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History of nuclear weapons
History of nuclear weapons
from Wikipedia

Trinity-Gadget, an implosion-type plutonium device tested on July 16, 1945, by the United States was the first successful nuclear weapon ever created. It yielded approximately 25 kilotons of TNT.

Building on major scientific breakthroughs made during the 1930s, the United Kingdom began the world's first nuclear weapons research project, codenamed Tube Alloys, in 1941, during World War II. The United States, in collaboration with the United Kingdom, initiated the Manhattan Project the following year to build a weapon using nuclear fission. The project also involved Canada.[1] In August 1945, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were conducted by the United States, with British consent, against Japan at the close of that war, standing to date as the only use of nuclear weapons in hostilities.[2]

The Soviet Union started development shortly after with their own atomic bomb project, and not long after, both countries were developing even more powerful fusion weapons known as hydrogen bombs. Britain and France built their own systems in the 1950s, and the number of states with nuclear capabilities has gradually grown larger in the decades since.

A nuclear weapon, also known as an atomic bomb, possesses enormous destructive power from nuclear fission, or a combination of fission and fusion reactions.

Background

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In nuclear fission, the nucleus of a fissile atom (in this case, enriched uranium) absorbs a thermal neutron, becomes unstable and splits into two new atoms, releasing some energy and between one and three new neutrons, which can perpetuate the process.

In the first decades of the 19th century, physics was revolutionized with developments in the understanding of the nature of atoms including the discoveries in atomic theory by John Dalton.[3] Around the turn of the 20th century, it was discovered by Hans Geiger and Ernest Marsden and then Ernest Rutherford, that atoms had a highly dense, very small, charged central core called an atomic nucleus. In 1898, Pierre and Marie Curie discovered that pitchblende, an ore of uranium, contained a substance—which they named radium—that emitted large amounts of radiation. Ernest Rutherford and Frederick Soddy identified that atoms were breaking down and turning into different elements. Hopes were raised among scientists and laymen that the elements around us could contain tremendous amounts of unseen energy, waiting to be harnessed. In 1905, Albert Einstein described this potential in his famous equation, E = mc2.

H. G. Wells was inspired by the work of Rutherford to write about an "atom bomb" in a 1914 novel, The World Set Free, which appeared shortly before the First World War.[4] In a 1924 article, Winston Churchill speculated about the possible military implications: "Might not a bomb no bigger than an orange be found to possess a secret power to destroy a whole block of buildings—nay to concentrate the force of a thousand tons of cordite and blast a township at a stroke?"[5]

At the time however, there was no known mechanism which could be used to unlock the vast energy potential that was theorized to exist inside the atom. The only particle then known to exist within the nucleus was the positively-charged proton, which would act to repel protons set in motion towards it. Then in 1932, a key breakthrough was made with the discovery of the neutron. Having no electric charge, the neutron is able to penetrate the nucleus with relative ease.

In January 1933, the Nazis came to power in Germany and suppressed Jewish scientists. Physicist Leo Szilard fled to London where, in 1934, he patented the idea of a nuclear chain reaction using neutrons. The patent also introduced the term critical mass to describe the minimum amount of material required to sustain the chain reaction and its potential to cause an explosion (British patent 630,726). The patent was not about an atomic bomb per se, as the possibility of chain reaction was still very speculative. Szilard subsequently assigned the patent to the British Admiralty so that it could be covered by the Official Secrets Act.[6] This work of Szilard's was ahead of the time, five years before the public discovery of nuclear fission and eight years before a working nuclear reactor. When he coined the term neutron inducted chain reaction, he was not sure about the use of isotopes or standard forms of elements. Despite this uncertainty, he correctly theorized uranium and thorium as primary candidates for such a reaction, along with beryllium which was later determined to be unnecessary in practice. Szilard joined Enrico Fermi in developing the first uranium-fuelled nuclear reactor, Chicago Pile-1, which was activated at the University of Chicago in 1942.[7]

In Paris in 1934, Irène and Frédéric Joliot-Curie discovered that artificial radioactivity could be induced in stable elements by bombarding them with alpha particles; in Italy Enrico Fermi reported similar results when bombarding uranium with neutrons. He mistakenly believed he had discovered elements 93 and 94, naming them ausenium and hesperium. In 1938 it was realized these were in fact fission products.[citation needed]

Leo Szilard, pictured in about 1960, invented the electron microscope, linear accelerator, cyclotron, nuclear chain reaction and patented the nuclear reactor

In December 1938, Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann reported that they had detected the element barium after bombarding uranium with neutrons. Lise Meitner and Otto Robert Frisch correctly interpreted these results as being due to the splitting of the uranium atom. Frisch confirmed this experimentally on January 13, 1939.[8] They gave the process the name "fission" because of its similarity to the splitting of a cell into two new cells. Even before it was published, news of Meitner's and Frisch's interpretation crossed the Atlantic.[9] In their second publication on nuclear fission in February 1939, Hahn and Strassmann predicted the existence and liberation of additional neutrons during the fission process, opening up the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction.

After learning about the German fission in 1939, Leo Szilard concluded that uranium would be the element which could realize his 1933 idea about nuclear chain reaction.[10]

In the United States, scientists at Columbia University in New York City decided to replicate the experiment and on January 25, 1939, conducted the first nuclear fission experiment in the United States[11] in the basement of Pupin Hall. The following year, they identified the active component of uranium as being the rare isotope uranium-235.[12]

Between 1939 and 1940, Joliot-Curie's team applied for a patent family covering different use cases of atomic energy, one (case III, in patent FR 971,324 - Perfectionnements aux charges explosives, meaning Improvements in Explosive Charges) being the first official document explicitly mentioning a nuclear explosion as a purpose, including for war.[13] This patent was applied for on May 4, 1939, but only granted in 1950, being withheld by French authorities in the meantime.

Uranium appears in nature primarily in two isotopes: uranium-238 and uranium-235. When the nucleus of uranium-235 absorbs a neutron, it undergoes nuclear fission, releasing energy and, on average, 2.5 neutrons. Because uranium-235 releases more neutrons than it absorbs, it can support a chain reaction and so is described as fissile. Uranium-238, on the other hand, is not fissile as it does not normally undergo fission when it absorbs a neutron.

By the start of the war in September 1939, many scientists likely to be persecuted by the Nazis had already escaped. Physicists on both sides were well aware of the possibility of utilizing nuclear fission as a weapon, but no one was quite sure how it could be engineered. In August 1939, concerned that Germany might have its own project to develop fission-based weapons, Albert Einstein signed a letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt warning him of the threat.[14]

The final iteration of the Gadget nuclear device prior to its successful test on July 16, 1945, the culmination of the United States' three-year Manhattan Project's research and development of nuclear weapons

Roosevelt responded by setting up the Uranium Committee under Lyman James Briggs but, with little initial funding ($6,000), progress was slow. It was not until the U.S. entered the war in December 1941 that Washington decided to commit the necessary resources to a top-secret high priority bomb project.[15]

Organized research first began in Britain and Canada as part of the Tube Alloys project: the world's first nuclear weapons project. The Maud Committee was set up following the work of Frisch and Rudolf Peierls who calculated uranium-235's critical mass and found it to be much smaller than previously thought which meant that a deliverable bomb should be possible.[16] In the February 1940 Frisch–Peierls memorandum they stated that: "The energy liberated in the explosion of such a super-bomb...will, for an instant, produce a temperature comparable to that of the interior of the sun. The blast from such an explosion would destroy life in a wide area. The size of this area is difficult to estimate, but it will probably cover the centre of a big city."

Edgar Sengier, a director of Shinkolobwe Mine in the Congo which produced by far the highest quality uranium ore in the world, had become aware of uranium's possible use in a bomb. In late 1940, fearing that it might be seized by the Germans, he shipped the mine's entire stockpile of ore to a warehouse in New York.[17]

For 18 months British research outpaced the American but by mid-1942, it became apparent that the industrial effort required was beyond Britain's already stretched wartime economy.[18]: 204 

In September 1942, General Leslie Groves was appointed to lead the U.S. project which became known as the Manhattan Project. Two of his first acts were to obtain authorization to assign the highest priority AAA rating on necessary procurements, and to order the purchase of all 1,250 tons of the Shinkolobwe ore.[17][19] The Tube Alloys project was quickly overtaken by the U.S. effort and after Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Quebec Agreement in 1943, it was relocated and amalgamated into the Manhattan Project.[18] Canada provided uranium and plutonium for the project.[20]

Szilard started to acquire high-quality graphite and uranium, which were the necessary materials for building a large-scale chain reaction experiment. The Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago was tasked with the completion of such a reactor, and Fermi moved there, continuing the pile experiments he began at Columbia. After many subcritical designs, Chicago Pile-1 achieved criticality on December 2, 1942. The success of this demonstration and technological breakthrough were partially due to Szilard's new atomic theories, his uranium lattice design, and the identification and mitigation of a key graphite impurity (boron) through a joint collaboration with graphite suppliers.[21]

From Los Alamos to Hiroshima

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Physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer led the Allied scientific effort at Los Alamos.
Proportions of uranium-238 (blue) and uranium-235 (red) found naturally versus grades that are enriched by separating the two isotopes atom-by-atom using various methods that all require a massive investment in time and money.

