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Enlargement of the European Union
Enlargement of the European Union
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The territories of the member states of the European Union (European Communities pre-1993), animated in order of accession. Territories outside Europe and its immediate surroundings are not shown.

The European Union (EU) has expanded a number of times throughout its history by way of the accession of new member states to the Union. To join the EU, a state needs to fulfil economic and political conditions called the Copenhagen criteria (named after the Copenhagen summit in June 1993), which require a stable democratic government that respects the rule of law, and its corresponding freedoms and institutions. According to the Maastricht Treaty, each current member state and the European Parliament must agree to any enlargement. The process of enlargement is sometimes referred to as European integration. This term is also used to refer to the intensification of co-operation between EU member states as national governments allow for the gradual harmonisation of national laws.

The EU's predecessor, the European Economic Community,[1] was founded with the Inner Six member states in 1958, when the Treaty of Rome came into force. Since then, the EU's membership has grown to twenty-seven, with the latest member state being Croatia, which joined in July 2013. The most recent territorial enlargement of the EU was the incorporation of Mayotte in 2014. Campione d'Italia joined the EU Customs Union in 2020. The most notable territorial reductions of the EU, and its predecessors, have been the exit of Algeria upon independence in 1962, the exit of Greenland in 1985, and the withdrawal of the United Kingdom in 2020.

Accession negotiations are currently ongoing with Montenegro (since 2012), Serbia (since 2014), Albania (since 2020), North Macedonia (since 2020), Moldova (since 2024), and Ukraine (since 2024). Negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005,[2] but have been effectively frozen by the EU since December 2016,[3][4][5] due to backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights.[3][6][7]

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia were granted official candidate status respectively in December 2022[8][9] and December 2023,[10] but were asked to complete additional reforms before qualifying for the formal start of membership negotiations. Kosovo submitted an application for membership in December 2022.[11] For Kosovo to be granted official candidate status, the Council will need to unanimously agree to start Kosovo's accession process by requesting an opinion from the European Commission on its application. The EU however remains divided on its policy towards Kosovo, with five EU member states not recognising its independence.

Criteria

[edit]

According to the EU treaties, membership of the European Union is open to "any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them" (TEU Article 49). Those Article 2 values are "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities." This is based on the 1993 "Copenhagen criteria" agreed as it became clear many former Eastern Bloc countries would apply to join:

Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

— Excerpt from the Copenhagen Presidency conclusions[12]

In December 1995, the Madrid European Council revised the membership criteria to include conditions for member country integration through the appropriate adjustment of its administrative structures: since it is important that European Community legislation be reflected in national legislation, it is critical that the revised national legislation be implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.

Finally, and technically outside the Copenhagen criteria, comes the further requirement that all prospective members must enact legislation to bring their laws into line with the body of European law built up over the history of the Union, known as the acquis communautaire.

Process

[edit]
The European Commission, which plays a central role in the enlargement process.

Today the accession process follows a series of formal steps, from a pre-accession agreement to the ratification of the final accession treaty. These steps are primarily presided over by the European Commission (Enlargement Commissioner and DG Enlargement), but the actual negotiations are technically conducted between the Union's Member States and the candidate country.

Before a country applies for membership it typically signs an association agreement to help prepare the country for candidacy and eventual membership. Most countries do not meet the criteria to even begin negotiations before they apply, so they need many years to prepare for the process. An association agreement helps prepare for this first step.

In the case of the Western Balkans, a special process, the Stabilisation and Association Process exists to deal with the special circumstances there.

When a country formally applies for membership, the Council asks the commission to prepare an opinion on the country's readiness to begin negotiations. The council can then either accept or reject the commission's opinion (The council has only once rejected the commission's opinion when the latter advised against opening negotiations with Greece).[13]

If the Council agrees to open negotiations the screening process then begins. The commission and candidate country examine its laws and those of the EU and determine what differences exist. The Council then recommends opening negotiations on "chapters" of law that it feels there is sufficient common ground to have constructive negotiations. Negotiations are typically a matter of the candidate country convincing the EU that its laws and administrative capacity are sufficient to execute European law, which can be implemented as seen fit by the member states. Often this will involve time-lines before the Acquis Communautaire (European regulations, directives and standards) has to be fully implemented.

2010 population and GDP per capita of individual EU member states compared with those of non-member states in Europe.

A chapter is said to be closed when both sides have agreed it has been implemented sufficiently, however it can still be re-opened if the Commission feels that the candidate has fallen out of compliance.

To assess progress achieved by countries in preparing for accession to the European Union, the European Commission submits regular reports (yearly) to the European Council. These serve as a basis for the council to make decisions on negotiations or their extension to other candidates.

Once the negotiations are complete, a Treaty of Accession will be signed, which must then be ratified by all of the member states of the Union, as well as the institutions of the Union, and the candidate country. Once this has been completed it will join the Union on the date specified in the treaty.

The entire process, from application for membership to membership has typically taken about a decade, although some countries, notably Sweden, Finland, and Austria have been faster, taking only a few years. The process from application for association agreement through accession has taken far longer, as much as several decades (Turkey, for example, first applied for association in the 1950s and has yet to conclude accession negotiations).

On 18 October 2019, France vetoed starting of negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, citing problems with the current enlargement process.[14] In November 2019, France proposed a seven-stage accession plan for membership.[15] The reformed accession strategy proposes participation in different programs, such as Erasmus, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, Customs Union, etc.[16]

Example

[edit]

The following is an example of the accession process—Estonia's path to membership from its restoration of independence from the Soviet Union in November 1991 with recognition from the EU the same month to membership in May 2004. Ease of accession depends on the state: how integrated it is with the EU beforehand, the state of its economy and public institutions, any outstanding political issues with the EU and (historically) how much law to date the EU has built up that the acceding state must adopt. This outline also includes integration steps taken by the accession country after it attains membership.

Estonia EU membership timeline
Year Date Event Notes
1991 20 August Restoration of independence from USSR Recognition from EU in same month.[17]
1994 18 July Free trade agreement concluded[17]
1995 1 January Free trade agreement in force[17]
12 June Europe Agreement concluded[17]
24 November Applied for Membership[17]
1998 1 January Europe Agreement comes into force[17] Aiding pre-integration
March Membership negotiations open[17] 6 chapters opened[18]
1999 17 chapters opened[18]
2000 6 chapters opened[18]
2002 December All chapters closed[18] and negotiations concluded Final chapter (No. 30) was opened and closed at the same time.
2003 8 April Draft accession treaty approved by Estonian government
16 April Treaty of Accession signed
14 September Referendum on membership approved 66.84% in favour, turnout : 64.02%
2004 1 May Acceded to EU
28 June Joined ERM Requires 2 years in ERM before euro adoption
2007 21 December Entered the Schengen area
2011 1 January Adoption of the euro
1 May Right to limit migration from 2004 countries expired Only Austria and Germany applied this, the rest of EU countries abolished restrictions before 2011

Success and fatigue

[edit]

Enlargement has been one of the EU's successful foreign policies,[19] yet has equally suffered from considerable opposition from the start. French President Charles de Gaulle opposed British membership.[20] A later French President, François Mitterrand, opposed Greek, Spanish and Portuguese membership, fearing that the former dictatorships were not ready and that the countries' inclusion would reduce the union to a free-trade area.[21]

The reasons for the first member states to apply, and for them to be accepted, were primarily economic while the second enlargement was more political. The southern Mediterranean countries had just emerged from dictatorships and wanted to secure their democratic systems through the EEC, while the EEC wanted to ensure the same thing and that their southern neighbours were stable and aligned to NATO.[20] These two principal forces, economic gain and political security, have been behind enlargements since. After the large enlargements in 2004, public opinion in Europe turned against further expansion.[21]

It has also been acknowledged that enlargement has its limits; the EU cannot expand endlessly.[19] Former Commission President Romano Prodi favoured granting "everything but institutions" to the EU's neighbour states, allowing them to co-operate deeply while not adding strain on the EU's institutional framework.[19] This has in particular been pushed by France and Germany as a privileged partnership for Turkey, membership for which has faced considerable opposition on cultural and logistical grounds.[22][23]

Historical enlargements

[edit]

Notes:

  1. ^ Due to veto of UK application.
  2. ^ On 3 October 1990, East Germany joined West Germany through the process of German reunification; since then, the reunited Germany has been a single member state.
  3. ^ Due to the election of new government.
  4. ^ Due to veto of UK application.
  5. ^ Due to election of new government in October 1996. Resumed following another election of a new government in September 1998.
  6. ^ a b By the European Council.
  7. ^ Referred to as "the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" by the EU before 2019.
  8. ^ Due to veto of UK application.
  9. ^ By Norway after a 1972 referendum.
  10. ^ By Norway after a 1994 referendum.
  11. ^ Due to public opinion.
  12. ^ By France.

