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Nuclear weapons testing
Nuclear weapons testing
from Wikipedia
The mushroom cloud from the Castle Bravo thermonuclear weapon test in 1954, the largest nuclear weapons test ever conducted by the United States

Nuclear weapons tests are experiments carried out to determine the performance of nuclear weapons and the effects of their explosion. Over 2,000 nuclear weapons tests have been carried out since 1945. Nuclear testing is a sensitive political issue. Governments have often performed tests to signal strength. Because of their destruction and fallout, testing has seen opposition by civilians as well as governments, with international bans having been agreed on. Thousands of tests have been performed, with most in the second half of the 20th century.

The first nuclear device was detonated as a test by the United States at the Trinity site in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, with a yield approximately equivalent to 20 kilotons of TNT. The first thermonuclear weapon technology test of an engineered device, codenamed Ivy Mike, was tested at the Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands on November 1, 1952 (local date), also by the United States. The largest nuclear weapon ever tested was the Tsar Bomba of the Soviet Union at Novaya Zemlya on October 30, 1961, with the largest yield ever seen, an estimated 50–58 megatons.

With the advent of nuclear technology and its increasingly global fallout an anti-nuclear movement formed and in 1963, three (UK, US, Soviet Union) of the then four nuclear states and many non-nuclear states signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, pledging to refrain from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. The treaty permitted underground nuclear testing. France continued atmospheric testing until 1974, and China continued until 1980. Neither has signed the treaty.[1]

Underground tests conducted by the Soviet Union continued until 1990, the United Kingdom until 1991, the United States until 1992, and both China and France until 1996. In signing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996, these countries pledged to discontinue all nuclear testing; the treaty has not yet entered into force because of its failure to be ratified by eight countries. Non-signatories India and Pakistan last tested nuclear weapons in 1998. North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013, January 2016, September 2016 and 2017. The most recent confirmed nuclear test occurred in September 2017 in North Korea.

Types

[edit]
Four major types of nuclear testing: 1. atmospheric, 2. underground, 3. exoatmospheric, and 4. underwater

Nuclear weapons tests have historically been divided into four categories reflecting the medium or location of the test.

  • Atmospheric testing involves explosions that take place in the atmosphere. Generally, these have occurred as devices detonated on towers, balloons, barges, or islands, or dropped from airplanes, and some only buried far enough to intentionally create a surface-breaking crater. The United States, the Soviet Union, and China have all conducted tests involving explosions of missile-launched warheads (See List of nuclear weapons tests#Tests of live warheads on rockets). Nuclear explosions close enough to the ground to draw dirt and debris into their mushroom cloud can generate large amounts of nuclear fallout due to irradiation of the debris (particularly with neutron radiation) as well as radioactive contamination of otherwise non-radioactive material. This definition of atmospheric is used in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned this class of testing along with exoatmospheric and underwater.
  • Underground testing is conducted under the surface of the earth, at varying depths. Underground nuclear testing made up the majority of nuclear tests by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War; other forms of nuclear testing were banned by the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963. True underground tests are intended to be fully contained and emit a negligible amount of fallout. Unfortunately these nuclear tests do occasionally "vent" to the surface, producing from nearly none to considerable amounts of radioactive debris as a consequence. Underground testing, almost by definition, causes seismic activity of a magnitude that depends on the yield of the nuclear device and the composition of the medium in which it is detonated, and generally creates a subsidence crater.[2] In 1976, the United States and the USSR agreed to limit the maximum yield of underground tests to 150 kt with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
    Underground testing also falls into two physical categories: tunnel tests in generally horizontal tunnel drifts, and shaft tests in vertically drilled holes.
  • Exoatmospheric testing is conducted above the atmosphere. The test devices are lifted on rockets. These high-altitude nuclear explosions can generate a nuclear electromagnetic pulse (NEMP) when they occur in the ionosphere, and charged particles resulting from the blast can cross hemispheres following geomagnetic lines of force to create an auroral display.
  • Underwater testing involves nuclear devices being detonated underwater, usually moored to a ship or a barge (which is subsequently destroyed by the explosion). Tests of this nature have usually been conducted to evaluate the effects of nuclear weapons against naval vessels (such as in Operation Crossroads), or to evaluate potential sea-based nuclear weapons (such as nuclear torpedoes or depth charges). Underwater tests close to the surface can disperse large amounts of radioactive particles in water and steam, contaminating nearby ships or structures, though they generally do not create fallout other than very locally to the explosion.

Salvo tests

[edit]

Another way to classify nuclear tests is by the number of explosions that constitute the test. The treaty definition of a salvo test is:

In conformity with treaties between the United States and the Soviet Union, a salvo is defined, for multiple explosions for peaceful purposes, as two or more separate explosions where a period of time between successive individual explosions does not exceed 5 seconds and where the burial points of all explosive devices can be connected by segments of straight lines, each of them connecting two burial points, and the total length does not exceed 40 kilometers. For nuclear weapon tests, a salvo is defined as two or more underground nuclear explosions conducted at a test site within an area delineated by a circle having a diameter of two kilometers and conducted within a total period of time of 0.1 seconds.[3]

The USSR has exploded up to eight devices in a single salvo test; Pakistan's second and last official test exploded four different devices. Almost all lists in the literature are lists of tests; in the lists in Wikipedia (for example, Operation Cresset has separate items for Cremino and Caerphilly, which together constitute a single test), the lists are of explosions.

Purpose

[edit]

Separately from these designations, nuclear tests are also often categorized by the purpose of the test itself.

  • Weapons-related tests are designed to garner information about how (and if) the weapons themselves work. Some serve to develop and validate a specific weapon type. Others test experimental concepts or are physics experiments meant to gain fundamental knowledge of the processes and materials involved in nuclear detonations.
  • Weapons effects tests are designed to gain information about the effects of the weapons on structures, equipment, organisms, and the environment. They are mainly used to assess and improve survivability to nuclear explosions in civilian and military contexts, tailor weapons to their targets, and develop the tactics of nuclear warfare.
  • Safety experiments are designed to study the behavior of weapons in simulated accident scenarios. In particular, they are used to verify that a (significant) nuclear detonation cannot happen by accident. They include one-point safety tests and simulations of storage and transportation accidents.
  • Nuclear test detection experiments are designed to improve the capabilities to detect, locate, and identify nuclear detonations, in particular, to monitor compliance with test-ban treaties. In the United States these tests are associated with Operation Vela Uniform before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty stopped all nuclear testing among signatories.
  • Peaceful nuclear explosions were conducted to investigate non-military applications of nuclear explosives. In the United States, these were performed under the umbrella name of Operation Plowshare.

Aside from these technical considerations, tests have been conducted for political and training purposes, and can often serve multiple purposes.

Alternatives to full-scale testing

[edit]
Subcritical experiment at the Nevada National Security Site

Since the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, "nuclear explosions" of all kinds are banned. Nuclear nations have invested in many alternatives to maintain confidence in weapon capability:

  • Computer simulation is used extensively to provide as much information as possible without physical testing. Mathematical models for such simulation model scenarios not only of performance but also of shelf life and maintenance.[4][5] A theme has generally been that even though simulations cannot fully replace physical testing, they can reduce the amount of it that is necessary.[6]
  • Physical testing
    • Materials testing
      • Subcritical (or cold) tests involving fissile materials and high explosives that purposely result in no yield. The name refers to the lack of creation of a critical mass of fissile material. Subcritical tests continue to be performed by the United States, Russia, and the People's Republic of China, at least.[7][8]
      • Proxy isotope testing: high temperature/density/pressure compression testing of non-fissile isotopes such as plutonium-242 or uranium-238, to determine a bomb core's relevant equation of state.
    • Fission testing
      • Critical mass experiments studying fissile material compositions, densities, geometries, and reflectors. They can be subcritical or supercritical, in which case significant radiation fluxes can be produced. This type of test has resulted in several criticality accidents.
      • Hydronuclear tests (hydrodynamical + nuclear) study nuclear materials under the conditions of explosive shock compression. They can create subcritical conditions, or supercritical conditions with yields ranging from negligible all the way up to a substantial fraction of full weapon yield.[9] Any fission yield is considered banned by the CTBT.
    • Fusion testing: inertial confinement fusion experiments using lasers, like the National Ignition Facility, or magnetized liners, like the Z Pulsed Power Facility, or projectile compression. They study the plasma physics and ignition of deuterium-tritium mixtures.

Subcritical tests executed by the United States include:[10][11][12]

Subcritical Tests
Name Date Time (UT[a]) Location Elevation + Height Notes
A series of 50 tests January 1, 1960 Los Alamos National Lab Test Area 49 35°49′22″N 106°18′08″W / 35.82289°N 106.30216°W / 35.82289; -106.30216 2,183 metres (7,162 ft) and 20 metres (66 ft) Series of 50 tests during US/USSR joint nuclear test ban.[13]
Odyssey NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft)
Trumpet NTS Area U1a-102D 37°00′40″N 116°03′31″W / 37.01099°N 116.05848°W / 37.01099; -116.05848 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft)
Kismet March 1, 1995 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 293 metres (961 ft) Kismet was a proof of concept for modern hydronuclear tests; it did not contain any SNM (Special Nuclear Material—plutonium or uranium).
Rebound July 2, 1997 10:—:— NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 293 metres (961 ft) Provided information on the behavior of new plutonium alloys compressed by high-pressure shock waves; same as Stagecoach but for the age of the alloys.
Holog September 18, 1997 NTS Area U1a.101A 37°00′37″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01036°N 116.05888°W / 37.01036; -116.05888 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Holog and Clarinet may have switched locations.
Stagecoach March 25, 1998 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Provided information on the behavior of aged (up to 40 years) plutonium alloys compressed by high-pressure shock waves.
Bagpipe September 26, 1998 NTS Area U1a.101B 37°00′37″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01021°N 116.05886°W / 37.01021; -116.05886 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Cimarron December 11, 1998 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Plutonium surface ejecta studies.
Clarinet February 9, 1999 NTS Area U1a.101C 37°00′36″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01003°N 116.05898°W / 37.01003; -116.05898 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Holog and Clarinet may have switched places on the map.
Oboe September 30, 1999 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 2 November 9, 1999 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 3 February 3, 2000 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Thoroughbred March 22, 2000 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Plutonium surface ejecta studies, followup to Cimarron.
Oboe 4 April 6, 2000 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 5 August 18, 2000 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 6 December 14, 2000 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 8 September 26, 2001 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 7 December 13, 2001 NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Oboe 9 June 7, 2002 21:46:— NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Mario August 29, 2002 19:00:— NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Plutonium surface studies (optical analysis of spall). Used wrought plutonium from Rocky Flats.
Rocco September 26, 2002 19:00:— NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Plutonium surface studies (optical analysis of spall), followup to Mario. Used cast plutonium from Los Alamos.
Piano September 19, 2003 20:44:— NTS Area U1a.102C 37°00′39″N 116°03′32″W / 37.01095°N 116.05877°W / 37.01095; -116.05877 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft)
Armando May 25, 2004 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 290 metres (950 ft) Plutonium spall measurements using x-ray analysis.[b]
Step Wedge April 1, 2005 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) April–May 2005, a series of mini-hydronuclear experiments interpreting Armando results.
Unicorn August 31, 2006 01:00:— NTS Area U6c 36°59′12″N 116°02′38″W / 36.98663°N 116.0439°W / 36.98663; -116.0439 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) "...confirm nuclear performance of the W88 warhead with a newly-manufactured pit." Early pit studies.
Thermos January 1, 2007 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) February 6 – May 3, 2007, 12 mini-hydronuclear experiments in thermos-sized flasks.
Bacchus September 16, 2010 NTS Area U1a.05? 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft)
Barolo A December 1, 2010 NTS Area U1a.05? 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft)
Barolo B February 2, 2011 NTS Area U1a.05? 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft)
Castor September 1, 2012 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) Not even a subcritical, contained no plutonium; a dress rehearsal for Pollux.
Pollux December 5, 2012 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) A subcritical test with a scaled-down warhead mockup.[c]
Leda June 15, 2014 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) Like Castor, the plutonium was replaced by a surrogate; this is a dress rehearsal for the later Lydia. The target was a weapons pit mock-up.[d]
Lydia ??-??-2015 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 1,222 metres (4,009 ft) and 190 metres (620 ft) Expected to be a plutonium subcritical test with a scaled-down warhead mockup.[citation needed]
Vega December 13, 2017 Nevada test site Plutonium subcritical test with a scaled down warhead mockup.[14]
Ediza February 13, 2019 NTS Area U1a 37°00′41″N 116°03′35″W / 37.01139°N 116.05983°W / 37.01139; -116.05983 Plutonium subcritical test designed to confirm supercomputer simulations for stockpile safety.[15]
Nightshade A November 2020 Nevada test site Plutonium subcritical test designed to measure ejecta emission.[16][17]

