991, providing important diplomatic support during the nation's early years. In May 1992, Nazarbayev made his first state visit to the United States, meeting with President George H. W. Bush.[203] During this visit, the leaders expressed a commitment to developing friendly and cooperative relations. Nazarbayev also signed a landmark agreement with Chevron to develop the Tengiz oil field, signaling the start of major American investment in Kazakhstan's energy sector.[204][205]

A central aspect of U.S.–Kazakhstan relations during Nazarbayev’s presidency was Kazakhstan's decision to voluntarily renounce the nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev's government closed the Semipalatinsk Test Site and worked closely with the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure. Kazakhstan's role in global nuclear nonproliferation was further highlighted by its hosting of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Low-Enriched Uranium Bank, designed to promote peaceful nuclear energy.[206]

Throughout his tenure, Nazarbayev met with several US diplomats and presidents, including Bill Clinton,[207] George W. Bush,[208][209] Barack Obama,[206] and Donald Trump.[210] These meetings served to strengthen cooperation on energy development, regional security, counterterrorism, and nuclear nonproliferation.[211] Under Nazarbayev's leadership, Kazakhstan and the United States established a strategic partnership that contributed to regional stability and addressed shared security concerns.[212]

Turkey

[edit]

Kazakhstan established early and enduring diplomatic ties with Turkey. In March 1991, Turkish President Turgut Özal became the first foreign head of state to visit Kazakhstan, signing foundational cooperation agreements.[213] Turkey promptly recognized Kazakhstan's independence that year, and diplomatic relations were formally established on 2 March 1992. Later that year, Nazarbayev made his inaugural state visit to Ankara, commemorating the opening of Kazakh embassy and deepening bilateral engagement.[214]

During his presidency, Nazarbayev prioritized Turkey as a key partner, driven by shared Turkic heritage and strategic interests. One of the earliest symbols of this partnership was the transformation of Turkistan State University into the Khoja Akhmet Yassawi International Kazakh–Turkish University in 1991, formally established by bilateral agreement in October 1992.[215] Educational ties expanded further through the opening of dozens of Kazakh–Turkish lyceums across Kazakhstan, supported by the Kazakh–Turkish Education Foundation, and through scholarship programs that enabled thousands of Kazakh students to study in Turkey.[216]

During his presidency, Nazarbayev prioritized Turkey as a key partner, driven by shared Turkic heritage and strategic interests. Significant milestones included a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2009, which expanded collaboration in energy, infrastructure, education, and defense.[217] Economically, the "New Synergy" initiative aimed to raise bilateral trade from around US $3.3 billion in 2011 toward US $10 billion by 2015, and Turkish investors played a growing role in Kazakh infrastructure and energy projects.[218][219] Nazarbayev also incorporated Turkey into his Nurly Zhol economic corridor strategy to strengthen transport links between Europe and Central Asia.[220][221]

Post-presidency

[edit]
Nazarbayev (third from the left) with Vladimir Putin at the 2019 Moscow Victory Day Parade

According to The Economist, despite his resignation, he is still behind the leadership of the country.[222] His resignation is considered by The Moscow Times to be an attempt to turn him into a Lee Kuan Yew type of public figure.[223] In the month since his resignation, he had met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán during their visit to Kazakhstan. Notably, their meetings with Nazarbayev took place separately from their meetings with President Tokayev, who is the de jure head of state. Two days after leaving office, he attended the Nauryz celebrations where he was greeted by the civilian population.[224] In regard to accommodations as the first president, it is known that his personal office (now known as Kökorda) has been moved to a different location in the capital from the presidential palace. It was also reported in late April 2019 that Nazarbayev also maintains a private jet for official and private visits.[225]

He has embarked on two foreign visits since leaving office, to Beijing and Moscow. The former visit took place during the second Belt and Road Forum[226] while the latter took place during the 2019 Moscow Victory Day Parade.[227] In late-May, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu announced the naming of Nazarbayev as the Honorary President of the Turkic Council.[228][229] On 7 September, he visited Moscow once again to attend the Moscow City Day celebrations on the VDNKh and to open his pavilion at the trade show.[230] During a visit to the Azerbaijani capital of Baku, he told the hosting President Ilham Aliyev that his father, former President Heydar Aliyev, would be "very delighted" with the development of the capital.[231] In late October, he attended the Enthronement of Japanese emperor Naruhito as the representative of Kazakhstan.[232][233] During this visit, he met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during which he congratulated him on his election victory and was invited by Zelensky to visit Kyiv.[234][235][236] Nazarbayev met with Spanish tennis player Rafael Nadal during his visit to Kazakhstan for a charity tennis match. During his meeting with Nadal, he personally called former Spanish King Juan Carlos I.[237][238] In October 2019, it was announced that all potential ministerial candidates needed the approval of Nazarbayev before being appointed by Tokayev, with the exception of Minister of Defence, Interior Minister and Foreign Minister.[239]

Nazarbayev in 2021

On 29 November 2019, Nazarbayev was named the Honorary Chair of Central Asian Consultative Meeting. It was announced at the second Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia in Tashkent.[240]

At the 29th Session of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (QHA) held on 28 April 2021, Nazarbayev announced his intention to step down as the QHA chairman and have President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to succeed his role, describing it as an emotional "serious step".[241][242] However from there, Tokayev suggested for Nazarbayev to be named as an "Honorary Chairman" by the QHA to which his statements received applause. Nazarbayev accepted the offer, promising to continue to work with the Assembly.[242]

In October 2021, during a visit to the United Arab Emirates, Nazarbayev awarded Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan the Nuclear Weapon-Free World and Global Security award for ensuring peace, regional stability and sustainable economic development.[243][244]

On 23 November 2021, at the Nur Otan political council meeting, it was revealed that Nazarbayev would resign from the party's leadership and suggested President Tokayev to take over the position, stressing that the Nur Otan should be led by an incumbent president.[245][246] The move was met with various reactions from political analysts and activists, affirming that it would increase Tokayev's governing powers and influence over the Kazakh politics while some going as far as proclaiming it as an end to the "era of Nazarbayev".[247] According to Nazarbayev's press secretary Aidos Ükıbai, the decision was a "logical continuation of the transit of power" with the party needing to be main support for Tokayev due to "the global crisis caused by the pandemic."[248]

Capital renaming

[edit]

On 20 March 2019, after Nazarbayev's resignation, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed renaming the capital Astana to Nur-Sultan[249] in honor of Nazarbayev. The Parliament of Kazakhstan officially voted in favour of the renaming.[250]

However, Kazakhstan changed the name of the capital from Nur-Sultan back to Astana in September 2022.[251]

COVID-19

[edit]

Nazarbayev created the Biz Birgemiz (lit. "We are Together") Fund in March 2020 "to fight the pandemic COVID-19 effectively while supporting the economy".[252] As of June 2020, the fund gathered over 28 billion tenge ($69.3 million) to provide financial aid to more than 470,000 families in 23 cities as part of the fund's three waves of assistance.[252] Upon his diagnosis with COVID-19 in mid-June of that year, he received calls and telegrams of support from world leaders, including Vladimir Putin and King Abdullah II of Jordan[253] as well as former president of Croatia Stjepan Mesić.[254]

In June 2021, Nazarbayev received a Russian-made Sputnik V vaccine against the virus. From there, he urged everyone to get vaccinated due to emergence of the new COVID-19 strains for their health, acknowledging the challenging times happening in amidst of the pandemic and wishing health and wellbeing for the public.[255][256]

80th birthday

[edit]

He recovered from the virus on 3 July 2020,[257] in time for the celebration of his 80th birthday which was held on 6 July and also coincided with the Day of the Capital City. Nazarbayev received congratulations from leader such as the Armenian President Armen Sarkissian,[258] Russian President Vladimir Putin, former Tatar President Mintimer Shaimiev[259] and former Turkish President Abdullah Gül.[260] Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Grigory Karasin described Nazarbayev in an interview honoring his birthday as "one of the few world politicians who has a vision of political processes".[261] The celebratory events were held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic in the country.[262] A statue of Nazarbayev in military uniform was unveiled at the National Defense University (an institution that itself bears his name).[263]

2021 legislative campaign

[edit]

While continuing to lead the Nur Otan after resigning from presidency, Nazarbayev signed a decree in the preparation of the 2021 legislative elections on 4 June 2020 setting the date of closed primaries would be held within the party "for open and political competition, promote civic engagement in the political process, and empower women and the youth of the country" to which he instructed for the party to include 30% of women and 20% of people under the age of 35 in its list.[264] The primaries were held from 17 August to 3 October 2020 where Nazarbayev himself voted online.[265][131]

At the 20th Nur Otan Extraordinary Congress held on 25 November 2020, the Nur Otan revealed its list of party candidates as well as electoral platforms which were approved by the delegates. Nazarbayev at the congress spoke saying:

"The party's program announced by our President [Kassym-Jomart Tokayev] today is ambitious and at the same time calculated, supported by financial and human resources. It is a logical extension of our reforms. Throughout the years of independence, I have always set clear goals, and I have said that it is necessary to work hard and hard to achieve them. And now it's the same. I support this program proposed by the President and our common task is to rally around it and work together. You have to believe in yourself, love your homeland and do everything possible for progress."[266]

Nazarbayev, at the congress, accused the United States of "double standards" over its conduct of the 2020 presidential elections, telling "what is there to talk about now in the United States of America, the OSCE was not allowed in the elections at all. The Democrats did not allow Republican observers and so on. It is not in order to criticize a big state, but if we are criticized, then why are there such disorders?". In his response to the Belarusian protests against President Alexander Lukashenko's re-election, Nazarbayev criticized the protestors, saying "they've been fucking Belarus for a whole month," and noted the Bulgarian protests in which Nazarbayev claimed that it received a lack of international attention in contrast with Belarus.[267] To conclude the Nur Otan congress, Nazarbayev proposed Bauyrjan Baibek to be the head of the party's campaign headquarters, a decision that was unanimously supported by the Nur Otan delegates.[266]

In the following aftermath of the elections to the Mazhilis which were held on 10 January 2021, the ruling Nur Otan swept a comfortable majority of 76 seats despite a loss eight seats in contrary to the 2016 election. Nazarbayev congratulated the party's victory in the election saying, "Kazakhstanis associate the further development of our country, improvement of welfare with our party."[268]

2022 unrest and resignation from Security Council

[edit]

Following the outbreak of protests after a sudden sharp increase in gas prices, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared a state of emergency in Mangystau Region and Almaty, effective from 5 January 2022. The Mamin Cabinet resigned the same day. On the evening of 5 January, Tokayev announced Nazarbayev's resignation from the Security Council.[269] Questions regarding Nazarbayev's whereabouts arose as he was viewed to be the main target in the unrest with anti-Nazarbayev slogans being chanted throughout protests along with monuments and street names dedicated to him being vandalized and torn down.[270][271]

Rumours about Nazarbayev fleeing Kazakhstan was brought up by Echo of Moscow chief editor Alexei Venediktov, claiming that he was preparing to leave the country for unspecified treatment citing inner diplomatic circle.[272] The Kyrgyz media reported that a private jet belonging to Nazarbayev's family had allegedly arrived in the capital of Bishkek from the United Arab Emirates without official confirmation.[273][274] While the Kazakh embassy in the UAE denied reports of his presence in the country.[275] Spokesperson Aidos Ükıbai in his Twitter dismissed claims, affirming that Nazarbayev was in the capital of Nur-Sultan and that he had stayed in the country the whole time.[276] From there, Ükıbai stated that Nazarbayev "holds a number of consultative meetings" and is in direct contact with President Tokayev, whom he urged everyone to rally around with "to overcome current challenges and ensure the integrity" of Kazakhstan.[276]

Putin's meeting with Nazarbayev in the Kremlin, Moscow, 29 May 2025

On 18 January 2022, Nazarbayev made his first public appearance in a video address since the unrest, calling the events a "tragedy" which "became a lesson for all of us."[277] From there, he urged the public "to protect independence like the apple of one's eye" by finding out unknown people responsible for "demonstrations and murders" while expressing condolences to the families of the victims in the protests.[277] During the address, Nazarbayev dismissed any rumours in regard to supposed inner conflict between the country's elite by calling them "absolutely groundless", insisting that he'd been a pensioner ever since handing over presidency to Tokayev whom he remarked "possesses full power" as he was set to be elected as the new chairman of the ruling Nur Otan party.[278][279][277] Nazarbayev remarked about his achievements as president in which his goal was to form "stability and tranquility for the country" by calling for everyone to protect these "enduring values" and for unity around the Tokayev by supporting his reform agenda.[277]

Personal life

[edit]

Nursultan Nazarbayev identifies as a Muslim. Nazarbayev has described his spirituality as being based on the words from Abai Qunanbaiuly, a Kazakh poet whose philosophy is based on an enlightened Islam. According to Nazarbayev, Abai's "Words of Wisdom" aided him in attempting to build a modern Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[280]

Postage stamp with Nazarbayev and his wife

Nazarbayev is married to Sara Alpysqyzy Nazarbayeva. They have three daughters: Dariga, Dinara and Aliya. Aliya's first marriage was notably to Aidar Akayev, the eldest son of former president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev, which for a short period made the two Central Asian leaders related.[281] Having grown up in the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev is fluent in Kazakh as well as Russian and understands English.[282] He has two brothers, Satybaldy (1947–1980) and Bolat (1953–2023),[283][284] as well as one sister named Anip.[285] On 16 August 2020, Nazarbayev's grandson, Aisultan, reportedly died from cardiac arrest in London. Prior to that, Aisultan made several public statements on social media that Nazarbayev was his biological father and that his life was constantly threatened.[286] He also accused his grandfather's associates of plotting and scheming.[287] In response, Nazarbayev described Aisultan as being very similar to himself, expressing his regrets by telling that "one could not have sent him anywhere, but it was impossible to keep him. He was already a slave to this work and could not stop. We treated him in Moscow, and we treated him in London. It seems that I went out and came back to it again."[288]

On 18 June 2020, it was reported that Nazarbayev had tested positive for COVID-19; a spokesman stated that Nazarbayev would go into isolation and work remotely.[289] On 3 July 2020, Nazarbayev had recovered and was "back on his feet" three weeks after contracting the virus.[290] Nazarbayev later during a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin recalled his sickness, telling that "group of Russian doctors stood by me for ten days. It was decisive in my recovery, so it will not be forgotten."[291]

In an October 2021 interview, Nazarbayev revealed that he had suffered a disease in his spine back in 2011, to which it became noticed while attending a concert, resulting him being carefully escorted out of the hall and eventually undergo a vertebra surgery to which Nazarbayev stated was amongst things that have influenced him in eventually resigning from presidency.[103]

In January 2023, Nursultan Nazarbayev was hospitalized at the National Scientific Cardiac Surgery Center in Astana. On 20 January 2023, a heart operation was performed, which was successful.[292]

He gave his last name to his grandchildren: Aisultan Nazarbayev (1990–2020) and Nabi Nazarbayev (born 2008).

Honours

[edit]
Nursultan Nazarbayev monument, Ankara, Turkey
Nursultan Nazarbayev street, Amman

Kazakhstan

[edit]

Soviet Union

[edit]
Nazarbayev with leaders of China, Russia and India during the Moscow Victory Day Parade, 9 May 2015
Postage stamp with Nazarbayev, Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev

Russian Federation

[edit]

Foreign awards

[edit]

Other

[edit]
  • Jordan: A street in Amman is named after him.
  • World Turks Qurultai: Turk El Ata (Spiritual Leader of the Turkic People).[316]
  • Russia: A street in the central part of Kazan was named after him.
  • Kazakhstan: The capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, was named after him following his resignation in 2019. In September 2022 it reverted to its original name, Astana.
[edit]

Nazarbayev is portrayed by Romanian actor Dani Popescu in the 2020 satirical film Borat Subsequent Moviefilm: Delivery of Prodigious Bribe to American Regime for Make Benefit Once Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan.[317][318]

In 2021, Nazarbayev was interviewed by Oliver Stone in an eight-part hagiographic documentary titled Qazaq: History of the Golden Man.[319]

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from Grokipedia
Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev (born 6 July 1940) is a Kazakh statesman who led Kazakhstan as its first president from 1990 until his resignation in 2019, guiding the nation through independence from the Soviet Union and establishing it as a resource-rich economy in Central Asia. Under Nazarbayev's nearly three-decade rule, Kazakhstan achieved stable borders for the first time in its history, denuclearized by returning Soviet-era weapons to Russia, and transitioned from a command economy to market-oriented reforms that capitalized on vast oil and mineral reserves, fostering GDP growth from under $25 billion in 1991 to over $180 billion by 2019. He pursued a multi-vector foreign policy balancing relations with Russia, China, the United States, and Europe, positioning Kazakhstan as a mediator in regional affairs while avoiding entanglement in great-power conflicts. Nazarbayev's tenure, however, drew criticism for authoritarian practices, including suppression of political opposition, control over media, and electoral processes that ensured his perpetual re-election without genuine competition, sustaining a patronage-based system often described as "soft authoritarianism." Despite resigning in 2019 and retaining the lifelong title of Elbasy (Leader of the Nation), his influence persisted until constitutional changes diminished it following 2022 unrest, though he remains active in advisory roles as of 2025.

