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Blockade of the Gaza Strip
Blockade of the Gaza Strip
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Blockade of the Gaza Strip
Map illustrating the blockade on the Gaza Strip
DateFull blockade: June 2007 – present
Duration18 years, 4 months
LocationGaza Strip
CauseIsolate Hamas after its takeover, prevent weapons smuggling and attacks, and exert political pressure
ParticipantsIsraeli security forces
Egyptian Border Guard

The restrictions on movement and goods in Gaza imposed by Israel date to the early 1990s.[1] After Hamas took over in 2007, Israel significantly intensified existing movement restrictions and imposed a complete blockade on the movement of goods and people in and out of the Gaza Strip.[2] In the same year, Egypt closed the Rafah border crossing.[3] The blockade's stated aims are to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza and exert economic pressure on Hamas.[1] While the blockade's legality has not been adjudicated in court, human rights groups believe it would be deemed illegal and that it is a form of collective punishment, as it restricts the flow of essential goods, contributes to economic hardship, and limits Gazans' freedom of movement.[2][4] The land, sea, and air blockade isolated Gaza from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory and the world.[5] The blockade and its effects have led to the territory being called an "open-air prison".[6][7]

Exit and entry into Gaza by sea or air is prohibited. There are only three crossings in and out of Gaza, two of them controlled by Israel and one by Egypt. Israel heavily regulates Palestinians' movement through Erez, with applications considered only for a small number of laborers (less than 5% of the number considered in 2000) and for limited medical and humanitarian reasons.[8] Israel's military cooperation with Egypt and its control of the population registry (through which it controls who can obtain the necessary travel documents) gives it influence over movement through Rafah.[9] Imports are heavily restricted, with "dual use" items permitted only as part of donor projects. This includes construction material and computer equipment. Exports are also heavily restricted, with the main impediment to economic development in Gaza being Israel's ban on virtually all exports from the Strip.[10]

Israel blockaded the Gaza Strip at various levels of intensity in 2005–2006. Israeli-imposed closures date to 1991.[11][12][13][14][15] In 2007, after Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed an indefinite blockade of Gaza that remains in place, on the grounds that Fatah and Palestinian Authority forces had fled the Strip and were no longer able to provide security on the Palestinian side.[16] Israel has said the blockade is necessary to protect itself from Palestinian political violence and rocket attacks, and to prevent dual use goods from entering Gaza.[17]

Israel has been accused of violating or failing to fulfill specific obligations it has under various ceasefire agreements[18][19][20] to alleviate or lift the blockade.[21] "Crossings were repeatedly shut and buffer zones were reinstated. Imports declined, exports were blocked, and fewer Gazans were given exit permits to Israel and the West Bank."[22][23][24][25][26][27][28] Human rights groups, international community representatives, and legal professionals have decried the blockade as a form of collective punishment in contravention of international law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention. Rights groups have held Israel mainly responsible as the occupying power.[29][30]

Background

[edit]
Gaza Strip, with Israeli/Egyptian-controlled borders and limited fishing zone.

Israeli imposed closure on the movement of goods and people to and from Gaza dates back to 1991 when Israel cancelled the general exit permit for Palestinians in the occupied territories. This policy was initially temporary, but developed into a permanent administrative measure in March 1993 after heightened levels of violence by Palestinians inside Israel. Since then, the closure has become an institutionalized system in Gaza (and the West Bank), and has varied in intensity but never been completely lifted.[31] As the closure was coming into place, academics and diplomats were already describing it as a form of collective punishment,[32][33][34] a trend that continues in more recent times.[35][36] For example, between 1993 and 1996, total closure was imposed on the Gaza Strip for a cumulative 342 days. During periods of total closure, Israel enforced a complete ban on any movement of people or goods between Gaza and Israel, the West Bank and foreign markets. The economic impact of these closures during 1996 alone was estimated by the World Bank as amounting to losses of almost 40% of Gaza's GNP.[37] In 1994, Israel built the Gaza–Israel barrier as a security measure, despite this, Israeli security establishment has described the closure as having limited value against extremist attacks.[37][38] Since then, there are four border crossings between Israel and the Gaza Strip through the barrier: the Kerem Shalom, Karni, Erez, and Sufa crossings. All goods bound for Gaza as well as exports passing through Israel must use one of these crossings, and undergo security inspection before being permitted to enter or leave Gaza.

In 2005, Israel withdrew its settlers and forces from the Gaza Strip, redeploying its military along the border. Following Hamas' electoral victory and subsequent military confrontation with opposing party Fatah which led to Hamas taking control over all of Gaza in 2007, Israel further tightened restrictions in an attempt to exert economic pressure on Hamas. With this new tightening of restrictions, all trade was ceased and the entrance of goods was limited to a "humanitarian minimum", allowing only those good which are "essential to the survival of the civilian population".[39] Israeli security officials have described the ban on exports as "a political decision to separate Gaza from the West Bank" further describing it as a matter of "political-security" and a form of "economic warfare".[40][41][42]

Additionally, starting in 2009, Egypt built an underground Egypt–Gaza barrier along the Egypt–Gaza border. The stated aim was to block smuggling tunnels. The Rafah Border Crossing is the only lawful crossing point between Egypt and Gaza, and was manned by PA security forces and the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah.[43] All humanitarian and other supplies passing through Israel or Egypt must pass through these crossings after security inspection.

Until 2013, there were hundreds of smuggling tunnels dug under the Egypt-Gaza border to smuggle goods, including fuel, into Gaza to bypass the blockade.

2005–2006 blockades

[edit]

On 12 September 2005, the final day of the Israeli withdrawal, international politicians such as France's Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy and Jordan's Deputy Prime Minister Marwan Muasher warned of Gaza being turned into an open-air prison.[44][45] Four days later, Mahmoud Abbas stated to the UN General Assembly:

It is incumbent upon Israel to turn this unilateral withdrawal into a positive step in a real way. We must quickly resolve all outstanding major issues, including the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, the airport and the seaport, as well as the establishment of a direct link between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Without this, Gaza will remain a huge prison.[46]

Following the disengagement, human rights groups alleged that Israel frequently blockaded Gaza in order to apply pressure on the population "in response to political developments or attacks by armed groups in Gaza on Israeli civilians or soldiers".[47] The special envoy of the Quartet James Wolfensohn noted that "Gaza had been effectively sealed off from the outside world since the Israeli disengagement [August–September 2005], and the humanitarian and economic consequences for the Palestinian population were profound. There were already food shortages. Palestinian workers and traders to Israel were unable to cross the border".[48]

On 15 January 2006, the Karni crossing – the sole point for exports of goods from Gaza – was closed completely for all kinds of exports.[49][50] The greenhouse project suffered a huge blow, as the harvest of high-value crops, meant to be exported for Europe via Israel, was essentially lost (with a small part of the harvest donated to local institutions).[50][51][52] Moreover, closing of Karni cut off the so-far resilient textile and furniture industries in Gaza from their source of income.[53] Starting February 2006, the Karni crossing was sporadically open for exports, but the amount of goods allowed to be exported was minuscule compared to the amount of goods imported[54] (which, in turn, barely supported Gaza's needs).[55][54] Between 1 January and 11 May, more than 12,700 tonnes of produce were harvested in Gaza's greenhouses, almost all of it destined for export; out of it, only 1,600 tonnes (less than 13%) were actually exported.[51]

Sanctions on Hamas-led PA governments

[edit]

The election for the Palestinian Legislative Council took place on 25 January 2006, and was won by Hamas. The election took place during a full blockade of Gaza.[56][50][57][54][a] After the PLC was sworn in on 18 February 2006,[58] in addition to its blockade of the Gaza Strip, Israel imposed other sanctions on the PA, including withholding the PA's tax revenue (collected by Israel on the PA's behalf), and imposing travel restrictions on Hamas PLC members. Israel's position is that Hamas is a terrorist organisation that has vowed to destroy Israel, and is responsible for the death of hundreds of its citizens, and neither wanted to have any direct relations with the other.[citation needed] On 20 February, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was nominated to form a new PA government, which was sworn in on 29 March.

Besides Israel's position in relation to a Hamas-led PA government, following the election, the Quartet on the Middle East had stated that continued aid to and dialogue with the PA under a Hamas government was conditional on Hamas agreeing to three conditions: recognition of Israel, the disavowal of violent actions, and acceptance of previous agreements between Israel and the PA, including the Oslo Accords. Haniyeh refused to accept these conditions, and the Quartet stopped all dialogue with the PA and especially any member of the Hamas government, ceased providing aid to the PA and imposed sanctions against the PA under Hamas.[59] Though initially opposed by the United States, a Quartet member, the US government agreed in April 2006 to discontinue $400 million of foreign aid to the PA. Instead the US redirected $100 million to the United Nations and other non-Palestinian groups, but no aid money was given directly to the government of Mahmoud Abbas.[60]

As noted by Wolfensohn (and also in an EU paper), withholding of the PA's own tax revenue – an action taken by Israel alone, not by the Quartet – was more damaging than the ceasing of international aid to the PA. These taxes, collected in Palestine (both in the West Bank and Gaza) by Israeli authorities, were supposed to be transferred to the PA's budget. By releasing or withholding these revenues, Israel was able, in the words of the International Crisis Group, to "virtually turn the Palestinian economy on and off".[61] Israel withheld these transfers from the PA until June 2007.[62][63] Withholding the tax revenue by Israel meant that the PA lacked money to pay its employees, including the police, further destabilizing the situation in Gaza.[64]

In March 2007, Fatah agreed to join Hamas in a PA unity government, also headed by Haniyeh. Shortly after, in June, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip during the Battle of Gaza,[65] seizing PA government institutions in the Strip and replacing Fatah and other PA officials with Hamas members.[66]

Following the takeover, in the West Bank, President Mahmoud Abbas officially dissolved the Haniyeh-led PA government, suspended parts of the Basic Law, and created a new PA government by decree, without approval of the PLC. This government was recognized by the international community, and international relations and aid to the PA government in the West Bank resumed, the economic sanctions were lifted, and Israel resumed the transfer of tax revenue to it.

In the autumn of 2007, Israel designated the Gaza Strip, under Hamas control, as a hostile entity, and instituted a series of sanctions which encompassed power reductions, stringent import restrictions, and border closures.[7] In January 2008, in response to ongoing rocket attacks on its southern communities, Israel expanded its sanctions, fully sealing its border with the Gaza Strip and temporarily halting fuel imports.[7] Later in January, following nearly a week of the heightened Israeli blockade, Hamas militants dismantled sections of the barrier along the Gaza Strip-Egypt border, which was closed from Hamas's takeover in mid-2007 until 2011, creating openings that, as per estimations, allowed hundreds of thousands of Gazans to cross into Egypt to procure food, fuel, and other goods unattainable due to the blockade. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak temporarily allowed the border breach to mitigate civilian suffering in Gaza, prior to initiating efforts to reestablish the border.[7]

History

[edit]
The Gaza Strip

Early 2000s

[edit]

During the Second Intifada, Israel blockaded the Palestinian territories, including the Gaza Strip, several times.[67][68] In Gaza, the blockade caused unemployment to skyrocket to 85%. Christian Aid reported that malnourishment among children doubled in one year due to the blockade.[69] Clinics run by Middle East Council of Churches also reported treating increasing numbers of underweight and malnourished children.[69]

June 2007 – January 2008

[edit]

In June 2007, Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in the Battle of Gaza,[65] and removed Fatah officials. Following the Hamas takeover, the sanctions put in place after Hamas's 2006 electoral victory were dramatically tightened. Truck transits, which had been 12,000 per month in 2005, were reduced to 2,000 by November of that year, when in a further measure, in the context of Hamas rocket fire and Israeli attacks, food supplies were halved, fuel imports slashed and foreign currency restricted by the latter.[70]

Following the Hamas takeover in Gaza, Egypt and Israel largely sealed their border crossings with Gaza, on the grounds that Fatah had fled and the PA was no longer providing security on the Palestinian side.[16]

In July 2007, Israeli officials stated they had been planning to open the Rafah border crossing to allow stranded Palestinians to return, but claimed that this plan had been cancelled after Hamas threatened to fire on the refugees.[71]

A Jerusalem Post article mentioned Hamas' complaints that since June 2008 the PA no longer granted passports to Gazans, thereby "preventing tens of thousands of Palestinians from being able to travel abroad".[72]

Egypt, fearing a spill-over of Hamas-style militancy into its territory, kept its border with Gaza largely sealed.[73] Israel sealed the border completely on 17 January in response to rocket attacks on southern Israel and Palestinian militant attacks on crossing points between Israel and Gaza.[74][75]

The Egyptian government feared also that Iran wanted to establish a base in its territory as well as in Gaza through its proxy Hezbollah following the 2009 Hezbollah plot in Egypt.[76][77]

January 2008 breach of the Egypt-Gaza border

[edit]

On 22 January 2008, Gazans clashed with Egyptian police in front of the border, demanding that the Rafah Border Crossing be opened. The clashes included live fire, and there were injuries on both sides. Fifty women managed to cross, and Egyptian police responded with a water cannon assault. Additional Egyptian security forces arrived, and managed to restore calm and prevent further crossing.[78]

The breach of the Gaza–Egypt border began on 23 January 2008, after gunmen in the Gaza Strip set off an explosion near the Rafah Border Crossing, destroying part of the former Israeli Gaza Strip barrier. The United Nations estimated that as many as half of the population of the Gaza Strip crossed the border into Egypt seeking food and supplies.[79] Israel said that militants had exploited the breach in the border wall to send armed men into the Sinai to infiltrate Israel across the Sinai-Israel border. Egyptian troops at first permitted the crossing[73] but did not allow Palestinians to travel further than El Arish. On 25 January, Egyptian forces blocked almost all illegal entry points to stem the flow of Gazans pouring in, and Egyptian riot police erected barbed wire and chain-link fences along the border. Palestinians used a bulldozer to knock down the fence and once again flooded in. Egyptian border police began stopping Palestinians from crossing and sealed the road from Rafah to El Arish. On 28 January, Egyptian security forces and Hamas militants strung barbed wire across one of the breaches, sealing it off. The Egyptians began repairing one of the two remaining breaches on 29 January, and closed the border with the Gaza Strip on 3 February 2008.

June 2008 attempt at easing restrictions

[edit]

Under a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas in June 2008, Israel agreed to lift its blockade of Gaza Strip. At Egypt's request, Israel did not always respond to Palestinian ceasefire violations by closing the border.[80]

Israel accused Hamas of transporting weapons into Gaza via tunnels to Egypt, failing to stop rocket attacks, and noted that Hamas would not continue negotiating the release of Israeli hostage Gilad Shalit, who had been held by Hamas since 2006.[81] Hamas' decision alienated it from the government of Egypt, which had linked the opening of the Gaza-Egypt border crossing to Shalit's release.[82] In the early stage of the ceasefire, Israeli officials had stated that they found "a certain sense of progress" on Shalit's release.[83]

The UN recorded seven Israel Defense Forces (IDF) violations of the ceasefire between 20 and 26 June, and three violations by Palestinian groups not affiliated with Hamas between 23 and 26 June.[84] On 18 December, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, reported 185 Israeli violations during the lull period.[85] The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center reported a total of 223 rockets and 139 mortar shells fired from Gaza during the lull, including 20 rockets and 18 mortar shells before 4 November.[86] It noted that "Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire" until 4 November, when the ceasefire was "seriously eroded."[87] Rocket fire decreased by 98 percent in the four-and-a-half months between 18 June and 4 November, compared to the four-and-a-half-months preceding the ceasefire.[88] Hamas denied responsibility for the rocket fire during the lull. Human Rights Watch reported that Hamas security forces demonstrated an ability to curb rocket fire while some people detained for rocket fire were released without explanation.[89]

In August 2008, the first NGO-organized attempts to breach Israel's maritime closure of the Gaza Strip occurred when two vessels, containing activists from the Free Gaza Movement and International Solidarity Movement, sailed from Cyprus towards Gaza, carrying hearing aids and balloons. The boats reached Gaza on 23 August 2008 after the Israeli government allowed the boats free passage.[90] Four more voyages occurred from October until December 2008, as passengers were transported another boat called the "Dignity", a 66-foot yacht owned by the Free Gaza Movement.[91] The Dignity was rammed three times while it was sailing in international waters by the Israeli Navy and significant damage was incurred.[92]

On 28 October 2008, the Dignity, carrying 26 activists and medical supplies, docked in a strip harbor without interference. Israel had initially decided to stop the vessel, but the decision was made to let it through just before it reached Gaza.[91] The Dignity sailed to Gaza four times before it was attacked on 30 December 2008 in international waters, as it sailed towards Gaza to deliver medicine and medical help.[93]

In August 2008, it was reported that Israel despite the ceasefire was still allowing in very few goods.[94] A WikiLeaks cable from the US embassy in Tel Aviv dated 3 November 2008 revealed that Israel still maintained the economy of the Gaza strip "on the brink of collapse" without "pushing it over the edge". The cable said that "Israeli officials have confirmed to Embassy officials on multiple occasions that they intend to keep the Gazan economy functioning at the lowest level possible consistent with avoiding a humanitarian crisis."[95]

2008–2009 Gaza war and aftermath

[edit]
An explosion caused by an Israeli airstrike in Gaza during the Gaza War

In January 2009, after the first phase of the Gaza War, Israel said it would allow in some humanitarian aid, but will continue its economic blockade in order to weaken the power of Hamas.[96] In June 2009, on the second anniversary of the blockade, 38 United Nations and non-governmental humanitarian organisations issued a joint press release calling for "free and uninhibited access for all humanitarian assistance in accordance with the international agreements and in accordance with universally recognised international human rights and humanitarian law standards".[97] As of July 2009, Israel said it is making the humanitarian relief efforts in Gaza one of its top priorities.[98] The amount of goods Israel allows into Gaza is one quarter of the pre- blockade flow.[97]

Mark Regev, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated "We want to make sure that reconstruction for the people of Gaza is not reconstruction for the Hamas regime." U.S. State Department spokesman Robert Wood said on 25 February that "Aid should never be used as a political weapon. We'll try to push to get into Gaza as many supplies as possible."[99]

Rafah border crossing – British aid convoy entering Gaza Strip from Egypt in 2009

The Olmert cabinet had decided in March 2009 that food and medical supplies to Gaza would be allowed through unfettered. This was met with resistance by Israel's Defense Ministry, which controls the border crossings.[100] An Israeli military spokesperson said that each item was decided on an individual basis and that food was being let through daily. According to NGO Gisha, the amount of food entering Gaza is as of May 2009, about 25% of the pre-June 2007 figures. A UN study has found that Gazan families are eating fewer meals a day and mainly relying on carbohydrates such as rice and flour because protein foods are expensive or unavailable. Chicken eggs have doubled in price due to the destruction of chicken coops during the Gaza War.[100]

February 2009 Hamas-UNRWA incident

[edit]

On 3 February, 3,500 blankets and over 400 food parcels were confiscated by Hamas police personnel from an UNRWA distribution center. On the following day, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator demanded that the aid be returned immediately.[101] In a separate incident on 5 February, Hamas seized 200 tons of food from UNRWA aid supplies. The following day, UNRWA suspended its activities in Gaza. Hamas issued a statement stating that the incident was a misunderstanding between the drivers of the trucks and had been resolved through direct contact with the UNRWA.[102] On 9 February, UNRWA lifted the suspension on the movement of its humanitarian supplies into Gaza, after the Hamas authorities returned all of the aid supplies confiscated.[103]

2010–2011 freedom flotillas

[edit]
May 2010 Gaza flotilla raid

On 31 May 2010, the Israeli Navy seized an aid convoy of six ships known as the "Gaza Freedom Flotilla".[104] aiming to break through the blockade, carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials. The flotilla had declined an Israeli request to change course to the port of Ashdod, where the Israeli government had said it would inspect the aid and deliver (or let humanitarian organizations deliver) Israeli-approved items to Gaza.[105]

Pictured here: Knives, wrenches, and wooden clubs used to attack the soldiers during the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid

Israeli Shayetet 13 naval commandos boarded the ships from speedboats and helicopters launched from three missile ships, while the flotilla was still in international waters.[106] On the MV Mavi Marmara, the main ship of the convoy, passengers attacked and managed to capture three soldiers.[107] Israeli soldiers responded with rubber bullets and live ammunition from soldiers in helicopters and on the ship. Several of the activists were shot in the head by Israeli forces, some from behind and at close range.[108] Israel was accused of using disproportionate force. On other ships, soldiers were met with passive resistance which was easily suppressed with non-lethal techniques. Nine passengers were killed and dozens wounded. Nine soldiers were also injured, two of them seriously. All of the ships were seized and towed to Ashdod, while passengers were imprisoned in Israel and then deported to their home countries.[109][110][111][112][113][114] The MV Rachel Corrie, a seventh ship that had been delayed, set sail from Malta on the same day of the flotilla's interception. Israeli naval vessels shadowed the Rachel Corrie, and after it ignored three warnings, Israeli commandos boarded the ship from speedboats, arrested the crew, and forced it to sail to Ashdod.[115]

Freedom Flotilla II

Following the Gaza flotilla raid, a coalition of 22 NGOs assembled in July 2011 a flotilla of 10 vessels and 1,000 activists to breach the blockade.

