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United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict
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The authors : Goldstone, Jilani, and Chinkin.

The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, also known as the Goldstone Report, was a United Nations fact-finding mission established in April 2009 pursuant to Resolution A/HRC/RES/S-9/1 of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) of 12 January 2009, following the Gaza War as an independent international fact-finding mission "to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression".[1][2] South African jurist Richard Goldstone was appointed to head the mission.[2][3] The other co-authors of the Report were Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin and Desmond Travers.

The Goldstone Report accused both the Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes against humanity. It recommended that each side openly investigate its own conduct, and to bring the allegations to the International Criminal Court if they failed to do so.[4][5] The government of Israel rejected the report as prejudiced and full of errors, and also sharply rejected the charge that it had a policy of deliberately targeting civilians.[6] The militant Islamic group Hamas initially rejected some of the report's findings,[7] but then urged world powers to embrace it.[8] Goldstone stated that the mission was not a judicial investigation, it was a fact-finding mission; the findings were "reasonable on weighing the evidence" but did not amount to "the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt".[9] The allegations were "a useful road map" for independent investigations by Israel and the Palestinians.[10]

The report received wide support among countries in the United Nations, while Western countries were split between supporters and opponents of the resolutions endorsing the report.[11][12][13][14] Critics of the report stated that it contained methodological failings, legal and factual errors, and falsehoods, and devoted insufficient attention to the allegations that Hamas was deliberately operating in heavily populated areas of Gaza.[15][16]

The Report described the three weeks comprising the Gaza War as:

a deliberately disproportionate attack designed to punish, humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability.[4]

On 1 April 2011, Goldstone stated that recent Israeli investigations indicated that it was not Israeli government policy to deliberately target citizens.[17] On 14 April 2011 the three other co-authors of the Report, Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin and Desmond Travers, jointly criticized Goldstone's recantation. They all agreed that the report was valid and that Israel and Hamas had failed to investigate alleged war crimes satisfactorily.[18][19]

Mandate of mission

[edit]

On 3 January 2009, in response to the Gaza War, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference's executive committee asked UNHRC to send a fact-finding mission to Gaza.[20] On 12 January, UNHRC adopted Resolution S-9/1:[1]

to dispatch an urgent, independent international fact-finding mission, to be appointed by the President of the Council, to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel, against the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression, and calls upon Israel not to obstruct the process of investigation and to fully cooperate with the mission.[2]

Mary Robinson, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, was asked by UNHRC President Martin Uhomoibhi to lead the Mission but expressed disappointment with the mandate and refused to head the Mission for that reason. She stated that the UNHRC resolution was one-sided and "guided not by human rights but by politics". She later expressed full support for the report.[21]

Richard Goldstone initially refused the appointment for the same reason, calling the mandate "biased" and "uneven-handed". In January 2011, Goldstone said that UNHRC "repeatedly rush to pass condemnatory resolutions in the face of alleged violations of human rights law by Israel but fail to take similar action in the face of even more serious violations by other States. Until the Gaza Report they failed to condemn the firing of rockets and mortars at Israeli civilian centers".[22] Following Goldstone's objection, the mandate was informally widened to cover activities by Palestinian militants as well, and the revised mandate, as quoted by the final report, became:[3][23]

to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, whether before, during or after.

Speaking at Brandeis University, Goldstone noted that the widened mandate was presented by UNHRC President to a plenary session, where it did not encounter a single objection.[24] He later described as "tiresome and inept" allegations made by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the mandate had not been broadened to cover violations by all parties.[25] Despite Uhomoibhi's verbal commitment that there was no objection to the revised mandate,[26] UNHRC never voted to revise the mandate, and resolution S-9/1 remained unchanged.[27]

Mission members

[edit]

According to the mission's report, "The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,[28] to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were: Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who took part in a fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun in 2008; Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur in 2004; and Desmond Travers, a former colonel in the Irish Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations."

Human Rights Watch (HRW) applauded the selection of Goldstone to head the mission, saying, "Justice Goldstone's reputation for fairness and integrity is unmatched, and his investigation provides the best opportunity to address alleged violations by both Hamas and Israel."[29] Goldstone was a board member of HRW at that time,[30] which HRW noted in its article. Gerald Steinberg of the Jerusalem-based NGO Monitor and journalist Melanie Phillips said that even though Goldstone resigned from HRW after the inquiry began, his impartiality was compromised by his link to an organization that accused Israel of war crimes.[31][32][33]

In March 2009, Goldstone, Travers and Jilani signed an open letter to United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the United Nations Security Council, calling for those who perpetrated "gross violations of the laws of war", "gross violations of international humanitarian law" and "targeting of civilians" to be brought to account. The letter concluded: "The events in Gaza have shocked us to the core. Relief and reconstruction are desperately needed but, for the real wounds to heal, we must also establish the truth about crimes perpetuated against civilians on both sides."[34] The chief rabbi of South Africa Warren Goldstein and Melanie Phillips asserted that this statement, made before the work of the mission has begun, violated provisions for impartiality of the fact-finding missions.[33][35] Mary Robinson called Goldstone "a dedicated and unimpeachable human rights lawyer and advocate" who "was able to work with the [Human Rights] Council's president to secure an agreement that he felt confident would permit the mandate to be interpreted in such a way as to allow his team to address the actions taken by both parties to the conflict".[21]

In January 2009, before her appointment to the mission, Christine Chinkin co-signed a letter published in the Sunday Times describing Israel's military offensive in Gaza as "an act of aggression". The letter also stated that the firing of rockets by Hamas into Israel and suicide bombings are "contrary to international humanitarian law and are war crimes".[36][37] Critics, among them Howard L. Berman, said that Chinkin should have been disqualified to preserve the impartiality of the mission.[38][39][40][41] In August 2009, NGO UN Watch submitted a petition to the UN, calling for Chinkin's disqualification.[42] In May 2009, Chinkin denied the charges, saying that her statement only addressed jus ad bellum, and not jus in bello."[43]

The inquiry members said that the mission investigated whether Israel, Hamas or the Palestinian Authority had unnecessarily harmed innocent civilians, stating "On those issues the letter co-signed by Chinkin expressed no view at all."[44][45] The members wrote that the fact-finding mission was not a judicial or even a quasi-judicial proceeding.[45] Hillel Neuer, director of UN Watch, said that the basic standards for international fact-finding missions had been ignored.[46] Goldstone agreed that the letter could have been the grounds for disqualification if the mission had been a judicial inquiry.[47] Two groups, a group of UK lawyers and academics, and a group of Canadian lawyers, said they supported the UN Watch request that Chinkin be disqualified and expressed disappointment that it was rejected.[40][41][39]

Investigation

[edit]

The mission convened on 4 May in Geneva and during a week-long session held meetings with UN Member States, NGOs and representatives of the UN. By the end of the session, the mission established its methodology and a three-month program of work.[3] The mission issued a press release on 8 May describing the mandate, progress and plans. Goldstone stated that the focus of the investigation would be on "an objective and impartial analysis of compliance of the parties to the conflict with their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, especially their responsibility to ensure the protection of civilians and non-combatants," adding "I believe that an objective assessment of the issues is in the interests of all parties, will promote a culture of accountability and could serve to promote greater peace and security in the region."[48]

On 8 June, the mission invited "all interested persons and organizations to submit relevant information and documentation that will assist in the implementation of the Mission's mandate". Submissions were to focus on "events and conduct that occurred in the context of the armed conflict that took place between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009" and that "for the purposes of its mandate, events since June 2008 are particularly relevant to the conflict."[3][49]

The mission conducted two field visits to Gaza, entering through the Rafah Border Crossing from Egypt after access through Israel was denied. The first visit, on 1–5 June 2009, included a tour of the sites and interviews with victims and witnesses. Investigations continued during the second visit, from 26 June to 1 July, with public hearings.[3] In the course of the investigation, the committee conducted 188 interviews, reviewed 10,000 pages of documents and inspected 1,200 photographs.[50]

Israel refused to cooperate with the investigation, citing anti-Israel bias in the UNHRC and the mission's one-sided founding resolution. Israel also stated that the mission would be unable to question Palestinian militants who fired rockets at Israel.[23][36][51] The team was denied access to military sources, and entrance to Gaza via Israel.[51]

According to Western media reports, Hamas was very cooperative;[51] nevertheless, Goldstone pointed out that in some areas of information the committee did not receive full cooperation from the Palestinians.[47] It was also reported that the team had been escorted by Hamas minders who could have intimidated witnesses.[52][53] Goldstone dismissed these allegations as "baseless".[47]

At the end of a four-day trip, the head of the team expressed shock at the scale of destruction. Goldstone announced that the team would hold public hearings with the war's victims later in June, in Gaza and Geneva.[54] Alex Whiting, a professor at Harvard law school, said cases like the one being probed by the UN inquiry team are hard to investigate, especially without military records.[51]

In the morning session of 6 July, Israeli witnesses and representatives testified in front of the committee, describing years of living under rocket attack.[55][56] The last to take the floor during the session was Noam Shalit, father of the Israeli captive soldier Gilad Shalit who at that time had been imprisoned in Gaza for three years, with no visit by the Red Cross permitted.[56][57] Later that day, pro-Palestinian witnesses and experts from Israel and the West Bank testified.[58] The next day, a military expert testified on weapons use by Hamas and Israel and an international law expert testified at Goldstone's Gaza hearings.[59] Following the two-day session, Goldstone said that the investigation entered its final phase, but that it was too soon to conclude that war crimes were committed.[60]

Israeli lawyer Charles Abelsohn criticized the objectivity of the committee members, citing Travers who said during the public hearings that "there have been instances of the shooting of children in front of their parents. As an ex-soldier I find that kind of action to be very, very strange and very unique", asking the witness to comment on those insights.[61]

The commission's report states that during and after the investigation, several Palestinians cooperating with the Mission were detained by Israeli security forces. One of them was Muhammad Srour, a member of the Popular Committee Against the Wall in Nilin, who testified before the Mission in Geneva; en route back to West Bank he was arrested. After UN intervention, he was released. Israeli security sources said that Sruor was detained for questioning on suspicion that he was involved in terror activity and that his visit to Geneva had no bearing on the arrest.[62] Another witness, Shawan Jabarin, General Director of the Palestinian human-rights organisation Al Haq, had to be heard by videoconference, as he has been subject to a travel ban by Israel since 2006 preventing him from leaving the West Bank on the grounds that he is a senior member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.[63][64]

Report

[edit]

On 15 September 2009, a 574-page report was released.[4] The report concluded that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Palestinian militant groups had committed war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. While the report condemned violations by both sides, it differentiated between the moral and legal severity of the violations of the Israeli forces compared to those of Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. These differentiators included 'grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention committed by Israeli forces in Gaza; wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly'.[65][note 1]

Accusations against Israel

[edit]

Blockade of Gaza allegations

[edit]

The report stated that the blockade constituted a violation of Israel's obligations as an occupying power in Gaza.[4]: p. 276ff 

Civilian targeting allegations

[edit]

The report disputes Israel's claim that the Gaza war would have been conducted as a response to rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, saying that at least in part the war was targeted against the "people of Gaza as a whole". Intimidation against the population was seen as an aim of the war.[note 2] The report also says that Israel's military assault on Gaza was designed to "humiliate and terrorize a civilian population, radically diminish its local economic capacity both to work and to provide for itself, and to force upon it an ever increasing sense of dependency and vulnerability".[50]

The report focused on 36 cases that it said constituted a representative sample. In 11 of these episodes, it said the Israeli military carried out direct attacks against civilians, including some in which civilians were shot "while they were trying to leave their homes to walk to a safer place, waving white flags".[50] Talking to Bill Moyers Journal, Goldstone said that the committee chose 36 incidents that represented the highest death toll, where there seemed to be little or no military justification for what happened.[66] According to the report, another alleged war crime committed by IDF include "wanton" destruction of food production, water and sewerage facilities; the report also asserts that some attacks, which were supposedly aimed to kill small number of combatants amidst significant numbers of civilians, were disproportionate.[50]

The report concluded that Israel violated the Fourth Geneva Convention by targeting civilians, which it labeled "a grave breach".[10] It also claimed that the violations were "systematic and deliberate", which placed the blame in the first place on those who designed, planned, ordered and oversaw the operations.[67] The report recommended, inter alia, that Israel pay reparations to Palestinians living in Gaza for property damage caused during the conflict.[65][4]: para. 1768 

Ibrahim al-Maqadma Mosque missile strike

[edit]

The report stated that the January 3, 2009 strike on the al-Maqadmah mosque on the outskirts of Jabilyah occurred when between 200 and 300 men and women attended for their evening prayer, with 15 people being killed and 40 wounded as a result of the attack. The Mission has established that the Israeli armed forces fired a missile that struck near the doorway of the mosque. The Mission found that the mosque was damaged and lodged in its interior walls with "small metal cubes", several of which were retrieved by the Mission when it inspected the site. The Mission concluded that the mosque had been hit by an air-to-ground missile fitted with a shrapnel fragmentation sleeve, fired from an aircraft. The Mission based its findings on investigation of the site, photographs and interviewing witnesses. The Mission found no indications that the mosque was used to launch rockets, store munitions or shelter combatants. The Mission also found that no other damage was done in the area at the time, making the attack an isolated incident. The Mission concluded that the Israelis intentionally bombed the mosque.[4] Judge Goldstone said: "Assuming that weapons were stored in the mosque, it would not be a war crime to bomb it at night... It would be a war crime to bomb it during the day when 350 people are praying." He further added that there is no other possible interpretation for what could have occurred other than a deliberate targeting of civilians.[10] The report also reproduces a statement from the Israeli government concerning the attack, where the Israeli government both denies that the mosque was attacked and states that the casualties of the attack were Hamas operatives. The report says that the position of the Israeli government contains "apparent contradictions" and is "unsatisfactory" and "demonstrably false".[4]

Zeitoun killings

[edit]

According to interviews with family members, neighbors, Palestinian Red Crescent personnel, submissions from various NGOs and visits to the site, the extended al-Samouni family gathered together in one house after the fighting in the area was over, ordered there by Israeli soldiers patrolling their Gaza neighborhood of Zeitoun as part of the ground phase of the Gaza War; when five men stepped out of the house to collect firewood, a missile struck them, fired, possibly, from an Apache helicopter; several more missiles followed, this time aimed directly at the house. In all, 21 family members were killed, including women and children. When the surviving al-Samounis attempted to leave and make their way to Gaza City, they were told by an Israeli soldier to return to the house.[10] In April 2011, Goldstone wrote that the shelling of the home was apparently the consequence of an Israeli commander's erroneous interpretation of a drone image.[68]

Al-Fakhura school incident

[edit]