Early life and career

Childhood and education

Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev was born on July 6, 1940, in the village of Chemolgan (also known as Shamalgan) in the Kaskelen District of Almaty Region, Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, to parents Abish Nazarbayev, a herdsman and farmer, and Alzhan Nazarbayeva. The family belonged to the Kazakh ethnic group and lived in modest circumstances typical of rural peasants in Soviet Kazakhstan, where traditional nomadic practices had been largely supplanted by collectivized agriculture under Stalin's policies. Nazarbayev's early years were shaped by the hardships of wartime rationing during World War II and the post-war reconstruction efforts, with his family relying on subsistence farming and livestock herding in the foothills of the Zailiysky Alatau mountains. After completing secondary education in local schools, Nazarbayev began vocational training and entered the workforce as a skilled laborer before pursuing higher studies. In 1960, he graduated from a technical school in Dneprodzerzhinsk, Ukrainian SSR, specializing in metallurgy-related skills. From 1962 to 1965, he studied at the Karaganda Polytechnic Institute, then transferred to the newly established Karaganda Metallurgical Institute (later combined as part of the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine's higher technical institution) in Temirtau, graduating in 1967 with a degree in metallurgical engineering. This education emphasized practical industrial training aligned with Soviet five-year plans for heavy industry, rather than broad ideological or humanities coursework.

Soviet-era professional roles

Nazarbayev began his professional career in 1960 as a worker in the construction management of the Kazmetallurgstroy Trust in Temirtau, Karaganda region, contributing to the development of the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine. He pursued technical education concurrently, studying metallurgy at the Karaganda Metallurgical Combine's technical school and graduating in 1967, after which he advanced to roles as a steelworker and engineer at the combine during the 1960s. These positions involved hands-on industrial labor and oversight in steel production, reflecting the Soviet emphasis on heavy industry in Kazakhstan's resource-based economy. In the early 1970s, Nazarbayev transitioned into administrative and party roles within Temirtau's industrial sector, engaging in Komsomol and Communist Party activities from 1969 to 1973. By 1973, he served as secretary of the Communist Party committee at the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant, a position he held until 1977 or 1978, managing party operations amid the plant's expansion and operational demands. This role honed his skills in coordinating labor, enforcing ideological discipline, and addressing production inefficiencies in a key Soviet industrial hub. By 1979, Nazarbayev's experience propelled him to the republican level as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, initially focused on industrial development. In this capacity during the early 1980s, he oversaw sectors including industry, transport, and communications, applying technocratic approaches to modernize Kazakhstan's extractive and manufacturing base within the Five-Year Plan framework. These responsibilities emphasized practical management over doctrinal matters, aligning with his background in metallurgy and contributing to his reputation as a pragmatic administrator in Soviet Kazakhstan's hierarchical structures.

Ascent in Kazakhstan Communist Party

In 1984, Nursultan Nazarbayev was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, serving as the republic's prime minister under First Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunayev and becoming the youngest individual to hold such a position in any Soviet union republic at age 43. In this role, he oversaw economic administration during the early phases of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika initiatives, advocating for industrial restructuring and anti-corruption measures aligned with Moscow's directives, including efforts to address inefficiencies in heavy industry sectors like metallurgy where he had prior experience. The Jeltoqsan events of December 1986 unfolded amid Nazarbayev's premiership, triggered by Gorbachev's abrupt dismissal of the long-tenured Kunayev and appointment of Gennady Kolbin, an ethnic Russian outsider lacking local ties, as First Secretary. Protests in Almaty involved up to 10,000 participants, primarily students and youth decrying perceived Russification and bypassing of Kazakh cadres; the unrest was quelled over several days by Interior Ministry troops and local police, with estimates of 2-3 deaths, over 1,000 injuries, and thousands arrested, though official Soviet figures minimized casualties. As head of the republican government, Nazarbayev coordinated with Kolbin and central authorities in managing the aftermath, maintaining his position despite the leadership transition, which underscored his alignment with Soviet central control while preserving operational continuity in local governance. Kolbin's subsequent tenure exacerbated ethnic resentments due to his enforcement of perestroika through purges of Kunayev loyalists, creating conditions for a Kazakh-led alternative. By 1989, dissatisfaction with Kolbin's outsider status and handling of reforms prompted his reassignment to Moscow by Gorbachev. On 22 June 1989, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan elected Nazarbayev as First Secretary with overwhelming support—154 votes in favor out of 158—marking his rapid ascent to the republic's highest party position and making him only the second ethnic Kazakh to hold it after Kunayev. This appointment, endorsed by Gorbachev as a nod to perestroika's emphasis on competent local reformers, allowed Nazarbayev to consolidate influence by balancing loyalty to Moscow with initiatives to rehabilitate Jeltoqsan victims and promote Kazakh-language policies, thereby enhancing his domestic standing without immediate challenge to central authority.

Presidency (1990–2019)

Path to presidency and independence

In February 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic unanimously elected Nursultan Nazarbayev as its Chairman, positioning him as the republic's head of state in a process without competing candidates. This elevation built directly on his role as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan since June 1989, reflecting a seamless transition from party authority to executive leadership amid Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika reforms and growing republican autonomy demands. The failed August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow accelerated the Soviet Union's disintegration, prompting Nazarbayev—initially supportive of a renewed union federation—to navigate toward sovereignty. Kazakhstan declared state independence on December 16, 1991, formalized by the Supreme Council through the Constitutional Law on Independence, making it the last Soviet republic to do so following the Alma-Ata Declaration's dissolution of the USSR. Earlier, on December 1, 1991, Nazarbayev secured election as the republic's first president with 98.7% of the vote in a direct popular ballot, consolidating his authority as the nation exited the Soviet framework. Prioritizing stability in a multi-ethnic state with significant Russian and Slavic minorities, Nazarbayev preserved key elements of the Soviet administrative and governance apparatus post-independence, eschewing radical institutional overhauls that had destabilized other former republics. This approach emphasized pragmatic continuity, retaining bureaucratic expertise and avoiding the ethnic conflicts seen elsewhere, while gradually adapting to sovereign needs.

First term: Stabilization and reforms (1991–1999)

Upon Kazakhstan's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union on December 16, 1991, the country inherited a disintegrating command economy plagued by shortages, supply chain disruptions, and accelerating inflation tied to the depreciating Soviet ruble. President Nazarbayev prioritized macroeconomic stabilization, implementing fiscal austerity and establishing the National Bank of Kazakhstan in 1995 to enforce independent monetary policy. These steps aimed to sever economic dependence on Russia and restore domestic control over finances amid regional turmoil. A key reform was the introduction of the national currency, the tenge, on November 15, 1993, which replaced the hyperinflationary ruble and facilitated price stabilization by limiting money supply growth. Unlike Russia's abrupt liberalization under shock therapy, which triggered industrial collapse and social unrest, Nazarbayev pursued a phased approach to privatization, beginning with small and medium enterprises through voucher schemes while retaining state oversight of strategic assets like energy and mining to mitigate output shocks. This gradualism preserved industrial capacity and avoided the acute contraction seen in neighboring states, though it drew criticism for delaying full market transition. Politically, Nazarbayev consolidated authority to manage the transition, dissolving the fractious Supreme Soviet in 1993 and advancing a new constitution via national referendum on August 30, 1995, which voters approved by a simple majority turnout exceeding the required threshold. The document established a presidential republic with expansive executive powers, including decree authority and parliamentary dissolution, justified as necessary for decisive crisis response but enabling centralized control. By 1999, amid signs of economic recovery including reduced inflation and resumed growth, Nazarbayev secured re-election on January 10 with approximately 81% of the vote in a contest lacking robust opposition due to registration barriers and media dominance. International observers noted procedural flaws, yet the outcome reflected stabilizing conditions under his tenure.

Second and third terms: Economic liberalization (1999–2011)

Nazarbayev secured re-election on January 10, 1999, with 80.97% of the vote in an election marked by limited opposition participation and procedural concerns raised by international observers. This outcome enabled continuity in market-oriented policies amid post-Soviet recovery. Kazakhstan's economy shifted toward liberalization, prioritizing hydrocarbon sector expansion and foreign investment to leverage its oil and gas reserves, which accounted for over 30% of GDP by the mid-2000s. Guiding these efforts was the "Kazakhstan-2030" strategy, unveiled by Nazarbayev in October 1997, which outlined seven priorities: national security, domestic stability, economic growth through private enterprise, health and education improvements, water and energy security, infrastructure development, and professional state institutions. The framework aimed for Kazakhstan to enter the top 50 global economies by 2030 via pragmatic reforms emphasizing export-led growth and minimal state welfare expansion, with periodic updates tracking progress against benchmarks like GDP per capita targets. Implementation focused on resource-led development, as rising oil prices from 2000 onward drove fiscal revenues, funding diversification initiatives without broad subsidization. Annual GDP growth averaged approximately 8% from 1999 to 2011, peaking at 10.6% in 2006 amid the global commodity boom, with hydrocarbons comprising the primary driver as production rose from 800,000 barrels per day in 2000 to over 1.6 million by 2010. To bolster investment, the Development Bank of Kazakhstan was established on May 31, 2001, as a state-backed entity to finance non-resource projects, infrastructure, and industrial upgrades, channeling funds toward manufacturing and export-oriented sectors. Tax reforms complemented this, including the 2003 Investment Law offering incentives like tax holidays for priority sectors and the 2006 introduction of a 10% flat personal income tax rate, simplifying the system from prior progressive scales of 5-20% and reducing evasion. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows expanded markedly, rising more than tenfold relative to GDP from the early 1990s to the late 2000s, concentrated in oil and gas with major deals involving Western firms like Chevron and ExxonMobil under production-sharing agreements. These policies, including streamlined licensing and repatriation guarantees, positioned Kazakhstan as a regional energy hub, though growth remained vulnerable to commodity cycles rather than diversified manufacturing. In the December 4, 2005, presidential election, Nazarbayev won 91.05% amid high turnout, with OSCE observers acknowledging administrative enhancements like improved voter registers but criticizing pervasive irregularities, media bias, and opposition harassment that undermined pluralism. The early April 3, 2011, election saw him garner 95.54%, technically efficient per OSCE assessment, yet lacking genuine competition due to the withdrawal of viable challengers and state dominance in campaigning. These outcomes sustained policy continuity amid the oil-fueled expansion.