History

[edit]
The Phoenix of Hiroshima (foreground) in Hong Kong Harbor in 1967, was involved in several famous anti-nuclear protest voyages against nuclear testing in the Pacific.
The 6,900-square-mile (18,000 km2) expanse of the Semipalatinsk Test Site (indicated in red), attached to Kurchatov (along the Irtysh river). The site comprised an area the size of Wales.[18]
Notable nuclear explosions
Significance Country Name Date Yield
First plutonium test United States Trinity July 16, 1945 25 kt
First implosion test
First uranium bomb United States Atomic bombing of Hiroshima August 6, 1945 15 kt
First gun-type bomb
First thermonuclear boosting United States Greenhouse George May 8, 1951 225 kt
First underground test United States Buster–Jangle Uncle November 29, 1951 1.2 kt
First Teller-Ulam test United States Ivy Mike November 1, 1952 10.4 Mt
First cryogenic deuterium test
First deliverable thermonuclear test Soviet Union RDS-6s August 12, 1953 400 kt
First solid-fuelled thermonuclear test
First exoatmospheric test United States Argus I August 27, 1958 1.7 kt
Most recent atmospheric test China 1980 Chinese nuclear test October 16, 1980 1 Mt
Most recent test North Korea 2017 North Korean nuclear test September 3, 2017 50-300 kt

The first atomic weapons test was conducted near Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945, during the Manhattan Project, and given the codename "Trinity". The test was originally to confirm that the implosion-type nuclear weapon design was feasible, and to give an idea of what the actual size and effects of a nuclear explosion would be before they were used in combat against Japan. The test gave a good approximation of many of the explosion's effects, but did not give an appreciable understanding of nuclear fallout, which was not well understood by the project scientists until well after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The United States conducted six atomic tests before the Soviet Union developed their first atomic bomb (RDS-1) and tested it on August 29, 1949. Neither country had very many atomic weapons to spare at first, and so testing was relatively infrequent (when the US used two weapons for Operation Crossroads in 1946, they were detonating over 20% of their current arsenal). By the 1950s the United States had established a dedicated test site on its own territory (Nevada Test Site) and was also using a site in the Marshall Islands (Pacific Proving Grounds) for extensive atomic and nuclear testing.

The early tests were used primarily to discern the military effects of atomic weapons (Crossroads had involved the effect of atomic weapons on a navy, and how they functioned underwater) and to test new weapon designs. During the 1950s, these included new hydrogen bomb designs, which were tested in the Pacific, and also new and improved fission weapon designs. The Soviet Union also began testing on a limited scale, primarily in Kazakhstan. During the later phases of the Cold War, both countries developed accelerated testing programs, testing many hundreds of bombs over the last half of the 20th century.

In 1954 the Castle Bravo fallout plume spread dangerous levels of radiation over an area over 100 miles (160 km) long, including inhabited islands.

Atomic and nuclear tests can involve many hazards. Some of these were illustrated in the US Castle Bravo test in 1954. The weapon design tested was a new form of hydrogen bomb, and the scientists underestimated how vigorously some of the weapon materials would react. As a result, the explosion—with a yield of 15 Mt—was over twice what was predicted. Aside from this problem, the weapon also generated a large amount of radioactive nuclear fallout, more than had been anticipated, and a change in the weather pattern caused the fallout to spread in a direction not cleared in advance. The fallout plume spread high levels of radiation for over 100 miles (160 km), contaminating populated islands in nearby atoll formations. Though they were soon evacuated, many of the islands' inhabitants suffered from radiation burns and later from other effects such as increased cancer rate and birth defects, as did the crew of the Japanese fishing boat Daigo Fukuryū Maru. One crewman died from radiation sickness after returning to port, and it was feared that the radioactive fish they had been carrying had made it into the Japanese food supply.

Because of concerns about worldwide fallout levels, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963. Above are the per capita thyroid doses (in rads) in the continental United States resulting from all exposure routes from all atmospheric nuclear tests conducted at the Nevada Test Site from 1951 to 1962.

Castle Bravo was the worst US nuclear accident, but many of its component problems—unpredictably large yields, changing weather patterns, unexpected fallout contamination of populations and the food supply—occurred during other atmospheric nuclear weapons tests by other countries as well. Concerns over worldwide fallout rates eventually led to the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which limited signatories to underground testing. Not all countries stopped atmospheric testing, but because the United States and the Soviet Union were responsible for roughly 86% of all nuclear tests, their compliance cut the overall level substantially. France continued atmospheric testing until 1974, and China until 1980.

A tacit moratorium on testing was in effect from 1958 to 1961 and ended with a series of Soviet tests in late 1961, including the Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear weapon ever tested. The United States responded in 1962 with Operation Dominic, involving dozens of tests, including the explosion of a missile launched from a submarine.

Almost all new nuclear powers have announced their possession of nuclear weapons with a nuclear test. The only acknowledged nuclear power that claims never to have conducted a test was South Africa (although see Vela incident), which has since dismantled all of its weapons. Israel is widely thought to possess a sizable nuclear arsenal, though it has never tested, unless they were involved in Vela. Experts disagree on whether states can have reliable nuclear arsenals—especially ones using advanced warhead designs, such as hydrogen bombs and miniaturized weapons—without testing, though all agree that it is very unlikely to develop significant nuclear innovations without testing. One other approach is to use supercomputers to conduct "virtual" testing, but codes need to be validated against test data.

There have been many attempts to limit the number and size of nuclear tests; the most far-reaching is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996, which has not, as of 2013, been ratified by eight of the "Annex 2 countries" required for it to take effect, including the United States. Nuclear testing has since become a controversial issue in the United States, with a number of politicians saying that future testing might be necessary to maintain the aging warheads from the Cold War. Because nuclear testing is seen as furthering nuclear arms development, many are opposed to future testing as an acceleration of the arms race.

In total nuclear test megatonnage, from 1945 to 1992, 520 atmospheric nuclear explosions (including eight underwater) were conducted with a total yield of 545 megatons,[19] with a peak occurring in 1961–1962, when 340 megatons were detonated in the atmosphere by the United States and Soviet Union,[20] while the estimated number of underground nuclear tests conducted in the period from 1957 to 1992 was 1,352 explosions with a total yield of 90 Mt.[19]

Yield

[edit]

The yield of atomic and thermonuclear weapons is typically measured in kilotons or megatons TNT equivalent. Thermonuclear (fusion/fission by Teller-Ulam design) bombs, often mesaured in megatons, can be hundreds of times stronger than their atomic (fission only) counterparts measured only in kilotons.

In the US context, it was decided during the Manhattan Project that yield measured in tons of TNT equivalent could be imprecise. This comes from the range of experimental values of the energy content of TNT, ranging from 900 to 1,100 calories per gram (3,800 to 4,600 J/g). There is also the issue of which ton to use, as short tons, long tons, and metric tonnes all have different values. It was therefore decided that one kiloton would be equivalent to 1×1012 calories (4.2×1012 J) exactly,[21] (the equivalent of 1000 cal/g if the metric tonne were used).

Nuclear testing by country

[edit]
Over 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted in over a dozen different sites around the world. Red Russia/Soviet Union, blue France, light blue United States, violet Britain, yellow China, orange India, brown Pakistan, green North Korea, and light green (territories exposed to nuclear bombs). The black dot indicates the location of the Vela incident.
"Baker Shot", part of Operation Crossroads, a nuclear test by the United States at Bikini Atoll in 1946

The nuclear powers have conducted more than 2,000 nuclear test explosions (numbers are approximate, as some test results have been disputed):

There may also have been at least three alleged but unacknowledged nuclear explosions (see list of alleged nuclear tests) including the Vela incident.

From the first nuclear test in 1945 until tests by Pakistan in 1998, there was never a period of more than 22 months with no nuclear testing. June 1998 to October 2006 was the longest period since 1945 with no acknowledged nuclear tests.

A summary table of all the nuclear testing that has happened since 1945 is here: Worldwide nuclear testing counts and summary.

Graph of nuclear testing
Graph of nuclear testing

Global fallout

[edit]
Atmospheric 14C Bomb pulse, New Zealand[31] and Austria.[32] The New Zealand curve is representative for the Southern Hemisphere, the Austrian curve is representative for the Northern Hemisphere. Atmospheric nuclear weapon tests almost doubled the concentration of 14C in the Northern Hemisphere.[33]

Nuclear weapons testing did not produce scenarios like nuclear winter as a result of a scenario of a concentrated number of nuclear explosions in a nuclear holocaust, but the thousands of tests, hundreds being atmospheric, did nevertheless produce a global fallout that peaked in 1963 (the bomb pulse), reaching levels of about 0.15 mSv per year worldwide, or about 7% of average background radiation dose from all sources, and has slowly decreased since,[34] with natural environmental radiation levels being around 1 mSv. This global fallout was one of the main drivers for the ban of nuclear weapons testing, particularly atmospheric testing. It has been estimated that by 2020 between to 200,000 to 460,000 people have died as a result of nuclear weapons testing, while the total number of deaths may rise up to 2.4 million people.[35]

Criticism

[edit]

Nuclear arms tests have been criticized for its arms race[36] and its fallout,[37][38][39] with a potentially global fallout.

Nuclear weapons tests have been criticized by anti-nuclear activists as nuclear imperialism, colonialism,[40] ecocide, environmental racism and nuclear genocide.[41][42][43]

The movement gained particularly in the 1960s and in the 1980s again.

The international day "End Nuclear Tests Day" raises critical awareness annually.[44]

Treaties against testing

[edit]

There are many existing anti-nuclear explosion treaties, notably the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. These treaties were proposed in response to growing international concerns about environmental damage among other risks. Nuclear testing involving humans also contributed to the formation of these treaties. Examples can be seen in the following articles:

The Partial Nuclear Test Ban treaty makes it illegal to detonate any nuclear explosion anywhere except underground, in order to reduce atmospheric fallout. Most countries have signed and ratified the Partial Nuclear Test Ban, which went into effect in October 1963. Of the nuclear states, France, China, and North Korea have never signed the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.[45]

The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans all nuclear explosions everywhere, including underground. For that purpose, the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is building an international monitoring system with 337 facilities located all over the globe. 85% of these facilities are already operational.[46] As of May 2012, the CTBT has been signed by 183 States, of which 157 have also ratified. For the Treaty to enter into force it needs to be ratified by 44 specific nuclear technology-holder countries. These "Annex 2 States" participated in the negotiations on the CTBT between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power or research reactors at that time. The ratification of eight Annex 2 states is still missing: China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the United States have signed but not ratified the Treaty; India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed it.[47]

The following is a list of the treaties applicable to nuclear testing:

Name Agreement date In force date In effect today? Notes
Unilateral USSR ban March 31, 1958 March 31, 1958 no USSR unilaterally stops testing provided the West does as well.
Bilateral testing ban August 2, 1958 October 31, 1958 no USA agrees; ban begins on 31 October 1958, 3 November 1958 for the Soviets, and lasts until abrogated by a USSR test on 1 September 1961.
Antarctic Treaty System December 1, 1959 June 23, 1961 yes Bans testing of all kinds in Antarctica.
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) August 5, 1963 October 10, 1963 yes Ban on all but underground testing.
Outer Space Treaty January 27, 1967 October 10, 1967 yes Bans testing on the moon and other celestial bodies.
Treaty of Tlatelolco February 14, 1967 April 22, 1968 yes Bans testing in South America and the Caribbean Sea Islands.
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty January 1, 1968 March 5, 1970 yes Bans the proliferation of nuclear technology to non-nuclear nations.
Seabed Arms Control Treaty February 11, 1971 May 18, 1972 yes Bans emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor outside territorial waters.
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) January 1, 1972 no A five-year ban on installing launchers.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty May 26, 1972 August 3, 1972 no Restricts ABM development; additional protocol added in 1974; abrogated by the US in 2002.
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War June 22, 1973 June 22, 1973 yes Promises to make all efforts to promote security and peace.
Threshold Test Ban Treaty July 1, 1974 December 11, 1990 yes Prohibits higher than 150 kt for underground testing.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) January 1, 1976 December 11, 1990 yes Prohibits higher than 150 kt, or 1500kt in aggregate, testing for peaceful purposes.
Moon Treaty January 1, 1979 January 1, 1984 no Bans use and emplacement of nuclear weapons on the moon and other celestial bodies.
Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II) June 18, 1979 no Limits strategic arms. Kept but not ratified by the US, abrogated in 1986.
Treaty of Rarotonga August 6, 1985 ? Bans nuclear weapons in South Pacific Ocean and islands. US never ratified.
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) December 8, 1987 June 1, 1988 no Eliminated Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). Implemented by 1 June 1991. Both sides alleged the other was in violation of the treaty. Expired following US withdrawal, 2 August 2019.
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe November 19, 1990 July 17, 1992 yes Bans categories of weapons, including conventional, from Europe. Russia notified signatories of intent to suspend, 14 July 2007.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) July 31, 1991 December 5, 1994 no 35-40% reduction in ICBMs with verification. Treaty expired 5 December 2009, renewed (see below).
Treaty on Open Skies March 24, 1992 January 1, 2002 yes Allows for unencumbered surveillance over all signatories.
US unilateral testing moratorium October 2, 1992 October 2, 1992 no George. H. W. Bush declares unilateral ban on nuclear testing.[48] Extended several times, not yet abrogated.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) January 3, 1993 January 1, 2002 no Deep reductions in ICBMs. Abrogated by Russia in 2002 in retaliation of US abrogation of ABM Treaty.
Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok) December 15, 1995 March 28, 1997 yes Bans nuclear weapons from southeast Asia.
African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) January 1, 1996 July 16, 2009 yes Bans nuclear weapons in Africa.
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) September 10, 1996 yes (effectively) Bans all nuclear testing, peaceful and otherwise. Strong detection and verification mechanism (CTBTO). US has signed and adheres to the treaty, though has not ratified it.
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT, Treaty of Moscow) May 24, 2002 June 1, 2003 no Reduces warheads to 1700–2200 in ten years. Expired, replaced by START II.
START I treaty renewal April 8, 2010 January 26, 2011 yes Same provisions as START I.

Compensation for victims

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Over 500 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests were conducted at various sites around the world from 1945 to 1980. As public awareness and concern mounted over the possible health hazards associated with exposure to the nuclear fallout, various studies were done to assess the extent of the hazard. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ National Cancer Institute study claims that nuclear fallout might have led to approximately 11,000 excess deaths, most caused by thyroid cancer linked to exposure to iodine-131.[49]

  • United States: Prior to March 2009, the US was the only nation to compensate nuclear test victims. Since the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, more than $1.38 billion in compensation has been approved. The money is going to people who took part in the tests, notably at the Nevada Test Site, and to others exposed to the radiation.[50] As of 2017, the US government refused to pay for the medical care of troops who associate their health problems with the construction of Runit Dome in the Marshall Islands.[51]
  • France: In March 2009, the French Government offered to compensate victims for the first time and legislation is being drafted which would allow payments to people who suffered health problems related to the tests.[52] The payouts would be available to victims' descendants and would include Algerians, who were exposed to nuclear testing in the Sahara in 1960. Victims say the eligibility requirements for compensation are too narrow.[citation needed]
  • United Kingdom: There is no formal British government compensation program. Nearly 1,000 veterans of Christmas Island nuclear tests in the 1950s are engaged in legal action against the Ministry of Defense for negligence. They say they suffered health problems and were not warned of potential dangers before the experiments.[citation needed]
  • Russia: Decades later, Russia offered compensation to veterans who were part of the 1954 Totsk test. There was no compensation to civilians sickened by the Totsk test. Anti-nuclear groups say there has been no government compensation for other nuclear tests.[citation needed]
  • China: China has undertaken highly secretive atomic tests in remote deserts in a Central Asian border province. Anti-nuclear activists say there is no known government program for compensating victims.[citation needed]

Milestone nuclear explosions

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The following list is of milestone nuclear explosions. In addition to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first nuclear test of a given weapon type for a country is included, as well as tests that were otherwise notable (such as the largest test ever). All yields (explosive power) are given in their estimated energy equivalents in kilotons of TNT (see TNT equivalent). Putative tests (like Vela incident) have not been included.

Date Name
Yield (kt)
Country Significance
(1945-07-16)July 16, 1945 Trinity 18–20 United States First fission-device test, first plutonium implosion detonation.
(1945-08-06)August 6, 1945 Little Boy 12–18 United States Bombing of Hiroshima, Japan, first detonation of a uranium gun-type device, first use of a nuclear device in combat.
(1945-08-09)August 9, 1945 Fat Man 18–23 United States Bombing of Nagasaki, Japan, second detonation of a plutonium implosion device (the first being the Trinity Test), second and last use of a nuclear device in combat.
(1949-08-29)August 29, 1949 RDS-1 22 Soviet Union First fission-weapon test by the Soviet Union.
(1951-05-08)May 8, 1951 George 225 United States First boosted nuclear weapon test, first weapon test to employ fusion in any measure.
(1952-10-03)October 3, 1952 Hurricane 25 United Kingdom First fission weapon test by the United Kingdom.
(1952-11-01)November 1, 1952 Ivy Mike 10,400 United States First "staged" thermonuclear weapon, with cryogenic fusion fuel, primarily a test device and not weaponized.
(1952-11-16)November 16, 1952 Ivy King 500 United States Largest pure-fission weapon ever tested.
(1953-08-12)August 12, 1953 RDS-6s 400 Soviet Union First fusion-weapon test by the Soviet Union (not "staged").
(1954-03-01)March 1, 1954 Castle Bravo 15,000 United States First "staged" thermonuclear weapon using dry fusion fuel. A serious nuclear fallout accident occurred. Largest nuclear detonation conducted by United States.
(1955-11-22)November 22, 1955 RDS-37 1,600 Soviet Union First "staged" thermonuclear weapon test by the Soviet Union (deployable).
(1957-05-31)May 31, 1957 Orange Herald 720 United Kingdom Largest boosted fission weapon ever tested. Intended as a fallback "in megaton range" in case British thermonuclear development failed.
(1957-11-08)November 8, 1957 Grapple X 1,800 United Kingdom First (successful) "staged" thermonuclear weapon test by the United Kingdom
(1960-02-13)February 13, 1960 Gerboise Bleue 70 France First fission weapon test by France.
(1961-10-31)October 31, 1961 Tsar Bomba 50,000 Soviet Union Largest thermonuclear weapon ever tested—scaled down from its initial 100 Mt design by 50%.
(1964-10-16)October 16, 1964 596 22 China First fission-weapon test by the People's Republic of China.
(1967-06-17)June 17, 1967 Test No. 6 3,300 China First "staged" thermonuclear weapon test by the People's Republic of China.
(1968-08-24)August 24, 1968 Canopus 2,600 France First "staged" thermonuclear weapon test by France
(1974-05-18)May 18, 1974 Smiling Buddha 12 India First fission nuclear explosive test by India.
(1998-05-11)May 11, 1998 Pokhran-II 45–50 India First potential fusion-boosted weapon test by India; first deployable fission weapon test by India.
(1998-05-28)May 28, 1998 Chagai-I 40 Pakistan First fission weapon (boosted) test by Pakistan[53]
(2006-10-09)October 9, 2006 2006 nuclear test under 1 North Korea First fission-weapon test by North Korea (plutonium-based).
(2017-09-03)September 3, 2017 2017 nuclear test 200–300 North Korea First "staged" thermonuclear weapon test claimed by North Korea.
Note

See also

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Explanatory notes

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Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ "The Treaty has not been signed by France or by the People's Republic of China." US Department of State, Limited Test Ban Treaty.
  2. ^ For a longer and more technical discussion, see US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment (October 1989). The Containment of Underground Nuclear Explosions (PDF). Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2013-02-27. Retrieved 2018-12-24.
  3. ^ Yang, Xiaoping; North, Robert; Romney, Carl; Richards, Paul R. "Worldwide Nuclear Explosions" (PDF).
  4. ^ Scoles, Sarah (2023-04-20). "Trust but verify: U.S. labs are overhauling the nuclear stockpile. Can they validate the weapons without bomb tests?". Science.
  5. ^ Hoffman, David E. (2011-11-01). "Supercomputers offer tools for nuclear testing — and solving nuclear mysteries". Washington Post.
  6. ^ Associated Press (2006-10-18). "Supercomputers can't perfectly simulate nuclear blasts: Experts". CBC News.
  7. ^ "US conducts 'subcritical' nuclear test". zeenews.india.com. 2012-12-07. Retrieved 2013-05-28.
  8. ^ Thomas Nilsen (2 October 2012). "Subcritical nuke tests may be resumed at Novaya Zemlya". barentsobserver.com. Retrieved 2017-07-13.
  9. ^ Carey Sublette (9 August 2001), Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked Questions, section 4.1.9, retrieved 10 April 2011
  10. ^ Papazian, Ghazar R.; Reinovsky, Robert E.; Beatty, Jerry N. (2003). "The New World of the Nevada Test Site" (PDF). Los Alamos Science (28). Retrieved 2013-12-12.
  11. ^ Thorn, Robert N.; Westervelt, Donald R. (February 1, 1987). "Hydronuclear Experiments" (PDF). LANL Report LA-10902-MS. Retrieved December 9, 2013.
  12. ^ Conrad, David C. (July 1, 2000). "Underground explosions are music to their ears". Science and Technology Review. Retrieved 9 December 2013.
  13. ^ Nevada Test Site: U1a Complex subcritical experiments (PDF) (Report). DOE Nevada. February 2003. Archived from the original (PDF) on 17 May 2003.
  14. ^ Kishner, Andrew (18 September 2018). "U.S. Sneaks in 'Vega,' Its 28th Subcritical Nuclear Test". Retrieved 30 October 2019.
  15. ^ O'Brien, Nolan (24 May 2019). "Subcritical experiment captures scientific measurements to advance stockpile safety". LLNL. Retrieved 16 January 2021.
  16. ^ "US conducted subcritical nuclear test in November". NHK World-Japan. 16 January 2021. Retrieved 16 January 2021.
  17. ^ Danielson, Jeremy; Bauer, Amy L. (September 2016). Nightshade Prototype Experiments (Silverleaf). Los Alamos National Laboratory (Report). OSTI. doi:10.2172/1338708. OSTI 1338708.
  18. ^ Togzhan Kassenova (28 September 2009). "The lasting toll of Semipalatinsk's nuclear testing". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
  19. ^ a b Pavlovski, O. A. (1 January 1998). "Radiological Consequences of Nuclear Testing for the Population of the Former USSR (Input Information, Models, Dose, and Risk Estimates)". Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. pp. 219–260. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-03610-5_17. ISBN 978-3-642-08359-4.
  20. ^ "Radioactive Fallout - Worldwide Effects of Nuclear War - Historical Documents". Atomciarchive.com.
  21. ^ The Containment of Underground Explosions (Report). Office of Technology Assessment. 31 October 1989. p. 11. OTA-ISC-414.
  22. ^ "United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992" (PDF). Las Vegas, NV: Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office. 2000-12-01. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2006-10-12. Retrieved 2013-12-18. This is usually cited as the "official" US list.
  23. ^ Long, Kat. "Blasts from the Past: Old Nuke Test Films Offer New Insights [Video]". Scientific American. Retrieved 2017-04-24.
  24. ^ "USSR Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 1949 through 1990" (Document). Sarov, Russia: RFNC-VNIIEF. 1996. The official Russian list of Soviet tests.
  25. ^ Mikhailov, Editor in Chief, V.N.; Andryushin, L.A.; Voloshin, N.P.; Ilkaev, R.I.; Matushchenko, A.M.; Ryabev, L.D.; Strukov, V.G.; Chernyshev, A.K.; Yudin, Yu.A. "Catalog of Worldwide Nuclear Testing". Archived from the original on 2013-12-19. Retrieved 2013-12-28. {{cite web}}: |last1= has generic name (help)An equivalent list available on the internet.
  26. ^ "British nuclear weapons testing in Australia | ARPANSA". Retrieved 2022-11-02.
  27. ^ "UK/US Agreement". Archived from the original on 2007-06-07. Retrieved 2010-10-21.
  28. ^ "N° 3571.- Rapport de MM. Christian Bataille et Henri Revol sur les incidences environnementales et sanitaires des essais nucléaires effectués par la France entre 1960 et 1996 (Office d'évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques)". Assemblee-nationale.fr. Retrieved 2010-10-21.
  29. ^ "Nuclear Weapons Test List". Fas.org. Retrieved 22 September 2018.
  30. ^ "Pakistan Special Weapons - A Chronology". Archived from the original on 2012-04-27. Retrieved 2018-12-24.
  31. ^ "Atmospheric δ14C record from Wellington". Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center. 1994. Archived from the original on 1 February 2014. Retrieved 2007-06-11.
  32. ^ Levin, I.; et al. (1994). 14C record from Vermunt". Trends: A Compendium of Data on Global Change. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center. Archived from the original on 23 September 2008. Retrieved 4 January 2016.
  33. ^ "Radiocarbon dating". University of Utrecht. Retrieved 2008-02-19.
  34. ^ Bouville, André; Simon, Steven L.; Miller, Charles W.; Beck, Harold L.; Anspaugh, Lynn R.; Bennett, Burton G. (2002). "Estimates of Doses from Global Fallout". Health Physics. 82 (5): 690–705. Bibcode:2002HeaPh..82..690B. doi:10.1097/00004032-200205000-00015. ISSN 0017-9078. PMID 12003019.
  35. ^ Adams, Lilly (May 26, 2020). "Resuming Nuclear Testing a Slap in the Face to Survivors". The Equation. Retrieved July 16, 2024.
  36. ^ Kinsella, William (2023-08-04). "The nuclear arms race's legacy: Contamination, staggering cleanup costs and a culture of secrecy • Missouri Independent". Missouri Independent. Retrieved 2025-01-07.
  37. ^ Prăvălie, Remus (2014-02-22). "Nuclear Weapons Tests and Environmental Consequences: A Global Perspective". Ambio. 43 (6). Springer Science and Business Media LLC: 729–744. Bibcode:2014Ambio..43..729P. doi:10.1007/s13280-014-0491-1. ISSN 0044-7447. PMC 4165831. PMID 24563393.
  38. ^ Seale, Jack (2024-11-20). "Britain's Nuclear Bomb Scandal: Our Story review – how the UK's atomic testing programme devastated lives". the Guardian. Retrieved 2025-01-07.
  39. ^ "Banning nuclear explosions protects the environment". CTBTO. Retrieved 2025-01-07.
  40. ^ Hennaoui, Leila; Nurzhan, Marzhan (2023-10-02). "Dealing with a Nuclear Past: Revisiting the Cases of Algeria and Kazakhstan through a Decolonial Lens". The International Spectator. 58 (4): 91–109. doi:10.1080/03932729.2023.2234817. ISSN 0393-2729.
  41. ^ Skinner, Rob (2021-09-30). "'Against Nuclear Imperialism': peace, race and anti-colonialism in the early 1960s". University of Bristol. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
  42. ^ Hsu, Hsuan L. (2014-05-21). "Nuclear colonialism". Environment & Society Portal. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
  43. ^ Maguire, Richard (2007). "From the Guest Editor: The nuclear weapon and genocide: The beginning of a discussion". Journal of Genocide Research. 9 (3): 353–360. doi:10.1080/14623520701528866. ISSN 1462-3528.
  44. ^ Nations, United (1945-07-16). "End Nuclear Tests Day". United Nations. Retrieved 2025-01-08.
  45. ^ U.S. Department of State, Limited Test Ban Treaty.
  46. ^ "CTBTO Factsheet: Ending Nuclear Explosions" (PDF). Ctbto.org. Retrieved 2012-05-23.
  47. ^ "Status of signature and ratification". Ctbto.org. Retrieved 2012-05-23.
  48. ^ "The Status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers". Arms Control Association. March 2014. Retrieved June 29, 2014.
  49. ^ Council, National Research (11 February 2003). Exposure of the American Population to Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests: A Review of the CDC-NCI Draft Report on a Feasibility Study of the Health Consequences to the American Population from Nuclear Weapons Tests Conducted by the United States and Other Nations. doi:10.17226/10621. ISBN 9780309087131. PMID 25057651.
  50. ^ "Radiation Exposure Compensation System: Claims to Date Summary of Claims Received by 06/11/2009" (PDF). Usdoj.gov.
  51. ^ "Troops Who Cleaned Up Radioactive Islands Can't Get Medical Care". The New York Times. 28 January 2017.
  52. ^ Hardach, Sophie; Shirbon, Estelle (24 March 2009). "France to compensate victims of nuclear testing". Reuters. Retrieved 28 January 2025.
  53. ^ "Pakistan Nuclear Weapons: A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program". Federation of American Scientists. 11 December 2002. Retrieved 30 October 2019.

