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[1]

Politics of Spain
Constitution
Monarchy
Felipe VI
Executive
Government of the Nation
Legislature
Cortes Generales
(15th Cortes Generales)
Judiciary
General Council of the Judiciary
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Related topics

The foreign relations of Spain could be constructed upon the foreign relations of the Hispanic Crown. The personal union of Castile and Aragon that ensued with the joint rule of the Catholic Monarchs was followed by the annexation of the Kingdom of Granada and the Kingdom of Navarre. The crown also built a large colonial empire in the Americas after the arrival of Columbus to the New World in 1492.

The Spanish Habsburg monarchs had large holdings across the European continent stemming from the inherited dominions of the Habsburg monarchy and from the Aragonese holdings in the Italian Peninsula. The Habsburg dynasty fought against the Protestant Reformation in the continent and achieved a dynastic unification of the realms of the Iberian Peninsula with their enthronement as Portuguese monarchs after 1580. The American colonies shipped bullion, but resources were spent in wars waged against France in Italy and elsewhere as well as in conflicts against the Ottoman Empire, England or revolts in the Spanish Netherlands, Portugal (lost after 1640) and Catalonia (lost in 1640 and recovered after 1652). Mainland Spain was the main theatre of the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714), after which the Bourbon dynasty consolidated rule, while handing in holdings in Italy and the Netherlands. The successive Bourbon Family Compacts underpinned a close alignment with the Kingdom of France throughout the 18th century. During the Napoleonic Wars, Mainland Spain was occupied by the French Empire (which installed a puppet ruler), and became after an 1808 uprising the main theatre of the Peninsular War. Nearly all its colonies fought for and won independence in the early 19th century. From then on it kept Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, otherwise lost in 1898 after the Spanish–American War, and, in line with far-reaching efforts by other European powers, Spain began to sustain a colonial presence in the African continent, most notably in Western Sahara and Equatorial Guinea. It also intervened in Nguyễn Vietnam alongside France and involved in the affairs of former colony Santo Domingo, which briefly returned to Spanish control. In the wake of the creation of a Spanish protectorate in Northern Morocco, the early 20th century saw a draining conflict against Riffian anti-colonial resistance. Spain stuck to a status of neutrality during World War I.

The Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 became a proxy war between the axis powers Germany and Italy and the Soviet Union (which lost). The war ensued with the installment of a dictatorship under Francisco Franco lasting until 1975. In the aftermath of World War 2, the series of multilateral agreements and institutions configuring what it is known today as Western Europe were made apart from Francoist Spain.[2] The 1953 military agreements with the United States entailed the acceptance of unprecedented conditions vis-à-vis the (peacetime) military installment of a foreign power on Spanish soil.[3] Spain joined the UN in 1955 and the IMF in 1958.[4] In the last rales of the dictator, the mismanaged decolonisation of Spanish Sahara ensued with the Moroccan invasion of the territory in 1975 and the purported partition of it between Morocco and Mauritania, spawning a protracted conflict pitting the Sahrawi national liberation Polisario Front against Morocco and (briefly) Mauritania lasting to this day. Spain joined NATO (1982) and entered the European Communities (1986).

On a wide range of issues, Spain often prefers to coordinate its efforts with its EU partners through the European political cooperation mechanisms. In addition to being represented via EU membership, Spain is a permanently invited guest to all G20 summits.[5]

History

[edit]

In 218 BC the Romans invaded the Iberian Peninsula, which later became the Roman province of Hispania. The Romans introduced the Latin language, the ancestor of both modern-day Spanish and Italian. The Iberian peninsula remained under Roman rule for over 600 years, until the collapse of the Western Roman Empire.

In the Early modern period, until the 18th century, southern and insular Italy came under Spanish control, having been previously a domain of the Crown of Aragon.

Dominions of the Habsburgs in 1556

Charles V

[edit]
Main article: Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor

Charles V (1500–1558) inherited vast lands across Western Europe and the Americas, and expanded them by frequent wars.[6] Among other domains he was King of Spain from 1516, and Holy Roman Emperor and Archduke of Austria from 1519. As head of the rising House of Habsburg during the first half of the 16th century, his dominions in Europe extending from Germany to northern Italy with direct rule over the Austrian hereditary lands and the Burgundian Low Countries, and a unified Spain with its southern Italian kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. His great enemy on land was France, on the Mediterranean Sea it was the Ottoman Empire, which at times was allied with France. England and the Papacy were sometimes part of the coalition against him. Much of his attention focused on wars in Italy. At the Diet of Augsburg (1547) he secured recognition that the Netherlands belonged to the Hapsburg domain. However Charles was intensely Catholic and the northern Netherlands was Protestant. He and his Spanish heirs fought for a century against Dutch independence; despite the enormous cost they failed.[7]

Philip II, 1556–1598

[edit]
Main article: Philip II of Spain § Foreign policy

Philip III, 1598–1621

[edit]
Main article: Philip III of Spain § Foreign policy
The Somerset House Conference between English and Spanish diplomats that brought an end to the Anglo–Spanish War (1585–1604).

Philip III has a poor reputation in terms of both domestic and foreign policy. He inherited two major conflicts from his father. The first of these, the long-running Dutch revolt, represented a serious challenge to Spanish power from the Protestant United Provinces in a crucial part of the Spanish Empire. The second, the Anglo–Spanish War was a newer, and less critical conflict with Protestant England, marked by a Spanish failure to successfully bring its huge military resources to bear on the smaller English military.[8]

Philip's own foreign policy can be divided into three phases. For the first nine years of his reign, he pursued a highly aggressive set of policies, aiming to deliver a 'great victory'.[9] His instructions to his most important advisor Duke Lerma to wage a war of "blood and iron" on his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands reflects this.[10] After 1609, when it became evident that Spain was financially exhausted and Philip sought a truce with the Dutch, there followed a period of retrenchment; in the background, tensions continued to grow, however, and by 1618 the policies of Philip's 'proconsols' were increasingly at odds with de Lerma's policy from Madrid.[11]

Europe in 1701 at the beginning of the War of the Spanish Succession

War of the Spanish Succession and after 1701–1759

[edit]
Main articles: War of the Spanish Succession and Philip V of Spain

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) saw Spain in a nearly helpless position as multiple European powers battled for control over which of three rivals would be king. At first most of the warfare took place outside of Spain. However, in 1704 Spain was invaded by the Germans (officially by the Holy Roman Empire including Habsburg Austria and Prussia, as well as other minor German states), Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, the Duchy of Savoy and Portugal. The invaders wanted to make the Habsburg candidate king instead of the incumbent Philip V who the grandson of France's powerful king Louis XIV and candidate of the House of Bourbon. Spain had no real army, but it defense was a high priority for Louis XIV who sent in his French armies and after a devastating civil war eventually drove out the invaders from Spain.[12][13]

After years of warfare and changing coalitions, the final result was that Philip V remained king. In practice his wife Elisabeth Farnese ruled Spain from 1714 until 1746, and was more interested in Italy than Spain. Spain was not even invited to the peace treaties (Peace of Utrecht); they forbade any future possibility of unifying the French and Spanish crowns. Britain was the main winner; it blocked France from becoming too powerful. Britain acquired Minorca and Gibraltar from Spain, as well as the right to sell slaves to Spanish colonies. Britain also gained Newfoundland and Nova Scotia from France. Spain kept its American colonies but lost its European holdings in Italy and the Spanish Netherlands (modern Belgium), mostly to Austria. Spain briefly regained some Italian holdings until the British sank its fleet in 1718. Elisabeth Farnese succeeded in recapturing Naples and Sicily. She put her son on the throne there. He abdicated in 1759 to return to Madrid as King Charles III of Spain.[14][15]

American Revolutionary War: 1775–1783

[edit]
Main article: Spain and the American Revolutionary War

Eager to gain revenge on the British for its defeat during the Seven Years' War, France offered support to rebel American colonists seeking independence from Britain during the American War of Independence and in 1778 entered the war on their side. They then urged Spain to do the same, hoping the combined force would be strong enough to overcome the British Royal Navy and be able to invade England. In 1779 Spain joined the war, hoping to take advantage of a substantially weakened Britain. Distrustful of republics, Spain did not officially recognize the new United States of America.[16]

A well-organised force under Bernardo de Galvez operating out of Spanish Louisiana launched repeated attacks on British colonies in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. They were easy winners against weak British garrisons, and were planning an expedition against Jamaica when peace was declared in 1783.[citation needed]

Spain's highest priority was to recapture Gibraltar from Britain using the Great Siege of Gibraltar.[17] Despite a prolonged besiegement, the British garrison there was able to hold out until relieved and it remained in British hands following the Treaty of Paris. Unlike their French allies (for whom the war proved largely to be a disaster, financially and militarily) the Spanish made a number of territorial gains, recovering Florida and Menorca.[18][19]

20th century

[edit]

A neutral country during World War I, Spain was not invited to take part in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, owing to the country's relative low profile in international affairs.[20] It was however invited to join the League of Nations as a non-permanent member and it formally did so on 14 August 1919.[20] During the so-called Wilsonian moment in international relations, forces adversarial to the Spanish State such as the Rifis vying for international recognition of their proto-republic and the Catalan separatist movement emboldened.[20]

Regional relations

[edit]

Latin America

[edit]

The Ibero-American vision

[edit]

Spain has maintained its special identification with its fellow Spanish-speaking countries. Its policy emphasizes the concept of an Ibero-American community, essentially the renewal of the historically liberal concept of "Hispano-Americanismo" (or Hispanic as it is often referred to in English), which has sought to link the Iberian peninsula to the Spanish-speaking countries in Central and South America through language, commerce, history and culture. Spain has been an effective example of transition from dictatorship to democracy, as shown in the many trips that Spain's King and prime ministers have made to the region.[21]

[edit]

Spain maintains economic and technical cooperation programs and cultural exchanges with Latin American countries, both bilaterally and within the EU. During José María Aznar's government, Spanish relations worsened with countries like Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, but were exceptionally good with others, like Colombia, the Dominican Republic and several Central American republics. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's victory in the 2004 general elections changed this setting. Despite long-standing close linguistic, economic and cultural relations with most of Latin America, some aspects of Spanish foreign policy during this time, such as its support for the Iraq War, were not supported or widely favored.

Sub-Saharan Africa

[edit]

Spain has gradually begun to broaden its contacts with Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a particular interest in its former colony of Equatorial Guinea, where it maintains a large aid program. More recently, it has sought closer relation with Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and others to find solutions for the issue of illegal immigration to the Canary Islands.[22]

Middle East

[edit]

In the Middle East, Spain is known as a broker between powers. In its relations with the Arab world, Spain frequently supports Arab positions on Middle East issues. The Arab countries are a priority interest for Spain because of oil and gas imports and because several Arab nations have substantial investments in Spain.[23]

Europe

[edit]

Spain has been successful in managing its relations with its three immediate European neighbours, France, Andorra, and Portugal. The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU in 1986[24] has helped ease some of their periodic trade frictions by putting these into an EU context. Franco-Spanish bilateral cooperation has been enhanced by joint action against recurring violence by separatist Basque group ETA since the 1960s.[citation needed] Ties with the United Kingdom are generally good, although the question of Gibraltar remains a sensitive issue, especially since the UK vote on Brexit.[citation needed]

Asia

[edit]

Today, Spain is trying to expand its still narrow relations with East Asian nations,[25] with China, Japan and South Korea as its main points of interest in the region. Thailand and Indonesia are Spain's main allies in the ASEAN region, having a considerable number of agreements and a very good relationship. In the recent years Spain has also been boosting its contacts, relations and investment in other Asian countries, most notably Vietnam and Malaysia. Relations with the Philippines are, despite a very long colonial past, considerably weaker than the ones Spain has with other countries in the area, dealing mostly with cultural aspects and humanitarian assistance programs.[26]

Disputes

[edit]

Territorial disputes

[edit]

Whilst the disputed on Gibraltar with Great Britain is the best known territorial dispute of Spain, the country also has disputes with Portugal and Morocco.

Foreign Relations

[edit]

The foreign relations of Spain could be constructed upon the foreign relations of the Hispanic Crown. The personal union of Castile and Aragon that ensued...

History

[edit]

In 218 BC the Romans invaded the Iberian Peninsula, which later became the Roman province of Hispania...

With Great Britain

[edit]
Main article: Status of Gibraltar

Ever since it was captured in 1704 by Anglo-Dutch forces during the War of the Spanish Succession, Gibraltar has been the subject of a dispute between Britain and Spain. Situated at the southern tip of the Iberian peninsula, overseeing the Strait of Gibraltar which connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Mediterranean Sea, the territory has great strategic importance. Today, Gibraltar is a British Overseas Territory and houses an important base for the British Armed Forces.[27]

Then a Spanish town, it was conquered during the War of the Spanish Succession on behalf of Archduke Charles, pretender to the Spanish throne. The legal situation concerning Gibraltar was settled in 1713 by the Treaty of Utrecht, in which Spain ceded the territory in perpetuity to the British Crown[28] stating that, should the British abandon this post, it would be offered to Spain first. Since the 1940s Spain has called for the return of Gibraltar. The overwhelming majority of Gibraltarians strongly oppose this, along with any proposal of shared sovereignty.[29] UN resolutions call on the United Kingdom and Spain to reach an agreement over the status of Gibraltar.[30][31]

Aerial view showing the Rock of Gibraltar, the isthmus of Gibraltar and the Bay of Gibraltar

The Spanish claim makes a distinction between the isthmus that connects the Rock to the Spanish mainland on the one hand, and the Rock and city of Gibraltar on the other. While the Rock and city were ceded by the Treaty of Utrecht, Spain asserts that the "occupation of the isthmus is illegal and against the principles of International Law".[32] The United Kingdom relies on de facto arguments of possession by prescription in relation to the isthmus,[33] as there has been "continuous possession [of the isthmus] over a long period".[34]

With Morocco

[edit]

The strategic position of the Strait of Gibraltar has left a legacy of a number of sovereignty disputes.[35] These include the "five places of sovereignty" (plazas de soberanía) on and off the coast of Morocco: the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which Morocco contests, as well as the islands of Peñon de Alhucemas, Peñon de Vélez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas. Spain maintains sovereignty over Ceuta, Melilla, Peñon de Velez de la Gomera, Alhucemas and the Chafarinas Islands (captured following the Christian reconquest of Spain) based upon historical grounds, security reasons and on the basis of the UN principle of territorial integrity. Spain also maintains that the majority of residents are Spanish. Morocco claims these territories on the basis of the UN principles of decolonisation, territorial integrity and that Spanish arguments for the recovery of Gibraltar substantiate Morocco's claim.[36] Spain claims sovereignty over the Perejil Island, a small, uninhabited rocky islet located in the South shore of the Strait of Gibraltar. The island lies 250 metres (820 ft) just off the coast of Morocco, 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) from Ceuta and 13.5 kilometres (8.4 mi) from mainland Spain. Its sovereignty is disputed between Spain and Morocco. It was the subject of an armed incident between the two countries in 2002. The incident ended when both countries agreed to return to the status quo ante which existed prior to the Moroccan occupation of the island. The islet is now deserted and without any sign of sovereignty.

With Portugal

[edit]

Olivenza (Spanish) or Olivença (Portuguese) is a town and seat of a municipality, on a disputed section of the border between Portugal and Spain, which is claimed de jure by both countries and administered de facto as part of the Spanish autonomous community of Extremadura. The population is 80% ethnic Portuguese and 30% of Portuguese language. Olivenza/Olivença was under continuous Portuguese sovereignty since 1297 until it was occupied by the Spanish in 1801 and formally ceded by Portugal later that year by the Treaty of Badajoz. Spain claims the de jure (legal) sovereignty over Olivenza/Olivença on the grounds that the Treaty of Badajoz still stands and has never been revoked. Thus, the border between the two countries in the region of Olivenza/Olivença should be as demarcated by that treaty. Portugal claims the de jure sovereignty over Olivenza/Olivença on the grounds that the Treaty of Badajoz was revoked by its own terms (the breach of any of its articles would lead to its cancellation) when Spain invaded Portugal in the Peninsular War of 1807.[37]

Portugal further bases its case on Article 105 of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, which Spain signed in 1817, that states that the winning countries are to "endeavour with the mightiest conciliatory effort to return Olivenza/Olivença to Portuguese authority". Thus, the border between the two countries in the region of Olivenza/Olivença should be as demarcated by the Treaty of Alcanizes of 1297. Spain interprets Article 105 as not being mandatory on demanding Spain to return Olivenza/Olivença to Portugal, thus not revoking the Treaty of Badajoz. Portugal has never made a formal claim to the territory after the Treaty of Vienna, but has equally never directly acknowledged the Spanish sovereignty over Olivenza/Olivença. Portugal continues to claim Olivenza/Olivença, asserting that under the Vienna Treaty of 1815, Spain recognized the Portuguese claims as "legitimate".