Fourth and fifth terms: Consolidation and growth (2011–2019)

Nazarbayev secured a fourth consecutive term in an early presidential election held on April 3, 2011, obtaining 95.5 percent of the vote amid limited opposition participation. The election followed constitutional amendments that abolished term limits for the incumbent, enabling his continued leadership while formalizing selective extensions for stability. Governance during this term emphasized recovery from the lingering effects of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, with state interventions including a $10 billion drawdown from the National Oil Fund, tax reductions, and targeted stimuli for banking and construction sectors to sustain growth averaging around 5–7 percent annually in the early 2010s. These measures prioritized fiscal resilience and resource revenues, reflecting a consolidation of state control over key economic levers. In his December 14, 2012, State of the Nation Address, Nazarbayev introduced the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy, a long-term framework aiming to position the country among the world's top 30 economies by 2050 through industrialization, human capital development, and reduced hydrocarbon dependency. The strategy built on prior diversification efforts by promoting non-oil sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture, though implementation relied heavily on state-led programs amid volatile global oil prices. Complementing this, the 2014 Nurly Zhol (Bright Path) initiative allocated billions for infrastructure, including roads, railways, and urban projects, to foster connectivity and internal demand as buffers against external shocks. Nazarbayev won a fifth term in a snap election on April 26, 2015, capturing 97.7 percent of the vote in a contest lacking genuine challengers. This period saw intensified resource nationalism, with the government pursuing renegotiations and tax claims on major oil projects like Karachaganak and Tengiz to boost state shares and revenues, often citing unauthorized expenses by foreign operators between 2010 and 2018. Diversification attempts persisted through incentives for private investment in processing industries and exports, yet oil and gas remained dominant, comprising over 60 percent of GDP contributions during peak years. Infrastructure advancements included the ongoing transformation of Astana into a modern hub, with investments in high-profile developments that supported urbanization rates rising to nearly 60 percent by 2019. These policies underscored a pattern of centralized decision-making to navigate commodity cycles, prioritizing macroeconomic stability over rapid structural shifts.

Resignation and transition

On March 19, 2019, Nursultan Nazarbayev announced his resignation as President of Kazakhstan in a televised address to the nation, concluding nearly 30 years in office since Kazakhstan's independence in 1991. He described the decision as voluntary, citing the need to allow younger leaders to continue the country's development while expressing confidence in the institutions he had built. Despite stepping down from the presidency, Nazarbayev retained significant influence through constitutional amendments previously enacted, including lifelong immunity as Elbasy (Leader of the Nation) and the chairmanship of the National Security Council, which empowered him to shape key domestic and foreign policy decisions. He also maintained leadership of the ruling Nur Otan party, ensuring continuity in political structures. Parliamentary leaders promptly appointed Senate Chairman Kassym-Jomart Tokayev as interim president on March 20, 2019, in accordance with constitutional provisions for succession. Tokayev, a longtime diplomat and associate of Nazarbayev, pledged to uphold the former president's policies and reforms, emphasizing stability and the avoidance of any power vacuum during the transition. Nur Otan, under Nazarbayev's continued chairmanship, endorsed Tokayev as its candidate for the snap presidential election held in June 2019, facilitating a controlled handoff. This process was presented as a deliberate managed succession, preserving elite consensus and policy direction amid Kazakhstan's centralized governance model.

Domestic policies and achievements

Economic transformation and resource management

Under Nazarbayev's leadership, Kazakhstan transitioned from a centrally planned Soviet to a market-oriented through extensive efforts initiated in the early . Legislative foundations included the laws "On Denationalization and Privatization" enacted on , , and subsequent measures that facilitated the transfer of small and medium-sized enterprises to private hands, with over entities privatized by 1995. By the mid-, privatization had encompassed a substantial share of state assets, including industrial and agricultural holdings, reducing the dominance of state-owned enterprises that employed 87% of the workforce at independence. These reforms aimed to dismantle command structures and attract foreign investment, though implementation faced challenges from economic contraction in the initial post-Soviet years. Resource management focused on hydrocarbon development, leveraging Kazakhstan's vast oil reserves through partnerships with Western firms. The Tengiz field, discovered in 1979, saw a landmark production-sharing agreement signed on April 6, 1993, with Chevron leading a consortium that invested billions to expand output from under 300,000 barrels per day to over 500,000 by the 2000s. Similarly, the Kashagan field, discovered in 2000, entered a North Caspian Production Sharing Agreement in 2001 with Eni, Shell, Total, ExxonMobil, and others, committing over $50 billion in investments despite technical delays, positioning it as one of the world's largest offshore fields. These deals under Nazarbayev's oversight integrated Kazakhstan into global energy markets, boosting export revenues that funded broader economic stabilization. Economic indicators reflected this shift, with GDP rising from $1,208 in 1991 to $9,682 in 2019 in current U.S. dollars, driven by surges and production growth averaging 7.2% annually from 2000 to 2014. Poverty rates declined sharply, from approximately 40% of the in the 1990s to under 5% by the late 2010s, as articulated by Nazarbayev and corroborated by national , lifting millions through job creation in extractive sectors and related services. To mitigate risks of resource dependence akin to , Nazarbayev established the in 2008 via presidential , consolidating state holdings to manage oil windfalls, invest in infrastructure, and stabilize finances during volatility. The fund's assets grew to support diversification, including initiatives under strategies like Kazakhstan 2030 and 2050, which promoted sectors such as , machinery, and agro-processing to reduce hydrocarbon reliance from over 60% of GDP in the early 2000s. These efforts yielded modest gains, with 's GDP share increasing amid targeted incentives, though oil remained dominant.

Nuclear disarmament and security

Upon independence in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited the world's fourth-largest nuclear arsenal from the Soviet Union, including approximately 1,400 strategic nuclear warheads deployed on 104 intercontinental ballistic missiles at sites such as Zhangiz and Derzhavinsk, along with tactical nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft. Nursultan Nazarbayev, as the republic's leader, prioritized denuclearization to secure international financial aid for economic stabilization, obtain security assurances against aggression, and mitigate the risks of proliferation or accidental use amid post-Soviet instability, viewing retention of the weapons as a liability rather than a deterrent given Kazakhstan's limited technical capacity to maintain or control them independently. Nazarbayev issued a decree on August 29, 1991—coinciding with the 42nd anniversary of the first Soviet nuclear test—to permanently close the Semipalatinsk Polygon, the Soviet Union's primary nuclear testing site where over 450 tests had occurred between 1949 and 1989, causing widespread environmental contamination and health issues among local populations. This decision, driven by domestic anti-nuclear activism and Nazarbayev's assessment that continued testing would hinder Kazakhstan's global integration, marked an early symbolic rejection of nuclear weapons and facilitated later disarmament efforts. In December 1991, Kazakhstan joined the Soviet successor states in the Alma-Ata Protocol and Lisbon Protocol to START I, committing to eliminate nuclear weapons on its territory; tactical weapons were repatriated to Russia by January 1992, with strategic warheads transferred between 1992 and April 1995, when the process concluded under U.S.-funded Cooperative Threat Reduction programs providing technical and financial support. To formalize its non-nuclear status, Kazakhstan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on December 13, 1993, acceding as a non-nuclear-weapon state on February 14, 1994, after which the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia extended security assurances via trilateral statements in Budapest, pledging to respect Kazakhstan's sovereignty and borders, refrain from nuclear threats or use against it, and seek UN Security Council action in response to aggression—commitments tied to Kazakhstan's NPT adherence and weapon transfers. These steps, executed despite parliamentary debates over retaining a nuclear option for leverage against Russia, positioned Kazakhstan as a model of voluntary disarmament, influencing global non-proliferation norms and earning Nazarbayev recognition for forgoing inherited capabilities in favor of verifiable elimination and international partnerships.