The beginning of the American research about nuclear weapons (The Manhattan Project) started with the Einstein–Szilárd letter.

With a scientific team led by J. Robert Oppenheimer, the Manhattan project brought together some of the top scientific minds of the day, including exiles from Europe, with the production power of American industry for the goal of producing fission-based explosive devices before Germany. Britain and the U.S. agreed to pool their resources and information, but the main other Allied power, the Soviet Union (USSR), was not informed. The U.S. made a tremendous investment in the project, then the second largest industrial enterprise ever seen,[18] spread across more than 30 sites in the U.S. and Canada. Scientific development was centralized in a secret laboratory at Los Alamos.

Electromagnetic U235 separation plant at Oak Ridge, Tenn. Massive new physics machines were assembled at secret installations around the United States for the production of enriched uranium and plutonium.

For a fission weapon to operate, there must be sufficient fissile material to support a chain reaction, a critical mass. To separate the fissile uranium-235 isotope from the non-fissile uranium-238, two methods were developed which took advantage of the fact that uranium-238 has a slightly greater atomic mass: electromagnetic separation and gaseous diffusion. Another secret site was erected at rural Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the large-scale production and purification of the rare isotope, which required considerable investment. At the time, K-25, one of the Oak Ridge facilities, was the world's largest factory under one roof. The Oak Ridge site employed tens of thousands of people at its peak, most of whom had no idea what they were working on.

Although uranium-238 cannot be used for the initial stage of an atomic bomb, when it absorbs a neutron, it becomes uranium-239 which decays into neptunium-239, and finally the relatively stable plutonium-239, which is fissile like uranium-235. This could then be chemically separated from the rest of the irradiated fuel, in a process far simpler than enrichment. Following the success of Chicago Pile-1 and 2, techniques for continuous reactor operation, plutonium production and separation were developed at the X-10 Graphite Reactor pilot plant in Oak Ridge from 1943. From 1944, the B, D, and F reactors were secretly constructed at what is now known as the Hanford Site, alongside large separation plants. Separate efforts to produce plutonium from heavy water reactors were pursued, with the P-9 Project producing the moderator and resulting in the 1944 test reactor Chicago Pile-3. Such reactors would only be used for plutonium production in the postwar Savannah River Site.

The simplest form of nuclear weapon is a gun-type fission weapon, where a sub-critical mass would be shot at another sub-critical mass. The result would be a super-critical mass and an uncontrolled chain reaction that would create the desired explosion. The weapons envisaged in 1942 were the two gun-type weapons, Little Boy (uranium) and Thin Man (plutonium), and the Fat Man plutonium implosion bomb.

In early 1943 Oppenheimer determined that two projects should proceed forwards: the Thin Man project (plutonium gun) and the Fat Man project (plutonium implosion). The plutonium gun was to receive the bulk of the research effort, as it was the project with the most uncertainty involved. It was assumed that the uranium gun-type bomb could then be adapted from it.

In December 1943 the British mission of 19 scientists arrived in Los Alamos. Hans Bethe became head of the Theoretical Division.

In April 1944 it was found by Emilio Segrè that the plutonium-239 produced by the Hanford reactors had too high a level of background neutron radiation, and underwent spontaneous fission to a very small extent, due to the unexpected presence of plutonium-240 impurities. If such plutonium were used in a gun-type design, the chain reaction would start in the split second before the critical mass was fully assembled, blowing the weapon apart with a much lower yield than expected, in what is known as a fizzle.

The two fission bomb assembly methods.

As a result, development of Fat Man was given high priority. Chemical explosives were used to implode a sub-critical sphere of plutonium, thus increasing its density and making it into a critical mass. The difficulties with implosion centered on the problem of making the chemical explosives deliver a perfectly uniform shock wave upon the plutonium sphere— if it were even slightly asymmetric, the weapon would fizzle. This problem was solved by the use of explosive lenses which would focus the blast waves inside the imploding sphere, akin to the way in which an optical lens focuses light rays.[22]

After D-Day, General Groves ordered a team of scientists to follow eastward-moving victorious Allied troops into Europe to assess the status of the German nuclear program (and to prevent the westward-moving Soviets from gaining any materials or scientific manpower). They concluded that, while Germany had a modest nuclear research program headed by Werner Heisenberg, the government had not made a significant investment in the project, and it had been nowhere near success.[citation needed] Similarly, Japan's efforts at developing a nuclear weapon were starved of resources. The Japanese navy lost interest when a committee led by Yoshio Nishina concluded in 1943 that "it would probably be difficult even for the United States to realize the application of atomic power during the war".[23]

Historians claim to have found a rough schematic showing a Nazi nuclear bomb.[24] In March 1945, a German scientific team was directed by the physicist Kurt Diebner to develop a primitive nuclear device in Ohrdruf, Thuringia.[24][25] Last ditch research was conducted in an experimental nuclear reactor at Haigerloch.

Decision to drop the bomb

[edit]

On April 12, after Roosevelt's death, Vice President Harry S. Truman assumed the presidency. At the time of the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945, the Manhattan Project was still months away from producing a working weapon.

Because of the difficulties in making a working plutonium bomb, it was decided that there should be a test of the weapon. On July 16, 1945, in the desert north of Alamogordo, New Mexico, the first nuclear test took place, code-named "Trinity", using a device nicknamed "the gadget." The test, a plutonium implosion-type device, released energy equivalent to 22 kilotons of TNT, far more powerful than any weapon ever used before. The news of the test's success was rushed to Truman at the Potsdam Conference, where Churchill was briefed and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin was informed of the new weapon. On July 26, the Potsdam Declaration was issued containing an ultimatum for Japan: either surrender or suffer "prompt and utter destruction", although nuclear weapons were not mentioned.[18]

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed between 150,000 and 250,000 people. Of these, 10,000 were soldiers. They were the first and only deployment of nuclear weapons in combat.

After hearing arguments from scientists and military officers over the possible use of nuclear weapons against Japan (though some recommended using them as demonstrations in unpopulated areas, most recommended using them against built up targets, a euphemistic term for populated cities), Truman ordered the use of the weapons on Japanese cities. Under the clause of the 1943 Quebec Agreement that specified that nuclear weapons would not be used against another country without mutual consent, the atomic bombing of Japan was recorded as a decision of the Anglo-American Combined Policy Committee.[26][27][28]

Truman hoped it would send a strong message that would end in the capitulation of the Japanese leadership and avoid a lengthy invasion of the islands. Truman and his Secretary of State James F. Byrnes were also intent on ending the Pacific war before the Soviets could enter it,[29] given that Roosevelt had promised Stalin control of Manchuria if he joined the invasion.[30] On May 10–11, 1945, the Target Committee at Los Alamos, led by Oppenheimer, recommended Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and Kokura as possible targets. Concerns about Kyoto's cultural heritage led to it being replaced by Nagasaki. In late July and early August 1945, a series of leaflets were dropped over several Japanese cities warning them of an imminent destructive attack (though not mentioning nuclear bombs).[31] Evidence suggests that these leaflets were never dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or were dropped too late,[32][33] although a testimony does contradict this.[34]

The Bockscar B-29 that was used to deliver the Fat Man bomb and a post war Mk III nuclear weapon painted to resemble the Fat Man, at the National Museum of the United States Air Force
Hiroshima: burns from the intense thermal effect of the atomic bomb.

On August 6, 1945, a uranium-based weapon, Little Boy, was detonated above the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and three days later, a plutonium-based weapon, Fat Man, was detonated above the Japanese city of Nagasaki. To date, Hiroshima and Nagasaki remain the only two instances of nuclear weapons being used in combat. The atomic raids killed at least one hundred thousand Japanese civilians and military personnel outright, with the heat, radiation, and blast effects. Many tens of thousands would later die of radiation sickness and related cancers.[35][36] Truman promised a "rain of ruin" if Japan did not surrender immediately, threatening to systematically eliminate their ability to wage war.[37] On August 15, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's surrender.[38]

Soviet atomic bomb project

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The Soviet Union was not invited to share in the new weapons developed by the United States and the other Allies. During the war, information had been pouring in from a number of volunteer spies involved with the Manhattan Project (known in Soviet cables under the code-name of Enormoz), and the Soviet nuclear physicist Igor Kurchatov was carefully watching the Allied weapons development. It came as no surprise to Stalin when Truman had informed him at the Potsdam conference that he had a "powerful new weapon." Truman was shocked at Stalin's lack of interest. Stalin was nonetheless outraged by the situation, more by the Americans' guarded monopoly of the bomb than the weapon itself. Some historians share the assessment that Truman immediately authorized nuclear weapons as a "negotiating tool" in the early Cold War. In alarm at this monopoly, the Soviets urgently undertook their own atomic program.[29]

The Soviet spies in the U.S. project were all volunteers and none were Soviet citizens. One of the most valuable, Klaus Fuchs, was a German émigré theoretical physicist who had been part of the early British nuclear efforts and the UK mission to Los Alamos. Fuchs had been intimately involved in the development of the implosion weapon and passed on detailed cross-sections of the Trinity device to his Soviet contacts. Other Los Alamos spies—none of whom knew each other—included Theodore Hall and David Greenglass. The information was kept but not acted upon, as the Soviet Union was still too busy fighting the war in Europe to devote resources to this new project.