The report says that IDF's mortar shelling near a United Nations-run Al-Fakhura school in the Jabaliya refugee camp, which was sheltering some 1,300 people, killed 35 and wounded up to 40 people. The investigation did not exclude the possibility that Israeli forces were responding to fire from an armed Palestinian group, as Israel said, but said that this and similar attacks "cannot meet the test of what a reasonable commander would have determined to be an acceptable loss of civilian life for the military advantage sought".[50] The mission criticized IDF for the choice of the weapons for the supposed counterstrike and concluded that the IDF fire at the Al-Fakhura street violated the law of proportionality.[69]: Para. 696–698, late submission 

In 2012 Israeli officials acknowledged that contrary to earlier claims, no rockets were fired from schools operated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) during the Gaza war.[70]

Abd Rabbo family incident

[edit]

According to the Mission's report, the committee found Khaled and Kawthar Abd Rabbo to be credible and reliable witnesses and it had no reason to doubt the veracity of the main elements of their testimony, which it says is consistent with the accounts it received from other eyewitnesses and NGOs.[69]: para. 777  The report concludes that the Israeli soldiers deliberately shot at the family members, as they could not perceive any danger from the house, its occupants or the surroundings. The report bases its conclusion on the premise that the family, consisting of a man, a young and an elderly woman and three small girls, some of them waving white flags, stepped out of the house and stood still for several minutes waiting for instructions from the soldiers.[69]: para. 777 

White phosphorus allegations

[edit]

The report says that Israeli forces were "systematically reckless" in determining the use of white phosphorus in built-up areas.[69]: p. 21  The writers highlighted the Israeli attack on the UN Relief and Works Agency compound in Gaza City on 15 January, the attack on the Al Quds hospital, and the attack on the Al Wafa hospital, each of which involved using white phosphorus. They described its use as disproportionate or excessive under international law. More generally, the UN report recommended that "serious consideration should be given to banning the use of white phosphorus in built-up areas".[71]

Human shields allegations

[edit]

The report also accused Israel of using Palestinians as "human shields" and torturing detainees.[71] The human shields accusations were supported in 2010, with Israel charging two soldiers with forcing a 9-year-old Palestinian boy to open bags suspected of containing bombs.[72]

Accusations against Palestinian militants

[edit]

The report also stated there is evidence that Palestinian armed groups committed war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity by deliberately launching rockets and firing mortars into Israel, calculated to kill civilians and damage civilian structures.[5] The report accused Palestinian armed groups of causing psychological trauma to the civilians within the range of the rockets. It also concluded that killings and abuses of members of the Fatah political movement amount to a "serious violation of human rights".[50]

The Mission, however, found no evidence of Palestinian armed groups placing civilians in areas where attacks were being launched; of engaging in combat in civilian dress; or of using a mosque for military purposes or to shield military activities.[73] This statement contrasted with media reports that Hamas fighters wore civilian clothes and concealed their weapons.[74] In March 2009, the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (Malam) published a report that included material supplied by the IDF and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) as part of an effort to counter the Goldstone Report. It included videos and photographs reportedly showing that "dozens of mosques that were used by Hamas to store weapons, functioned as command centers or whose grounds were used to fire rockets into Israel."[75]

While discussing an obligation of Palestinian armed groups to protect the civilian population in Gaza, the report notes that those interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed groups. The Mission does not discount that the interviewees' reluctance may have stemmed from a fear of reprisals.[69]: para. 440  The report also criticized the treatment of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, and called for his release.[citation needed]

Reactions

[edit]

Israel

[edit]

The Israeli government issued an initial 32-point formal response to the fact-finding mission's report on 24 September 2009. The response listed a series of what it argued were serious flaws and biases in the report, finally concluding that the report perverts international law to serve a political agenda. (See below.)

Also in October 2009, Israel pressured the Palestinian president to postpone asking for a UN vote on the Goldstone report. Yuval Diskin, head of the Israeli Shin Bet security service, met in Ramallah with President Mahmud Abbas and informed him that if Abbas refuses to ask to postpone the UN vote on the Goldstone report then Israel will turn the West Bank into a "second Gaza": the Shin Bet chief told Abbas that if he did not ask for a deferral of the vote, Israel would withdraw permission for mobile phone company Wataniya to operate in the Palestinian Authority and threatened to revoke the easing of restrictions on movement within the West Bank that had been implemented earlier in 2009.[76]

Israeli President Shimon Peres said the mission's report "makes a mockery of history".

Israeli President Shimon Peres said that the report "makes a mockery of history" and that "it does not distinguish between the aggressor and the defender. War is crime and the attacker is the criminal. The defender has no choice. The Hamas terror organization is the one who started the war and also carried out other awful crimes. Hamas has used terrorism for years against Israeli children." Peres also stated that "the report gives de facto legitimacy to terrorist initiatives and ignores the obligation and right of every country to defend itself, as the UN itself had clearly stated." He added that the report "Failed to supply any other way for Hamas fire to stop. The IDF's operations have boosted the West Bank's economy, liberated Lebanon from Hezbollah terror and allowed Gazans to resume normalcy. The Israeli government withdrew (from Gaza) and Hamas began a murderous rampage, firing thousands of shells on women and children – innocent civilians, instead of rebuilding Gaza and caring for the population's welfare. (Hamas) builds tunnels and used civilians and children to shield terrorists and hide weapons."[77]

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: "The Goldstone Report is a field court-martial, and its findings were prewritten. This is a prize for terror. The report makes it difficult for democracies to fight terror."[78] On another occasion, Netanyahu said that the report ignored Israel's 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and the Palestinian rocket attacks that preceded the war. He also warned world leaders that they and their anti-terror forces could be targets for charges similar to those in the report.[79] At the United Nations General Assembly, Netanyahu called the report biased and unjust, asking: "Will you stand with Israel or will you stand with the terrorists? We must know the answer to that question now. Only if we have the confidence that we can defend ourselves can we take further risks for peace."[80]

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said: "The Goldstone Commission is a commission established with the aim of finding Israel guilty of crimes ahead of time, [the commission] was dispatched by countries in which the terms 'human rights' and 'combat ethics' are unknown" He added that "the IDF was forced to deal with the lowest form of terrorists that set themselves the goal of killing women and children [by] hiding behind women and children. The state of Israel will continue to protect its citizens from the attacks of the terrorists and the terror organizations, and will continue to protect its soldiers from hypocritical and distorted attacks."[81]

Preliminary analysis by Israel

[edit]

The Government of Israel issued a 32-point preliminary analysis of the report, titled "Initial Response to Report of the Fact Finding Mission on Gaza Established Pursuant to Resolution S-9/1 of the Human Rights Council". The main arguments in the analysis were the following.

  1. The resolution mandating the mission was one-sided and prejudicial and the terms of the mandate were never changed.
  2. The composition of the Mission and its conduct raised serious questions about its impartiality.
  3. Incidents selected for examination were cherry-picked for political effect.
  4. The mission displayed double standards in acceptance of evidence: treating even photographic evidence presented by Israel as inherently untrustworthy, except when it could be used to condemn Israel, while uncritically accepting statements by Hamas; reinterpreting or dismissing self-incriminating statements by Hamas; and selectively quoting material from sources.
  5. The report includes misstatements of fact: for example, it stated that Israel discriminated against its non-Jewish citizens in providing shelter from Palestinian rocket attacks, when the shelter was provided on the basis of proximity to the Gaza Strip and did not discriminate between Jews and non-Jews.
  6. The report contains misstatements of law: for example, its description of the Israeli appeals process is outdated.
  7. The report fails to consider the military complexities of the war, makes judgments lacking necessary knowledge, and ignores Israel's extensive efforts to maintain humanitarian standards and protect civilians.
  8. The report unjustifiably minimizes the threat of terrorism and in effect vindicates terrorist tactics.
  9. The report presents its findings as judicial determinations of guilt, despite its admission that it does not reach a judicial level of proof; it commits egregious legal errors, including unjustifiable assumptions regarding intent and commanders' states of mind, as well as misinterpretation of the willfulness requirement of responsibility under international law.
  10. The report ignores Israel's own investigations into its conduct, overlooks the many independent levels of scrutiny in Israel's judicial system, misrepresents Israel's legal mechanisms and shows disdain for democratic values.
  11. The report makes one-sided recommendations against Israel while making only token recommendations with respect to Palestinians: for example, recommending Israel compensate Palestinians for attacks without recommending Palestinians compensate Israelis for attacks.

The analysis concludes that the report claims to represent international law but perverts it to serve a political agenda; that it sends a "legally unfounded message to states everywhere confronting terrorism that international law has no effective response to offer them", and that it signals to terrorist groups "that the cynical tactics of seeking to exploit civilian suffering for political ends actually pays dividends".[82]

Palestinian National Authority

[edit]
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas

Following the postponing of the vote on the resolution in UNHRC, the Palestinian National Authority came under heavy criticism for agreeing to defer the draft proposal endorsing all recommendations of the UN Fact Finding Mission. Several Palestinian human rights organizations, condemning the PA's action, issued a statement under the title "Justice Delayed is Justice Denied".[83] Abbas agreed to postpone the vote on the Goldstone report following a confrontational meeting with Yuval Diskin, head of the Israeli Shin Bet security service.[76] Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas announced on 4 October that a new committee would be established in order to investigate the circumstances surrounding the deferral of the UN vote on the Goldstone Report.[84] Hamas officials in Gaza demanded Abu Mazen's resignation for supporting the postponement of the vote at the UN Human Rights Council. Mahmoud al-Zahar said that Abbas was guilty of "a very big crime against the Palestinian people" over the PA's conduct at UNHRC.[85]

Palestinian representative to the United Nations Ibrahim Khraishi called the report unbiased and professionally compiled. He further added, "This report was important; what bothered some parties was that the report simply monitored international law, international humanitarian law and all relevant international instruments. This was not a political instrument that supported Palestine or Israel." He added the report was the first time killings of Palestinian civilians have been documented, and that his people would not forgive if those responsible were not punished.[86]

Eleven Palestinian human rights organizations, including two based in Israel, called on the Palestinian Authority and the Hamas government in Gaza to investigate Palestinian violations of international law allegedly committed during the Gaza War. Alleged violations include Palestinian attacks on civilians in Israel and instances of internal repression, such as summary executions in the Gaza Strip and arrests and torture in the West Bank. The letter asked to launch investigations before the 5 February deadline. The authors of the call said that for PLO efforts to have the report endorsed by the UN to be of lasting value, the Palestinian authorities must take action to implement its recommendations.[87]

United Nations

[edit]

The UN high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, endorsed the report and supported the call on Israel and Hamas to investigate and prosecute those who committed war crimes.[88][89] UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urged "credible" investigations by both sides into the conduct of the Gaza conflict "without delay".[90]

Governments and regional organizations

[edit]

United States

[edit]

Ambassador Susan Rice, the U.S. permanent representative to the UN, said: "We have very serious concerns about many recommendations in the report"[91] State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said: "Although the report covers both sides of the conflict, it focuses overwhelmingly on Israel's actions," adding that Goldstone opted for 'cookie cutter conclusions' about Israel's actions, while keeping 'the deplorable actions of Hamas' to generalized remarks'.[92] The United States pledged to stand by Israel in the fight against the Goldstone report.[93] U.S. Ambassador Alejandro Wolff told the Security Council that whereas the U.S. had "serious concerns" about the report's "unbalanced focus on Israel, the overly broad scope of its recommendations and its sweeping conclusions of law, it also took the allegations in the report seriously and encouraged Israel to conduct serious investigations.[94]

A presidential advisor on Middle East policy told a group of American Jewish leaders in November 2010 that the U.S. government was committed to curbing actions by the UN on the Goldstone Report.[95]

Shelley Berkley of Nevada and Eliot Engel of New York wrote in a joint statement: "Israel took every reasonable step to avoid civilian casualties ... It is ridiculous to claim that Israel did not take appropriate actions to protect civilian populations."[91]

Perceived unwillingness on the part of the United States to act on the report was criticized by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which represents 118 nations, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and international studies at the University of San Francisco, and Human Rights Watch.[96] Naomi Klein stated that instead of proving its commitment to international law, the United States is smearing the "courageous" report.[97]

House of Representatives resolution
[edit]

On 3 November 2009, the United States House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a resolution, H. Res. 867 (344 for, 36 against),[98] calling the report irredeemably biased and unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy.[99] Howard Berman, one of the cosponsors of the resolution, expressed several concerns:[38]

*The commission's report lacks context. It does not take account of the nature of Israel's enemy – operating from the midst of civilian populations, committed to Israel's destruction, and fully supported by state actors Iran and Syria.

*The report does not take into account the extent to which witnesses from Gaza were likely intimidated by Hamas.

*In general, the report is credulous of Hamas claims but skeptical of Israeli claims.

Goldstone and several U.S.-based rights groups denounced the resolution. Sarah Leah Whitson, a director of Middle East and North Africa Division of Human Rights Watch, commented that "this sort of resolution sends a terrible message to the international community about American willingness to believe in international justice for all. I hope that the members of Congress reject it. It's funny because it accuses the Goldstone Report of being one sided but it's not. It's this resolution that's one-sided and biased."[100] HRW also maintained that the House resolution "has factual errors and would help shield from justice the perpetrators of serious abuses – both Israeli and Palestinian".[101]

Europe

[edit]
  • European Union The European Parliament passed a resolution endorsing the Goldstone report in March 2010. The resolution called on the bloc's member states to "publicly demand the implementation of [the report's] recommendations and accountability for all violations of international law, including alleged war crimes".[102]
  • France The French foreign ministry called the facts revealed by the report "extremely serious" and deserving of utmost attention.[103] The French UN Ambassador Gérard Araud urged both sides to initiate "independent inquiries in line with international standards".[90]
  • Spain Talking to Israeli television Channel 2, Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero said that in any event, Spain would not seek to prosecute Israelis for alleged war crimes.[104]
  • Sweden Sweden's foreign minister Carl Bildt said he supported the report, and called Israel's refusal to cooperate with the investigation a mistake. Bildt characterized Goldstone as a person with high integrity and credibility, and called his report worthy of consideration. At the time of Bildt's statement, Sweden held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union.[105]
  • Switzerland At the UNHRC, Switzerland commented favourably on the impartiality of the findings in the 575-page report. The Swiss ambassador called on Israel and Hamas to conduct independent investigations into the allegations of war crimes. He also called for an independent expert panel to oversee legal procedures on both sides.[106]
  • Turkey Turkey, which held a seat in the Security Council until the end of 2010, has voiced support for discussing the report to the Security Council. Turkish prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan called for "accountability" and said that guilty parties should be identified and face necessary sanctions.[107] He also accused Israel of raining "phosphorus bombs ... on innocent children in Gaza".[108]
  • United Kingdom In an interview with an Israeli radio station, the British Ambassador to the United Nations, John Sawers, supported the findings of the report and called for both Israel and the Palestinians to investigate its conclusions.[109] During the UN Security Council's meeting, he said, "the Goldstone Report itself did not adequately recognize Israel's right to protect its citizens, nor did it pay sufficient attention to Hamas's actions." Nevertheless, he further stressed the concerns raised in the report, which he said cannot be ignored.[94] In October 2009 it was reported saying that Ehud Olmert, Israeli prime minister during the conflict, would "probably" face arrest should he visit the UK.[110]
  • Netherlands Dutch foreign minister Maxime Verhagen said both Israel and the Palestinian Authority must investigate war crimes allegations, saying "there can be no impunity for serious human rights violations both on the Palestinian and the Israeli side". Verhagen also urged Israel to halt building settlements in the West Bank, calling the practice a serious obstacle to peace, which "will have to stop".[111]
  • Norway As reported in Haaretz in April 2011, Labor Party Secretary-General Hilik Bar said that Norway's Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre told him that Norway will reconsider their support for the report in light of Goldstone's recantation.[112]