Another dispute surrounds the Savage Islands, which Spain acknowledges to be part of Portugal. However, Spain claims that they are rocks rather than islands, and therefore Spain does not accept the Portuguese Exclusive Economic Zone (200 nautical miles) generated by the islands, while acknowledging the Selvagens as possessing territorial waters (12 nautical miles). On 5 July 2013, Spain sent a letter to the UN expressing these views.[38][39]

Diplomatic relations

[edit]

List of countries which Spain maintains diplomatic relations with:

# Country[40] Date
1 Portugal 5 October 1143[41]
2 France 1486[42]
3 United Kingdom 1505[43][failed verification]
4 Denmark 1 April 1516[44]
— Holy See March 1559[45]
5 Sweden 29 June 1578[46]
6 Netherlands 29 June 1649[47]
7 United States 20 February 1783[48]
8 Russia 20 July 1812[49]
9 Brazil 6 June 1834[50]
10 Greece 6 December 1835[51]
11 Mexico 28 December 1836[52]
12 Ecuador 16 February 1840[53]
13 Iran 4 March 1842[54]
14 Chile 25 April 1844[55]
15 Venezuela 30 March 1845[56]
16 Bolivia 21 July 1847
17 Costa Rica 10 May 1850[57]
18 Nicaragua 21 March 1851[58]
19 Dominican Republic 18 February 1855[59]
20 Italy 5 May 1856[60]
21 Argentina 9 July 1859[61][62]
22 Guatemala 18 June 1864[63]
23 El Salvador 24 June 1865[64]
24 Japan 12 November 1868[65]
25 Thailand 23 February 1870[66]
26 Uruguay 19 July 1870[67]
27 Monaco 2 June 1876[68]
28 Peru 15 November 1879[69]
29 Paraguay 10 September 1880
30 Colombia 30 January 1881[70]
31 Romania 5 July 1881[71]
32 Luxembourg 9 February 1891[72]
33 Honduras 11 June 1896
34 Cuba 21 June 1902[73]
35 Panama 10 May 1904[74]
36 Norway 26 November 1905[75]
37 Bulgaria 5 August 1910[76]
38 Serbia 14 October 1916[77][78]
39 Finland 16 August 1918[79]
40 Czech Republic 19 June 1919[80]
41 Poland 17 September 1919[81]
42 Belgium 21 January 1921[82]
43 Egypt 9 May 1922[83]
44 Hungary 12 July 1924[84]
45 Turkey 27 September 1924
46 Austria 14 June 1925[85]
47 Ireland 23 June 1935[86]
— Sovereign Military Order of Malta 19 November 1938[87]
48  Switzerland 14 February 1939[88]
49 Philippines 27 September 1947[89]
50 Syria 3 April 1948[90][91]
51 Lebanon 15 April 1949[88]
52 Iceland 20 September 1949[92]
53 Haiti 6 November 1949[88]
54 South Korea 24 March 1950[88]
55 Liberia 5 May 1950[88]
56 Jordan 6 July 1950[88]
57 Iraq 5 August 1950[88]
58 Ethiopia 27 April 1951[93]
59 South Africa 18 May 1951[88]
60 Pakistan 17 September 1951[88]
61 Saudi Arabia 17 July 1952[88]
62 Germany 6 November 1952[88]
63 Canada 21 February 1953[94]
64 Sri Lanka 10 July 1955
65 Morocco 26 June 1956[88]
66 India 7 November 1956[88]
67 Tunisia 8 July 1957[88]
68 Indonesia 28 February 1958[95]
69 Afghanistan 28 October 1958[96]
70 Libya 14 January 1961
71 Nigeria 10 February 1961[88]
72 Mauritania 15 April 1961[88]
73 Cameroon 10 November 1961[88]
74 Algeria 18 December 1962[88]
75 Sudan 20 February 1964
76 Gabon 25 February 1964[88]
77 Sierra Leone 6 March 1964[88]
78 Laos 20 March 1964[97]
79 Kuwait 17 April 1964[88]
80 Ivory Coast 12 June 1964[88]
81 Mali 20 August 1964[88]
82 Democratic Republic of the Congo 3 November 1964[88]
83 Burkina Faso 27 November 1964
84 Central African Republic 27 November 1964[88]
85 Guinea 10 February 1965
86 Senegal 3 March 1965[88]
87 Niger May 1965
88 Gambia 14 August 1965[88]
89 Togo 22 October 1965
90 Benin 25 March 1966
91 Madagascar 25 March 1966
92 Burundi 27 September 1966[88]
93 Jamaica 21 December 1966[88]
94 Tanzania 23 February 1967[88]
95 Myanmar 11 March 1967[98]
96 Kenya 27 April 1967
97 Malaysia 12 May 1967
98 Trinidad and Tobago 15 June 1967[88]
99 Rwanda 16 June 1967[88]
100 Australia 26 October 1967
101 Ghana 10 November 1967
102 Cyprus 22 December 1967[88]
103 Singapore 26 April 1968
104   Nepal 14 May 1968
105 Somalia 31 May 1968[88]
106 Malta 7 June 1968[99]
107 Yemen 24 September 1968[88]
108 Equatorial Guinea 12 October 1968[100]
109 New Zealand 28 March 1969
110 Uganda 13 September 1969
111 Zambia 26 September 1969[88]
112 Bahrain 15 November 1971[101]
113 Bangladesh 12 May 1972[88]
114 Malawi 27 October 1972[88]
115 Oman 10 November 1972
116 United Arab Emirates 10 November 1972[102]
117 Republic of the Congo 7 December 1972
118 Qatar 22 December 1972
119 China 9 March 1973[103]
120 Chad 7 February 1975[88]
121 Guinea Bissau 3 March 1975[104]
122 Lesotho 3 May 1976[105]
123 Suriname 9 July 1976[88]
124 Grenada 2 September 1976[88]
125 Bahamas 1 December 1976
126 Fiji 10 December 1976[106]
127 Cambodia 3 May 1977
128 Vietnam 23 May 1977
129 Mozambique 27 May 1977[88]
130 Mongolia 4 July 1977
131 Angola 19 October 1977
132 Cape Verde 21 December 1977
133 Papua New Guinea 28 August 1978
134 Seychelles 3 November 1978
135 Eswatini 6 April 1979[88]
136 Mauritius 30 May 1979
137 Djibouti 25 June 1979[107]
138 Maldives 24 August 1979
139 Guyana 12 October 1979[108][109]
140 Tonga 16 November 1979
141 Zimbabwe 21 April 1980[110]
142 Solomon Islands 8 August 1980
143 Barbados 29 September 1980[88]
144 Dominica 29 September 1980[88]
145 Samoa 5 November 1980[111]
146 Botswana 29 April 1981
147 Vanuatu 30 April 1981
148 São Tomé and Príncipe 26 February 1982[112]
149 Comoros 1 March 1983
150 Brunei June 1984
151 Israel 17 January 1986
152 Saint Lucia 2 May 1986
153 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 21 July 1986[88]
154 Albania 12 September 1986
155 Saint Kitts and Nevis 19 March 1987
156 Antigua and Barbuda 27 June 1988[88]
157 Belize 13 January 1989[88]
158 Namibia 21 March 1990[113]
159 Estonia 10 September 1991
160 Lithuania 7 October 1991
161 Latvia 9 October 1991[114]
162 Marshall Islands 17 December 1991[115]
163 Liechtenstein 9 January 1992[116]
164 Armenia 27 January 1992
165 Ukraine 30 January 1992[117]
166 Moldova 31 January 1992
167 Azerbaijan 11 February 1992
168 Kazakhstan 11 February 1992
169 Belarus 13 February 1992
170 Croatia 9 March 1992
171 Uzbekistan 18 March 1992
172 Turkmenistan 19 March 1992
173 Slovenia 25 March 1992[118]
174 Kyrgyzstan 3 April 1992[119]
175 San Marino 29 April 1992[120]
176 Federated States of Micronesia 11 May 1992
177 Georgia 9 July 1992
178 Tajikistan 4 August 1992[121]
179 Bosnia and Herzegovina 14 December 1992[122]
180 Slovakia 1 January 1993
181 Andorra 3 June 1993[123]
182 Eritrea 5 October 1993
183 North Macedonia 28 July 1994
184 Tuvalu 4 May 1995
185 Palau 3 August 1995
186 Nauru 27 September 1995
— Cook Islands 29 January 1998
187 North Korea 7 February 2001
188 Timor-Leste 20 May 2002
189 Montenegro 11 December 2006
190 Bhutan 11 February 2011[124]
191 Kiribati 24 September 2011[115]
192 South Sudan 7 October 2011[125]
— State of Palestine 16 September 2024[126]

Bilateral relations

[edit]

Africa

[edit]
Country Date formal relations began Notes
Algeria 18 December 1962[88] See Algeria–Spain relations
Angola 19 October 1977[40] See Angola–Spain relations
  • Angola has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Luanda.
Burkina Faso 27 November 1964[40] See Burkina Faso–Spain relations
Cameroon 10 November 1961[88] See Cameroon–Spain relations
  • Cameroon has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Yaoundé.
Chad 7 February 1975[88]
  • Chad is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain is accredited to Chad from its embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon.
Ivory Coast 12 June 1964[88] See Ivory Coast–Spain relations
  • Ivory Coast has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Abidjan.
Democratic Republic of the Congo 3 November 1964[88] See Democratic Republic of the Congo–Spain relations
  • DR Congo has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Kinshasa.
Egypt 15 July 1950[88] See Egypt–Spain relations
  • Egypt has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Cairo.
Equatorial Guinea 27 September 1968[88] See Equatorial Guinea–Spain relations
Ethiopia April 1951[40] See Ethiopia–Spain relations
  • Ethiopia is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain has an embassy in Addis Ababa.
Gambia 14 August 1965[88]
  • Gambia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy office in Banjul.
Gabon 25 February 1964[88] See Gabon–Spain relations
  • Gabon has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Libreville.
Ghana 10 November 1967[40] See Ghana–Spain relations
  • Ghana has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Accra.
Guinea 10 February 1965[40] See Guinea–Spain relations
  • Guinea has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Conakry.
Guinea-Bissau 1974[40] See Guinea-Bissau–Spain relations
  • Guinea-Bissau has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Bissau.
Kenya 27 April 1967[40] See Kenya–Spain relations
  • Kenya has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Nairobi.
Liberia 5 May 1950[88] See Liberia–Spain relations
Libya 14 January 1961[40] See Libya–Spain relations
  • Libya has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Tripoli.
Madagascar 25 March 1966[40]
  • Madagascar is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain is accredited to Madagascar from its embassy in Pretoria, South Africa.
Mali 20 August 1964[88] See Mali–Spain relations
  • Mali has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Bamako.
Mauritania 15 April 1961[88] See Mauritania–Spain relations
Morocco 26 June 1956[88] See Morocco–Spain relations

Spain has several interests in Morocco. This is dictated by geographic proximity and long historical contacts, as well as by the two Spanish enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the northern coast of Africa. While Spain's departure from its former colony of Western Sahara ended direct Spanish participation in Morocco, it maintains an interest in the peaceful resolution of the conflict brought about there by decolonization. These issues were highlighted by a crisis in 2002, when Spanish forces evicted a small contingent of Moroccans from a tiny islet off Morocco's coast following that nation's attempt to assert sovereignty over the Spanish island.

Mozambique 27 May 1977[88] See Mozambique–Spain relations
  • Mozambique has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Maputo.
Namibia 2 March 1990[88] See Namibia–Spain relations
  • Namibia is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain has an embassy in Windhoek.
Niger May 1965[40] See Niger–Spain relations
  • Niger is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain has an embassy in Niamey.
Nigeria 10 February 1961[88] See Nigeria–Spain relations
  • Nigeria has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Abuja and a consulate-general in Lagos.
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic No diplomatic relations See Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic–Spain relations
  • Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has a delegation office in Madrid[130] and a delegation office in Barcelona.[131]
Senegal 3 March 1965[88] See Senegal–Spain relations
  • Senegal has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Dakar.
South Africa 18 May 1951[88] See South Africa–Spain relations
  • South Africa has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Pretoria and a consulate-general in Cape Town.
Sudan 20 February 1964[40] See Spain–Sudan relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Khartoum.
  • Sudan has an embassy in Madrid.
Tanzania 23 February 1967[88]
  • Spain has an embassy in Dar es Salaam.
  • Tanzania is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
Tunisia 8 July 1957[88] See Spain–Tunisia relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Tunis.
  • Tunisia has an embassy in Madrid.
Zambia 26 September 1969[88]
  • Spain has no embassy in Zambia, but has an honorary consulate in Lusaka, and is accredited to the country from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Zambia is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe 21 April 1981[88]
  • Spain has an embassy in Harare.
  • Zimbabwe is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.

Americas

[edit]
Country Date formal relations began Notes
Antigua and Barbuda 27 June 1988[88]
  • Antigua and Barbuda has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain is accredited to Antigua and Barbuda from its embassy in Kingston, Jamaica.
Argentina 21 September 1863[40] See Argentina–Spain relations
Bahamas 1 December 1976[40] See Bahamas–Spain relations
Barbados 29 September 1980[88]
  • Barbados is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Spain is accredited to Barbados from its embassy in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.
Belize 13 January 1989[88] See Belize–Spain relations
  • Belize is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Spain is accredited to Belize from its embassy in Guatemala City, Guatemala.
Bolivia 21 July 1847[40] See Bolivia–Spain relations

A diplomatic crisis with Bolivia in 2005 due to a misunderstanding was quickly resolved by Zapatero and Spain became the first European country visited by Evo Morales on January 4, 2006. However, there remain problems surrounding the exploitation of oil and gas fields in the country by Spanish corporations like Repsol.

Bolivian President Evo Morales met King Juan Carlos and held talks with Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero during a visit to Spain in September 2009 with the intention of resolving issues concerning the nationalisation of the Bolivian energy sector. The move has the potential to hurt some Spanish companies however relations were said to be "positive" between the Bolivian state and Spanish private sector energy companies. Evo Morales said that Bolivia is ready to accept outside investment in its energy and natural resource industries as long as foreign firms do not act as owners and that Bolivia is "looking for investment, be it from private or state sector. We want partners, not owners of our natural resources."

It was suggested that Bolivia would also negotiate with Spanish companies to produce car parts and lithium batteries in the future.[134]

Brazil See Brazil–Spain relations
Canada 21 February 1953[139] See Canada–Spain relations
Chile 12 June 1883[144] See Chile–Spain relations

Both nations are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Colombia 30 January 1881[70] See Colombia–Spain relations
Costa Rica 10 May 1850[57] See Costa Rica–Spain relations
Cuba 1902[40] See Cuba–Spain relations
Dominican Republic 18 February 1855[59] See Dominican Republic–Spain relations
Ecuador 16 February 1840[53] See Ecuador–Spain relations
El Salvador 24 June 1865[64] See El Salvador–Spain relations
  • El Salvador has an embassy in Madrid and consulates-general in Barcelona and Seville.[158]
  • Spain has an embassy in San Salvador.[159]
Guatemala 18 June 1864[63] See Guatemala–Spain relations
Haiti 6 November 1949[88] See Haiti–Spain relations
Honduras 11 June 1896[40] See Honduras–Spain relations
  • Honduras has an embassy in Madrid and consulates-general in Barcelona, Bilbao and Valencia and a vice consulate in Girona.[163][164][165]
  • Spain has an embassy in Tegucigalpa.[166]
Jamaica 21 December 1966[88] See Jamaica–Spain relations
  • Jamaica is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Spain has an embassy in Kingston.
Mexico 28 December 1836[52] See Mexico–Spain relations
Nicaragua 21 March 1851[58] See Nicaragua–Spain relations
  • Nicaragua has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Managua.[172]
Panama 10 May 1904[74] See Panama–Spain relations
Paraguay 10 September 1880[40] See Paraguay–Spain relations
Peru 15 November 1879[69] See Peru–Spain relations
Trinidad and Tobago 15 June 1967[88] See Spain–Trinidad and Tobago relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Port of Spain.
  • Trinidad and Tobago is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
United States 20 February 1783[48] See Spain–United States relations

Under the government of José María Aznar, Spain developed exceptionally good relations with the US, in great part due to the personal empathy between Aznar and George W. Bush. Following Zapatero's decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq immediately after the 2004 general elections, relations predictably soured, although important commercial links remained intact. When elected, President Barack Obama expressed his wish to enhance cooperation between both countries, especially in policies like the Green Energy plan from Zapatero,[181] introducing the AVE (the Spanish High Speed Train) in United States [182] and aiding US by receiving in Spanish prisons Guantanamo Prison detainees [183]

Uruguay 9 October 1841[186] See Spain–Uruguay relations
Venezuela 30 March 1845[56] See Spain–Venezuela relations

Asia

[edit]
Country Date formal relations began Notes
Afghanistan 28 October 1958[96] See Afghanistan–Spain relations
  • Afghanistan has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain closed its embassy in Kabul in August 2021.
Armenia 27 January 1992[40] See Armenia–Spain relations
Azerbaijan 11 February 1992[40] See Azerbaijan–Spain relations
  • Azerbaijan has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy office in Baku.
Bahrain 15 November 1971[101]
Bangladesh 12 May 1972[88] See Bangladesh–Spain relations
  • Bangladesh has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Dhaka.
Bhutan 11 February 2011[124] See Bhutan–Spain relations
China 9 March 1973[103] See China–Spain relations
Georgia 9 July 1992[40] See Georgia–Spain relations
  • Georgia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain is accredited to Georgia from its embassy in Ankara, Turkey.
  • Both countries are full members of the Council of Europe.
  • Georgia is an EU candidate and Spain is an EU member.
India 7 November 1956[88] See India–Spain relations
Indonesia February 1958[202] See Indonesia–Spain relations
  • Indonesia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Jakarta.
Iran 4 March 1842[54] See Iran–Spain relations
  • Iran has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Tehran.
Iraq 5 August 1950[88] See Iraq–Spain relations
  • Iraq has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Baghdad.
Israel 17 January 1986[40] See Israel–Spain relations
Japan 12 November 1868[65] See Japan–Spain relations
Jordan 6 July 1950[88] See Jordan–Spain relations
  • Jordan has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Amman.
Kazakhstan 11 February 1992[40] See Kazakhstan–Spain relations
Kuwait 17 April 1964[88] See Kuwait–Spain relations
  • Kuwait has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Kuwait City.
Kyrgyzstan 3 April 1992[119]
  • Spain is accredited to Kyrgyzstan from its embassy in Astana, Kazakhstan.
  • Kyrgyzstan does not have an accreditation to Spain.
Lebanon 15 April 1949[88] See Lebanon–Spain relations
  • Lebanon has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Beirut.
Malaysia 12 May 1967[40] See Malaysia–Spain relations
  • Malaysia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Kuala Lumpur.
Mongolia 4 July 1977[40]
  • Mongolia is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain is accredited to Mongolia from its embassy in Beijing, China.
North Korea 7 February 2001[40] See North Korea–Spain relations
  • North Korea closed its embassy in Madrid in November 2023.[209]
  • Spain is accredited to North Korea from its embassy in Beijing, China.
Pakistan 17 September 1951[88] See Pakistan–Spain relations

Pakistan and Spain enjoy extremely cordial and friendly ties.[210] Relations were established in the late 1950s. Pakistanis form the largest Asian immigrant community in Spain.