In the years immediately after World War II, the issue of who should control atomic weapons became a major international point of contention. Many of the Los Alamos scientists who had built the bomb began to call for "international control of atomic energy," often calling for either control by transnational organizations or the purposeful distribution of weapons information to all superpowers, but due to a deep distrust of the intentions of the Soviet Union, both in postwar Europe and in general, the policymakers of the United States worked to maintain the American nuclear monopoly.

A half-hearted plan for international control was proposed at the newly formed United Nations by Bernard Baruch (The Baruch Plan), but it was clear both to American commentators—and to the Soviets—that it was an attempt primarily to stymie Soviet nuclear efforts. The Soviets vetoed the plan, effectively ending any immediate postwar negotiations on atomic energy, and made overtures towards banning the use of atomic weapons in general.

The Soviets had put their full industrial might and manpower into the development of their own atomic weapons. The initial problem for the Soviets was primarily one of resources—they had not scouted out uranium resources in the Soviet Union and the U.S. had made deals to monopolise the largest known (and high purity) reserves in the Belgian Congo. The USSR used penal labour to mine the old deposits in Czechoslovakia—now an area under their control—and searched for other domestic deposits (which were eventually found).

Two days after the bombing of Nagasaki, the U.S. government released an official technical history of the Manhattan Project, authored by Princeton physicist Henry DeWolf Smyth, known colloquially as the Smyth Report. The sanitized summary of the wartime effort focused primarily on the production facilities and scale of investment, written in part to justify the wartime expenditure to the American public.

The Soviet program, under the suspicious watch of former NKVD chief Lavrenty Beria (a participant and victor in Stalin's Great Purge of the 1930s), would use the Report as a blueprint, seeking to duplicate as much as possible the American effort. The "secret cities" used for the Soviet equivalents of Hanford and Oak Ridge literally vanished from the maps for decades to come.

At the Soviet equivalent of Los Alamos, Arzamas-16, physicist Yuli Khariton led the scientific effort to develop the weapon. Beria distrusted his scientists, however, and he distrusted the carefully collected espionage information. As such, Beria assigned multiple teams of scientists to the same task without informing each team of the other's existence. If they arrived at different conclusions, Beria would bring them together for the first time and have them debate with their newfound counterparts. Beria used the espionage information as a way to double-check the progress of his scientists, and in his effort for duplication of the American project even rejected more efficient bomb designs in favor of ones that more closely mimicked the tried-and-true Fat Man bomb used by the U.S. against Nagasaki.[citation needed]

On August 29, 1949, the effort brought its results, when the USSR successfully tested its first fission bomb, dubbed "Joe-1" by the U.S.[39] The news of the first Soviet bomb was announced to the world first by the United States,[40] which had detected atmospheric radioactive traces generated from its test site in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.[41]

The loss of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons marked the first tit-for-tat of the nuclear arms race.[42]

American developments after World War II

[edit]

With the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the U.S. Congress established the civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to take over the development of nuclear weapons from the military, and to develop nuclear power.[43] The AEC made use of many private companies in processing uranium and thorium and in other urgent tasks related to the development of bombs. Many of these companies had very lax safety measures and employees were sometimes exposed to radiation levels far above what was allowed then or now.[44] (In 1974, the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) of the Army Corps of Engineers was set up to deal with contaminated sites left over from these operations.[45])

The Atomic Energy Act also established the United States Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which had broad legislative and executive oversight jurisdiction over nuclear matters and became one of the powerful congressional committees in U.S. history.[46] Its two early chairmen, Senator Brien McMahon and Senator Bourke Hickenlooper, both pushed for increased production of nuclear materials and a resultant increase in the American atomic stockpile.[47] The size of that stockpile, which had been low in the immediate postwar years,[48] was a closely guarded secret.[49] Indeed, within the U.S. government, including the Departments of State and Defense, there was considerable confusion over who actually knew the size of the stockpile, and some people chose not to know for fear they might disclose the number accidentally.[48]

First thermonuclear weapons

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Hungarian physicist Edward Teller toiled for years trying to discover a way to make a fusion bomb.

The notion of using a fission weapon to ignite a process of nuclear fusion can be dated back to September 1941, when it was first proposed by Enrico Fermi to his colleague Edward Teller during a discussion at Columbia University.[50] At the first major theoretical conference on the development of an atomic bomb hosted by J. Robert Oppenheimer at the University of California, Berkeley in the summer of 1942, Teller directed the majority of the discussion towards this idea of a "Super" bomb.

It was thought at the time that a fission weapon would be quite simple to develop and that perhaps work on a hydrogen bomb (thermonuclear weapon) would be possible to complete before the end of the Second World War. However, in reality the problem of a regular atomic bomb was large enough to preoccupy the scientists for the next few years, much less the more speculative "Super" bomb. Only Teller continued working on the project—against the will of project leaders Oppenheimer and Hans Bethe.

The Joe-1 atomic bomb test by the Soviet Union that took place in August 1949 came earlier than expected by Americans, and over the next several months there was an intense debate within the U.S. government, military, and scientific communities regarding whether to proceed with development of the far more powerful Super.[51]

After the atomic bombings of Japan, many scientists at Los Alamos rebelled against the notion of creating a weapon thousands of times more powerful than the first atomic bombs. For the scientists the question was in part technical—the weapon design was still quite uncertain and unworkable—and in part moral: such a weapon, they argued, could only be used against large civilian populations, and could thus only be used as a weapon of genocide.

A view of the Ivy-Mike "Sausage" device casing, with its instrumentation and cryogenic equipment attached. The long pipes connected to the device to the left were for measuring purposes; the first thermonuclear weapon test-design required cryogenic-fuel lowered to a temperature of near-absolute-zero; a design initially considered far too cumbersome as a deliverable weapon.

Many scientists, such as Bethe, urged that the United States should not develop such weapons and set an example towards the Soviet Union. Promoters of the weapon, including Teller, Ernest Lawrence, and Luis Alvarez, argued that such a development was inevitable, and to deny such protection to the people of the United States—especially when the Soviet Union was likely to create such a weapon themselves—was itself an immoral and unwise act.

Oppenheimer, who was now head of the General Advisory Committee of the successor to the Manhattan Project, the Atomic Energy Commission, presided over a recommendation against the development of the weapon. The reasons were in part because the success of the technology seemed limited at the time (and not worth the investment of resources to confirm whether this was so), and because Oppenheimer believed that the atomic forces of the United States would be more effective if they consisted of many large fission weapons (of which multiple bombs could be dropped on the same targets) rather than the large and unwieldy super bombs, for which there was a relatively limited number of targets of sufficient size to warrant such a development.

What is more, if such weapons were developed by both superpowers, they would be more effective against the U.S. than against the USSR, as the U.S. had far more regions of dense industrial and civilian activity as targets for large weapons than the Soviet Union.

In the end, President Truman made the final decision, looking for a proper response to the first Soviet atomic bomb test in 1949. On January 31, 1950, Truman announced a crash program to develop the hydrogen (fusion) bomb. The exact mechanism was still not known: the classical hydrogen bomb, whereby the heat of the fission bomb would be used to ignite the fusion material, seemed highly unworkable. An insight by Los Alamos mathematician Stanislaw Ulam showed that the fission bomb and the fusion fuel could be in separate parts of the bomb, and that radiation of the fission could compress the fusion material before igniting it.

Teller pushed the notion further and used the results of the boosted-fission "George" test (a boosted-fission device using a small amount of fusion fuel to boost the yield of a fission bomb) to confirm the fusion of heavy hydrogen elements before preparing for their first true multi-stage, Teller-Ulam hydrogen bomb test. Many scientists, initially against the weapon, such as Oppenheimer and Bethe, changed their previous opinions, seeing the development as being unstoppable.