Multi-ethnic stability and nationalism

Kazakhstan, home to over 130 ethnic groups, maintained relative stability in its multi-ethnic society under Nazarbayev's leadership by emphasizing inclusive policies that granted equal regardless of , countering potential Soviet-era resentments through legal integration rather than assimilation. The 1995 designated Kazakh as the state while establishing Russian as the language of interethnic communication, allowing its use in institutions and daily affairs to accommodate the significant Russian-speaking minority and others, thereby avoiding linguistic exclusion. This balanced approach, articulated by Nazarbayev as preserving ethnic equality while elevating the titular , facilitated administrative continuity in a Russified bureaucracy without provoking widespread backlash. Nazarbayev established the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan in 1995 as a consultative body representing ethnic communities, promoting dialogue and cultural preservation to foster interethnic accord and prevent the ethnic strife seen in post-Soviet states like Yugoslavia or Tajikistan. The Assembly, comprising delegates from various groups, advised on policies to integrate minorities through quotas in parliament and local governance, emphasizing a supra-ethnic "Kazakhstani" civic identity over narrow ethnic nationalism to unify the population around shared state loyalty. This model, credited by Nazarbayev with averting major conflicts, prioritized consensus-building among groups such as Russians (who declined from 37.8% in 1989 to about 15% by 2021 due to emigration) and Uzbeks, without resorting to violence or forced displacement. The titular Kazakh population rose from 39.7% in the 1989 Soviet census to 71.3% by the 2021 national census, driven primarily by repatriation programs initiated in 1991 that resettled over one million ethnic Kazakhs (known as kandas or oralman) from neighboring countries like China, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan, offering citizenship, housing subsidies, and language training. These efforts, expanded under Nazarbayev's directives, boosted demographic weight through voluntary return and higher birth rates among Kazakhs, but were paired with safeguards against exclusionary policies, ensuring non-Kazakhs retained full civic rights and cultural autonomy. This demographic rebalancing occurred amid net outflows of other groups, yet without pogroms or mass expulsions, distinguishing Kazakhstan from neighbors experiencing ethnic upheavals.

Social and religious policies

Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev maintained framework, with the establishing and guaranteeing while prohibiting religious parties and ensuring state control over religious activities to promote interfaith and prevent . Nazarbayev positioned the , fostering among faiths including Hanafi , Orthodox , and others, amid a post-Soviet revival of Islam that was channeled through state-approved structures like a separate muftiate for ethnic Kazakhs. In 2011, amendments to the religion law were enacted to curb extremism, banning unapproved missionary activities, prayer in state institutions, and unregistered religious groups, reflecting efforts to balance tradition with regulated modernization. Education policies emphasized sustaining high literacy—near 99% for adults, inherited from Soviet times and maintained through investments in —and expanding technical and higher education, including the establishment of in as a hub for international-standard programs in science and . Reforms integrated competency-based curricula aligned with global standards, such as the 2016 Renewed Content of , to modernize schooling while preserving . Social welfare initiatives included the 1998 pension reform, which privatized the system by introducing mandatory individual accounts managed by private funds, shifting from Soviet-era pay-as-you-go solidarity to accumulative capitalization for long-term sustainability. Healthcare modernization, through state programs, contributed to rising life expectancy from approximately 67 years in 1991 to 73 years by 2019, via expanded access to services and infrastructure upgrades. 31523-5/abstract)

Governance and political system

Constitutional framework and elections

The constitutional framework of Kazakhstan under Nursultan Nazarbayev evolved toward a to prioritize executive and national stability following the Soviet . The 1993 Constitution established a more parliamentary-oriented , but political prompted the to dissolve itself in December 1993, paving the way for reforms. Partial legislative elections in 1994 were subsequently ruled unconstitutional by the in early 1995, leading Nazarbayev to dissolve the parliament and govern via presidential decrees until a new framework could be established. A nationwide referendum on April 29, 1995, extended Nazarbayev's presidential term to December 2000 and authorized the drafting of a revised constitution, which was approved by another referendum on August 30, 1995. The Constitution entrenched a super-presidential model, granting the president broad powers including the issuance of decrees with of , appointment of the without parliamentary , veto over , and the to dissolve the Majilis () if it government nominations thrice or failed to form a . This centralization was justified as necessary for rapid decision-making amid post-independence volatility, contrasting with decentralized Westminster systems by vesting stability in a singular executive rather than fragmented legislative checks. The bicameral parliament—comprising the Majilis and Senate—was subordinated, with the president influencing senatorial appointments and parliamentary composition through party alignments. Presidential elections reinforced this executive dominance, with Nazarbayev securing victories in direct contests starting from 1999: approximately 81% in 1999, 91% in , 95.5% in , and 97.7% in 2015. OSCE/ODIHR observation missions reported technical advancements in , polling procedures, and across these elections, yet identified persistent shortcomings in political , such as barriers to opposition registration, limited for challengers, and absence of substantive . The party system complemented this framework, with Nur Otan—Nazarbayev's vehicle—achieving hegemony in legislative elections, capturing all Majilis seats in 2007 and maintaining supermajorities thereafter through a 7% electoral threshold and resource advantages. Other registered parties, including Ak Zhol and the People's Communists, operated but remained marginal, often aligning with Nur Otan on key votes; outright bans on opposition were absent, though registration hurdles and state media favoritism constrained their viability. This managed pluralism facilitated policy continuity and executive-led reforms, underscoring a preference for centralized governance over multiparty contestation to avert instability.

Rule of law and institutional development

In , President Nazarbayev established the Agency for Affairs and , consolidating efforts to professionalize and graft through prevention, detection, and investigation of corrupt practices. This agency pursued high-profile cases, such as the prosecution of 21 senior officials including Serik Akhmetov on embezzlement charges, and the conviction of Minister Kuandyk Bishimbayev to 10 years for involving over $3 million. These actions targeted bureaucratic malfeasance, resulting in dismissals and asset seizures, though critics noted selective enforcement favoring regime stability over systemic eradication. Judicial reforms under Nazarbayev included adopting a and expanding programs to enhance and competence, as outlined in the 2015 "100 Steps" , which reduced prosecutorial oversight in civil cases to expedite proceedings. 's score rose from 21 in 2012 to 34 in 2019, reflecting perceived gains in transparency, yet remained inconsistent, with highlighting persistent vulnerabilities to political influence and low rates for offenses. Civil service reforms emphasized merit-based and competency frameworks, phasing out Soviet-era by introducing evaluations and reducing arbitrary appointments, as benchmarked in assessments of Kazakhstan's toward modern . By , these measures had streamlined administrative processes and holdover inefficiencies, though entrenched continued to undermine full , evidenced by recurring scandals in .

Human rights record and civil liberties

Kazakhstan under Nursultan Nazarbayev's leadership was consistently classified as "Not Free" by Freedom House, with aggregate scores reflecting severe restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, including scores of 5 or lower in political rights from the 1990s through 2019. These ratings stemmed from systemic limitations on freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, alongside government control over electoral processes and judicial independence. Media freedoms faced ongoing constraints through legislation enacted during Nazarbayev's tenure. The amendments to the media law imposed responsibilities on journalists to avoid undermining state interests, leading to and closures of critical outlets. In 2017, Nazarbayev signed further amendments requiring journalists to verify with sources before and prohibiting anonymous comments on news sites, which curtailed investigative reporting and public . Despite these measures, internet penetration expanded rapidly, achieving 82.3 percent by under state programs, enabling some circumvention of traditional media controls via social platforms, though subject to blocking and . A pivotal incident highlighting tensions occurred in 2011 during the oil workers' strike, where opened on protesters, resulting in at least 14 and dozens injured. Subsequent trials convicted some police officers of excessive , but investigations were criticized for failing to address higher-level or underlying labor grievances, with documenting inadequate . Prison conditions and detainee treatment showed mixed developments. Periodic amnesties, including mass releases to alleviate overcrowding, were implemented, with thousands freed in initiatives tied to national holidays or reforms. Nazarbayev-era policies banned torture and mandated investigations into allegations, yet Amnesty International reported persistent use of ill-treatment in custody, with over 100 annual complaints registered but few prosecutions, indicating weak enforcement. Arbitrary detentions of activists, journalists, and opposition figures were recurrent, as noted in Amnesty International assessments, often justified under laws on public order or extremism but lacking due process. These practices contributed to a climate where dissent risked reprisal, though proponents argued they preserved stability amid ethnic diversity and post-Soviet transitions; independent monitors, however, emphasized the erosion of civil liberties without commensurate accountability.