The vessels docked in Greece in preparation for the journey to Gaza. However, the Greek government announced that it would not allow the vessels to leave for Gaza,[116] and the Hellenic Coast Guard stopped three vessels attempting to evade the travel ban and leave port. On 7 July, most activists left for home, leaving only a few dozen to continue the initiative.[117] On 16 July, the French yacht Dignite Al Karama was allowed to leave port after informing Greek authorities that its destination was Alexandria, Egypt. Instead, the yacht headed directly for Gaza. The Israeli Navy stopped the Dignite Al Karama about 65 kilometers off Gaza. After the boat was warned and refused to turn back, it was surrounded by three Israeli naval vessels and boarded by Shayetet 13 commandos, who took it over. The boat was then taken to Ashdod.[118] Ultimately, the Freedom Flotilla sailing did not take place.

November 2011 flotilla

On 4 November 2011, the Israeli Navy intercepted two vessels heading towards Gaza in a private initiative to break the blockade. Shayetet 13 commandos boarded the vessels from speedboats and took them over with no resistance. The vessels were then taken to Ashdod port.[119]

June 2010 easing of the blockade

[edit]

Facing mounting international calls to ease or lift their blockade in response to the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid, Egypt and Israel lessened the restrictions starting in June 2010. Israel announced that it will allow all strictly civilian goods into Gaza while preventing weapons and what it designates as "dual-use" items from entering Gaza.[120] Egypt partly opened the Rafah border crossing from Egypt to Gaza, primarily for people, but not for supplies, to go through.[121] The Israeli NGO Gisha Legal Center for Freedom of Movement reported in a July 2010 publication[122] that Israel continues to prevent normal functioning of the Gazan economy. Israel continues to severely restrict and/or prevent people from entering or exiting Gaza according to Gisha.[123][124][125] The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) conducted an assessment of the humanitarian impact of the easing of the blockage in January and February 2011 and concluded that they did not result in a significant improvement in people's livelihoods.[126] The World Bank estimated in 2015 that the GDP losses caused by the blockade since 2007 was above 50%, and entailed large welfare losses.

On 1 June 2010, the Rafah border crossing from Egypt to Gaza was partially opened. Egypt's foreign ministry has made it clear that the crossing will remain open mainly for people, not for aid, to go through.[121] Several aid trucks began making it into Gaza during the following morning including some carrying power generators from the Egyptian Red Crescent, and hundreds of Gazans who had been staying in Egypt returned home, although little traffic, human or cargo, flowed from Gaza to Egypt.[127] On 3 June, the manager of the Gaza side of the Rafah crossing, Salameh Barakeh, explained that the crossing is open for the free travel of patients, foreign passport holders, those with residency status in other countries, students and internationals.[128] The Arab Physicians Union officials submitted a request to Egyptian authorities on 3 June 2010 to send 400 tons of food, blankets, electric generators for hospitals and construction material from Egypt to Gaza, but their request was denied by Egyptian authorities without specific reason. Emad Gad, political analyst at Egyptian Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, believes the government should keep the Rafah border under control because opening it completely could allow weapons smuggling or illegal financial transactions.[121]

On 17 June 2010, Israel's Prime Minister's Office announced that Israel's security cabinet had agreed to relax Israel's blockade on the Gaza Strip, and issued an English-language press release, according to which a decision to ease the blockade had been made. The English text reads: "It was agreed to liberalize the system by which civilian goods enter Gaza [and] expand the inflow of materials for civilian projects that are under international supervision." However, no binding decision has been made during the cabinet meeting, and an announcement issued in Hebrew did not mention any such decision. The Prime Minister's office said that a meeting would be held soon, and expressed hope that a binding decision will be taken then.[129]

International response to easing of restrictions

[edit]

Tony Blair, who welcomed Israel's decision to ease the restrictions on behalf of the Quartet on the Middle East, said that the Quartet – the UN, US, EU, and Russia – would continue talks with Israel "to flesh out the principles". Suggesting that "items of ordinary daily life, including materials for the construction of homes, infrastructure and services as the UN have asked" should be allowed to enter Gaza, he stated that "the decision to allow foodstuffs and household items is a good start".[130] A spokesperson for the Secretary-General of the United Nations declared that the Secretary-General would be encouraged that the Israeli government is reviewing its policy towards Gaza. He added that the United Nations would continue to seek a fundamental change in policy as agreed by the Quartet. Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri said that Israel's decision would have been designed to "beautify" the blockade and mislead public opinion.[131][132]

A British Foreign Office spokesman said: "It is good that Israel is giving serious consideration to resolving these issues, [b]ut further work is needed. We need to see the additional steps still to be announced." EU officials also said they were disappointed by the decision.[131] German Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development Dirk Niebel said that the Israeli announcement was "not sufficient". During a visit to the country, Niebel intended to visit a sewage treatment plant being financed with German development aid, but was denied entry into the Gaza strip by Israel. He commented that the Israeli government sometimes would "not make it easy for its friends to explain why it behaves the way it does."[133] A spokesperson for Israel's Foreign Ministry responded that Israel would have been obliged to allow any other European minister entry if it had allowed Niebel to visit the Gaza strip, thus conferring additional legitimacy to the Hamas government.[134]

Chris Gunness from UNRWA criticised Israel's move to ease the blockade as not being adequate, saying that

Even if the blockade is eased it remains illegal under international law as it is a collective form of punishment on a civilian population. Eighty percent of Gaza's population is aid-dependent. Allowing more aid in is perpetuating this dependency and not addressing the issue of self-sufficiency or the root causes of the crisis. What have not been addressed by the easing of the closure are the issues of exports as well as the limited number of crossings open to facilitate the flow of goods. Operation Cast Lead destroyed at least 60,000 homes and structures which need to be urgently repaired and rebuilt. The easing of the blockade is not addressing this adequately.[135]

Maxwell Gaylard, UN Deputy Special and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Middle East also criticised Israel, saying "Permitting mayonnaise and potato chips into Gaza is really irrelevant in dealing with the underlying issues. What we need to see is an improvement in Gaza's water, sanitation, power grid, educational and health sectors. Gaza's economy is shot to pieces and its infrastructure is extremely fragile."[135]

New blockade policy by Israel

[edit]

On 20 June 2010, Israel's Security Cabinet approved a new system governing the blockade that would allow practically all non-military or dual-use items to enter the Gaza strip. According to a cabinet statement, Israel would "expand the transfer of construction materials designated for projects that have been approved by the Palestinian Authority, including schools, health institutions, water, sanitation and more – as well as (projects) that are under international supervision."[17] Despite the easing of the land blockade, Israel will continue to inspect all goods bound for Gaza by sea at the port of Ashdod.[136]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that the decision enabled Israel to focus on real security issues and would eliminate "Hamas' main propaganda claim,"[137] and that it would strengthen the case for keeping the sea blockade in place.[138] He also said the decision would have been coordinated with the United States and with Tony Blair, the representative of the Quartet for the Middle East.[137] Blair characterized the decision as a "very significant step forward", but added that the decision needs to be implemented.[17] In a statement, the Quartet said that the situation remained "unsustainable and unacceptable" and maintained that a long-term solution was urgently needed.[139][140] The UNRWA called for a complete lift of the Gaza blockade, expressing concern that the new policy would continue to limit Gaza's ability to develop on its own.[140] The European Union's representative for foreign policy, Catherine Ashton, welcomed the decision. She called the step "a significant improvement" and expressed the expectation that the measures take effect as soon as possible, adding that "more work remains to be done."[141] The U.S. government welcomed the decision, expressing the belief that the easing would significantly improve the lives of Gaza Strip residents and prevent weapons smuggling.[17] It expressed its intention to contribute to an international effort to "explore additional ways to improve the situation in Gaza, including greater freedom of movement and commerce between Gaza and the West Bank."[142] Hamas dismissed the measures as trivial and "media propaganda", and demanded a complete lifting of the blockade, including the removal on all restrictions on the import of construction material.[17] Israeli Arab member of Knesset Hanin Zoabi commented that the easing of the blockade would prove that "it is not a security blockade, but a political one," adding that the flotilla "succeeded in undermining the blockade's legitimacy."[143]

The U.S., United Nations, European Union and Russia in 2010 were jointly consulting with Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt on additional measures, described by the United States Department of State as a "fundamental change in policy" toward the Gaza strip.[138]

Lieberman Proposal

[edit]

On 2 June 2010 a letter in the London newspaper The Times suggested the establishment of a permanent humanitarian sea corridor linking Cyprus with Gaza.[144] In July 2010, a similar proposal emerged from Israel's foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman who proposed it as part of an initiative to shift full responsibility over the Gaza Strip to the international community. He announced that he planned to discuss the idea, which was labelled a "personal initiative" with the EU Foreign Minister Catherine Ashton.[145][146]

Lieberman proposed that units of the French Foreign Legion and commando units from EU member states be sent in to secure the Gaza border crossings to prevent the smuggling of weapons, and that the border with Israel be sealed. Ships that underwent inspections in Cyprus or Greece would be allowed to dock in Gaza and unload humanitarian cargoes. The EU would help improve and build civilian infrastructure, and Gaza would become a fully independent entity.[147]

Lieberman, then defense minister, proposed a similar maritime corridor plan to Cyprus in 2018,[148] at a time when a number of such options were being considered in Israel.[149][150]

Humanitarian impact assessment

[edit]

In January and February 2011, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) conducted an assessment of the effects of the measures to ease the access restrictions.[126] They concluded that they did not result in a significant improvement in people's livelihoods.[126]

They found that a limited reactivation of the private sector resulted from the increased availability of consumer goods and some raw materials but the "pivotal nature of the remaining restrictions" and the effects of three years of strict blockade prevented a significant improvement in livelihoods.[126] Although the unemployment rate in Gaza fell from 39.3% to 37.4% in the second half of 2010 there were significant food price rises.[126] There was little or no improvement in food insecurity rates in Gaza which continued to affect 52% of the population.[126] Few of the 40,000 housing units needed to replace homes lost during Operation Cast Lead and for natural population growth could be built as a result of the ongoing restrictions on importing building materials.[126] The approval of over 100 projects funded by international organizations intended to improve the "extremely deteriorated" water and sanitation, education and health services, followed the easing of the blockade.[126] The implementation of these projects was delayed by the entry approval process for materials and the limited opening of the Karni crossing.[126] OCHA found that there had been no improvement in the quality of services provided to the population of the Gaza Strip as a result of the projects so far.[126] There was no significant increase in the number of exit permits granted by Israel to allow access to the outside world including other parts of the Palestinian territories.[126] Permits continued to be issued by Israel only on an exceptional basis with 106–114 per day being issued during the second half of 2010.[126] OCHA described Egypt's move to regularly operate its crossing with Gaza for special categories of people as a "significant, albeit limited, improvement".[126]

They concluded that the easing of restrictions was "a step in the right direction" but called on Israel to fully abolish the blockade including removing restrictions on the import of construction materials and the exports of goods, and to lift the general ban on the movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank via Israel in order to comply with what they described as international humanitarian and human rights law obligations.[126]

According to the World Health Organization, the shortage of essential medicines and equipment has been the primary obstacle to providing adequate health care in the Gaza Strip since the 2012 conflict. Gazan hospitals had a shortage of more than 50% of "medical consumables" even before the conflict. Workers in some hospitals reported having to sterilize and re-use single-use equipment due to the lack of critical items. Palestinian hospitals are unable to meet the need of their patients due to economic underdevelopment and the varying strictness of the Israeli blockade.[151] According to B'Tselem, Restrictions on Movement the blockade, which not only restricts Gazans' access to Israel but also communication between Gaza and the West Bank, has denied Gazan fishermen access to 85% of the waters they have been guaranteed access to.[152]

During the 2014 Israel–Gaza Conflict, 108,000 people were displaced, almost all of whom are still living in UNWRA refugee camps or inadequate improvised shelters. 28 schools, numerous wells, and other important civil infrastructure like major sewage and electricity plants were destroyed during Operation Protective Edge.[153] Since then over 2,000 truckloads of materials for reconstruction have been allowed into Gaza, but according to a UN estimate, 735 truckloads per day, for three years, would be necessary to rebuild all the damaged infrastructure.[154]

Further easing (2011–2013)

[edit]

Following the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, Egypt for some time opened the Rafah border crossing permanently as of 28 May 2011. A limited number of women of all ages and men aged below 18 and above 40 were able to enter Egypt without a visa,[155] although there are still severe restrictions on the movement of personnel and goods to and from Gaza.[156][157] In 2012 Egypt started supplying fuel to the Gaza Strip, to help ease a lengthy fuel crisis arising from a dispute between Egypt and the Hamas government in Gaza over whether Gaza can trade with Egypt openly, or only via Israel.[158]

In 2013 Israel eased its regulation on the entering of construction material into Gaza. The regulation was an attempt to reduce rocket fire in the south.[159]

Prior to a Gaza visit, scheduled for April 2013, Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan explained to Turkish newspaper Hürriyet that the fulfilment of three conditions by Israel was necessary for friendly relations to resume between Turkey and Israel: an apology for the raid (Prime Minister Netanyahu had delivered an apology to Erdogan by telephone on 22 March 2013), the awarding of compensation to the families affected by the raid, and the lifting of the Gaza blockade by Israel. The Turkish prime minister also explained in the Hürriyet interview, in relation to the April 2013 Gaza visit, "We will monitor the situation to see if the promises are kept or not."[160] At the same time, Netanyahu affirmed that Israel would only consider exploring the removal of the Gaza blockade if peace ("quiet") is achieved in the area.[161]

During the Gaza war

[edit]

On 9 October 2023, Israel intensified its blockade of the Gaza Strip when it announced a "total blockade", blocking the entry of food, water, medicine, fuel and electricity after the October 7 attacks and the ensuing Gaza war.[162][163] The blockade has been credited with contributing significantly to the Gaza genocide.[164][165][166] Israel has conditioned its lifting of the blockade with the return of the hostages abducted by Hamas,[167] which has been criticized as collective punishment and an apparent war crime.[168][169][170] As of August 2025, 27 European countries and over 100 international aid organizations have called for an end to Israel's blockade of aid into Gaza.[171][172]

A few weeks after 9 October 2023, Israel eased the complete blockade, but still continued to severely restrict the amount of aid entering the Gaza Strip. The first supplies entered on 21 October 2023.[173] The blockade exacerbated Gaza's humanitarian crisis.[174] In January 2024, Israeli authorities blocked 56% of humanitarian aid to northern Gaza.[175] On 9 February 2024, UNRWA's director Philippe Lazzarini said that Israel had blocked food for 1.1 million Palestinians in Gaza.[176]

During the January 2025 Gaza war ceasefire, Israel relaxed aid restrictions, allowing much more aid than previously.[177] On 2 March 2025, however, Israel completely blocked all supplies from entering the territory, making it the longest complete closure in the history of the blockade.[177][178] Since 26 May 2025, the United States- and Israeli-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation has facilitated limited and largely ineffective aid distribution, marred by mass killings that resulted in over 1,400 Palestinian deaths.[179]

The blockade has created famine conditions in the Gaza Strip, which was exacerbated by Israeli airstrikes targeting food infrastructure and restrictions on humanitarian aid.[180] In a number of incidents, Israeli protesters, including settlers, blocked aid trucks carrying humanitarian aid heading towards the Gaza Strip, and in some cases attacked them.[181][182]

Famine

[edit]

The population of the Gaza Strip is undergoing a famine as a result of an Israeli blockade during the Gaza war that prevents basic essentials and humanitarian aid from entering Gaza,[183][184][185] as well as airstrikes that have destroyed food infrastructure, such as bakeries, mills, and food stores, causing a widespread scarcity of essential supplies.[b] Humanitarian aid has also been blocked by protests at borders and ports. Increasing societal breakdown in Gaza, including looting, has also been cited as a barrier to the provision of aid.