  • Pakistan has an embassy in Madrid and a consulate-general in Barcelona.
  • Spain has an embassy in Islamabad and honorary consulates in Karachi and Lahore.
Philippines 27 September 1947[89] See Philippines–Spain relations

Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo concluded her second state visit in Spain in July 2006, bringing back millions of dollars of Spanish investments, particularly in Tourism and Information Technology. The Spanish king, Juan Carlos I, also reiterated in Mrs. Arroyo's visit, his support for her project in the Philippines to re-establish Spanish as an official language in the country. He and his wife, Queen Sofia attended the 1998 centennial celebrations in Manila, commemorating 100 years of independence from Spain. The mediation of King Juan Carlos I is said to have produced the pardon and liberation of two Filipina domestic workers sentenced to death in Kuwait and the UAE.

Qatar 22 December 1972[40] See Qatar–Spain relations
  • Qatar has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Doha.
Saudi Arabia 17 July 1952[88] See Saudi Arabia–Spain relations
  • Saudi Arabia has an embassy in Madrid and a consulate-general in Málaga.
  • Spain has an embassy in Riyadh.
South Korea 24 March 1950[88] See South Korea–Spain relations

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Kingdom of Spain began on 7 March 1950.[213]

Taiwan No diplomatic relations See Spain–Taiwan relations
Tajikistan 4 August 1992[121]
  • Spain is accredited to Tajikistan from its embassy in Astana, Kazakhstan.
  • Tajikistan is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Geneva, Switzerland.
Thailand 23 February 1870[66] See Spain–Thailand relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Bangkok.
  • Thailand has an embassy in Madrid.
Timor-Leste 20 May 2002[40]
  • Timor-Leste is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Lisbon, Portugal.
  • Spain is accredited to Timor-Leste from its embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia.
Turkey 27 September 1924[40] See Spain–Turkey relations
United Arab Emirates 10 November 1972[102] See Spain–United Arab Emirates relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Abu Dhabi.
  • United Arab Emirates has an embassy in Madrid.
Uzbekistan 18 March 1992[40] See Spain–Uzbekistan relations
  • Spain is accredited to Uzbekistan from its embassy in Moscow, Russia.
  • Uzbekistan has an embassy in Madrid.
Vietnam 23 May 1977[40] See Spain–Vietnam relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Hanoi.
  • Vietnam has an embassy in Madrid.
Yemen 24 September 1968[88] See Spain–Yemen relations

Europe

[edit]
Country Date formal relations began Notes
Albania 12 September 1986[40] See Albania–Spain relations
Andorra 3 June 1993[123] See Andorra–Spain relations
Austria 28 March 1956[88] See Austria–Spain relations
Belarus 13 February 1992[40] See Belarus–Spain relations
Belgium 21 January 1921[82] See Belgium–Spain relations
  • Belgium has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Brussels.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 14 December 1992[122] See Bosnia and Herzegovina–Spain relations
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Sarajevo.
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina is an EU candidate and Spain is an EU member.
Bulgaria 5 August 1910[76] See also Bulgaria–Spain relations
Croatia 9 March 1992[40] See Croatia–Spain relations
Cyprus 22 December 1967[88] See Cyprus–Spain relations
Czech Republic 19 June 1919[80] See Czech Republic–Spain relations
  • Czech Republic has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Prague.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Denmark 1 April 1516[44] See Denmark–Spain relations
Estonia 10 September 1991[40] See Estonia–Spain relations
  • Estonia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Tallinn.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Finland 16 August 1918[79] See Finland–Spain relations
  • Finland has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Helsinki.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
  • Spain fully supported Finland's application to join NATO, which resulted in membership on 4 April 2023.
France 1486[42] See France–Spain relations
Germany 6 November 1952[88] See Germany–Spain relations
Greece 6 December 1835[51] See Greece–Spain relations

Both countries maintain enhanced cooperation on the serious problem of illegal migration, which they have in common. The need for effective confrontation of the illegal migration pressures on both states in the Mediterranean basin have led to close cooperation both bilaterally and within the framework of the European Union.

Holy See 1400s[236] See Holy See–Spain relations
  • The Holy See has a nunciature in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy to the Holy See based in Rome.[237]
Hungary December 1944[238] See Hungary–Spain relations
  • Hungary has an embassy in Madrid and a consulate-general in Barcelona.[239]
  • Spain has an embassy in Budapest.[240]
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Iceland 20 September 1949[92] See Iceland–Spain relations
  • Iceland is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Paris, France.
  • Spain is accredited to Iceland from its embassy in Oslo, Norway and maintains an honorary consulate in Reykjavík.
  • Both countries are full members of the NATO.
Ireland September 1935[241] See Ireland–Spain relations
Italy See Italy–Spain relations

Both countries established diplomatic relations after the unification of Italy. Relations between Italy and Spain have remained strong and affable for centuries owing to various political, cultural, and historical connections between the two nations. In the Early modern period, southern and insular Italy came under Spanish control, having been previously a domain of the Crown of Aragon. This extended period of foreign domination left marked influences in the modern southern Italian dialects. During the Spanish Civil War, the Corps of Volunteer Troops, a fascist expeditionary force from Italy, supported the Nationalist forces led by Francisco Franco. It's estimated that around 75,000 Italians fought in the war.

Latvia 9 October 1991[114] See Latvia–Spain relations
  • Latvia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Riga.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Lithuania 7 October 1991[40] See Lithuania–Spain relations
  • Lithuania has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Vilnius.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Luxembourg 9 February 1891[72] See Luxembourg–Spain relations
Malta 7 June 1968[99] See Malta–Spain relations
Moldova 31 January 1992[40] See Moldova–Spain relations
  • Moldova has an embassy in Madrid.[248]
  • Spain is accredited to Moldova from its embassy in Bucharest, Romania.
  • Both countries are full members of the Council of Europe.
  • Moldova is an EU candidate and Spain is an EU member.
  • In 2008, the Spanish government indicated that 12,582 Moldovan citizens were legally working there.[249] Spain is a significant investor in Moldova through Unión Fenosa which owns three of Moldova's five energy distribution companies.[250]
Monaco 2 June 1876[68] See Monaco–Spain relations
  • Monaco has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain is accredited to Monaco from its embassy in Paris, France.
Montenegro 11 December 2006[40] See Montenegro–Spain relations
  • Montenegro has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain is accredited to Montenegro from its embassy in Belgrade, Serbia.
  • Both countries are full members of the NATO.
  • Spain supports Montenegro's EU membership.
Netherlands See Netherlands–Spain relations
  • Netherlands has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in The Hague.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
North Macedonia 28 July 1994[40] See North Macedonia–Spain relations
  • North Macedonia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Skopje.
  • Both countries are full members of the NATO.
  • North Macedonia is an EU candidate and Spain is an EU member.
Norway 26 November 1905[75] See Norway–Spain relations
  • Norway has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Oslo.
  • Both countries are full members of the NATO.
Poland 17 September 1919[81] See Poland–Spain relations
  • Poland has an embassy in Madrid and a consulate-general in Barcelona.
  • Spain has an embassy in Warsaw.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Portugal 5 October 1143[41] See Portugal–Spain relations

Portugal's copy of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) divided the New World between Portugal and Castile. During the 15th century, Portugal built increasingly large fleets of ships and began to explore the world beyond Europe, sending explorers to Africa and Asia. Castile followed suit decades later. Following the first Spanish voyage of Christopher Columbus to the Caribbean in 1492, both states began acquiring territory in the New World. As a result of the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, Portugal acquired its most potentially important colony, Brazil (much of the South American continent), as well as a number of possessions in Africa and Asia, while Castile took the rest of South America and much of the North American continent as well as a number of possessions in Africa, Oceanía and Asia as the important colony of the Philippines. This line of demarcation was about halfway between the Cape Verde Islands (already Portuguese) and the islands claimed for Castile by Columbus on his first voyage. Although the Treaty of Tordesillas attempted to clarify their empires, many subsequent treaties were needed to establish the modern boundaries of Brazil and the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza was needed to demarcate their Asian possessions.

Henry of Portugal, reigned until his death (31 January 1580). He lacked heirs and his death triggered a succession crisis, where the main claimants to the throne were Philip II of Spain and Anthony, Prior of Crato. After the Spanish victory in the War of Portuguese Succession Philip of Spain was crowned king of Portugal in 1581, beginning a personal union between the two nations known as the Iberian Union generating a decline of the Portuguese Empire during the period of Union. The Iberian Union lasted for almost sixty years until 1640, when the Portuguese Restoration War was initiated against Spain and Portugal reestablished the Portuguese dynasty under the Bragança.

Relations between Portugal and Spain are also good. They cooperate in the fight against drug trafficking and tackling forest fires (common in the Iberian Peninsula in summers), for example. These close relations are facilitated by similar governments: the government of conservative Spanish PM José María Aznar coincided with the government of also conservative José Manuel Durão Barroso in Portugal; today, both José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of Spain and José Sócrates of Portugal are socialists.

Portugal also holds claim to the disputed territory of Olivença in the Portuguese-Spanish border.

Romania 5 July 1881[71] See Romania–Spain relations
Russia 20 July 1812[49] See Russia–Spain relations

Spain and the Grand Duchy of Moscow first exchanged envoys in the 1520s; regular embassies were established in 1722. Soviet-Spanish relations, once terminated after the Spanish Civil War, were gradually reestablished since 1963 and fully established in 1977. Trade between two countries amounts to two billion Euros (2008); in March 2009 two countries signed an energy agreement providing national energy companies access to other party's domestic markets.

Serbia 14 October 1916[77][78] See Serbia–Spain relations
Slovakia 1 January 1993[40] See Slovakia–Spain relations
  • Slovakia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Bratislava.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Slovenia 25 March 1992[118] See Slovenia–Spain relations
  • Slovenia has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Spain has an embassy in Ljubljana.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union and of the NATO.
Sweden 1651[259] See Spain–Sweden relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Stockholm.
  • Sweden has an embassy in Madrid.
  • Both countries are full members of the European Union, the NATO and of the Council of Europe.
  • Spain fully supported Sweden's application to join NATO, which resulted in membership on 7 March 2024.
 Switzerland 14 February 1939[88] See Spain–Switzerland relations
  • Spain has an embassy in Bern.
  • Switzerland has an embassy in Madrid and a consulate-general in Barcelona.
Ukraine 30 January 1992[117] See Spain–Ukraine relations
United Kingdom 1505 See Spain–United Kingdom relations
Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer in 10 Downing Street, September 2025.

Spain established diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in 1505.[43][failed verification]

  • Spain maintains an embassy in London.[262]
  • The United Kingdom is accredited to Spain through its embassy in Madrid, a consulate general Barcelona, and consulates in Alicante, Ibiza, Las Palmas, Malaga, Palma de Mallorca, and Santa Cruz de Tenerife.[263]

Both countries share common membership of the Council of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, NATO, the OECD, the OSCE, and the World Trade Organization. Bilaterally the two countries have a Double Taxation Convention.[264]

Oceania

[edit]
Country Date formal relations began Notes
Australia 26 October 1967[40] See Australia–Spain relations
Federated States of Micronesia 11 May 1992[40]

The FS of Micronesia were once part of the Spanish East Indies.

  • The FS of Micronesia do not have an accreditation to Spain.
  • Spain is accredited to the FS of Micronesia from its embassy in Manila, Philippines.
Fiji 10 December 1976[106]
  • Fiji is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Spain is accredited to Fiji from its embassy in Wellington, New Zealand.
Kiribati 24 September 2011[115]
Marshall Islands 17 December 1991[115] See Marshall Islands–Spain relations

The Marshall Islands were once part of the Spanish East Indies.

  • Marshall Islands do not have an accreditation to Spain.
  • Spain is accredited to the Marshall Islands from its embassy in Manila, Philippines.
New Zealand 28 March 1969[40] See New Zealand–Spain relations
Palau 3 August 1995[40] See Palau–Spain relations

Palau was once part of the Spanish East Indies.

  • Palau does not have an accreditation to Spain.
  • Spain is accredited to Palau from its embassy in Manila, Philippines.
Papua New Guinea 28 August 1978[40]
  • Papua New Guinea is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Spain is accredited to Papua New Guinea from its embassy in Canberra, Australia.
Samoa 5 November 1980[111]
  • Samoa is accredited to Spain from its embassy in Brussels, Belgium.
  • Spain is accredited to Samoa from its embassy in Wellington, New Zealand.
Solomon Islands 8 August 1980[40] See Solomon Islands–Spain relations
Tonga 16 November 1979[40]
  • Spain is accredited to Tonga from its embassy in Wellington, New Zealand.
  • Tonga does not have an accreditation to Spain.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Foreign relations of Spain

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The foreign relations of consist of the diplomatic, economic, military, and cultural interactions pursued by the Kingdom of with other sovereign states and international organizations, primarily coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Cooperation. As a and parliamentary democracy since the 1978 constitution, 's foreign policy emphasizes , defense of , and a rules-based global order, with a central focus on strengthening the as a geopolitical actor. Post-Francoist Spain rapidly integrated into Western alliances, acceding to NATO in 1982 despite domestic opposition and to the European Economic Community (predecessor to the EU) in 1986, which facilitated economic modernization and elevated its global influence. These steps marked a shift from isolation under the dictatorship to active participation in transatlantic security and European integration, including hosting U.S. military bases under bilateral agreements that underpin alliance commitments. Spain maintains extensive ties with Latin America through shared language, history, and institutions like the Ibero-American Summit, prioritizing cooperation on trade, development, and democratic governance amid efforts to bridge EU-Latin American relations. Key challenges include the unresolved sovereignty dispute with the over , territorial enclaves Ceuta and Melilla administered by Spain in , and migratory pressures from , which have strained relations despite pragmatic alignments on issues like recognition in 2022. Spain's Mediterranean policy underscores interdependence with southern neighbors for stability, migration control, and , while recent strategies address global shifts like , technological competition, and great-power rivalries through enhanced EU autonomy and UN engagement.