Asia and Africa

[edit]
  • China A Foreign Ministry spokesman said China had voted in favor of the report "in the hope of protecting the human rights of the people in the occupied Palestinian territories and to promote the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace process."[113] Chinese members of parliament told a visiting delegation of the Israeli Parliament officials in Beijing that China will oppose discussing the Goldstone Commission's report at the UN Security Council and allowing the document to serve as a basis for lawsuits against Israel at the International Criminal Court in the Hague. The Chinese parliamentarians stressed that the UNHRC had the necessary tools to look into the report without the involvement of other institutions.[114]
  • Iran Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran's foreign minister, referred to the report when calling for legal action against the Israeli leadership saying, "The perpetrators of the Gaza war should stand before [an] international war crimes tribunal."[citation needed]
  • Nigeria The Nigerian ambassador to the UNHRC, Martin Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi, said that he Council should not dilute its efforts by vilifying the Fact-Finding Mission members and parts of the report – no useful purpose would be served by compounding the human rights situation in the region through sheer rhetoric or failure to act. He said, "The implementation of the report was crucial to addressing the pernicious issues of impunity and accountability".[86]

Organizations

[edit]
  • Arab League The Arab League called for implementation of the recommendations and Secretary General Amr Moussa stressed its commitment to closely following up the situation and assuring implementation of Goldstone's recommendations to "prevent future assaults".[115]
  • Organisation of Islamic Cooperation On behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Pakistani Ambassador Zamir Akram welcomed the fact-finding mission and thanked them for presenting a comprehensive and objective account. Discussing responding to allegations of war crimes, he said, "it was now the time for action; words needed to be converted into deeds."[86]
  • United Nations Speaking in the UNHRC, numerous states called the report "balanced".[106]
  • Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Egyptian Ambassador Hisham Badr welcomed the report, saying that those responsible for crimes should be brought to justice and called for an end to a "situation of impunity and defiance of the law".[86]

Non-government organizations

[edit]

Amnesty International stated that Goldstone's findings were consistent with those of Amnesty's own field investigation, and called on the UN to implement the recommendations.[116] Human Rights Watch called the report a significant step toward justice and redress for the victims on both sides, and called on the Security Council to implement the report's recommendations.[117]

Israeli human rights group B'Tselem, along with eight other Israeli human-rights NGOs, stated that they "expect the Government of Israel to respond to the substance of the report's findings and to desist from its current policy of casting doubt upon the credibility of anyone who does not adhere to the establishment's narrative".[118] At the same time, leaders of B'Tselem and Breaking the Silence think that the Goldstone accusation of an assault on civilians is incorrect.[119] The executive director of B'Tselem criticized some aspects of the report, particularly "very careful phrasing regarding Hamas abuses", such as lack of condemnation of mosques' misuses or human shielding, as well as supposedly sweeping conclusions regarding Israel.[120][121] Yael Stein, research director of B'Tselem, said that she does not accept the Goldstone conclusion of a systematic attack on civilian infrastructure, which she found unconvincing. At the same time, she urged to check out every incident and every policy by an independent body, because in her view the military cannot check itself and it has to be explained why so many people had been killed.[119]

The European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) – the international affiliate of the American Center for Law and Justice – claimed in its analyses of the Report that among numerous flaws in it, the Mission misstated the International Humanitarian Law regarding the obligation of the fighters engaged in hostilities to distinguish themselves from the civilian population by uniform (perfidy violation per Article 37 of the Protocol I).[122]

UN Watch criticized Goldstone's report methodologies that allegedly dismissed or ignored much of the evidence provided in Israeli Government report from July 2009 on the one hand and on the other hand endorsed unquestionably testimonies by Gaza officials.[123] Representatives of Simon Wiesenthal Center made similar charges.[124]

Journalism

[edit]

The Financial Times (UK) called the report balanced and criticized attacks on Goldstone. It argued, however, that Israeli objections to the UNHRC were on strong ground, stating, "council members from Libya to Angola hide behind the Palestinian cause to deflect attention from their own records of serious human rights abuse."[125]

The Independent wrote that Israel should open a parliamentary investigation after the model of the Kahan Commission to look into its actions in Gaza. The paper wrote, "Strong democratic nations are able to scrutinise their own behaviour, even in times of conflict. It is time for Israel to demonstrate its own democratic strength."[126]

The Economist (UK) denounced the report as "deeply flawed" and detrimental to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, arguing that it was tainted by anti-Israel prejudice in the UNHRC. In particular, The Economist chastised the mission for saying there was little or no evidence showing Hamas endangered civilians by basing themselves around schools, mosques and hospitals, and claimed that instead, the charge was supported by many reports in the public domain.[127]

The Times (UK) criticized the report as "provocative bias" and described as dangerous and unreasonable the moral equivalence drawn in the report between Israel and Hamas. The Times praised Israel for quietly continuing to conduct its own investigation into the conflict despite the report, and concluded that Israel "is an accountable, democratic, transparent nation, and fighting to remain one amid challenges that few other nations ever have to face".[128]

The Washington Post wrote that "... the Goldstone commission proceeded to make a mockery of impartiality with its judgment of facts. It concluded, on scant evidence, that "disproportionate destruction and violence against civilians were part of a deliberate policy" by Israel. At the same time it pronounced itself unable to confirm that Hamas hid its fighters among civilians, used human shields, fired mortars and rockets from outside schools, stored weapons in mosques, and used a hospital for its headquarters, despite abundant available evidence".[129]

The Wall Street Journal criticized the report, calling it a "new low" in United Nations bias on Israel-related matters. WSJ wrote that the commission's members "were forced to make some astonishing claims of fact" in order to reach some of their conclusions. In particular, WSJ criticized the report's claim that the Gaza police force was a "civilian" agency and its inability to establish Palestinian use of mosques for military purposes despite evidence to the contrary.[130]

Military commentators

[edit]

Colonel Richard Kemp, former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, addressed the UNHRC in October 2009, speaking on behalf of UN Watch. He said that Hamas is "adept at staging and distorting incidents" and asserted that during the conflict the Israel Defense Forces "did more to safeguard the rights of civilians in a combat zone than any other army in the history of warfare" and that Palestinian civilian casualties were a consequence of Hamas' way of fighting, which involved using human shields as a matter of policy, and deliberate attempts to sacrifice their own civilians. He added that Israel took extraordinary measures to give Gaza civilians notice of targeted areas, aborted potentially effective missions in order to prevent civilian casualties, and took "unthinkable" risks by allowing huge amounts of humanitarian aid into Gaza during the fighting.[131] Goldstone stated that Kemp was not interviewed "because the report did not deal with the issues he raised regarding the problems of conducting military operations in civilian areas".[61]

Australian Major General Jim Molan (retired), who served as chief of operations of the Iraq multinational force in 2004–05, stated that "The Goldstone report is an opinion by one group of people putting forward their judgments, with limited access to the facts, and reflecting their own prejudices. The difference in tone and attitude in the report when discussing Israeli and Hamas actions is surprising." ... "as a soldier who has run a war against an opponent not dissimilar to Hamas, facing problems perhaps similar to those faced by Israeli commanders, my sympathies tend to lie with the Israelis." ... "But having stated my prejudice, I think I may be more honest than Goldstone, who seems to pass off his prejudices in a report that cannot be based on fact, and uses judicial language and credibility to do so. It comes down to equality of scepticism: if you refuse to believe anything the Israelis say, then you have no right to unquestioningly accept what Hamas says."[132]

[edit]

Writing in the Financial Times Italian Jurist Antonio Cassese who was the first President of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia argued that critics of the report were relying primarily on ad hominem and strawman attacks. He argued that "critics have given inaccurate descriptions of the report's findings" and that "those who claim the mission's mandate was biased against Israel seem to have ignored a significant fact: Justice Goldstone, whose mission was initially asked to look into alleged violations only by Israel, demanded—and received—a change of mandate to include attacks by Hamas." Furthermore, he argued that many critics of the report "have launched personal attacks on Justice Goldstone's character" and some critics have even gone as far as labeling Goldstone, who is Jewish, "an 'anti-Semite' of a kind who 'despise and hate our own people'".[133]

Former Canadian Minister of Justice, Attorney General of Canada, former president of the Canadian Jewish Congress and former Director of the Human Rights Program at McGill University Professor Irwin Cotler called the inquiry "inherently tainted", agreeing with Mary Robinson and Richard Goldstone that its original mandate was "deeply one-sided and flawed" prior to being broadened, and stating that the UNHRC is "systematically and systemically biased against Israel".[134] He opposed the report, which he regarded as "tainted". At the same time, he is in favor of establishing an independent inquiry into the Gaza war, saying that Israel would set a precedent if it creates such an inquiry that according to his best knowledge "no other democracy" had.[135]

Princeton professor emeritus of international law Richard Falk, appointed in 2008 by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to serve as a United Nations Special Rapporteur on "the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967", endorsed the report as "an historic contribution to the Palestinian struggle for justice, an impeccable documentation of a crucial chapter in their victimization under occupation". Writing in Electronic Intifada, Falk further commented that the report appeared to him to be "more sensitive" to Israel's contentions that Hamas was guilty of war crimes, and that the report in many ways "endorses the misleading main line of the Israeli narrative". Falk was critical of charges that the report, or the UNHRC, were biased and inferred that such criticism amounted to an attempt to "avoid any real look at the substance of the charges".[136]

York University scholar of human rights and humanitarian law Professor Anne Bayefsky said that the report, which claims to be a human rights document, never mentions the racist, genocidal intent of the enemy, which Israel confronted after years of restraint. She added that the report relies on testimonies from witnesses speaking under circumstances that gave rise to "a fear of reprisals" from Hamas should they have dared to tell the truth.[137]

Nigel Rodley, professor of law at University of Essex said the report "painstakingly documents" a large number of violations by Hamas, PA and Israel, and carefully provides evidence to back them. He explains that because the report focused on the loss of life, and because overwhelming majority of lives lost were Palestinian lives at the hands of Israel, it is natural for the report to give that more attention.[138]

Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz wrote that the problem with the report is what its composers willfully and deliberately refused to see and hear. He said that the commission ignored easily accessible videotapes that show Hamas operatives routinely firing rockets from behind human shields, and the report dismissed eyewitness accounts published by reputable newspapers and admissions by Hamas leaders regarding Hamas military activities.[139]

University of Toronto professor of law Ed Morgan wrote in the Toronto Star that in dealing with the alleged use of human shielding of the Gaza civilian population by Hamas, the report "put its head in the sand", saying merely that "[t]he mission notes that those interviewed in Gaza appeared reluctant to speak about the presence of or conduct of hostilities by the Palestinian armed groups". The article also criticized the way the committee dismissed first-hand evidences from IDF soldiers implying that mosques were used as launching points for Hamas attacks and as weapons storage facilities.[140]

Professor Daniel Friedmann, who served as the Justice Minister of Israel during the Gaza War, criticized what he called the "reinterpretation" of evidence unfavorable to Hamas. As an example, he cites the statement of the Hamas police force spokesman saying that "police officers received clear orders from the leadership to face the [Israeli] enemy". He says that the committee uncritically accepted the explanation that the intention was that in the event of an invasion, the police would continue to uphold public order and ensure the movement of essential supplies.[141]

Writing in the JURIST, Laurie Blank of Emory Law's International Humanitarian Law Clinic and Gregory Gordon of the University of North Dakota School of Law said that the Goldstone Report's major flaw is that it fails the law. In their view, the Report incorrectly claims Israel disproportionately attacked civilians by relying on information gathered after the fact and discounting contemporaneous Israeli intentions or actions and the surrounding circumstances; the Report unjustly accuses Israel of a disproportionate response to eight years of Hamas's attacks, unfairly presenting Operation Cast Lead as disproportionate overall; the Report treats Israel and Hamas disproportionately by holding them to different standards, merely suggesting that Hamas's actions "would constitute" legal violations.[142]

Other

[edit]

Noam Shalit, father of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit held captive by Hamas, urged the UN to take all possible measures to implement the Goldstone report's recommendations on the status of his son. The Goldstone report calls for the immediate release of Gilad Shalit and, while Shalit is in captivity, for access to him by the International Committee of the Red Cross.[143]

Residents of southern Israel who testified before the commission regarding Palestinian rocket attacks on the region said that their testimonies were largely ignored.[144]

Noam Chomsky argued that the Goldstone report is biased in favour of Israel since the report failed to question Israel's contention that it was acting in self-defence. Chomsky stressed that the right to self-defence requires that peaceful means are first exhausted before resorting to military force, something Israel "did not even contemplate doing".[145]

The Trades Union Congress (TUC), the main federation of trade unions in the United Kingdom, "welcomed" the findings of the report.[146]

J Street, a Liberal Jewish lobby in the United States, called on Israel to establish an independent state commission of inquiry to investigate the accusations detailed in the report.[147]

Richard Landes, who also maintains the "Understanding the Goldstone Report" site, published in the December 2009 volume of the Israeli MERIA Journal critical analyses of the Goldstone report. Landes argued that the report fails to investigate seriously the problem of Hamas embedding its war effort in the midst of civilian infrastructure in order to draw Israeli fire and then accuse Israel of war crimes; the report is credulous concerning all Palestinian claims, contrasted with a corresponding skepticism of all Israeli claims; the report harshly judges Israel for war crimes, contrasted with its resolute agnosticism concerning Hamas intentions. Landes concluded that Goldstone actually participates in Hamas' strategy, which, according to Landes, encourages the sacrificing of their own civilians.[148]

In an interview on the independent U.S. news broadcaster Democracy Now, Norman Finkelstein questioned the way the report judged the events in Gaza based on the laws of war, saying that Gaza did not meet the criteria of a war zone, calling it instead a "massacre". He went on to say that there was no fighting in Gaza, and referred to quotes from the testimonies of the Israeli soldiers published in the report by NGO Breaking the Silence. Concerning the substance of the report, Finkelstein says the Goldstone report is in-line with reports compiled by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in the findings that Israel had targeted civilians and the Palestinian infrastructure.[149]

Yaniv Reich and Norman Finkelstein have commented that Goldstone's statement does not contradict the findings of the report, specifically pointing out that the report did not claim the existence of an explicit policy of targeting civilians.[150][151]

Mission members' responses to criticism

[edit]