Foreign policy

Multi-vector diplomacy principles

Nazarbayev formulated Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy doctrine in the early 1990s as a pragmatic framework for cultivating balanced, equal partnerships with major powers, thereby preserving sovereignty and eschewing exclusive alignments or dependencies. This approach, first outlined in his May 1992 policy article "Strategy for the Formation of Kazakhstan's Independent Foreign Policy," prioritized diversified engagement to mitigate risks from geopolitical pressures, particularly post-Soviet transitions, without subordinating national interests to any bloc. Nazarbayev described it as fostering "friendly and predictable" relations across multiple vectors—encompassing Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and others—to secure economic gains, security assurances, and diplomatic leverage. Implementation emphasized neutrality and multilateralism, exemplified by Kazakhstan's 2010 chairmanship of the for and Co-operation in (OSCE), during which Nazarbayev hosted the Astana on December 1–2, adopting the Astana Commemorative Declaration to reaffirm pan-European security principles amid regional tensions. The country also positioned itself as a by hosting P5+1 negotiations with on its nuclear program in Almaty from February 26–27, 2013, leveraging its own nuclear disarmament experience to facilitate between conflicting parties. In response to the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Nazarbayev elevated Kazakhstan's profile by proposing mediation platforms and supporting ceasefire initiatives tied to the Minsk process, though primary talks occurred in Minsk, underscoring the doctrine's focus on de-escalation without partisan commitment. Economic diversification further embodied multi-vector principles, as Kazakhstan acceded to the (EAEU) on January 1, 2015, for while independently completing World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations and joining on November 30, 2015, to access global markets and reduce overreliance on Eurasian structures. This parallel pursuit ensured tariff alignments compatible with both frameworks, promoting on multiple fronts without ceding . The strategy's success hinged on pragmatic flexibility, allowing to navigate great-power by treating relations as mutually beneficial exchanges rather than ideological alliances.

Relations with Russia and former Soviet states

Nazarbayev pursued pragmatic relations with Russia, emphasizing economic interdependence in energy transit and security cooperation while safeguarding Kazakhstan's sovereignty through completed border demarcations. The two countries maintained the lease of the Baikonur Cosmodrome to Russia, extended until 2050 for an annual fee of approximately $115 million, facilitating Russian space launches while providing Kazakhstan revenue and technological benefits. Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev settled long-standing border issues with Russia, finalizing demarcation protocols that affirmed territorial integrity and reduced potential disputes. In security matters, joined the (CSTO) in 1992 as part of post-Soviet frameworks, participating in joint military exercises and collective defense commitments, though Nazarbayev prioritized national control over troop deployments. Energy ties were deepened through multiple agreements, including a 2002 accord allowing Kazakh oil transit via Russian pipelines to ports, and subsequent deals for gas exports routing through to access European markets. In 2007, Nazarbayev disclosed that Kazakhstan exported 24 billion cubic meters of gas via Russian infrastructure, highlighting mutual economic reliance. Regarding the 2014 events, Nazarbayev endorsed the outcome of the , stating that Crimea's had exercised their right to , while avoiding explicit recognition of Russian and refraining from joining Western sanctions against . This stance drew domestic but aligned with Kazakhstan's non-interference , as Nazarbayev emphasized over in Eurasian affairs. Through the (CIS), Nazarbayev fostered ties with former Soviet states like and , promoting economic coordination and frameworks established in 1991. served as a key CIS partner for and engaged in multilateral summits with prior to 2014 tensions, focusing on customs unions and links, though relations with cooled amid the without severing CIS institutional .

Engagement with China and Asia

Nazarbayev prioritized pragmatic economic with , beginning with the resolution of long-standing border disputes inherited from Soviet times. In 1994, and signed an agreement on the eastern section of their shared , followed by a supplementary accord in 1998 that addressed remaining segments, culminating in full demarcation by 2002 and establishing a 1,782-kilometer boundary without territorial concessions to either side. These pacts, ratified under Nazarbayev's leadership, eliminated sources of friction and facilitated cross-border trade, with annual volumes exceeding expectations post-delimitation. A of this was the co-founding of the (SCO) in 2001, evolving from the 1996 Five mechanism involving , , , , and . Nazarbayev actively participated in its , viewing it as a platform for regional and economic coordination without binding alliances, which aligned with Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy. By fostering joint counterterrorism efforts and infrastructure dialogue, the SCO under Nazarbayev's involvement helped integrate Kazakhstan into Eurasian economic networks. Economic ties deepened through , notably the Kazakhstan-China , operationalized in with flows from Atasu to Alashankou 962 kilometers and capacity for 10-20 million tons annually. This $700 million , backed by , diversified Kazakhstan's routes away from , with expansions in extending reach to western fields. Subsequent gas pipelines, linked to Central Asia-China lines from , further solidified hydrocarbon , generating billions in by to China's growing market. Chinese investments in Kazakhstan surged during Nazarbayev's tenure, totaling approximately $19 billion in foreign direct investment from to , concentrated in , , and sectors. A 2016 package of industrial projects valued at $26 billion exemplified this, focusing on chemicals, , and without equity stakes in strategic assets. Nazarbayev endorsed alignment with China's , announced by at in , docking it with Kazakhstan's Nurly Zhol program to fund transport corridors like the Western Europe-Western China highway. This yielded tangible infrastructure gains, including rail and road upgrades, while Nazarbayev emphasized reciprocal benefits over dependency. To broaden Asian diversification, Nazarbayev pursued ties with nations, launching mechanisms in tied to Nurly Zhol for in and . Bilateral with grew modestly, reaching sectors like exports and , as Kazakhstan positioned itself as a Eurasian bridge without formal alliances. These efforts complemented China-focused partnerships by tapping Southeast Asian markets for non-hydrocarbon diversification.

Ties with the United States and West

Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev established robust bilateral relations with the following independence in , encompassing security, economic, and diplomatic dimensions. High-level engagements included meetings between Nazarbayev and U.S. presidents, such as in and in , where commitments to and non-proliferation were affirmed. In , President hosted Nazarbayev, elevating ties to an focused on , , and regional . The U.S. State Department recognized Nazarbayev's in fostering enduring U.S.- . Post-9/11, collaboration intensified through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), enabling U.S. and NATO logistics transit via Kazakhstan to Afghanistan, handling significant cargo volumes until 2015. Counterterrorism efforts included joint training, intelligence sharing, and Kazakhstan's overflight permissions for U.S. operations, as noted in Vice President Mike Pence's 2018 discussions with Nazarbayev. The C5+1 framework, launched in 2015, further structured U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states on security, economic resilience, and countering extremism. U.S. foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan's energy sector has been substantial, with the U.S. positioned as a leading under Nazarbayev's tenure, contributing to and gas development amid total FDI exceeding $150 billion since 1991. Ties with the broader West involved EU partnerships, including the and Cooperation Agreement effective from , positioning the EU as Kazakhstan's primary trading partner with reaching $48.7 billion in 2024. Nazarbayev was credited with initiating these EU . However, Western sanctions under frameworks like the targeted Nazarbayev's associates for alleged and abuses, including members and advisors.

Interactions with Middle East and Turkey

Nazarbayev pursued deepened ties with , positioning it as a developmental model due to shared Turkic cultural roots and economic complementarity, as evidenced by the establishment of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council) in 2009 during his presidency, with Kazakhstan as a founding member and Nazarbayev serving as its honorary chairman. This framework facilitated summits and initiatives like the "Turkish World 2040 Vision," aimed at enhancing cooperation in trade, transport, and culture among Turkic states. Bilateral trade volume expanded significantly under his leadership, rising from approximately $500 million in 2004 to $3.9 billion by 2019, with mutual targets set to reach $10 billion through enhanced infrastructure links like the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway. A strategic partnership agreement signed during Nazarbayev's 2009 visit to formalized these efforts, emphasizing energy, investment, and security collaboration. Economic outreach to Gulf states focused on attracting sovereign wealth funds for diversification beyond hydrocarbons, with the United Arab Emirates emerging as Kazakhstan's primary partner in the region; Nazarbayev's 2009 visit to the UAE spurred agreements leading to investments exceeding $3 billion cumulatively from Gulf entities by the late 2010s, including joint ventures in energy and infrastructure. Qatar's sovereign fund contributed over $60 million in foreign direct investment since 2015, targeting sectors like logistics and manufacturing, while bilateral treaties from 2007 onward supported this influx. These ties leveraged Kazakhstan's Islamic heritage for pragmatic gains, including streamlined Hajj pilgrimage quotas and logistics, with Nazarbayev's administration negotiating increased allocations from Saudi Arabia to accommodate growing Muslim pilgrim numbers from Central Asia. Relations with emphasized balanced non-alignment and to safeguard regional stability, particularly pre-sanctions; Nazarbayev offered as a neutral venue for nuclear talks, hosting rounds of Iran-P5+1 negotiations in in 2013 that advanced proposals for uranium swaps and reduced stockpiles. This reflected 's multi-vector approach, maintaining in non-sanctioned like exports while avoiding entanglement in geopolitical frictions, with Nazarbayev publicly endorsing Iran's right to nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards.