Membership of EU predecessors

[edit]

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was proposed by Robert Schuman in his declaration on 9 May 1950 and involved the pooling of the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany.[44] Half of the project states, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, had already achieved a great degree of integration amongst themselves with the organs of Benelux and earlier bilateral agreements. These five countries were joined by Italy and they all signed the Treaty of Paris on 23 July 1952. These six members, dubbed the 'Inner Six' (as opposed to the 'outer seven' who formed the European Free Trade Association who were suspicious of such plans for integration) went on to sign the Treaties of Rome establishing two further communities, together known as the European Communities when they merged their executives in 1967.[45]

In 1962, Spain, ruled by the military dictator Francisco Franco, issued its first attempt to join the European Communities. Spanish Foreign Affairs minister Fernando María Castiella sent the request form to French Prime Minister Maurice Couve de Murville.[37] This request was rejected by all the member countries in 1964; Spain was not a democracy at the time, and thus unable to enter the EEC.[46]

The Community did see some loss of territory due to the decolonialisation occurring in their era. Algeria, which was an integral part of France, had a special relationship with the Community.[47] Algeria gained independence on 5 July 1962 and hence left the Community. There would be no further efforts at enlargement until the early 1970s.

Enlargement of the European Communities

[edit]
Interactive map of the enlargement and evolution of the European Union, excluding Greenland and Algeria

The United Kingdom, which had refused to join as a founding member, changed its policy following the Suez crisis and applied to be a member of the Communities. Other EEC members were also inclined to British membership on those grounds. French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed British membership.[20]

Once de Gaulle had left office, the door to enlargement was once again opened. The EEC economy had also slowed down and British membership was seen as a way to revitalise the community.[20] Only after a 12-hour talk between British Prime Minister Edward Heath and French President Georges Pompidou took place did Britain's third application succeed.[48] After Britain was accepted Prime Minister Edward Heath said:

For my part, I have no doubt at all that the discussions which we have had will prove of real and lasting benefit, not only to Britain and France, but to Europe as a whole.[48]

As part of the deal for British entry, France agreed to allow the EEC its own monetary resources. However France made that concession only as Britain's small agriculture sector would ensure that Britain would be a net contributor to the Common Agricultural Policy dominated EEC budget.[20] Applying together with the UK, as on the previous occasions, were Denmark, Ireland, and Norway.[49] These countries were so economically linked to the UK that they considered it necessary to join the EEC if the UK did.[20] However the Norwegian government lost a national referendum on membership and hence did not accede with the others on 1 January 1973. Gibraltar joined the Community with the United Kingdom at this point, as can be seen in the long title of the UK European Communities Act 1972.

Mediterranean enlargements

[edit]

The next enlargement would occur for different reasons. The 1970s also saw Greece, Spain, and Portugal emerge from dictatorship. These countries desired to consolidate their new democratic systems by binding themselves into the EEC. Equally, the EEC was unsure about which way these countries were heading and wanted to ensure stability along its southern borders.[20] However François Mitterrand initially opposed their membership fearing they were not ready and it would water the community down to a free trade area.[21]

Greece joined the EEC in 1981 followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. None of these nations had a referendum related to accession.

The year 1985, however, saw the first time a territory voted to leave the Community, when Greenland was granted home rule by Denmark and the territory used its new powers and voted to withdraw from the Community (see member state territories).

Morocco and Turkey applied for membership in 1987. Morocco's application was turned down as it was not considered European;[citation needed] Turkey's application was considered eligible on the basis of the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement but the opinion of the Commission on the possible candidate status was by then negative.[citation needed] Turkey received candidate status in 1999 and began full membership negotiations in 2005, which were still in progress as of 2021.[50]

Post–Cold War

[edit]
The Iron Curtain's fall enabled eastward enlargement. (Berlin Wall)

After the 1970s, Europe experienced an economic downturn which led to leaders launching of the Single European Act which set to create a single market by 1992. The effect of this was that EFTA states found it harder to export to the EEC and businesses (including large EFTA corporations such as Volvo) wished to relocate within the new single market making the downturn worse for EFTA. EFTA states began to discuss closer links with the EEC despite its domestic unpopularity.[51]

Austria, Finland, and Sweden were neutral in the Cold War so membership of an organisation developing a common foreign and security policy would be incompatible with that. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, that obstacle was removed, and the desire to pursue membership grew stronger.[51] On 3 October 1990, the reunification of East and West Germany brought East Germany into the Community without increasing the number of member states.

The Community later became the European Union in 1993 by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty, and established standards for new entrants so their suitability could be judged. The Copenhagen criteria stated in 1993 that a country must be a democracy, operate a free market, and be willing to adopt the entire body of EU law already agreed upon. Also in 1993 the European Economic Area was established with the EFTA states except Switzerland. Most of the new EEA states pursued full EU membership as the EEA did not sufficiently satisfy the needs of their export based corporations. The EU has also preferred these states to integrate via the EEA rather than full membership as the EEC wished to pursue monetary integration and did not wish for another round of enlargement to occupy their attention. However, with the EEA's credibility dented following rejection by businesses and Switzerland, the EU agreed with full membership. This was more readily accepted with the prospect of poorer countries wishing to join; contributions from richer countries would help balance the EU budget.[51] On 1 January 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the EU marking its fourth enlargement. The Norwegian government lost a second national referendum on membership.

Eastern enlargement

[edit]
EU enlargements, 2004–2013:
  EU prior to 2004
  Joined the EU on 1 May 2004
  Joined the EU on 1 January 2007
  Joined the EU on 1 July 2013

In the late 1980s (shortly prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union) Mikhail Gorbachev announced the Soviet Union would no longer intervene in other countries' internal affairs (Sinatra Doctrine), practically freeing Central and Eastern Europe from Soviet occupation (Czechoslovakia and Hungary) / Soviet backed authoritarian regimes. These countries wanted to consolidate their democracies through joining Western world international organisations (including participation in European integration) which would ensure the newly emerged democracies would not fall back under Russian control. The EU and NATO offered a guarantee of this, and the EU was also seen as vital to ensuring the economic success of those countries. However, the EU's desire to accept these countries' membership applications was less than rapid. The collapse of communism came quickly and was not anticipated. The EU struggled to deal with the sudden reunification of Germany with the addition of its poorer 17 million people and, while keeping its monetary union project on track, it was still at that early stage pointing the EFTA countries in the direction of the EEA rather than full membership.[52]

States in Central and Eastern Europe persisted and eventually the above-mentioned issues were cleared. The US also pressured the EU to offer membership as a temporary guarantee; it feared expanding NATO too rapidly for fear of frightening Russia. Although eventually trying to limit the number of members, and after encouragement from the US, the EU pursued talks with ten countries and a change of mind[clarification needed] by Cyprus and Malta helped to offset slightly the influx of large poorer member states from Central and Eastern Europe.[52]

The 10 post-Communist European Union candidate countries in 1998
Country

Europe Association Agreement
signing date
[53]

Start of accession negotiations
[54]

Population in 1998
[55]

1998 GDP ($ billions)
[A]

1998 GDP (PPP) per capita
[57][58]

Real GDP in 1998
(1989=100)
[B]

Real wage in 1998
(1989=100)
[61]

Real gross industrial output
in 1998 (1989=100)
[62]

Private sector share of GDP in 1998
[63]

Asset share of state-owned banks in 1998
[64]

External debt in 1998
(% of GDP)
[56]

General government debt in 1998
(% of GDP)
[56]

Net inflows of FDI in 1998 (% of GDP)
[65]

General government balance in 1998
(% of GDP)
[66]

Freedom House's Nations in Transit score in 1998
[C]