Goldstone dismissed accusations of anti-Israel bias in his report as "ridiculous"[152] and invited "fair minded people" to read the report and "at the end of it, point out where it failed to be objective or even-handed".[5] Speaking in the UNHRC, Goldstone rejected what he called a "barrage of criticism" about his findings and said the answers to such criticism are in the findings of the report.[153] Goldstone said that the United States, for example, had failed to substantiate its charges that the report was biased. In an interview with Al Jazeera, Goldstone challenged the Obama administration to identify the flaws the U.S. said it has found in the report.[25][154] Alan Dershowitz in his analyses of the Report responded that as of January 2010 Goldstone had generally refused to reply substantively to credible critics of the Report and declined Dershowitz's offer to publicly debate Goldstone about its contents.[155][156] Goldstone referred to his experiences of South Africa to reject Israeli PM Netanyahu's arguments that the report would make peacemaking more difficult, saying, "truth-telling and acknowledgement to victims can be a very important assistance to peace."[25][154]

In an interview with The Jewish Daily Forward, published on 7 October 2009, Goldstone emphasized that his task was to conduct a "fact-finding mission" and not an "investigation". He acknowledged the reliance on Palestinian (Gazan and Hamas) testimonies, noting his mission cross-checked those accounts against each other and sought corroboration from photos, satellite photos, contemporaneous reports, forensic evidence and the mission's own inspections of the sites in question. He further acknowledged that "We had to do the best we could with the material we had. If this were a court of law there would have been nothing proven.... I would not consider it in any way embarrassing if many of the allegations turn out to be disproved."[10]

Harper's Magazine published a brief telephone interview with Desmond Travers in which he was asked to respond to criticism of the mission and the report. He rejected the criticism that insufficient weight was given to the difficulties of fighting in the urban environment, and said that he was surprised by what he called "the intensity and viciousness of the personal attacks aimed at members of the Mission". He also said that the mission found no evidence that mosques were used to store munitions; in two cases investigated, neither was used as anything but a place of worship. He added that he had seen no credible criticism of the report itself or of the information in it.[157]

Travers' statement regarding the use of mosques was challenged by a researcher at JCPA Colonel (res.) Halevi. Halevi said that the use of mosques as munition storage was supported by photographs of weapons seized in the Salah a-Din mosque in Gaza City during the operation, and the committee did not explain why it chose to disregard the information completely.[158]

Subsequent developments

[edit]

Human Rights Council

[edit]
UN Human Rights Council vote on the resolution. Green represents support, blue represents opposition, brown means abstain, and tan means absent.

The vote for the UNHRC resolution endorsing the report was delayed on 2 October 2009 until the council's meeting in March 2010, after Palestinian delegation dropped its support for a resolution, apparently under heavy U.S. pressure.[159] But on 11 October, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas called on the UN Human Rights Council to hold a special session to endorse the Goldstone Report.[160] UN officials announced that the UN Human Rights Council would reopen the debate about the report's findings on 15 October.[161] UN Watch issued a statement saying that the announced special Council's session would be a gross abuse of the procedures.[162] On 15 October, the UNHRC endorsed the report, a move that sends it on to more powerful UN bodies for action. The resolution to the council condemned Israeli human rights violations in east Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, as well as chastised Israel for failing to cooperate with the UN mission.[163] The resolution text also calls on the council to endorse the Goldstone Report, however the resolution explicitly mentions only Israeli violations of international law.[164] 25 of the UNHRC members, mostly developing and Islamic countries, voted in favour of the resolution; the United States and five European countries opposed; 11 mostly European and African countries abstained, and Britain, France, and three other members of the 47-nation body declined to vote.[163] The "unbalanced focus" of the ratification was criticized by U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly[165] and U.S. ambassador to the UNHRC Douglas Griffiths.[166]

Israeli officials rejected the UN Human Rights Council decision to endorse the report. Israeli Arab MK Ahmed Tibi, Hamas, and Palestinian Authority representatives welcomed the vote.[167]

The report was adopted by a vote of 25 in favour, 6 against, and 11 abstentions at a meeting held on 16 October 2009. The vote was as follows:[168]

Goldstone criticized the United Nations Human Rights Council resolution for targeting only Israel, and failing to include Hamas: "This draft resolution saddens me as it includes only allegations against Israel. There is not a single phrase condemning Hamas as we have done in the report. I hope that the council can modify the text."[169]

On 13 April 2011, the UNHCR recommended that the General Assembly reconsider the report at its sixty-sixth session (to be held in September 2011), and urges the Assembly to submit that report to the Security Council for its consideration and appropriate action, including consideration of referral of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, pursuant to article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute.[170] The resolution was drafted by the Palestinian Authority and adopted by the Human Rights Council with 27 states voting in favour, three against, and 16 abstentions. It followed the second report of a Committee of Independent Experts, established to monitor the domestic investigations into violations committed during the conflict, which was submitted to the Human Rights Council on 18 March 2011. The report concurred with Amnesty International's assessment that – more than 18 months since the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict documented crimes under international law committed by both sides – the Israeli authorities and the Hamas de facto administration have failed to conduct investigations meeting the required international standards of independence, impartiality, thoroughness, effectiveness and promptness. The General Assembly has already twice called on the domestic authorities to conduct credible, independent investigations into the serious violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law documented by the UN Fact-Finding Mission, in resolutions adopted in November 2009 and February 2010. Those calls appear to have been ignored meaning that the General Assembly would be entitled to submit the issue to the Security Council.[171]

General Assembly

[edit]

The United Nations General Assembly endorsed a resolution calling for independent investigations to be conducted by Israel and Hamas on allegations of war crimes described in the Goldstone report. The resolution was passed by overwhelming numbers with 114 in favour and 18 against, and 44 abstentions. The resolution calls on the UN Secretary General to report to the General Assembly within three months "with a view to considering further action, if necessary, by the relevant United Nations organs and bodies", and to send the report to the Security Council.[172][173] The resolution enjoyed wide support among the Non-Aligned Movement bloc and the Arab bloc that comprise a majority of 120 votes. Most developing countries voted in favor. The countries that voted against the resolution were: Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, the Netherlands, Palau, Panama, Poland, Slovakia, The Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and the United States. Some European countries, namely Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Malta, Serbia, Slovenia and Switzerland, voted in favor of the resolution. Other European countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Spain, abstained.[16]

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said the vote showed that Israel has a "moral majority", adding: "[we] are pleased that 18 democratic 'premier league' states voted in line with Israel's position, while 44 South American and African states abstained".[174] The Palestinian ambassador to the UN stated that "the General Assembly sent a powerful message", adding that if Israelis do not comply, "we will go after them."[172]

The General Assembly passed a second resolution on 26 February 2010 to call once more for credible investigations into war crimes allegations detailed in the report, giving both sides five months to report on their investigations. The resolution was passed by a vote of 98–7 with 31 abstentions, with several European countries changing their vote from against to abstaining or from abstaining to supporting relative to the first resolution. Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak attributed the change in voting partly to a negative reaction in Europe to an assassination carried out in Dubai, which was largely blamed on Israel.[175][176]

Security Council

[edit]

Libya requested an emergency session of the UN Security Council on 7 October to consider the content of the report by UNHRC fact-finding mission.[85] The request was rejected, but the Security Council agreed to advance its periodical meeting on the Middle East from 20 to 14 October and to discuss the war crimes allegations raised in the report.[177] The report became the focus of the Security Council's monthly Mideast meeting on 14 October. Council diplomats say there is little chance that the Security Council will take any action, primarily because of objections by the United States, which said the report should be handled by the Human Rights Council.[178] All of the permanent members of the Security Council, which wield veto powers, oppose involving the Security Council in the report.[179]

The ICC Prosecutor could seek a determination from the Judges of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber on whether he can open an investigation into crimes committed during the conflict on the basis of a declaration issued by the Palestinian Authority in January 2009. That declaration accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC over crimes "committed on the territory of Palestine since 1 July 2002". Legal experts dispute whether the Palestinian Authority is a "state" capable of making such a declaration under the Rome Statute. If the judges were to determine that the ICC could act on the declaration, a referral by the Security Council would not be required for the ICC to open an investigation. The ICC Prosecutor has not yet sought such a determination.[171]

Israeli internal investigations

[edit]

The UNHRC Mission's report recommended that both sides in the conflict open credible independent investigations into their own actions.[11] The Israeli military opened about 100 internal investigations into its actions during the conflict, of which about 20 were criminal.[11] The Prime Minister's Office released a statement on 24 October stating that the Israel Defense Forces had investigated most of the incidents and accusations of human rights abuses mentioned in the report.[180] Goldstone and human rights organizations said it was insufficient for the military to investigate itself, and the United States urged Israel to mount an independent inquiry. Goldstone also stated that an independent investigation in Israel "would really be the end of the matter, as far as Israel is concerned".[11]

In October, support grew within Israel for the launch of an independent inquiry, although the IDF and Defense Ministry argued that it would discredit the military's own internal investigations.[11] That month, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the establishment of a commission headed by Justice Minister Yaakov Ne'eman that would reassemble and reevaluate material gathered by the IDF to ensure that the investigations were thorough and that no facts were covered up. According to the report, the team would not question soldiers and officers.[180]

Two professors, Moshe Halbertal and Avi Sagi, called for further investigation of incidents of Israeli troops opening fire on civilians carrying white flags, the destruction of homes in the final days of the operation and the destruction of power stations and water facilities.[181] Former Israeli Supreme Court President Aharon Barak advised the Attorney General to establish a state committee endowed with investigative and subpoena powers to look into the claims raised by the Goldstone report.[87] The chief legal officer of the IDF, Pnina Sharvit-Baruch, advocated establishing a commission of inquiry to respond to the Goldstone report, which she described as "very, very damaging" to Israel's international standing. She argued that an inquiry was needed to provide Israel with arguments that it had complied with the report's recommendations, rather than to uncover actual war crimes.[182]

In January 2010, the Israeli military completed a rebuttal to the Goldstone report. The IDF affirmed that Gaza's sole flour mill was hit by tank shells in the course of a firefight with Hamas and that it was a legitimate military target because Hamas fighters were allegedly in its vicinity.[183] The Goldstone Report informed that the mill had been hit by an aircraft bomb. Moreover, the Israeli military denied that the mill was a pre-planned target.[183] (Photographs taken by a UN team to which The Guardian had access reportedly show, however, that the remains of a 500-pound Mk82 aircraft-dropped bomb were found in the midst of the mill's ruins.[183]) Israel said it would present UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon with its response to the Goldstone report by 28 January to meet the 5 February deadline set by the UN General Assembly.[184] Defense Minister Ehud Barak and IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi pushed for the establishment of a judicial investigative panel to review the internal IDF investigations and determine whether the investigations were thorough.[185]

In January 2010, eight human rights organizations in Israel reissued a call to the government to establish an independent and impartial investigation.[186] The call was issued by Adalah, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, B'Tselem, Gisha, HaMoked, Physicians for Human Rights–Israel, the Public Committee Against Torture in Israel, Yesh Din and Rabbis for Human Rights.[186]

In April 2010, Human Rights Watch released a 62-page report on Israels and Hamas' investigations. Concerning Israel, HRW reported that Israel had until that point failed to conduct a credible and independent investigation into the alleged war crimes in Gaza. "Israel's investigations into serious laws-of-war violations by its forces during last year's Gaza war lack thoroughness and credibility," HRW said in a release.[187] In July 2010 Israel released second response to the report.[188] Several soldiers were charged with misconduct, including manslaughter charges against a soldier for shooting at Palestinian women carrying white flags, as well as charges against use of a boy as a human shield. Brigadier General Eyal Eisenberg and Colonel Ilan Malca were reprimanded for authorizing an artillery attack that hit a UN compound.[189]

Hamas claims

[edit]

Addressing the report's allegations, initially a Hamas spokesman in Gaza said that the rockets fired at Israel were in self-defense, and were not intended to target civilians: "We were targeting military bases, but the primitive weapons make mistakes."[50] In what the Associated Press called "a rare deviation from Hamas' violent ideology", Hamas also initially said it regretted killing Israeli civilians. Ahmed Assaf, a spokesman for the rival Palestinian party Fatah, said he was "stunned" at the apology, and said Hamas should instead apologize rather to fellow Palestinians for the deaths and injuries Hamas caused during its violent struggle with Fatah over control in Gaza in 2007, which he called a "bloody coup".[190]

HRW rejected Hamas's claim:

Hamas' claim that rockets were intended to hit Israeli military targets and only accidentally harmed civilians is belied by the facts. Civilians were the target, deliberately targeting civilians is a war crime.

HRW deputy Middle East director Joe Stork stated: "Hamas can spin the story and deny the evidence, but hundreds of rockets rained down on civilian areas in Israel where no military installations were located."[191][192] The Associated Press noted, "Hamas fired hundreds of rockets toward Israeli towns and cities during the fighting, killing three Israeli civilians."[193]

Several days later, Hamas retracted its apology, stating that its statement had been incorrectly interpreted. According to Gaza analyst Naji Sharrab, Hamas's retraction was likely a result of public pressure on Hamas in the Gaza Strip. "They are addressing two different audiences," Sharrab said of Hamas.[194]

In April 2010, HRW reported that Hamas had not conducted any credible investigations at all. "Hamas has punished no one for ordering or carrying out hundreds of deliberate or indiscriminate rocket attacks into Israeli cities and towns," HRW said in a release.[187]

UN Panel assessment

[edit]

In September 2010, A UN Human Rights Council panel said Israel and Hamas had failed to conduct credible and adequate investigations into the war crimes allegations contained in the Goldstone report. The panel said Israel only investigated low-ranking officials and failed to investigate the role of "officials at the highest levels", while Hamas was criticised for not making serious efforts to investigate.[195]

Future ramifications

[edit]
Mustafa Barghouti, Palestinian democracy activist

It has been suggested by some states, individuals, organisations and media outlets that the Goldstone report may have ramifications for other present and future conflicts, particularly conflicts between states and non-state actors such as terrorist organisations.