Ivy Mike, the first full test of the Teller–Ulam design (a staged fusion bomb), with a yield of 10.4 megatons (November 1, 1952)

The first fusion bomb was tested by the United States in Operation Ivy on November 1, 1952, on Elugelab Island in the Enewetak (or Eniwetok) Atoll of the Marshall Islands, code-named "Mike." Mike used liquid deuterium as its fusion fuel and a large fission weapon as its trigger. The device was a prototype design and not a deliverable weapon: standing over 20 ft (6 m) high and weighing at least 140,000 lb (64 t) (its refrigeration equipment added an additional 24,000 lb (11,000 kg) as well), it could not have been dropped from even the largest planes.

Its explosion yielded energy equivalent to 10.4 megatons of TNT—over 450 times the power of the bomb dropped onto Nagasaki— and obliterated Elugelab, leaving an underwater crater 6240 ft (1.9 km) wide and 164 ft (50 m) deep where the island had once been. Truman had initially tried to create a media blackout about the test—hoping it would not become an issue in the upcoming presidential election—but on January 7, 1953, Truman announced the development of the hydrogen bomb to the world as hints and speculations of it were already beginning to emerge in the press.

Not to be outdone, the Soviet Union exploded its first thermonuclear device, designed by the physicist Andrei Sakharov, on August 12, 1953, labeled "Joe-4" by the West. This created concern within the U.S. government and military, because, unlike Mike, the Soviet device was a deliverable weapon, which the U.S. did not yet have. This first device though was arguably not a true hydrogen bomb and could only reach explosive yields in the hundreds of kilotons (never reaching the megaton range of a staged weapon). Still, it was a powerful propaganda tool for the Soviet Union, and the technical differences were fairly oblique to the American public and politicians.

The SHRIMP device, utilized in the Bravo test of Operation Castle, was the first ever solid-fueled thermonuclear weapon design ever tested by the United States, light and compact enough to be theoretically deliverable by its existing bomber-aircraft fleet.

Following the Mike blast by less than a year, Joe-4 seemed to validate claims that the bombs were inevitable and vindicate those who had supported the development of the fusion program. Coming during the height of McCarthyism, the effect was pronounced on the security hearings in early 1954, which revoked former Los Alamos director Robert Oppenheimer's security clearance on the grounds that he was unreliable, had not supported the American hydrogen bomb program, and had made long-standing left-wing ties in the 1930s. Edward Teller participated in the hearing as the only major scientist to testify against Oppenheimer, resulting in his virtual expulsion from the physics community.

On March 1, 1954, the U.S. detonated its first practical thermonuclear weapon (which used isotopes of lithium as its fusion fuel), known as the "Shrimp" device of the Castle Bravo test, at Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands. The device yielded 15 megatons, more than twice its expected yield, and became the worst radiological disaster in U.S. history. The combination of the unexpectedly large blast and poor weather conditions caused a cloud of radioactive nuclear fallout to contaminate over 7,000 square miles (18,000 km2). 239 Marshall Island natives and 28 Americans were exposed to significant amounts of radiation, resulting in elevated levels of cancer and birth defects in the years to come.[52]

The crew of the Japanese tuna-fishing boat Lucky Dragon 5, who had been fishing just outside the exclusion zone, returned to port suffering from radiation sickness and skin burns; one crew member was terminally ill. Efforts were made to recover the cargo of contaminated fish but at least two large tuna were probably sold and eaten. A further 75 tons of tuna caught between March and December were found to be unfit for human consumption. When the crew member died and the full results of the contamination were made public by the U.S., Japanese concerns were reignited about the hazards of radiation.[53]

Castle-Bravo, 15 megatons. The most powerful nuclear-weapons test ever conducted by the United States. Its unexpectedly higher yield and destructive power resulted in an international incident from the significant amount of nuclear fallout it generated.

The hydrogen bomb age had a profound effect on the thoughts of nuclear war in the popular and military mind. With only fission bombs, nuclear war was something that possibly could be limited. Dropped by planes and only able to destroy the most built up areas of major cities, it was possible for many to look at fission bombs as a technological extension of large-scale conventional bombing—such as the extensive firebombing of German and Japanese cities during World War II. Proponents brushed aside as grave exaggeration claims that such weapons could lead to worldwide death or harm.

Even in the decades before fission weapons, there had been speculation about the possibility for human beings to end all life on the planet, either by accident or purposeful maliciousness—but technology had not provided the capacity for such action. The great power of hydrogen bombs made worldwide annihilation possible.

The Castle Bravo incident itself raised a number of questions about the survivability of a nuclear war. Government scientists in both the U.S. and the USSR had insisted that fusion weapons, unlike fission weapons, were cleaner, as fusion reactions did not produce the dangerously radioactive by-products of fission reactions. While technically true, this hid a more gruesome point: the last stage of a multi-staged hydrogen bomb often used the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions to induce fissioning in a jacket of natural uranium and provided around half of the yield of the device itself.

This fission stage made fusion weapons considerably dirtier than they were made out to be. This was evident in the towering cloud of deadly fallout that followed the Bravo test. When the Soviet Union tested its first megaton device in 1955, the possibility of a limited nuclear war seemed even more remote in the public and political mind. Even cities and countries that were not direct targets would suffer fallout contamination. Extremely harmful fission products would disperse via normal weather patterns and embed in soil and water around the planet.

Speculation began to run towards what fallout and dust from a full-scale nuclear exchange would do to the world as a whole, rather than just cities and countries directly involved. In this way, the fate of the world was now tied to the fate of the bomb-wielding superpowers.

Deterrence and brinkmanship

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November 1951 nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site, from Operation Buster, with a yield of 21 kilotons. It was the first U.S. nuclear field exercise conducted on land; troops shown are 6 mi (9.7 km) from the blast.

Throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s the U.S. and the USSR both endeavored, in a tit-for-tat approach, to prevent the other power from acquiring nuclear supremacy. This had massive political and cultural effects during the Cold War. As one instance of this mindset, in the early 1950s it was proposed to drop a nuclear bomb on the Moon as a globally visible demonstration of American weaponry.[54]

The first atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively, were large, custom-made devices, requiring highly trained personnel for their arming and deployment. They could be dropped only from the largest bomber planes—at the time the B-29 Superfortress—and each plane could only carry a single bomb in its hold. The first hydrogen bombs were similarly massive and complicated. This ratio of one plane to one bomb was still fairly impressive in comparison with conventional, non-nuclear weapons, but against other nuclear-armed countries it was considered a grave danger.

Despite having an almost-exact explosive-yield and assembly method as Little Boy, the first nuclear weapon ever deployed in combat, the W9 nuclear artillery-shell test-fired during Operation Upshot-Knothole series of tests was far smaller and lighter than its predecessors; a result of the evolving efficiencies of new nuclear-weapon designs.

In the immediate postwar years, the U.S. expended much effort on making the bombs "G.I.-proof"—capable of being used and deployed by members of the U.S. Army, rather than Nobel Prize–winning scientists. In the 1950s, the U.S. undertook a nuclear testing program to improve the nuclear arsenal.

Starting in 1951, the Nevada Test Site (in the Nevada desert) became the primary location for all U.S. nuclear testing (in the USSR, Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan served a similar role). Tests were divided into two primary categories: "weapons related" (verifying that a new weapon worked or looking at exactly how it worked) and "weapons effects." A detailed study about the effects of nuclear weapons can be read from S. Glasstone and P.J. Dolan. [55]

In the beginning, almost all nuclear tests were either atmospheric (conducted above ground, in the atmosphere) or underwater (such as some of the tests done in the Marshall Islands). Testing was used as a sign of both national and technological strength, but also raised questions about the safety of the tests, which released nuclear fallout into the atmosphere (most dramatically with the Castle Bravo test in 1954, but in more limited amounts with almost all atmospheric nuclear testing).

Test-deployment of the 3.88-megaton Teak via the PGM-11 Redstone rocket during the Hardtack series of nuclear-weapons tests were made possible from the culmination of many aeronautical-engineering research and developments gathered from a post-war Germany.

Because testing was seen as a sign of technological development (the ability to design usable weapons without some form of testing was considered dubious), halts on testing were often called for as stand-ins for halts in the nuclear arms race itself, and many prominent scientists and statesmen lobbied for a ban on nuclear testing. In 1958, the U.S., USSR, and the United Kingdom (a new nuclear power) declared a temporary testing moratorium for both political and health reasons, but by 1961 the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium and both the USSR, and the U.S. began testing with great frequency.

As a show of political strength, the Soviet Union tested the largest-ever nuclear weapon in October 1961, the massive Tsar Bomba, which was tested in a reduced state with a yield of around 50 megatons—in its full state it was estimated to have been around 100 Mt. The weapon was largely impractical for actual military use but was hot enough to induce third-degree burns at a distance of 62 mi (100 km) away. In its full, dirty, design it would have increased the amount of worldwide fallout since 1945 by 25%.

In 1963, all nuclear and many non-nuclear states signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, pledging to refrain from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. The treaty permitted underground tests.