Controversies and criticisms

Corruption allegations and family influence

Nazarbayev has faced allegations of channeling state-derived into family-controlled entities through charitable , which reportedly manage billions in assets including hotels, banks, and industrial facilities. An investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting (OCCRP) detailed how four —Baitak, Qazaq , Saginov, and the Nazarbayev Fund—hold stakes in over 300 companies valued at tens of billions of dollars, with opaque structures limiting oversight. These include the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools foundation, which oversees educational institutions but linked to broader asset without transparent financial reporting. One foundation was connected to a UK-registered holding $7.8 billion in assets, though the entities involved denied opacity and illicit control. Post-2019 , Kazakh authorities initiated probes into Nazarbayev relatives for and asset . Nephew Kairat Satybaldy was detained in 2022 and accused of over 227 billion tenge (approximately $500 million) from state entities like , leading to a six-year sentence in 2023; authorities seized jewels valued at $230 million from him. Brother Bolat Nazarbayev faced investigations in 2022 for alleged involving deals and partnerships. Earlier leaks, including documents, revealed grandson Altai Kulin using offshore firms to hide assets, though no convictions followed at the time. Family influence extended to economic sectors, with relatives and associates securing contracts in oil, banking, and construction amid Kazakhstan's resource wealth, echoing patterns of elite capture in petro-states. Pandora Papers exposed offshore maneuvers enriching Nazarbayev's unofficial third wife, Dariga Nazarbayeva's associate, via entities tied to family networks. Nazarbayev's office and foundations have rejected these claims, asserting assets serve public good and filing lawsuits against accusers like OCCRP for reputational harm. By 2024, some relatives offered asset returns totaling 50 billion tenge ($100 million) to resolve cases, signaling partial accountability under new leadership.

Suppression of opposition and media

During Nazarbayev's presidency, opposition figures faced significant risks, including suspicious . Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a former of and vocal of Nazarbayev who had accused him of involvement in the of opposition Kozhakhmetov, was found shot twice in the chest and once in the head in his on , 2005, weeks before presidential elections. Kazakh authorities ruled the death a suicide, claiming Nurkadilov fired the shots himself, but opposition groups and international observers questioned the official account due to the improbability of self-inflicted wounds in that manner and Nurkadilov's prior threats to reveal compromising information on Nazarbayev. Prominent exiles included banker and opposition leader Mukhtar Ablyazov, who fled Kazakhstan in 2009 after allegations of embezzling $5 billion from BTA Bank, which he headed until state seizure in 2009. Ablyazov, granted political asylum in the UK in 2011 based on claims of persecution for his political activities against Nazarbayev, was convicted in absentia by Kazakh courts in 2017 to 20 years for financial crimes and faced extradition pressures from multiple countries. In 2018, Kazakh authorities banned Ablyazov's Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan movement as extremist, citing its calls for regime change as threats to national security funded by foreign interests. Media outlets critical of the government encountered closures and legal restrictions, particularly after 2012 amendments tightening control. In November 2012, prosecutors sought court bans on opposition newspapers Respublika and Vzglyad, satellite channel K+, and news site Golos Respubliki, labeling them part of an "organized group" inciting unrest; Respublika was shuttered by court order that year. President Nazarbayev signed a January 2012 law requiring foreign broadcasters to register and restricting rebroadcasts of foreign content exceeding 50 hours monthly, while broader amendments prohibited content deemed to undermine state security. These measures, defended by officials as necessary to counter foreign-influenced destabilization, contributed to self-censorship and harassment of journalists. Dissenters, including bloggers and online activists, were prosecuted under anti-extremism laws expanded during Nazarbayev's tenure. Legislation introduced in broadened counter-terrorism and extremism provisions, enabling charges against those accused of promoting "extremist" views via or calls for protests. The frequently invoked these laws against opposition , portraying them as threats backed by external funding to justify suppression for maintaining stability amid post-Soviet vulnerabilities. Kazakhstan's press declined under Nazarbayev, with it 157th out of 180 in , 158th in , and similarly low positions throughout his rule, citing systematic muzzling of and use of charges against critics.

Environmental and resource mismanagement claims

Critics have alleged that Nazarbayev's administration perpetuated through inadequate oversight of extraction, particularly in and development, though such claims must account for the of Soviet-era legacies and the economic imperatives of rapid industrialization. The Aral 's shrinkage, initiated in the 1960s by Soviet diversions for , continued post-independence, with the sea losing over 90% of its by the 2000s, exacerbating , , and issues like respiratory diseases in surrounding regions. Under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan pursued partial mitigation by constructing the Kokaral Dam in 2005, funded in part by a World Bank project, which separated the northern Aral Sea and restored water levels there by approximately 30 cubic kilometers between 2005 and 2010, reviving fisheries and reducing dust storms. Detractors contend this addressed only Kazakhstan's northern portion while regional cooperation faltered, allowing the southern Aral (primarily Uzbekistan's responsibility) to nearly vanish, with ongoing evaporation losses estimated at 50 cubic kilometers annually absent comprehensive inflows. These efforts reflect causal trade-offs: water diversion sustained agriculture, contributing to GDP growth from under $25 billion in 1991 to over $180 billion by 2019, but at the cost of ecological collapse inherited and incrementally managed rather than reversed. Oil extraction critiques center on incidents like the 2013 pipeline leaks at the in the , where sulfide stress cracking released , necessitating shutdowns and flaring of approximately 2.8 million cubic meters of toxic sulfide-laden emissions, which temporarily acidified local air and , harming and prompting health warnings for nearby communities. The government imposed a $737 million fine on the , highlighting regulatory , yet environmental advocates argued that rushed development under Nazarbayev's resource-nationalist policies prioritized revenues—Kashagan's reserves exceeding 13 billion barrels—over robust protocols, with visible impacts including deteriorated and potential long-term . Production resumed after remediation, underscoring development necessities for a landlocked economy reliant on hydrocarbons for 60% of exports, but the event fueled claims of systemic underinvestment in environmental safeguards amid corruption-adjacent opacity in state-company partnerships, though empirical data shows no widespread ecosystem collapse beyond localized effects. Uranium mining, positioning as the world's top producer with over 40% of global supply by the , drew protests over alleged risks from tailings and in regions like Inkai and , where communities reported elevated cancer and rates linked to open-pit operations, echoing Soviet nuclear testing legacies at Semipalatinsk that Nazarbayev closed in 1991. Local demonstrations, such as those against mine expansions in the , cited insufficient monitoring and worker protections, with independent assessments noting contamination risks from in-situ leaching techniques used by firms like . However, Nazarbayev's administration expanded production to bolster revenues—uranium accounting for 10-15% of exports—while implementing some safeguards, including international audits; claims of mismanagement often stem from groups with agendas skeptical of , lacking peer-reviewed causal links to widespread epidemics beyond baseline exposures. Trade-offs here involve fueling global nuclear energy transitions against localized hazards, with forest cover increases of 8% over 2010-2020 partly offsetting aridification via afforestation programs. In response to such critiques, Nazarbayev's government ratified the in , committing to curb by up to 25% below business-as-usual levels by 2030 (conditional on external support), integrating goals into the 2050 for . Complementary reforestation initiatives, including the project and urban planting drives, aimed to restore 1.3 million hectares by enhancing , though empirical outcomes show modest sequestration gains amid persistent emissions from sectors. These measures indicate reactive realism—balancing extraction-driven poverty alleviation ( GDP rising from $700 in to $9,000 by ) against environmental costs—rather than outright , with revealing no exponential degradation beyond inherited baselines.

Post-presidency (2019–present)

Retained influence and titles

Upon resigning as president on March 19, , Nursultan Nazarbayev retained the constitutional status of Elbasy (Leader of the Nation), a title conferred upon him in that granted lifelong immunity from criminal prosecution for actions taken during his presidency, along with access to state resources, residences, and security protections. This status positioned him as a pivotal figure in national affairs, with authority to advise on policy and maintain influence over key institutions despite the formal transfer of power to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Nazarbayev continued as lifelong chairman of Kazakhstan's , a body overseeing defense, internal security, and strategic decisions, which had been restructured in to ensure his permanent role. This position allowed him to direct and matters, reinforcing his oversight of state apparatus in the immediate post-resignation period. In a symbolic affirmation of his enduring prominence, Kazakhstan's capital was renamed from Astana to Nur-Sultan on March 23, 2019, via a constitutional amendment signed by Tokayev, explicitly to honor Nazarbayev's contributions to the nation's development. Family members also held strategic positions that extended Nazarbayev's influence: his daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva was elected chairwoman of the Senate—the upper house of parliament—on March 20, 2019, placing her in the line of presidential succession as the second-highest office in the state. His son-in-law Timur Kulibayev, married to daughter Dinara, maintained control over major economic assets as chairman of Samruk-Kazyna, the state sovereign wealth fund managing over $70 billion in assets tied to oil, gas, and mining sectors, alongside leadership in Kazenergy, the influential oil and gas association. Following his resignation, Nazarbayev published the essay "Seven Facets of the Great Steppe" on November 1, 2019, an article-essay exploring the history and culture of the Great Steppe, available in Russian, Kazakh, and English on the official website of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

2022 unrest and power erosion

In early 2022, protests erupted in Kazakhstan's western of on over a sharp increase in prices, which had doubled after the lifted price controls and subsidies on . Demonstrations quickly spread nationwide, including to , evolving into broader anti-government riots targeting symbols of Nursultan Nazarbayev's enduring influence despite his 2019 resignation from the presidency. On January 5, President removed Nazarbayev from his position as head of the —a key post Nazarbayev had retained post-presidency—and assumed the himself, signaling a challenge to the leader's behind-the-scenes . The unrest intensified with widespread , , and clashes, resulting in an official death toll of 225 people by January 15, including 19 security personnel, later revised to 238 after accounting for additional medical fatalities. Tokayev responded by declaring a nationwide state of emergency and, on January 7, authorizing security forces to "shoot to kill without warning" against armed protesters who refused to surrender. Facing escalating , Tokayev requested assistance from the (CSTO)—a -led —on 5, bypassing Nazarbayev's traditional oversight of such matters and highlighting the erosion of the elder statesman's control. CSTO forces, primarily from , arrived shortly after and helped stabilize key sites, withdrawing by late after Tokayev declared the situation under control. In the , several Nazarbayev members were ousted from influential positions, including nephew Samat Abish as head of the and sons-in-law from roles in state and entities. These moves, amid elite rivalries exposed by the crisis, accelerated the diminishment of Nazarbayev's post-presidential power structures.