Israel has said that the Goldstone report poses a challenge to the ability of states to defend themselves against terrorism, and warned that similar allegations could be made against other militaries fighting in comparable circumstances. In a statement released by Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel claims that the report "[t]ies the hands of democratic countries fighting terror worldwide" and "[p]romotes criminal proceedings against forces confronting terrorism in foreign states".[196] Following statements by the United Kingdom's Ambassador to Israel calling upon Israel to investigate the allegations contained in the report, Israeli officials reportedly responded that "[i]f a precedent is set of Israelis being prosecuted for acts during the Gaza war, Britons could also be placed in the dock for actions in Iraq and Afghanistan."[197] Similarly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in an interview broadcast on Israel's Channel 10, said, "... countries that are fighting terrorism must understand that this report hurts not only us but them as well. It hurts peace. It hurts security."[198]

Opinion and editorial pieces expressing similar views have been published in a variety of newspapers and media outlets in the U.S. and Israel, some claiming that American and European military forces could be subject to similar criticism for their operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[199][200][201][202][203]

An article published by the BBC said that the fact that the Goldstone report might have consequences for countries fighting terrorists that hide among civilians "may have been a consideration for the U.S. and some NATO countries that either voted against the UN resolution or abstained [at the General Assembly vote]". The article concludes by stating that human rights groups note that the report has reinforced efforts to tackle issues of impunity and lack of accountability for war crimes.[179]

In an interview conducted by Al-Jazeera, American Professor of law and former Lieutenant Colonel in the Israeli Defense Forces Amos N. Guiora and Palestinian politician Mustafa Barghouti both stated that they believed that the Goldstone report would have massive ramifications for the United States and other countries involved in military conflicts. According to Guiora the report "[minimizes] the nation-state's right to self-defence" and "raises extraordinarily important questions for American policymakers and for American commanders presently engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq and that same question is true with respect to other armies".[204]

On 26 February 2010, in testimony before the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton "admitted that the report was problematic for the United States and other countries, which face the same type of war on terrorism coming out of populated areas". She also warned that if the Goldstone report were to set the international standards, the U.S. and many other countries might be accused of war crimes for their military operations.[205]

In the wake of the report, and following receipt of material from South African, International Criminal Court prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo stated he was considering opening an investigation into whether Lt. Col. David Benjamin, an IDF reserve officer, allowed war crimes to be committed during the Gaza War. Benjamin served in the Military Advocate General's international law department, but was actually abroad for most of the period of the conflict and already retired from active duty. Because of his dual Israeli-South African citizenship, he is according to Moreno Ocampo within the jurisdiction of the ICC.[206]

The European Initiative, a pro-Israeli group, lodged an itemized legal complaint with the Belgian Federal Prosecutor's Office and demanded that the top Hamas leadership in Gaza and Damascus be prosecuted for war crimes. The plaintiffs are Israelis who hold Belgian citizenship and live in the Gaza periphery communities that have been targeted by rockets. The suit is based on the Goldstone Report, as well as on reports by B'Tselem and Amnesty International.[207][208]

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, wrote that the even-handed and impartial approach of the team led by Goldstone is indispensable in preventing future human-rights violations and in establishing a solid base for peace and security.[209]

Goldstone's Op-Ed on the existence of an IDF policy of targeting civilians

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On 1 April 2011, Goldstone published a piece in The Washington Post titled 'Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and war crimes' in which he re-iterated the basis on which the report found that Israel had targeted civilians:

The allegations of intentionality by Israel were based on the deaths of and injuries to civilians in situations where our fact-finding mission had no evidence on which to draw any other reasonable conclusion.

He goes on to explain that "the investigations published by the Israeli military... indicate that civilians were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy" while "the crimes allegedly committed by Hamas were intentional goes without saying."[210]

The other principal authors of the UN report, Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin and Desmond Travers, have rejected Goldstone's reassessment arguing that there is "no justification for any demand or expectation for reconsideration of the report as nothing of substance has appeared that would in anyway change the context, findings or conclusions of that report with respect to any of the parties to the Gaza conflict".[18][19] When Israeli journalist Akiva Eldar asked Goldstone to clarify what evidence prompted him to change his mind, Goldstone declined to answer, saying he had imposed "media silence" on himself.[211]

Goldstone had reportedly came under pressure such that threats were made to ban him from his grandson's bar mitzvah at a Johannesburg synagogue.[212][211]

Goldstone's statement

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Goldstone wrote that the mission lacked evidence about why civilians were targeted in Gaza and so based its conclusion that Israel intentionally targeting civilians because it had no evidence to base any other conclusion on, but that subsequent investigations "indicate that civilians were not intentionally targeted as a matter of policy". In contrast, he wrote that "it goes without saying" that Hamas intentionally targeted Israeli civilians. Goldstone praised Israel for investigating claims of war crimes while faulting Hamas for its failure to launch any investigations of its own forces. Goldstone commended Israel for responding to his report by revising military procedures e.g. to discontinue the use of white phosphorus (including as a smokescreen) in or near civilian areas.[213]

Reactions

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Response in Israel to Goldstone's reappraisal of the report was harsh with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu releasing a statement saying that the report should be thrown "into the dustbin of history" and Jerusalem Post editor David Horovitz writing that Goldstone had "produced a report that has caused such irreversible damage to Israel's good name" that the very least that Goldstone now owes Israel "is to work unstintingly from now on to try to undo the damage he has caused".[214] UN human rights council spokesman Cedric Sapey stated "The UN will not revoke a report on the basis of an article in a newspaper. The views Mr Goldstone expressed are his own personal views." Sapey explained "A move to change or withdraw the report would either require a formal written complaint from Goldstone, backed unanimously by his three fellow authors, or a vote by the UN general assembly or the human rights council."[215] However, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri dismissed Goldstone's remarks saying, "his retreat does not change the fact war crimes had been committed against 1.5 million people in Gaza," while Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki said Goldstone's comments did not change a thing and that "The report was as clear as the crimes that Israel committed during the war."[216]

Hina Jilani, one of the four writers of the "Goldstone Report", noted when asked if the report should allegedly be changed: "Absolutely not; no process or acceptable procedure would invalidate the UN Report; if it does happen, it would be seen as a 'suspect move'."[217][218] Also another of the four co-writers, Irish international criminal investigations expert Desmond Travers, noted: 'the tenor of the report in its entirety, in my opinion, stands'.[219] Also Goldstone maintained that, although the one correction should be made, he had "no reason to believe any part of the report needs to be reconsidered at this time" and that he did not plan to pursue nullifying the report.[220]

Human rights organizations said that much of the report remained valid.[221]

American Jewish Committee (AJC) Executive Director, David Harris, said that "Judge Goldstone should apologize to the State of Israel for the accusations of intentionally targeting civilians, which he now admits were unfounded. He should present his updated conclusions to the UN Human Rights Council, as well as to the General Assembly, which endorsed the skewed report, and press for its rejection."[222]

Statement issued by other members of UN mission

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On 14 April 2011, the other three authors of the report released a statement regarding Goldstone's article in which they collectively stood by the findings of the report and lamented "the personal attacks and the extraordinary pressure placed on members of the fact-finding mission".[19]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, also known as the Goldstone Mission, was an independent fact-finding body established by the through resolution S-9/1 on 12 January 2009, in the aftermath of Israel's military operation in Gaza from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. Chaired by South African jurist , with panel members including Christine Chinkin, , and Desmond Travers, the mission was mandated to investigate all violations of and committed by any party in the conflict context, whether before, during, or after the specified period. The mission's 574-page report, submitted to the Human Rights Council in September 2009 as document A/HRC/12/48, detailed extensive civilian casualties and infrastructure damage in Gaza, attributing much to Israeli military actions such as airstrikes and ground operations, while also documenting indiscriminate rocket fire by Palestinian armed groups from Gaza into . It concluded there was evidence of war crimes and possible by both sides, recommending that the UN Security Council consider referring the situation to the if national investigations proved inadequate. The sparked significant , with critics arguing its mandate—stemming from a resolution that predominantly focused on Israeli actions—and the prior public statements of some panel members indicated inherent against , potentially undermining the mission's . Proponents viewed it as a necessary accountability mechanism highlighting disproportionate force and . In April 2011, Goldstone published an partially retracting the report's assertion that had deliberately targeted civilians as policy, citing subsequent Israeli investigations that exonerated the IDF on that point and regretting the mission's inability to access Israeli during its work. This retraction did not extend to findings on Hamas's actions or other Israeli conduct, but it fueled debates over the report's lasting credibility and influence on international discourse regarding the conflict.

Background and Establishment

Context of the Gaza Conflict Leading to Operation Cast Lead

Following Israel's complete withdrawal of military forces and settlement communities from the in August 2005, Palestinian militant organizations, primarily and , escalated the launch of Qassam rockets and mortar shells targeting Israeli civilian areas in the western , such as and . These attacks, which numbered over 4,000 projectiles between 2001 and 2008, were inherently indiscriminate, lacking guidance systems and often aimed at population centers, resulting in civilian injuries, , and disruptions to daily life for approximately 250,000 Israelis within range. Hamas, designated as a terrorist by , the , the , and others, gained political momentum after winning Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006. In June 2007, Hamas militants violently ousted forces in the Battle of Gaza, seizing full control of the territory and executing or expelling rival officials, which fragmented Palestinian Authority governance and positioned Gaza as a launchpad for attacks on . From the Hamas takeover on June 15, 2007, to June 2008, Gaza-based groups fired 1,508 rockets and 1,799 mortar shells that struck Israeli territory, a sharp increase attributed to reduced internal security constraints under Hamas rule. responded with targeted operations against launch sites and imposed border restrictions, including a naval and tightened crossings, to interdict arms smuggling—primarily Iranian-supplied rockets via Egyptian tunnels—while allowing passage under international monitoring. An Egypt-brokered tahdia (lull) took effect on June 19, 2008, committing both sides to halt hostilities for six months, with phased easing of Israeli restrictions contingent on zero fire. While launches dropped initially, exploited the period to import longer-range Grad rockets and fortify smuggling tunnels, violating the truce's intent; approximately 38 projectiles were fired from Gaza during the ceasefire's first months. Tensions peaked on November 4, 2008, when Israeli forces raided a infiltration tunnel near the border, killing seven militants planning an abduction; retaliated with dozens of rockets, ending the formal truce and triggering barrages that reached up to 70 per day by mid-December, including strikes on and . These attacks, launched from densely populated areas and often using civilian infrastructure for cover, prompted Israel's cabinet to authorize military action to dismantle the and degrade 's operational capacity.

UN Human Rights Council Mandate and Its Inherent Biases


The established the Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict via Resolution S-9/1, adopted on January 12, 2009, during its ninth special session convened to address Israel's military operations in Gaza, known as Operation Cast Lead, which began on December 27, 2008. The resolution passed with 33 votes in favor, 1 against (), and 11 abstentions, strongly condemning the Israeli operations as "disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks" and violations of by the "occupying Power." It directed the mission to investigate "all violations of and that might have been committed at any time in the ongoing conflict in Gaza," but placed primary emphasis on actions by Israeli forces, with only passing reference to Palestinian armed groups' rocket attacks.
This framing was widely criticized for predetermining Israel's culpability, as the resolution's operative paragraphs focused overwhelmingly on alleged Israeli violations while contextualizing Palestinian rocket fire minimally and without equivalent condemnation. , initially approached to lead the mission, declined the appointment citing the mandate's "unbalanced" nature and bias against , but accepted after the UNHRC President expanded its scope to explicitly include violations by all parties, including Palestinian militants. Despite this adjustment, the original resolution's language and the special session's precipitous timing—amid active hostilities—raised concerns about impartiality, with observers noting it exemplified the UNHRC's pattern of reactive, Israel-centric inquiries that often overlook initiating aggressions like Hamas's indiscriminate rocket barrages. The UNHRC's inherent biases stem from its institutional structure and membership dynamics, which systematically prioritize scrutiny of over other global crises. Unique among UN bodies, the Council maintains a permanent Agenda Item 7 dedicated solely to the " situation of the territories and other occupied Arab territories," mandating discussion of at every regular session—a distinction not afforded to any other nation, regardless of ongoing atrocities elsewhere, such as in or . Composed frequently of majorities from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and states with abysmal records, the Council has adopted over 100 resolutions condemning since 2006, dwarfing the fewer than 50 passed on all other countries combined during the same period; this disparity persists despite empirical data showing higher civilian death tolls in non--related conflicts. Such patterns, documented by monitoring organizations like , indicate a politicized selectivity that erodes the body's credibility, favoring bloc voting aligned with anti-Western and anti- agendas over balanced, evidence-based assessments.

Appointment and Objectives of the Mission

The established the Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict through resolution S-9/1, adopted on 12 January 2009 during its ninth special session, convened to address 's Operation Cast Lead, which commenced on 27 December 2008 following thousands of rocket and mortar attacks launched from Gaza into southern by and other Palestinian militant groups. The resolution, titled "The grave violations of in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the occupied ," focused extensively on alleged Israeli conduct while making no reference to the preceding Palestinian attacks that triggered the operation, exemplifying the UNHRC's disproportionate scrutiny of compared to other states. The mission's formal mandate was to conduct "an urgent, independent and international fact-finding mission to investigate all violations of and that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that had taken place in Gaza since 27 December 2008, whether before, during or after." This directive aimed to ascertain facts regarding potential breaches by involved parties, though the resolution's preamble and clauses emphasized Israel's obligations as the occupying power, potentially predisposing the inquiry toward findings of Israeli culpability. On 3 April 2009, UNHRC President Martin I. Ihoeghian Uhomoibhi appointed Richard J. Goldstone, a former justice of South Africa's Constitutional Court and prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former and , to chair the mission. Goldstone conditioned his acceptance on assurances that the investigation would impartially examine actions by all sides, including Palestinian armed groups' rocket barrages and possible use of human shields, thereby reinterpreting the mandate to ensure balance despite its origins in a resolution shaped by states antagonistic to . Goldstone articulated the mission's objectives as advancing the , upholding international humanitarian protections for civilians in armed conflict, and fostering accountability to support efforts in the region, with findings intended to deliver for victims irrespective of affiliation. This approach sought empirical verification of claims through witness testimonies, forensic analysis, and legal standards, though access denials by and constrained on-site verification.

Mission Composition and Methods

Key Personnel and Expertise

The Fact Finding Mission was chaired by Justice , a South African jurist who previously served as a judge on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former (ICTY) and as the first Chief Prosecutor of the (ICTR), bringing expertise in and prosecutions of war crimes. The other members included Professor Christine Chinkin, a professor of at the London School of Economics and a member of the , with a focus on public , , and gender aspects of armed conflict; , a Pakistani advocate for who had served as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on defenders and on the International Commission of Inquiry on , offering experience in human rights monitoring in conflict zones; and Colonel (retired) Desmond Travers, a former officer in the Irish Defence Forces who contributed military expertise, particularly in investigating allegations of misconduct in peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations. The Mission's composition drew criticism for lacking members with specific knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or expertise in urban , fields central to evaluating the Gaza operations. Goldstone's background was primarily judicial and prosecutorial rather than operational or tactical, while Travers' experience centered on European contexts like rather than Middle Eastern militancy. Chinkin's prior public statements, including co-authoring a 11 January 2009 open letter asserting that Israel's actions in Gaza constituted crimes and were not legitimate , raised concerns about predetermination, as the letter preceded the Mission's formal start and the full evidence review. Jilani's history included positions critical of state actions in conflicts involving Islamist groups, potentially influencing perspectives on ' conduct. These factors, combined with the appointing body's—the UN Council—documented disproportionate scrutiny of (e.g., over 30% of its special sessions on from 2006-2009), fueled allegations that the personnel selection prioritized activism over balanced forensic or analysis.