Most tests were considerably more modest and worked for direct technical purposes as well as their potential political overtones. Weapons improvements took on two primary forms. One was an increase in efficiency and power, and within only a few years fission bombs were developed that were many times more powerful than the ones created during World War II. The other was a program of miniaturization, reducing the size of the nuclear weapons.

Smaller bombs meant that bombers could carry more of them, and also that they could be carried on the new generation of rockets in development in the 1950s and 1960s. U.S. rocket science received a large boost in the postwar years, largely with the help of engineers acquired from the Nazi rocketry program. These included scientists such as Wernher von Braun, who had helped design the V-2 rockets the Nazis launched across the English Channel. An American program, Project Paperclip, had endeavored to move German scientists into American hands (and away from Soviet hands) and put them to work for the U.S.

Weapons improvement

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Early nuclear armed rockets—such as the MGR-1 Honest John, first deployed by the U.S. in 1953—were surface-to-surface missiles with relatively short ranges (around 15 mi/25 km maximum) and yields around twice the size of the first fission weapons. The limited range meant they could only be used in certain types of military situations. U.S. rockets could not, for example, threaten Moscow with an immediate strike, and could only be used as tactical weapons (that is, for small-scale military situations).

Strategic weapons—weapons that could threaten an entire country—relied, for the time being, on long-range bombers that could penetrate deep into enemy territory. In the U.S., this requirement led, in 1946, to creation of the Strategic Air Command—a system of bombers headed by General Curtis LeMay (who previously presided over the firebombing of Japan during WWII). In operations like Chrome Dome (1961–1968), SAC kept nuclear-armed planes in the air 24 hours a day, ready for an order to attack Moscow.

These technological possibilities enabled nuclear strategy to develop a logic considerably different from previous military thinking. Because the threat of nuclear warfare was so awful, it was first thought that it might make any war of the future impossible. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's doctrine of "massive retaliation" in the early years of the Cold War was a message to the USSR, saying that if the Red Army attempted to invade the parts of Europe not given to the Eastern bloc during the Potsdam Conference (such as West Germany), nuclear weapons would be used against the Soviet troops and potentially the Soviet leaders.

With the development of more rapid-response technologies (such as rockets and long-range bombers), this policy began to shift. If the Soviet Union also had nuclear weapons and a policy of "massive retaliation" was carried out, it was reasoned, then any Soviet forces not killed in the initial attack, or launched while the attack was ongoing, would be able to serve their own form of nuclear retaliation against the U.S. Recognizing that this was an undesirable outcome, military officers and game theorists at the RAND think tank developed a nuclear warfare strategy that was eventually called Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

MAD divided potential nuclear war into two stages: first strike and second strike. First strike meant the first use of nuclear weapons by one nuclear-equipped nation against another nuclear-equipped nation. If the attacking nation did not prevent the attacked nation from a nuclear response, the attacked nation would respond with a second strike against the attacking nation. In this situation, whether the U.S. first attacked the USSR, or the USSR first attacked the U.S., the result would be that both nations would be damaged to the point of utter social collapse.

According to game theory, because starting a nuclear war was suicidal, no logical country would shoot first. However, if a country could launch a first strike that utterly destroyed the target country's ability to respond, that might give that country the confidence to initiate a nuclear war. The object of a country operating by the MAD doctrine is to deny the opposing country this first strike capability.

MAD played on two seemingly opposed modes of thought: cold logic and emotional fear. The English phrase MAD was often known by, "nuclear deterrence," was translated by the French as "dissuasion," and "terrorization" by the Soviets. This apparent paradox of nuclear war was summed up by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill as "the worse things get, the better they are"—the greater the threat of mutual destruction, the safer the world would be.

This philosophy made a number of technological and political demands on participating nations. For one thing, it said that it should always be assumed that an enemy nation may be trying to acquire first strike capability, which must always be avoided. In American politics this translated into demands to avoid "bomber gaps" and "missile gaps" where the Soviet Union could potentially outshoot the Americans. It also encouraged the production of thousands of nuclear weapons by both the U.S. and the USSR, far more than needed to simply destroy the major civilian and military infrastructures of the opposing country. These policies and strategies were satirized in the 1964 Stanley Kubrick film Dr. Strangelove, in which the Soviets, unable to keep up with the US's first strike capability, instead plan for MAD by building a Doomsday Machine, and thus, after a (literally) mad US General orders a nuclear attack on the USSR, the end of the world is brought about.

The policy also encouraged the development of the first early warning systems. Conventional war, even at its fastest, was fought over days and weeks. With long-range bombers, from the start of a nuclear attack to its conclusion was mere hours. Rockets could reduce a conflict to minutes. Planners reasoned that conventional command and control systems could not adequately react to a nuclear attack, so great lengths were taken to develop computer systems that could look for enemy attacks and direct rapid responses.

The U.S. poured massive funding into development of SAGE, a system that could track and intercept enemy bomber aircraft using information from remote radar stations. It was the first computer system to feature real-time processing, multiplexing, and display devices. It was the first general computing machine, and a direct predecessor of modern computers.

Emergence of the anti-nuclear movement

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Women Strike for Peace during the Cuban Missile Crisis

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of World War II quickly followed the 1945 Trinity nuclear test, and the Little Boy device was detonated over the Japanese city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Exploding with a yield equivalent to 12,500 tonnes of TNT, the blast and thermal wave of the bomb destroyed nearly 50,000 buildings and killed approximately 75,000 people.[56] Subsequently, the world's nuclear weapons stockpiles grew.[57]

Operation Crossroads was a series of nuclear weapon tests conducted by the United States at Bikini Atoll in the Pacific Ocean in the summer of 1946. Its purpose was to test the effect of nuclear weapons on naval ships. To prepare the Bikini atoll for the nuclear tests, Bikini's native residents were evicted from their homes and resettled on smaller, uninhabited islands where they were unable to sustain themselves.[58]

National leaders debated the impact of nuclear weapons on domestic and foreign policy. Also involved in the debate about nuclear weapons policy was the scientific community, through professional associations such as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs.[59] Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was first drawn to public attention in 1954 when a Hydrogen bomb test in the Pacific contaminated the crew of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon. One of the fishermen died in Japan seven months later. The incident caused widespread concern around the world and "provided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the anti-nuclear weapons movement in many countries".[60] The anti-nuclear weapons movement grew rapidly because for many people the atomic bomb "encapsulated the very worst direction in which society was moving".[61]

Peace movements emerged in Japan and in 1954 they converged to form a unified "Japanese Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs". Japanese opposition to the Pacific nuclear weapons tests was widespread, and "an estimated 35 million signatures were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear weapons".[61] The Russell–Einstein Manifesto was issued in London on July 9, 1955, by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the Cold War. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and called for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict. The signatories included eleven pre-eminent intellectuals and scientists, including Albert Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April 18, 1955. A few days after the release, philanthropist Cyrus S. Eaton offered to sponsor a conference—called for in the manifesto—in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthplace. This conference was to be the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held in July 1957.

In the United Kingdom, the first Aldermaston March organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament took place at Easter 1958, when several thousand people marched for four days from Trafalgar Square, London, to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston in Berkshire, England, to demonstrate their opposition to nuclear weapons.[62][63] The Aldermaston marches continued into the late 1960s when tens of thousands of people took part in the four-day marches.[61]

In 1959, a letter in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists was the start of a successful campaign to stop the Atomic Energy Commission dumping radioactive waste in the sea 19 kilometres from Boston.[64] On November 1, 1961, at the height of the Cold War, about 50,000 women brought together by Women Strike for Peace marched in 60 cities in the United States to demonstrate against nuclear weapons. It was the largest national women's peace protest of the 20th century.[65][66]

In 1958, Linus Pauling and his wife presented the United Nations with the petition signed by more than 11,000 scientists calling for an end to nuclear-weapon testing. The "Baby Tooth Survey," headed by Dr Louise Reiss, demonstrated conclusively in 1961 that above-ground nuclear testing posed significant public health risks in the form of radioactive fallout spread primarily via milk from cows that had ingested contaminated grass.[67][68][69] Public pressure and the research results subsequently led to a moratorium on above-ground nuclear weapons testing, followed by the Partial Test Ban Treaty, signed in 1963 by John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev.[59][70][71]

Cuban Missile Crisis

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U-2 photographs revealed that the Soviet Union was stationing nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba in 1962, beginning the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Bombers and short-range rockets were not reliable: planes could be shot down, and earlier nuclear missiles could cover only a limited range— for example, the first Soviet rockets' range limited them to targets in Europe. However, by the 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed intercontinental ballistic missiles, which could be launched from extremely remote areas far away from their target. They had also developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which had less range but could be launched from submarines very close to the target without any radar warning. This made any national protection from nuclear missiles increasingly impractical.

The military realities made for a precarious diplomatic situation. The international politics of brinkmanship led leaders to exclaim their willingness to participate in a nuclear war rather than concede any advantage to their opponents, feeding public fears that their generation may be the last. Civil defense programs undertaken by both superpowers, exemplified by the construction of fallout shelters and urging civilians about the survivability of nuclear war, did little to ease public concerns.