General and cited references

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Nuclear weapons testing involves the experimental detonation of nuclear explosive devices to verify designs, measure fission and fusion yields, assess blast dynamics, radiation propagation, and effects, and certify the reliability of existing arsenals through empirical data collection. Commencing with the ' test on July 16, 1945, at the Alamogordo Bombing Range in , the practice has seen at least eight nations—primarily the (1,054 tests from 1945 to 1992), the / (715 tests), the (45), (210), and (45), along with limited tests by India, Pakistan, and —conduct a cumulative total exceeding 2,000 detonations across atmospheric, underground, underwater, and space environments. These tests enabled rapid advancements in sophistication during the , peaking at 178 detonations in 1962 alone, but atmospheric variants released radioactive isotopes like and into the global , correlating with detectable increases in and rates among downwind populations and via milk contamination pathways in peer-reviewed epidemiological analyses. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty curtailed open-air explosions, shifting most activity underground to mitigate fallout while preserving data acquisition, though subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments continue for absent full-yield tests under the unratified 1996 . Defining controversies include disputed long-term health burdens on test participants and indigenous communities near sites like and Semipalatinsk, where causal links to excess cancers persist in longitudinal studies despite challenges in isolating radiation from confounders, alongside debates over testing's necessity versus simulation alternatives in maintaining deterrence credibility.61037-6/abstract)

Technical Fundamentals

Types of Nuclear Tests

Nuclear weapons tests are primarily classified by the physical environment in which the detonation occurs, as this determines the propagation of blast effects, dispersal, and detectability. The main categories include atmospheric, underground, , and exoatmospheric tests, each conducted to gather data on weapon performance under specific conditions while assessing environmental and strategic implications. Atmospheric tests involve detonations in the open air, either as air bursts at altitude, surface bursts on land, or elevated shots using towers or balloons. These tests, totaling 528 globally, produced visible fireballs and widespread fallout due to direct interaction with the atmosphere, allowing observation of full-scale effects like and electromagnetic pulses but risking global . The conducted 215 such tests between 1945 and 1962, including the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, which yielded 21 kilotons and marked the first artificial . Atmospheric testing ended for most nations following the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited tests outside underground environments to mitigate health and environmental hazards from fallout. Underground tests, comprising 1,528 detonations worldwide, occur in shafts or tunnels beneath the Earth's surface, typically at depths of hundreds of meters to contain blast and radiation. This method, adopted post-1963 treaty, minimizes atmospheric fallout but can cause seismic activity and venting of radioactive gases if containment fails, as seen in some U.S. Nevada Test Site events. The U.S. performed 815 underground tests from 1963 to 1992, using vertical boreholes for device emplacement and horizontal tunnels for diagnostics, enabling precise measurement of yield and efficiency without surface disruption. These tests supported weapon reliability verification amid escalating yields, such as the 15-megaton Castle Bravo miscalculation in 1954, though that was atmospheric. Underwater tests detonate devices submerged in water, studying hydrodynamic effects, shockwave propagation, and hull damage to ships, as in the U.S. Baker shot on July 25, 1946, at , which yielded 23 kilotons and contaminated vessels severely. Fewer than atmospheric tests, they highlighted of seawater and biological impacts but were largely curtailed by treaties due to disruption. Exoatmospheric or high-altitude tests explode above the sensible atmosphere, often via rocket delivery, to examine effects like gamma-ray induced auroras and satellite disruptions, exemplified by the U.S. on July 9, 1962, at 400 kilometers altitude yielding 1.4 megatons. These produced no local fallout but generated artificial radiation belts affecting electronics over vast areas, informing anti-satellite and EMP weaponization studies. Additional categories include peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), such as the U.S. program's 35 underground or cratering shots for like excavation, banned under the 1996 as indistinguishable from weapons tests. Subcritical tests, using conventional explosives to compress without achieving supercriticality or yield, comply with test ban treaties and sustain stockpile confidence through hydrodynamic simulations, as conducted at U.S. sites like the Nevada National Security Site. Hydronuclear tests, producing minimal fission yield to verify implosion dynamics, represent a gray area but were phased out under moratoria.

Yield Assessment and Measurement

The explosive yield of a nuclear weapon, defined as the total energy released and conventionally expressed in kilotons (kt) or megatons (Mt) of , is assessed through a combination of direct , empirical scaling laws, and post-detonation tailored to the test environment. For early atmospheric tests like the 1945 detonation, yields were initially estimated indirectly via hydrodynamic scaling laws applied to declassified blast radius photographs, as pioneered by , yielding an approximate value of 18-22 kt without classified data on energy input. Subsequent radiochemical of trinitite samples from , involving decay counting and of isotopes such as , has refined the yield to approximately 24.8 ± 2.0 kt, accounting for fission efficiency and fluence. These methods cross-validate against fireball imaging and data, which for the bomb converged on 21 kt using radiochemistry and optical measurements of initial luminosity. In atmospheric and underwater tests, yield determination often relies on multi-parameter diagnostics including overpressure gauges for shock wave propagation, bhangmeter readings for fireball luminosity, and radiochemical sampling of debris clouds via aircraft or rockets to quantify fission products and neutron activation ratios. For instance, post-test debris analysis measures isotopic ratios (e.g., uranium-235 fission remnants) to compute the fission fraction, supplemented by gamma-ray spectroscopy for fusion-boosted components, achieving uncertainties typically under 10-20% for yields above 1 kt. Crater dimensions and ejecta volume provide additional scaling for surface or shallow bursts, calibrated against known TNT benchmarks. Underground tests, comprising the majority of post-1963 detonations under the Partial Test Ban Treaty, predominantly use seismic monitoring to estimate yield, converting body-wave or surface-wave magnitudes (mb or Ms) to energy release via site-specific empirical formulas that correct for , depth, and decoupling effects. The process involves recording teleseismic P-waves, applying magnitude-yield relations like log(Y) = A(mb - C) + B (where Y is yield in kt, and A, B, C are calibrated constants), with corrections for tectonic release or cavity tamping reducing errors to 20-50% for contained explosions up to 1 Mt. Hydrodynamic sensors in boreholes and venting analysis serve as confirmatory techniques, though seismic methods dominate for remote assessments of foreign tests due to their global detectability. Uncertainties persist in adversarial contexts, as evidenced by debates over Soviet yields at Semipalatinsk, where seismic data required decoupling adjustments to align with 10-100 kt ranges.

Testing Methodologies and Sites

Nuclear weapons testing methodologies encompass a range of techniques designed to evaluate device performance, yield, and effects under controlled conditions, evolving from open-air detonations to contained explosions to minimize environmental release while adhering to international treaties post-1963. Primary categories include atmospheric tests, conducted in the open air via methods such as tower-mounted devices, balloon suspension for elevated bursts, airdrops from , or surface placements; these allowed direct of fireball dynamics, blast waves, and but dispersed fallout widely until prohibited by the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. Underground testing, predominant after the , involved emplacing devices in vertical shafts—typically 100 to 2,000 feet deep—or horizontal tunnels to contain the explosion and limit venting, with over 800 such tests at U.S. sites alone between 1951 and 1992; shaft tests focused on yield measurement via seismic data and cavity analysis, while tunnels enabled effects simulations on structures or materials. Other variants include underwater detonations for naval effects studies, as in (1946), and exoatmospheric or space tests to assess high-altitude electromagnetic pulses, exemplified by U.S. in 1962. Post-moratorium, subcritical experiments—using conventional explosives on fissile materials without achieving criticality—have sustained stockpile certification, conducted in tunnels at sites like the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Test sites were selected for geographic isolation, geological stability, and logistical access, often repurposed military areas to facilitate rapid iteration amid Cold War imperatives. The United States executed 1,030 tests, with 928 at the NNSS (formerly Nevada Test Site) in Yucca Flat and Pahute Mesa—ideal for underground containment due to alluvial basins and tuff layers—and 106 in the Pacific Proving Grounds at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls for atmospheric and underwater trials, though these caused extensive radiological contamination. The Soviet Union conducted 715 tests, primarily at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan (456 explosions, including early atmospheric and later underground in salt domes for containment) and Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic (132 tests, focused on thermonuclear yields up to 50 megatons). France performed 210 detonations, shifting from the Algerian Sahara (13 atmospheric at Reggane and In Ekker, 1960-1966) to French Polynesia's Moruroa and Fangataufa Atolls (193 underwater and atmospheric tests), where coral geology proved inadequate for full containment, leading to documented leakage. The United Kingdom's 45 tests included joint U.S. operations at NNSS, independent atmospheric blasts at Monte Bello Islands and Maralinga in Australia (1952-1957), and Christmas Island in the Pacific, selected for imperial access but resulting in long-term indigenous exposure. China's 45 tests occurred exclusively at Lop Nur in Xinjiang, utilizing desert basins for both atmospheric (23) and underground (22) methods from 1964 onward, with yields scaling to megaton range by the 1970s.
NationPrimary SitesTest CountKey Methodologies
Nevada National Security Site; 1,030Underground shafts/tunnels; atmospheric airdrops/towers; subcritical (post-1992)
/RussiaSemipalatinsk; 715Atmospheric surface/airbursts; underground in salt/caverns
/Monte Bello (Australia); ; NNSS (joint)45Atmospheric towers/balloons; limited underground
France/In Ekker (Algeria); / (Polynesia)210Atmospheric; underwater; shaft/tunnel underground
45Atmospheric drop; vertical shaft underground
These sites' legacies include seismic monitoring advancements and challenges, with no full-yield tests by declared nuclear states since France's 1996 halt, though subcritical and simulation-based validation persists under Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provisions.