Bulgaria 1993-03-03 2000-02-15 8.34 12.7 $4,776
€4,583
67.3 47.0 44.3 65% 59.5% 80.6 95.6 4 2 30
Czech Republic 1993-10-04 1998-03-31 10.28 60.8 $12,479
€12,045
95.45 101.0 79.4 75% 18.8% 40.0 13.2 6 −4 14
Estonia 1995-06-13 1998-03-31 1.43 5.65 $7,607
€7,491
79.95 74.3 59.0 70% 7.8% 52.5 6.0 11 0 16
Hungary 1991-12-16 1998-03-31 10.12 46.9 $10,202
€9,735
95.3 79.6 103.0 80% 11.8% 58.0 61.9 4 −8 13
Latvia 1995-06-13 2000-02-15 2.42 6.6 $5,557
€5,465
59.4 63.0 47.9 65% 8.5% 46.8 10.6 6 −1 18
Lithuania 1995-06-13 2000-02-15 3.69 11 $6,437
€6,124
65.6 44.6 40.6 70% 45.3% 34.2 16.5 8 −3 18
Poland 1991-12-16 1998-03-31 38.72 158.5 $7,658
€7,756
117.2 85.2 117.3 65% 48% 37.3 39.9 4 −4 13
Romania 1993-02-01 2000-02-15 22.47 42.1 $5,646
€5,576
78.1 61.1 42.5 60% 74.6% 23.6 27.6 5 −4 33
Slovakia 1993-10-04 2000-02-15 5.38 22.2 $9,817
€9,615
99.8 88.8 80.9 75% 50% 53.7 28.6 3 −5 29
Slovenia 1996-06-10 1998-03-31 1.99 21.1 $14,305
€13,589
102.25 86.7 75.9 60% 41.3% 34.7 22.2 1 −2 16

Notes:

  1. ^ 1998 GDP per capita multiplied by 1998 population[56]
  2. ^ the average between the EIU estimate (used by the OECD)[59] and the UNECE estimate (used by the Council of Europe)[60]
  3. ^ The Nations in Transit score comprises 8 categories: political process, civil society, independent media, governance and public administration, rule of law, privatization, macroeconomics and microeconomics. Each category is assigned a score from 1 (highest) to 7 (lowest). Thus, the greater the final score (8 to 56), the more authoritarian the country. In 1998, the most authoritarian of the 10 EU candidates was Romania: with a score of 33, Romania was even more authoritarian than Russia (32).[67]

In the end, eight Central and Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), plus two Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus), joined on 1 May 2004. This was the largest single enlargement in terms of people, and number of countries, though not in terms of GDP.[68] The less developed nature of these countries was of concern to some of the older member states. Some countries, such as the UK, immediately opened their job market to the accession states, whereas most others placed temporary restrictions on the rights of work of the citizens of these states to their countries. The movement westward of some of the labour force of the newly acceded countries that occurred in the aftermath of the enlargement initially spawned clichés among the public opinion and media of some western countries (such as the "Polish plumber"), despite the generally conceded benefit to the economies concerned.[69] The official EU media (the speeches of the European Commission) frequently referred to the enlargement to the CEE region as "an historical opportunity" and "morally imperative", which reflected the desire of the EU to admit these countries as members, even though they were less developed than the Western European countries.[70]

Following this, Romania and Bulgaria, deemed as not fully ready by the commission to join in 2004, acceded instead on 1 January 2007. These, like the countries joining in 2004, faced a series of restrictions as to their citizens not fully enjoying working rights on the territory of some of the older EU members until 2014.[71] Romania and Bulgaria did not have a referendum related to accession.

The socio-economic research on the attitudes towards the integration from both hosting and visiting countries has revealed divergent views. The analysis shows, there are a number of possible factors of the rationalisation and understanding of the practices on what the enlargement has been and should be like. Attitudes of even sceptical citizens, do not discard the possibility on future sustainable enlargements. The years subsequent to the EU accession will lead to extensive dialogues between policy-makers, governments, and European citizens about the path for a constructive development.[72]

Western Balkans enlargements

[edit]

The 2003 European Council summit in Thessaloniki set integration of the Western Balkans as a priority of EU expansion. The EU's relations with the Western Balkans states were moved from the "External Relations" to the "Enlargement" policy segment in 2005. Those states which have not been recognised as candidate countries are considered "potential candidate countries".[73] The move to Enlargement directorate was a consequence of the advancement of the Stabilisation and Association process.

Croatia joined on 1 July 2013, following ratification of the 2011 Accession Treaty by all other EU countries. Albania and the several successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have all adopted EU integration as an aim of foreign policy.

Detail

[edit]
# Official name Date Community countries and OMR Associated territories Excluded territories
1 ECSC Foundation 23 July 1952 Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Saarland, Italy, West Germany, West Berlin[A] Belgian Congo, Ruanda-Urundi, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, French Tunisia, French Morocco, Adélie Land, Comoro Islands, Chad, Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, French India, French Oceania,[B] Clipperton Island, French Somaliland, Dahomey, French Guinea, French Sudan, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Upper Volta, French Cameroons, French Togoland, Madagascar, Crozet Islands, Kerguelen Islands, Saint-Paul-and-Amsterdam Islands, New Caledonia, Wallis-et-Futuna, French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Réunion, French Algeria, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Scattered Islands in the Indian Ocean, French-administration of the New Hebrides,[C] Italian Somaliland, Netherlands New Guinea, Surinam, Netherlands Antilles
1953–1957 the above, Saarland joined West Germany the above without the newly independent: Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, French Tunisia, French Morocco, French India;[D] and without Adélie Land, Crozet Islands, Kerguelen Islands, Saint-Paul-and-Amsterdam Islands[E]
2 EEC and EURATOM Foundation 1 January 1958 the above, French Algeria, Réunion, French Guiana, Martinique, Guadeloupe French Guinea, French Cameroons, French Togoland,[F] French Sudan,[G][H] Senegal,[H] Madagascar,[I] Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, Ubangi-Shari, Middle Congo,[J] Gabon, Mauritania, Ruanda-Urundi, Netherlands New Guinea, Comoro Islands, French Somaliland,[K] French-administration of the New Hebrides,[C] St. Pierre and Miquelon, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, French Southern and Antarctic Lands, Scattered islands in the Indian Ocean the above, West Berlin, without Scattered islands in the Indian Ocean
1958–1962 the above the above, without the newly independent: French Guinea, French Cameroons, Togo, Mali Federation, Malagasy Republic, Belgian Congo, Italian Somaliland, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Mauritania, Ruanda-Urundi,[L] Netherlands New Guinea[M] the above
3 July 1962 the above, without the newly independent: Algeria the above the above
1 September 1962 the above the above, with Surinam[76] the above, without Surinam
Netherlands Antilles Association Convention[77] 1 October 1964 the above the above, with the Netherlands Antilles the above, without the Netherlands Antilles
3 First Enlargement 1 January 1973 the above, Republic of Ireland, United Kingdom, Gibraltar, Denmark[N] the above, Antigua, Redonda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Brunei, Canton and Enderbury Islands,[O] Bahama Islands, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Honduras,[P] British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, British Western Pacific Territories,[Q] Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Falkland Islands Dependencies,[R] Gilbert and Ellice Islands,[S] Montserrat, Pitcairn Islands, St. Helena, Ascension Island, Tristan da Cunha, Seychelles, New Hebrides,[C] Turks and Caicos Islands the above, the Faroe Islands, Akrotiri and Dhekelia,[T] the Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney, Sark, Rhodesia,[U] Hong Kong
1973–1980 the above the above, Barbuda,[V] Mayotte,[W] without the newly independent Bahama Islands, Grenada, St. Vincent, Seychelles, British Solomon Islands, Surinam, Ellice Island, Dominica, St. Lucia, Gilbert Islands, New Hebrides, Comoro Islands[W] and French Territory of the Afars and the Issas the above without the newly independent Rhodesia
4 Second Enlargement 1 January 1981 the above, Greece the above the above
1981–1984 the above the above, Anguilla,[X] without the newly independent Belize, Antigua, Barbuda, Redonda,[Y] St. Christopher and Nevis[X] and Brunei the above
1 January 1985 the above without Greenland the above, Greenland the above
5 Third Enlargement 1 January 1986 the above, Spain, Portugal, Azores, Madeira, Plazas de soberanía, Canary Islands the above, with Aruba, formerly part of the Netherlands Antilles[Z][AA] the above, Macau, East Timor[AB]
German reunification 3 October 1990 the above, East Germany and West Berlin join to form Germany the above the above without West Berlin
6 Fourth Enlargement 1 January 1995 the above, Austria, Sweden, Finland the above the above
1 July 1997 the above the above the above, without Hong Kong[AC]
20 December 1999 the above the above the above, without Macau[AC]
20 May 2002 the above the above the above, without the newly independent East Timor
7 Fifth Enlargement[79] 1 May 2004 the above, Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary the above, Akrotiri and Dhekelia[80] the above, without Akrotiri and Dhekelia[80]
8 Sixth Enlargement 1 January 2007 the above, Bulgaria, Romania the above the above
22 February 2007 the above, Collectivity of Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy[AD] the above, without Scattered islands in the Indian Ocean[AE] the above
10 October 2010 the above the above, without the now-dissolved Netherlands Antilles, with Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, Saba[AA] the above
1 January 2012[81] the above, without Saint Barthélemy the above, Saint Barthélemy the above
9 Seventh Enlargement
[82][83][84][85]
1 July 2013 the above, Croatia the above the above
10 1 January 2014[86] the above, Mayotte the above, without Mayotte the above
11 Withdrawal of the United Kingdom Transition period: 1 February 2020 to 31 December 2020[87] the above, without United Kingdom, Gibraltar the above without Akrotiri and Dhekelia, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Montserrat, Pitcairn, Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands the above without the Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey

Notes:

  1. ^ Until the reunification of Germany in 1990 the de jure status of West Berlin was that of French, UK and US occupied zones with West German civilian administration. The treaties applied fully during 1952–1990 over the West German and French responsibilities, and during 1973–1990 over the UK responsibilities. From 3 October 1990 West Berlin was fully integrated in the Federal Republic of Germany along with East Germany.[74][75][failed verification]
  2. ^ Renamed French Polynesia on 1957-07-22
  3. ^ a b c The New Hebrides was a condominium between the United Kingdom and France until its independence in 1980, and was generally considered to be an overseas territory of both countries
  4. ^ Became part of India on 1954-07-21
  5. ^ Adélie Land, Crozet Islands, Kerguelen Islands and Saint-Paul-and-Amsterdam Islands merged to become the French Southern and Antarctic Lands on 1955-08-06. All territories were already outside the ECSC and the merged territory retained the same status
  6. ^ Renamed Togo on 1958-02-22
  7. ^ Renamed Sudanese Republic on 1958-11-24
  8. ^ a b Senegal and the Sudanese Republic merged on 1959-04-04 to create the Mali Federation
  9. ^ Renamed Malagasy Republic on 1958-10-14
  10. ^ Renamed Congo on 1958-11-28
  11. ^ Renamed French Territory of the Afars and the Issas in 1967
  12. ^ Became independent as the Kingdom of Ruanda and the Kingdom of Burundi
  13. ^ Annexed by Indonesia in 1962
  14. ^ Including the County of Greenland, which later gained home rule and left the EC
  15. ^ The UK co-administered the condominium of the Canton and Enderbury Islands with the US, until the UK merged it with its Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony on 1975-01-01 to create its Gilbert Islands colony. As such it ceased to be a condominium, but the US continued to claim it until 1979
  16. ^ Renamed Belize on 1973-06-01
  17. ^ Renamed the British Solomon Islands on 1976-01-02
  18. ^ Renamed South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in 1985
  19. ^ Split into the Gilbert Islands (which was merged with the Canton and Enderbury Islands) and Ellice Island on 1975-01-01
  20. ^ British Sovereign Base Areas on the island of Cyprus
  21. ^ Legally a British colony until independence in 1980
  22. ^ The island of Barbuda became a separate territory from Antigua on 1976-12-23
  23. ^ a b The island of Mayotte became a separate territory in 1974, and chose to remain with France, rather than become independent
  24. ^ a b Anguilla stayed a British colony, while Saint Christopher and Nevis became independent as St. Kitts and Nevis
  25. ^ Antigua, Barbuda and Redonda merged to become independent as Antigua and Barbuda
  26. ^ Although Aruba was only added to the OCT list with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, it was considered an OCT by the European Communities since leaving the Netherlands Antilles: "De eilandgebieden zullen dus de rechten en plichten van de LGO-status van het Land de Nederlandse Antillen overnemen, wanneer dat opgeheven wordt. Hetzelfde gebeurde in 1986 toen Aruba van eilandgebied van de Nederlandse Antillen een apart Land binnen het Koninkrijk werd. Hoewel de LGO-bijlage pas in 1999 aan deze situatie werd aangepast, heeft de Europese Gemeenschap Aruba van het begin af aan als LGO behandeld." in: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs[78]
  27. ^ a b The Netherlands Antilles dissolved on 10 October 2010 and contained the islands of Aruba (which left the Netherlands Antilles in 1986), Bonaire, Curacao, Sint Maarten, Saba and Sint Eustatius. Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten are autonomous countries in the Kingdom of Netherlands, and remain overseas territories of the European Union. Bonaire, St Eustatius and Saba, also known as the BES islands, are special municipalities of the Netherlands, and remained legally overseas territories
  28. ^ De jure a Portuguese colony under Indonesian occupation until 1999
  29. ^ a b Transferred to China
  30. ^ Saint Martin and Saint Barthélemy were part of Guadeloupe and thus already part of the EU. On 2007-02-22, they became separate territories but France retained application of EU law there, and their EU OMR status was confirmed in the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 2009-01-01.
  31. ^ The Scattered islands in the Indian Ocean became part of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands on 2007-02-22. Both territories were already EU OCTs and the merged territory retained the same status.

Timeline

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Potential enlargements

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Current enlargement agenda

[edit]
  Current members (27)
  Candidates negotiating (6)
  Candidates (2)
  Applicant / Potential candidate (1)
  Candidate with frozen negotiations (1)

Article 49 of the Maastricht Treaty (as amended) says that any European state that respects the "principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law", may apply to join the Union. The European Council set out the conditions for EU membership in June 1993 in the so-called Copenhagen criteria (see Criteria above for details). The Western Balkan states had to sign Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) before applying for membership, but have been prioritised with an open path to apply for membership and roadmap for an accession perspective, since emerging from the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and subsequent Yugoslav Wars.

Accession negotiations are currently ongoing with Montenegro (since 2012), Serbia (since 2014), Albania (since 2020), North Macedonia (since 2020), Moldova (since 2024) and Ukraine (since 2024). Negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005,[2] but have been effectively frozen by the EU since December 2016,[3][4][5] due to backsliding in the areas of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental rights.[3][6][7]

The most advanced stage of the negotiations, defined as meeting the interim benchmarks for negotiation chapter 23 and 24 which allow the closing process of all negotiation chapters to start, has so far only been reached by Montenegro.[88] Montenegro's declared political goal is to achieve membership of the EU by 2028.[89][90]

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia were granted official candidate status respectively in December 2022[8][9] and December 2023,[10] but were asked to complete additional reforms before qualifying for the formal start of membership negotiations. Kosovo submitted an application for membership in December 2022.[11] For Kosovo to be granted official candidate status, the Council will need to unanimously agree to start Kosovo's accession process by requesting an opinion from the European Commission on its application. The EU however remains divided on its policy towards Kosovo, with five EU member states not recognising its independence.

EU enlargement policy

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On 6 February 2018, the European Commission published its expansion plan,[91] which covers the six Western Balkan countries. The plan envisages that all six applicants could achieve accession as members of the European Union after 2025. In May 2018, Bulgaria—holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union—hosted a summit on the Western Balkans, which aimed to facilitate accession by the six, including enhanced regional security cooperation and regional connectivity.[92]

It was noteworthy that the Summit referred to "partners" rather than states: this reflects that Kosovo is only partially recognised as a state.[93] As of 2018, Kosovo was not recognised by fellow Western Balkan applicant Serbia and existing EU members Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece. The European Commission is sensitive to the issue, which was addressed in a speech by the EU's High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the European Parliament Plenary Session on the Western Balkan Strategy: "shared, unequivocal, concrete perspective for European Union integration for each and every one of the six partners. Each at its own pace, with its own specificities and under different conditions, but the direction is clear and is one."[94]

Amid the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the three former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia submitted applications for EU membership.[95][96][97] The European Parliament subsequently voted to accept an emergency petition from the government of Ukraine for EU member state candidacy.[98] On 17 June 2022, the European Commission recommended that Ukraine and Moldova become candidates for EU membership and that Georgia be recognised as a potential candidate but that it would need to "meet certain conditions" to be granted candidate status. These conditions included investing more in education and infrastructure and completing several reforms in elections, judicial independence, crime, corruption, and oligarchs. These recommendations were approved by the European Council during a summit on 23 June.[99][100]

On 14 December 2023, the European Council granted candidate status to Georgia, agreed to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and announced that the opening of accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina would be reconsidered once certain conditions were met with an update expected in March 2024.[101] On 9 July 2024 the European Union halted Georgia's accession into the European union after their authorities adopted a new "foreign influence" law which some fear might curb democratic freedom.[102]

Potential enlargement agenda

[edit]
Countries that could join the European Union
  Current members
  Candidate countries
  Applicant / potential candidate countries
  Membership possible
  Membership rejected
  Located at least partially in Europe

Armenia

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On 12 March 2024, the European Parliament passed a resolution confirming Armenia meets Maastricht Treaty Article 49 requirements and that the country may apply for EU membership.[103] On 26 March 2025, the Armenian parliament approved a bill calling for the start of the process of Armenia's accession to the European Union.[104][105]

Abandoned enlargement negotiations

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Several sovereign states have previously submitted applications for membership to the EU but are no longer on the agenda:

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The enlargement of the European Union refers to the formal accession process through which sovereign states join the , expanding its membership from the original six founding states—, , , , the Netherlands, and —upon the entry into force of the in 1958 to 27 members following Croatia's entry in 2013 and the United Kingdom's withdrawal in 2020. This stepwise growth, conducted in eight distinct rounds, has reshaped the EU's geopolitical footprint, economic scale, and institutional dynamics, with the 2004 wave incorporating ten Central and Eastern European countries marking the most ambitious single expansion to date. Accession demands adherence to the , established in 1993, which mandate stable institutions securing , the , and ; a competitive ; and the ability to implement the EU's , comprising over 35 chapters of legislation covering areas from to . As of 2025, nine nations—, , Georgia, , , , , Türkiye, and —hold official candidate status, with negotiations opened for several amid heightened geopolitical pressures from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, though progress remains uneven due to persistent rule-of-law deficits, economic disparities, and domestic opposition within the EU to further dilution of per-capita prosperity and decision-making consensus.