The climax of brinksmanship came in early 1962, when an American U-2 spy plane photographed a series of launch sites for medium-range ballistic missiles being constructed on the island of Cuba, just off the coast of the southern United States, beginning what became known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The U.S. administration of John F. Kennedy concluded that the Soviet Union, then led by Nikita Khrushchev, was planning to station Soviet nuclear missiles on the island (as a response to placing US Jupiter MRBMs in Italy and Turkey), which was under the control of communist Fidel Castro. On October 22, Kennedy announced the discoveries in a televised address. He announced a naval blockade around Cuba that would turn back Soviet nuclear shipments and warned that the military was prepared "for any eventualities." The missiles had 2,400 mile (4,000 km) range and would allow the Soviet Union to quickly destroy many major American cities on the Eastern Seaboard if a nuclear war began.

The leaders of the two superpowers stood nose to nose, seemingly poised over the beginnings of a third world war. Khrushchev's ambitions for putting the weapons on the island were motivated in part by the fact that the U.S. had stationed similar weapons in Britain, Italy, and nearby Turkey, and had previously attempted to sponsor an invasion of Cuba the year before in the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy offering to withdraw all missiles if Kennedy committed to a policy of no future invasions of Cuba. Khrushchev worded the threat of assured destruction eloquently:

You and I should not now pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot of war, because the harder you and I pull, the tighter the knot will become. And a time may come when this knot is tied so tight that the person who tied it is no longer capable of untying it, and then the knot will have to be cut. What that would mean I need not explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly what dreaded forces our two countries possess.

Newer, and more varied deployment weapon options, such as via Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, made defending against nuclear attack increasingly impractical.

A day later, however, the Soviets sent another message, this time demanding that the U.S. remove its missiles from Turkey before any missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. On the same day, a U-2 plane was shot down over Cuba and another almost intercepted over the Soviet Union, as Soviet merchant ships neared the quarantine zone. Kennedy responded by accepting the first deal publicly and sending his brother Robert to the Soviet embassy to accept the second deal privately. On October 28, the Soviet ships stopped at the quarantine line and, after some hesitation, turned back towards the Soviet Union. Khrushchev announced that he had ordered the removal of all missiles in Cuba, and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was moved to comment, "We went eyeball to eyeball, and the other fellow just blinked."

The Crisis was later seen as the closest the U.S. and the USSR ever came to nuclear war and had been narrowly averted by last-minute compromise by both superpowers. Fears of communication difficulties led to the installment of the first hotline, a direct link between the superpowers that allowed them to more easily discuss future military activities and political maneuverings. It had been made clear that missiles, bombers, submarines, and computerized firing systems made escalating any situation to Armageddon far easier than anybody desired.

After stepping so close to the brink, both the U.S. and the USSR worked to reduce their nuclear tensions in the years immediately following. The most immediate culmination of this work was the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, in which the U.S. and USSR agreed to no longer test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, underwater, or in outer space. Testing underground continued, allowing for further weapons development, but the worldwide fallout risks were purposefully reduced, and the era of using massive nuclear tests as a form of saber rattling ended.

In December 1979, NATO decided to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe in response to Soviet deployment of intermediate range mobile missiles, and in the early 1980s, a "dangerous Soviet-US nuclear confrontation" arose.[72] In New York on June 12, 1982, one million people gathered to protest about nuclear weapons, and to support the second UN Special Session on Disarmament.[73][74] As the nuclear abolitionist movement grew, there were many protests at the Nevada Test Site. For example, on February 6, 1987, nearly 2,000 demonstrators, including six members of Congress, protested against nuclear weapons testing and more than 400 people were arrested.[75] Four of the significant groups organizing this renewal of anti-nuclear activism were Greenpeace, The American Peace Test, The Western Shoshone, and Nevada Desert Experience.

There have been at least four major false alarms, the most recent in 1995, that resulted in the activation of nuclear attack early warning protocols. They include the accidental loading of a training tape into the American early-warning computers; a computer chip failure that appeared to show a random number of attacking missiles; a rare alignment of the Sun, the U.S. missile fields and a Soviet early warning satellite that caused it to confuse high-altitude clouds with missile launches; the launch of a Norwegian research rocket resulted in President Yeltsin activating his nuclear briefcase for the first time.[76]

Initial proliferation

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In the fifties and sixties, three more countries joined the "nuclear club." The United Kingdom had been an integral part of the Manhattan Project following the Quebec Agreement in 1943. The passing of the McMahon Act by the United States in 1946 unilaterally broke this partnership and prevented the passage of any further information to the United Kingdom. The British Government, under Clement Attlee, determined that a British Bomb was essential. Because of British involvement in the Manhattan Project, Britain had extensive knowledge in some areas, but not in others.

An improved version of 'Fat Man' was developed, and on 26 February 1952, Prime Minister Winston Churchill announced that the United Kingdom had an atomic bomb and a successful test took place on 3 October 1952. At first these were free-fall bombs, intended for use by the V Force of jet bombers. A Vickers Valiant dropped the first UK nuclear weapon on 11 October 1956 at Maralinga, South Australia. Later came a missile, Blue Steel, intended for carriage by the V Force bombers, and then the Blue Streak medium-range ballistic missile (later canceled). Anglo-American cooperation on nuclear weapons was restored by the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement. As a result of this and the Polaris Sales Agreement, the United Kingdom has bought United States designs for submarine missiles and fitted its own warheads. It retains full independent control over the use of the missiles. It no longer possesses any free-fall bombs.

France had been heavily involved in nuclear research before World War II through the work of the Joliot-Curies. This was discontinued after the war because of the instability of the Fourth Republic and lack of finances.[77] However, in the 1950s, France launched a civil nuclear research program, which produced plutonium as a byproduct.

In 1956, France formed a secret Committee for the Military Applications of Atomic Energy and a development program for delivery vehicles. With the return of Charles de Gaulle to the French presidency in 1958, final decisions to build a bomb were made, which led to a successful test in 1960. Since then, France has developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent independent of NATO.

In 1951, China and the Soviet Union signed an agreement whereby China supplied uranium ore in exchange for technical assistance in producing nuclear weapons. In 1953, China established a research program under the guise of civilian nuclear energy. Throughout the 1950s the Soviet Union provided large amounts of equipment. But as the relations between the two countries worsened the Soviets reduced the amount of assistance and, in 1959, refused to donate a bomb for copying purposes. Despite this, the Chinese made rapid progress. Chinese first gained possession of nuclear weapons in 1964, making it the fifth country to have them. It tested its first atomic bomb at Lop Nur on October 16, 1964 (Project 596); and tested a nuclear missile on October 25, 1966; and tested a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb (Test No. 6) on June 14, 1967. China ultimately conducted a total of 45 nuclear tests; although the country has never become a signatory to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, it conducted its last nuclear test in 1996. In the 1980s, China's nuclear weapons program was a source of nuclear proliferation, as China transferred its CHIC-4 technology to Pakistan. China became a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear weapon state in 1992, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004.[78] As of 2017, the number of Chinese warheads is thought to be in the low hundreds,[79] The Atomic Heritage Foundation notes a 2018 estimate of approximately 260 nuclear warheads, including between 50 and 60 ICBMs and four nuclear submarines.[78] China declared a policy of "no first use" in 1964, the only nuclear weapons state to announce such a policy; this declaration has no effect on its capabilities and there are no diplomatic means of verifying or enforcing this declaration.[80]

Cold War

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ICBMs, like the American Minuteman missile, allowed nations to deliver nuclear weapons thousands of miles away with relative ease.
On 12 December 1982, 30,000 women held hands around the 6 miles (9.7 km) perimeter of the RAF Greenham Common base, in protest against the decision to site American cruise missiles there.

After World War II, the balance of power between the Eastern and Western blocs and the fear of global destruction prevented the further military use of atomic bombs. This fear was even a central part of Cold War strategy, referred to as the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. So important was this balance to international political stability that a treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (or ABM treaty), was signed by the U.S. and the USSR in 1972 to curtail the development of defenses against nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles that carry them. This doctrine resulted in a large increase in the number of nuclear weapons, as each side sought to ensure it possessed the firepower to destroy the opposition in all possible scenarios.

Early delivery systems for nuclear devices were primarily bombers like the United States B-29 Superfortress and Convair B-36, and later the B-52 Stratofortress. Ballistic missile systems, based on Wernher von Braun's World War II designs (specifically the V-2 rocket), were developed by both United States and Soviet Union teams (in the case of the U.S., effort was directed by the German scientists and engineers although the Soviet Union also made extensive use of captured German scientists, engineers, and technical data).