De-Nazarbayevization and recent status

In September 2022, Kazakhstan's parliament approved renaming the capital from Nur-Sultan back to , reversing the 2019 decree that had honored Nazarbayev by adopting his first name for the city. President signed the bill on September 16, 2022, framing the change as aligning with public sentiment while preserving recognition of Nazarbayev's historical role without altering other named sites. De-Nazarbayevization extended to institutional reforms in 2023, when Kazakhstan's annulled the 2000 law "On the First ," which had granted Nazarbayev the perpetual title of "Leader of the Nation" along with associated privileges like lifelong immunity and state-funded . The simultaneously removed his honorary senator status on January 12, 2023, eliminating guaranteed parliamentary representation and related perks. By late 2023, Tokayev had enacted additional laws curtailing Nazarbayev's residual privileges, including access to state resources, as part of broader efforts to centralize . These measures reflected a systematic reduction in Nazarbayev's formal influence following the January 2022 unrest, though constitutional immunity persisted independently. Nazarbayev has since adopted a low-profile stance, with sparse public engagements, including a December 13, 2024, meeting with Russian President at and an October 2025 appearance at the in . No significant political interventions have been recorded from him after 2022. Philanthropic activities continue via entities like the Nursultan Nazarbayev Foundation, Kazakhstan's largest non-profit, focusing on , , and social programs without evident ties to influence. As of 2026, Nursultan Nazarbayev remains alive and in retirement. No major public activities or specific health updates have been reported for him in 2026, with discussions during this period centering on his political legacy and Kazakhstan's transition under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

Personal life

Family and marriages

Nazarbayev married Sara Alpysovna Nazarbayeva, a fellow worker at the Metallurgical Combine, on , 1962. Sara, born in 1943, graduated from a technical school and worked as a dispatcher before the marriage; she later focused on family and public initiatives in and culture while maintaining a low public profile. The couple's union reflects Soviet-era norms of workplace marriages among industrial workers, with limited public disclosure of personal details beyond official biographies. The marriage produced three daughters: Dariga Nursultanovna (born , 1963), Dinara Nursultanovna (born 1966), and Aliya Nursultanovna (born 1983). Dariga, the eldest, pursued careers in media, business, and , including roles as a parliamentarian and speaker; she has three children, with her Aisultan involved in political organizations. Dinara, the middle , is a business executive married to Timur Kulibayev since 1990; together they hold significant stakes in Halyk Bank, Kazakhstan's largest commercial bank, and she has two daughters. Aliya, the youngest, has engaged in media and entrepreneurial ventures; she is married to Aidar Akimov and has three children, including a named Aldiyar born in 2016. Nazarbayev's family life has been characterized by discretion, with details primarily emerging from state-affiliated sources or ; the daughters and their have occasionally held or positions, though remain shielded from extensive in line with Kazakh cultural and political norms. By 2023, the family included at least eleven grandchildren across the three daughters.

Health, residences, and philanthropy

Nazarbayev, born on July 6, 1940, underwent prostate surgery in Germany in 2011 amid reports of health concerns. In January 2023, he had successful heart surgery at the National Research Cardiac Surgery Center in Astana, followed by discharge from the hospital on January 24. As of July 2025, at age 85, he received public congratulations from President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on his birthday, indicating ongoing vitality despite advanced age and prior medical interventions. Post-resignation, Nazarbayev has primarily resided in Almaty, utilizing the former President's Residence there for meetings and personal activities. He maintains connections to Astana, including access to the Akorda Presidential Palace and his initial residence in the city from the early 1990s, reflecting his historical ties to the capital. Nazarbayev has supported educational philanthropy through initiatives like the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools (NIS), a nationwide network of specialized schools for gifted students aged 11 , established to integrate international teaching methods and foster talent development. The associated Nazarbayev Fund, founded in 2010 as an endowment, provides financial backing for NIS and , funding scholarships, teacher training, and to advance Kazakhstan's . These efforts emphasize long-term , with NIS operating autonomously under oversight to deliver advanced curricula.

Legacy and honors

National and international awards

Nazarbayev received the Soviet Union's Order of Lenin for outstanding performance in industrial management, particularly in advancing mining and metallurgical production at facilities in Balkhash and Dzhezkazgan during the 1970s. In Kazakhstan, he was conferred the title Halyk Qaharmany (Hero of the Nation), the republic's highest civilian honor, recognizing his foundational role in establishing and stabilizing the independent state. He also holds the Order of Altyn Qyran (Order of the Golden Eagle) in a special configuration, awarded for exceptional services to national sovereignty and economic progress. Internationally, Russian President Vladimir Putin presented Nazarbayev with the Order of Friendship on July 9, 2015, during a meeting in Moscow, citing his efforts to foster cooperation and mutual understanding between Russia and Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev has accumulated over 100 foreign honors from heads of state and governments worldwide, primarily for diplomatic initiatives in nuclear non-proliferation, regional stability, and economic integration, though specific attributions vary by issuing authority. These recognitions underscore acknowledgments of his policies in transitioning Kazakhstan from Soviet republic to sovereign entity with diversified international partnerships.

Assessments of long-term impact

Under Nazarbayev's rule from Kazakhstan's independence in 1991 until his 2019 resignation, the country achieved notable macroeconomic stability and human development gains relative to other post-Soviet Central Asian states, avoiding the civil conflicts, ethnic strife, and state fragility that plagued Tajikistan in the 1990s and recurrent instability in Kyrgyzstan. Gross domestic product per capita, which contracted sharply in the early 1990s amid hyperinflation and Soviet collapse, rebounded with average annual growth exceeding 8% from 2000 to 2019, fueled primarily by hydrocarbon exports and foreign investment in oil fields like Tengiz and Kashagan. The Human Development Index rose from 0.690 in 1990 to 0.825 by 2019, reflecting improvements in life expectancy (from 67.1 to 70.2 years), mean years of schooling (from 9.1 to 11.4), and gross national income per capita (from $4,800 to $24,290 in PPP terms). These outcomes positioned Kazakhstan as a regional outlier, with governance indicators improving from -0.92 in 2012 to higher relative performance by 2022 compared to peers, attributed to centralized control over resource revenues via the National Fund for Children and the Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund, which helped buffer against commodity price volatility and partially mitigate Dutch disease effects. Critics, including analyses from experts, argue that Nazarbayev's personalized prioritized and of extractive industries over structural diversification, leaving the vulnerable to shocks—evident in the 2014-2016 downturn when GDP growth fell to 1% annually—and hindering non-hydrocarbon sectors like and , which comprised under 10% of GDP by 2019 despite repeated pledges. This approach, while delivering short-term stability, fostered a "" dynamic where rents reinforced rather than broad-based , with perceptions remaining high ( ranked 93rd out of 180 on Transparency International's 2019 index) and inequality-adjusted HDI dropping 20% to uneven gains. Empirical studies on resource-rich autocracies highlight as a partial success in avoiding total collapse but caution that such models sustain only through continuous revenue inflows, risking stagnation without institutional pluralism. Pre-2022 public opinion surveys indicated majority approval of Nazarbayev's tenure, with 87% of respondents evaluating it positively in a 2019 nationwide poll amid perceptions of stability and , though younger cohorts expressed reservations about and limited opportunities. Successor Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's reforms, including 2022 constitutional changes curbing influence and a 2025 referendum on parliamentary powers, represent incremental adjustments rather than a decisive rupture, preserving core authoritarian continuity—such as restricted opposition and media control—while addressing unrest triggers like fuel pricing; analysts note these build on Nazarbayev-era frameworks like the 2050 Strategy, suggesting long-term impact hinges on whether diversification accelerates beyond rhetoric amid global energy transitions.

References

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