Investigative Processes and Access Challenges

The Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, established in April 2009, employed a range of investigative methods aligned with United Nations standards for inquiries, including the review of , witness interviews, and on-site examinations. The mission examined over 10,000 pages of documents, 1,200 photographs, and 30 videos, alongside analysis conducted in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research's Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNITAR-UNOSAT). It issued a public call for information submissions from governments, organizations, and individuals, receiving inputs from Palestinian authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and United Nations agencies, while also consulting international legal experts on applicable and humanitarian law. Field investigations centered on two visits to the , conducted from 1 to 5 June and 26 June to 1 July 2009, during which mission members inspected incident sites, observed destruction patterns, and gathered forensic-like evidence such as residue analysis where possible. These visits included public hearings in on 28 and 29 June, featuring approximately 40 witnesses, including civilians, medical personnel, and alleged victims of specific strikes. In total, the mission conducted 188 interviews with victims, witnesses, and other informed parties, primarily in Gaza and during a supplementary trip to , , from 1 to 4 July to meet additional witnesses unable or unwilling to travel to Gaza. Additional hearings were held in on 6 and 7 July, incorporating expert testimony on munitions and tactics. Access to the conflict zone presented significant obstacles, as the Government of repeatedly denied the mission entry into proper and the despite multiple formal requests starting in May 2009, citing the biased nature of the underlying Human Rights Council resolution that presupposed Israeli culpability. Consequently, the mission entered Gaza exclusively via the Rafah crossing from , bypassing Israeli-controlled borders, which restricted direct observation of launch sites, impact areas in southern , and Israeli military operations. This lack of access prevented in-person interviews with Israeli officials, soldiers, or southern residents affected by Palestinian fire, limiting the mission to 's written submissions and publicly available materials rather than interactive engagement or site visits to and other border communities. The absence of Israeli cooperation extended to non-engagement with mission queries on operational details, forensic , or declassified intelligence, compelling reliance on unilateral Palestinian accounts and NGO reports for much of the Gaza-side evidence, amid concerns raised by that witness testimonies in Hamas-controlled Gaza could be influenced or coerced. Palestinian authorities facilitated access within Gaza but provided limited transparency on militant activities, with interviewees reportedly reluctant to discuss armed group conduct due to security fears. These constraints, compounded by the ongoing and post-conflict security issues, hindered balanced evidentiary collection and contributed to criticisms that the process disproportionately emphasized allegations against while under-scrutinizing Hamas's role in embedding military assets amid civilians.

Methodological Flaws and Allegations of Predetermination

The composition of the Fact Finding Mission raised immediate concerns about impartiality, as mission member Christine Chinkin had publicly prejudged Israel's actions prior to her appointment. On January 7, 2009, before the mission's formal establishment, Chinkin co-signed an from UK-based legal academics asserting that Israel's military operations in Gaza constituted violations of , including deliberate attacks on civilians amounting to war crimes. This preconceived position conflicted with the requirements for an unbiased fact-finding process, leading critics to argue that Chinkin's participation invalidated the mission's neutrality from the outset. The UN Human Rights Council's original mandate under Resolution S-9/1 further exacerbated allegations of predetermination by focusing exclusively on Israel's conduct during Operation Cast Lead, while omitting systematic examination of Hamas's rocket attacks on Israeli civilians that precipitated the operation. Although mission chair Richard Goldstone insisted on expanding the scope to include both parties' actions, the inherent asymmetry in the council's directive—issued by a body with a documented record of disproportionate resolutions targeting Israel—undermined the mission's credibility. Goldstone himself acknowledged the council's "history of bias against Israel" in the report, yet proceeded under its auspices, which legal analysts later deemed incompatible with due process standards for international inquiries. Methodologically, the mission's investigative approach was flawed by its inability to secure balanced evidence, as Israel denied the panel access to its territory and declined interviews with IDF personnel, citing the biased mandate. Consequently, the report relied heavily on testimonies from Gaza residents and Palestinian sources, often unverified and potentially influenced by Hamas control over the territory, without equivalent direct engagement with Israeli witnesses or forensic data from the defending side. This one-sided evidentiary base extended to extensive incorporation of reports from NGOs with established anti-Israel advocacy, amplifying while neglecting contradictory evidence, such as Hamas's documented use of human shields. These issues culminated in Goldstone's partial retraction in a 2011 Washington Post , where he stated that subsequent Israeli investigations provided evidence refuting the mission's conclusion of deliberate civilian targeting by the IDF, a finding he would not have endorsed had such data been available earlier. This admission highlighted fundamental errors in the mission's causal assessments and verification processes, reinforcing critiques that the report prioritized narrative alignment over empirical rigor.

Core Findings on Conduct During the Conflict

Accusations Against Palestinian Militants and Hamas

The United Nations Fact Finding Mission documented that Palestinian armed groups, including 's Brigades and other factions such as the and Islamic Jihad, had launched over 8,000 rockets and mortars into southern since April 2001, with approximately 570 rockets and 205 mortars fired during Operation Cast Lead from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009. These attacks resulted in three Israeli civilian deaths, one military fatality, over 1,000 injuries, and extensive psychological trauma, including treatment for 1,596 individuals for stress-related conditions. The Mission concluded that these rocket and mortar launches constituted deliberate attacks on the civilian population of southern Israel, with the primary purpose of spreading terror, in violation of the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution under international humanitarian law. Due to their inherent inaccuracy and lack of guidance systems, the projectiles were deemed indiscriminate by nature, incapable of reliably targeting military objectives, and thus amounting to war crimes; in some instances, the intent to terrorize civilians elevated them to potential crimes against humanity. Specific incidents included a rocket strike in Sderot on 17 December 2008 injuring three civilians and a mortar near the Karni crossing on 7 July 2008, with armed groups publicly claiming responsibility for hundreds of launches. During the conflict, Palestinian armed groups continued firing rockets from densely populated urban areas in Gaza, such as and , thereby endangering Palestinian civilians by exposing them to retaliatory strikes without taking feasible precautions to separate military objectives from civilian populations. The Mission found no evidence that these groups systematically used civilians as human shields or forced them to shield military objectives, nor that they consistently operated from mosques, hospitals, or ambulances, though their presence near civilian structures violated obligations to protect the population. The Mission also investigated internal violations by Gaza authorities and armed groups, documenting extrajudicial executions of 17 to 22 detainees, including suspected collaborators with and affiliates, between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, often following escapes from al-Saraya prison amid Israeli airstrikes. These killings, along with arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment of political opponents, formed a of organized violence breaching rights to life, , and fair trial, with additional incidents attributed to personal vendettas. Gaza authorities, under Hamas control, were accused of failing to maintain an effective system for investigating or prosecuting these violations, with implausible denials of control over armed groups and inadequate responses to allegations, thereby evading accountability. The Mission recommended that and Palestinian authorities conduct credible investigations into these acts and prosecute perpetrators, while urging the release of detained Israeli soldier under humane conditions as required by .

Accusations Against Israel and the IDF

The Fact Finding Mission, in its September 2009 report, alleged that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) committed war crimes and during Operation Cast Lead from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, including deliberate attacks on the civilian population of Gaza that failed to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. The Mission claimed a pattern of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, citing over 1,400 Palestinian deaths, including approximately 1,100 civilians, as evidence of systematic violations of , with specific incidents such as the shelling of the girls' school in Jabaliya on January 6, 2009, killing at least two civilians and injuring others despite coordinates being shared with i authorities. The report accused the IDF of using white phosphorus munitions in densely populated urban areas, such as the shelling around on January 15, 2009, which caused severe burns to civilians and was described as an indiscriminate weapon prohibited under for use in such contexts. It further alleged the intentional destruction of civilian infrastructure without military necessity, including over 50,000 homes, industrial sites like the Al-Bader flour mill on January 4, 2009, and water and sewage facilities, framing these as part of a broader strategy to punish Gaza's population collectively. The Mission highlighted the pre-conflict blockade of Gaza, imposed since June 2007, as collective punishment amounting to a crime against humanity, exacerbating humanitarian conditions and restricting essential goods. Additional accusations included the IDF's alleged use of Palestinian civilians as human shields, such as forcing residents to enter potentially booby-trapped buildings ahead of troops, and attacks on medical personnel and facilities, including the shelling of ambulances and the targeting of the complex. The report asserted that these actions demonstrated a policy of disregard for civilian life, recommending criminal investigations and accountability through bodies like the . In April 2011, Mission chair publicly retracted the finding of intentional civilian targeting by , stating that subsequent IDF investigations had clarified that such incidents were not deliberate policy, and expressing regret that the report's conclusions on this point would have differed with fuller evidence at the time. The other Mission members, however, maintained the original allegations, arguing that Israel's self-investigations were insufficient.

Analysis of Civilian Casualties and Human Shields

The United Nations Fact Finding Mission, in its September 2009 report, attributed a significant portion of the approximately 1,400 Palestinian deaths during Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009)—with claims of over 900 civilians killed—to Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) actions, including alleged disproportionate attacks and failures to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. The report cited incidents such as strikes on civilian infrastructure and suggested a pattern of deliberate or reckless endangerment, drawing on witness testimonies from Gaza and limited forensic evidence, while noting the dense urban environment of Gaza Strip as a complicating factor but not exonerating Israel. However, Palestinian casualty figures primarily derived from the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry, which reported 1,417 total deaths including 313 children, have been contested for lacking independent verification and potentially inflating civilian counts by including combatants as non-combatants. Evidence from IDF investigations and contemporaneous documentation indicates that systematically employed human shields, embedding military operations within civilian areas to deter Israeli strikes and exploit resulting casualties for . This included storing rockets and weapons in residential homes, launching attacks from schools, mosques, and hospitals, and commandeering civilian buildings for command posts, as corroborated by photographic and video released by Israeli authorities showing munitions caches in densely populated zones. operatives were documented firing from urban neighborhoods while urging civilians to remain as "shields," a tactic that violates by increasing foreseeable civilian harm during legitimate targeting of military objectives. In contexts like Gaza—where over 1.5 million people lived in 360 square kilometers—such integration of combatants and civilians causally elevates collateral deaths, as precision strikes on valid targets inevitably risk bystanders when fighters exploit populated spaces rather than heeding warnings or evacuating. The Mission's report acknowledged Hamas's rocket fire from civilian areas but downplayed its role in civilian casualties, focusing instead on Israeli responsibility without fully accounting for verified instances of shielding, such as the use of UNRWA schools for rocket storage. Independent analyses, including later Israeli military inquiries, identified over 1,100 of the deceased as militants, suggesting a combatant-to-civilian ratio closer to 1:1 than the Mission's implications of overwhelming civilian tolls. Mission chair Richard Goldstone retracted key elements in a 2011 op-ed, stating that subsequent IDF probes provided no evidence of a policy to deliberately target civilians, and that civilian deaths were more attributable to operational errors or Hamas tactics than intentional policy. This revision underscores methodological limitations in the Mission's reliance on one-sided testimonies amid access denials by Israel, highlighting how Hamas's shielding strategy—not Israeli intent—primarily drove the civilian casualty profile in a conflict initiated by over 8,000 indiscriminate rockets fired at Israeli civilians since 2001.

Specific Incidents and Evidence Evaluation

Rocket Attacks and Indiscriminate Fire by Militants

The Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict documented extensive rocket and mortar fire by Palestinian armed groups, primarily , as a core element of the hostilities preceding and during Israel's Operation Cast Lead from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009. These attacks involved unguided Qassam rockets and mortars launched from Gaza toward southern Israeli population centers, including cities like , , and , with ranges extending up to 40 kilometers. The Mission noted that between 2001 and the onset of the operation, approximately 8,000 such projectiles had been fired into , escalating to nearly 3,000 in 2008 alone, creating a pattern of sustained aggression that prompted Israel's military response. During the 22-day conflict, militants fired over 750 rockets and mortars, with 571 rockets and 205 mortar shells landing in Israeli territory, though interception and inaccuracy reduced some impacts. The Mission's report characterized these launches as indiscriminate attacks that failed to distinguish between military targets and civilians, constituting war crimes under . Palestinian armed groups admitted to targeting Israeli civilians, with leaders publicly stating intentions to strike population centers, as evidenced by intercepted communications and public statements collected by the Mission. The projectiles' inherent inaccuracy—Qassam rockets having a circular error probable of up to 250 meters—ensured that even aimed launches inevitably endangered non-combatants, violating the principle of distinction. The report highlighted specific incidents, such as the January 11, 2009, mortar attack near the that killed an Israeli civilian, and broader barrages causing three to four civilian deaths, over 180 injuries, and widespread across southern . Evidence presented to the Mission included forensic analysis of remnants, data from Israeli authorities, and testimonies from affected communities, confirming the civilian-oriented nature of the fire. While the acknowledged Hamas's claims of retaliatory intent against Israeli blockades or prior operations, it rejected these as justification, emphasizing that no prior Israeli action negated the illegality of deliberate or indiscriminate civilian targeting. The Mission recommended investigations into these acts by Palestinian authorities and potential referrals to the , underscoring their systematic character as possible when viewed cumulatively. This assessment aligned with independent analyses, though the Mission faced criticism for underemphasizing the rockets' role as the conflict's precipitating cause compared to Israeli actions.

Blockade and Targeting Allegations Against Israel

The Fact Finding Mission alleged that 's blockade of Gaza, imposed following Hamas's violent takeover in June 2007 and tightened in the months before Operation Cast Lead (27 December 2008–18 January 2009), amounted to of the territory's civilian population, in violation of Article 33 of the , which prohibits such measures against . The Mission described the blockade as a policy that went beyond legitimate security measures against rocket fire, deliberately inflicting severe restrictions on the import of goods, movement of people, and access to zones, leading to widespread , with Gaza's unemployment rate reaching approximately 40% and over 80% of the population dependent on food aid by late 2008. Specific restrictions included limiting truck entries to an average of 89 per day in the three months prior to the operation—down from 400–500 daily before June 2007—and banning dual-use items like construction materials, which the Mission argued exacerbated a rather than solely addressing of weapons. Regarding targeting during the conflict, the Mission claimed of a deliberate Israeli policy to target civilians, citing patterns in over 200 investigated incidents where Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) strikes resulted in civilian deaths without apparent , such as the shelling of groups carrying (killing at least 11 civilians in separate events), attacks on family residences harboring no combatants, and the use of white phosphorus in densely populated areas like the al-Fakhura junction near a UN school on 6 January 2009, where 40 civilians were reported killed. The report inferred intentionality from IDF operational doctrines emphasizing "effects-based operations" and witness testimonies from Palestinian civilians, arguing these demonstrated a systematic disregard for proportionality and distinction between combatants and non-combatants, potentially constituting war crimes and . However, the Mission's assessments relied predominantly on Gazan eyewitness accounts and open-source data due to Israel's refusal to grant access or cooperate, with limited forensic to establish command intent. In April 2011, Mission chair publicly retracted the report's core assertion of deliberate civilian targeting as Israeli policy, stating that subsequent IDF investigations—covering 400 allegations and leading to 36 criminal probes—had found no evidence of systematic intent, and that "civilians were not intentionally targeted as a policy" during the operation; he noted that, had this information been available at the time, "the Goldstone Report would have been a different document." The other Mission members disagreed with this retraction, maintaining the original findings on intentionality based on the evidence reviewed. Independent analyses have criticized the Mission's evidentiary approach to targeting claims as selectively reliant on unverified Palestinian narratives while discounting Israeli accounts, potentially reflecting biases in the UN Council's establishment of the inquiry.