Accession Framework

Copenhagen Criteria and Adaptations

The , established by the at its June 1993 summit, stipulate that candidate countries for EU membership must possess stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the , , and respect for minorities; a functioning capable of withstanding competitive pressures within the internal market; and the ability to adopt the obligations of the EU acquis, including adherence to the goals of political, . These criteria were further reinforced at the 1995 , which emphasized administrative capacity to implement the acquis effectively. In response to post-2004 enlargement experiences, where in reforms occurred in some new member states, the proposed a revised enlargement in February 2020 to enhance credibility and dynamism. This adaptation prioritizes and as the first negotiation cluster, introduces a "high-level" political steering mechanism for reversibility in cases of regression, and links progress in sensitive areas to financial assistance and economic reforms, aiming to address prior shortcomings in enforcement. Empirical application of the criteria has revealed challenges, particularly in ensuring sustained compliance before accession. and acceded in despite incomplete fulfillment of benchmarks, notably in combating high-level and , prompting the establishment of the and Verification Mechanism (CVM) as a post-accession safeguard. The CVM monitored progress until its formal closure by the Commission on 15 September 2023, after assessing that both countries had met key benchmarks, though independent analyses indicate persistent vulnerabilities, such as 's slower advances in enforcement compared to 's post-2016 gains. This case illustrates how political imperatives have occasionally overridden strict pre-accession enforcement, leading to reliance on monitoring mechanisms that, while innovative, have yielded uneven long-term institutional improvements.

Negotiation Stages and Mechanisms

The process of EU accession negotiations commences after a country receives candidate status, which follows a formal membership application and the European Commission's assessment of compliance with foundational criteria. Negotiations are initiated upon unanimous agreement by EU member states on a negotiating framework, which outlines the terms, including bilateral protocols addressing specific issues like transitional arrangements or safeguard clauses. These protocols allow for tailored conditions, such as extended transition periods for sensitive sectors like or , to mitigate impacts on existing members. A key initial mechanism is the screening process, conducted jointly by the and the candidate country, involving a detailed analytical examination of the EU divided into 33 chapters (with fundamentals like and often addressed separately under chapters 23 and 24). This phase identifies gaps in alignment and sets interim benchmarks for progress, typically lasting several months per chapter depending on complexity. Following screening, formal negotiations proceed on 35 chapters, increasingly organized into thematic clusters—such as fundamentals, internal market, competitiveness, and external relations—under the revised introduced in to enhance structure and focus. Chapters are opened only after the candidate meets opening benchmarks, demonstrating sufficient legislative and institutional alignment, and closed upon fulfillment of closing benchmarks, verified through monitoring reports. Conditionality forms the core mechanism, enforcing reforms through merit-based progression: advancement ties directly to verifiable compliance, with stalled or reversed steps possible for non-fulfillment or , as emphasized in the 2020 methodology to restore credibility amid past criticisms of lax enforcement. This reversibility clause allows suspension of negotiations or closure of opened chapters if systemic issues, such as rule-of-law deterioration, emerge, countering perceptions of enlargement as automatic. For instance, Turkey's accession talks, opened in October 2005, have remained effectively stalled since 2016, partly due to its non-recognition of and failure to meet benchmarks on Cyprus-related trade, illustrating how bilateral disputes can indefinitely halt progress despite initial frameworks. Negotiations typically span 5 to 10 years from opening, though durations vary widely based on reform pace and political consensus, with no guaranteed simultaneity even among parallel candidates. Recent adaptations, applied to candidates like and —granted status on June 23, 2022—prioritize early opening of cluster fundamentals (chapters 5, 18, 23, 24, and 32) with stringent interim benchmarks to front-load rule-of-law reforms, aiming to prevent delays seen in prior waves. Accession concludes with a signed after all chapters close, subject to by all member states and the candidate, underscoring the process's requirement and potential for vetoes.

Institutional Reforms for Enlargement

The , signed on 26 February 2001 and entering into force on 1 February 2003, introduced reforms to the Council of the European Union's voting system to facilitate the 2004 enlargement to 25 members, including ten Central and Eastern European states. It reweighted votes in qualified majority voting (QMV), allocating between 3 and 29 votes per based on population size, with a qualified majority requiring either a simple majority of states plus 74% of total votes for Commission proposals or two-thirds of states plus 74% for others, aiming to balance efficiency with representation amid increased membership diversity. These changes applied from 1 November 2004, addressing absorption capacity concerns by preventing institutional deadlock in a larger Union, though critics noted the system's complexity and persistent large-state advantages. The , signed on 13 December 2007 and effective from 1 December 2009, further adapted institutions for post-2004 enlargements by replacing weighted votes with a in the : 55% of member states (at least 15 of 27 as of 2025) representing 65% of the EU population for QMV adoption. This shift extended QMV to over 40 policy areas previously under unanimity, enhancing decision-making speed for a Union potentially exceeding 30 members, while capping seats at 751 to manage growth from enlargement-induced representation increases. also formalized the European Council's role in proposing the Commission President, indirectly influencing systems like Spitzenkandidaten, where Parliament lead candidates link election outcomes to the presidency, though its application has varied and faced resistance from national leaders prioritizing intergovernmental flexibility over parliamentary claims. Amid renewed enlargement momentum post-2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, 2024-2025 proposals emphasize pre-accession treaty revisions to avert paralysis in a 30-plus member EU, including German-Slovenian suggestions for QMV on technical enlargement decisions without full treaty change. The European Parliament's 2 October 2025 report on enlargement's institutional impacts urges reforms like expanding QMV to foreign and security policy, where unanimity enables single-state vetoes that could intensify with diverse new members from the Western Balkans or Eastern Europe. Debates highlight risks of gridlock under current unanimity in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), with proponents arguing QMV—already enabled by passerelle clauses in Articles 24 and 31 TEU—would bolster geopolitical responsiveness, though opponents cite sovereignty erosion and require treaty amendments for broader application. These reforms underscore the EU's "absorption capacity" doctrine, prioritizing internal adaptability to maintain efficacy without diluting core decision rules.

Historical Enlargements

Founding and Early Expansions (1950s-1970s)

The (ECSC) was established by the Treaty of Paris, signed on 18 April 1951 by , , , , the , and , and entered into force on 23 July 1952. This supranational organization pooled the coal and steel production of these six nations—key resources for postwar industrial reconstruction and previous conflict—aiming to foster economic interdependence and render future wars "not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible," as articulated in the preceding of 9 May 1950. The initiative was driven primarily by economic imperatives: facilitating recovery from devastation through coordinated , reductions, and joint investment, rather than broader ideological goals like among the founding members, all of which had transitioned to democratic governance by the early 1950s. Building on the ECSC's framework, the same six countries signed the Treaties of Rome on 25 March 1957, creating the (EEC) and the (Euratom), which entered into force on 1 January 1958. The EEC established a with progressive trade liberalization, eliminating internal tariffs and adopting a to stimulate intra-European commerce and industrial efficiency. Early efforts at enlargement faced resistance; the applied for EEC membership in 1961, but French President vetoed it on 14 January 1963, citing concerns over British ties to the and potential dilution of the community's agricultural policies and supranational character. A second UK application in 1967 met a similar fate with de Gaulle's veto later that year. The first successful enlargement occurred on 1 January 1973, when , , and the acceded, expanding the EEC to nine members; Norway had negotiated accession but withdrew following a negative . These expansions were motivated by economic calculus: applicant nations sought access to the growing internal market to boost exports and investment, while existing members anticipated gains from enlarged volumes without immediate political integration pressures. Empirical outcomes validated the trade liberalization focus; the original six members recorded GDP growth exceeding 20% cumulatively from 1957 to 1961, averaging over 4.7% annually amid rising intra-EEC trade shares that rose from 30% to nearly 50% of members' total external by the early . This period's high growth—sustained at around 5% annually through the 1960s—stemmed causally from tariff dismantlement and , compounded by external factors like the Marshall Plan's lingering effects, rather than supranational governance alone.