Strategic and Developmental Objectives

Deterrence and Arsenal Reliability

Nuclear weapons testing plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining the reliability of arsenals, which forms the foundation of credible nuclear deterrence by assuring potential adversaries of the certainty of devastating retaliation. Full-scale explosive tests allow verification of performance, including yield, delivery integration, and resilience to environmental stresses, thereby building empirical confidence in operational effectiveness. Historically, the conducted over 1,000 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992 to refine designs and certify reliability, enabling a deterrent posture that prevented direct great-power conflict during the . Following the U.S. voluntary moratorium on explosive testing in September 1992, the (NNSA) has relied on the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) to sustain arsenal reliability without full-yield detonations. The SSP integrates simulations, hydrodynamic testing, and subcritical experiments—non-nuclear explosions that assess behavior under compression—to annually certify the , , and effectiveness of the approximately 3,700 warheads in the U.S. stockpile. These methods leverage data from prior tests and advanced diagnostics to detect potential degradation in components like pits and boosters, with annual presidential certifications affirming high confidence in performance since the moratorium. Debates persist regarding the long-term sufficiency of test-ban-era approaches for deterrence, as adversaries such as , , and have conducted post-1992 tests to validate modernized arsenals, potentially exploiting perceived U.S. vulnerabilities from untested modifications or aging effects. Critics, including some defense analysts, contend that without occasional explosive testing, uncertainties in low-probability failure modes could undermine deterrence credibility, especially amid peer competitors' advancements in hypersonics and defenses that challenge legacy designs. Proponents of the moratorium counter that SSP's science-based tools provide robust assurance, with resumption risking global proliferation and norm erosion without proportional reliability gains. Empirical outcomes, including the absence of stockpile failures in programs, support continued certification, though causal links to deterrence efficacy remain inferential absent real-world use.

Scientific Advancements from Testing

![Castle Bravo thermonuclear test, March 1, 1954][float-right] Nuclear weapons testing provided critical empirical data on fission and fusion processes, enabling refinements in theoretical models of nuclear reactions under extreme conditions. The test on July 16, 1945, at , confirmed the viability of implosion designs, yielding approximately 20 kilotons and validating dynamics predicted by Los Alamos scientists. This test resolved uncertainties in neutron multiplication and criticality, foundational to subsequent weapon designs and broader . The test on November 1, 1952, at , demonstrated the Teller-Ulam staged thermonuclear configuration, achieving a yield of 10.4 megatons through deuterium-tritium fusion boosted by a fission primary. Analysis of debris revealed the first synthesis of superheavy elements and , expanding the periodic table and advancing understanding of heavy ion production in high-flux environments. These insights confirmed mechanisms and informed multi-stage weapon architectures. Operation Castle Bravo on March 1, 1954, at , unexpectedly yielded 15 megatons due to unanticipated production from lithium-7 fission, revealing previously unknown reaction pathways in lithium deuteride fuels. This discovery shifted fusion design paradigms toward "dry" fuels, eliminating cryogenic requirements and enabling compact, deliverable thermonuclear weapons. The test's diagnostics, including radiochemical sampling, provided data on plasma evolution and radiation hydrodynamics, contributing to high-energy-density physics. Testing science by exposing alloys and composites to gigabar pressures and temperatures exceeding 100 million , yielding data on phase transitions, , and defect formation unattainable in laboratories until recent decades. Effects simulations from tests like on July 9, 1962, elucidated generation and artificial radiation belts, informing models and satellite hardening. Seismic monitoring of over 2,000 global tests refined crustal wave propagation models, enhancing earthquake detection and . Instrumentation innovations, such as ultra-high-speed framing cameras and detectors developed for yield measurements, extended to non-nuclear applications in plasma research and shock physics. Fallout isotope analysis from atmospheric tests traced global dispersion patterns, advancing and , though primarily through unintended releases rather than controlled experiments. These empirical validations underpinned computational codes for simulating nuclear phenomena, bridging first-principles hydrodynamics with observed outcomes.

Safety and Stockpile Stewardship

Safety protocols during nuclear weapons testing evolved from rudimentary measures in the to more structured evacuation and monitoring by the , yet atmospheric tests exposed personnel and nearby populations to via fallout. Empirical studies indicate that fallout from U.S. atmospheric tests, particularly from sites between 1951 and 1962, resulted in elevated doses for downwind populations, contributing to an estimated 10,000 to 75,000 additional cases nationwide, though overall cancer risk increases were modest relative to background rates. The 1954 test, yielding 15 megatons, exemplified risks when unexpected lithium hydride fusion produced massive fallout, irradiating Marshall Islanders and Japanese fishermen with doses up to 17 rads, leading to acute sickness in some and long-term health issues. Underground testing, mandated by the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, reduced public exposure but introduced containment challenges, with venting incidents like the 1968 Baneberry test releasing 0.04% of its yield as fallout due to a cracked containment chimney. Health monitoring programs, such as the U.S. Nuclear Test Personnel Review, have documented slightly elevated and solid tumor rates among participants, though confounding factors like smoking complicate attribution solely to radiation. These incidents underscored the trade-offs in testing for deterrence reliability versus environmental and human health costs, with total U.S. test yields exceeding 200 megatons by 1992. Post-1992 U.S. testing moratorium, the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), established under Presidential Decision Directive 15, maintains nuclear arsenal safety, security, and reliability through advanced simulations, hydrodynamic tests, and subcritical experiments without producing a nuclear yield, ensuring compliance with the . Subcritical tests, conducted at the National Security Site since 1997, compress special nuclear materials with high explosives to replicate physics under extreme conditions, validating models of aging and safety features like insensitive high explosives. As of 2024, the completed experiments at the PULSE facility, gathering data on material behavior to certify warheads annually without full-scale detonations. The SSP integrates supercomputing at facilities like , where campaigns simulate decades of stockpile aging effects, predicting failures in safety mechanisms such as fire-resistant pits or one-point safety, with confidence derived from cross-validating against historical test data totaling over 1,000 U.S. explosions. This approach has sustained certification of the —approximately 3,700 warheads as of 2023—amid concerns over pit degradation, prompting investments in production facilities to replace aging components by the 2030s. Critics argue simulations cannot fully replicate fission chain reactions, but empirical validation through subcritical and radiographic data has upheld reliability assessments, averting the need for resumed testing despite geopolitical tensions.

Historical Evolution

Origins in World War II and Immediate Postwar (1940s)

The origins of nuclear weapons testing trace to the ' Manhattan Project, a classified research effort launched in 1942 to develop atomic bombs amid . This program, directed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under General and scientific lead , focused on uranium enrichment and plutonium production at sites including . The project's culmination was the test, the world's first nuclear detonation, conducted on July 16, 1945, at 5:29 a.m. local time on the Alamogordo Bombing Range, approximately 210 miles south of Los Alamos. A plutonium implosion device nicknamed "Gadget," weighing 4,690 pounds and suspended 100 feet above ground on a steel tower, yielded an explosive force of about 21 kilotons of , vaporizing the tower and creating glass from fused sand. The Trinity test validated the implosion mechanism critical for plutonium-based weapons, providing empirical data on yield, fireball dynamics, and shockwave propagation through instrumentation like cameras and pressure gauges placed miles away. Conducted under secrecy with evacuation of nearby ranchers, the explosion's light was visible up to 250 miles and its shockwave registered on seismographs in , yet initial public reports attributed it to a munitions . This single test, involving around 400 personnel at the site, confirmed design viability just 21 days before the operational atomic bombings of and , though those drops on August 6 and 9, 1945, served combat purposes rather than scientific testing. In the immediate postwar era, the U.S. shifted to evaluating nuclear effects on military assets through at in the , commencing July 1, 1946. This series, observed by 42,000 participants including international scientists, targeted a fleet of 95 ships, aircraft, and animals to study blast, heat, and . The Able shot, an airdrop of a 23-kiloton plutonium device at 520 feet altitude, sank five ships but underperformed due to aiming errors. The Baker shot followed on July 25, an underwater burst at 90 feet depth yielding the same energy but generating a radioactive water column and base surge that contaminated surviving vessels, rendering many uninhabitable and highlighting unforeseen radiological hazards. The , having initiated its atomic program in 1943 under and influenced by espionage on secrets, achieved its first controlled chain reaction on December 25, 1946, using a graphite-moderated pile in . However, no explosive tests occurred in the 1940s, with the USSR's first detonation delayed until August 29, 1949. Other nations, including the —which contributed to the via the initiative—lacked independent testing capabilities during this decade. These early U.S. efforts established nuclear testing as a cornerstone for weapon reliability, effects assessment, and strategic deterrence amid emerging superpower rivalry.

Cold War Proliferation and Escalation (1950s-1960s)

The Soviet Union's first nuclear test on August 29, 1949, prompted the United States to accelerate its testing program amid fears of a growing communist nuclear arsenal. In response, the U.S. conducted Operation Greenhouse in April-May 1951 at Enewetak Atoll, testing boosted fission and early thermonuclear designs with yields up to 225 kilotons. This marked the beginning of intensified atmospheric testing, with the U.S. performing over 100 tests annually by the late 1950s at sites including the Nevada Test Site and Pacific Proving Grounds. The Soviet Union followed with its first thermonuclear test, RDS-6s, on August 12, 1953, at Semipalatinsk, achieving a yield of 400 kilotons and demonstrating rapid catch-up in fusion technology. Thermonuclear escalation peaked with the U.S. test on November 1, 1952, at Enewetak, yielding 10.4 megatons in the first full-scale hydrogen bomb detonation, though it was a large, cryogenic device unsuitable for weapons. The U.S. in 1954 included Bravo on March 1, which unexpectedly yielded 15 megatons—over twice predictions—due to lithium-7 fusion, dispersing radioactive fallout across 7,000 square miles and contaminating Japanese fishing vessel . The Soviets tested their first deployable in 1955 and escalated further, detonating the 50-megaton on October 30, 1961, over , the largest explosion ever, designed to showcase capability amid Berlin Crisis tensions. Testing frequency surged, with 178 detonations in 1962 alone: 96 by the U.S. and 79 by the USSR, driven by mutual deterrence needs and arsenal validation. Proliferation extended beyond superpowers as allies pursued independent capabilities. The detonated its first device, , on October 3, 1952, off aboard HMS Plymouth, yielding 25 kilotons with U.S. technical assistance under the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement. conducted its inaugural test, Gerboise Bleue, on February 13, , in the Sahara Desert, yielding 70 kilotons and asserting strategic autonomy. followed with its first test on October 16, 1964, at , a 22-kiloton implosion device aided by Soviet transfers until , signaling communist bloc expansion. These developments, totaling hundreds of tests by 1963, underscored the arms race's causal dynamic: each advancement compelled rivals to test for parity in yield, delivery, and reliability, heightening global fallout risks until the Partial Test Ban Treaty of August 5, 1963, prohibited atmospheric, underwater, and space tests among signatories.