Notable Strikes and Their Contexts

The Zeitoun incident occurred on January 3, 2009, in the Zeitoun neighborhood of , where Israeli tank shells struck several houses sheltering the extended Samouni family, resulting in the deaths of at least 22 civilians, including women and children, according to eyewitness testimonies collected by the Fact Finding Mission. The Mission's report alleged that Israeli forces deliberately targeted civilians after they had gathered under the protection of white flags, citing a lack of military justification and failure to distinguish combatants. Israeli investigations, however, attributed the strikes to targeting suspected militants in the area and secondary explosions from weapons caches stored in the homes, with no evidence of intentional civilian targeting as policy; subsequent probes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) led to indictments for negligence in some related cases but cleared broader intent claims. In his 2011 reflection, Mission chair noted that Israel's thorough examination of over 400 allegations, including this incident, demonstrated a commitment to accountability absent in 's responses, revising his earlier view on deliberate civilian targeting. On January 6, 2009, three IDF mortar shells landed near the Al-Fakhura UNRWA school compound in , where displaced civilians had sought shelter, killing approximately 40-43 people queued for food aid and injuring dozens more, as documented by and local reports. The Mission concluded the strikes were indiscriminate or disproportionate, with no adequate precautions taken despite known civilian presence, and rejected Israel's claim of a misfire aimed at a mortar position 250 meters away. IDF ballistic analysis indicated the shells fell short due to calculation errors and wind, targeting active fire in the vicinity, which was consistent with patterns of militants embedding launch sites amid civilian areas to exploit proximity for cover. 's practice of operating from densely populated zones, including near UN facilities, contributed to the risk calculus, as evidenced by their own admissions and video footage of rocket launches from similar locations during the conflict. The January 3, 2009, strike near the in Beit Lahiya killed at least 12-15 people, including six children, during evening prayers, with shrapnel penetrating the structure from an Israeli missile reportedly aimed at senior commander in an adjacent multi-story building. The Mission's findings described it as a direct attack on with no proximate inside the , emphasizing the timing and density as of intentionality or recklessness. maintained the precision-guided strike neutralized Rayan—a key figure in 's wing responsible for attacks on Israeli —along with other operatives, with resulting from unavoidable collateral due to the commander's use of for concealment, a tactic corroborated by and post-strike forensics showing no direct hit on the prayer hall. This incident exemplified the operational challenges of initiated by 's indiscriminate barrages, which exceeded 8,000 launches into southern from 2001-2008, prompting 's Operation Cast Lead to degrade launch capabilities.

Report Release and Immediate Reactions

Publication and Summary of Recommendations

The , titled Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict and designated as document A/HRC/12/48, was published on 25 September 2009 and presented to the during its twelfth session under agenda item 7. Authored under the leadership of Justice , it spanned over 450 pages and encompassed findings from investigations into alleged violations of and during Israel's military operations in Gaza from 27 2008 to 18 January 2009, as well as related actions by Palestinian armed groups. The recommendations, detailed primarily in paragraphs 1962–1978 (pp. 422–429), urged both Israeli authorities and Palestinian entities in Gaza and the to conduct independent, impartial, thorough, and prompt investigations into alleged violations, with accountability for war crimes, , and grave breaches of the through prosecution of responsible individuals. Specific to , the mission called for lifting the Gaza blockade, ceasing settlement activities and border closures, reviewing rules of engagement to address disproportionate force and use of certain weapons like flechettes, ending practices such as human shields, ensuring humane treatment of detainees including release of children, and investigating incidents like attacks on civilians, UN facilities, and infrastructure such as the . For Palestinian authorities, recommendations included probing internal violence, security force abuses like and arbitrary arrests, and armed group actions endangering civilians near protected sites, alongside releasing political detainees and bolstering monitoring. Palestinian armed groups were directed to respect , release captive soldier , and permit International Committee of the Red Cross access. On the international front, the report proposed that the UN Security Council refer the situation to the if domestic probes proved inadequate within specified timelines (e.g., Israel to initiate investigations within ), with an independent committee to monitor compliance and report back within six months. It further recommended UN support for prosecutions, establishment of a compensation fund for victims, a conference to enforce the , integration of into peace processes, and in affected areas, while urging states to review arms transfers enabling violations.

Israeli Government and Military Response

The Israeli government issued a formal initial response to the Goldstone Report on September 24, 2009, rejecting it as fundamentally flawed and biased against . The document outlined 32 specific points of criticism, arguing that the report ignored the context of over 8,000 rockets and mortars fired by and other Palestinian militants from Gaza into Israeli civilian areas between 2001 and 2008, which necessitated Israel's defensive operations under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It further contended that the mission's mandate, established by UN Human Rights Council Resolution S-9/1 on January 12, 2009, was inherently prejudiced, focusing disproportionately on alleged Israeli violations while downplaying 's initiation of hostilities and use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described the report as a "travesty" that delegitimized Israel's right to self-defense, stating in an October 18, 2009, address that it rewarded terrorism by portraying Hamas's deliberate targeting of Israeli civilians as equivalent to Israel's efforts to minimize collateral damage. In a December 23, 2009, Knesset speech, Netanyahu elevated the Goldstone Report to one of Israel's primary security threats alongside nuclear and missile dangers, vowing an international campaign against its implementation and emphasizing that it incentivized militants to exploit civilian populations as shields. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs echoed these views, asserting that the report's evidentiary standards were lax, relying heavily on unverified Palestinian testimonies without cross-examination or access to Israeli perspectives, and failing to distinguish between intentional terrorist acts and unintended consequences of lawful military actions. The (IDF) maintained that Operation Cast Lead, conducted from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, adhered to , with operations designed to target rocket-launching sites and command centers while issuing warnings to civilians via leaflets, phone calls, and "roof-knocking" munitions to reduce casualties. IDF spokespersons highlighted that 's embedding of military assets in densely populated areas—evidenced by videos and captured documents showing rocket launches from schools and mosques—created unavoidable risks to civilians, which the report inadequately addressed by presuming disproportionate force without considering the operational necessity to neutralize ongoing threats. In response to specific allegations, such as the shelling near UN facilities, the IDF argued that fire was directed at militants firing from adjacent positions, supported by forensic analysis and real-time intelligence, and initiated preliminary internal probes into incidents to affirm compliance with . On January 29, 2010, submitted a comprehensive 160-page report to the UN, detailing the legal and factual basis for its actions and rebutting Goldstone's claims of systematic war crimes, including data on precision-guided munitions use (over 90% in targeted strikes) and efforts to verify targets excluding civilians. This submission underscored the government's position that the Goldstone Mission's conclusions lacked credibility due to its non-cooperation with Israeli authorities and overreliance on adversarial sources, positioning 's own investigations as a superior mechanism for accountability.

Palestinian and Hamas Perspectives

The Palestinian Authority (PA) initially received the Goldstone Report positively, with its representatives describing the document as comprehensive and balanced in documenting alleged violations by during the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict. The PA emphasized the report's findings on Israeli use of disproportionate force, through the , and targeting of civilians, urging swift implementation of recommendations for accountability, including referral to the if Israel failed to investigate. However, in October 2009, the PA, under President , deferred a UN Council vote on a resolution endorsing the report, citing the need for additional time to build international support and reportedly responding to U.S. to avoid escalation. This decision provoked widespread Palestinian protests, resignations including that of a PA minister, and accusations of undermining national interests by prioritizing diplomatic concessions over justice for Gaza victims. Abbas responded to the backlash by ordering an independent PA commission to investigate the conflict in line with the report's calls and later advocated for resuming UN efforts to advance its adoption, framing the deferral as a tactical delay rather than abandonment. , which controlled Gaza and facilitated the mission's access there, welcomed the report's extensive critique of Israeli operations, including allegations of deliberate attacks on and civilians, portraying it as validation of their narrative of Israeli aggression and occupation as the root cause of the conflict. leaders contended that their attacks constituted legitimate defense against and prior Israeli incursions, rejecting the report's classification of them as indiscriminate or criminal. Hamas disputed the mission's conclusions on the use of civilian areas for military purposes, denying systematic human shielding and attributing any civilian casualties to Israeli precision failures or overreach, while asserting that the report unfairly equated a state military with a lacking conventional capabilities. In response to recommendations for internal probes into militant actions, claimed it was preparing assessments but emphasized that the Human Rights Council had not mandated follow-up from Palestinian authorities, later drawing criticism for inadequate investigations into incidents like attacks on Israeli civilians.

International and Organizational Responses

United States and Western Allies

The United States government criticized the Goldstone Report for its flawed mandate, which originated from a UN Human Rights Council resolution that singled out Israel for presumed violations, thereby compromising the mission's impartiality. On September 18, 2009, US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice stated that the administration had "very serious concerns about many recommendations in the report," arguing it undermined efforts for genuine accountability through domestic processes. The US opposed the Human Rights Council's October 16, 2009, resolution endorsing the report's findings and recommendations, voting against it alongside five other nations. On November 3, 2009, the US House of Representatives passed H. Res. 867 by a vote of 344-36, declaring the report "irredeemably biased" against Israel and urging the President and international bodies to reject it. Western allies echoed concerns over the report's perceived lack of balance and evidentiary standards. In the same October 16, 2009, UN Human Rights Council vote on endorsement, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany abstained, reflecting reservations about the mission's methodology and its potential to hinder bilateral investigations into alleged violations by both Israeli forces and Palestinian militants. UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband described the report as unbalanced, emphasizing that accountability required cooperation with Israel's judicial system rather than unilateral UN actions. France's Foreign Ministry similarly highlighted the need for both parties to conduct transparent internal probes, avoiding measures that could prejudice ongoing inquiries. Germany, prioritizing Israel's right to self-defense against rocket attacks, supported calls for evidence-based assessments over the report's broader indictments. Canada voted against the endorsement resolution, with its government labeling the mission as predisposed to anti-Israel conclusions from its inception. These positions aligned with a preference for pragmatic diplomacy, including pressure on Israel to demonstrate compliance with international humanitarian law through self-initiated reviews, rather than endorsing the report's calls for potential prosecutions at the International Criminal Court.

United Nations Internal Debates

The (UNHRC) convened a on September 29, 2009, to discuss the fact-finding mission's report, presented by mission head , who emphasized findings of potential war crimes by both Israeli forces and Palestinian militants, including Hamas's use of human shields and indiscriminate rocket fire. During the session, delegates from Arab and non-aligned states praised the report for documenting alleged Israeli violations, such as the shelling of civilian areas, while Western representatives, including the and European nations, criticized the mission's mandate under UNHRC Resolution S-9/1 for its initial focus solely on Israeli actions, arguing it compromised impartiality and overlooked Hamas's initiation of hostilities. On October 16, 2009, in its 12th special session, the UNHRC adopted Resolution S-12/1 endorsing the report's findings and recommendations, including calls for investigations into alleged crimes and potential referrals to the , by a vote of 25 in favor, 6 against (including , the , , , the , and ), and 11 abstentions (primarily European states). This outcome reflected deep divisions, with supporters from the and African Group prioritizing accountability for Gaza's civilian casualties—estimated at over 1,400 by mission data—while opponents highlighted evidentiary reliance on unverified militant sources and the panel's pre-existing biases, such as member Christine Chinkin's prior public accusations against . The report's transmission to the UN prompted further debate in November 2009, culminating in Resolution 64/10 on November 5, which urged both parties to conduct credible investigations and report back within five months, passing 114-18 with 44 abstentions. Proponents, led by Palestinian representatives and allies, stressed the report's documentation of over 11 incidents of disproportionate Israeli force, while opponents, including the , , and several members, contended it equated a democratic state's with and ignored Hamas's 8,000+ rockets fired since 2001. Abstentions from countries like and underscored concerns over the report's legal overreach without awaiting Israel's ongoing military inquiries, which by then had initiated probes into specific strikes. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed reservations, stating on October 28, 2009, that while the report merited serious consideration, premature actions against Israel—such as Security Council referral—should be deferred to allow completion of its internal investigations, a stance that contrasted with the UNHRC's urgency and highlighted tensions between the Council's activist majority and the Secretariat's emphasis on balanced process. Ban's February 2010 follow-up report noted insufficient evidence of either side's full compliance with international standards, declining to endorse unilateral conclusions. These positions underscored broader institutional frictions, as the UNHRC's structure—dominated by states with poor human rights records—has historically produced resolutions disproportionately targeting Israel, comprising nearly one-third of its country-specific actions since 2006. ![UNHRC vote on Gaza fact-finding mission resolution][float-right] Post-report, internal follow-up mechanisms perpetuated divides; a 2010 UNHRC-mandated committee of experts, excluding Goldstone after his partial 2011 retraction, maintained the original findings' validity, rejecting Israel's self-investigations as inadequate despite their examination of 400+ allegations and prosecutions in some cases. This stance, reiterated in UNHRC reports through 2011, ignored Goldstone's revised view that new evidence of Hamas's deliberate civilian endangerment undermined claims of Israel's intentional targeting, illustrating persistent resistance within UN bodies to reassess initial narratives.