Southern Enlargements (1980s-1990s)

acceded to the (EEC) on January 1, 1981, becoming its tenth member following the collapse of the in 1974. This accession was motivated by the EEC's aim to anchor the nascent amid political instability, with pre-accession association agreements from providing a framework for economic cooperation and aid that supported transitional reforms. Similarly, joined on January 1, 1986, after the 1974 ended the authoritarian Estado Novo regime under Salazar and , while followed the same day, post-Franco's death in 1975 and the ensuing . These Iberian accessions were politically driven to bolster fragile democracies against potential reversals, with EEC financial assistance—totaling around 1 billion ECU in pre-accession loans and grants to alone—facilitating institutional stabilization and despite the applicants' relatively low GDP per capita ( at about 70% and at 55% of the EEC average in 1985). By 1986, the EEC had expanded to twelve members, marking the "southern enlargement" as a strategic response to Mediterranean pressures and post-authoritarian consolidations. The 1990s saw no further full accessions from southern or Mediterranean states, as the focus shifted northward with the 1995 integration of , , and via the (EEA) agreement effective 1994, which extended the to non-applicant EFTA countries without full membership. Instead, the EEC/EU pursued looser frameworks for Mediterranean neighbors, including Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched at the 1995 Barcelona Conference, aiming to foster trade and stability with states like (associate since 1963), , and amid stalled candidacy processes for and . These arrangements provided technical aid and market access but lacked the transformative incentives of full accession, reflecting EU caution after southern integration strains. Empirically, southern members exhibited slower economic convergence than northern counterparts; from 1981 to 1999, Greece's GDP per capita rose from 60% to only 70% of the average, Portugal from 55% to 75%, and from 70% to 85%, hampered by structural rigidities and reliance on cohesion funds that accounted for up to 3-4% of their GDPs annually by the mid-1990s. This dependency on structural funds—disbursed at €150 billion cumulatively to Objective 1 regions in the south during 1989-1999—supported but fostered inefficiencies, with studies showing limited gains relative to northern states' endogenous growth. Political stabilization succeeded initially, as membership correlated with sustained democratic institutions in Greece, , and , yet fiscal indiscipline emerged, exemplified by Greece's primary deficits averaging 5% of GDP from 1981 onward. Criticisms of these enlargements center on lax economic entry standards prioritizing over readiness, which sowed seeds for later vulnerabilities; Greece's accession overlooked weak fiscal controls, enabling debt accumulation to 100% of GDP by through financing and statistical manipulations later exposed. Analysts argue this political haste—despite warnings of integration costs—imposed asymmetric burdens on northern payers via transfers, while southern economies remained agrarian and industrialized slowly, prefiguring the 2009-2018 crises where Greece's imbalances traced to post-1981 overspending. Empirical reviews indicate that while democracy aid via accession stabilized regimes, the absence of stringent convergence benchmarks (pre-Maastricht) allowed divergences that structural funds mitigated but did not resolve, highlighting causal risks of rapid political enlargement without economic preconditions.

Eastern and Post-Cold War Waves (2000s)

The Eastern and Post-Cold War waves of EU enlargement in the 2000s represented the most ambitious expansions, integrating former communist states alongside Mediterranean islands to consolidate democracy and market economies after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall. On 1 May 2004, ten countries acceded: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, adding 74 million citizens and shifting the EU's borders eastward. This wave, often termed the "big bang" enlargement, followed accession negotiations that began in March 1998 for six Central European states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and later Slovakia) and extended to the others by 2000, with progress tied to meeting Copenhagen criteria on stable institutions, market economies, and acquis adoption. These accessions were closely aligned with NATO expansions, as seven of the 2004 EU entrants (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) joined in March 2004, fostering security coordination and democratic reforms in parallel. The process accelerated post-1990s Association Agreements, emphasizing rapid integration to anchor post-communist transitions amid geopolitical stability goals. In 2007, and joined on 1 January, following negotiations opened in 2000, though with safeguards due to slower judicial and corruption reforms. Immediate economic effects included trade surges within the , with new members experiencing export growth to , though disparities persisted. Labor mobility strained some host states; the UK's decision to grant immediate access without transitional restrictions led to over 1.2 million Eastern European migrants arriving by 2010, boosting sectors like but sparking wage pressures and public service demands. Geopolitically, the enlargements stabilized Central and Eastern borders, integrating regions once vulnerable to Soviet influence and promoting unified European policies. Post-accession, initial rule-of-law adherence gave way to challenges in and , where governments after 2010 and 2015, respectively, pursued judicial reforms criticized for undermining independence, prompting EU infringement actions despite pre-accession commitments. These developments highlighted enforcement gaps in the enlargement framework, as monitoring mechanisms like cooperation and verification for and extended into the 2000s to address persistent and .

Recent Accessions and Stagnation (2010s-2020s)

acceded to the on 1 July 2013, becoming the 28th member state after signing the accession treaty on 9 December 2011 and completing ratification processes. This marked the final enlargement of the 2004-2007 wave's momentum, with no subsequent accessions occurring through 2025 despite active candidate statuses for nine countries, including six in the Western Balkans. Enlargement efforts shifted focus to screening and negotiation openings in the 2010s, such as Montenegro's accession talks launching on 29 June 2012, which by 2025 had opened all 33 chapters with seven provisionally closed, though overall progress remained incremental. Stagnation intensified due to internal candidate challenges and EU-wide "enlargement fatigue," exemplified by Turkey's negotiations effectively freezing after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt, amid concerns over democratic backsliding, civil liberties violations, and failure to implement judgments, leading to a formal standstill declaration in 2018. In the Western Balkans, Serbia's path hinged on the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue for normalization with , initiated in 2011 but yielding limited tangible agreements by 2025, stalling chapter openings beyond initial clusters. and began formal negotiations on 19 July 2022 after prolonged screening delays tied to bilateral disputes, but advancement slowed amid rule-of-law deficiencies. progress reports for 2024 and 2025 underscored persistent weaknesses in , measures, and media freedom across candidates, with only marginal reforms despite targeted funding like the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. Russia's full-scale invasion of on 24 February 2022 catalyzed a partial revival of enlargement rhetoric, reframing it as a geopolitical imperative to stabilize Europe's eastern flanks, though Western Balkan talks incorporated stricter, merit-based benchmarks prioritizing rule-of-law clusters before broader economic chapters. This shift contrasted with 2010s trends of budgetary restraint and vetoes from member states like and , which had blocked openings; post-2022 initiatives, such as the 2024 Growth Plan allocating up to €6 billion in grants and loans conditional on reforms, aimed to accelerate integration but yielded uneven results by 2025, with frontrunners like and targeting closures by 2026-2027 absent accelerated compliance. Overall, the period reflected a tension between aspirational momentum and empirical hurdles, including entrenched and ethnic disputes, limiting tangible expansion.

Empirical Outcomes

Economic Convergence and Divergences

Following the 2004 enlargement, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries experienced substantial economic convergence toward the EU average, driven by , structural reforms, and (FDI). GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) for Poland rose from 52% of the EU-15 average in 2004 to 78% by 2023, reflecting average annual growth exceeding 4% in the initial decade post-accession. Similar patterns emerged across the , with Slovakia reaching 89% and Czechia 92% of the EU average by 2023, supported by FDI inflows averaging 5-7% of GDP annually in the early years, which facilitated and . These gains aligned with pre-accession conditionality under the , which enforced fiscal discipline and , yielding multiplier effects from EU integration estimated at 1.5-2 times initial investments in . However, convergence proved uneven, with southern CEE accessions like and —joining in 2007—lagging persistently below 70% of the average by 2023 (Bulgaria at 64%, Romania at 69%). Post-accession weakening of enforcement mechanisms, such as reduced monitoring of state aid and , contributed to slower structural reforms and higher indices in these states, perpetuating gaps rooted in institutional quality rather than funding shortages. cohesion funds, totaling over €350 billion for 2007-2020 across new members, showed mixed returns on (ROI), with econometric analyses indicating GDP boosts of 0.5-1% per annum in high-absorption regions but near-zero or negative in low-governance areas due to inefficient allocation and leakage. Western EU members bore significant fiscal costs as net contributors, with Germany transferring an estimated cumulative €150-200 billion net to the EU budget from 2004-2023, primarily funding cohesion and agricultural supports for new entrants that diluted per-capita returns for donors. Intra-EU migration, peaking at 5-7 million from CEE to Western states post-2004, increased labor supply in recipient economies, exerting downward pressure on low-skilled wages by 1-3% in sectors like and services in the UK and , according to difference-in-differences studies controlling for skill composition. Aggregate GDP effects remained positive due to complementarity with native high-skilled labor, but localized divergences amplified "enlargement fatigue" by straining public finances without proportional trade reciprocity gains.
CountryGDP per Capita (% EU Average, 2004/Pre-Accession)GDP per Capita (% EU Average, 2023)Key Driver of Divergence
Poland52%78%Strong FDI and exports
Czechia78%92%Institutional stability
~30% (2004)64%Weak post-accession reforms
~32% (2004)69%Governance inefficiencies
These patterns underscore that while accession catalyzed initial convergence via enforceable rules, lapsed conditionality post-entry fostered divergences, with empirical ROI from transfers hinging on recipient-side causal factors like rule adherence over mere capital inflows.