Historical Development

Age of Exploration and Imperial Expansion (1492–1700)

The sponsorship of Christopher Columbus's 1492 voyage by Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile marked the onset of Spain's overseas expansion, with Columbus's landfall in the Americas on October 12 establishing initial Spanish claims to territories in the New World. Papal bulls issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, including Inter caetera, granted Spain exclusive rights to lands west of a line 100 leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands, justifying further exploration and conquest. To resolve overlapping claims with Portugal, the Treaty of Tordesillas was signed on June 7, 1494, shifting the demarcation line 370 leagues west of Cape Verde, allocating most of the Americas to Spain while preserving Portuguese access to Africa, Brazil, and Asia. This agreement, ratified by both crowns and reinforced by the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza for the Pacific, minimized direct Iberian rivalry and facilitated Spain's unchallenged dominance in the Western Hemisphere for over a century. Under the Habsburg dynasty, initiated by Charles I's ascension in 1516—who as Charles V also became in 1519—Spain's foreign policy balanced European entanglements with colonial consolidation. Charles V's inheritance encompassed 's American viceroyalties, the , Franche-Comté, and Austrian Habsburg lands, prompting diplomatic maneuvers against French Valois ambitions in and through alliances like the 1526 League of Cognac with and , though these faltered amid repeated (1521–1559). The 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis concluded these conflicts, affirming Spanish hegemony over , , , and while ceding little territory, though it strained resources and highlighted the perils of multi-front warfare against , the Ottomans, and German Protestants. Charles's abdications (1555–1556) devolved the to his son Philip II, separating it from the to streamline . Philip II (1556–1598) pursued a policy of Catholic universalism, forging temporary alliances such as the with and the Papacy against the , culminating in the naval victory at Lepanto on October 7, 1571, which checked Turkish advances in the Mediterranean. Dynastic unions expanded influence, including the 1580 incorporation of following the crisis of succession after King Sebastian's death at Alcácer Quibir in 1578, granting control over Portuguese and until 1640. However, support for Catholic causes ignited prolonged conflicts: the Dutch Revolt from 1568 escalated into the , with Philip's suppression efforts fostering permanent enmity; and rivalry with England intensified after Elizabeth I's excommunication in 1570, leading to privateering, the 1588 defeat, and the undeclared , ended by the Treaty of London. Subsequent reigns under Philip III (1598–1621) and Philip IV (1621–1665) saw escalating European commitments, including intervention in the (1618–1648) to counter and French influence, resulting in the , which recognized Dutch independence and eroded Spanish primacy in the . The 1659 with France ceded and parts of the , signaling Habsburg Spain's defensive posture amid fiscal exhaustion from imperial overreach. By Charles II's death in 1700 without issue, Spain's foreign relations reflected a pivot from expansionist zenith to contested inheritance, precipitating the and the Bourbon transition.

Dynastic Shifts and Global Conflicts (1700–1898)

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714) marked the transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rule in Spain, following the death of Charles II on November 1, 1700, who named Philip, Duke of Anjou and grandson of Louis XIV of France, as his heir. This provoked opposition from the Grand Alliance—comprising Britain, the Dutch Republic, Austria, and Portugal—fearing Bourbon unification of France and Spain would upset European power balances. The conflict ravaged Spain's European holdings, culminating in the Treaty of Utrecht (April 11, 1713), which confirmed Philip V's throne but required his renunciation of French succession rights and ceded key territories: the Spanish Netherlands, Naples, Milan, and Sardinia to Austria; Sicily to Savoy; and Gibraltar and Menorca to Britain. Spain preserved its vast American empire and Philippines, redirecting foreign policy toward colonial defense and Bourbon centralization. Under Philip V and successors, Spain formalized alliances with France through the Family Compacts (1733 and 1761), subordinating foreign policy to Bourbon familial ties and anti-Habsburg/ British aims. This drew Spain into the (1740–1748) and (1756–1763), where joint operations with France against Britain yielded setbacks: British captures of Havana (1762) and (1762), and the transferring Florida and Louisiana east of the Mississippi to Britain. Temporary recoveries followed, including Florida's return via the 1783 Treaty of Paris after Spain's 1779 declaration of war on Britain during the , enabling seizures of , Mobile, and Pensacola. Portuguese relations oscillated between rivalry—exacerbated by the 1762 Bourbon invasion—and pragmatic borders, as in the 1777 Treaty of Santo Ildefonso. The eroded the Franco-Spanish pact, but initial neutrality shifted to against Britain (1796–1808), including joint invasions of . Napoleon's 1808 invasion shattered this, forcing Charles IV's abdication, installing as king, and igniting the (1808–1814) with British support via Wellington's campaigns. The resulting legitimacy crisis fueled Latin American independence revolts from 1810; despite Spanish reconquest efforts, defeats like (December 9, 1824) led to recognition of most continental colonies' independence by 1825, leaving , , and the . Britain enforced anti-slave trade pacts (1817 onward), while remained a flashpoint, with failed Spanish sieges (1727, 1779–1783). Nineteenth-century diplomacy emphasized European conservatism post-1815 , with joining the against liberalism, though interventions like the 1823 landing at failed to halt colonial losses. Tensions with the grew over , culminating in the Spanish-American War (April–August 1898), precipitated by the USS Maine's sinking (February 15, 1898) in and U.S. intervention in Cuba's struggle. U.S. naval victories at (May 1) and Santiago (July 3) forced the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898), under which ceded and , sold the for $20 million, and withdrew from —effectively granting it under U.S. influence—ending Spain's transoceanic empire and pivoting relations toward Europe.

Decline, Neutrality, and Civil War Era (1898–1975)

The defeat in the Spanish-American War of 1898 marked the collapse of Spain's remaining overseas empire, with the Treaty of Paris forcing the cession of Cuba's independence, , , and the to the for $20 million. This "Disaster of '98" prompted a policy of introspective neutrality and reluctance to engage in great-power rivalries, as Spain lacked the military and economic capacity to project influence abroad, shifting focus to consolidating control over its North African protectorates in . The loss exacerbated domestic instability, fostering regenerationist movements that critiqued imperial overextension while advocating limited colonial defense. During (1914–1918), under King maintained strict neutrality, avoiding entanglement despite internal pressures from and factions. This stance, driven by military weakness and economic opportunism, allowed to profit from exporting goods to both Entente and , boosting GDP by up to 15% through trade surpluses, though it fueled inflation and labor unrest. Neutrality preserved territorial integrity but highlighted 's marginal role in European affairs, with submarine warfare incidents straining relations with without prompting belligerency. The (1921–1927) in Spanish Morocco exemplified Spain's precarious colonial commitments, where Berber tribes under inflicted devastating defeats, including the on July 22, 1921, resulting in over 13,000 Spanish casualties and exposing leadership failures. International repercussions were limited, but the war's costs—exceeding 1.5 million pesetas daily—and use of chemical weapons from 1925 onward drew condemnation from the League of Nations, though no sanctions ensued. The conflict precipitated General Miguel Primo de Rivera's (1923–1930), which prioritized military stabilization over diplomatic outreach, further isolating as France intervened to protect its adjacent Moroccan zone. The (1936–1939) saw asymmetrical foreign involvement despite the Non-Intervention Agreement signed by 27 nations in September 1936, ostensibly to prevent escalation but effectively shielding Nationalist forces led by General . provided 16,000 troops, 600 aircraft, and 1,000 tanks via the , while supplied 75,000 soldiers, 950 planes, and substantial artillery, enabling key advances like the occupation of the Basque Country in 1937. The aided Republicans with 2,000 advisors, 648 aircraft, and tanks, alongside 35,000 International Brigade volunteers from 52 countries, yet Republican disorganization and purges limited effectiveness. Franco's victory on March 28, 1939, consolidated authoritarian rule but tied Spain to , complicating future alignments. In , Franco's regime declared neutrality on September 4, 1939, shifting to "non-belligerency" in June 1940 to signal Axis sympathy without full commitment, motivated by recovery needs after devastation (over 500,000 dead) and resource shortages like oil. A summit with Hitler at on October 23, 1940, saw Franco demand , French , and war supplies, demands unmet due to Allied pressure and logistical impossibilities, preserving de facto neutrality. supplied 100,000 tons of to and permitted the (45,000 volunteers) on the Eastern Front from 1941–1943, incurring 5,000 casualties, while covertly aiding Allies with intelligence on U-boats. Postwar, Franco's Axis ties led to isolation: the 1946 UN resolution barred Spain from specialized agencies, and Western Europe withdrew ambassadors until 1950. Economic autarky yielded stagnation, with GDP per capita lagging Europe's by 20–30% in the 1940s, prompting realignment. The 1953 Pacts of granted the basing rights at four sites (Morón, Torrejón, , Rota) in exchange for $226 million in aid and loans, facilitating Spain's UN admission on December 14, 1955, amid , though European skepticism persisted until the 1960s. This pragmatic pivot prioritized survival over ideology, ending pariah status by 1975.

Democratic Transition and Western Integration (1975–2000)

Following the on November 20, 1975, Spain under King pursued foreign policy reforms to anchor the nascent democracy in Western institutions, prioritizing integration with and the (EEC) to secure legitimacy and economic modernization. The transition government, led initially by and then from 1976, emphasized multilateral engagement, expanding diplomatic relations from 122 countries in 1975 to 144 by 1982. This shift marked a departure from Franco-era isolation, with early efforts focused on and normalizing ties amid domestic instability. A pivotal early challenge was the withdrawal from , formalized in the Madrid Tripartite Agreement signed on November 14, 1975, between , , and , which partitioned the territory and ended Spanish administration by February 28, 1976. This accord, driven by Morocco's mobilization of 350,000 civilians on November 6, 1975, aimed to avert conflict but sparked the Polisario Front's insurgency and strained Spain-Morocco relations, leading to Ceuta and Melilla border closures in 1976. Despite tensions, it facilitated Spain's focus on European alignment, though it drew criticism for conceding claims without self-determination referenda as urged by the in 1975. Spain's accession on May 30, , as the 16th member, symbolized its Western reorientation, following formal application in 1977 and invitation in December 1981, despite public opposition rooted in anti-militarism and neutrality traditions. Under Prime Minister , entry bypassed full military integration initially to ease domestic resistance, with full incorporation delayed until 1999; a 1986 referendum under González's PSOE government upheld membership by 52.5% amid 56% turnout, rejecting withdrawal demands. This move strengthened transatlantic ties, including U.S. base renewals, but faced left-wing protests viewing it as subordination to blocs. Entry into the EEC on January 1, 1986, alongside , represented the cornerstone of integration, with accession signed June 12, 1985, after negotiations launched in 1977 that addressed tariffs, agriculture, fisheries, and regional sensitivities like . González's administration prioritized this for economic transformation, securing structural funds that boosted GDP growth from 2.3% annually pre-accession to over 3% in the , while adapting to common market rules despite short-term disruptions in textiles and shipbuilding. EU membership reinforced Spain's , enabling influence in Mediterranean policy and Ibero-American outreach, with diplomatic missions expanding to 158 countries by 1989. U.S.-Spain relations evolved from Franco-era base pacts—renewed in 1988 for $6 billion in aid over five years—to partnership in and , though debates over bases like Rota persisted into the 1990s. Post-transition, Spain diversified ties, re-engaging through and trade, reversing Franco's ideological interventions; by 1992, Ibero-American summits formalized this "Hispanic community" framework, emphasizing shared language over colonial legacies. Overall, 1975–2000 saw Spain transition from pariah status to active Western player, with integration yielding stability but exposing vulnerabilities like terrorism and regional disputes.

Post-2000 Global Engagement and Crises

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, Spain under Prime Minister aligned closely with the U.S.-led "War on Terror," committing approximately 1,300 troops to the coalition starting in 2003 as part of efforts to dismantle weapons of mass destruction and regime change under . Spain also deployed forces to , contributing over 1,500 personnel to NATO's (ISAF) by 2010 and later to the , with the final contingent withdrawing in May 2021 amid the resurgence. These engagements marked Spain's deepened transatlantic security ties but faced domestic opposition, exemplified by protests against Iraq involvement exceeding 1 million participants in in 2003. The March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings, perpetrated by an Islamist cell inspired by al-Qaeda and killing 193 civilians while injuring over 2,000, profoundly influenced Spain's foreign policy trajectory. Occurring three days before national elections, the attacks—linked by perpetrators to Spain's Iraq presence—shifted public sentiment, contributing to the defeat of Aznar's Popular Party (PP) and the victory of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), which campaigned on withdrawal. Zapatero ordered the rapid repatriation of Spanish troops from Iraq by May 2004, a move critics, including the Heritage Foundation, argued rewarded terrorism by signaling vulnerability to electoral pressure rather than resolving underlying threats. Nonetheless, Spain sustained counterterrorism reforms, enhancing internal security structures and intelligence sharing within the EU, while maintaining Afghanistan commitments until their phased end. The 2008 global financial crisis exacerbated Spain's economic vulnerabilities, with GDP contracting 3.8% in 2009 and peaking at 26% by 2013, prompting a €41 billion bailout in 2012 focused on banking recapitalization. This downturn constrained bandwidth, slashing by over 70% from 2010 peaks and redirecting diplomatic efforts toward fiscal discipline negotiations, including support for the . Emigration surged, with over 500,000 Spaniards departing between 2008 and 2013, often to and partners, underscoring how domestic fiscal pressures diminished Spain's global projection while heightening reliance on multilateral institutions. Recovery under subsequent PP governments from 2011 emphasized austerity-aligned ties, restoring some international standing by 2015. Spain's Mediterranean frontier amplified engagement with migration crises, particularly via the Western African and Canary Islands routes, where arrivals spiked to 39,180 in 2006 before EU-wide pacts with Senegal and Mauritania reduced flows temporarily. Post-2015, irregular crossings exceeded 50,000 annually at times, prompting bilateral deals like the 2019 Spain-Morocco agreement enhancing border controls in exchange for development aid, though tensions arose over Ceuta and Melilla incursions in 2021 involving over 8,000 migrants. These dynamics integrated security with foreign policy, as Spain advocated EU-wide burden-sharing via the New Pact on Migration and Asylum while critiquing unilateral national responses, reflecting causal links between instability in origin countries like Mali and Libya and maritime pressures. In response to Russia's 2022 invasion of , Spain under PSOE leadership condemned the aggression, committing €1.2 billion in by 2025, including tanks and Patriot systems, and joining 's joint procurement of U.S. munitions for . hosted Ukrainian President in 2023 and 2025, framing support as defense of international norms, while sheltered over 200,000 Ukrainian refugees and allocated €300 million in . This stance reinforced commitments, with increasing defense spending toward 2% of GDP by 2024, though geographic distance moderated enthusiasm for escalation compared to Eastern European allies.

Core Principles of Modern Foreign Policy

Constitutional Framework and Strategic Objectives

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 vests the direction of foreign policy in the Government, as stipulated in Article 97, which mandates that the executive branch conduct international relations while ensuring compliance with constitutional principles and statutory laws. This framework positions the and as the primary actors in formulating and executing foreign affairs, with the (Parliament) exercising oversight through ratification of treaties that affect , , or under Article 94. The King holds a ceremonial role, expressing the state's assent to international commitments via treaties in accordance with Article 63(2), but without independent decision-making authority. Article 93 enables the transfer of sovereign powers to international organizations through treaties approved by organic laws, facilitating Spain's integration into supranational bodies like the , while Article 96 incorporates ratified treaties into domestic law upon official publication, granting them precedence over non-constitutional statutes unless conflicting with the itself. Notably, the Constitution lacks a dedicated chapter on , reflecting a domestic-oriented focus during its drafting amid the , which has led critics to argue for greater explicit international emphasis to adapt to global interdependence. Strategic objectives of Spain's , guided by this constitutional mandate, prioritize the defense of , , and economic prosperity through multilateral engagement. Core aims include bolstering European and , as emphasized in recent strategies, to enhance responses to global challenges like migration, , and . Additional priorities encompass promoting peace and security via adherence to , mediation in conflicts, and support for democratic values, while advancing commercial interests through free trade and investment diversification, particularly with Ibero-American nations and Mediterranean partners. These objectives align with Spain's geostrategic position, emphasizing commitments for defense, leadership for economic stability, and bilateral ties to counterbalance dependencies on major powers.

Foreign Action Strategy 2025–2028

The Foreign Action Strategy 2025–2028 serves as the primary framework directing Spain's external policy, approved by the on 10 June 2025 following a participatory drafting process involving ministries, regional governments, , the , and experts. Publicly presented by Foreign Minister on 4 September 2025, the document analyzes global risks such as the erosion of the rules-based order, economic fragmentation, rising conflicts (including in and the ), and climate-driven instability, while identifying opportunities in Spain's , leadership, and cultural . It establishes priorities to enhance Spain's influence amid these dynamics, emphasizing coherence across , defense, development cooperation, and . The strategy is structured around three cross-cutting principles: fostering a stronger Europe through greater autonomy, cohesion, and strategic ambition; positioning a committed Spain that upholds international law, human rights, and multilateral institutions; and advancing a Spain dedicated to peace and security by prioritizing citizen protection, collective defense, and conflict mediation. These principles integrate transversal themes including gender equality via a self-described feminist foreign policy, sustainability aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Agreement targets (such as climate neutrality by 2050), and technological governance to promote ethical AI and digital rights. Economic security features prominently, with objectives to diversify trade partners, reduce supply chain vulnerabilities, and leverage Spain's geostrategic position for competitiveness in sectors like renewables and hydrogen (e.g., the H2Med corridor). Strategic axes focus on key regions and issues, including bolstering integration by advocating qualified majority voting reforms, enlargement support, and defense enhancements; deepening Mediterranean stability through the and dialogue with the ; and expanding ties with via the parallel Spain-Africa Strategy 2025–2028, targeting and the with tripled official development assistance to address migration drivers, institutional fragility, and economic development. In , priorities include strengthening the Ibero-American space with €9.4 billion in EU investments by 2027, promoting digital and green transitions, and enhancing EU-CELAC mechanisms. Multilateral efforts emphasize UN Security Council reform (seeking a non-permanent seat for 2031–2032), , counter-terrorism, and hosting events like the 4th UN Financing for Development Conference in in July 2025, with commitments to reach 0.7% of for official development assistance by 2030. Security measures include bolstering and EU roles, supporting €1 billion in military aid to in 2025, and modernizing consular services for over 3 million Spaniards abroad. The strategy underscores Spain's through , with institutions like the operating 78 centers worldwide to project language and values, while addressing challenges like and . It commits to reforming global institutions for democratic resilience and , including for developing nations, amid 50 active conflicts worldwide. Overall, the document positions Spain as an active protagonist in international affairs, prioritizing to safeguard interests without subservience to external powers.