These systems were used to launch satellites, such as Sputnik, and to propel the Space Race, but they were primarily developed to create Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) that could deliver nuclear weapons anywhere on the globe. Development of these systems continued throughout the Cold War—though plans and treaties, beginning with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I), restricted deployment of these systems until, after the fall of the Soviet Union, system development essentially halted, and many weapons were disabled and destroyed. On January 27, 1967, more than 60 nations signed the Outer Space Treaty, banning nuclear weapons in space.

There have been a number of potential nuclear disasters. Following air accidents U.S. nuclear weapons have been lost near Atlantic City, New Jersey (1957); Savannah, Georgia (1958) (see Tybee Bomb); Goldsboro, North Carolina (1961); off the coast of Okinawa (1965); in the sea near Palomares, Spain (1966) (see 1966 Palomares B-52 crash); and near Thule Air Base, Greenland (1968) (see 1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash). Most of the lost weapons were recovered, the Spanish device after three months' effort by the DSV Alvin and DSV Aluminaut. Investigative journalist Eric Schlosser discovered that at least 700 "significant" accidents and incidents involving 1,250 nuclear weapons were recorded in the United States between 1950 and 1968.[81]

The Soviet Union was less forthcoming about such incidents, but the environmental group Greenpeace believes that there are around forty non-U.S. nuclear devices that have been lost and not recovered, compared to eleven lost by America, mostly in submarine disasters.[82] The U.S. has tried to recover Soviet devices, notably in the 1974 Project Azorian using the specialist salvage vessel Hughes Glomar Explorer to raise a Soviet submarine. After news leaked out about this boondoggle, the CIA would coin a favorite phrase for refusing to disclose sensitive information, called glomarization: We can neither confirm nor deny the existence of the information requested but, hypothetically, if such data were to exist, the subject matter would be classified, and could not be disclosed.[83]

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 essentially ended the Cold War. However, the end of the Cold War failed to end the threat of nuclear weapon use, although global fears of nuclear war reduced substantially. In a major move of symbolic de-escalation, Boris Yeltsin, on January 26, 1992, announced that Russia planned to stop targeting United States cities with nuclear weapons.

Cost

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The designing, testing, producing, deploying, and defending against nuclear weapons is one of the largest expenditures for the nations which possess nuclear weapons. In the United States during the Cold War years, between "one quarter to one third of all military spending since World War II [was] devoted to nuclear weapons and their infrastructure."[84] According to a retrospective Brookings Institution study published in 1998 by the Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Committee (formed in 1993 by the W. Alton Jones Foundation), the total expenditures for U.S. nuclear weapons from 1940 to 1998 was $5.5 trillion in 1996 dollars.[85]

For comparison, the total public debt at the end of fiscal year 1998 was $5,478,189,000,000 in 1998 dollars[86] or $5.3 trillion. The entire public debt in 1998 was therefore equal to the cost of research, development, and deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related programs during the Cold War.[84][85][87]

Second nuclear age

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Large stockpile with global range (dark blue), smaller stockpile with global range (medium blue), small stockpile with regional range (light blue).

The second nuclear age can be regarded as proliferation of nuclear weapons among lesser powers and for reasons other than the American-Soviet-Chinese rivalry.

India embarked relatively early on a program aimed at nuclear weapons capability, but apparently accelerated this after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. India's first atomic-test explosion was in 1974 with Smiling Buddha, which it described as a "peaceful nuclear explosion."

After the collapse of Eastern Military High Command and the disintegration of Pakistan as a result of the 1971 Winter war, Pakistan's Bhutto launched scientific research on nuclear weapons. The Indian test caused Pakistan to spur its programme, and the ISI conducted successful espionage operations in the Netherlands, while also developing the programme indigenously. India tested fission, and perhaps, fusion devices in 1998, and Pakistan successfully tested fission devices that same year, raising concerns they would use nuclear weapons on each other.

All the non-Russian former Soviet bloc countries with nuclear weapons - Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan - transferred their warheads to Russia by 1996.

South Africa had an active program to develop uranium-based nuclear weapons but dismantled its nuclear weapon program in the 1990s.[88] Experts do not believe it actually tested such a weapon, though it later claimed it constructed crude devices that it eventually dismantled. In the late 1970s American spy satellites detected a "brief, intense, double flash of light near the southern tip of Africa."[89] Known as the Vela incident, it was speculated to have been a South African or possibly Israeli nuclear weapons test, though some feel that it may have been caused by natural events or a detector malfunction.

Israel is widely believed to possess an arsenal of up to several hundred nuclear warheads, but this has never been officially confirmed or denied (though the existence of their Dimona nuclear facility was confirmed by Mordechai Vanunu in 1986). Key US scientists involved in the American bomb program, clandestinely helped the Israelis and thus played an important role in nuclear proliferation, one was Edward Teller.[citation needed]

In January 2004, Dr A. Q. Khan of Pakistan's programme confessed to having been a key mover in "proliferation activities",[90] seen as part of an international proliferation network of materials, knowledge, and machines from Pakistan to Libya, Iran, and North Korea.

North Korea announced in 2003 that it had several nuclear explosives. The first claimed detonation was the 2006 North Korean nuclear test, conducted on October 9, 2006. On May 25, 2009, North Korea continued nuclear testing, violating United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. A third test was conducted on 13 February 2013, two tests were conducted in 2016 in January and September, followed by test a year later in September 2017.

As part of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994,[91] the country of Ukraine surrendered its nuclear arsenal, left over from the USSR, in part on the promise that its borders would remain respected if it did so. In 2022 during the prelude to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin, as he had lightly done in the past, alleged that Ukraine was on the path to receiving nuclear weapons. According to Putin, there was a "real danger" that Western allies could help supply Ukraine, which appeared to be on the path to joining NATO, with nuclear arms. Critics labelled Putin's claims as "conspiracy theories" designed to build a case for an invasion of Ukraine.[92]

See also

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References

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Further reading

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The history of nuclear weapons chronicles the scientific elucidation of atomic fission, secretive wartime engineering to harness explosive chain reactions, and postwar proliferation that endowed nations with arsenals capable of annihilating cities, thereby instituting a paradigm of deterrence predicated on mutual vulnerability. German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann discovered nuclear fission in uranium upon neutron bombardment in December 1938, a breakthrough interpreted theoretically by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch as the splitting of atomic nuclei releasing vast energy. Fears of Nazi Germany weaponizing this process prompted Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard to enlist Albert Einstein in warning U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt in August 1939, catalyzing initial American research that evolved into the Manhattan Project by 1942—a colossal endeavor under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, employing over 130,000 personnel across multiple sites to produce fissile materials and bomb designs. The project's culmination arrived with the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, at Alamogordo, New Mexico, where the first plutonium implosion device yielded an explosion equivalent to 21 kilotons of TNT, validating the technology amid concerns over yield uncertainty and fallout. Three weeks later, uranium-based "Little Boy" devastated Hiroshima on August 6 and plutonium "Fat Man" struck Nagasaki on August 9, inflicting catastrophic blast, thermal, and radiation effects that hastened Japan's surrender and demonstrated nuclear weapons' coercive potential, though debates persist on alternatives like blockade or invasion. The Soviet Union, benefiting from espionage by figures like Klaus Fuchs, conducted its inaugural fission test, RDS-1, on August 29, 1949, at Semipalatinsk, shattering U.S. monopoly and igniting the Cold War arms race. Escalation ensued with thermonuclear fusion devices: the U.S. detonated "Ivy Mike" on November 1, 1952, at Enewetak Atoll, achieving 10.4 megatons via deuterium-tritium fusion boosted by fission, orders of magnitude surpassing atomic yields and spurring Soviet parity by 1953. This trajectory of innovation and dissemination, unconstrained by early international accords, amplified destructive capacities exponentially while fostering strategic doctrines centered on assured retaliation, profoundly influencing global stability through the late 20th century.