As of August 2025, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) projections show 100% of the population are experiencing "high levels of acute food insecurity", and 32% are projected to face Phase 5 catastrophic levels by 30 September 2025.[187] On 22 August 2025, the IPC said that famine is taking place in one of the five governorates in the Gaza Strip: specifically, the Gaza Governorate which includes Gaza City. The IPC added that, within the next month, famine was likely to also occur in both the Deir al-Balah Governorate and Khan Yunis Governorate. The IPC had insufficient data on the North Gaza Governorate for a classification but concluded that conditions were likely similar or worse than in the Gaza Governorate.[187][188] Within the next 6 weeks as of 16 August, the number of people in IPC Phase 5 is expected to rise from 500,000 to over 640,000.[189]

Israel has been accused of using starvation as a weapon of war to commit genocide against the Palestinian people in Gaza.[190] On 21 November 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant due to "reasonable grounds" that they bear criminal responsibility for "the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare".[191][192] The United States "fundamentally reject[ed]" the ICC decision to issue the warrants.[193] The genocide has been recognized by a United Nations special committee[194] and commission of inquiry, Amnesty International, and other experts and human rights organisations.[190][195]

On 22 October 2025, the International Court of Justice found that Israel is obliged to guarantee sufficient food to Gazans and to allow UNRWA to operate in Gaza.[196][197]

Border crossings

[edit]

At the end of 2023, there were two open border crossings with Israel (Kerem Shalom border crossing and Erez), with an additional option via an Israel-Egypt crossing (Nitzana), and two border crossings with Egypt (Rafah Crossing and Salah al-Din Gate 4 km northwest of Rafah Crossing).[198] On 12 March 2024, as a "pilot project", the 96th gate in the security fence (near Kibbutz Be'eri) was used by a convoy of six trucks taking humanitarian aid to northern Gaza under IDF protection.[199]

Military impact

[edit]

The Israeli government justifies the blockade as a security measure. According to Sara Roy, Israeli security officials have said the blockade has limited value against extremist attacks.[31] Ghazi Hamad, a senior Hamas member, said in 2024 that the blockade made importing components for Hamas weapons industry a challenge. Machine tools and explosives were either labeled for civilian use or hidden inside shipments of food or other goods.[200] Jerome Slater described the blockade as a form of continuing Israeli control over the Strip,[201] adding that "most Palestinian terrorism almost certainly would have ended" if Israel had ceased to occupy the West Bank and Gaza,[202] and considered it probable that the policy of deliberate impoverization creates as much terrorism as it deters.[203]

Socioeconomic impact

[edit]

The worsening economic and humanitarian situation raised great concern abroad. According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in January 2003, the Israeli blockade and closures had drained as much as US$2.4 billion out of the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[204]

Throughout 2006, the Karni crossing was only partially operational, costing Palestinians $500,000 a day, as less than 10% of the Gaza Strip's minimal daily export targets were achieved. Basic food commodities were severely depleted, bakeries closed and food rationing was introduced.[205]

The World Bank estimated in 2015 that the GDP losses caused by the blockade since 2007 was above 50%, and entailed large welfare losses. Gaza's manufacturing sector, once significant, shrunk by as much as 60% in real terms, due to the wars in the past 20 years and the blockade. Gaza's exports virtually disappeared since the imposition of the 2007 blockade. It stated that "solutions have to be found to enable faster inflow of construction materials into Gaza", while taking into account "legitimate security concerns of neighboring countries."[206]

In May 2015, the World Bank reported that the Gaza economy was on the "verge of collapse". 40% of Gaza's population lived in poverty, even though around 80% received some sort of aid. It said the restrictions had to be eased to allow construction materials "to enter in sufficient quantities" and to allow exports. "The economy cannot survive without being connected to the outside world", The World Bank said the tightened restrictions meant the construction sector's output was reduced by 83%.[207]

Role in turning Gaza into an "open-air prison"

[edit]

Several rights groups have characterized the situation in Gaza as an "open-air prison",[208][6] including the United Nations,[209] Human Rights Watch,[29] and the Norwegian Refugee Council.[210] This characterization was often cited by a number of human rights activists, politicians, and media news outlets reporting on the Gaza-Israel conflict and the wider Palestinian–Israeli conflict.[211][212][213][214][215][216] Former British Prime Minister David Cameron,[217] US Senator Bernie Sanders,[218] former Israeli diplomat Gideon Levy,[219] and Israeli historian Ilan Pappe have endorsed this characterization as well.[220]

In 2022, Human Rights Watch issued a report on the situation in the Gaza Strip, which it called an "open-air prison" due to the blockade and held Israel responsible as the occupying power, and to a lesser degree Egypt, which has restricted movement of Palestinians through its border.[29] The report highlighted how this blockade has led to humanitarian crises, namely shortages of essential supplies, limited access to healthcare, and high levels of poverty and unemployment among the Palestinian population in Gaza.[29] It claimed that Israel has formed a formal policy of separation between Gaza and the West Bank, despite both forming parts of the Palestinian territories.[29] The Israeli blockade on Gaza has restricted the freedom of movement of Gaza Palestinians to both the West Bank and the outside world; in particular, Palestinian professionals were most impacted by these restrictions, as applying for travel permit takes several weeks.[29]

The Norwegian Refugee Council report issued in 2018 called the territory "the world's largest open-air prison", highlighting in it several figures, including lack of access to clean water, to reliable electrical supply, to health care, food and employment opportunities.[210] It lamented the fact that a majority of Palestinian children in Gaza suffer from psychological trauma, and a portion of which suffer from stunted growth.[210]

Economic effects

[edit]

Following the implementation of the blockade, Israel halted all exports from the Gaza Strip. Israeli human rights organization Gisha, the Legal Center for Freedom of Movement, obtained an Israeli government document which says "A country has the right to decide that it chooses not to engage in economic relations or to give economic assistance to the other party to the conflict, or that it wishes to operate using 'economic warfare'".[221] Sari Bashi, the director of Gisha, said that this showed that Israel was not imposing its blockade for its stated reasons of a security measure to prevent weapons from entering Gaza, but rather as collective punishment for the Palestinian population of Gaza.[221]

In November 2010, the Israeli government allowed Gaza to resume agricultural exports, while still banning industrial exports. Shortly afterward, Gazan farmers began exporting strawberries, peppers, carnations, and cherry tomatoes. The exports travel to Europe via Israel, and Israel then transfers the money to agricultural cooperatives, which in turn pay the Palestinian farmers. The exports were implemented with aid from the Netherlands, which was monitored by the Israeli defense establishment.[222]

It is estimated that in November, less than 20,000 liters of fuel per week entered Gaza via the tunnels, compared to nearly 1 million liters per day until June 2013. The Gaza Power Plant (GPP), which had been supplying 30 percent of the electricity available in Gaza, has been exclusively dependent on Egyptian diesel smuggled through the tunnels, since early 2011. On 1 November, after depleting its fuel reserves, the GPP was forced to shut down, triggering power outages of up to 16 hours per day, up from 8–12 hours prior to that.[223]

The World Bank estimated in 2015 that the GDP losses caused by the blockade since 2007 was above 50%, and entailed large welfare losses. Gaza's manufacturing sector, once significant, shrunk by as much as 60 percent in real terms, due to the wars in the past 20 years and the blockade. Gaza's exports virtually disappeared since the imposition of the 2007 blockade. It stated that "solutions have to be found to enable faster inflow of construction materials into Gaza", while taking into account "legitimate security concerns of neighboring countries."[206]

Movement of people

[edit]

Because of the widespread violence within Israel during the Second Intifada that began in September 2000, Israel closed all entry points between Israel and the Palestinian territories, including the Gaza Strip, and closed the Gaza International Airport. On 9 October 2001, all movement of people and goods between Israel and the Palestinian territories was halted, and a complete internal closure came into effect on 14 November 2001.[224]

Palestinian workers wait at the Erez Crossing to enter the Gaza Strip, July 2005.

The Intifada came to an end in February 2005, and Israel forces and settlers left the Gaza Strip by 1 September 2005 as part of Israel's unilateral disengagement plan. To improve the movement of people and economic activity in the Gaza Strip, Israel and the PA on 15 November 2005 signed an "Agreement on Movement and Access" (AMA). The AMA provided for the reopening of the Rafah crossing with Egypt, which was to be monitored by the PA and the European Union. Only people with Palestinian identity cards or foreign nationals, subject to Israeli oversight, were to be permitted to cross.[225][226] In mid-November 2005, Israel started allowing some workers and traders to enter Israel via the Erez crossing, if they had Israeli-issued permits; however, until 21 January 2006, the crossing was open on less than 50% of working days on average.[227][57]

Palestinians were invariably banned from traveling between Gaza and the West Bank. Following the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in September 2005, Israel "[established] a domestic legal framework apparently aimed at sealing off Gaza from Israel and from the West Bank"[228] Israel had previously agreed, as part of the Oslo Accords, to treat Gaza and the West Bank as a single territorial unit, a position upheld by the Israeli High Court.[228] However, following the 2005 disengagement, Israel adopted the position that Gaza residents have "no vested right" to cross into the West Bank; and that although there is "a certain connection" between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, it "does not give Gaza residents a right to enter [the West Bank]".[228] Those Gaza residents who did not try to cross the territory of Israel proper, but instead traveled around it, using the "long and expensive" route via Egypt and Jordan to travel from Gaza to the West Bank, were still turned back by Israeli border personnel at the Allenby Bridge when attempting to enter the West Bank from Jordan.[228] This policy was still in place as of 2014: Gaza residents, except in rare "humanitarian" cases, are not allowed to enter the West Bank – even if they do not travel via Israel proper but around it, trying to enter via the Allenby Bridge.[229]

AMA stipulated the opening hours of crossings between Gaza and Israel and the number of trucks/truckloads to pass through them.[230] It also stipulated that bus convoys, carrying Palestinians from Gaza to the West Bank and vice versa, would start on 15 December 2005; and truck convoys, carrying goods on the same route, would start on 15 January 2006.[53] This agreement was not upheld, as neither bus nor truck convoys started by their respective dates.[53] Israel first announced that according to its interpretation, Israel was only obliged to run a "test" or "pilot" bus route and only for Palestinians meeting certain Israeli-specified requirements, then delayed this pilot project "indefinitely".[228] The part of the agreement concerning opening hours and throughput of border crossings was not implemented either.[230][54]

The Palestinians claim that Israel did not honor AMA in relation to movement of people between Gaza and the West Bank. The bus convoys between Gaza and the West Bank (which were to start on 15 December 2005) never started.[53][228]

Gazans are invariably banned from entering the West Bank, and Israel adopted the position that they have no legal right to do so. This position has not changed since 2005.[228][229]

Land blockade

[edit]

The Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian parliament wished to open trade across the border with Gaza in 2012, a move said to be resisted by Egypt's Tantawi government.[231]

Goods blocked

[edit]

In the "Failing Gaza"[232] report, Amnesty International and other organizations wrote that cement, glass, steel, bitumen, wood, paint, doors, plastic pipes, metal pipes, metal reinforcement rods, aggregate, generators, high voltage cables and wooden telegraph poles were "high priority reconstruction materials currently with no or highly limited entry into Gaza through official crossings."[232] A 2009 UN report by Kevin M. Cahill called the restrictions "Draconian", and said that reconstruction efforts were being undermined by Israel's refusal to permit the importation of steel, cement or glass, among other building materials, and its policy of restricted importation of lentils, pasta, tomato paste and juice, as well as batteries for hearing aids for deaf children. He said that despite the restrictions, UNRWA had been able to provide a basic food supply to over a million refugees in the Gaza Strip. He added that he "visited a food station where hundreds of displaced persons waited to collect their meager staples of rice, sugar, lentils and cooking oil. While this program may save people from starvation, it is a diet that does not prevent the highest level of anemia in the region, with alarming rates of childhood stunting due to inadequate nutrition."[233]

The Palestinians who negotiated the 2008 cease-fire believed that commerce in Gaza was to be restored to the levels preceding Israel's 2005 withdrawal and Hamas's electoral victory.[234][235] Israeli policy tied the easing of the blockade to success in reducing rocket fire.[236] Israel permitted a 20% increase in goods trucked into Gaza in the pre-lull period, up from 70 to 90 truckloads a day,[234] including not only humanitarian supplies but also clothes, shoes, refrigerators, and construction materials.[237] Fuel supplies increased from 55 MW worth to 65 MW worth.[237] BBC News reported on 11 November that Gaza was then receiving only 28% of the amount of goods traded before the Hamas takeover.[237]

Over the one-month period from 4 November to 8 December, approximately 700 truck loads of goods went into Gaza, accounting for approximately 1/40th of estimated pre-blockade commerce.[235]

Israel stated that food imports into the Strip were limited by its inability to operate at border checkpoints.[237] It accused Hamas of exacerbating fuel shortages by leading labor union strikes by power plant workers.[237] It has also accused Hamas of underfunding the Gaza health care system, and then blaming the situation on Israel despite supposed free trade of medical supplies. Shipments of permitted medical supplies have expired due to the lengthy process required for passage through border crossings, requiring their destruction.[238] Israel states that travel restrictions on Gazans is necessary to protect national security, citing the cases of three Gazans who claimed to require medical attention in Israel but who were in fact planning attacks in Israel.[237]

Tunnels

[edit]
Smuggling tunnel in Rafah, 2009

The Gaza smuggling tunnels are mainly located at Rafah, on the border with Egypt. The tunnels connect the Egyptian town of Rafah with the Palestinian refugee camp of Rafah. As a result of the blockade, these tunnels became a vital supply artery for Gaza.[239][240] They are used for various purposes, such to transport people (in and out) and commercial materials like medicine, food and clothes, cigarettes, alcohol, and vehicle parts into Gaza.[241][242] They are also used to smuggle illegal arms (including rockets, mortars and explosives) to Gaza militants.[241][242] Often cars are sliced into four parts and transported across and re-assembled in Gaza.[240] Ahead of the Islamic festival, Eid al-Adha, they were used to transport live cattle.[240]

According to a tunnel operator, Israel bombards tunnels from the air, while Egypt either pumps poisonous gases and water or detonates explosives to destroy tunnels. During the Gaza War, Israel destroyed most of the tunnels, reducing their number to 150 (from 3,000) as of late 2009.[240] Egypt is constructing an underground steel barrier to prevent circumvention of the blockade through tunnels.

The UN estimates unemployment has risen from 32.5% in September, to around 40%. In addition to people directly employed by tunnels, the shortage of materials has stopped the majority of construction projects in Gaza and left many jobless.[243]

Following the removal of Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi from office, Egypt's military had destroyed most of the 1,200 tunnels used for smuggling food, weapons and other goods into Gaza.[244] After protest sit-ins in Egypt supporting Morsi were dispersed, the border crossing was closed 'indefinitely'.[245]

Buffer zone
[edit]

In October 2014, days after an attack in which 33 Egyptian soldiers were killed, Egypt announced it may create a buffer zone between Palestinian Rafah and Egyptian Rafah, where most tunnels were believed to be.[246][247] Initially, the width of the buffer zone was 500 meter but on 18 November 2014, Egypt said it would expand it to 1 km.[248] On 29 December 2014, the buffer zone was extended again to 5 km.[249]

Egyptian authorities began implementing phase two in the flattening of large swaths of Egyptian Rafah where over 2,000 families lived, and widened the buffer zone. According to Egyptian reports, the second phase involved destroying everything standing across an additional 500 meters from the border area, on top of the 500 meters already cleared several months earlier.[250]

Effects of land blockade on Gaza

[edit]

There have been several reports and studies analysing the effect of the blockade on Gaza.

In July 2008, an UNRWA report on the situation in Gaza stated that "the number of households in Gaza below the consumption poverty line continued to grow, reaching 51.8% in 2007 (from 50.7% in 2006)".[251] In the same year, a Palestinian Bureau of Statistics study concluded that 80% of families in Gaza were living below the poverty line.[252] A World Health Organization assessment conducted in 2009 claimed that the level of anemia in babies (9–12 months) was as high as 65%, while a Socio-economic and Food Security Survey Report stated that 61% of Gazans are food insecure and reliant on humanitarian aid. Of those that are food insecure, 65% are children under 18 years. Lastly, a European Network of Implementing Development Agencies (EUNIDA) report notes that, because of the security buffer zone imposed around Gaza as part of the blockade, as of June 2009, 46% of agricultural land was either inaccessible or out of production.[253]

On 14 June 2010, the International Committee of the Red Cross noted that the increasing scarcity of items has led to rises in cost of goods while quality has fallen.[254] There is also "an acute electricity crisis", where electricity supplies are "interrupted for seven hours a day on average". As a consequence, they note that public services, particularly health services, have suffered, posing "a serious risk to the treatment of patients". In addition, medical equipment is difficult to repair, and medical staff cannot leave to gain more training. Lastly, the ICRC note that sanitation is suffering, because construction projects lack the equipment needed, or the equipment is of poor quality. Only 60% of the population is connected to a sewerage collection system, with the rest polluting the Gaza aquifer. As a result, water is largely "unfit for consumption".[30]

A 25 May 2010 United Nations Development Programme report stated that, as a result of the blockade, most of Gaza's manufacturing industry has closed, and unemployment stood at an estimated 40%, a decrease on previous years. The blockade has also prevented much needed construction, noting that almost "none of the 3,425 homes destroyed during Cast Lead have been reconstructed, displacing around 20,000 people". Less than 20% "of the value of the damages to educational facilities has been repaired", only "half of the damage to the power network has been repaired", "no repair has been made to the transport infrastructure", "a quarter of damaged farmland has been rehabilitated and only 40% of private businesses have been repaired".[255]

An August 2012 report by UNRWA of the blockade's effects and general trends in Gaza forecasted that the region's population growth would outpace developments in economic infrastructure. In its press release, UN humanitarian coordinator Maxwell Gaylard said, "Gaza will have half a million more people by 2020 while its economy will grow only slowly. In consequence, the people of Gaza will have an even harder time getting enough drinking water and electricity, or sending their children to school."[256]

A UN OCHA 2015 report stated that "longstanding access restrictions imposed by Israel have undermined Gaza's economy, resulting in high levels of unemployment, food insecurity and aid dependency," and that "Israeli restrictions on the import of basic construction materials and equipment have significantly deteriorated the quality of basic services, and impede the reconstruction and repair of homes."[257]

[edit]

The Israeli Navy enforces a maritime blockade of the Port of Gaza and the coastline.[258][259]

Under the Oslo II Accord, activities of the Palestinian Naval Police are restricted to 6 nautical miles (11 km) from the coast.[260] Under the 1994 Gaza–Jericho Agreement, which was not implemented, Palestinian fishing was to be permitted up to 20 nautical miles (37 km) offshore.[261] In 2007, Israel restricted fishermen travel to 6 nautical miles (11 km) offshore. Israeli officials said the restrictions were necessary because of past incidents of Palestinians using fishing boats for smuggling and attacks. Israeli patrol boats regularly patrol Gaza's coastline and fire on Palestinian fishing vessels that go beyond the permitted distance from shore.[261] In July 2018, Israel further restricted the Gaza fishing space to 3 nautical miles (5.6 km).[262]

Israel has intercepted a number of vessels attempting to bring supplies into Gaza, claiming that they may be providing goods that may be used to build arms. A humanitarian mission organised by the Free Gaza Movement, with Cynthia McKinney and Mairead Maguire on board, was intercepted by Israel attempting to sail to Gaza. They were deported but the supplies were later delivered to Gaza over land by truck.

On 29 April 2014, Gaza's Ark, a vessel being converted in Gaza from a fishing boat to carry cargo to Europe, was sunk by an explosion following a telephone warning to the guard, who was uninjured.[263][264] The organisers of the project suspect that Israel forces are responsible.[265]

Between 2000 and 2018, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights has documented 1,283 incidents involving Palestinian fishermen, including 1,192 shooting incidents that led to the death of 8 fishermen and to the injury of 134 fishermen. During these incidents, 656 fishermen were detained, and 209 boats were confiscated.[266][unreliable source?]

Effect on the fishing industry

[edit]
Al Jazeera report on the effects on the fishing industry

The sea blockade has caused damage to Gaza fishing industry.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has estimated that Gaza fishermen need to journey at least 12–15 nautical miles from shore to catch larger shoals, and sardines in particular are 6 nmi (11 km) offshore. Shoals closer to shore have been depleted. The total catch pre-blockade in 1999 was nearly 4,000 tons, this was reduced to 2,700 tons in 2008. In the 90s, the Gaza fishing industry was worth $10 million annually or 4% of the total Palestinian economy; this was halved between 2001 and 2006. 45,000 Palestinians were employed in the fishing industry, employed in jobs such as catching fish, repairing nets and selling fish. Fish also provided much-needed animal protein to Gazans' diet.[267]

The International Committee of the Red Cross also notes that "90% of Gaza's 4000 fishermen are now considered either poor (with a monthly income of between US$100 and US$190) or very poor (earning less than US$100 a month), up from 50% in 2008." Nezar Ayyash, head of Gaza's fishermen's union, is quoted as saying that he has been arrested and his boat confiscated several times.[30] According to the Palestinian Fishermen's Syndicate, there are 3,800 registered fishermen in the Gaza Strip. Only 2,000 of them are currently working as a result of restrictions, constant attacks and growing cost of fishing equipment.