Non-Governmental Organizations and Media Critiques

Non-governmental organizations critical of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, commonly known as the Goldstone Report, focused on its methodological flaws, over-reliance on partisan sources, and disproportionate emphasis on Israeli actions relative to Hamas's rocket barrages and use of human shields. NGO Monitor, in its October 1, 2009, analysis "House of Cards: NGOs and the Goldstone Report," argued that the mission uncritically adopted unverified allegations from Palestinian NGOs such as the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (PCHR), which documented over 1,100 Gaza deaths but failed to distinguish combatants from civilians or address Hamas's embedding of military assets in populated areas. The organization further contended that the report's 452-page document cited Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International extensively—over 50 times combined—despite these groups' histories of selective reporting that minimized Hamas's initiation of the conflict with approximately 8,000 rockets fired into Israel from 2005 to 2008. In a 2011 edited volume, "The Goldstone Report 'Reconsidered': A Critical Analysis," NGO Monitor and contributors like Gerald Steinberg highlighted how the mission's fact-finding ignored empirical evidence of Hamas's deliberate endangerment of civilians, such as storing weapons in UNRWA schools and launching attacks from mosques, leading to unsubstantiated claims of Israeli "indiscriminate" attacks. UN Watch, another NGO monitoring UN bodies, criticized the mission's mandate from the UN Human Rights Council—established via Resolution S-9/1 on January 12, 2009—as inherently biased, focusing primarily on alleged Israeli violations while allocating minimal scrutiny to Hamas's estimated 1,400 rocket and mortar attacks during the December 2008–January 2009 operation. In submissions to the UN and public statements, UN Watch documented how the report dismissed Israeli-provided evidence, including video footage and ballistic analyses showing precise targeting of militants, and instead privileged eyewitness accounts from Gaza without cross-verification against forensic data. These critiques underscored a pattern where the mission's four members, including Christine Chinkin who had pre-signed a letter deeming Israel's actions criminal on January 11, 2009, approached the inquiry with presumptions of guilt, contravening standards of impartial fact-finding. Media outlets, particularly those skeptical of UN impartiality, lambasted the report for evidentiary shortcomings and politicization. A February 1, 2010, Jerusalem Post article detailing "The Case Against the Goldstone Report: A Study in Evidentiary Bias" by scholars including Laurie Blank and Anne Herzberg asserted that the mission concluded Israeli forces intentionally targeted civilians—citing incidents like the al-Fakhura junction strike killing 24 on January 6, 2009—without forensic or intelligence substantiation, while downplaying Hamas's confirmed use of ambulances and hospitals for military purposes as documented in Israeli intercepts. The Wall Street Journal, in an October 19, 2009, op-ed by John Bolton, former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, described the report as an attempt to "criminalize Israel's strategy of minimizing civilian casualties" in asymmetric warfare, noting its failure to grapple with Hamas's 13,000+ projectiles fired since 2001 and the resulting Israeli civilian trauma. Conservative commentators, including those in Commentary magazine, further argued that the report's recommendations for ICC prosecution ignored Israel's domestic investigations, which by 2010 had led to 150 probes and three indictments for misconduct, contrasting with Hamas's lack of accountability. These NGO and media analyses often highlighted systemic issues in UN inquiries, such as the Council's disproportionate resolutions on —over 45% of its country-specific condemnations from 2006–2009 targeted despite global atrocities elsewhere—fostering an environment where reports amplify unverified narratives over causal evidence of militant tactics. While some progressive media like defended aspects of the report's call for investigations, critiques from outlets like the Washington Institute emphasized its underappreciation of realities, where Hamas's 2008 charter-endorsed strategy of civilian integration complicated distinctions under .

Post-Report Developments and Reassessments

Israeli Internal Investigations and Self-Corrections

Following the release of the Fact Finding Mission report in September 2009, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued and expanded internal probes into allegations of misconduct during Operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008–January 18, 2009), emphasizing operational reviews and criminal inquiries independent of external pressures. The IDF's Military Advocate General oversees such processes, with initial operational debriefings ("command investigations") examining compliance with and , potentially escalating to criminal probes by the Investigation Unit if evidence of wrongdoing emerges. By January 2010, Israel reported examining approximately 150 incidents raised in complaints or media reports, resulting in 36 referrals for criminal investigation; of these, several addressed specific Goldstone Report incidents, such as strikes on civilian structures and the use of the "neighbor procedure" (where were coerced to assist in house searches). Criminal outcomes included convictions for procedural violations rather than intentional war crimes. In October 2010, two IDF soldiers were convicted by a military court for using an 11-year-old Palestinian boy as a during a house search in , receiving suspended sentences and demotions; the court ruled the act breached orders prohibiting such tactics, though it occurred amid active combat with fighters present. Similarly, in 2010, two reservists were convicted for forcing to enter potentially booby-trapped buildings, violating the formalized "neighbor procedure" guidelines issued mid-operation to mitigate risks. Overall, out of 52 criminal investigations initiated by November 2010 (expanded from initial complaints totaling around 400), four led to indictments and convictions, with sentences ranging from reprimands to seven months' , typically for or order breaches rather than deliberate civilian targeting. No probes substantiated systemic policy violations, attributing most civilian casualties to 's use of and urban embedding, as verified through IDF forensic and intelligence reviews. These investigations prompted doctrinal self-corrections to enhance civilian protection in asymmetric . Post-operation analyses led to revised , including stricter thresholds for use and expanded "roof-knocking" warnings via non-explosive munitions to evacuate civilians before strikes. The IDF phased out white phosphorus for smokescreen purposes in populated areas, favoring precision-guided alternatives, and intensified training on distinguishing combatants from non-combatants amid hybrid threats. By , these adaptations were credited with reducing in subsequent border responses, such as pinpoint strikes on rocket launchers, reflecting empirical adjustments based on Cast Lead's battle data rather than external mandates. Judge later acknowledged in April that Israel's thorough probes provided absent in the original , enabling him to conclude no deliberate civilian targeting policy existed. Critics, including , argued the low conviction rate indicated insufficient accountability, but Israel's system demonstrated functionality through documented prosecutions, contrasting with the absence of Hamas investigations into its rocket attacks or civilian exploitation.

Goldstone's Partial Retraction and Its Implications

On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone published an op-ed in The Washington Post titled "Reconsidering the Goldstone Report," in which he retracted the report's conclusion that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had deliberately targeted civilians in Gaza as part of a policy during Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone cited Israel's subsequent military and state investigations—numbering over 400 criminal inquiries and resulting in indictments or disciplinary actions in cases of misconduct—as providing evidence that no such intentional policy existed, stating, "If I had known then what I know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different document." He maintained the report's findings on Hamas's intentional attacks on Israeli civilians and called for Palestinian investigations into alleged war crimes by militants. The retraction did not extend to all aspects of the report; Goldstone affirmed evidence of potential war crimes by but emphasized Israel's accountability mechanisms, noting the lack of equivalent Palestinian probes into actions. This partial reassessment drew sharp responses from the mission's other members—Christine Chinkin, , and Desmond Travers—who issued a joint statement on April 14, 2011, rejecting Goldstone's shift, reaffirming the original findings, and opposing any retraction, arguing the report's conclusions were based on available evidence at the time. The implications were profound for the report's credibility and broader international discourse. Goldstone's disavowal of the deliberate targeting claim—central to accusations of systematic violations by —validated Israel's internal investigations and reduced the perceived basis for pursuing senior IDF officers under in foreign courts. It intensified scrutiny of the UN Human Rights Council's (UNHRC) fact-finding processes, as the lead author's retraction highlighted potential biases in the mission's mandate and evidentiary handling, particularly given the UNHRC's disproportionate focus on . Non-governmental organizations like faced pressure to revise their reliance on the report's allegations, though many resisted. The UN did not withdraw the document, but the episode underscored challenges in achieving impartiality in UN inquiries into asymmetric conflicts, contributing to lasting skepticism about their utility in promoting accountability.

Responses from Other Mission Members and Ongoing UN Actions

In April 2011, following Richard Goldstone's op-ed in partially retracting aspects of the report's findings on Israeli intent in civilian casualties, the other three mission members—Hina Jilani, Christine Chinkin, and Desmond Travers—issued a joint statement rejecting any implication that the report was invalidated. They maintained that the mission's evidence-based conclusions on war crimes, including deliberate attacks on civilians and infrastructure, remained intact, as Israeli investigations had not credibly probed or policy-level decisions cited in the report. The statement, published in , emphasized that Goldstone's access to subsequent data—primarily from Israel's self-reported probes—did not contradict the mission's fieldwork or witness testimonies, and accused of systemic non-compliance with recommendations for independent inquiries. The trio also served on the UN Human Rights Council's Committee of Independent Experts, established by resolution 13/9 on March 25, 2010, to monitor and assess whether and Palestinian authorities investigated the report's 36 cited incidents involving potential war crimes. In their September 2010 report (A/HRC/15/21), the committee documented 's closure of probes into 172 of 195 alleged violations without prosecutions, citing failures to examine superior responsibility or patterns of conduct, while noting Hamas's inadequate internal reviews. A follow-up report in May 2011 (A/HRC/17/27) reiterated these shortcomings, recommending HRC referral of unresolved cases to the prosecutor by October 2011 if domestic efforts proved insufficient, though no such referral occurred due to Security Council veto dynamics. Subsequent UN resolutions, such as A/RES/64/10 (2009) and A/RES/73/255 (2019), have periodically urged follow-up reporting by the Secretary-General on , with the latter requesting updates within five months on measures. These actions sustained scrutiny but yielded limited , as the Human Rights Council—criticized for institutional bias toward resolutions targeting (over 45% of its country-specific measures from 2006–2023)—continued endorsing the report's framework amid later Gaza inquiries, including the 2014 commission on Operation Protective Edge. No comprehensive UN retraction or revision of the original mission's findings has ensued, despite Goldstone's partial disavowal.

Long-Term Impact and Legacy

Influence on International Law and Subsequent Inquiries

The Goldstone Report's allegations of Israeli violations of (IHL), including disproportionate attacks and failure to distinguish between civilians and combatants, have been cited in subsequent legal analyses and advocacy efforts to expand accountability mechanisms under . For instance, the report's findings contributed to attempts against Israeli officials in countries like the and , heightening risks of extraterritorial prosecutions based on interpretations of the ' proportionality principle. However, these efforts largely failed due to diplomatic interventions and domestic legal hurdles, underscoring the report's limited practical impact on enforcing IHL against state actors with robust self-defense capabilities. Critiques of the report's IHL application, particularly its expansive view of proportionality—such as deeming strikes on Hamas-affiliated police as inherently unlawful despite their combatant roles—have influenced academic and policy debates on . Scholars argue that the report's framework risks incentivizing non-state actors to embed military operations in , complicating legitimate under Article 51 of the UN Charter and Additional Protocol I to the . This has prompted refinements in IHL interpretations emphasizing contextual , as seen in later International Committee of the Red Cross guidelines that prioritize empirical assessments over presumptive protections in urban guerrilla contexts. The report directly spurred UN Human Rights Council resolutions mandating follow-up investigations into alleged Gaza violations, establishing a template for subsequent fact-finding missions on Israel- conflicts. For example, UNHRC Resolution 13/9 in 2010 required monitoring of the report's recommendations, leading to periodic updates and influencing the 2014 Independent Commission of Inquiry on the Gaza Conflict, which adopted similar methodologies for assessing IHL compliance despite criticisms of methodological bias inherited from the Goldstone model. These inquiries have cumulatively fed into preliminary examinations, including the 2021 probe into Palestine Situation, where Goldstone-era allegations provided historical context for claims of systematic war crimes. Yet, the absence of comparable scrutiny on Hamas's non-investigation of its attacks—contrasting Israel's documented internal probes—has fueled arguments that such missions erode IHL's impartiality, prioritizing political symbolism over verifiable causation.

Criticisms of UN Bias and Fact-Finding Standards

The Council's (UNHRC) establishment of the Fact Finding Mission through Resolution S-9/1 on , 2009, drew widespread criticism for embedding in the mandate, as it emphasized investigating "grave violations" by 's military operations while only cursorily referencing Palestinian armed groups' actions, effectively presupposing Israeli prior to any collection. The resolution passed by a vote of 33-1 with 13 abstentions, opposed primarily by Western democracies citing its one-sidedness, amid the UNHRC's pattern of disproportionate scrutiny of —holding more special sessions on than on all other countries combined since 2006. This institutional , rooted in the council's composition including non-democratic states like , , and , was argued to undermine the mission's legitimacy from inception, with refusing cooperation and access to its territory on grounds that the framework precluded impartiality. Further critiques targeted the mission's panel composition and evidentiary standards, highlighting pre-existing biases among members such as Christine Chinkin, who co-signed a January 22, 2009, accusing of "war crimes" and before her appointment, prompting calls for her recusal from organizations like on grounds of compromised neutrality. Methodologically, the inquiry deviated from established fact-finding protocols like the Lund-London Guidelines by conducting public hearings exclusively in Hamas-controlled Gaza with prescreened witnesses, dismissing Israeli-submitted evidence such as photographic documentation of weapons caches, and heavily relying on reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like and , whose own methodological flaws—including unverified claims and legal distortions—the mission uncritically adopted. Specific inaccuracies compounded these issues, such as mission member Desmond Travers' erroneous claim of only two Hamas rockets fired in the days before Operation Cast Lead (versus documented Israeli records of 32 between December 16-18, 2008) and technically implausible assertions about Israeli detection capabilities. These deficiencies manifested in the report's conclusions, which were condemned by the U.S. via Resolution 867 on November 4, 2009 (passed 344-36), for evidential bias and politicization, and later partially retracted by mission head in an April 1, 2011, Washington Post , where he acknowledged that Israeli internal probes—contrasting with ' lack of accountability—demonstrated no deliberate targeting of civilians, a finding he stated would have altered the report's assessments had known at the time. While the other panel members rejected Goldstone's reassessment, maintaining the original framework's validity, critics including legal scholars argued the episode exposed systemic flaws in UN fact-finding, such as overreliance on adversarial sources without cross-verification and failure to account for dynamics like human shielding.

Ramifications for Israel-Hamas Dynamics

The Goldstone Report's emphasis on alleged Israeli violations, coupled with its qualified criticism of rocket attacks and use of civilian areas, was interpreted by leadership as a partial vindication, prompting them to intensify cross-border assaults following the January 2009 ceasefire. In the months after the report's September 2009 release, escalated rocket and mortar fire targeting Israeli population centers, including for the first time cities like , signaling a perceived weakening of Israeli deterrence amid international scrutiny. This uptick in aggression reflected 's strategic calculus that global condemnation, as amplified by the report, would constrain Israel's response options in future escalations. Hamas publicly expressed qualified endorsement of the report, committing to pursue its recommendations for investigations into Israeli conduct while dismissing calls for self-scrutiny of its own tactics, such as embedding military operations in densely populated areas. The document's reliance on uncorroborated Palestinian testimonies, often facilitated by Hamas-aligned sources, without equivalent evidentiary rigor toward militant practices, fostered a of that Hamas exploited in to portray itself as a victim-resister rather than an initiator of hostilities. This asymmetry contributed to a dynamic where Hamas prioritized —leveraging international bodies to delegitimize Israeli countermeasures—over internal reforms, emboldening sustained low-level conflicts through 2010 and beyond. Richard Goldstone's April 2011 partial retraction, published in , underscored a critical divergence in post-report accountability: Israel's military examined over 400 allegations from the operation, leading to policy adjustments and prosecutions where warranted, whereas Hamas conducted no credible investigations into its deliberate targeting of civilians or misuse of human shields. This admission diminished the report's credibility as a balanced indictment, potentially bolstering Israel's operational freedom by reducing the specter of prosecutions abroad, though it did little to alter 's rejection of similar introspection. In subsequent Gaza confrontations, such as 2012 and 2014, 's persistence with tactics suggested the original report's legacy endured in encouraging reliance on civilian casualties to generate international pressure, perpetuating a cycle of provocation and limited retaliation. The report's framework influenced broader Israel-Hamas interactions by institutionalizing a UN-endorsed that equated state with non-state , complicating Israel's ability to achieve decisive military outcomes without risking diplomatic isolation. Hamas officials, including those in Gaza's , referenced the findings in diplomatic maneuvers to rally and Islamic support, framing escalations as responses to "occupation" rather than unprovoked attacks. Despite the retraction's empirical validation of Israel's investigative rigor—contrasting with Hamas's opacity—the UN General Assembly's refusal to formally revisit the report entrenched its role in sustaining Hamas's asymmetric , where political gains from perceived victimhood outweighed military setbacks.

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