Emphasis on Multilateralism, Security, and Economic Interests

Spain's foreign policy places significant emphasis on multilateralism as a cornerstone for addressing global challenges, viewing strengthened international institutions as essential for stability and cooperation. The Foreign Action Strategy 2025-2028 identifies the defense of a multilateral order as one of its three primary axes, prioritizing reforms to bodies like the United Nations to enhance effectiveness where current mechanisms prove insufficient, supplemented by flexible bilateral or minilateral arrangements to advance shared objectives. Spain has historically supported UN initiatives, contributing to peacekeeping operations and advocating for equitable representation in multilateral forums, while critiquing inefficiencies in global governance structures. In security policy, Spain underscores collective defense through , to which it acceded in , positioning itself as a committed ally focused on the alliance's southern flank amid threats from , migration, and instability in and the . The strategy integrates security with multilateral efforts, including contributions to missions such as deploying over 800 troops to , , and the , alongside air policing with Eurofighter jets and enhancements to integrated systems. However, Spain's defense spending has drawn scrutiny, with commitments to reach 's 2% GDP target by 2025 via a €10.5 billion budget increase, though implementation lags have prompted criticisms from allies, including U.S. threats of tariffs or expulsion under certain administrations. Within the , Spain advocates for strategic autonomy, supporting initiatives like the (PESCO) to bolster European defense capabilities complementary to . Economic interests are pursued through proactive , treating promotion as a core instrument of foreign action to safeguard and expand for Spanish exports and investments. The strategy links to multilateral frameworks, leveraging agreements—such as the with —to drive bilateral growth, with Spanish firms benefiting from diversified partnerships in regions like the and . Spain prioritizes economic ties with the , which accounts for over 60% of its , while fostering relations with emerging markets in and to mitigate risks from global fragmentation, including through bilateral agendas with major economies like . This approach integrates security and economic goals, as seen in efforts in the to protect routes vital for Spain's export-oriented economy.

Relations with Europe

European Union Dynamics and Reforms

Spain acceded to the on January 1, 1986, following its application on July 28, 1977, marking a pivotal shift from post-Franco isolation toward deep economic and political integration. Adoption of the on January 1, 1999, further embedded Spain in the , facilitating trade growth but exposing vulnerabilities during the . By 2012, Spain requested a €100 billion bailout for its banking sector, receiving €41.3 billion, which imposed structural reforms including measures and labor market adjustments to restore fiscal stability. These dynamics highlighted Spain's reliance on EU solidarity while fueling domestic debates over and integration depth. Post-crisis, Spain advocated for Eurozone reforms to enhance resilience, supporting the establishment of the in 2012 and banking union mechanisms like the Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2014. In response to the , Spain emerged as the second-largest beneficiary of NextGenerationEU, allocated €163.8 billion in grants and loans through its Recovery and Resilience Plan, with over €53.6 billion disbursed by May 2025 to fund digitalization, green transition, and structural reforms. Execution emphasized reducing dependency via REPowerEU-aligned investments, though critics noted delays in private sector leverage and uneven regional impacts. Regarding institutional reforms, Spain has positioned itself as a proponent of deeper integration conditional on efficiency gains, endorsing the 2024 fiscal framework overhaul that introduced net expenditure paths and multi-year adjustment flexibility to balance sustainability with investment. In its Foreign Action Strategy 2025-2028, Spain supports EU enlargement—particularly for Western Balkan and Eastern European candidates—tied to internal reforms like qualified majority voting expansions and budget reallocations to mitigate cohesion policy losses from new members. On migration, Spain backs the 2024 Pact on Migration and Asylum for burden-sharing but prioritizes bilateral pacts, such as with Morocco, amid frontline pressures. For the European Green Deal, Spain aligns national energy policies with the 55% emissions reduction target by 2030, investing in renewables while navigating geopolitical dependencies on imports. These stances reflect Spain's strategic balancing of federalist aspirations against budgetary and sectoral interests, with ongoing tensions over enlargement's fiscal implications for net contributors like Spain in agriculture and regional funds.

NATO Commitments and Transatlantic Security

Spain acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization () on May 30, 1982, becoming its 16th member state following a that approved membership despite domestic opposition from leftist groups wary of alignment with the . The country integrated fully into 's military command structure in 1999, marking a shift from its prior bilateral defense pacts with the under the Franco regime. This integration reinforced Spain's commitment to collective defense under Article 5, though early participation was tempered by a focus on modernization of its armed forces amid post-dictatorship transitions. Spain has contributed personnel and assets to numerous NATO-led operations, including the in (2001–2014), where it deployed over 4,000 troops at peak involvement, and NATO Training Mission-Iraq, which it led for one year starting in 2004. In maritime domains, Spain participates in Standing NATO Maritime Groups and Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean, providing frigates and submarines for counter-terrorism and deterrence patrols. For air policing, it supports missions with detachments from 2015 onward, logging hundreds of flight hours annually. These efforts underscore Spain's role on 's southern flank, addressing hybrid threats from migration, terrorism, and Russian activities in the Mediterranean. Defense expenditures have lagged behind benchmarks, with allocating 1.24% of GDP to defense in 2024—approximately €17.2 billion—the lowest among allies. In April 2025, announced plans to reach the 2% target by year-end through a €10.5 billion budget increase, prioritizing procurement like F-35 aircraft and naval upgrades, though critics note persistent underinvestment in readiness. rejected a proposed 5% GDP spending hike at the 2025 Summit, securing an exemption by arguing its geographic position necessitates tailored contributions over raw percentages. Transatlantic security ties are anchored by U.S. facilities at and , which host four Aegis-equipped destroyers integral to NATO's Ballistic Missile Defense system since 2011 and support rapid deployment for operations in Africa and the . These bases facilitate U.S. Sixth Fleet and joint exercises, enhancing , as affirmed in the 2022 U.S.-Spain Joint Declaration emphasizing NATO's centrality to mutual security. Recent frictions include Spain's 2025 ban on transiting U.S. arms to via these sites amid Gaza tensions, highlighting divergences on Middle East policy despite shared counter-terrorism goals. In response to Russia's 2022 invasion of , Spain has provided non-lethal aid including 70 generators via its development agency and joined NATO's Prioritised Ukraine Requirement List in October 2025 to procure U.S. weapons for , alongside participation in the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre. However, its aid package—totaling €1.23 billion in military support by mid-2025—ranks below major European contributors, drawing criticism from U.S. figures like President-elect Trump for insufficient burden-sharing. This reflects a broader Spanish emphasis on multilateral over escalation, prioritizing southern European stability amid domestic fiscal constraints.

Bilateral Ties with Major European Powers

Spain's bilateral relations with are marked by deep strategic partnership, rooted in geographic proximity, shared borders, and historical cooperation against . and judicial collaboration between the two nations significantly contributed to dismantling the Basque separatist group , fostering a relationship of mutual trust. In April 2022, Spain and formalized an agreement promoting the and Hispanic culture in , marking the first such bilateral pact with a non-Spanish- or Portuguese-speaking country. High-level engagements, such as the October 2025 meeting in between Spanish Foreign Minister and his French counterpart, reaffirmed excellent neighborly ties amid regional challenges like migration and . Relations with emphasize economic interdependence and alignment. Bilateral trade reached approximately 92.5 billion euros in 2024, positioning as 's 11th-largest trading partner and source of imports. King Felipe VI's to in October 2022 underscored commitments to enhanced cooperation in energy, defense, and . In September 2025, Spanish Prime Minister and German Chancellor highlighted "excellent relations" while advocating for a more unified to address global threats, including support for . Recent bilateral talks have also explored recognition of co-official languages like Catalan, reflecting ongoing dialogue on cultural and institutional matters. Ties with the have evolved post-Brexit, centering on pragmatic cooperation despite the enduring sovereignty dispute, where maintains historical claims while the upholds Gibraltarian . In June 2025, the and (with 's involvement) reached a political agreement establishing a between and the , eliminating checks on persons and goods at the - border while preserving sovereignty and military . This paved the way for a September 2025 bilateral between and the , enhancing collaboration in , , environment, and mobility, signaling a strategic thaw in relations. Spain-Portugal relations exemplify Iberian solidarity, with structured political dialogue across political, economic, and security domains. The neighboring states share preferential economic ties, bolstered by joint projects and exceeding expectations of mere proximity. In May 2024, Foreign Ministers Albares and Gomes Cravinho committed to preparing the next bilateral and advancing common initiatives in defense and . October 2024's Spanish-Portuguese further strengthened defense cooperation, including multilateral contributions to and EU security frameworks. Portugal's diplomatic portal describes the partnership as "excellent," underpinned by historical reconciliation and mutual support in international forums. Bilateral engagement with focuses on Mediterranean synergies, economic complementarity, and shared pro-EU stances. ranks as Spain's third-largest trading partner, with Italian investments in Spain totaling 43.2 billion euros, supporting over jobs. In 2025, both nations marked 160 years of diplomatic relations, emphasizing mutual admiration and cooperation in culture, migration management, and . Italian Giuseppe Buccino Grimaldi noted in June 2025 that Spain and view a strengthened EU as essential for addressing geopolitical challenges.

Ibero-American and Transatlantic Relations

Historical Ties and Cultural Influence in Latin America

Spain's engagement with Latin America originated in the late 15th century, when Christopher Columbus's voyages, sponsored by the Catholic Monarchs and , initiated the exploration and subsequent colonization of the Americas beginning in 1492. The in 1494, mediated by , delineated Spanish claims west of a meridian line, facilitating the establishment of viceroyalties such as (encompassing and ) in 1535 and in 1542, which governed vast territories including modern-day , , most of except , and parts of the . By the , Spanish conquistadors like conquered the between 1519 and 1521, while subdued the starting in 1532, integrating indigenous populations into a colonial system that extracted silver from mines like (producing an estimated 80% of the world's silver from 1545 to 1800) and enforced labor arrangements. This era established administrative, legal, and infrastructural foundations that persisted beyond formal rule, including the introduction of the Castilian legal code and urban grid planning evident in cities like and . Independence movements across , triggered by Napoleon's 1808 invasion of and inspired by Enlightenment ideas and local Creole grievances over mercantilist restrictions, led to the fragmentation of Spanish authority between 1810 and 1825. Key declarations included Mexico's on September 16, 1810; Venezuela's on July 5, 1811; Argentina's on July 9, 1816; Chile's on February 12, 1818; Colombia's on July 20, 1810 (finalized 1819); Peru's on July 28, 1821; and Bolivia's on August 6, 1825, culminating in Simón Bolívar's campaigns and Spain's defeat at the in 1824. Despite these ruptures, historical ties endured through familial, migratory, and institutional links; for instance, post-independence elites often retained Spanish options, and maintained diplomatic missions in former colonies, fostering a sense of "Hispanidad" emphasized by figures like Ramiro de Maeztu in the early . This continuity is evident in the persistence of Spanish as the primary , with approximately 460 million native speakers across the region as of 2023, enabling unhindered cultural and economic exchange. The cultural influence of Spain manifests prominently in religion, where Catholicism, introduced via Franciscan, Dominican, and Jesuit missions from the 1520s onward, became the dominant faith, shaping societal norms, festivals, and architecture; today, about 40% of Latin Americans identify as Catholic, with syncretic practices like Mexico's Day of the Dead blending indigenous and Spanish elements. Spanish colonial architecture, including baroque cathedrals and plazas modeled on Sevillian styles, endures in landmarks such as Quito's historic center (UNESCO-listed in 1978) and Cusco's Inca-Spanish fusion. Literary and artistic legacies include the adaptation of Golden Age works by authors like Cervantes, whose Don Quixote influenced regional picaresque traditions, and the spread of bullfighting, guitar music, and flamenco derivatives in countries like Colombia and Argentina. These elements underpin modern ties, reinforced by institutions like the Instituto Cervantes, which promotes Spanish language education in over 100 Latin American centers, and Ibero-American summits since 1991, where shared heritage facilitates dialogue on issues from migration—over 1.5 million Latin Americans reside in Spain—to trade, with Spain as the second-largest investor in the region after the U.S. as of 2022. While some Latin American discourse critiques this influence as neocolonial due to economic dependencies, empirical data on mutual remittances (exceeding €8 billion annually from Spain to Latin America in recent years) and cultural exports underscore reciprocal benefits rooted in historical affinity.

United States Partnership and Divergences

Spain and the United States maintain a strategic alliance rooted in shared democratic values and mutual security interests, formalized through NATO membership since Spain's accession in 1982. The bilateral defense cooperation agreement, signed in 1988 and periodically updated, facilitates U.S. military presence at key facilities including Naval Station Rota, which hosts four Aegis destroyers contributing to NATO's ballistic missile defense and supports over 6,000 U.S. personnel as the largest American naval base in Europe. This arrangement enhances transatlantic logistics, cargo handling, and rapid response capabilities for operations in Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Economic ties underpin the partnership, with bilateral goods trade reaching approximately $40 billion annually by 2024, representing about 4.4% of Spain's GDP in combined exports and imports. Spain's exports to the U.S. totaled $18.44 billion in , focusing on machinery, pharmaceuticals, and , while U.S. exports include , fuels, and agricultural products. High-level engagements, such as the 2022 Joint Declaration and meetings between Presidents Biden and in 2023, reaffirm cooperation on global challenges including support, migration management, and climate initiatives. Divergences arise primarily in foreign policy approaches toward and selective security issues, often reflecting ideological differences between Spanish governments. During the 2003 , Prime Minister José María Aznar's Popular Party administration committed 1,300 troops in solidarity with the U.S.-led coalition, but incoming Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's 2004 withdrawal strained ties, highlighting partisan divides in Spain's transatlantic alignment. On , Spain has pursued diplomatic engagement and opposed the U.S. embargo, as seen in Zapatero's mediation efforts, contrasting with Washington's regime-change stance. Similar frictions persist under Pedro Sánchez's Socialist leadership regarding Venezuela, where Spain critiques Nicolás Maduro's regime but resists full U.S.-style sanctions, favoring EU-led dialogue. In 2025, Spain prohibited U.S. use of its bases for arms shipments to Israel amid the Gaza conflict, signaling independent positioning on Middle East policy despite NATO commitments. Additionally, Madrid's reluctance to fully exclude Huawei from 5G networks has raised U.S. concerns over cybersecurity risks, potentially complicating bilateral trust amid broader great-power competition with China. These episodes underscore occasional tensions, yet the alliance endures through institutional frameworks like NATO, where Spain met the 2% GDP defense spending target in 2024.

Ibero-American Cooperation Mechanisms

The Ibero-American cooperation mechanisms encompass a network of multilateral forums and institutions fostering political dialogue, economic ties, and cultural exchange among , , 19 Latin American nations, and , totaling 22 member states. These structures emerged in the early 1990s to strengthen shared linguistic and historical bonds while addressing contemporary challenges such as democratic governance, , and . has positioned itself as a pivotal actor, leveraging its historical influence and geographic proximity to to bridge with the , thereby enhancing bi-regional strategic partnerships. The cornerstone of these mechanisms is the (Cumbre Iberoamericana), an annual gathering of heads of state and government initiated in 1991 to promote consensus on key issues like , , and . The summits rotate among member countries and culminate in declarations outlining actionable commitments, with Spain co-founding the process and hosting multiple editions, including preparations for the 2026 summit to revitalize the forum's global relevance. Complementing the summits, the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), established to provide permanent operational support, coordinates implementation of summit outcomes and facilitates initiatives in areas such as and youth employment; headquartered in since its inception, SEGIB's current secretary-general, Andrés Allamand of , assumed office in 2022 following . Sectoral bodies further operationalize cooperation, notably the Organization of Ibero-American States for Education, Science and Culture (OEI), founded in 1949 as the oldest such entity and focused on advancing educational equity, scientific innovation, and cultural preservation across the region. With its general secretariat in Madrid and offices in 19 countries, the OEI has supported over 75 years of programs, including teacher training and biodiversity research, often funded through Spanish contributions. Additional mechanisms include specialized conferences for parliaments, judiciaries, and businesses, which enable targeted collaboration on rule-of-law reforms and investment flows, with Spain advocating for their alignment with broader foreign policy goals like economic resilience amid global disruptions. These frameworks have facilitated tangible outcomes, such as joint responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and climate initiatives, though participation varies due to domestic priorities in member states.