Energy restrictions

[edit]

Almost all of Gaza's liquid fuel and about half of its electricity are supplied by Israel, while Gaza's sole power plant runs on crude diesel imported via Israel. In normal times, Israel exempts from the blockade fuel for the power plant as well as for essential services such as hospitals, and does not cut electricity supplies. However, during times of conflict, Israel has disrupted supplies. In late October 2007, in response to persistent rocket fire on southern Israel, Israel cut diesel exports to Gaza by 15% and gasoline exports by 10%, and created targeted electrical outages for 15 minutes after a rocket attack. According to Israeli officials, the energy flow to hospitals and Israeli shipments of crude diesel to Gaza's sole power plant was unaffected. The Israeli government argued that these limited energy cuts were a non-violent way to protest against Hamas rocket attacks.[268]

The following day, Attorney General of Israel Menachem Mazuz suspended the electricity cuts, and the Israeli Supreme Court gave the government three days to justify its energy cuts policy.[269]

On 1 December 2007, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the electricity cuts were unlawful, and ordered the Israeli military to stop them by the following day. In its ruling, however, the court allowed Israel to continue reducing its diesel and gasoline shipments to Gaza.[270]

Control of Gazan air space

[edit]

The Oslo Accords interim peace agreements expressly give Israel security control over Gazan airspace and coastal waters.[271] Gazan air space is controlled by radar.[261] There are regular overflights by Israeli fighter jets and a surveillance balloon is tethered near the Erez crossing. Unmanned aerial vehicles patrol the sky for surveillance,[261] also engaging in missile strikes targeting people and infrastructure; these drones produce a nearly constant buzzing noise audible from the ground and are therefore referred to by Palestinians in Gaza as zanana.[272]

Limitation of basic goods

[edit]

Israel allows limited humanitarian supplies from aid organizations into the Gaza Strip, but not dual-use items, which can also be used for military purposes. According to the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories of the Israel Defense Forces, in May 2010, this included over 1.5 million litres of diesel fuel and gasoline, fruits and vegetables, wheat, sugar, meat, chicken and fish products, dairy products, animal feed, hygiene products, clothing and shoes.[273]

According to Gisha, items that have at various times been denied importation into Gaza in 2010 include ordinary consumer goods such as jam, candles, books, musical instruments, shampoo, A4 paper, and livestock such as chicken, donkeys, and cows.[274][275] The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (COGAT) also lists wheelchairs, dry food items, crayons, stationery, and soccer balls as shipments that Israeli authorities have prevented from entering Gaza.[276][277][278] International aid group Mercy Corps said it was blocked from sending 90 tons of macaroni and other foodstuffs. After international pressure, Israeli authorities said that they were giving the shipment a green light.[99] Israel was also reported to have prevented aid groups from sending in other items, such as paper, art supplies, tomato paste and lentils.[279] Because of an Israeli ban on the importation of construction materials such as cement and steel, which could be used to build bunkers for military use by Hamas, the UN Relief and Works Agency started to build mud brick homes.[280]

Aid agencies say that while food and other essential supplies pile up in warehouses and await trucks at crossing points, Israel's COGAT, which controls access to Gaza, routinely rejects or delays shipments, often without explanation. Humanitarian workers and officials describe the approval process as arbitrary and sometimes contradictory. Even minor issues, such as a single item deemed problematic, can result in the entire truck being turned back, forcing it to restart a lengthy clearance process that may take weeks. Items have been rejected as "luxuries", including chocolate croissants, or flagged as potential dual-use goods: a truckload of green sleeping bags was turned away because COGAT associated the color with the military.[281][282]

Limitation system

[edit]

In September 2007, the Israeli cabinet voted to tighten the restrictions on the Gaza strip. The cabinet decision stated, "the movement of goods into the Gaza Strip will be restricted; the supply of gas and electricity will be reduced; and restrictions will be imposed on the movement of people from the Strip and to it."[283]

In January 2010, the Israeli group Gisha took Israeli authorities to court, forcing them to reveal which goods were permitted and which goods were not. The Israeli government replied that canned fruit, fruit juices and chocolate are blocked, while at the same time canned meat, canned tuna, mineral water, sesame paste, tea and coffee are allowed into the Gaza Strip.[284] Banned items also included coriander, shampoo and shoes.[283][285]

In October 2010, papers were released which revealed a system to maintain the minimum level of basic goods entering the Strip. It contained upper and lower warning lines, identifying surpluses and shortages of listed products in Gaza.[286]

In October 2012, an Israeli court forced Israel's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) to release a document that detailed "red lines" for "food consumption in the Gaza strip" during the 2007 blockade. According to the COGAT, the document was a rough draft, and never actually implemented. He want on further to say that there was never even any discussion after the document had been drafted. The document calculates the minimum number of calories necessary to keep Gazans from malnutrition and avoid a humanitarian crisis. This number was converted to a number of daily truckloads, the number being decreased to account for food produced in Gaza, and further on the basis of "culture and experience" of the Gazans. This reduction, if implemented, would have resulted in an increase in sugar and a decrease in fruits, vegetables, milk, and meat.[283] Gisha, an Israeli human-rights group, said that in fact the number of truckloads allowed into Gaza was less than stipulated in the calculation. The UN said that if the policy was intended to cap food imports, it would go against humanitarian principles. The body responsible for the calculation said its intent was to ensure no shortages occur, not to cap food imports. Israeli officials now acknowledge the restrictions were partly meant to pressure Hamas by making the lives of Gazans difficult.[287]

Israel limits the amount of load the trucks may carry, ostensibly for security reasons. In the past, the total height of goods stacked on trucks was not allowed to exceed 1.2 meters. The Israeli authorities did, however, not explain why they did not use to its full potential the scanner, donated by the Dutch government and calibrated according to the military's specifications, which can scan at a height of 2 meters. In February 2016, the allowed height was increased to 1.5 meters.[288]

Legality of the blockade

[edit]

While the blockade's legality has not been adjudicated in court, several non-judicial entities have expressed opinions. International law regards a blockade as an act of war.[289] Laws of war define a blockade as encirclement of an area and prevention of access to it with the aim to make the enemy surrender through deprivation and isolation. It is a legitimate means of warfare. Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted on 28 September 2001 after the September 11 attacks on the United States, obliges all member states to prohibit making resources available to militant organizations. The Fourth Geneva Convention allows humanitarian assistance to be denied if there is a serious concern that it will be delivered to those who are not innocent civilians and create an advantage for the enemy.[290]

Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC),[291] and other human rights organizations have criticized the blockade. In 2011, a panel of UN experts concluded that the naval blockade of Gaza constituted collective punishment and in doing so violated international law, contradicting a previous UN investigation that declared it was legal.[292]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) termed Israel's blockade of Gaza "collective punishment" in violation of international humanitarian law. In 2010 it also called the blockade a violation of the Geneva Conventions and called for its lifting.[293]

The 2010 UNHRC Report on the Flotilla Incident also noted that the naval blockade and other travel restrictions imposed on the Gaza Strip had tripled "abject poverty" among refugees in the territory, making 61 per cent of households food insecure causing "disproportionate damage to the civilian population".[294]

These views are supported by further legal analyses. A multi-referenced University of California, Hastings College of the Law analysis in 2009 recorded:

Under customary international law, a blockade is an act of war. It is employed to cut off communications and supplies of an enemy. While the modern concept extends beyond its original and exclusive maritime roots to include both land and technological blockades, the consistent feature is that a blockade's purpose has been to deprive a military adversary of necessary supplies. A belligerent imposing a blockade upon a region consisting of a civilian population must allow the free passage of relief consignments to the civilian population. In fact, the legality of a blockade under customary international law hinges on the requirement that aid for the civilian population be met with free passage.

The reasons cited for Israel's refusal to allow passage of basic necessities are untenable. Israel claimed that its restrictions were necessary to put pressure on Hamas officials to halt or substantially hinder the firing of rockets into Southern Israel. However, there is no reasonable relationship between depriving Gazan civilians of subsistence items and the suppression of Hamas' rocket launchings against Israeli towns. Israel's duties to "protected persons" as an occupier of the Gaza Strip under Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention require that it allow the passage of all aid, foodstuffs, and water given the severity of the humanitarian crisis. The blockade appears to have clearly violated this provision of the law of occupation.

Israel's blockade, which by the launching of Operation Cast Lead had persisted for eighteen months, violated international law in another respect. Under Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism . . . against protected persons and their property are prohibited." This article prohibits the use of collective punishment of protected persons, the breach of which constitutes war crimes. "Protected persons" [include] civilian individuals who find themselves, in case of an armed conflict or occupation, in the hands of a power of which they are not nationals[, not citizens of a neutral country in the territory of a belligerent nation, and not nationals of a co-belligerent state.][295]

George Bisharat highlighted that Israel instituted the blockade against the Gaza Strip not in response to a violent attack, but rather in response to Hamas's ascension to exclusive authority in the Gaza Strip, and earlier in response to the Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections. According to Bisharat, Israel engaged in an act of war and violated its legal obligations long before launching Operation Cast Lead in 2008.[289]

A 2011 policy paper by Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research stated that the "arguments that conditions required for declaring a blockade are actually met in the case of Israeli blockade of Gaza" were both inadequate and a misinterpretation of international law. In addition, Israel's overarching argument directed at Gazans that "you have elected Hamas, now endure its consequences" amounted to collective punishment and was illegal.[296]

Law professor Noura Erakat wrote in 2012 that Israel's blockade was "illegal pursuant to international humanitarian law because it contravenes its obligations towards a civilian population living under its occupation" and said this had been covered at length by various commentators and human rights organizations.[297]

The Global International Humanitarian Law Centre of Diakonia published in 2014 that:

... as outlined by the Hague Regulations (1899/1907), a territory is considered occupied when it is placed under the effective control of a hostile army. The Gaza Strip remains under belligerent occupation as Israel continues to retain effective control over significant aspects of civil life in the Gaza Strip on a daily basis as well as directly exercising certain elements of governing control over the territory and the people of the Gaza Strip. For as long as Israel maintains effective control over the Gaza Strip, it must fully comply with its obligations under IHL and IHRL, as the occupying power. This includes providing for the welfare of the occupied Palestinian population therein.[298]

Filippo Grandi, Commissioner General of the UNRWA, said in 2014 that "Israel's blockade is illegal and [it] must be lifted ... the siege on the Gaza Strip which has been imposed on the Gaza Strip for more than half a decade is considered the longest in history; longer than that of Sarajevo, Berlin and Leningrad", adding that "the world should not forget about the security of the people of Gaza ... Their security is worth the same as everybody else's security so we appeal to the humanitarian sense of all."[299]

UNRWA also referred to the blockade as illegal as it entered its tenth year in June 2016, saying that it was one of "the principle causes of the socio-economic and psychosocial crisis in Gaza".[300] Amnesty International called in 2017 for the lifting of the "illegal blockade", warning of a "looming humanitarian catastrophe".[301]

Reactions

[edit]

Palestinian

[edit]

Fatah

[edit]

Linked with the conflict following his party's loss in the 2006 election, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas approved the Egyptian border restrictions by the new regime, purportedly aimed at protecting Egypt from danger. In 2014 and subsequent years, Abbas supported Egypt's crackdown on smuggling tunnels and welcomed the flooding of the tunnels by Egypt in coordination with the PA.[302][303][304]

In 2010, Abbas declared that he opposed lifting the Israeli naval blockade of the Gaza Strip because this would bolster Hamas. Egypt also supported this position.[305]

In 2016, Abbas objected to the entrance of Qatari fuel to the Gaza electricity plant via Israel, because his PA would be unable to collect taxes on the fuel.[306]

In 2016 most Palestinian parties welcomed Turkish initiatives to end the strict Israeli siege on the Gaza Strip by building a seaport for the movement of people and goods. This step was condemned by Fatah and the PA, a senior Fatah leader saying that his movement would not allow this to happen, while the Fatah Executive Committee said this was an Israeli trick to separate Gaza from the West Bank. In turn a Hamas official condemned the PA's position; "This position proves that the PA is part of the Israeli-led siege which has been imposed on Gaza for ten years".[307]

In 2017, the PA government imposed its own sanctions against Gaza, including, among other things, cutting off salaries to thousands of PA employees, as well as financial assistance to hundreds of families in the Gaza Strip. The PA initially said it would stop paying for the electricity and fuel that Israel supplies to the Gaza Strip, but after a year partially backtracked.[308]

Israel

[edit]

Israel Since 2005, Israel asserts that it ended its occupation of Gaza when it disengaged from the coastal strip in 2005.[309] After Israel's unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza strip, Israel no longer has troops stationed within Gaza. Israel has retained control over Gaza's airspace and coastline, and over its own border with the territory. Egypt has control of its border with Gaza. Israel and Egypt also control the flow of goods in and out. Israel controls fuel imports to Gaza, and also controls the majority of electricity used in Gaza (approximately 60%), which it supplies from the Israeli electrical grid.[75][310] There have been a series of attacks by Israeli ground forces such as the 2008–2009 Israel–Gaza conflict, as well as rocket attacks on Israel and cross-border attacks by Gazan militant groups against Israeli troops.

In September 2007, citing an intensification of Qassam rocket attacks, Israel restricted the transfer of electricity, fuel, and other supplies into Gaza. Israel stated that the purpose of the blockade was to pressure Hamas into ending the rocket attacks and to deprive them of the supplies necessary for the continuation of rocket attacks.[311][312][313] Israel argues that it is not legally responsible for Gaza beyond whatever is necessary to avoid a humanitarian crisis.[75]

According to a US Congressional Research Service report:

While there are differing views in Israel concerning the Gaza blockade ... most Israelis equate security with survival and peace. Israel's leaders appear to believe that the blockade of the Gaza Strip [among other security and deterrence measures], have brought about a quiet. ... As of the date of the Gaza flotilla incident, no Israeli had been killed in a terrorist or in a cross-border rocket attack in more than a year. Therefore, the Israeli government is reluctant to abandon the blockade tactic ... from its perspective.[314]

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu maintained that the blockade is necessary to prevent weapons from reaching Gaza, saying, "it's our obligation—as well as our right in accordance to international law and to common sense—to prevent these weapons from entering by air, sea, and land." Of the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, he said: "Had the blockade been breached, this flotilla would have been followed by dozens, by hundreds of ships. The amount of weapons that can be transported aboard a ship is totally different from what we saw get through the tunnels." He argued that the consequences of Israel's failure to maintain the blockade would be "an Iranian port in Gaza, only a few dozen kilometers from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem."[314]

According to an Israeli government document:

A country has the right to decide that it chooses not to engage in economic relations or to give economic assistance to the other party to the conflict, or that it wishes to operate using 'economic warfare'.[221]

An Israeli government spokesman added in 2010 that the blockade is intended to bring about a political goal and that Israel "could not lift the embargo altogether as long as Hamas remains in control" of Gaza.[221]

Speaking in 2006, Dov Weisglass, an advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, allegedly said that, "The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger."[315] Although this quote is widely reported, the original quote appears to have been: "It's like an appointment with a dietician. The Palestinians will get a lot thinner, but won't die."[316] Weisglass has denied this report.[317]

According to US diplomatic cables obtained by the WikiLeaks organization, diplomats stationed in the US embassy in Tel Aviv were briefed by Israelis on the blockade of the Gaza Strip. One of the cables states that "as part of their overall embargo plan against Gaza, Israeli officials have confirmed (...) on multiple occasions that they intend to keep the Gazan economy on the brink of collapse without quite pushing it over the edge".[318]

Egypt

[edit]

Egypt Egypt's argument is that it cannot open Rafah crossing unless the Palestinian Authority headed by Mahmoud Abbas controls the crossing and international monitors are present. Egypt Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit said Hamas wants the border opened because it would represent Egyptian recognition of the group's control of Gaza. "Of course this is something we cannot do," he said, "because it would undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and consecrate the split between Gaza and the West Bank."[319]

According to Sharif Elmusa, Associate Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo, Israel wants Gaza to fade into Egypt. Egyptian authorities are determined to avoid opening the Rafah crossing without ending the Israeli siege, which would ultimately serve Israel's goal of displacing the Gaza problem onto Egypt. Secondly it is Cairo's concern that under Hamas rule violence can spill into Sinai and threaten tourism, leaving Egypt vulnerable to US and Israeli accusations of ineffectively fighting terrorism.[320]

Following the events of the Gaza flotilla raid in May 2010, after Egypt opened its borders with Gaza, it was reported that former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was caught between the need to appease growing public anger at Israel's actions and the necessity of maintaining his close relationship with Israel. This friendship was needed to secure more than $2bn of American aid annually, money on which many analysts believe Mubarak's former regime depended.[127]

While Israel contends that the blockade is necessary to prevent smuggling of weapons into Gaza, Egypt argues that it is needed to prevent smuggling of them from Gaza into the Sinai.[321]

In the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, Israel claimed that over 30 underground attack tunnels were discovered under the Gaza-Israel border which are used by militants in order to infiltrate Israel. It also claimed that over 600,000 tons of cement required to construct the tunnels was originally designated for humanitarian aid and diverted.[322]

United States

[edit]

United States Although the United States officially supports the blockade,[323] in February 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton urged Israeli Minister of Defence Ehud Barak to ease the blockade. The US has long pressed Israel to ease restrictions on Gaza.[324] Of the Gaza flotilla raid on 31 May 2010, Clinton said, "The situation in Gaza is unsustainable and unacceptable."[325] Of the impending second Gaza flotilla, she said, "the Gaza flotilla is not necessary or useful."[326] In June 2010, Clinton said the humanitarian needs in the Hamas-controlled area must be met along with legitimate Israeli security concerns.[327]

The United Nations

[edit]

United Nations On 24 January 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council released a statement calling for Israel to lift its siege on the Gaza Strip, allow the continued supply of food, fuel, and medicine, and reopen border crossings.[328] According to The Jerusalem Post, this was the 15th time in less than two years the council condemned Israel for its human rights record regarding the Palestinian territories.[329] The proceedings were boycotted by Israel and the United States. Prior to this, U.N. Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, described the blockade as "collective punishment", saying, "We all understand the security problems and the need to respond to that but collective punishment of the people of Gaza is not, we believe, the appropriate way to do that."[330]

On 15 December 2008, following a statement in which he described the embargo on Gaza as a crime against humanity, United Nations Special Rapporteur Richard A. Falk was prevented from entering the Palestinian territories by Israeli authorities and expelled from the region.[331] The Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Itzhak Levanon[332] said that the mandate of the Special Rapporteur was "hopelessly unbalanced", and "redundant at best and malicious at worst".[333]

In August 2009, U.N. human rights chief Navi Pillay criticised Israel for the blockade in a 34-page report, calling it a violation of the rules of war.[334]

In March 2010, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that the blockade of Gaza is causing "unacceptable suffering" and that families were living in "unacceptable, unsustainable conditions".[335]

A UN Fact Finding mission in September 2009 led by South African Judge Richard Goldstone (the Goldstone report) concluded that the blockade was possibly a crime against humanity, and recommended that the matter be referred to the International Criminal Court if the situation has not improved in six months.