Political Stability and Rule of Law Impacts

The accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU facilitated the transition from communist-era to multi-party democracies, with empirical studies indicating improved through institutional reforms and electoral competition in the initial post-accession decade. For instance, countries like , , and the established stable parliamentary systems and held competitive elections following their 2004 entry, attributing much of this stability to EU conditionality that enforced adoption of democratic norms prior to membership. However, these gains have been uneven, as subsequent governance challenges revealed limitations in sustaining adherence without ongoing mechanisms. Democratic backsliding emerged prominently in after 2010, where Viktor Orbán's policies, including media control and electoral law changes, led to downgrade the country from a semi-consolidated to a hybrid/transitional regime in its Nations in Transit report by 2019, citing erosion of checks and balances. Similarly, under the (PiS) government from 2015 to 2023 implemented judicial reforms that politicized court appointments and disciplinary processes, prompting to note declines in judicial independence scores until partial reversals after the 2023 electoral shift. These cases illustrate how post-accession "carrot" incentives waned, allowing incumbents to consolidate power through formal institutional changes without sufficient countervailing EU sticks, as Article 7 procedures—invoked against both nations—have stalled at the preventive stage without suspending voting rights due to required unanimity among member states. Rule-of-law deficits persisted in newer members, evidenced by elevated corruption perceptions: in the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index, post-2004 entrants like (42/100), (45/100), and (46/100) scored markedly below older members such as (90/100) and (87/100), reflecting systemic issues in integrity. The EU's Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established in 2007 for and to monitor judicial reforms and efforts, was extended repeatedly—until its formal closure in September 2023—due to insufficient progress, with reports highlighting high-level graft and influences undeterred by accession pressures. Overall, while enlargement anchored initial stability, the absence of robust post-membership enforcement has permitted governance reversals, underscoring causal limits of conditionality in entrenched domestic political dynamics.

Security and Geopolitical Gains

The 2004 enlargement, which integrated ten Central and Eastern European states and shifted the EU's external borders eastward by over 1,000 kilometers, extended the bloc's zone of stability and to former frontlines of the divide. This incorporation of countries like , , and the created a buffer against potential eastern threats, fostering internal peace where no interstate wars have occurred among EU members since 1945, a record preserved and broadened through successive accessions. Empirical outcomes include reduced regional conflicts in the enlarged area, as integration mechanisms aligned these states with Western norms, deterring aggression through shared commitments. Synergies between EU enlargement and parallel NATO expansions in the same states amplified deterrence against Russian actions prior to 2014, with the presence of alliance structures in newly acceded territories contributing to stability along the EU's extended eastern frontier. Proponents argue this soft power projection—via the appeal of EU membership standards—exported stability to neighboring regions, enhancing geopolitical leverage without direct military confrontation. However, exclusions like Ukraine's stalled candidacy left vulnerabilities exposed, as its non-membership facilitated Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion by removing integrative deterrents present in acceded states. Persistent challenges include unchanged energy dependencies, where Eastern enlargements paradoxically heightened the EU's reliance on Russian natural gas, rising to over 40% of imports by the late due to infrastructure legacies in new members. Critics contend that rapid expansion overstretched resources, diluting focus on core priorities and exacerbating external instabilities, as evidenced by the 2015 migration that overwhelmed borders despite southeastern accessions like Croatia's in 2013. This overextension, per analyses, strained cohesion and amplified hybrid threats from non-integrated peripheries.

Criticisms and Challenges

Enlargement Fatigue in Core Members

Enlargement fatigue among core EU members, particularly founding states such as , , and the , emerged prominently after the 2004 Eastern enlargement, manifesting as declining public and elite support for further expansions due to perceived economic and social strains. This sentiment intensified with large-scale migration from new member states, which strained public services, housing, and labor markets in recipient countries; for instance, net migration from to exceeded 1 million between 2004 and 2014, contributing to wage pressures in low-skilled sectors despite overall labor market benefits documented in economic analyses. In , similar inflows heightened concerns over social welfare costs, with studies estimating additional fiscal burdens from non-contributory benefits accessed by migrants. Public opinion polls reflect this erosion: surveys indicate support for enlargement in fell from around 60-70% in the early —prior to the Eastern waves—to 42% in 2023, while in it dropped to 35%, among the lowest in the . By 2025, amid fiscal pressures from post-pandemic recovery and energy crises, a Special reported overall support at 56%, but core members like and remained below average, with only 35-42% favoring further accessions, underscoring persistent skepticism. This fatigue contributed to referenda setbacks, such as the 2005 French and Dutch rejections of the EU Constitutional Treaty, where opposition to rapid widening without deeper integration was a key factor, echoing fears of diluted decision-making and increased burdens. Empirical assessments highlight net fiscal costs for donor states, with core members bearing higher EU budget contributions post-enlargement; for example, Germany's net payments rose significantly after 2004 due to cohesion and agricultural funds directed to poorer entrants, estimated at tens of billions annually, often outweighing trade gains in donor calculations. Right-leaning analyses and political figures, such as those in Germany's AfD or France's National Rally, argue these transfers prioritize peripheral welfare over domestic priorities, citing data that short-term donor costs— including migration-related expenditures—exceed benefits absent robust absorption capacities. Elite positions mirror this, with French President Macron conditioning further enlargement on internal reforms to avoid "enlargement without integration," reflecting elite wariness of geopolitical gains being undermined by institutional overload.

Integration Failures and Persistent Corruption

Post-accession to the , several Central and Eastern European member states have demonstrated limited progress in combating , with Transparency International's (CPI) revealing stagnation or decline in scores for key countries. Hungary's CPI score fell from 55 in 2012 to 42 in 2023, while and maintained low scores of 45 and 46 respectively in 2023, far below Western European averages such as Denmark's 90. These figures indicate that pre-accession reforms did not translate into sustained improvements, as corruption perceptions remained entrenched despite membership and associated funding. Judicial independence has eroded in multiple new member states, undermining the despite billions in EU structural funds allocated for institutional strengthening. In , government measures have politicized judicial appointments and disciplinary processes, as documented in assessments, leading to persistent vulnerabilities in high-level cases. Similarly, and continue under post-accession monitoring mechanisms like the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), established in 2007, due to incomplete reforms in prosecutorial oversight and judicial accountability, with scandals involving public procurement persisting into the 2020s. The 2004 "big bang" enlargement contributed causally to these shortcomings through accelerated vetting that prioritized geopolitical momentum over rigorous enforcement of reform benchmarks, allowing transitional governments to defer deep structural changes. Post-accession, the dilution of conditionality—once the primary lever for compliance—enabled rational , as domestic political actors faced reduced external pressures to maintain institutions. Empirical data from the period shows no automatic convergence in standards; instead, without ongoing stringent oversight, absorption rates for EU funds remained high, with alone receiving over €30 billion in cohesion funds from 2014-2020 amid documented misuse. EU enforcement has exhibited selectivity and delays, exemplified by prolonged Article 7 proceedings against Hungary and Poland initiated in 2017 and 2018, which have yet to yield sanctions despite evidence of systemic deficiencies. This hesitancy contrasts with pre-accession rigor, fostering perceptions of hypocrisy and weakening deterrence against norm violations. Recent applications of rule-of-law conditionality, such as the 2022 freezing of €€137 billion in recovery funds for Hungary until partial judicial reforms, demonstrate that targeted financial leverage can prompt incremental changes, but persistent resistance underscores the limits of post-accession tools. Data from these interventions refute narratives of inevitable integration success, revealing that governance improvements require continuous, credible enforcement rather than accession as an endpoint.