Mediterranean, African, and Middle Eastern Relations

North African Enclaves and Morocco Dynamics

Spain maintains sovereignty over the North African enclaves of and , autonomous cities located on the Mediterranean coast adjacent to , which it has administered since the 15th and 17th centuries, respectively; was ceded by in following the end of the , while was established as a Spanish presidio in 1497. These territories, along with smaller sovereignty plazas like the and Peñón de Vélez de la Gomera, were retained by Spain after 's independence in 1956 under the Treaty of Madrid, which contests as invalid due to its non-recognition of Spanish title predating colonial boundaries. asserts territorial claims over and as integral parts of its pre-colonial domain, viewing them as remnants of European colonialism akin to , though Spain defends its possession through historical acquisition and principles, emphasizing their integration into the Spanish state with EU membership and autonomous governance. Bilateral dynamics are characterized by pragmatic cooperation overshadowed by recurring tensions, particularly over migration control and . Morocco has periodically leveraged irregular migration as diplomatic pressure, as seen in the May 2021 Ceuta crisis, where approximately 8,000 migrants, including unaccompanied minors, entered the enclave after Moroccan authorities relaxed border enforcement amid Spain's hospitalization of leader for treatment; this incident strained ties until Spain's endorsement of Morocco's autonomy plan in March 2022, which facilitated a diplomatic thaw. Similar pressures recurred in June 2022 at , where a mass border rush resulted in at least 23 migrant deaths and injuries to Spanish and Moroccan guards, highlighting Morocco's as a for Europe's southern frontier in exchange for economic incentives. , facing acute migration inflows—over 87,000 interceptions by Morocco in 2023 alone—relies on bilateral pacts, including a 2019 joint declaration on minor repatriations and expanded circular migration visas, to manage flows, though enforcement gaps persist due to Morocco's strategic use of the issue. Economic and security interdependencies further define the relationship, with disputes over fishing rights in adjacent waters complicating cooperation. The EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement, renewed in 2019 for four years with a €52 million annual fee for access to Moroccan waters (including contested Western Saharan zones), granted licenses to 119-128 EU vessels, predominantly Spanish, but faced annulment by the European Court of Justice in 2021 and 2023 for lacking Sahrawi consent, though transitional provisions allowed operations until 2023; Spain anticipates a new bilateral or EU deal despite opposition from Sahrawi advocates. Trade volumes reached €20 billion in 2024, bolstered by Spanish investments and Morocco's position as Spain's top aid recipient with €85 million allocated in 2025 for development cooperation. Security collaboration on counter-terrorism and border management has intensified post-2022, with joint exercises and intelligence sharing, yet underlying frictions endure, including the 2002 Perejil Island crisis where Spain militarily reasserted control after Moroccan occupation. Spain's alignment on Western Sahara—prioritizing Morocco's plan over independence—has stabilized ties but invites criticism for conceding to coercive tactics, reflecting a realist calculus of proximity-driven mutual dependencies over ideological sovereignty disputes.

Sub-Saharan Africa Engagement

Spain's engagement with emphasizes pragmatic cooperation in development, security, migration management, and economic ties, framed by the Spain-Africa Strategy 2025-2028, launched on December 5, 2024, which outlines 100 lines of action across five goals including strengthening bilateral relations, fostering growth, and enhancing security. This approach recognizes 's demographic pressures—with 40% of its population in extreme poverty and projected to hold 50% of the world's under-18s by 2050—and positions as a bridge to , prioritizing and the due to proximity and mutual interests in stability. Historical links stem primarily from , 's sole former colony in the region, which gained independence on October 12, 1968; relations remain strained by the authoritarian governance under President Teodoro Obiang Nguema since 1979, marked by concerns, electoral irregularities, and , though cultural affinities persist through Spanish as the and oil sector interests, with reserves confirmed at 563.5 million barrels by 2002. Diplomatically, Spain maintains embassies in key Sub-Saharan capitals, such as —its oldest representation in the region—and , which accredits to , , and others; additional missions cover , , and , facilitating high-level dialogues with bodies like the and via memoranda signed in 2022 and 2023, respectively. Economically, over 600 Spanish companies operate in , representing 38% of Spain's continental business presence, with foreign direct investment stock at €5.95 billion in 2022, concentrated in and ; trade volumes are modest compared to , featuring oil imports from (10.4% of Spain's total in 2023) and exports to valued at €7.21 billion in 2021, bolstered by initiatives like the and Alianza África Avanza for infrastructure. Development aid prioritizes Sub-Saharan Africa in the Spanish Cooperation Master Plan 2024-2027, focusing on youth employment, vocational training, and gender equality programs like Ellas+; Spain's total official development assistance rose 12% to over €4 billion in 2024, with increased allocation to the region for job creation and countering poverty drivers. Security cooperation targets Sahel instability, where terrorism accounts for 43% of global attacks, through EU training missions, support for G5 Sahel and Gulf of Guinea maritime security, and Spain's chairmanship of the Sahel Alliance from June 2020 to July 2023. Migration efforts address irregular arrivals via Canary Islands routes, promoting circular programs with Senegal, Gambia, and Mauritania—home to 261,976 Sub-Saharan residents in Spain as of 2022—and combating trafficking through legal pathways and root-cause investments.

Middle East Policies and Energy Dependencies

Spain's foreign policy toward the has prioritized advocacy for , particularly since the 2023 escalation of the Israel-Hamas conflict. In May 2024, the Spanish approved the recognition of the State of Palestine, framing it as a step toward a amid ongoing violence in Gaza. This position, articulated by Prime Minister , contrasted with restrained European responses and drew domestic support from public opinion favoring Palestinian recognition over alternative conflict resolutions. By September 2025, Sánchez announced a total arms embargo on and described its actions in Gaza as genocide, while avoiding full diplomatic rupture and implementing targeted retaliatory measures. Diplomatic efforts have included multilateral initiatives to isolate , such as hosting European and Arab foreign ministers in in May 2025 to demand an end to 's Gaza offensive and propose UN sanctions. Spain's Foreign Minister toured , , and the in February 2024 to seek Gulf input on de-escalation, reflecting a of engaging Arab states despite pro-Palestinian rhetoric. Bilateral ties with Gulf monarchies emphasize economic cooperation; for instance, the inaugural -Spain Strategic Dialogue in June 2024 highlighted deepening relations in trade and security, while high-level talks with in September 2025 focused on diversifying economic partnerships beyond energy. On , following the December 2024 fall of , Spain urged "red lines" in engagements with the new Islamist-led interim government, advocating sanctions to enforce inclusive transitions and minority protections. Energy dependencies shape Spain's pragmatic approach, though Middle Eastern sources constitute a minority of imports. In 2024, Gulf states supplied only 8% of Spain's crude oil, down from 12% in 2023 due to regional instability and diversification toward American suppliers like the and . remains a key oil provider alongside , but (LNG)—which comprised over half of Spain's €9.77 billion gas imports in 2024—primarily originates from () and the , with contributing as a secondary Gulf supplier. 's pipeline gas dominates, underscoring geographic proximity over Middle Eastern volumes, which limits leverage from Gulf producers despite diplomatic overtures. This modest reliance has enabled vocal without alienating energy partners, as Spain pursues broader diversification amid EU-wide shifts away from vulnerabilities.

Global Engagements Beyond Traditional Spheres

Asia-Pacific Relations and China Pivot

Spain's foreign policy towards the region has historically prioritized economic opportunities and multilateral engagement, with diplomatic ties established with most countries post-Franco era in the and . Under the 2025-2028 External Action Strategy, Spain emphasizes diversified partnerships in the to enhance , , and , reflecting the region's growing global weight in GDP and sectors. Bilateral relations with key players like , , and have intensified, including strategic dialogues with since Pedro Sánchez's 2023 visit and cooperation councils with and focused on . A notable shift in Spain's approach is the deepening pivot towards , formalized as a comprehensive since 2005 and reaffirmed in multiple high-level engagements. Trade volumes underscore this orientation: in 2024, Spanish exports to reached €7.69 billion, primarily in machinery, chemicals, and agri-food products, while imports from exceeded €45 billion, dominated by and consumer goods, resulting in a significant deficit. This imbalance has driven policy efforts to boost exports, including seven agreements signed during Sánchez's April 2025 visit to facilitate Spanish food, health, and cosmetic product access to the Chinese market. The pivot accelerated amid U.S. tariff threats under the second Trump administration, with Spain advocating for an EU-wide reorientation towards China to safeguard trade interests and maintain supply chain resilience. Sánchez's three visits to China between 2023 and 2025, coupled with Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares's October 2025 meeting with counterpart Wang Yi, emphasized mutual respect, innovation cooperation, and a new Spanish embassy in Beijing to expand diplomatic footprint. The 2025-2028 strategy equates China with the U.S. in technological collaboration potential, prioritizing areas like renewable energy and digital infrastructure over geopolitical confrontation. Critics, including U.S. officials, have warned against over-reliance, citing risks to transatlantic alignment, yet Spanish authorities frame the approach as pragmatic diversification rather than a full strategic realignment. This China-focused engagement coexists with broader initiatives, such as Spain's observer status in the since 2012 and exploratory maritime security dialogues, but remains tempered by EU-wide de-risking efforts regarding critical dependencies on Chinese supply chains. Overall, the pivot reflects economic imperatives— accounts for over 10% of Spain's extra-EU imports—balanced against alliance commitments, with ongoing intergovernmental dialogues aimed at sustaining high-level momentum into 2026.

Russia-Ukraine Conflict Stance

Spain has consistently condemned Russia's full-scale invasion of , initiated on February 24, 2022, as a violation of and . articulated this position early, denouncing Russia's recognition of the self-proclaimed and People's Republics on February 21, 2022, and committing to a coordinated and response. In subsequent statements, Sánchez emphasized that any peace agreement must be rooted in , rejecting unilateral impositions by Russia and highlighting Moscow's rejection of diplomatic initiatives to prolong the conflict. As a and EU member, aligned with collective measures, implementing all EU sanctions packages against , which by October 2025 included 19 rounds targeting over €48 billion in restricted goods and technologies. Spanish authorities have actively enforced these, conducting operations like "Probirka" in 2024 to curb sanctions evasion, such as illicit timber imports, with support from the . The economic impact on has been moderate, primarily affecting agricultural exports, though broader diversification reduced energy dependencies on , which supplied negligible volumes pre-invasion. Spain's material support for has been substantial and multifaceted. Since November 2022, Spanish forces under the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM ) have trained over 8,000 Ukrainian personnel across 185 modules in more than 30 specialties, including advanced tactics and equipment handling. Military aid includes Leopard 2A4 tanks, Patriot air defense systems, anti-ship missiles, and ammunition, with bilateral agreements expanding transfers in 2025. Humanitarian assistance totals over €100 million since 2022, supplemented by €400 million for reconstruction efforts, including solar plants near Chornobyl and projects. In February 2025, Foreign Minister announced an additional €10 million during a visit, underscoring ongoing commitment amid Russian strikes on civilian . Diplomatically, Spain has prioritized a "just and lasting " as its top objective by mid-2025, with visiting multiple times, including for the summits, to reaffirm . This stance integrates into Spain's 2025-2028 Foreign Action Strategy, framing the war as a core threat to European security and advocating enhanced and defense capabilities in response. While domestic opposition, such as from the Vox party, has critiqued escalation risks, the government's position remains firmly aligned with Western allies, emphasizing deterrence against Russian aggression without direct troop deployment.

Indo-Pacific and Emerging Markets

Spain's foreign policy has pivoted towards the to address geopolitical shifts, secure maritime trade routes vital for 90% of global commerce, and capitalize on in the region, which accounts for over 60% of world GDP. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Foreign Action Strategy 2025-2028 emphasizes diversified partnerships in this area, prioritizing resilience against supply chain disruptions and alignment with objectives for . Foreign Minister highlighted the region's centrality to security and prosperity during a 2025 UN address, underscoring Spain's intent to contribute to stability without militarizing its presence. Bilateral ties with , established in 1956, have intensified as a cornerstone of this outreach, driven by complementary interests in , digital technology, and defense. Trade volume reached €5.2 billion in 2023, with Spain exporting machinery and pharmaceuticals while importing chemicals and textiles; potential growth areas include and IT services. Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez's October 28-29, 2024, visit to resulted in a joint statement committing to enhanced cooperation on Indo-Pacific security, counter-terrorism, and , including joint naval exercises and technology transfers. Spain views as a counterbalance to Chinese influence, aligning with efforts to de-risk supply chains without decoupling. Engagement with and focuses on and defense-industrial collaboration. Spain maintains regular high-level dialogues with , emphasizing joint ventures in and cybersecurity, with exceeding €10 billion annually as of 2024. , a key partner for naval , has awarded Spanish firms contracts worth over €2 billion for frigate construction under the framework's indirect supply chains. , with diplomatic relations dating to 1958, represents outreach; economic ties center on imports and infrastructure investments, totaling €1.5 billion in trade in 2023, amid Spain's support for EU-Indonesia negotiations. In broader emerging markets beyond core Indo-Pacific states, Spain pursues pragmatic diplomacy to access high-growth sectors like green technologies and digital infrastructure. The strategy targets diversification from over-reliance on traditional partners, with initiatives in Vietnam and the Philippines yielding €800 million in annual trade by 2024, focused on electronics and agriculture. This approach integrates economic incentives with multilateral forums, such as Spain's observer role in ASEAN dialogues, to mitigate risks from U.S.-China tensions while advancing EU-aligned standards on sustainability and human rights.

Territorial and Sovereignty Disputes

Gibraltar Sovereignty Claim Against the

Spain's sovereignty claim over originates from its capture by Anglo-Dutch forces on July 24, 1704, during the , when the territory was under Spanish control. The subsequent Treaty of Utrecht, signed on April 13, 1713, saw Spain cede to "in perpetuity" under Article X, granting the British Crown "the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of , together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging... forever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever." This cession included stipulations prohibiting Jewish or Moorish settlement and requiring return to Spain should Britain renounce sovereignty, provisions the maintains do not undermine the perpetual transfer. Spain has contested the permanence of this transfer since the , arguing that the treaty conveyed only possession rather than full and invoking principles of and , viewing as a remnant of colonial occupation listed by the as a non-self-governing territory since 1960. Under Francisco Franco's regime, Spain intensified pressure, closing the border in 1969 and maintaining it until 1982, amid broader claims tied to national unity. Post-transition to , Spain persisted in diplomatic assertions, though referendums in Gibraltar have consistently rejected integration or shared sovereignty: in 1967, 12,138 of 12,362 votes (99.1%) favored remaining British, with only 44 supporting Spain; in 2002, 17,900 of 18,087 valid votes (98.97%) opposed a UK-Spain shared sovereignty proposal. The 1984 Brussels Declaration between the and established a framework for dialogue on all differences, including , while committing to cooperation on practical issues like border movement and economic equality, with the affirming no sovereignty change without Gibraltarian consent. This process facilitated normalized relations but left sovereignty unresolved, as maintains its claim while the upholds the Treaty of Utrecht's legal validity and the principle of enshrined in UN resolutions. Post-Brexit negotiations, culminating in a June 11, 2025, political agreement between the , , , and , addressed frontier and trade frictions without altering sovereignty: the retains full control over defense and internal affairs, military facilities operate autonomously, and border checks are eliminated via a Schengen-like area for , with the physical slated for dismantling by January 2026. 's foreign ministry continues to frame as pending , but the deal emphasizes practical cooperation over territorial concessions, reflecting ' repeated democratic preference for British status.

Ceuta, Melilla, and Maritime Claims with Morocco

and are two autonomous cities of located on the North African coast, enclaved within Moroccan territory, with populations of approximately 85,000 and 86,000 residents respectively as of 2023. administers them as integral parts of its national territory, equivalent to provinces on the mainland, and they have been under continuous Spanish sovereignty since the 15th and 17th centuries, predating the formation of modern . has contested this control since its in 1956, viewing the enclaves as remnants of Spanish colonialism and demanding their integration into Moroccan territory, though international legal precedents on long-term possession weaken such claims under principles of acquisition by prescription. Historically, Spain seized in 1497 as a military outpost during the , while —initially captured by in 1415—was incorporated into the Spanish Crown following the in 1580 and formally ceded by in 1668. At the time of conquest, neither territory was under effective control of a centralized Moroccan state; operated as a semi-independent entity under local Muslim rule, and Melilla's acquisition faced resistance from Berber tribes rather than a unified kingdom. Morocco's post-independence irredentist stance draws on a broader narrative of , including references to pre-colonial , but lacks treaties or principles from that applied to , which Spain relinquished in 1975. Spain's official position, reiterated by Pedro Sánchez in 2022, affirms the enclaves' "indisputable" sovereignty as non-negotiable Spanish soil, supported by their EU membership and integration despite geographic separation. Diplomatic frictions have periodically escalated, often linked to migration pressures exploited as leverage; in May 2021, Morocco allegedly relaxed border controls, allowing over 8,000 migrants to enter amid tensions over Spain's treatment of 's Polisario leader, though denied orchestration. Border fences, fortified since 1993 and reinforced with by 2005, span 8 kilometers around and 11 around , yet breaches occur, as in September 2024 when Moroccan forces halted hundreds attempting mass entries. Relations normalized in 2022 following Spain's endorsement of 's autonomy plan for , leading to enhanced cooperation on migration control, evidenced by 's interception of 78,685 irregular attempts to reach via in 2024, including routes to the enclaves. responded to persistent threats by bolstering military deployments in June 2025, adding troops and armored units to deter potential aggression. Maritime claims exacerbate the dispute, as Morocco rejects the enclaves' generation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs), asserting that surrounding waters fall under its extending from the mainland, thereby nullifying Spanish claims to 12-nautical-mile territorial seas around Ceuta and Melilla. This stance, rooted in the non-recognition of the enclaves' , has prevented bilateral delimitation agreements, contrasting with provisional fishing accords that allow limited Moroccan access but leave broader EEZ boundaries unresolved as of 2024. Spain maintains that UNCLOS provisions affirm EEZs based on sovereign land territory, positioning the enclaves as valid baselines for resource rights, including potential , though no joint development zones exist due to Rabat's maximalist demands. Ongoing talks, influenced by energy dependencies and EU migration pacts, prioritize pragmatic border management over sovereignty concessions, with no territorial transfers anticipated absent mutual recognition.