In May 2010, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that the formal economy in Gaza has collapsed since the imposition of the blockade.[336] They also stated that the "restrictions imposed on the civilian population by the continuing blockade of the Gaza Strip amount to collective punishment, a violation of international humanitarian law."[253]

In June 2010, United Nations envoy to the Middle East and former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair said:

The policy of Gaza is counter-productive and what [Israel] should be doing is allow material in to rebuild homes and sanitation and power and water systems and allow business to flourish. Nor do we in fact do damage to the position of Hamas by harming people in Gaza. People are harmed when the quality of service is poor and people cannot work.[337]

He also called for Hamas to stop the "terrorism coming out of Gaza".[337] In the same month, Robert Serry, the UN special envoy for Middle East peace process, said:

The flotilla crisis is the latest symptom of a failed policy. The situation in Gaza is unsustainable and the current policy is unacceptable and counter-productive, and requires a different, more positive strategy. The closure and blockade of the Gaza Strip needs to come to an end. There is now a welcome international consensus on Gaza.[338]

In the September 2011 Palmer Report, the UN investigative committee for the 2010 Flotilla to Gaza said that Israel's naval blockade of Gaza was legal under international law, but criticised the nature of the Israeli raid.[339][340] Later that same month, five independent U.N. rights experts reporting to the U.N. Human Rights Council rejected that conclusion, saying the blockade had subjected Palestinians in Gaza to collective punishment in "flagrant contravention of international human rights and humanitarian law."[292]

European Union

[edit]

European Union In May 2011, EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid Kristalina Georgieva said the European Union and the United Nations were "calling for the immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons.", after she and UN Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Valerie Amos had a meeting in Tel Aviv with Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak.[341] She then said in an interview with Israel's Ynet that she believes that the "humanitarian crisis...was artificially created because of the blockade," but added that the idea of a flotilla is not the correct action to take: "We are not in favor of attempts to help people in this way."[342]

Turkey

[edit]

Turkey Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made harsh comments against the blockade, especially following the Gaza flotilla raid. Erdoğan raised the possibility of trying to forcibly breach the blockade by sending the Turkish Navy to escort any future flotilla or by trying to visit Gaza himself. The Turkish government made it clear that it opposes the blockade and regards it as illegal, and before the flotilla raid, issued a demand for safe passage. However, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said that Turkey was willing to normalize relations with Israel if it lifted the blockade.[343] Following Israel's easing of the blockade, the Turkish Foreign Ministry called it "a positive but insufficient step", and said that "Turkey considers that Israel's inhuman blockade of Gaza represents a threat to regional peace and stability and considers that the blockade must be entirely lifted.[344]

Ireland

[edit]

Ireland After visiting Gaza in March 2010, Irish foreign minister Micheál Martin described the Israeli blockade of Palestinian-ruled Gaza as "inhumane and unacceptable" and called on the European Union and other countries to increase pressure on Israel to lift the blockade. Martin was the first EU foreign minister to enter Gaza in over a year. He said that all that is being achieved through the blockade is to "enrich Hamas and marginalize even further the voices of moderation."[345]

United Kingdom

[edit]

United Kingdom David Cameron, the UK Prime Minister, during Prime Minister's Questions, stated that "Friends of Israel – and I count myself a friend of Israel – should be saying to the Israelis that the blockade actually strengthens Hamas's grip on the economy and on Gaza, and it's in their own interests to lift it and allow these vital supplies to get through. ... We should do everything we can through the UN, where resolution 1860 is absolutely clear about the need to end the blockade and to open up Gaza."[346] In July 2010, Cameron called on Israel to relax the blockade. He said "Humanitarian goods and people must flow in both directions. Gaza cannot and must not be allowed to remain a prison camp."[347][348] In response, Ephraim Sneh, former Israeli minister, said: "Cameron is right – Gaza is a prison camp, but those who control the prison are Hamas. I'm totally against the double standards of a nation which fights the Taliban but is showing its solidarity with their brothers, Hamas.[347]

Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom speaking after the Gaza flotilla raid, criticized the blockade saying "So the events of the last 24/48 hours confirm in my mind, as they do if you hear what William Hague and David Cameron have done and everyone in Government, the view that the blockade on Gaza is neither sustainable nor tenable in its present form."[349] He also commented that "If we needed any confirmation about the unjustified and untenable blockade of Gaza, we have been reminded overnight of the need to lift this blockade. What is going on in Gaza is a humanitarian catastrophe. While of course Israel has every right to defend itself and its citizens from attack, we must now move towards lifting the blockade from Gaza as soon as possible."[350]

William Hague, the Foreign Secretary, said in a prepared speech to the House of Commons that the blockade of Gaza was "unacceptable and unsustainable", and that it was "the view of the British government, including the previous government, that restrictions on Gaza should be lifted – a view confirmed in United Nations security council resolution 1860 which called for sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and which called on states to alleviate the humanitarian and economic situation", and that "current Israeli restrictions are counterproductive for Israel's long term security".[351]

Acting Labour Leader Harriet Harman also stated that "This blockade must end."[346]

Humanitarian organizations

[edit]

Human Rights Watch argues that Israel is still an occupying power and is responsible for Gaza under the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, which seeks to protect the civilian population.[75][29]

Amnesty International said that "The blockade constitutes collective punishment under international law and must be lifted immediately," and that as the occupying power, Israel has a duty under international law to ensure the welfare of Gaza's inhabitants, including their rights to health, education, food and adequate housing.[352]

On 7 March 2008, several international aid groups, including Amnesty International, CARE International UK, and Oxfam, issued a report saying that the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip was more acute than at any time since the beginning of the Israeli occupation in 1967. While critical of Palestinian militants firing rockets from Gaza into Israel, and acknowledging that "Israel has the right and obligation to protect its citizens", they said that as the "occupying power in Gaza" it also has a legal duty to ensure Gaza civilians have access to food, clean water, electricity and medical care. They urged Israel to lift the blockade, characterizing it as collective punishment against the 1.5 million residents of the territory.[353]

According to the ICRC, "The hardship faced by Gaza's 1.5 million people cannot be addressed by providing humanitarian aid. The only sustainable solution is to lift the closure."[30] The ICRC has also referred to the blockade as "a collective punishment imposed in clear violation of Israel's obligations under international humanitarian law".[30]

In May 2015, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor issued a report discussing the situation in Gaza nine months after the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict. The report touched on the continuity of Gaza blockade was on the cost of relief, recovery and reconstruction due to last summer's war which reached $4 billion, as international donors pledged $3.5 billion for Gaza's reconstruction, only $954 million had been disbursed as of early April. The report also shed light on the UNRWA financial crises that threatened the stability of its operation in Gaza which probably further affect the humanitarian situation in Gaza Strip. The report accused the Egyptian authorities in joining Israel in imposing a siege on Gaza. According to the report, Egypt had closed Rafah crossing 66% of the time in 2014, 100 days from the beginning of 2015 to May of the same year. As the world's attention has shifted away to other pressing issues, the report warned that, if the international community does not re-shoulder its responsibilities, Gaza will blow up into another war. The Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor urgently calls on the international community to take a practical steps to end the blockade on Gaza. The monitor also called the Egyptian government to open Rafah crossing, without any restrictions. Finally the monitor called for Support the Palestinian call for a commercial seaport in Gaza that guarantees the free import and export of goods and private international travel.[354]

Non-governmental organizations

[edit]

Justus Weiner and Avi Bell of the pro-Israeli lobby group JCPA said that Israel's combat actions and blockade cannot be considered collective punishment. They cite Article 75(4)(b) of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, which says the bar on collective punishment forbids the imposition of criminal-type penalties on individuals or groups on the basis of another's guilt, or the commission of acts that would otherwise violate the rules of distinction and/or proportionality.[355] According to Weiner and Bell, the blockade does not "involve the imposition of criminal-type penalties or the violation of the rules of distinction and proportionality."[356]

The Islamic Action Front (IAF), a Jordanian Islamist group, criticized Egypt for the blockade and accused it of "collaborating" with Israel and the United States. "The Egyptian authorities are ...increasing the suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza by building the steel wall and closing the border crossings with Gaza," said Hamzah Mansour, a member of the Shura Council of the IAF.[357]

Gideon Rose of the Council on Foreign Relations has written that the blockade serves a secondary aim, which is to undermine Hamas by making life unpleasant for Gaza's residents.[358]

Individuals

[edit]
  • Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter – In June 2009, Carter met with Hamas leaders in Gaza for three hours. Before his meeting with former Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and other Hamas officials, Carter spoke forcefully against the economic blockade of Gaza. He told a crowd at an awards ceremony for UN refugee school pupils:[359]

    The responsibility for this terrible human rights crime lies in Jerusalem, Cairo, Washington, and throughout the international community. This abuse must cease; the crimes must be investigated; the walls must be brought down, and the basic right of freedom must come to you.

  • Pope Benedict XVI – During a May 2009 visit to Bethlehem, Benedict mentioned Gazans, saying: "Please be assured of my solidarity with you in the immense work of rebuilding which now lies ahead and my prayers that the embargo will soon be lifted."[100]
  • In August 2014, at the height of the 2014 Israel–Gaza conflict, Carter and former president of Ireland Mary Robinson called for a UN-mandated lifting of the blockade.[360]

International relief

[edit]

Following the 2014 Gaza War, a donors conference was held in Egypt where different countries committed to donate total sum of US$5.4 billion.[361] In September 2014, Turkey proposed sending a powership to Gaza to ease the shortage of electricity,[362] but in December 2014 Israel rejected the proposal stating that the infrastructure in Gaza was not compatible with the ship.[363]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Blockade of the Gaza Strip encompasses 's land, sea, and air restrictions on imports and exports, alongside Egypt's controls over the , imposed in response to escalating security threats from Gaza—including the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas militants on 25 June 2006 via a cross-border tunnel incursion that killed two soldiers, and approximately 2,700 rocket and mortar attacks launched by Palestinian armed groups between September 2005 and May 2007, killing 4 Israeli civilians, injuring 75 civilians, and at least 9 soldiers—and intensified following Hamas's violent seizure of the territory from forces in June 2007. The blockade's stated aims include preventing the smuggling of weapons into Gaza and limiting materials that could be used for military purposes by Hamas. These measures limit the entry of dual-use materials that could be diverted for military purposes, such as rocket components or tunnel construction materials, in response to Hamas's designation as a terrorist organization by , the , and the , and its history of launching thousands of rockets at Israeli areas. Israel maintains that the blockade is a lawful naval blockade, a position supported by the UN Palmer Report of September 2011, which concluded that Israel's naval blockade of Gaza was lawful under international law, under applicable to non-international armed conflicts, justified by the ongoing threat from 's , including smuggling via sea and underground tunnels. Although the blockade's legality has not been definitively adjudicated in an international court, human rights organizations argue that it constitutes illegal collective punishment by restricting essential goods, contributing to economic hardship, and limiting freedom of movement for Gaza's population. Egypt's restrictions at stem from its own security imperatives, including preventing the spillover of Islamist militancy into the and avoiding destabilization from mass refugee flows or affiliates tied to the . Prior to the escalation of hostilities in October 2023, an average of approximately 300 to 500 trucks carrying humanitarian and commercial goods entered Gaza daily through Israeli-coordinated crossings like and , coordinated by Israel's COGAT unit, though subject to security inspections to block prohibited items. The blockade has persisted for over 17 years, correlating with Gaza's from about 1.5 million in 2007 to over 2.3 million by 2023—a more than 50% increase—amid high reliance on international aid, elevated exceeding 40%, and restricted economic activity, though no widespread occurred pre-2023 due to sustained aid inflows. Critics, including agencies, have labeled it violating humanitarian law, while counters that Hamas's governance diverts resources to military ends, such as the extensive tunnel network and rocket production, rather than civilian welfare, and that easing restrictions previously enabled intensified attacks, as evidenced by events like the 2010 flotilla raid and subsequent escalations. Key incidents, including attempts to breach the naval blockade and operations, underscore the security dynamics driving the policy's continuation.

Background

Pre-2007 Context and Hamas's Rise

The , a narrow coastal enclave of approximately 365 square kilometers, was administered by from 1948 until the 1967 , after which captured and occupied it along with the and . During nearly four decades of Israeli military administration, Israel established 21 settlements housing around 8,000 Jewish settlers by 2005, while the Palestinian population grew to over 1.3 million, facing restrictions on movement, economic activity, and development amid ongoing conflict. Palestinian militant groups, including those affiliated with the (PLO), conducted attacks against Israeli targets, prompting Israeli military responses and closures, such as the 1991 restrictions following the Gulf War-era launches from . Hamas, an acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah), emerged in December 1987 during the , founded by Yassin as the Palestinian branch of the . Its founding charter explicitly rejected Israel's existence, advocating armed to establish an over historic and viewing peaceful negotiations as incompatible with its Islamist ideology, which frames the conflict in religious terms rather than nationalist ones. Hamas built popular support through a network of social welfare institutions providing education, healthcare, and aid in Gaza and the , filling gaps left by the PLO's focus on diplomacy and governance, while simultaneously forming the Brigades to carry out bombings, shootings, and later rocket attacks against Israeli civilians and military. By the late 1990s, Hamas had conducted numerous suicide bombings during the , undermining Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) efforts and contributing to the collapse of interim agreements. The Second Intifada, erupting in September 2000 after the failure of talks, intensified 's role, with the group claiming responsibility for over 50 suicide attacks that killed hundreds of Israeli civilians between 2000 and 2005. Israel's military operations in response, including targeted killings of leaders like Yassin in March 2004, weakened but did not dismantle the organization, which adapted by increasing launches from Gaza toward Israeli communities. In August 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from Gaza under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan, evacuating all settlements and withdrawing ground forces by September 12, 2005, while retaining control over the airspace, , and external borders to prevent arms smuggling and attacks. This move aimed to reduce friction and improve Israel's security posture but left Gaza's economy dependent on coordinated crossings, with immediate post-disengagement rocket fire from Palestinian militants prompting renewed Israeli enforcement measures. Hamas's political ascent culminated in the January 25, 2006, Palestinian Legislative Council elections, where its "Change and Reform" list secured 74 of 132 seats, defeating 's 45 amid widespread voter disillusionment with PA corruption, cronyism, and ineffective governance under . framed its campaign around anti-corruption reforms, Islamic values, and continued "resistance" against , capitalizing on Fatah's perceived concessions in peace talks; international monitors noted the vote's fairness despite violence, though Western donors conditioned aid on renouncing violence and recognizing —conditions rejected. The victory, representing about 44% of the popular vote but amplified by the , positioned to form a government in March 2006, escalating tensions with Fatah and , which viewed the outcome as legitimizing a group committed to its destruction.

Initial Restrictions and Hamas Takeover

In June 2007, amid escalating factional violence, forces launched a coordinated offensive against -dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) security installations in the , beginning on June 10. Over the following days, militants seized key government buildings, executed rival commanders, and expelled loyalists, culminating in full control of the territory by June 15. The clashes resulted in approximately 160 deaths, mostly affiliates, and marked 's violent ouster of the PA government, which had been internationally recognized despite 's 2006 electoral victory. The takeover prompted immediate security responses from , which intensified pre-existing restrictions on movement and goods originally implemented during the Second Intifada (2000–2005) and after 's 2005 disengagement. On June 16, closed the Karni commercial crossing and limited operations at other terminals like and to , effectively initiating a land blockade to curb arms smuggling to , designated a terrorist organization by , the , and the . Egypt simultaneously shuttered the crossing—Gaza's sole non-Israeli border—on June 2007, citing the collapse of EU-supervised security arrangements and fears of Islamist spillover, thereby contributing to the dual blockade framework. These measures were rationalized by Israeli officials as necessary to weaken Hamas's consolidation and secure the of soldier , abducted in a June 2006 cross-border raid that killed two IDF personnel. Hamas's refusal to renounce violence or recognize prior agreements with , coupled with its ideological commitment to armed struggle against the as outlined in its founding , underscored the causal link between the takeover and the blockade's escalation. Egypt's closure, while less comprehensive than Israel's, reflected Cairo's longstanding concerns over Gaza's stability and Hamas's ties to the , an affiliate it had suppressed domestically. By September 19, 2007, 's security cabinet formalized Gaza's status as a "hostile entity," authorizing targeted sanctions such as reduced fuel shipments and electricity cuts to pressure without fully severing humanitarian access. This declaration built on the restrictions, reducing Gaza's GDP by an estimated 30% in the initial years through curtailed exports and imports, though critics from UN agencies argued the measures disproportionately affected civilians. Empirical data from the period shows a sharp decline in truck entries—from over 500 daily pre-takeover to under 100 by late 2007—prioritizing security over economic flow amid ongoing rocket fire from Gaza into .

Objectives and Rationale

Security Imperatives Against Hamas Threats

The blockade of the Gaza Strip was instituted by primarily to counter the existential threats posed by , a militant Islamist organization designated as a terrorist group by , the , the , and others, which explicitly seeks 's destruction as outlined in its 1988 charter. The charter frames the conflict as a religious duty to eliminate the , rejecting any compromise or recognition of and calling for against it. Following 's violent seizure of Gaza in June 2007, which involved the execution of rivals and establishment of unchallenged rule, intensified border controls to prevent the group from acquiring and deploying advanced weaponry that could amplify attacks on Israeli population centers. This measure addressed the immediate risk of transforming Gaza into a launchpad for sustained aggression, as evidenced by the group's prior involvement in suicide bombings and the escalation of rocket fire post-takeover. A core security imperative was mitigating Hamas's rocket barrages, which have indiscriminately targeted Israeli civilians since 2001, with over 30,000 projectiles launched from Gaza by 2024, causing dozens of deaths, thousands of injuries, and widespread . These unguided munitions, ranging from short-range Qassams to longer-range Grad and variants smuggled or locally produced, have struck cities like , , and even , with annual salvos peaking during escalations such as over 4,000 in 2014 and 12,000 in the 2021 conflict. The blockade enforced an arms embargo to restrict imports of dual-use materials—like potassium nitrate for explosives and metals for casings—essential for manufacturing, thereby degrading Hamas's production capacity and forcing reliance on less effective homemade variants. Without such controls, Hamas's Iranian-supplied components, often routed via sea or Sinai tunnels, would enable precision-guided or longer-range systems, directly threatening Israel's southern heartland and necessitating continuous civilian evacuations and usage. Equally critical were Hamas's cross-border attack tunnels, excavated under Gaza's to facilitate infiltration, , and mass casualty raids into , as demonstrated in aborted 2014 incursions involving armed squads emerging near civilian communities. By 2023, this subterranean network spanned hundreds of kilometers, incorporating command bunkers, weapons caches, and smuggling routes that evaded surface inspections, with and reinforcements sourced illicitly. The blockade's naval and land components aimed to interdict these supply lines, particularly maritime attempts to ship heavy materials or disassembled arms, as intercepted in operations like the 2010 Marmara flotilla where weapons precursors were concealed among aid. This strategy, complemented by aerial surveillance and underground barrier , reduced tunnel viability by limiting resource inflows, compelling Hamas to divert from civilian infrastructure—a tactic the group itself employs to embed military assets amid populations for defensive advantage. These imperatives reflect a causal link between unrestricted access and heightened lethality: pre-blockade smuggling via and sea routes flooded Gaza with Iranian and Syrian arms, enabling to sustain offensives that prior governance had partially curbed. Post-2007 restrictions correlated with temporary declines in rocket ranges and volumes during lulls, though adapted via evasion, underscoring the blockade's role not as a blanket but as targeted denial of offensive capabilities to Israeli border security. Critics from biased outlets often frame this as , yet empirical interception data—such as thousands of shafts sealed and vessels diverted—demonstrates its focus on verifiable threats rather than humanitarian obstruction, with allowances for non-military via coordinated crossings.