De-escalation and Moratoriums (1970s-1990s)

The 1970s marked a shift toward constraining underground nuclear testing through bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed on July 3, 1974, prohibited underground nuclear weapon tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons, aiming to curb the development of higher-yield devices while allowing continued verification of compliance through on-site inspections and seismic monitoring. Ratification delays persisted due to verification concerns, but the treaty entered into force on December 11, 1990, after both parties addressed technical protocols for yield measurement. Complementing the TTBT, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNET), signed on May 28, 1976, imposed similar 150-kiloton limits on non-weapons-related explosions and required advance notification and international observers for events over specified thresholds. The PNET also entered into force in December 1990, effectively linking peaceful and military testing regimes under shared verification standards. Underground testing persisted under these constraints through the 1970s and 1980s, with both superpowers conducting hundreds of events to maintain arsenal reliability, though at lower frequencies than the atmospheric era's peak. The declared a unilateral moratorium from August 1985 to February 1987, halting tests at Semipalatinsk and in response to domestic and international anti-testing movements, only to resume amid U.S. testing continuity. This pause reflected Gorbachev-era de-escalation efforts but was short-lived, as seismic data indicated Soviet yields often approached the TTBT threshold, prompting U.S. demands for enhanced verification before ratification. The , under the Reagan administration, emphasized test resumption for strategic modernization while rejecting a comprehensive ban due to doubts over simulants' adequacy for full-scale validation, yet complied with yield limits verifiable via national technical means. By the early 1990s, end-of-Cold-War dynamics accelerated moratoriums, with the conducting its final test on October 24, 1990, at . The followed with a voluntary moratorium after its last underground test on September 23, 1992, at the , citing sufficient data from prior explosions and advancing computer simulations for . These self-imposed halts, upheld by post-dissolution, facilitated global negotiations culminating in the (CTBT), opened for signature on September 24, 1996, which bans all nuclear explosions regardless of purpose. Though the CTBT awaits due to non-ratifications by key states, the 1970s-1990s moratoriums demonstrably reduced explosive testing rates, shifting reliance toward subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments for deterrence maintenance without full-yield detonations.

Contemporary Developments (2000s-2025)

Following the de facto moratorium established in the , no nuclear-weapon states party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty conducted full-yield nuclear explosion tests from 2000 to 2025, with activities shifting toward non-explosive methods to maintain arsenal reliability. The , which last tested in 1992, advanced its Stockpile Stewardship Program through subcritical experiments—using conventional explosives on fissile materials without achieving supercriticality—and simulations to certify warhead performance without violating the (CTBT) provisions. These efforts, managed by the , included over 30 subcritical tests at the Nevada National Security Site by 2025, focusing on behavior under extreme conditions to ensure the viability of the approximately 3,700 warhead stockpile. Russia adhered to its testing moratorium, with its last full-yield test in , relying on inherited Soviet data and computational models for modernization of its estimated 4,309 as of early 2025. In November 2023, Russia revoked its 2000 ratification of the CTBT, citing U.S. non-ratification and concerns over hydrodynamic testing, though no resumption of explosive testing occurred by October 2025; officials maintained readiness at the site. , last testing in 1996, pursued stockpile maintenance through laboratory hydrotests and simulations amid rapid force expansion to around 600 warheads by 2025, without confirmed explosive tests despite international suspicions of sub-kiloton activities at . and the similarly abstained from testing, leveraging joint simulation facilities like the French Atomic Energy Commission's centers. North Korea, outside the CTBT framework, conducted six underground nuclear tests at Punggye-ri from 2006 to , escalating yields from an estimated 0.7-2 kilotons in October 2006 to 140-250 kilotons in September , claimed as a thermonuclear device, to advance its arsenal estimated at dozens of warheads by 2025. No further tests were verified after , though seismic monitoring detected possible non-nuclear activities at the site. and , having tested in 1998, reported no additional explosions, focusing on integration and doctrinal refinement without breaching their unilateral moratoria. The CTBT, opened for signature in 1996, remained unentered into force by 2025, requiring ratification by 44 Annex 2 states, with holdouts including the , , , , , , and ; Russia's withdrawal reduced ratifications to 177. Compliance monitoring via the CTBTO's International Monitoring System detected no prohibited explosions among signatories, though concerns persisted over the sufficiency of zero-yield testing for long-term stockpile confidence amid aging components and modernization pressures.

Programs by Nation

United States Testing History

The initiated nuclear weapons testing with the detonation on July 16, 1945, at the Alamogordo Bombing Range in , marking the first artificial . This implosion device yielded approximately 19 kilotons and confirmed the feasibility of the implosion design central to subsequent weapons development. The test, conducted as part of the , involved over 30 observers and extensive instrumentation to measure blast effects, , and fireball dynamics. Following , the U.S. shifted to peacetime testing with at in the , commencing on July 1, 1946, with the airburst Able shot (23 kilotons) followed by the underwater shot on July 25 (21 kilotons). These tests evaluated nuclear effects on naval vessels, equipment, and personnel, involving 242 ships, 156 aircraft, and over 42,000 personnel, revealing significant vulnerabilities to blast and radioactivity. Crossroads represented the first public nuclear tests, aimed at assessing strategic implications for fleet survivability amid emerging tensions. In 1950, the Nevada Proving Grounds (later , now Nevada National Security Site) was established for continental testing to reduce logistical challenges of Pacific operations. The first test there, Operation Ranger Able, occurred on January 27, 1951, an airdropped 1-kiloton device, initiating 100 atmospheric detonations at the site through 1962. By official count, the U.S. conducted 1,054 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992, with 928 at Nevada, including over 800 underground after the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty prohibited atmospheric, underwater, and outer space explosions. These encompassed yields from sub-kiloton to multi-megaton, refining warhead designs, delivery systems, and safety features amid Soviet advancements. Testing peaked in the 1950s and 1960s, with series like Upshot-Knothole (1953) and Dominic (1962) demonstrating thermonuclear capabilities and high-altitude effects. The 1963 treaty prompted a transition to underground testing, containing fallout while enabling continued validation of arsenal reliability. The final U.S. test, Divider, detonated on September 23, 1992, at Nevada, after which a unilateral moratorium was imposed, upheld since despite subcritical experiments for stockpile stewardship. This halt reflected strategic de-escalation, though debates persist on its impact on deterrence credibility given reliance on simulations and historical data.

Soviet/Russian Testing Efforts

The Soviet Union's nuclear testing program commenced with the device detonation on August 29, 1949, at the in , yielding approximately 22 kilotons and marking the first successful test outside the . This implosion-type plutonium bomb, code-named "First Lightning," relied heavily on design information acquired through espionage from the U.S. , accelerating Soviet development amid postwar security concerns. Testing expanded rapidly during the 1950s, with the achieving its first thermonuclear detonation in November 1955, producing yields far exceeding initial atomic devices and intensifying the . Primary sites included Semipalatinsk, where 456 explosions occurred from 1949 to 1989, encompassing both atmospheric and later underground tests, and in the , host to about 130 detonations starting in 1955. Atmospheric tests peaked in the early , including the 79 detonations in alone, before the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty shifted most activity underground to comply with prohibitions on open-air explosions. A landmark event was the October 30, 1961, airburst of the AN602 device, known as , over , achieving a 50-megaton yield—the largest artificial explosion ever recorded—and demonstrating multi-stage thermonuclear feasibility, though its impractical size limited deployability. The program encompassed diverse experiments, from tactical weapons to high-altitude and underwater tests, such as the 1955 T-5 torpedo detonation, prioritizing arsenal diversification and strategic parity with the West. Secrecy shrouded operations, with minimal regard for local populations near Semipalatinsk, where fallout exposure affected thousands without evacuation or disclosure. Following the USSR's dissolution in 1991, Russia inherited the arsenal and testing infrastructure but imposed a unilateral moratorium after the final full-yield test on October 24, 1990, at . While adhering to this pause, Russia has conducted subcritical and hydrodynamic experiments to maintain stockpile confidence without fission chain reactions, and in November 2023, it revoked ratification of the amid geopolitical tensions, signaling potential readiness to resume if provoked, though no detonations have occurred as of 2025. Facilities like remain operational for such non-explosive verification activities.

British, French, and Chinese Programs

The United Kingdom conducted 45 nuclear tests from 3 October 1952 to 26 November 1991. The initial test, Operation Hurricane, involved detonating a plutonium implosion device with a yield of 25 kilotons aboard HMS Plym in Main Bay off Trimouille Island, Monte Bello Islands, Australia. Early atmospheric tests followed at Emu Field (two in 1953) and Maralinga (seven major detonations from 1956 to 1963) in South Australia's Woomera Prohibited Area, aimed at weapons effects and safety trials. Thermonuclear development advanced through Operation Grapple, with six air-dropped tests at Malden and Christmas Islands in the Pacific from 1957 to 1958, including Britain's first hydrogen bomb yield exceeding 1 megaton on 28 April 1958. Post-1958, joint testing with the United States at the Nevada Test Site under the Mutual Defence Agreement facilitated underground experiments, comprising 21 of the UK's total atmospheric tests. France performed 210 nuclear tests between 13 February 1960 and 27 January 1996. The program's debut, Gerboise Bleue, was a 70-kiloton tower shot at in 's Desert, marking the fourth nation to test independently. Four atmospheric tests occurred in before independence prompted relocation to Mururoa and atolls in , sites of 193 subsequent detonations from 1966 onward, including 41 atmospheric tests until 1974 that dispersed fallout across the South Pacific. 's first hydrogen bomb test, , yielded 2.6 megatons on 24 August 1968 over . The final series of eight underground tests in 1995–1996, totaling yields over 4 megatons, preceded 's adherence to a testing moratorium amid global pressure. China executed 45 nuclear tests at in from 16 October 1964 to July 1996. The inaugural device, , was a 22-kiloton implosion fission bomb detonated in a tower, achieving despite Soviet assistance withdrawal. Progress accelerated with the first thermonuclear test on 17 June 1967, an air-dropped bomb yielding 3.3 megatons—accomplished 32 months after the atomic test through parallel production and design iteration. After initial atmospheric series (23 tests to 1980), all remaining detonations were underground, supporting arsenal modernization while upholding a no-first-use .

Non-NPT State Tests: India, Pakistan, North Korea

conducted its first nuclear test, designated , on May 18, 1974, at the Test Range in , with seismic estimates of the yield ranging from 6 to 15 kilotons from a plutonium implosion device; Indian authorities claimed 12 kilotons and described the event as a peaceful , though the design demonstrated weapons potential. No further tests occurred until 1998, when executed , comprising five underground detonations between May 11 and May 13 at the same site. On May 11, three devices were tested simultaneously: a fission device (claimed yield ~12 kt), a purported thermonuclear device (~43 kt), and a low-yield device (<1 kt), but teleseismic and regional seismic data indicated a total yield of approximately 10-20 kt, with analyses suggesting the thermonuclear primary functioned while the secondary stage likely fizzled, failing to achieve full fusion yield. The May 13 tests involved two sub-kiloton devices (claimed 0.3-0.5 kt each), which evaded detection by global seismic networks due to their small scale. Pakistan, prompted by India's Pokhran-II series, conducted its inaugural nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, at the Ras Koh Hills in the Chagai region, detonating five devices (or possibly six, per some accounts) with a combined official yield of 36-40 kt, including uranium-based boosted fission designs; seismic assessments estimated lower outputs, capping the largest at ~12 kt and total around 9-12 kt. A follow-up test, Chagai-II, occurred on May 30 at Kharan, involving a single device with a claimed yield of 12-20 kt, seismically verified at ~4-6 kt. These remain Pakistan's only nuclear tests, establishing its capability for uranium-implosion weapons. North Korea, having withdrawn from the NPT in January 2003, performed six underground nuclear tests at the Punggye-ri facility from 2006 to 2017, escalating from -fueled devices to claimed thermonuclear designs, with yields increasing over time amid international condemnation and sanctions. The tests' details, based on seismic magnitudes and detections, are as follows:
DateEstimated Yield (kt)Notes
October 9, 20060.7-2First test; device, partial yield suspected.
May 25, 20092-5Second test; improved fission design.
February 12, 20136-7Third test; higher efficiency.
January 6, 20167-10Claimed hydrogen bomb; likely boosted fission.
September 9, 201615-25Fifth test; advanced warhead prototype.
September 3, 2017100-250Sixth and largest; seismic magnitude 6.3, claimed thermonuclear, though some estimates as low as 20-30 kt; caused site .
Yields derive from seismic body-wave magnitudes (mb) calibrated against known events, with uncertainties due to depth, geology, and decoupling effects; North Korean claims often exceed independent assessments. No nuclear tests have been conducted since 2017, though U.S. intelligence reported in 2025 that Punggye-ri has been restored and could support resumed testing.