Sovereignty Erosion and Cultural Clashes

Upon accession to the European Union, candidate states must fully adopt the acquis communautaire, the comprehensive body of EU law encompassing approximately 80,000 pages of regulations, directives, and treaties that supersede conflicting national legislation in areas of EU competence, thereby constraining independent policymaking. This requirement, formalized during enlargement negotiations divided into 35 chapters, ensures legal uniformity but has drawn Euroskeptic criticism for subordinating national parliaments to supranational oversight, as domestic reforms must align with ' directives without opt-outs for core policies. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty further diminished national veto power by expanding qualified majority voting (QMV) to additional domains, including aspects of justice and home affairs, while introducing passerelle clauses that enable the European Council to shift certain foreign and security policy decisions from unanimity to QMV without full treaty revision. Euroskeptics, including voices from national conservative movements, argue this mechanism erodes sovereignty by allowing majority blocs to impose policies—such as sanctions or diplomatic alignments—against dissenting states' preferences, fostering a dependency dynamic where smaller or outlier members yield to collective fiat. Pro-integration advocates counter that QMV enhances decisional efficiency and unity against external threats, though empirical instances, like Hungary and Poland's repeated vetoes on foreign policy, highlight ongoing tensions over national autonomy. Enlargement has also precipitated demographic shifts through intra-EU free movement, with over 2 million citizens from the 2004 accession countries (EU-8) migrating westward between 2004 and 2010, particularly to the (where numbers exceeded 1 million by 2016) and , intensifying pressures on , services, and social cohesion in recipient states. These inflows, enabled by transitional arrangements that lapsed unevenly, fueled perceptions of cultural dilution, as rapid population changes in locales like London's outer boroughs or Irish urban centers altered community dynamics and strained assimilation efforts. Integration data reveals mixed outcomes, with Eastern European migrants exhibiting higher employment rates than non-EU cohorts but persistent challenges in and civic participation, contributing to localized "parallel society" formations where ethnic enclaves maintain distinct social norms, as observed in surveys of second-generation communities in and . Right-wing Euroskeptics frame these developments as clashes between supranational openness and national cultural homogeneity, arguing that enlargement's mobility provisions exacerbate identity fragmentation and welfare competition, evidenced by rising nativist sentiments. The 2016 serves as an empirical proxy for such backlash, with voter concerns over post-2004 migration—cited by 52% of Leave supporters as a primary driver—illustrating how enlargement's unintended demographic consequences amplified grievances, culminating in the UK's exit to reclaim controls.

Future Enlargement Agenda

Active Candidates and Timelines

The European Union's enlargement process as of October 2025 involves nine official countries, with active progress concentrated among six in formal accession negotiations: , , , from the Western Balkans, and and from . These negotiations are conditioned on fulfilling , including stable democratic institutions, functionality, and alignment with EU across 35 chapters grouped into clusters. holds status since 2022 but has only recently initiated negotiations amid internal political divisions, while Georgia's candidacy from December 2023 remains stalled without opened talks due to unmet reform conditions on democratic and . , a long-standing since 1999, sees frozen negotiations since 2016 over rule-of-law concerns. In the Western Balkans, and represent frontrunners, with opening accession negotiations in July 2022 and advancing cluster talks on fundamentals, internal market, and competitiveness between 2022 and 2024; , negotiating since June 2012, has opened all 33 chapters, provisionally closing seven by mid-2025. , with negotiations opened in March 2020, faces persistent delays from Bulgaria's veto on historical and identity disputes, though partial progress resumed in 2024 with cluster screenings initiated; , negotiating since January 2014, has opened 22 chapters and closed two, but normalization with remains a key blocker. Recent funding releases under the Growth Plan in October 2025 to (€99.3 million), (€18.3 million), and (€25 million) reflect partial reform fulfillment, yet comprehensive assessments flag insufficient advancements in anti-corruption and judicial reforms across the region. For Eastern candidates, and received candidacy in June 2022, with negotiations formally launched for both on June 25, 2024; screening of EU laws concluded in September 2025, enabling potential first cluster openings pending consensus. 's progress includes activation of the €50 billion Ukraine Facility from March 2024, tied to quarterly reform audits through 2027, while secured €1.9 billion in Growth Plan aid in March 2025, with initial disbursements in July. Timelines remain aspirational and reform-dependent, with no binding dates; targets completion by 2026-2028 if closures accelerate, while broader 2025 Commission reports project possible Western Balkan accessions around 2030 for leaders like , tempered by flagged delays in rule-of-law implementation and bilateral disputes. Eastern candidates face longer horizons, potentially decades, given war-related disruptions in and governance vulnerabilities in , underscoring conditionality over geopolitical expediency.
CountryCandidacy GrantedNegotiations OpenedRecent Progress (2025)
2014July 2022Cluster openings 2022-2024; Growth Plan funds released October.
2010June 2012All chapters opened, 7 provisionally closed.
2005March 2020Screenings advanced post-Bulgaria thaw; funds released October.
2012January 201422 chapters opened, 2 closed; Kosovo dialogue ongoing.
June 2022June 2024Screening completed September; Facility audits active.
June 2022June 2024Screening completed September; Growth Plan disbursed July.

Geopolitical Pressures and Ukraine's Case

Ukraine submitted its formal application for membership on February 28, 2022, four days after Russia's full-scale began on February 24, prompting an accelerated EU response amid heightened geopolitical urgency. The issued its opinion on the application in June 2022, leading to the granting of candidate status by EU member states that same month, though the ongoing war has significantly impeded substantive negotiation progress despite formal talks opening in June 2024. Russia's aggression has intensified external pressures for Ukraine's integration, framing enlargement as a strategic counter to Moscow's influence in , particularly concerning Black Sea security and diversification. Control of routes remains contested, with Russia's military actions disrupting grain exports and threatening undersea , while strategies emphasize enhanced cooperation to mitigate these risks and reduce dependence on Russian supplies disrupted since 2022. The European Commission's 2024 enlargement package highlights hybrid threats, including and destabilization efforts linked to , as persistent challenges necessitating deeper -Ukraine alignment in defense and cybersecurity. Empirical estimates underscore the fiscal strains of potential accession, with Ukraine's reconstruction needs projected at $524 billion over the next decade as of February 2025, equivalent to roughly 2.8 times its current nominal GDP and posing significant demands on EU budgetary resources for recovery aid and integration support. Proponents argue that membership would bolster against Russian , yet analysts warn that expedited entry risks diluting EU standards on and , potentially importing systemic issues and eroding institutional integrity without prior reforms. As an alternative to full membership, deepening the existing EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, fully in force since September 2017, offers political and —including and reform alignment—without the immediate obligations of accession, allowing phased cooperation amid wartime constraints. This framework has already facilitated trade preferences and financial aid, providing a pragmatic bridge to address geopolitical pressures while preserving EU enlargement criteria.

Internal EU Reforms and Barriers

The European Union's capacity to absorb new members hinges on internal reforms to its decision-making structures, budgetary frameworks, and institutional arrangements, as larger enlargements would exacerbate existing inefficiencies in qualified majority voting thresholds, fiscal contributions, and parliamentary representation. Proposals in October 2025, including those from the European Parliament's Gozi Report, advocate shifting from unanimity to qualified majority voting in enlargement procedures and Article 7 sanctions to accelerate integration while mitigating veto risks from individual states. Similarly, discussions at the on October 23, 2025, highlighted preliminary ideas for admitting new members with phased or limited voting rights to preserve core decision-making cohesion, though these remain at an early stage requiring unanimous approval. A primary barrier is the treaty-mandated requirement for amending foundational rules, which demands consensus among all 27 member states and has stalled progress despite geopolitical pressures; for instance, and taxation domains vulnerable to post-enlargement veto proliferation would demand such changes to maintain functionality. Absorption capacity debates underscore empirical strains from prior expansions, where institutional overload—such as the European Parliament's growth beyond 700 seats—diluted legislative efficiency and increased administrative burdens without proportional productivity gains, prompting calls for prior reforms over rushed accession. Proponents of argue that urgency-driven enlargement risks institutional and policy gridlock, as evidenced by persistent blockages in recent deliberations, where even preliminary talks elicited resistance from key members prioritizing stability. This perspective prioritizes verifiable institutional readiness, contrasting with acceleration advocates who downplay capacity limits, yet data on post-enlargement slowdowns supports cautious sequencing of s to avert failures like diluted of rule-of-law standards. Budgetary adjustments, including reallocation of the to accommodate larger populations without proportional GDP contributions from poorer entrants, further necessitate treaty revisions, but thresholds have historically impeded such overhauls.

References

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