Dual Blockade by Israel and Egypt

The blockade of the Gaza Strip encompasses restrictions enforced by Israel along its northern and eastern borders and by Egypt at the southern Rafah crossing, the only non-Israeli controlled access point. Following Hamas's violent seizure of Gaza on 14 June 2007, both nations intensified border controls to curb weapons smuggling and militant movements, with Egypt aligning its policies to address shared threats from Islamist networks. Egypt's participation stems from acute security concerns in the , where groups like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (later ISIS-Sinai Province) have conducted deadly attacks, frequently sourcing arms, explosives, and fighters from Gaza through underground tunnels under . Hamas's ideological ties to the , which 's government views as a domestic , further motivate Cairo's vigilance against unrestricted cross-border flows that could bolster Sinai insurgents. In response to specific incidents, such as the 24 October 2014 assault by Sinai militants that killed 31 Egyptian soldiers, shuttered crossing on 25 October 2014, maintaining closures for extended periods to dismantle smuggling infrastructure. To enforce its restrictions, Egypt has deployed troops along the —established under the 2005 agreement granting responsibility for the Gaza-Sinai —and conducted operations destroying over 1,000 tunnels by 2013, escalating to systematic flooding and campaigns thereafter. In October 2014, Egypt enacted legislation creating a 500-meter along the , later expanded to 1 kilometer, involving the of approximately 1,200 homes and evacuation of 2,000 families to eliminate tunnel networks and prevent militant incursions. These measures, coordinated with via sharing and joint monitoring, reflect Egypt's prioritization of countering cross-border threats over easing humanitarian access, despite periodic limited openings for medical evacuations or aid under international pressure. Egypt's stance has persisted amid ongoing Sinai instability, with Rafah remaining predominantly closed or severely limited even during escalations like the post-7 October 2023 conflict, as Cairo rejects mass Palestinian entry to avoid creating a permanent refugee population that could strain resources and security. This dual framework underscores complementary national security rationales: Israel's focus on preventing rocket attacks and incursions from Hamas, paralleled by Egypt's imperative to contain jihadist spillover into Sinai, where over 1,000 Egyptian security personnel have died in related violence since 2011.

Implementation Mechanisms

Land Borders and Crossing Controls

The Gaza Strip shares land borders with Israel along its northern and eastern perimeters and with Egypt along its southern boundary at Rafah. Israel exercises operational control over the Erez and Kerem Shalom crossings on its side, managing the entry and exit of people and goods through security checkpoints administered by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT). These controls were significantly tightened following Hamas's violent takeover of Gaza in June 2007, with crossings frequently closed in response to security threats such as rocket fire. Erez Crossing primarily facilitates the movement of individuals, including those requiring medical treatment, traders, and essential workers, under a strict permit regime issued by Israeli authorities based on vetting. Access involves multiple layers of inspection, including biometric scans, interviews, and physical searches at turnstile-equipped terminals to mitigate risks of infiltration by militants. Operations are limited to specific hours, with closures imposed during escalations; for instance, in March 2019, was shut for a week amid rocket attacks from Gaza. In parallel efforts, such as May 2024, has been utilized to channel when adjacent goods crossings faced disruptions. Kerem Shalom serves as the principal conduit for commercial and humanitarian goods entering Gaza from , handling truckloads subjected to rigorous security protocols, including scanners, dogs, and manual inspections to screen for prohibited items. Since 2008, has enforced a policy categorizing certain materials as "dual-use," potentially convertible for military purposes by groups like —examples include equipment, certain medical devices, and construction aggregates that could aid or production. This scrutiny, while enabling the entry of hundreds of trucks daily under COGAT coordination, has drawn criticism from aid organizations for delays and rejections, though Israeli officials maintain it is essential to curb arms smuggling. The Rafah Crossing, under Egyptian sovereignty, represents the sole non-Israeli land gateway, but Egypt has maintained intermittent closures since Hamas's 2007 ascension, often citing concerns over militant spillover and smuggling via extensive tunnel networks along the border. Prior to 2007, Rafah operated under Palestinian Authority and EU oversight, but post-takeover, Egypt withdrew monitors and imposed buffer zones, demolishing over 1,500 tunnels by 2024 to enforce its restrictions. Coordination between Egypt, Israel, and Palestinian authorities is required for openings, which have been sporadic; for example, Rafah was shuttered from May 2024 onward after Israeli forces assumed tactical control of the Gaza side during military operations. Egyptian policy emphasizes preventing weapons flows while allowing limited humanitarian and medical evacuations, though access remains contingent on bilateral security agreements. Israel's naval of the Gaza Strip, formally imposed on January 3, 2009, is enforced by the through continuous patrols along the coastline to prevent the smuggling of weapons, explosives, and dual-use materials that could be used by for military purposes, such as production. The prohibits all maritime traffic into or out of Gaza waters without Israeli authorization, with vessels approaching the 20-nautical-mile security zone warned via radio and visual signals to divert to the for inspection; non-compliance leads to interception, boarding, and potential seizure if contraband is found. Enforcement assets include Sa'ar 5 and Sa'ar 6-class corvettes equipped with advanced , helicopter decks for aerial surveillance, and precision-guided munitions, supported by unmanned surface vessels and aerial drones for 24-hour monitoring of the maritime area. The Israeli Navy issues advance notifications to mariners via the Israeli Home Front Command and international notices to airmen and mariners (NOTAM/NOTMAR), specifying the blockade zone and procedures, which align with international law requirements for effective blockade declaration during armed conflict to interdict threats without unduly harming civilians. Interceptions occur in international waters if vessels intend to breach the blockade, as determined by their course and stated purpose, with boarding teams trained to minimize force while securing cargo manifests and scanning for hidden compartments used in past smuggling attempts, such as those concealing Iranian Fajr-5 rocket components. Between 2009 and 2023, the Navy intercepted over 50 vessels attempting to run the blockade, confiscating tons of construction materials repurposed for tunnels and weapons, though critics from organizations like the UN have contested the blockade's proportionality despite evidence of reduced maritime arms inflows correlating with fewer long-range rocket attacks on Israel. Regarding airspace enforcement, Israel maintains exclusive control over Gaza's airspace under the 1994 , which granted it security oversight while permitting limited Palestinian aviation infrastructure that has since been non-operational. The , opened in 1998, ceased operations in 2001 following the Second due to Israeli security closures and has not reopened, with its and facilities degraded by neglect and conflict damage, effectively banning all civilian or unauthorized flights into or over Gaza. The conducts routine surveillance using high-altitude drones, fighter jets, and to monitor for potential aerial threats or via low-flying aircraft, enforcing a that prevents from developing aviation capabilities or importing components by air. This dominance facilitates real-time intelligence gathering, including thermal imaging for detecting ventilation or launch sites, and enables rapid response to rocket fire with precision strikes, though it has drawn claims of overreach from groups; however, empirical data shows no successful aerial incursions since the blockade's inception, underscoring the mechanism's role in maintaining Israel's defensive posture against groups pledged to its destruction.

Monitoring and Anti-Smuggling Measures

implements multifaceted monitoring along its with the , utilizing seismic sensors, , and unmanned aerial vehicles to detect and attempts. In response to cross-border tunnels, initiated construction of a deep underground concrete and steel barrier along the Gaza perimeter in , designed to extend up to 65 meters below ground to impede subterranean incursions. By May 2024, Israeli forces had unearthed and neutralized 50 tunnels originating from in southern Gaza and extending into , highlighting persistent efforts to curb arms and contraband flows. Complementing these measures, has fortified its side of the with a and system. In June 2015, Egyptian forces began excavating a along the northern Sinai border to disrupt operations, following earlier campaigns that destroyed thousands of tunnels. Egyptian authorities reported eliminating up to 97 percent of known tunnels by December 2013 through demolition, flooding with seawater and sewage, and enhanced patrols, though new constructions periodically emerge. At sea, the Israeli Navy enforces a maritime blockade established in January 2009, conducting continuous patrols within a 20-nautical-mile exclusion zone off Gaza's coast to intercept vessels suspected of transporting weapons or dual-use materials. Enforcement actions include boarding and diversion of ships, as demonstrated by the July 2025 interception of the Madleen, which authorities claimed violated blockade protocols despite its humanitarian pretext. These operations aim to prevent the influx of components for rocket production and other military enhancements to Hamas-controlled territory. Israel maintains exclusive control over Gaza's airspace under the 1995 framework, deploying , drones, and radar systems to monitor aerial activities and preclude via low-flying or balloons. This oversight facilitates real-time detection of launches and potential arms deliveries, integrating with broader intelligence networks to target networks preemptively. Despite these measures, has adapted by constructing extensive internal networks estimated at 350 to 450 miles, underscoring the challenges in fully eradicating pathways.

Chronological Developments

2007-2009: Inception and Early Escalations

In June 2007, Hamas forcibly seized control of the Gaza Strip from Fatah forces during a violent intra-Palestinian conflict spanning June 10 to 15, resulting in the deaths of over 100 Palestinians and the expulsion of Fatah loyalists. Following the takeover, Israel intensified existing movement restrictions, closing the Karni crossing for commercial goods on June 12 and severely limiting other crossings to essential humanitarian aid, aiming to pressure Hamas and prevent arms smuggling. Egypt simultaneously sealed the Rafah crossing, its border with Gaza, citing security concerns over Hamas's Islamist governance and potential for cross-border threats, leaving it closed for extended periods thereafter. On September 19, 2007, Israel's Security Cabinet unanimously declared the a "hostile entity" in response to ongoing Hamas-led attacks, including rocket fire into Israeli communities, authorizing measures such as reduced fuel and electricity supplies to Gaza if rocket launches persisted, while committing to avoid a . These actions formalized the blockade's naval and air components, with enforcing a maritime to intercept potential weapons shipments. Palestinian armed groups, primarily and Islamic , launched 2,807 rockets and mortars toward in 2007 alone, causing civilian injuries and property damage in southern Israeli towns like . Escalations intensified in 2008 amid a fragile November 2006 ceasefire that broke down due to mutual violations, with over 3,200 rockets and mortars fired from Gaza that year, killing eight Israeli civilians and one foreign national while injuring hundreds more. Hamas's refusal to extend the truce and continued arms buildup via smuggling tunnels prompted to launch Operation Cast Lead on December 27, 2008, a large-scale military incursion to dismantle rocket-launching infrastructure and degrade 's capabilities after months of near-daily attacks disrupting life for approximately 800,000 within range. The 22-day operation ended with a unilateral Israeli ceasefire on January 18, 2009, following significant destruction of Hamas targets but persistent rocket fire during the conflict.

2010-2021: Flotillas, Easings, and Periodic Conflicts

In May 2010, the Gaza Freedom Flotilla, organized by pro-Palestinian activists, attempted to breach Israel's naval blockade with six ships carrying humanitarian aid, culminating in the interception of the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara on May 31. Israeli commandos boarded the ship in international waters, encountering violent resistance from passengers armed with knives, metal bars, and other improvised weapons, resulting in nine activists killed—eight Turkish nationals and one Turkish-American—and ten commandos wounded. Israel defended the operation as necessary to enforce the blockade against potential arms smuggling to Hamas, while international condemnation followed, including UN reports citing excessive force. Following the incident, Israel's security cabinet approved easing land-based restrictions on June 20, 2010, permitting all foodstuffs, most civilian goods previously banned, and construction materials for internationally supervised projects to address humanitarian concerns while maintaining security controls on dual-use items. Subsequent flotilla attempts, such as Freedom Flotilla II in July 2011, were intercepted by Israeli forces without fatalities, with vessels diverted to port where aid was offloaded for Gaza transfer. Later efforts in 2015 and beyond faced similar interceptions, deterring large-scale challenges to the naval enforcement. Periodic escalations underscored the blockade's security rationale amid ongoing rocket threats from Gaza. Operation Pillar of Defense from November 14 to 21, 2012, responded to over 120 rockets fired into in preceding days, with launching 1,506 rockets during the conflict—421 intercepted by Israel's —killing four Israeli civilians and wounding 112, while approximately 170 Palestinians died. The 2014 Gaza conflict, Operation Protective Edge (July 8 to August 26), followed intensified rocket barrages and tunnel infiltrations, lasting 50 days with over 4,500 rockets fired from Gaza, resulting in 66 Israeli soldiers and seven civilians killed, alongside more than 2,100 Palestinian deaths. Post-2014, limited easings occurred, including resumption of some Gaza exports to Israel from March 2015, though restrictions on movement and imports persisted due to security risks. In May 2021, Hamas fired over 4,000 rockets at Israel amid Jerusalem tensions, prompting airstrikes until a ceasefire on May 21; the escalation killed 13 in Israel (including one soldier) and around 250 in Gaza, temporarily closing crossings and reinforcing blockade measures to curb rearmament. These conflicts highlighted Hamas's continued military buildup despite restrictions, validating Israel's enforcement while prompting periodic policy adjustments under international pressure.

2021-2023: Heightened Tensions and Rocket Barrages

In May 2021, and allied groups in Gaza initiated a major escalation by firing over 4,360 unguided rockets and mortars toward Israeli civilian areas from May 10 to 21, following clashes at Jerusalem's and eviction disputes in . This barrage, the largest up to that point, prompted Israel's of the Walls, involving airstrikes on command centers, rocket manufacturing sites, and tunnels. The Israeli intercepted about 90% of incoming projectiles, but 13 Israeli civilians and one soldier were killed, with over 350 wounded and significant property damage in southern . In Gaza, misfired rockets and mortars caused at least 12 civilian deaths, highlighting the indiscriminate nature of the attacks. The 2021 conflict underscored Hamas's capacity to advanced rockets—many with ranges exceeding 100 km—despite the blockade's naval patrols, restrictions, and controls on dual-use imports intended to prevent arms proliferation. via Egyptian border tunnels supplied components like Iranian-grade propellants, allowing local production in hidden facilities. A brokered by ended the fighting after 11 days, with reporting the destruction of 60% of Hamas's rocket arsenal, though reconstruction resumed shortly thereafter using diverted construction materials. In 2022, rocket fire remained sporadic but intensified in August 5–7 during clashes with (PIJ), which launched approximately 1,100 rockets and mortars after preemptively targeted a senior PIJ operative planning an imminent attack. Operation Breaking Dawn followed, with Israeli airstrikes eliminating PIJ commanders and over 40 rocket launchers; again intercepted most threats, preventing fatalities in , while about 200 projectiles fell short in Gaza or the sea. These exchanges, totaling over 1,100 projectiles for the year, reflected ongoing militant rearmament, as groups evaded measures through tunnel networks and adapted manufacturing from civilian imports like fertilizers for explosives. Early 2023 saw further barrages, notably on May 10 when PIJ fired over 500 rockets in retaliation for 's counterterrorism operations, escalating to more than 1,400 projectiles by May 13 amid Operation Shield and . struck PIJ infrastructure, killing key figures and destroying launch sites, with no Israeli deaths but injuries from debris; dozens of Gaza civilians died from failed launches or crossfire. Smaller incidents, including a barrage of several rockets, preceded relative calm until . These patterns of unprovoked salvos—often initiated by Gaza factions citing distant triggers—reinforced the blockade's security rationale, as evidenced by the militants' persistent access to smuggled Iranian and Syrian weaponry, bypassing crossing inspections and maritime interdictions.

Post-October 2023 War and Intensified Restrictions

Following the Hamas-led attacks on on , 2023, which killed approximately 1,139 people and resulted in the abduction of around 200 hostages, intensified its blockade measures against the . On October 9, 2023, Israeli Defense Minister announced a "complete " on Gaza, directing the military to halt the supply of , , electricity, and other essentials to pressure Hamas and prevent the group from rearming. This escalation built on pre-existing restrictions, aiming to degrade Hamas's military capabilities amid ongoing rocket fire and the group's use of civilian infrastructure for operations. The intensified restrictions included a near-total closure of land crossings, with and points allowing minimal after initial delays, subject to rigorous Israeli inspections for dual-use materials that could aid weaponry. similarly restricted access via the Crossing, closing it shortly after , 2023, and maintaining limited operations thereafter to curb potential militant infiltration and arms . Naval and aerial enforcement was tightened, with maintaining control over Gaza's and maritime approaches to interdict attempts. By late October 2023, limited aid convoys began entering, but volumes remained far below pre-war levels of around 500 trucks daily, averaging 20-50 trucks initially before gradual increases. Throughout 2024 and into 2025, restrictions persisted amid Israel's ground operations in Gaza, with aid entries fluctuating due to concerns, including documented instances of diverting supplies for military purposes, as evidenced by seized internal documents showing systematic exploitation. However, U.S. assessments, including a USAID of 156 loss cases from October 2023 to May 2025, found no evidence of widespread theft of U.S.-funded , attributing many losses to conflict disruptions rather than systematic diversion, though Israeli officials contested this, citing broader patterns of misuse. In May 2024, seized the Gaza side of , leading to its prolonged closure except for brief reopenings, further bottlenecking and movement. A ceasefire agreement took effect on October 10, 2025, committing to increased access, including up to 600 trucks daily, but implementation faltered as maintained border controls and kept closed "until further notice" pending compliance on hostage remains and demilitarization terms. Aid inflows averaged 200-300 trucks per day in the immediate post-ceasefire period, below targets, with UN agencies reporting persistent shortages exacerbating needs for 1.5 million people, while Israeli restrictions aimed to prevent reconstitution amid continued skirmishes.

Security and Military Impacts

Effectiveness in Curbing Arms Imports and Rocket Attacks

The significantly disrupted overt arms smuggling routes, particularly through naval interceptions and coordination with to dismantle cross-border tunnels, but failed to halt Hamas's overall military buildup, as evidenced by the group's progressive enhancement of its in range, accuracy, and despite restrictions imposed since 2007. Between 2007 and 2013, hundreds of tunnels under the -Gaza border facilitated the influx of weapons components, explosives, and Iranian-supplied , with Egyptian authorities estimating over 1,200 such passages by 2013 before launching a crackdown that flooded, exploded, or sealed approximately 80% of them. Israel's naval enforcement intercepted multiple sea-based attempts, including vessels carrying arms precursors, thereby preventing some direct transfers of advanced munitions. Hamas circumvented these measures by developing indigenous manufacturing of rockets using smuggled dual-use materials like fertilizer and pipes, supplemented by parts imported via remaining tunnels or disguised commercial shipments through controlled crossings, enabling the arsenal to grow from short-range Qassam rockets in the mid-2000s to longer-range Grad and variants by the 2010s capable of striking . By 2021, Hamas possessed an estimated 10,000-20,000 rockets, a amassed through local workshops and sporadic high-value smuggling, allowing for sustained barrages exceeding 300-450 launches per day during the May 2021 escalation—rates 50-100% higher than in the 2014 conflict. Israeli assessments attribute partial success to the blockade in restricting heavier anti-ship or anti-air systems, but acknowledge that adaptations like tunnel-derived imports and Iranian technical aid sustained capabilities. Rocket attacks from Gaza, while fluctuating with ceasefires and operations, demonstrated limited long-term deterrence, with launches spiking during major confrontations but persisting at lower levels in interwar periods due to stockpile conservation rather than import elimination. Pre-blockade annual averages exceeded 2,000 projectiles in peak intifada years, dropping to hundreds in calmer post-2007 intervals before surging to over 4,000 in the 11-day 2021 war and tens of thousands cumulatively since October 2023, reflecting accumulated reserves rather than curbed production. The blockade's in temporarily degrading resupply—via tunnel closures and inspections reducing dual-use inflows by up to 90% in some categories post-2013—correlated with lulls in attacks, yet Hamas's ability to fire precision-guided munitions in 2021 and beyond indicates insufficient constraint on core capabilities, as groups adapted through decentralized fabrication and external patronage.
PeriodKey Rocket Launch EventsEstimated ProjectilesNotes on Blockade Impact
2007-2009 (Early )2008-2009 Gaza War~3,000+ totalInitial via tunnels enabled sustained fire; naval limited sea resupply.
2010-20142012, 2014 Operations2,500+ in 2014 aloneTunnel networks peaked; post-Egypt crackdown, local production filled gaps.
2015-20212021 Escalation4,300+ in 11 daysEnhanced range despite restrictions; smuggled Iranian tech evident.
2023-PresentPost-Oct 7 19,000+ by mid-2024Pre-war stockpile from prior evasions; tightened but pre-existing arsenal dominant.
Overall, while the blockade achieved tactical gains in interdicting specific shipments and collaborating on tunnel destruction—reducing active passages from to dozens by the late —it proved only marginally effective in curbing arms imports and threats, as Hamas's resilient supply chains and innovations sustained an offensive capacity that escalated in sophistication and lethality over time.