Olivença and Minor Border Issues with Portugal

Olivença, known as in Spanish, has been administered by Spain since its capture during the in 1801, despite 's ongoing claim to sovereignty based on post-Napoleonic settlements. The town, located on the left bank of the River in , was ceded to Spain under the Treaty of Badajoz signed on June 6, 1801, following a brief Franco-Spanish aimed at pressuring Portugal to exit its alliance with Britain. This treaty required Portugal to relinquish Olivença, along with fortresses like Almeida, and close Portuguese ports to British trade, reflecting the coercive dynamics of the era under French influence. The status of Olivença shifted after the , when the in 1815 addressed territorial restitutions. Article 105 of the Final Act recognized 's rights to the territory, effectively nullifying the 1801 treaty as coerced, in line with broader efforts to restore pre-war boundaries where possible. ratified the Vienna accords in 1815, but Spain delayed until signing the Treaty of Paris in 1817 without implementing the return of Olivença, citing unmet conditions such as 's failure to ratify certain protocols or ongoing border ambiguities. Spain has since integrated the municipality—spanning about 52 square kilometers and home to roughly 12,000 residents—into its province, with local inhabitants predominantly identifying as Spanish and using in daily life. Portugal has never formally recognized Spanish sovereignty over Olivença, viewing its administration as an unresolved occupation pending bilateral negotiation or . The dispute remains largely dormant in practice, overshadowed by strong Iberian ties within the , , and , which have eliminated routine border controls since 1995. However, it occasionally resurfaces; in September 2024, Portuguese Defense Minister Nuno Melo publicly urged Spain to return the territory, invoking the Vienna Congress rulings and framing non-compliance as inconsistent with mutual respect between neighbors. Spanish officials dismissed the remarks as anachronistic, emphasizing integration and the absence of active irredentist movements among Olivença's population. Beyond Olivença, minor border issues between and have historically involved ambiguities along the 1,234-kilometer frontier, particularly regarding riverine boundaries like the and Miño. The 1864–1868 boundary delimitation treaties resolved several enclaves and parcels, such as dividing disputed lands near Manín and Lindoso equally, but occasional disputes persisted into the over fluvial shifts and minor territorial pockets. A arbitration under of Nations addressed residual claims, including access to the Ajuda Bridge area near Olivença, affirming the as the natural divide except where conquests like altered it. Today, such issues are negligible, managed through joint commissions under the 1990 Spain-Portugal Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, with no significant active frictions reported as of , reflecting pragmatic cooperation on cross-border and environmental .

International Organizations and Multilateral Involvement

United Nations Role and Peacekeeping

Spain acceded to membership on 14 December 1955, following initial exclusion due to the political regime under , which had barred participation in international organizations until geopolitical shifts allowed admission. As a member state, Spain has engaged across UN bodies, emphasizing multilateralism in areas such as disarmament, non-proliferation, and ; it has served five terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, including 1969–1970 and most recently 2015–2016, during which it advocated for resolutions on conflict prevention and civilian protection. In the General Assembly, Spain has supported foundational principles through initiatives like resolution 70/3 in 2015, which reaffirmed member states' commitment to the UN Charter. More recently, on 14 October 2024, the General Assembly elected Spain to the Council for the 2025–2027 term, marking its third stint and focusing on accountability and democratic values. Spain's peacekeeping commitments underscore its dedication to UN-mandated operations, with participation commencing in 1989 and extending to over 50 missions across four continents, involving more than 137,000 personnel from the armed forces and state security corps as of recent assessments. These efforts have resulted in 101 Spanish fatalities, primarily from accidents, highlighting the operational risks borne in stabilizing post-conflict zones. Significant historical contributions include deployments exceeding 43,000 personnel to missions during the 1990s and early 2000s, such as in and , which earned collective recognition via the Prince of Asturias Award for International Cooperation in 1998. In ongoing operations, Spain maintains substantial presence in the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), contributing 660 troops and assuming command of a key sector in February 2022 to enhance maritime and ground patrols along the Blue Line. As of January 2025, Spain ranks among the top 30 troop-contributing countries with 710 personnel across UN missions, including contingents in (MINUSMA successor elements) and the , reflecting sustained financial and logistical support as one of the top-10 assessed contributors to the UN budget. This involvement aligns with Spain's broader policy of promoting civilian protection and , though deployments have occasionally faced domestic scrutiny over resource allocation and mission efficacy.

Economic Forums: WTO, OECD, and G20

Spain is a member of the (WTO) since 1 January 1995, having previously adhered to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) on 29 August 1963. As an EU member state, Spain's trade policy is largely coordinated through the , which represents the bloc in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement mechanisms, though Spain actively participates in working groups and supports multilateral trade liberalization to bolster its export-oriented economy, which relies heavily on sectors like , automobiles, and . In recent years, Spain has advocated for reforms to the WTO's dispute settlement system amid ongoing crises, emphasizing the need for effective enforcement of trade rules to protect medium-sized economies from unilateral actions by larger powers. In the , holds founding member status, having signed the OECD Convention on 14 December 1960 and formally acceding on 3 August 1961 as one of the original 20 participants. This involvement allows to influence global standards on , taxation, and development assistance; for instance, as a member of the since 1991, channels official development aid (ODA) totaling USD 74.8 million to in 2024 alone, focusing on humanitarian and reconstruction efforts amid geopolitical tensions. contributes 3.0% to the 's Part I budget for 2025, reflecting its economic weight, and engages in peer reviews that have informed domestic reforms, such as labor market adjustments and fiscal sustainability measures post-2008 crisis. Through platforms, promotes policies, including integration and anti-corruption frameworks, aligning with its goals of enhancing competitiveness in international markets. Spain participates in the as a permanent guest invitee rather than a full member, a status it has maintained since the forum's expansion in 1999 and formalized attendance at summits from onward, driven by its position as the world's 14th-largest economy by nominal GDP. This arrangement enables Spanish leaders, such as Prime Minister , to attend summits—like the November meeting in Rio de Janeiro—where they advocate for advancing the UN 2030 Agenda for and a negotiated peace in , while coordinating positions with EU counterparts to amplify influence on global financial stability and trade. Spain's G20 engagement underscores its strategy to bridge transatlantic and emerging market perspectives, pushing for reforms in and for developing nations, though its non-member status limits formal voting power and has prompted calls for greater inclusion to reflect its systemic economic importance.

Other Alliances: OSCE, Council of Europe

Spain acceded to the Final Act on 30 November 1977, becoming a participating State in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in (CSCE), the predecessor to the OSCE. This step aligned with 's post-Franco democratization efforts and commitment to the principles of security, cooperation, and across . As a participating State, maintains a permanent delegation to the OSCE in and contributes personnel to field operations, including election observation missions and conflict prevention initiatives. During its 2007 OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office, led by Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain hosted the 15th Ministerial Council in on 29–30 November, where participating States adopted decisions on , , and Roma integration, while emphasizing Mediterranean partnerships and . has provided financial and technical support to OSCE programs on control, stockpiles management, and in other participating States. In early 2025, chaired the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, prioritizing multilateral dialogue on conventional and regional stability amid ongoing conflicts. Spanish parliamentarians actively participate in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, with Pere Joan Pons serving as its president in 2025, advocating for enhanced election observation and parliamentary diplomacy. Spain joined the on 24 November 1977, marking a key milestone in its reintegration into European institutions after decades of isolation under the Franco regime. The country ratified the on 4 September 1979, subjecting it to the ' jurisdiction and committing to standards on , fair trials, and minority protections. Spain signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government on 15 October 1985 and ratified it, promoting decentralized governance and regional autonomy in line with its own territorial model. As a member, Spain has chaired the Committee of Ministers—responsible for implementing Council decisions—on multiple occasions, including from November 1997 to May 1998 and May to November 2010, during which it advanced priorities like and countering . Spanish representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly of the contribute to monitoring compliance with democratic norms, with ongoing involvement in rapporteur groups on and migration. Spain ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities on 1 September 1995, effective from 1 February 1998, supporting policies for linguistic and of groups such as and within its constitutional framework. These engagements underscore Spain's role in upholding rule-of-law mechanisms, though domestic challenges like Catalan have occasionally drawn Council scrutiny for proportionality in responses.

Economic Diplomacy and Trade

EU-Led Trade Policy and Bilateral Agreements

As a member of the since January 1, 1986, Spain's external trade policy falls under the exclusive competence of the EU's , as outlined in Article 207 of the on the Functioning of the , which mandates unified and representation in matters. This supranational framework superseded Spain's pre-accession bilateral arrangements, such as the 1970 Preferential Trade Agreement with the , integrating Spanish exports and imports into the EU's single customs territory and eliminating internal tariffs among member states. In 2023, the EU accounted for 62.7% of Spain's total exports, valued at €240.38 billion, underscoring the policy's dominance in Spanish trade flows, with primary destinations including (15.6%), (10.4%), (8.6%), and (8.3%). Spain influences EU trade policy through its representation in the Council of the European Union, where trade decisions require qualified majority voting, and via Members of the European Parliament, who scrutinize agreements post-negotiation. The Spanish government advocates for a "resilient European trade policy open to multilateralism," emphasizing free trade agreements (FTAs) to counter global protectionism, as stated by the Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Business in response to international tensions. This stance aligns with Spain's economic interests in sectors like agriculture, automobiles, and chemicals, which comprise over 50% of its exports; for instance, Spain has prioritized EU FTAs that reduce non-tariff barriers in these areas, contributing to a national export growth of 2.7% year-on-year in December 2024, reaching €384.465 billion for the full year despite an overall trade deficit of €40.276 billion. Key EU-led agreements benefiting Spain include the (CETA) with , provisionally applied since September 21, 2017, which has expanded market access for Spanish foodstuffs and machinery, and the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, effective since February 1, 2019, facilitating exports of Iberian ham and wine. Negotiations for the EU-Mercosur FTA, ongoing since 1999 with political agreement in 2019, are projected to increase Spanish exports to the bloc by 37% upon full implementation, driven by demand for vehicles and pharmaceuticals, though ratification faces delays due to environmental and agricultural concerns raised by some member states. Post-Brexit, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement of December 24, 2020, preserves tariff-free access for Spanish goods like and services, mitigating a potential 10-15% disruption estimated for bilateral flows. Outside the EU framework, Spain maintains no independent bilateral free trade agreements for goods, adhering to WTO most-favored-nation rules for non-preferential partners like the United States, where 2024 bilateral trade totaled approximately €30 billion but faces risks from proposed U.S. tariffs announced in 2025. Instead, Spain pursues bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to protect outbound investments, with over 70 active BITs as of 2024, including with countries like China (2005) and Mexico (1995), focusing on investor-state dispute settlement rather than tariff reductions. These complement EU efforts by addressing investment flows, which reached €1.2 trillion in Spanish FDI stock abroad by 2023, predominantly in Latin America and the EU. Sector-specific bilateral pacts, such as cooperation agreements with Tunisia and Jordan under EU-associated frameworks, aid Spanish firms in oral hygiene and textiles exports, representing about 70% of production for some manufacturers.

Investment Flows and Development Aid

Spain's (FDI) outflows reached approximately €50 billion in 2023, with significant portions directed toward Latin American countries, reflecting historical linguistic and cultural ties that facilitate . Major Spanish multinationals, such as and Telefónica, have established substantial operations in nations like , , and , bolstering bilateral relations through job creation and infrastructure projects. These investments, often exceeding €20 billion annually to the region, serve as levers for political influence and counterbalance to competitors like in resource sectors. Inbound FDI to totaled USD 35.9 billion in 2023, down 20% from the prior year, primarily from partners and the , supporting sectors like and . This capital inflow strengthens transatlantic and intra-EU bonds, with agreements like the EU's trade framework enhancing investor protections and mechanisms. However, outflows have occasionally outpaced inflows, positioning as a net investor abroad and using economic leverage in forums such as the to advance shared interests in trade liberalization. Spain's (ODA) amounted to over €4 billion in 2024, marking a 12% increase from 2023 and representing 0.24% of , ranking it as the 12th largest donor among members. Bilateral ODA in 2023 prioritized with USD 463.3 million, comprising the bulk of allocations to top recipients including , , and , aimed at and programs. exceeded €181 million in 2024, channeled through the Spanish Agency for Cooperation to address crises in and the , such as in and Ukraine-adjacent regions, fostering migration control pacts and stability partnerships. These efforts align with Spain's emphasis on Ibero-American , where ODA complements to promote democratic institutions and economic reforms, though varies due to recipient challenges. In , supports summits like the 2023 Africa-Spain Cooperation event, targeting in Sahel nations to mitigate irregular migration flows impacting Spain's southern borders. Overall, combining FDI and ODA enhances Spain's , with 26.2% of 2023 bilateral ODA concentrated in ten key partners across , , and the .

Energy Security and Resource Dependencies

Spain's energy import dependency rate stood at approximately 68% in 2023, reflecting its limited domestic production of fossil fuels and heavy reliance on external suppliers for oil, , and other resources to meet industrial, residential, and power generation demands. imports, which account for about 21% of total energy supply, are particularly critical, with pipeline supplies from historically comprising a significant share—over 25% of imports—while (LNG) shipments have diversified sources to include the , , , and residual volumes from . This structure exposes Spain to supply disruptions tied to geopolitical tensions, as evidenced by 's intermittent use of gas exports as leverage in disputes with and , including reduced flows in 2022 following Madrid's support for Morocco's autonomy plan. Diversification efforts intensified after Russia's 2022 invasion of , with the emerging as Spain's primary natural gas supplier by 2024, providing up to 35% of total gas via LNG and overtaking in January 2025. Spain's six regasification terminals, boasting Europe's largest capacity at around 67 billion cubic meters per year as of 2024, have positioned it as a continental LNG hub, facilitating re-exports and while reducing vulnerability to single-supplier risks. However, imports from persisted into 2025, averaging notable volumes despite EU-wide sanctions, underscoring incomplete decoupling and ongoing exposure to Moscow's pricing and supply manipulations. These shifts have strengthened transatlantic ties, with U.S. LNG deals enhancing bilateral energy diplomacy, while straining relations with amid pipeline underutilization and Madrid's balancing act between North African stability and migration control. Crude oil imports, comprising 44% of energy supply, have similarly diversified, with the Americas surpassing 50% of volumes in 2024 for the first time, led by U.S. refined products and surging shipments from —reaching 1.7 million tons from January to July. Traditional Middle Eastern and African sources persist but at reduced shares, mitigating risks from regional volatility, though overall import volumes remain high at around 1.24 million barrels per day in late 2023. Foreign policy implications include opportunistic engagements, such as renewed Venezuelan imports amid U.S. sanctions fluctuations, which test Spain's alignment with and stances on authoritarian regimes. While domestic renewables generated 56% of electricity in 2024, bolstering long-term security through and solar expansion, dependencies continue to shape diplomatic priorities, prioritizing supply stability over ideological consistency and fostering pragmatic alliances with resource-rich states like the U.S. and . This approach has tempered Algeria's leverage, enabling Spain to navigate rivalries without full subordination, though vulnerabilities persist in scenarios of coordinated supplier cutbacks or global price spikes.

Military and Defense Cooperation

Joint Operations and Alliances

Spain joined the on 2 May 1982, committing to the alliance's Article 5 collective defense principle and integrating its military structures for interoperability with allied forces. This membership has enabled Spanish forces to participate in numerous NATO-led operations, including contributions to the enhanced forward presence battlegroups in , , and as of 2025, bolstering deterrence against eastern threats. Spain has also assumed roles, such as commanding NATO's Allied Reaction Force until July 2025, when responsibility transferred to following certification in exercise Steadfast Dagger. Additionally, Spanish personnel lead a NATO training mission in and provide headquarters support for deployments in Slovakia. Within the European Union's (CSDP), Spain ranks as the largest contributor to military operations, deploying forces to missions such as the EU Training Mission in (EUTM Mali), where it provides leadership, and supporting broader EU efforts in the and Mediterranean. Spain's CSDP involvement extends to training over 8,000 Ukrainian military personnel through the European Union Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM Ukraine) as of September 2025, focusing on enhancing operational capabilities amid the ongoing conflict. These deployments underscore Spain's role in EU-led , often in coordination with frameworks, though domestic debates persist over defense spending levels relative to 's 2% GDP target, with Spain allocating approximately 1.3% in 2024. Bilaterally, Spain maintains a foundational defense partnership with the under the 1988 Agreement on Defense Cooperation, which authorizes U.S. access to bases at Rota and Morón, hosting permanent deployments including two U.S. destroyers at Rota since a 2023 protocol update to counter submarine threats. This arrangement facilitates joint exercises, logistics support, and , with Spain benefiting from U.S. and technology transfers that enhance its naval and air capabilities. Cooperation with and the occurs through and EU channels, including shared exercises and intelligence sharing, though Gibraltar-related tensions with the UK occasionally complicate defense dialogues. Overall, these alliances prioritize collective deterrence and expeditionary operations, with Spanish forces logging extensive deployments that exceed spending metrics in operational tempo.