Environmental and Human Impacts

Radiation Fallout from Atmospheric Tests

Atmospheric nuclear weapons tests released radioactive fission products and activated materials into the atmosphere, where they condensed into particles and were transported by winds before depositing as fallout on the Earth's surface via dry or wet processes. Approximately 90% of strontium-90 (Sr-90) and cesium-137 (Cs-137) deposition occurred through wet fallout during rainfall. Key radionuclides included iodine-131 (I-131, half-life 8 days), which concentrated in the thyroid via contaminated milk; Sr-90 (half-life 28.8 years), a bone-seeking isotope mimicking calcium; and Cs-137 (half-life 30 years), which distributes throughout soft tissues. Between 1951 and 1958, Nevada Test Site explosions alone released about 150 MCi of I-131. Fallout patterns varied by injection height: tropospheric injections caused prompt local deposition within hours to days, while stratospheric injections led to gradual global dispersal over months to years, with 90% of the 440 megatons of atmospheric test yields concentrated in the from 1951 to 1980. In the United States, Nevada tests resulted in elevated deposition levels exceeding 370 kBq/m² in some downwind states like . Globally, peak fallout occurred in the early , with Sr-90 and Cs-137 persisting due to their long half-lives. The test on March 1, 1954, at exemplified severe local fallout, yielding 15 megatons and dispersing radioactive debris over 450 km due to unexpected yield and wind shifts, exposing residents to doses up to 190 rem and causing acute symptoms. In the , this event contributed to average doses of 0.68 Gy among affected populations. U.S. in southwestern received doses averaging 0.12 Gy for children, with maxima up to 1.4 Gy linked to milk consumption. Empirical health data indicate elevated cancer risks in exposed cohorts. In the U.S., estimates attribute 49,000 excess cases (95% CI: 11,300–212,000) to I-131 from tests, primarily among those under 20 during 1951–1957. excess deaths numbered about 1,800 from combined and global fallout. In , incidence rose from 10 to 29.4 per 100,000 between baseline and 1990–2009. residents experienced 219 excess s (174% increase) and 162 other solid cancers (3% increase). Global per capita doses from tests averaged around 0.1 mSv annually at peak, comparable to natural background, with UNSCEAR attributing limited excess malignancies based on linear no-threshold models derived from higher-dose data like survivors.

Effects of Underground Testing

Underground nuclear weapons tests, initiated by the United States in 1957, aimed to contain the explosion's radioactive byproducts within the earth, substantially reducing atmospheric fallout compared to surface or aerial detonations. This method involved emplacing devices hundreds to thousands of feet beneath the surface in shafts drilled into bedrock, where the overlying rock was intended to absorb fission products and prevent release. Despite this, tests produced intense seismic waves equivalent to earthquakes, with body-wave magnitudes (mb) empirically related to explosive yield (Y in kilotons) by formulas such as mb ≈ 4.0 + 0.75 log₁₀(Y) for hard rock sites like the Nevada Test Site. These vibrations caused localized ground shaking, rock fracturing, and in shallow detonations, surface subsidence craters from cavity collapse. Radiological containment succeeded in the vast majority of cases, with only rare venting events releasing radionuclides to the atmosphere; U.S. records indicate such incidents occurred fewer than ten times across over 900 underground tests at the through 1992. A notable example was the Baneberry test on December 18, 1970, a 10-kiloton device at 900 feet depth that unexpectedly vented due to hydrofracturing of containment rock, dispersing about 6.7 million curies of radioactivity, primarily and particulates, across parts of and . This led to temporary suspension of testing and enhanced containment protocols, including deeper emplacement and better geological modeling. Environmental legacies include potential contamination where tests intersected aquifers, as at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly ), where radionuclides like , , and entered subsurface flows. Monitoring since the 1970s has detected plumes migrating slowly—rates of millimeters to centimeters per year—within site boundaries, contaminating an estimated 1.6 trillion gallons of , but hydrological barriers and dilution prevent migration to accessible public supplies like those in Pahute Mesa or Amargosa Valley. Department of Energy assessments, based on decades of sampling, affirm no off-site potable water risks, though long-term containment relies on natural attenuation rather than complete isolation. Human health impacts from underground testing were markedly lower than from atmospheric tests, with negligible widespread population exposure due to containment. On-site workers faced risks from venting, as in Baneberry, where over 100 personnel were potentially exposed, prompting medical monitoring but no cases. Epidemiological studies of employees, covering 1950–1990 exposures, report excess cancers (e.g., and ) at rates of 5–10% above baselines, attributable partly to cumulative dose estimates of 10–50 mSv for some cohorts, though from earlier atmospheric tests and non-radiation hazards complicates isolation of underground-specific effects. Nearby communities experienced no verifiable increases in radiation-linked diseases beyond background, per longitudinal health data.

Empirical Health Data and Risk Assessments

Empirical studies on populations exposed to radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear weapons tests have documented elevated incidences of specific cancers, particularly thyroid cancer attributable to iodine-131 (I-131) ingestion via contaminated milk. The National Cancer Institute's (NCI) analysis of I-131 releases from 90 atmospheric tests at the Nevada Test Site between 1951 and 1962 estimated collective thyroid doses to the U.S. population exceeding 200 million person-Gy, projecting between 11,000 and 212,000 attributable thyroid cancer cases nationwide, with the highest risks in states like Utah, Arizona, and Idaho due to dairy consumption patterns. A cohort study in Utah counties downwind of the Nevada Test Site reported 14 observed thyroid cancers versus 1.7 expected in early periods, alongside excesses in leukemia (9/3.6) and later breast cancer (27/14), linking these to fallout deposition. For the 1945 Trinity test in , NCI dose reconstructions estimated average adult doses of 2.2 mGy and child doses up to 78 mGy in nearby counties, projecting 70 to 390 excess cancers (primarily and ) over lifetimes under linear no-threshold (LNT) assumptions, representing 3-7% of total cancers in exposed groups. Global assessments by the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) indicate that atmospheric tests from 1945 to 1980 delivered an average per capita effective dose of approximately 0.17 mSv worldwide, equivalent to less than one year's natural background radiation, with collective doses leading to an estimated several thousand excess cancers globally, predominantly leukemias and solid tumors in the 1960s-1980s. Risk assessments generally employ the LNT model, extrapolating from high-dose data like atomic bomb survivors, to predict stochastic effects such as a 5% lifetime cancer risk per sievert of exposure, though empirical evidence for low-dose linearity remains debated due to confounding factors like lifestyle and natural radiation variability. Some cohort analyses, including one on Utah thyroid cancers, found no significant dose-response relationship with cumulative I-131 exposure or age at exposure under 15 years, suggesting potential thresholds or overestimation in projections. Underground tests, comprising over 90% of post-1963 detonations, produced negligible population-level fallout exposures due to containment, with health risks limited primarily to onsite workers via potential venting incidents, though peer-reviewed data show no widespread excess morbidity beyond baseline rates.
Study/PopulationKey ExposureAttributable Cancers EstimatedSource
U.S. Nationwide ( Tests I-131)Thyroid dose via 11,000–212,000
Downwind CountiesFallout depositionExcess (14/1.7), (9/3.6)
( Test)Gamma/beta fallout70–390 total (/ dominant)
Global Atmospheric TestsEffective dose ~0.17 mSv/capitaSeveral thousand (/solid tumors)

Early Bilateral Agreements

The initial efforts to curb nuclear weapons testing through bilateral means emerged in the late 1950s amid escalating concerns over radioactive fallout from atmospheric detonations, exemplified by the March 1, 1954, Castle Bravo test, which dispersed significant fission products across the Pacific. On October 31, 1958, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced a suspension of American atmospheric and underwater nuclear tests, effective immediately, while permitting underground testing; this move was tied to ongoing Geneva negotiations and anticipated Soviet reciprocity. The Soviet Union reciprocated on November 3, 1958, with Premier Nikita Khrushchev declaring a halt to all nuclear tests, initiating an informal bilateral moratorium that both nations observed until the USSR resumed atmospheric testing on September 1, 1961. This three-year pause, though lacking formal verification mechanisms, demonstrably reduced short-term global fallout deposition, with empirical monitoring by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission confirming decreased strontium-90 levels in milk and precipitation during the period. Parallel to U.S.-Soviet understandings, the United States and United Kingdom formalized nuclear cooperation via the July 3, 1958, Mutual Defence Agreement, which amended the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to enable bilateral exchange of classified nuclear weapon design information, including data from testing programs. This pact, rooted in wartime alliances like the 1943 Quebec Agreement, allowed the UK access to U.S. test results and designs during the moratorium, facilitating joint assessments of thermonuclear yields and safety without mandating test suspensions. The agreement emphasized mutual defense benefits over outright bans, with the UK conducting its final pre-moratorium tests in Australia earlier that year, but it underscored early bilateral frameworks prioritizing allied verification over unilateral restraint. These arrangements preceded more structured multilateral pacts, highlighting verification challenges: U.S. officials noted Soviet non-compliance risks due to inadequate on-site inspections, a point of contention that stalled comprehensive bans until post-1962 diplomatic breakthroughs. Empirical data from the moratorium era, including reduced cesium-137 in global soils, validated the causal link between testing halts and fallout mitigation, though both powers maintained underground programs—totaling 116 U.S. and 57 Soviet detonations—to advance warhead reliability without atmospheric release.

Partial and Threshold Test Bans

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), formally the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, prohibited nuclear explosions in those environments while permitting underground testing. Negotiated amid heightened tensions following the 's resumption of atmospheric testing in , it was signed on August 5, 1963, in by the , the , and the . The U.S. ratified it on September 23, 1963, by a vote of 80-19, with President Kennedy signing the instrument of ratification on October 7, 1963; the treaty entered into force on October 10, 1963, upon deposit of ratifications by the three depositary states. By limiting tests to underground sites, the PTBT aimed to curb radioactive fallout from atmospheric detonations, which had dispersed globally during prior open-air series; over 120 states eventually acceded, though and —major nuclear powers at the time—did not sign, continuing atmospheric tests into the 1970s and 1980s. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), signed on July 3, 1974, between the and the in , established a limit on underground tests by prohibiting detonations exceeding 150 kilotons yield after March 31, 1976. This threshold equated to roughly ten times the yield of the bomb, targeting high-yield devices while allowing lower-yield experiments essential for maintenance and design validation. Initial delays in ratification stemmed from verification disputes, including seismic detection capabilities and on-site inspections; a protocol signed in 1976 addressed yield measurement via hydrodynamic and seismic methods, but the treaty did not enter into force until December 11, 1990, following joint verification experiments at each side's test sites. Complementing the TTBT, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), signed on May 28, 1976, extended similar yield restrictions to non-weapon underground explosions for civilian purposes, such as resource extraction or engineering projects, capping individual events at 150 kilotons and aggregate yields for grouped explosions. Like the TTBT, it entered into force on December 11, 1990, after resolution of verification protocols, and mandated compliance with nonproliferation norms by treating such blasts as potential weapons delivery vehicles if not distinguished clearly. These bilateral accords, while halting the largest underground tests—U.S. yields had reached 1 megaton in 1962 and Soviet tests up to 5 megatons—preserved capabilities for sub-threshold detonations, with both nations conducting hundreds more underground events through the 1980s and early 1990s to refine arsenals amid mutual suspicions of cheating via decoupled explosions. Empirical seismic data from joint exercises confirmed the treaties' role in constraining but not eliminating high-confidence testing, as yields below 150 kilotons sufficed for many warhead certifications without evident degradation in reliability.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Status

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibits all nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions, establishing a comprehensive global ban on such activities. Negotiations concluded in Geneva after intensive talks from 1994 to 1996 under the Conference on Disarmament, building on prior partial test ban efforts, with the treaty text adopted on August 10, 1996, and opened for signature on September 24, 1996. The treaty's verification regime includes the International Monitoring System, comprising seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide stations to detect potential violations, alongside on-site inspections. Entry into force requires ratification by all 44 states listed in Annex 2, which were identified in 1996 as possessing nuclear reactors or research capabilities relevant to nuclear weapons development. As of October 2025, the CTBT has 187 signatories and 178 ratifications, reflecting broad but incomplete adherence. However, it remains outside force due to unratified Annex 2 states, including the eight that have signed but not ratified—China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States—and three that have neither signed nor ratified: India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Russia, which ratified in 2000, revoked its ratification in November 2023, citing concerns over U.S. compliance with testing moratoria and advancements in non-explosive testing technologies, effectively rejoining the holdout list. The signed the in 1996 but the declined in 1999, primarily due to verification uncertainties and potential impacts on without full-scale testing. has conditioned its on U.S. action, while and , outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty framework, have cited security concerns and the treaty's linkage to broader obligations as barriers to accession. Despite the treaty's non-entry into force, most nuclear-armed states observe voluntary moratoria on explosive testing, with the last acknowledged tests occurring in 1998 by and and 1996 by others; conducted its most recent claimed tests in 2017. The 14th Conference on Facilitating in September 2025 reiterated calls for Annex 2 ratifications but highlighted persistent geopolitical tensions impeding progress.