Hamas Military Buildup Despite Blockade

Despite the 's restrictions on arms imports since 2007, progressively expanded its military capabilities in Gaza through smuggling networks and indigenous production methods. The group's rocket arsenal evolved from rudimentary short-range Qassam projectiles, first produced around 2001 with ranges of about 2-3 kilometers, to thousands of longer-range weapons by the 2020s, including Iranian-influenced models capable of striking central . This growth persisted despite Israeli and Egyptian enforcement efforts, as evidenced by sustained barrages: in the May 2021 conflict, fired 300 to 450 rockets daily, exceeding volumes from prior escalations by 50-100%. Smuggling via underground tunnels beneath the Gaza-Egypt , known as the Philadelphi Route, served as a primary conduit for weapons components, explosives precursors, and even complete systems from Sinai networks. These tunnels, numbering in the hundreds with some spanning hundreds of meters, enabled the transit of arms despite periodic Egyptian flooding and demolition campaigns, as militants and continued to cross post-2014 crackdowns. Israeli interceptions highlighted the scale: in 2016, authorities seized four tons of ammonium —enough for hundreds of rockets—smuggled disguised . Complementing smuggling, Hamas invested in local manufacturing to circumvent import controls, repurposing dual-use civilian goods like fertilizers, metals, and construction materials entering via approved channels. By the , Gaza-based workshops produced a majority of the group's weaponry, from bullets and rocket-propelled grenades to anti-tank missiles, drones, and unmanned underwater vehicles, often in hidden urban facilities. This self-reliance extended to an extensive tunnel network for storage, command, and cross-border raids, constructed using diverted and despite quantity limits. Such adaptations underscore enforcement challenges, as aid inspections failed to fully prevent diversion to military ends. Hamas also augmented its forces with cyber capabilities and naval assets, though rockets and tunnels remained core to its strategy. Pre-October 2023 estimates placed the arsenal at tens of thousands of projectiles, enabling the initial barrage of over 3,000 rockets in a single day during the attack on . This buildup, funded partly by external support and local revenues, transformed from a guerrilla outfit into a proto-conventional force, capable of sustained operations against superior defenses.

Counter-Terrorism Operations and Border Incidents

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) maintain continuous counter-terrorism operations along the Gaza border, employing advanced surveillance systems, drone patrols, and rapid-response units to detect and neutralize threats from and affiliated militant groups attempting infiltrations or attacks. These efforts have thwarted multiple border breach attempts since the blockade's inception in 2007, including an April 17, 2008, incident near where IDF troops killed three armed Palestinian gunmen emerging from Gaza. Similar operations foiled an August 18, 2019, infiltration from northern Gaza, with IDF forces eliminating the squad before it could advance further. Such incidents underscore the persistent risk of cross-border raids, which the blockade aims to mitigate by limiting materiel for and weaponry. A primary focus has been the destruction of Hamas's cross-border terror tunnels, designed for surprise attacks into . During Operation Protective Edge in 2014, the IDF identified and demolished over 30 such tunnels, including one on July 17, 2014, near Kibbutz Sufa from which 13 armed militants emerged on Israeli soil and were subsequently killed in the ensuing clash. Earlier detections, such as in 2013, involved flooding and aerial bombardment to neutralize underground networks extending hundreds of meters into . These operations, often conducted via precision airstrikes or ground incursions, have prevented large-scale kidnappings and mass-casualty assaults akin to those executed on , 2023. Targeted killings of commanders have supplemented border defenses, disrupting operational chains. On November 14, 2012, an IDF airstrike eliminated Ahmed al-Jabari, 's military chief responsible for barrages and tunnel programs, initiating Operation Pillar of Defense. Other strikes, such as those against unit leaders during periodic escalations, aimed to degrade launch capabilities without full-scale invasion. These actions reflect a strategy of preemption, justified by intelligence on imminent threats, though critics from groups question proportionality despite evidence of militants' direct involvement in attacks. The 2018–2019 Great March of Return protests exemplified hybrid incidents, organized by to mask violent intents under civilian cover, including fence breaches, explosive hurling, and infrastructure sabotage. incentivized participation with payments and claimed 50 of the 59 Palestinians killed on March 30, 2018—the first day—as its militants, confirming armed elements' roles. IDF responses involved tiered force: warnings, non-lethal measures, and lethal fire against direct threats, resulting in approximately 223 Palestinian deaths over the year, per investigations acknowledging rioters' toward troops and . 's orchestration, including tire-burning to obscure visibility and coordinated assaults, transformed demonstrations into sustained low-intensity conflicts, testing blockade-enforced isolation.

Socioeconomic and Humanitarian Impacts

Economic Contraction and Unemployment

The blockade imposed in June 2007, following Hamas's violent seizure of control in Gaza, triggered an immediate economic downturn, with real GDP growth for the Palestinian territories estimated at approximately 0% that year—translating to a per capita contraction amid rapid population expansion. Gaza's nominal GDP stagnated near $1.2–1.3 billion from 2007 to 2010, showing no meaningful real growth and lagging far behind the West Bank's expansion during the same period. Over the longer term, Gaza's GDP per capita relative to the West Bank declined from rough parity in 1994 to 44% by 2007 and further to 28% by 2022, reflecting chronic underperformance driven by severe trade restrictions, limited access to export markets, and curtailed labor mobility. Unemployment in Gaza escalated sharply post-2007, averaging above 40% for much of the ensuing period and reaching a recorded high of 52% in 2018 according to (PCBS) data. By 2021, the rate stood at 47%, with at 64%, exacerbated by factory shutdowns—around 80% of industrial facilities closed due to import bans on raw materials and equipment. In 2022, PCBS reported 45% overall , with female rates exceeding 60%. These figures stem partly from measures limiting commercial crossings and zones to 3–12 nautical miles (versus pre-2007 access to 20 miles), which constricted key sectors like and light manufacturing. Recurrent escalations of conflict, including Hamas-initiated campaigns in 2008–2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021, inflicted further damage through infrastructure destruction and temporary closures, compounding baseline contraction from access controls. International assessments, such as those from UNCTAD and the ILO, attribute much of the stagnation to the blockade's cumulative effects on , though Israeli rationales emphasize preventing dual-use imports that enable production and via tunnels. Hamas governance factors, including toward military buildup over civilian enterprise and aid diversion allegations, have been cited by analysts as aggravating , with private sector jobs comprising under 20% of by the . The October 7, 2023, attacks prompted intensified restrictions, causing Gaza's GDP to contract by 81–85% within the first year and unemployment to surge to 79–80% by mid-2024, per ILO and PCBS estimates, as nearly all economic activity halted amid . Pre-war GDP hovered at $1,049 in 2020, but the blockade era's overall trajectory left over two-thirds of Gazans in poverty, with limited diversification into non-aid-dependent sectors. Despite periodic easings, such as post-2010 adjustments allowing more construction materials under oversight, structural unemployment persisted above 40%, underscoring the interplay of external controls and internal policy choices.

Aid Dependency, Diversion, and Governance Failures

Since seized control of Gaza in 2007, the territory has developed an acute dependency on international to sustain , with UN agencies alone spending nearly $4.5 billion there from 2014 to 2020, including $600 million in 2020. By 2022, more than 80% of Gaza's approximately 2 million residents relied on such assistance for food, exacerbating where hovered at 45% and private sector activity remained minimal due to restricted exports, internal , and priorities favoring military buildup over diversification. This reliance has persisted despite billions in cumulative inflows, as has largely replaced rather than enabled self-sustaining growth, with Gaza's GDP stagnating below $1,000 annually pre-2023 amid a lack of in productive industries. Aid diversion by Hamas has compounded this dependency, with the group systematically repurposing civilian materials for military ends, including channeling imported cement—intended for housing and infrastructure—into an underground tunnel network spanning hundreds of kilometers. Israeli intelligence assessments as early as 2010 documented Hamas's extensive use of such dual-use imports for rebuilding strike-damaged military sites and expanding fortifications, a pattern evidenced by post-2023 excavations revealing over 6,000 tons of concrete and 1,800 tons of steel in tunnel construction alone. While recent U.S. and UN reviews found no evidence of wholesale theft from their specific distributions, Hamas has imposed taxes and fees on aid trucks and imports entering via crossings, skimming 20% or more to fund operations, thereby indirectly diverting resources while inflating costs for recipients. These practices, generating $300–450 million yearly from taxation and smuggling, have enabled Hamas to maintain salaries for thousands of fighters and officials even amid wartime isolation. Hamas governance failures have further entrenched aid reliance through corruption, resource misallocation, and suppression of economic initiative. The group's annual , estimated at $100–350 million, has prioritized rockets, , and armaments over civilian welfare, with tunnel investments alone rivaling years of reconstruction aid in scale. Leaders have amassed vast personal —such as Khaled Mashal's reported $5 billion—via control over aid taxation, investments, and networks, while Gaza's power outages averaged 12–16 hours daily and systems collapsed due to neglected . This elite enrichment, coupled with rackets on businesses and farmers, has deterred investment and perpetuated poverty, as Hamas's authoritarian rule—initially promising reforms—devolved into mafia-like control, stifling and diverting public funds from and to ideological and militancy. The result is a cycle where aid inflows prop up a war economy rather than fostering reforms or .

Restrictions on Movement, Fishing, and Resources

The Israeli blockade, imposed following Hamas's 2007 takeover of Gaza, severely limits Palestinian movement through controlled border crossings, with administering (pedestrian, northern) and (goods, southeastern) while manages (southern, with Israeli coordination). permits exits primarily for medical cases (averaging 4,000-5,000 monthly pre-October 2023, subject to security vetting by COGAT), approved traders (under 500), and select aid workers or students, denying most Gazans travel for family, education, or work abroad due to risks of Hamas exploitation or attacks. facilitates the bulk of goods entry after inspections to block arms or dual-use materials, operating 6-7 days weekly but closing during escalations, such as after rocket fire; in 2022, it processed over 15,000 truckloads monthly of approved imports like and materials, though exports remain minimal (under 5% of pre-2007 levels) to prevent economic bolstering of . , reopened sporadically by since 2011, allows limited people crossings (e.g., 10,000-20,000 monthly in calmer periods) for pilgrims or medical evacuees but restricts goods without Israeli approval, reflecting Cairo's concerns over Islamist spillover. Gaza's sector faces naval enforcement limiting operations to a zone of 3-6 nautical miles offshore (expanded temporarily to 12 nautical miles in central areas during 2019 ceasefires but reverted amid violations), far below the 20-nautical-mile limit under the , justified by to prevent maritime smuggling of weapons or explosives by divers. The patrols enforce boundaries via warnings, arrests (over 100 fishermen detained annually pre-2023), or live fire in cases of perceived threats, contributing to a fleet reduced to under 1,000 boats and catches averaging 1,000-2,000 tons yearly—about 10% of potential—exacerbating among 4,000 registered fishermen who face equipment confiscations or vessel sinkings during incursions. Post-October 2023, the zone was declared a , halting entirely until partial reopenings in , with northern limits remaining at 6 nautical miles as of late to monitor for militant activity. Resource inflows are capped to essentials, with Israel supplying 120 megawatts of electricity (10-15% of Gaza's 1,200 MW peak demand pre-2023) via 10 power lines, supplemented by a Hamas-run plant reliant on restricted fuel imports (300,000-500,000 liters daily, vetted to avoid military diversion) and minimal Egyptian transfers, resulting in chronic 4-12 hour daily blackouts that impair desalination and sewage treatment. Water access averages 50-90 liters per capita daily (below WHO's 100-liter minimum), drawn from overexploited coastal aquifers (95% saline or contaminated) and limited Israeli/Egyptian desalinated supplies (via Ashkelon plant pipes, averaging 20 million cubic meters yearly), with blockade rules prohibiting certain pipes or pumps deemed dual-use for tunnel construction. Fuel and gas restrictions, tightened during conflicts (e.g., full cutoff October 2023 under Defense Minister Gallant's siege order), prioritize civilian needs but allow Hamas to siphon portions for tunnels and rockets, per Israeli assessments, sustaining dependency on international aid for 80% of energy while infrastructure decays from underinvestment and sabotage.

Health, Infrastructure, and Famine Allegations

Allegations of severe health deterioration in the Gaza Strip have centered on the blockade's restrictions on medical supplies, equipment, and personnel movement, compounded by recurrent conflicts. Reports from organizations like the claim that by mid-2024, over 80% of Gaza's hospitals were damaged or destroyed, leading to shortages of essential drugs and increased risks of infectious diseases such as and . However, data from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Ministry of Health (GHM), which supplies many of these figures, has faced scrutiny for inconsistencies, including unverified death counts and failure to distinguish combatants from civilians, with analyses indicating potential overreporting or manipulation to amplify humanitarian narratives. Independent assessments, such as those reviewing GHM lists, have identified thousands of removed entries without explanation, undermining reliability. Pre-existing chronic conditions, including high rates of non-communicable diseases like and cardiovascular issues, were cited as exacerbated by limited access to specialized care, with claims that the halved medical exports and imports compared to pre-2007 levels. Yet, empirical reviews attribute much of the strain to governance failures, including diversion of medical aid for military purposes and prioritization of networks over maintenance, rather than restrictions alone, as evidenced by Israel's facilitation of over 20,000 medical evacuations since October 2023. Infrastructure allegations focus on chronic shortages of , averaging 4-8 hours daily before October 2023, and , where only 3-12% of supply met WHO standards due to over-extraction of the coastal and saline intrusion. Post-2023 escalations intensified claims of deliberate deprivation, with UN reports documenting 57% destruction of water facilities by mid-2024, leading to sewage overflows and vectors. Critics, however, highlight that Hamas's allocation of fuel—intended for plants and power stations—to operations, including production, contributed significantly to blackouts, with Israeli data showing consistent electricity transfers via 10 power lines until war damage. Aid diversion, estimated at up to 25% by Israeli , further strained systems, as humanitarian supplies were rerouted to fighters or black markets. Famine allegations peaked in 2024-2025, with UN-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) reports declaring parts of Gaza in "famine" or phase 5 emergency, citing acute malnutrition rates exceeding 15% in children by July 2025 and over 60 hunger-related deaths. These assessments, drawing heavily on GHM and Palestinian surveys, have been contested for methodological flaws, including reliance on unverified household data and ignoring aid inflows, which exceeded pre-war levels—over 500,000 tons monthly by early 2025—while Hamas siphoned portions for its network. Israeli analyses and studies argue no empirical evidence supports mass starvation, noting stable or declining malnutrition during aid surges and attributing spikes to conflict disruptions and internal mismanagement rather than blockade-induced scarcity. Organizations like Amnesty International have alleged intentional starvation as genocidal policy, but such claims overlook Hamas's documented history of aid hoarding and sale at premiums, as reported by multiple field observers.

Arguments for Legality as Belligerent Self-Defense

Israel imposed a naval blockade on Gaza on , 2009, following Hamas's violent seizure of control in June 2007 and subsequent escalation of rocket attacks on Israeli civilians, which exceeded 2,000 launches by 2008. The blockade was publicly declared, with coordinates specified and prior notification to shipping, aimed at preventing the influx of weapons and military materiel by sea that could enhance Hamas's capacity to conduct cross-border attacks. This measure was framed as a necessary response to an ongoing armed conflict initiated by , a designated terrorist organization under U.S. and law, whose charter calls for 's destruction and whose forces have fired over 20,000 rockets since 2001. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, states retain an inherent right to against armed attacks until the Security Council acts. Proponents argue the qualifies as belligerent because Hamas's indiscriminate rocket barrages—totaling thousands annually in peak years like 2008 and 2014—constitute continuous armed aggression equivalent to an ongoing attack, justifying proportionate countermeasures including maritime interdiction. Legal scholars contend that even in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) with non-state actors like , permits to neutralize threats from hostile territories, as exercises de facto governmental control over Gaza, rendering it a entity. This view holds that Israel's 2005 disengagement, involving withdrawal of settlers and military from inside Gaza, ended occupation status, leaving only external security controls akin to those applied to enemy coasts in wartime, without triggering full occupant duties under the . The San Remo Manual on Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (1994), a authoritative restatement of customary rules, permits naval blockades in international armed conflicts if they are declared, effective, applied impartially to all neutrals, and do not unduly restrict passage after search. Israel's blockade met these criteria: it was formally announced via , enforced consistently (intercepting over 90% of suspected vessels), impartial (affecting ships from any attempting breach), and allowed convoys after inspection, with over 15,000 tons of food and medical supplies processed weekly by 2010. The Manual's provisions extend to NIACs by analogy, as affirmed by military manuals of states like the U.S. and , supporting the blockade's use against Hamas's -based arms procurement, evidenced by intercepted Iranian and Syrian weapons shipments. The 2011 UN Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry, chaired by former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, explicitly ruled the naval blockade legal, stating it was imposed as a "legitimate security measure" to halt weapons smuggling amid Hamas's control and rocket fire, and its implementation complied with despite flaws in the Mavi Marmara flotilla interception. The panel rejected claims of , noting the blockade targeted military threats rather than Gaza's civilian population per se, and distinguished the naval component from land restrictions. This assessment has been cited by legal experts as upholding the blockade's necessity, particularly post-October 7, 2023, when Hamas's attack killed 1,200 Israelis and took 250 hostages, demonstrating the blockade's role in denying materiel for such operations. Critics from UN human rights bodies have contested this, but the Palmer findings align with state practice in conflicts like the U.S. blockade of Confederate ports during the Civil War or NATO actions against Yugoslav supply lines, where self-defense imperatives overrode peacetime freedoms under UNCLOS. Empirical data reinforces the blockade's defensive rationale: despite it, amassed over 10,000 by via land tunnels, but naval interdictions prevented sea routes from becoming primary conduits, as seen in the 2009 Francop interception of 500 tons of weapons from . Sustained fire—peaking at 4,500 in —correlates with laxer enforcement periods, while stricter measures reduced incidents, justifying continuation as a minimal force option short of full . Thus, the blockade embodies causal realism in countering 's build-up, prioritizing empirical threat mitigation over unrestricted access that would enable further attacks.