Arms Exports and Defense Industry

Spain's defense industry encompasses approximately 500 companies, employing around 36,000 individuals and specializing in naval , land systems, components, and integration. Key players include the state-owned , which focuses on warships and submarines; for defense and surveillance systems; General Dynamics European Land Systems-Santa Bárbara Sistemas for armored vehicles; and Expal Systems for munitions. The sector has demonstrated capabilities in designing and producing complex platforms, such as frigates and missile systems, often in collaboration with international partners like for aircraft components. Arms exports represent a significant aspect of Spain's , fostering interoperability and economic ties with recipient nations while adhering to national and EU export controls that prioritize and conflict non-aggravation criteria. Between 2020 and 2024, Spain ranked as the ninth-largest global arms exporter, accounting for 3 percent of total transfers, with a 29 percent increase in volume compared to the prior five-year period. Primary recipients include , which received substantial naval vessels including Avante 2200 corvettes and patrol ships from , valued in billions of euros since 2018; , through the Hunter-class program incorporating Spanish designs; and European allies like for submarine components. These deals have enhanced Spain's strategic partnerships in the Gulf and Indo-Pacific, though they have drawn scrutiny from human rights organizations over end-use in conflicts like . In 2022, Spanish arms exports surged 24 percent year-over-year, driven by demand for and naval platforms amid global disruptions from the Russia-Ukraine war. The government's export licensing process, managed by the Ministry of Industry, and , approved shipments totaling over €4 billion in recent years, with munitions comprising a growing share due to commitments. While exports to controversial destinations persist under legal frameworks, has suspended certain transfers—such as to in response to Gaza developments—reflecting policy shifts influenced by domestic politics and EU pressures, though overall volumes indicate sustained industry competitiveness.

Counter-Terrorism and Migration Security

Spain has prioritized international cooperation in counter-terrorism since the 11 March , which killed 193 people and injured over 2,000 in an Islamist extremist attack claimed by al-Qaeda-inspired militants. The incident prompted enhanced bilateral intelligence sharing with the and European partners, including participation in NATO's counter-terrorism initiatives and frameworks like the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator's network for threat assessment and prevention. Spain contributes to UN efforts, such as hosting events on judicial cooperation against terrorism and supporting the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy through capacity-building in partner nations. Domestically coordinated by the Intelligence Centre against Terrorism and Organised Crime (CITCO), these efforts extend abroad via multilateral operations targeting financing networks and radicalization, with Spain designating groups like and affiliates under regimes. In migration security, Spain's foreign policy emphasizes bilateral pacts with origin and transit countries in Africa to curb irregular flows, which pose risks including human smuggling linked to organized crime and potential terrorist infiltration. On 29 August 2024, Spain signed agreements with Mauritania, The Gambia, and Senegal to expand legal migration pathways while reinforcing border controls and repatriation mechanisms, aiming to reduce dangerous Atlantic crossings to the Canary Islands that reached over 40,000 arrivals in 2023. These deals build on earlier frameworks from 2004-2008 with nations like Mali and Nigeria, which incentivized cooperation in exchange for development aid and readmission protocols. Within the EU, Spain collaborates via Frontex, deploying joint operations along the Western Mediterranean and West African coasts; in 2025, Frontex supported Spanish Policía Nacional during peak travel seasons and patrolled to intercept vessels, contributing to an 18% drop in EU-wide irregular crossings to 95,200 in the first seven months. Spain endorses the EU's Pact on Migration and Asylum, adopted in 2024, which mandates solidarity in screening, asylum processing, and returns, though implementation challenges persist amid high Canary Islands arrivals projected to rise in late 2025. Counter-terrorism and migration security intersect in Spain's diplomacy, as unsecured routes facilitate jihadist movements; for instance, intelligence cooperation with has thwarted plots, including arrests of sympathizers among migrants since 2015. Spain's strategy integrates these domains through EU-led initiatives like the Process successors, promoting stability in the via joint training and equipment sharing to address root causes like driving displacement. Despite reductions in crossings—down 21% EU-wide in early 2025—pressures from West African departures underscore the need for sustained third-country partnerships, with Spain allocating resources for €30 million EU aid to in 2024 to deter outflows.

Cultural and Soft Power Projection

Spanish Language and Heritage Diplomacy

Spain's foreign policy emphasizes the promotion of the as a cornerstone of , leveraging its status as the second most spoken native language globally, with over 600 million speakers worldwide as of 2024, including approximately 500 million native speakers concentrated primarily in and . This approach fosters by strengthening ties with Spanish-speaking nations, facilitating trade, education, and political influence through shared linguistic heritage rather than coercive means. The primary institution for this effort is the , established by the Spanish government in 1991 to promote the teaching, study, and dissemination of Spanish and the cultures of Spanish-speaking countries. Operating in collaboration with the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), it maintains centers across more than 50 countries, offering language courses, certification exams like the , and cultural programs that have reached millions of learners annually. Bilateral memoranda of understanding, signed with 12 Ibero-American countries, extend this promotion into diplomatic spheres, including training for officials and integration of Spanish in international forums. In Ibero-American relations, language diplomacy reinforces Spain's priority status, underpinned by historical, cultural, and economic bonds with the 22 Spanish-speaking nations in the region. Initiatives include dispatching Spanish language and culture assistants to foreign institutions to enhance teaching abroad, as coordinated through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation. Spain has advocated for Spanish's broader official use in global bodies, such as joint efforts with Honduras in 2024 to push for its recognition at the International Court of Justice. These activities culminate in forums like the Ibero-American Summits, with Spain set to host the 30th in 2026, emphasizing linguistic unity as a driver for cooperation. Heritage diplomacy complements language efforts by highlighting Spain's contributions to global literature, arts, and intellectual traditions, often through Cervantes Institute events and publications on the annual state of Spanish. This strategy yields measurable diplomatic returns, such as bolstered economic partnerships in , where shared language reduces transaction costs and aligns policy preferences, though its effectiveness depends on addressing regional variations in dialect and .

Historical Empire's Enduring Legacy

The , which at its zenith in the late encompassed territories across the , parts of , , and , disseminated the and Catholic traditions to over 13 million square kilometers of land, establishing foundations for enduring cultural affinities that bolster Spain's contemporary diplomatic influence. This legacy manifests primarily through linguistic commonality, with Spanish serving as the native tongue for approximately 500 million people worldwide as of 2024, projected to surpass 600 million total speakers including non-natives by the mid-2020s, concentrated in where it functions as an in 19 sovereign states. These ties facilitate preferential access for Spain in multilateral forums and bilateral engagements, transcending historical independence movements that concluded by 1898 with the loss of , , and the . Central to this projection is the , established by in 1991 as a public entity dedicated to promoting the study, teaching, and dissemination of Spanish and culture, operating over 80 centers across 45 countries with a focus on former imperial domains. The institute's activities, including language certification exams taken by millions annually and cultural events reaching global audiences, enhance Spain's by fostering mutual identification and economic opportunities, such as streamlined trade negotiations in Spanish-speaking markets where cultural familiarity reduces transaction costs. In parallel, shared heritage elements like architectural styles, festivals, and legal traditions—rooted in the empire's evangelization and administrative exports—sustain interpersonal and institutional bonds, evidenced by high levels of and migration reciprocity between and Latin American nations. The Ibero-American Summits, inaugurated in 1991 in Guadalajara, , exemplify institutionalized leverage of this legacy, convening leaders from 22 Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries biennially to advance cooperation in , , and , with assuming a pivotal coordinating role and set to host the 30th summit in 2026. These gatherings, emphasizing over colonial redress, have yielded tangible outcomes like joint educational exchanges and investment pacts, underscoring how imperial diffusion of and norms enables to cultivate a "Hispanic community" that amplifies its geopolitical voice in global arenas, distinct from more fractious post-colonial dynamics elsewhere. Despite occasional academic critiques framing the empire's through lenses of extraction, empirical patterns of voluntary affiliation—such as Latin American nations' alignment with in UN votes on cultural preservation—affirm the legacy's net positive utility in foreign relations.

Media and Public Diplomacy Efforts

Spain's public diplomacy efforts are primarily coordinated by the , European Union and Cooperation (MAEC), which employs a multifaceted approach encompassing digital outreach, media monitoring, and to influence international perceptions and support goals. These initiatives emphasize cross-cutting tools such as sports, , and scientific diplomacy alongside traditional media engagement, with a focus on countering negative narratives through proactive communication. The MAEC maintains a global network of 216 diplomatic posts, including embassies and consulates, which facilitate media interactions and public engagement abroad. A core component involves the deployment of Information Offices in key foreign capitals, which serve as instruments for projecting Spain's image while analyzing international media coverage for to national interests. These offices, operational in multiple countries, compile media analyses, organize press briefings, and disseminate to shape coverage of Spanish initiatives, such as partnerships in or EU positions. For instance, they monitor and respond to global reporting on issues like economic recovery post-2008, contributing to a shift from tourism-centric promotion to broader reputational management. Complementing this, the MAEC has integrated since the early , leveraging and online platforms by diplomatic staff to engage foreign audiences directly, as evidenced by modernization efforts in the Spanish External Service. The España Global platform, established to orchestrate public and private external actions, plays a pivotal role in coordinating under the Marca España initiative, which gained institutional momentum around amid economic challenges to highlight Spain's , cultural exports, and global contributions beyond stereotypes. This effort involves public-private collaborations to amplify positive media narratives, with reports noting its evolution from ad hoc tourism campaigns to strategic reputation-building, including responses to international coverage of domestic events like the 2017 Catalan referendum. Analyses by the Real Instituto Elcano indicate that Spain's media presence in global outlets often centers on 34% sports-related stories but underscores the need for diversified coverage to bolster diplomatic leverage, as tracked in periodic surveys of influential foreign press. The Foreign Action Strategy 2025-2028 further prioritizes these media tools to enhance Spain's influence in multilateral forums, integrating them with for sustained impact.

Controversies, Achievements, and Criticisms

Colonialism Narratives: Achievements vs. Exploitation Claims

The historiography of Spanish colonialism in the Americas features competing narratives: one emphasizing systemic exploitation and cruelty, often amplified by the 16th- and 17th-century "Black Legend" propagated by rivals like England and the Netherlands to undermine Habsburg power, and another highlighting administrative, educational, and economic achievements that integrated vast territories into a cohesive empire. The Black Legend, while rooted in real abuses such as the encomienda system's forced labor, exaggerated Spanish atrocities relative to other European powers, ignoring protective royal decrees and the role of diseases in causing 80-90% of indigenous population declines from an estimated 50-100 million pre-1492 to about 10 million by 1600. Modern academic emphases on exploitation often reflect institutional biases favoring decolonial frameworks over balanced assessments of imperial governance. Spanish achievements included the establishment of sophisticated viceregal administrations in (Mexico, 1535) and (1542), which imposed uniform legal codes like the Recopilación de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias (1680), fostering centralized control over 13 million square kilometers and enabling infrastructure projects such as extensions of Inca roads into a 25,000-kilometer network for trade and military movement. Educationally, Spain founded the first universities in the Americas, including the University of (1538) and the in (1551), which by the 18th century produced thousands of graduates in theology, law, and , many of indigenous or descent, contrasting with the later and fewer higher education institutions in . Economically, in (discovered 1545) yielded approximately 45,000 tons over three centuries—nearly 20% of global production—funding European wars, the trade linking and the Americas, and urban development in viceregal capitals like , which by 1650 rivaled in population and boasted aqueducts, printing presses, and theaters. Exploitation claims center on labor systems like the mita in Andean mines, where indigenous workers faced harsh conditions, contributing to Potosí's output but at high human cost, with estimates of 8 million deaths over centuries from overwork, mercury poisoning, and disease. However, Spain enacted the New Laws of 1542, prohibiting new encomiendas, banning Indian slavery (except war captives), and mandating protections influenced by Dominican friar Bartolomé de las Casas, though enforcement varied due to colonial resistance and distance from . In causal terms, European-introduced epidemics, not deliberate extermination, drove demographic collapse, while Spanish policies promoted intermarriage and cultural mestizaje, resulting in higher indigenous survival rates and societal integration than in British colonies, where displacement and segregation predominated, leaving fewer native descendants in the U.S. population today (about 1-2% vs. 10-50% in ). Comparatively, while all empires extracted resources, Spain's Catholic framework emphasized conversion and nominal equality under the Crown, leading to indigenous participation in cabildos (town councils) and universities, whereas British settler colonialism prioritized land clearance for plantations, minimizing native incorporation. These dynamics underscore that exploitation occurred amid achievements in state-building and globalization, with narratives of unmitigated plunder often sidelining empirical evidence of institutional reforms and long-term legacies like the Spanish language's role in unifying 500 million speakers across 20 nations.

Neutrality Traditions and Alignment Debates

Spain maintained a policy of neutrality during , balancing relations with the Entente and while avoiding direct involvement, driven by economic interests and domestic instability following the 1898 colonial losses. During , under Francisco Franco's regime, Spain officially declared non-belligerence in June 1940, later shifting to strict neutrality in October 1943 as Allied victories mounted, though it provided covert support to the , including the of over 45,000 volunteers fighting on the Eastern Front and tungsten exports vital for German armaments. This pragmatic stance stemmed from Spain's post-Civil War economic devastation and military weakness, preventing full Axis entry despite ideological sympathies, while Allied pressure ensured eventual distancing from Hitler. Post-1945, Franco's Spain abandoned isolationist neutrality in favor of alignment with the , securing bases agreements in 1953 that integrated it into the amid tensions, marking a departure from pre-war traditions. The democratic transition after Franco's 1975 death intensified alignment debates, culminating in accession on May 30, 1982, under Prime Minister , despite opposition from neutralist factions invoking historical precedents. The (PSOE), initially advocating neutrality or non-alignment—as evidenced by attending the 1979 summit in as a guest—reversed course under , supporting permanence in the 1986 referendum, which passed with 52.54% approval on a 59.39% turnout, conditional on no nuclear weapons, troop reductions, and enhanced Latin American ties. Contemporary debates reflect tensions between entrenched Western alignment and residual neutralist sentiments, particularly from leftist parties like Podemos, which have critiqued as provocative while Spain upholds commitments. In response to Russia's 2022 invasion of , Spain has aligned firmly with and positions, providing over €1.5 billion in by 2025, hosting tanks for training, and condemning aggression in UN speeches, yet Prime Minister has emphasized multilateral diplomacy, proposing UN-mediated ceasefires without territorial concessions to . Spain's 2025-2028 Foreign Action Strategy reaffirms transatlantic solidarity and support, but domestic critics argue for "" echoing non-alignment, hosting the 2021 Parliamentary Network launch amid integration. These debates underscore causal trade-offs: full neutrality risks marginalization in a polarized world, while alignment bolsters security but fuels partisan divides over issues like increased defense spending to meet 's 2% GDP target, achieved briefly in before lapses.

Recent Positions: Ukraine Support, Gaza Stance, and China Ties

Spain has provided military assistance to in response to Russia's beginning in February 2022, including 2A4 tanks and Patriot missiles as part of broader packages. In February 2025, Prime Minister announced a €1 billion annual commitment for the next decade, encompassing artillery ammunition, missiles, and other equipment delivered under a bilateral security agreement. Spanish Foreign Minister has reiterated support for 's sovereignty, joining European counterparts in statements condemning Russian aggression and advocating for immobilized Russian assets to fund reparations until a cessation of hostilities. Sánchez emphasized in August 2025 that achieving a "just and lasting peace" in remains a top priority, aligning with and EU frameworks while training Ukrainian troops and contributing to demining efforts. Following Hamas's October 7, 2023, attacks on that killed approximately 1,200 people and took over 250 hostages, Spain adopted a stance critical of 's subsequent military operations in Gaza, which have resulted in over 40,000 Palestinian deaths according to Gaza health authorities. In May 2024, formally recognized the State of Palestine alongside and , framing it as a step toward a amid calls for an immediate . By September 2025, imposed an on and partial import restrictions, citing alleged in Gaza, while recalling Spain's envoy after Israeli accusations of ; these measures built on earlier advocacy for sanctions to halt the conflict. Albares has hosted conferences with European and Arab nations to pressure , welcomed opinions on Israeli obligations in occupied territories, and supported Palestine's UN membership bid, positioning as a vocal proponent of Palestinian rights despite domestic and allied divisions over the war's origins and conduct. Spain has deepened economic ties with under the government, prioritizing trade amid EU-wide tensions over Chinese practices like subsidies and . Bilateral trade reached $56.97 billion in 2024, with agreements in April 2025 facilitating Spanish food, health, and cosmetic exports to . 's multiple visits, including in 2024 and 2025, have advanced a comprehensive , with October 2025 events promoting Chinese procurement of Spanish agricultural products and collaboration in renewables and . Albares announced plans for a new Spanish embassy in to enhance presence, while joint pledges in June 2025 emphasized innovation and investment, reflecting Spain's pivot toward as U.S. relations strain, though aligned with efforts to diversify supply chains.

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