Debates and Controversies

Claims of Catastrophic Harm vs. Verifiable Evidence

Alarmist narratives surrounding nuclear weapons testing frequently assert catastrophic environmental and health consequences, including widespread cancer epidemics, genetic mutations across generations, and irreversible ecological damage from radioactive fallout. Such claims, often amplified by advocacy groups and media outlets, portray testing as a progenitor of millions of excess cancers globally and depict affected populations, particularly "downwinders" near test sites, as suffering disproportionate morbidity. For instance, organizations representing downwinders from the Nevada Test Site cite anecdotal clusters of leukemia and thyroid cancers, attributing them directly to fallout without accounting for confounding factors like smoking, diet, or baseline incidence rates. Verifiable empirical data, however, reveals that while fallout contributed measurable radiation doses, these were modest relative to natural background levels and did not precipitate population-level catastrophes. Atmospheric tests from 1945 to 1980 released radionuclides that peaked global per capita exposure at approximately 0.15 millisieverts (mSv) per year in , constituting about 7% of the average natural background dose of 2.4 mSv annually from cosmic rays, , and terrestrial sources. In the United States, the National Cancer Institute's analysis of fallout from Nevada tests estimated 10,000 to 75,000 attributable cases over decades, a fraction amid the baseline annual U.S. incidence of around 40,000 cancers, with no statistically significant uptick in overall national cancer mortality rates linked to testing. Epidemiological studies further temper claims of pervasive harm. The Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) assessments of global fallout find no evidence of heritable genetic effects in human populations, despite predictions from linear no-threshold models, and attribute detectable health impacts primarily to localized high exposures rather than diffuse fallout. For downwinders, while and risks showed modest elevations in cohort studies—e.g., a 1.5-fold increase in carcinomas among exposed Pacific Islanders—these effects were confined to specific radionuclides like in milk, with overall cancer rates not deviating markedly from national trends when adjusted for age and lifestyle variables. Peer-reviewed analyses, including those examining high-fallout versus low-fallout U.S. counties, report no broad excess in solid tumors or all-cause mortality attributable to testing, contrasting with advocacy assertions of unchecked surges. Causal realism underscores that low-dose radiation risks remain contentious, with empirical challenging exaggerated projections: total collective dose from all atmospheric tests equated to roughly of global background exposure, far below medical diagnostics like CT scans (up to 10 mSv per procedure). Institutional biases in academia and media, which often prioritize precautionary narratives, may inflate perceived harms by extrapolating high-dose survivor (e.g., ) to trace-level fallout, overlooking dose-rate effects and adaptive biological responses observed in . Absent rigorous controls, downwinder compensation programs like the U.S. have acknowledged presumptive links for select cancers but do not substantiate claims of systemic devastation, as longitudinal health surveillance reveals resilience in exposed cohorts.

Ethical Objections and Security Trade-offs

Ethical objections to nuclear weapons testing center on the humanitarian consequences of , particularly from atmospheric detonations that dispersed fallout over populated areas and ecosystems. Critics, including organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross, argue that testing inflicts indiscriminate harm through , violating principles of proportionality and distinction in armed conflict preparations, as detonations release isotopes such as that bioaccumulate in glands, elevating cancer risks in exposed populations. For instance, the U.S. estimated that fallout from atmospheric tests between 1951 and 1962 could contribute to up to 212,000 excess cases nationwide, based on reconstructed exposure models, though actual attributable incidence remains debated due to factors like natural radiation and lifestyle risks. These concerns extend to ""—civilians in regions like and the —where empirical studies document elevated rates among children exposed post-1950s tests, with relative risks 2-3 times baseline in high-fallout zones, prompting compensation under the U.S. for verified cases exceeding 11,000 by 2023. Proponents of testing counter that such ethical critiques often overlook causal trade-offs, emphasizing that verifiable reliability underpins nuclear deterrence, which has empirically averted great-power conflicts since by ensuring retaliatory credibility—potentially sparing tens of millions from conventional or escalated wars, per utilitarian assessments of deterrence's net preservation of life. Underground testing, conducted in over 800 U.S. detonations after the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, contained fallout to negligible off-site levels, with seismic monitoring confirming efficacy and health of test site workers showing no statistically significant beyond baseline occupational hazards, as reported in Department of Energy longitudinal data. Ethical absolutism against testing, frequently advanced by anti-nuclear advocacy groups with institutional ties to agendas, underweights these deterrence benefits, where untested arsenals risk failure modes like plutonium pit degradation, observed in accelerated aging simulations since the 1992 U.S. testing moratorium. Security trade-offs of test bans manifest in the tension between non-proliferation norms and arsenal certification: the (CTBT), signed in 1996 but unratified by the U.S., prohibits full-yield explosions, relying on the Program's surrogate methods—hydrodynamic tests, subcritical experiments, and supercomputing—to maintain reliability without empirical validation at scale. While annual assessments by Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia labs certify the U.S. as safe and reliable as of 2024, program limitations preclude certifying novel low-yield designs or resolving unforeseen physics anomalies from material aging, such as in warhead secondaries, potentially eroding deterrence confidence if adversaries like —suspected of hydrodynamic cheats post-1996—advance hypersonic countermeasures unmirrored by U.S. constraints. This asymmetry heightens risks, as a 10-20% probability in high-stress scenarios could signal weakness, inviting coercion; historical testing data from over 1,000 U.S. events provided the empirical baseline for 99%+ predicted yields, absent which stewardship's predictive models, matured over 30 years at $20 billion+ cost, remain unproven against zero-test baselines. Resuming limited testing could restore parity, but at the cost of norm erosion and potential proliferation cascades, weighing short-term verification gains against long-term verification challenges in a multipolar era.

Calls for Resumed Testing Amid Adversary Advances

In response to 's expansion of its nuclear to over 500 operational warheads by mid-2024, including the development of hypersonic delivery systems and silo-based intercontinental ballistic s, some U.S. analysts have argued that the country's 1992 testing moratorium undermines confidence in the aging U.S. stockpile's performance against evolving threats. Proponents, including researchers at , contend that computer simulations and subcritical experiments under the Program cannot fully replicate the physics of full-yield detonations needed to certify modifications for countermeasures like defenses or to address pit aging in warheads averaging over 30 years old. They assert that without resumed testing, the U.S. risks deterrence failure as adversaries advance unhindered, with projected to possess 1,000 warheads by 2030. Russia's deployment of novel systems, such as the nuclear-powered underwater drone and Burevestnik nuclear-armed —both tested in subcritical or low-yield configurations since 2018—has similarly fueled calls for U.S. testing resumption to validate responses like enhanced warhead yields or penetration aids. Advisors aligned with former President , including those contributing to policy outlines, proposed in 2024 that underground testing be restarted to rebuild expertise lost since 1992 and ensure the arsenal's reliability amid Russia's suspension of treaty inspections in 2023 and its doctrinal shifts permitting nuclear use against conventional threats. These advocates emphasize that Russia's estimated 1,800 deployed strategic warheads and ongoing modernization necessitate empirical data beyond modeling to maintain credible second-strike capabilities. North Korea's series of six nuclear tests from 2006 to 2017, culminating in a claimed thermonuclear device with yields up to 250 kilotons, and its continued missile advancements, including ICBMs capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, have prompted warnings that U.S. reliance on unverified simulations leaves it vulnerable to asymmetric escalations. Experts like Robert Peters of the Davis Institute for National Security have stated in early 2025 that "the United States may need to restart explosive nuclear weapons testing" to counter North Korea's de facto nuclear state status and potential for further high-yield experiments, arguing that subcritical tests alone cannot confirm boosts in efficiency or miniaturization for new delivery vehicles. Such positions highlight the disparity where adversaries conduct over 2,000 combined tests post-1996 while the U.S. maintains readiness to resume but has not, potentially eroding technical proficiency in warhead design and certification.

Enduring Legacy

Key Milestone Detonations

The inaugural nuclear detonation, known as the test, occurred on July 16, 1945, at 5:29 a.m. local time in the desert near , conducted by the as part of the . This implosion device, code-named "," yielded approximately 18.6 kilotons of , confirming the feasibility of atomic fission weapons and paving the way for their combat use weeks later. The Soviet Union's first nuclear test, (also called "First Lightning" or "Joe-1" by Western intelligence), took place on August 29, 1949, at the in , with a yield of 22 kilotons. This plutonium-based implosion device ended the U.S. monopoly on atomic weapons, accelerating the and prompting intensified American efforts toward thermonuclear development. A pivotal advancement came with the United States' test on November 1, 1952, at in the , detonating the first full-scale thermonuclear device with a yield of 10.4 megatons—over 700 times the power of . This liquid deuterium-fueled "Sausage" design demonstrated staged fission-fusion reactions, validating the Teller-Ulam configuration essential for practical hydrogen bombs despite its non-weaponizable bulk. Castle Bravo, detonated by the U.S. on March 1, 1954, at , achieved an unprecedented 15-megaton yield—2.5 times the predicted 6 megatons—due to unexpected fusion contributions from lithium-7 in the deuteride fuel. As the most powerful U.S. test, it highlighted uncertainties in thermonuclear physics, caused extensive fallout contamination, and influenced subsequent dry fuel designs for deployable weapons. The Soviet Union's , tested on October 30, 1961, over in the , remains the largest nuclear detonation ever, with a yield of 50 megatons from a downsized 100-megaton design dropped from a Tu-95 . This three-stage thermonuclear device underscored the theoretical limits of explosive power but proved impractical for warfare due to its size and fallout risks, serving primarily as a demonstration amid heightened East-West tensions.
TestDateCountryYield (kt/Mt)Significance
July 16, 194518.6 ktFirst nuclear explosion, validated fission weapons
August 29, 194922 ktEnded U.S. atomic monopoly
November 1, 195210.4 MtFirst thermonuclear detonation, proved fusion staging
March 1, 195415 MtLargest U.S. yield, revealed lithium-7 fusion effects
October 30, 196150 MtHighest yield ever, demonstrated extreme scaling limits

Compensation Mechanisms and Reparations

The implemented the (RECA) in 1990 to address health harms from nuclear weapons testing and uranium production, offering one-time payments to verified claimants who developed specified cancers or diseases due to . Eligible categories include uranium miners ($100,000), ore transporters and millers ($50,000), downwind residents in parts of , , and present for at least two years before 1962 ($50,000), and onsite test participants ($75,000). By 2024, RECA had disbursed over $2.6 billion to more than 40,000 individuals, though it excludes broader fallout-affected regions like parts of and , prompting legislative expansions such as the 2024 amendments adding residents and extending claims through 2028. In the , site of 67 U.S. detonations from 1946 to 1958 yielding 108 megatons, compensation mechanisms include a $150 million trust fund under the 1986 for health and relocation aid to affected atolls like , Enewetak, Rongelap, and Utrik. The U.S. has provided approximately $250 million total for nuclear effects, including cleanup, but the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims assessed $2.3 billion in damages by 2001, exhausting funds and leading to unresolved claims for ongoing cancers and environmental damage. Marshallese officials continue advocating for full reparations, citing persistent elevated cancer rates exceeding U.S. baselines. France's 2010 Loir law created the Committee for Compensation of Victims of Nuclear Tests (CIVEN) to handle claims from 193 tests in (1960-1966) and (1966-1996), requiring proof of causal links between exposure and illness for payouts averaging tens of thousands of euros. In , where 41 atmospheric tests dispersed fallout across islands, about 50% of applicants received compensation by , but high rejection rates—up to 80% initially—stem from rigorous dosimetric thresholds, fueling lawsuits and criticisms of underestimation of risks. Kazakhstan's 1992 law on for Semipalatinsk victims of 456 Soviet tests (1949-1989) entitles recognized individuals—over 1.5 million exposed—to early pensions, medical aid, and one-time payments of around $600, with 2,924 awards in 2019 alone. Despite this, many report insufficient coverage for chronic illnesses like , with aid limited by verification challenges and budget constraints. For British tests at , , from 1952 to 1963, the government granted A$13.5 million in 1994 to the Maralinga Tjarutja Aboriginal custodians for land loss and contamination, alongside partial site handover and health monitoring. The UK funded £20 million in 1990s cleanups but offered minimal direct reparations to Aboriginal or claimants, with Australian veterans receiving enhanced pensions rather than lump sums.

References

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