Criticisms of Collective Punishment and Occupation Claims

Critics, including officials and organizations, have characterized the Gaza blockade as , arguing that the restrictions on goods, movement, and access imposed since June 2007—following Hamas's violent takeover of the territory—unlawfully penalize the entire 2.3 million population for the actions of militant groups. Secretary-General stated in October 2023 that Hamas's attacks "cannot justify the of the people," citing the blockade's role in exacerbating humanitarian conditions such as power shortages and economic collapse. has similarly deemed the measures a war crime under the , asserting they constitute "cruel and inhumane" reprisals against civilians rather than targeted security actions. These claims often reference Article 33 of the , which forbids punishing "for an offence he or she has not personally committed," though proponents of the blockade counter that the policy targets arms smuggling and dual-use materials exploited by , which governs Gaza and embeds military operations within civilian areas, rendering precise targeting infeasible without broader controls. Such characterizations frequently originate from entities like the UN Human Rights Council and NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, which exhibit patterns of disproportionate scrutiny toward Israel compared to other conflict zones involving non-state actors, potentially reflecting institutional biases that prioritize outcome-based humanitarian narratives over the causal link between Hamas's rocket fire—over 20,000 launches since 2001—and the blockade's imposition as a defensive necessity. Empirical data indicates the blockade allows entry of over 500 trucks daily pre-October 2023 via Kerem Shalom and other crossings, with restrictions calibrated to humanitarian needs as assessed by Israeli authorities and international monitors, undermining blanket assertions of punitive intent. The 2011 UN Palmer Report affirmed the naval blockade's legality under international law as a proportionate response to threats from a non-state actor controlling territory, though UN independent experts critiqued this finding for insufficiently addressing civilian impacts. On occupation claims, detractors argue that Israel's disengagement—entailing the evacuation of 21 settlements, 8,000 , and installations from Gaza's interior—did not terminate its status as an occupying power, as Israel retains "effective control" over the Strip's external borders (except Rafah with ), , and maritime zones, imposing obligations under Regulations and to ensure the population's welfare. The of Justice's July 2024 advisory on Israel's policies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory declared the overall occupation unlawful, implicitly encompassing Gaza through sustained external dominance that prevents autonomous , according to interpretations by bodies like the UN's Independent International Commission of Inquiry. This perspective holds that such control equates to occupation regardless of ground troop absence, obligating to facilitate unrestricted aid and movement, as reiterated in the ICJ's October 2025 order mandating cooperation with and lifting aid barriers to meet basic needs. Counterarguments emphasize that occupation requires boots-on-the-ground effective control over territory's internal administration, which Hamas has exercised since 2007, with Israel exerting only perimeter security akin to a against a hostile entity rather than sovereign oversight. Legal analyses, such as those from the Lieber Institute, assert that post-2005, Gaza falls outside occupation criteria under , as Israel's influence is limited to defensive externalities without daily or presence inside the 365 square kilometers. Claims of ongoing occupation often stem from academic and NGO sources predisposed to expansive interpretations favoring narratives, sidelining the reality that 's designation as a terrorist organization by the , , and others justifies Israel's measures as , not occupational duties. The ICJ's rulings, while authoritative in principle, are advisory and non-binding, frequently critiqued for lacking adversarial process and overemphasizing asymmetry without equivalent condemnation of 's use of Gaza as a launchpad for attacks.

Judicial Rulings and UN Assessments

In September 2011, the United Nations Secretary-General's Panel of Inquiry into the 31 May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident—commonly known as the Palmer Report—concluded that Israel's naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, imposed to prevent weapons smuggling by Hamas amid ongoing armed conflict, complied with international humanitarian law. The panel, chaired by former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer and including international law experts, determined the blockade met legal criteria under the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea: it was formally declared to relevant states, applied impartially to vessels of all nationalities, and was enforced effectively in a non-international armed conflict context justified by Israel's right to self-defense against rocket attacks. The report explicitly rejected claims of collective punishment, attributing Gaza's humanitarian challenges primarily to Hamas governance failures rather than the blockade itself. Subsequent UN Human Rights Council assessments, however, have consistently deemed the overall blockade (including land and air restrictions coordinated with ) illegal, characterizing it as prohibited under Article 33 of the and arguing it exacerbates civilian suffering without proportionate security gains. These positions, articulated by UN special rapporteurs and fact-finding missions, often link the blockade to broader claims of ongoing Israeli occupation despite the 2005 disengagement, though such views have been criticized for overlooking Hamas's role in diverting aid and rejecting truce offers that could lift restrictions. The UNHRC's disproportionate scrutiny of —having adopted more resolutions against it than against all other UN member states combined—raises questions about institutional bias influencing these assessments. Israeli judicial rulings have upheld the blockade's components as lawful measures. The , in multiple petitions since 2007 (including those by groups like Gisha challenging import restrictions), has affirmed that border controls, including on dual-use goods, are proportionate responses to threats from Hamas's military buildup and smuggling via tunnels, balancing humanitarian obligations with Article 51 UN Charter self-defense rights. A March 27, 2025, ruling in Gisha v. Government of Israel rejected demands for unrestricted aid flows amid the post-October 2023 war, emphasizing evidentiary links between eased restrictions and increased terrorist capabilities, while mandating case-by-case reviews rather than blanket prohibitions. Internationally, the (ICJ) has not issued a binding ruling directly on the blockade's pre-2023 legality but, in an October 22, 2025, order related to operations, held obligated to facilitate access under occupation law, finding certain wartime restrictions breached duties to prevent starvation as a method of warfare. This provisional measure, amid South Africa's case, assumes effective control akin to occupation but does not retroactively invalidate the blockade's foundational security rationale as assessed by the Palmer panel; dissenting judges noted insufficient evidence of intent to deny essentials.

Reactions and Perspectives

Palestinian Factions and Hamas Rhetoric

, the dominant faction governing Gaza since its violent seizure of control from forces on June 14, 2007, has consistently depicted the blockade—intensified by shortly thereafter—as a deliberate "" intended to economically asphyxiate the territory and undermine Palestinian resistance. leaders, including exiled Gaza chief , have argued that the restrictions render ceasefire or negotiations futile without their complete removal, framing them as an extension of Israeli occupation and rather than a measure against arms or rocket attacks. This rhetoric positions armed operations, such as rocket barrages, as legitimate responses to "break the ," while downplaying 's own role in initiating hostilities post-2007, including the coup that prompted the blockade's tightening. Allied militant groups like (PIJ), which operates alongside in Gaza and shares Iranian backing, echo this narrative, portraying the as Zionist oppression fueling the need for to liberate and eradicate . PIJ statements emphasize unrelenting armed struggle against what they term the "illegitimate entity," rejecting any political compromise and viewing restrictions on movement, goods, and fishing zones as tools to subjugate under occupation. Joint communiqués from and PIJ, such as endorsements of responses to proposed truces, consistently demand full Israeli withdrawal and dismantlement as non-negotiable for de-escalation. In contrast, Fatah—the leading faction within the (PLO) controlling the —condemns the 's humanitarian toll but attributes its origins and severity to Hamas's 2006 election victory, subsequent rejection of international conditions (recognizing , renouncing violence, accepting prior agreements), and militarized governance. officials, including those under President , have accused Hamas of provoking escalatory Israeli responses through rocket fire and , while exploiting blockade hardships for recruitment and diverting aid to military ends rather than development. This inter-factional discord manifests in rhetoric where calls for unified Palestinian diplomacy to ease restrictions via negotiations, criticizing Hamas's "resistance" paradigm as counterproductive and isolating Gaza further, as evidenced by stalled reconstruction efforts and salary deductions from PA funds to pressure Hamas compliance. Despite occasional unity pledges, such as rejecting foreign guardianship over Gaza, underlying accusations persist, with Hamas labeling complicit in enforcing aspects of the through security coordination with .

Israeli Government and Security Establishment

The Israeli government imposed the blockade on the in June 2007 following Hamas's violent seizure of control from Authority, aiming to prevent the smuggling of weapons and materials that could be used to construct rockets and tunnels for attacks against Israeli civilians. The security establishment, including the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), justified the measures as essential against an armed group designated as a terrorist organization by , the , and the , which had launched thousands of rockets into southern prior to and after the takeover. Israeli Prime Ministers, from to , have consistently defended the as a non-punitive security protocol in the context of ongoing armed conflict with , emphasizing that it targets illicit arms flows rather than the civilian population. The IDF and intelligence agencies assess that without restrictions on , air, and land access, would import advanced weaponry, as evidenced by intercepted attempts via routes and tunnels under the Egyptian . In 2010, the security cabinet approved limited easing of civilian goods imports while upholding the naval to weapons, a decision reaffirmed amid challenges. The government's position holds that the blockade has constrained Hamas's military buildup, reducing the scale of rocket barrages compared to pre-2007 levels—over 5,000 projectiles fired by 2008 alone—though enforcement requires continuous vigilance against dual-use materials diverted to militant infrastructure. Israeli security officials argue that is facilitated through coordinated inspections at crossings like to prevent diversion to tunnels and rocket production, citing instances where materials were repurposed for military ends. Following the , 2023, attacks, the security cabinet intensified oversight, linking any blockade adjustments to 's demilitarization and releases, viewing the policy as integral to deterring future aggression.

Egyptian Stance and Regional Dynamics

Egypt has enforced stringent controls at the Rafah border crossing with Gaza since Hamas seized control of the territory in June 2007, frequently closing it to prevent the smuggling of weapons and militants that could exacerbate instability in the Sinai Peninsula. These measures form a de facto extension of restrictions on Gaza, driven by Cairo's security imperatives rather than alignment with Israeli policy, as Egyptian authorities view unchecked cross-border flows as a direct threat to national stability amid ongoing insurgencies linked to Islamist groups. Egypt's military has actively demolished smuggling tunnels, including flooding them with water and sewage, to disrupt arms transfers to Hamas, which Cairo associates with the Muslim Brotherhood—a designated terrorist organization in Egypt. Official Egyptian statements emphasize opposition to any mass displacement of into Sinai, deeming it a "red line" that risks and demographic upheaval, while rejecting accusations of aid blockages as "malicious propaganda" attributed to Israeli actions at crossings. In practice, operates under tight Egyptian oversight, allowing limited humanitarian passages coordinated with international monitors but prioritizing inspections to block dual-use materials, a policy reinforced after the 2011 revolution when Sinai smuggling networks evolved into a domestic crisis. This approach reflects Cairo's pragmatic calculus: balancing public solidarity with against the imperative to contain Hamas's influence, which could embolden Brotherhood affiliates and fuel jihadist activities in Sinai. Regionally, leverages its border control and mediation role to assert influence, hosting summits and proposing security frameworks while coordinating tacitly with on counter-smuggling operations, despite periodic public rebukes over Gaza operations. This positioning distinguishes from states like and , which provide financial and political support to , as prioritizes the 1979 with and U.S. flows over ideological alignment with Islamist governance in Gaza. Amid broader Arab dynamics, advocates for ceasefires and reconstruction but insists on demilitarizing Gaza to avert spillover threats, viewing 's rocket attacks and tunnel networks as catalysts for regional escalation that undermine anti-Iran coalitions. Such stances have drawn U.S. criticism for aid delays at but underscore 's prioritization of border sovereignty over unrestricted access.

United States and Allied Support

The has long viewed the blockade of the Gaza Strip as a legitimate defensive measure by against , a designated terrorist organization responsible for rocket attacks and cross-border incursions. Following 's violent seizure of control in June 2007, the endorsed 's imposition of restrictions to curb arms smuggling via sea, land, and tunnels, emphasizing the need to prevent Gaza from serving as a launchpad for threats to Israeli civilians. This position aligns with assessments that diverts aid and materials for military purposes, necessitating sustained border controls. US military aid has been instrumental in bolstering Israel's capacity to enforce the blockade, including naval patrols and aerial surveillance. Under a 2016 memorandum of understanding, the US commits $3.8 billion annually in foreign military financing, with supplemental packages exceeding $14.3 billion approved by Congress after October 7, 2023, to replenish munitions and enhance systems like Iron Dome, which intercept Gaza-launched projectiles. From October 2023 to September 2025, total US arms transfers and aid to Israel reached at least $21.7 billion, directly supporting operations to dismantle smuggling networks and secure maritime approaches. Diplomatic backing includes repeated US vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions perceived as undermining Israel's security imperatives, such as those demanding unconditional or eased restrictions without Hamas concessions on hostages or . On June 4, 2025, the vetoed a draft calling for a permanent , arguing it failed to address 's role in perpetuating conflict and unfairly singled out . A similar veto on September 18, 2025, marked the sixth such instance, preserving 's operational freedom amid ongoing threats from Gaza. In 2025, affirmed 's authority to oversee aid distribution mechanisms, rejecting proposals granting or unchecked influence, thereby sustaining the blockade's framework for security vetting. Among US allies, the has coordinated intelligence sharing and joint military exercises with to monitor Gaza threats, while affirming in post-October 2023 statements that 's defensive actions, including blockade enforcement, respond to aggression rather than Palestinian civilians broadly. and similarly condemned 's charter-mandated attacks on , providing diplomatic cover in multilateral forums and continuing defense exports compatible with efforts, though both nations later advocated for calibrated humanitarian exemptions without dismantling core restrictions. These positions reflect a shared prioritization of countering Islamist militancy over easing controls that empirically reduced incidents prior to 2023 escalations.

United Nations and European Union Positions

The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on June 12, 2025, demanding that Israel immediately end its blockade of Gaza, open all border crossings, and ensure unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, with 143 votes in favor, 7 against, and 23 abstentions. UN officials, including the humanitarian chief, have described the blockade as exacerbating famine and malnutrition, attributing deaths and crises directly to restricted aid access, as stated in warnings issued on August 9 and May 4, 2025. A UN Commission of Inquiry report on September 16, 2025, concluded that Israel's policies, including the siege, constituted genocide, urging an end to the blockade to allow unimpeded aid. The International Court of Justice, in a ruling on October 22, 2025, ordered Israel to facilitate aid into Gaza and declared prior restrictions a breach of international obligations. These positions reflect the views of UN bodies like the Human Rights Council, which consistently criticize the blockade as collective punishment, though Security Council actions have been limited by vetoes, such as U.S. opposition to drafts demanding unconditional aid access. The has maintained that must fully lift the Gaza to enable immediate, unimpeded humanitarian access, as reiterated in statements and EU foreign policy positions. On May 7, 2025, EU diplomats urged to end the amid aid shortages, warning against alternative delivery plans that bypass standard channels. The , in a September 8, 2025, resolution, emphasized combating famine through unrestricted and hostage release, while calling for progress toward a . EU High Representative statements, such as on September 23, 2025, at the Council, demanded lifting the alongside ceasefire adherence, positioning the EU as the largest donor of Gaza . Despite recognizing 's security concerns post-2007 control, EU policy since then has framed the as disproportionate, advocating easing restrictions tied to political progress, though implementation has varied among member states with differing views on 's role in aid diversion and militancy.

Humanitarian NGOs and Media Narratives

Humanitarian NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have frequently portrayed the Gaza blockade as a primary driver of a man-made humanitarian catastrophe, emphasizing restrictions on aid inflows, high malnutrition rates, and infrastructure collapse since its imposition in 2007 following Hamas's takeover. In a July 2025 report, Amnesty described Palestinians facing an "impossible choice" between starvation and risking death from gunfire while seeking food, attributing the crisis largely to Israeli controls at crossings like Rafah and Kerem Shalom. Similarly, UN agencies like OCHA have reported insufficient aid volumes post-October 2023, with entries falling below pre-war levels of approximately 500 trucks per day, exacerbating famine risks in northern Gaza by mid-2025. These organizations often cite data from Gaza's Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health or UNRWA, which critics argue introduces bias due to UNRWA staff affiliations with Hamas and unverified casualty figures. Critiques of NGO narratives highlight methodological flaws and selective framing that underemphasize Hamas's governance failures, such as resource diversion to military tunnels and rocket production over civilian infrastructure, despite over $40 billion in international aid received by Gaza since 2007. Independent analyses, including those from NGO Monitor, document how groups like Oxfam and HRW rely on uncontextualized anecdotes while omitting Hamas's extortion of aid—estimated by Israeli assessments at up to 25% through taxation or resale—and internal mismanagement that has left Gaza's water and power systems dilapidated. A 2025 USAID review found no evidence of widespread Hamas theft of U.S.-funded aid, but acknowledged ongoing extortion tactics, underscoring that distribution challenges stem partly from Hamas's monopolistic control rather than total blockade-induced scarcity. This pattern reflects broader institutional biases in humanitarian NGOs, where anti-Israel advocacy often supersedes empirical scrutiny, as evidenced by Amnesty's December 2024 genocide accusation against Israel amid unaddressed Hamas war crimes. Media coverage has amplified these NGO-driven narratives, with Western outlets frequently framing the as inducing , while downplaying its origins as a security measure against arms smuggling and over 20,000 rockets fired into since 2007. Reports from 2023-2025 often prioritize visuals of queues and displacement—such as 1.9 million internally displaced by mid-2025—without proportional scrutiny of 's role in provoking escalations or hoarding supplies for combatants. Studies of coverage in outlets like reveal systematic biases, including higher sourcing from Israeli officials but framing that humanizes Israeli victims more than Palestinian ones, yet overall trends favor narratives of Israeli overreach echoed from NGO reports. This selective emphasis contributes to public perceptions of the as inhumane rather than calibrated response, despite empirical data showing entries averaging hundreds of trucks weekly even during intensified restrictions post-October 7, 2023. Such portrayals, while highlighting real hardships like acute affecting 15% of Gaza children by 2024, causalize distress to Israeli policy alone, sidelining 's prioritization of military expenditures over welfare.

Debunking Biased Interpretations

The characterization of Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip as illegal overlooks its establishment as a lawful naval measure in response to armed threats, including over 12,000 rockets fired from Gaza into between 2001 and 2007, culminating in Hamas's 2007 takeover and subsequent militarization. The 2011 UN Palmer Committee report, investigating the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, explicitly determined that the blockade was imposed legally to prevent weapons smuggling to a engaged in hostilities, consistent with on naval blockades during armed conflict, and not as retribution against civilians. This aligns with historical precedents, such as the of Confederate ports during the or Allied blockades in , which courts later upheld as permissible despite civilian impacts when tied to . Claims portraying Gaza as an "open-air prison" or under ongoing occupation ignore Israel's complete withdrawal of military forces and settlements on September 12, 2005, ending direct territorial control and leaving Gaza's internal governance to Palestinian authorities. Since disengagement, no Israeli troops have been stationed inside Gaza, distinguishing it from occupied territories under the , where effective control requires boots on the ground; Israel's external security measures, including airspace and coastal oversight, stem from Hamas's designation as a terrorist entity by the , , and others, rather than occupation. Egypt's parallel restrictions on its border further underscore that the blockade addresses transnational security threats, not unilateral Israeli domination. Exaggerated narratives of a perpetual humanitarian catastrophe attributable solely to the fail to account for Gaza's economic resilience in non-conflict periods and internal factors like Hamas's toward military infrastructure over civilian welfare. Despite restrictions, Gaza's GDP grew by 20% in 2011, with GDP rising 19%, driven by permitted exports and inflows exceeding $30 billion from 2007-2020. Recent UN and NGO reports decrying or collapse often rely on projections from Hamas-controlled data, which critiques highlight as inflated due to institutional biases and failure to differentiate between effects and Hamas-initiated escalations, such as the diversion of materials for over 500 smuggling tunnels detected by 2013. Empirical indicators, including holding at 74 years pre-2023 war and caloric intake meeting WHO standards via coordinated (over 500 trucks daily in ), contradict claims of engineered , with disruptions primarily linked to conflict cycles rather than . Assertions of systemic aid theft by Hamas, while alleged by Israel, lack corroboration from independent audits like the 2025 USAID review, which found no evidence of widespread diversion of US-funded assistance, complicating narratives that blame Israel for shortages without examining Hamas governance failures. However, the blockade's persistence is justified by verified arms imports via sea and tunnels, as documented in intercepted flotillas carrying military-grade , prioritizing prevention of rearmament over unsubstantiated claims. UN assessments, often cited by critics, exhibit selectivity by emphasizing Israeli actions while downplaying Hamas rocket barrages (over 4,000 in 2021 alone) as provocations, reflecting documented institutional asymmetries in scrutiny. These interpretations, prevalent in advocacy-driven reports, substitute causal attribution to for Hamas's charter-stated rejection of processes, undermining objective analysis of imperatives.

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