Scientific and Theoretical Foundations

Discovery of Radioactivity and Nuclear Fission

In 1896, French physicist discovered while studying the effects of X-rays on salts, observing that they emitted penetrating rays that fogged photographic plates even in darkness. This serendipitous finding, confirmed through experiments showing emission independent of external excitation, revealed spontaneous atomic decay and earned Becquerel the 1903 shared with the Curies. Marie Skłodowska-Curie and advanced this work by processing tons of pitchblende ore, isolating —a highly radioactive element—in July 1898, followed by in December 1898. Their extractions quantified radioactivity's intensity and linked it to specific elements, demonstrating nuclear instability and enabling purification techniques that yielded milligram quantities of by 1902. Ernest Rutherford's subsequent classification of emissions as alpha particles (helium nuclei), beta particles (electrons), and gamma rays (high-energy photons) from 1899 onward clarified decay mechanisms, while his 1911 gold foil experiments confirmed the nuclear atom model with a dense, positive core. These foundations highlighted energy release from nuclear transformations, setting the stage for probing heavy elements like . The 1932 discovery of the by provided a neutral projectile for nuclear bombardment, uncharged and thus penetrative without repulsion. Enrico Fermi's 1934 team irradiated with neutrons, reporting transuranic elements via chains, though results were ambiguous. On December 17, 1938, chemists and at Berlin's Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry detected —a fission product half 's mass—in neutron-bombarded solutions, defying expectations of heavier transuranics. Their January 1939 publication in Die Naturwissenschaften documented this chemical anomaly after repeated verifications. In exile from , physicist and nephew Otto Frisch interpreted the barium as evidence of uranium nucleus cleavage into two fragments, calculating a 200 MeV energy release—vastly exceeding chemical reactions—via liquid drop model analogy during a 1938 Christmas walk in . They coined "fission" in a February 1939 Nature paper, likening it to biological division, and confirmed enabling potential chains. Hahn acknowledged Meitner's theoretical role, though the 1944 awarded solely to him for the discovery overlooked her contributions amid wartime politics. This breakthrough revealed uranium-235's susceptibility to slow-neutron-induced fission, releasing 2-3 neutrons per event for possible self-sustaining reactions.

Chain Reactions and Critical Mass Concepts

The concept of a emerged in 1933 when physicist , while walking in , envisioned a self-sustaining process in which neutrons released from one could trigger fission in others, potentially liberating vast energy through exponential multiplication. Szilárd filed a for this neutron-induced mechanism on March 12, 1934, predating the experimental by five years. His idea generalized the potential for branching nuclear processes but lacked a specific fissile mechanism until later developments. Nuclear , the splitting of heavy atomic nuclei like by absorption, was experimentally observed on December 17, 1938, by and , with its theoretical explanation provided by and Otto Frisch in early 1939, who noted that fission typically releases 2 to 3 s per event. This raised the possibility of a sustained if the neutron multiplication factor, known as kk, exceeded 1, where kk represents the average number of neutrons from one fission inducing subsequent fissions. For k=1k = 1, the reaction is critical and self-sustaining at equilibrium; for k>1k > 1, it becomes supercritical, leading to rapid energy release suitable for weapons. Early calculations suggested natural uranium's impurities would absorb neutrons, preventing efficient chains, but pure isotopes could achieve k>1k > 1. The critical mass concept, denoting the minimum fissile material quantity for a sustained chain reaction under specific conditions (shape, density, reflector), was formalized in 1939 by French physicist Francis Perrin, who predicted an atomic explosion feasible from a uranium-235 mass achieving supercriticality. In March 1940, Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls calculated in their memorandum that a sphere of pure uranium-235 with a radius allowing minimal neutron escape—estimated at around 600 grams to 1 kilogram—could sustain an explosive chain, far smaller than prior pessimistic estimates, decisively influencing Allied bomb feasibility assessments. These computations accounted for neutron diffusion, absorption, and fission probabilities, highlighting how compressing fissile material or using tamper reflectors reduces critical mass by retaining neutrons. Practical validation came on December 2, 1942, when Enrico Fermi's achieved the world's first controlled, self-sustaining using and moderator, demonstrating k1k \approx 1 with slow neutrons and informing weapon designs reliant on fast-neutron chains without moderators. This experiment underscored that varies with geometry—a sphere minimizes surface escape—and purity, with weapons requiring highly enriched (about 64 kg bare sphere , reduced to 15-25 kg with implosion or gun assembly). Theoretical refinements continued, emphasizing tamper compression to exceed prompt for explosive yield before disassembly.

World War II Development and Deployment

The Manhattan Project

![J. Robert Oppenheimer, scientific director of the Los Alamos Laboratory during the Manhattan Project](./assets/Oppenheimer_(cropped) The Manhattan Project originated from concerns over potential German development of nuclear weapons, prompted by the discovery of nuclear fission in 1938 by Otto Hahn and Fritz Strasser. On August 2, 1939, physicist Leo Szilard drafted a letter signed by Albert Einstein warning President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the possibility of a uranium-based chain reaction leading to "extremely powerful bombs" and urging U.S. action to secure uranium supplies and accelerate research. This led to the formation of the Advisory Committee on Uranium under Lyman Briggs in October 1939, which evolved into the S-1 Committee in 1941, coordinating efforts among physicists like Enrico Fermi and Arthur Compton to explore fission's weapon potential. British intelligence from the MAUD Committee further influenced U.S. priorities by confirming in 1941 the feasibility of a bomb using separated uranium-235. In June 1942, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan Engineer District to oversee industrial-scale production, initially under Colonel James C. Marshall, with the project code-named after the New York Army base where planning began. Brigadier General Leslie Groves assumed command in September 1942, centralizing authority and emphasizing rapid execution, security, and resource allocation across dispersed sites to minimize espionage risks. Groves selected J. Robert Oppenheimer, a theoretical physicist from the University of California, Berkeley, as scientific director in October 1942, tasking him with assembling a team at Los Alamos, New Mexico, for bomb design despite Oppenheimer's limited administrative experience but leveraging his broad knowledge of fast-neutron physics and ability to coordinate elite scientists. Major facilities included Oak Ridge, Tennessee, activated in 1942 for uranium enrichment via electromagnetic separation (Y-12 plant) and gaseous diffusion (K-25 plant) to produce weapons-grade U-235 from natural uranium ore. Hanford, Washington, site began operations in 1943 for plutonium production using reactors designed by Fermi's team, fueled by uranium from Ontario mines and processed chemically to yield Pu-239. Los Alamos Laboratory, established in 1943 on isolated mesa land, focused on implosion-type plutonium bomb development and gun-type uranium bomb assembly, overcoming technical hurdles like criticality calculations and explosive lens symmetry through iterative experiments. The project employed approximately 130,000 personnel at its peak, including physicists, engineers, and laborers, with costs totaling about $2 billion by , equivalent to roughly 0.4% of U.S. wartime GDP, predominantly allocated to production (80% of expenses). Strict compartmentalization limited knowledge sharing, enforced by Groves' security measures, including FBI vetting, while risks from Soviet sympathizers among scientists like were later revealed but undetected during the war. By mid-1945, these efforts yielded two functional bombs: "," a gun-type device, and "," a implosion design, enabling deployment capabilities.

Soviet Atomic Efforts and Espionage

The initiated formal atomic research in response to intelligence reports on Anglo-American efforts, with initial uranium studies beginning on September 28, 1942, under the direction of physicist , who was appointed technical director of the nascent program in late 1942 or early 1943. By April 1943, Kurchatov led Laboratory No. 2 (later expanded into the broader Soviet atomic project), focusing on -graphite reactor experiments and production amid wartime resource constraints that limited independent progress. Oversight fell to Lavrentiy Beria's , which prioritized intelligence gathering over pure scientific innovation, reflecting Stalin's strategic emphasis on matching perceived Western capabilities despite the USSR's devastation from the German invasion. Espionage formed the cornerstone of Soviet atomic efforts, with a network of agents infiltrating the and providing designs that bypassed years of trial-and-error research. , a German-born physicist recruited to the British project in 1941 and transferred to Los Alamos in August 1944, transmitted critical details including production methods, the implosion lens configuration for compressing fissile cores, and the overall bomb design by June 1945—information that enabled the Soviets to prioritize implosion over less efficient uranium gun-type assemblies. Fuchs's handler, (code-named "Sonya"), relayed these reports via couriers to , where they informed Kurchatov's team; declassified Venona decrypts later confirmed Fuchs's role in accelerating Soviet bomb development by an estimated one to two years. Other spies complemented Fuchs's contributions: Theodore Hall, a 19-year-old Los Alamos physicist, independently passed implosion schematics in late 1944, emphasizing the technique's superiority for plutonium; David Greenglass, a machinist at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos, sketched high-explosive lens molds in 1945, funneled through his brother-in-law Julius Rosenberg's network; and George Koval, embedded in U.S. Army ordnance, relayed polonium initiator and plutonium processing data from Dayton and Oak Ridge sites. These leaks, uncovered post-war via the Venona Project (a U.S.-UK signals intelligence effort decrypting Soviet cables from 1943–1945), spanned gaseous diffusion, electromagnetic separation, and bomb assembly, allowing the USSR to economize on resources—scholarly estimates suggest espionage reduced Soviet R&D costs and manpower needs by leveraging Manhattan Project validations rather than duplicating failed experiments. While Soviet scientists like Yulii Khariton advanced theoretical work, the wartime program's viability hinged on this pilfered intelligence, which Beria integrated into facilities like the Mayak complex for plutonium production starting in 1945.

Trinity Test and Initial Detonations

The Trinity test represented the first detonation of a , conducted by the on July 16, 1945, at 05:29:45 a.m. on the Alamogordo Bombing and Gunnery Range in New Mexico's basin, approximately 55 miles northwest of Alamogordo and 210 miles south of Los Alamos Laboratory. The remote desert location minimized risks to populated areas while allowing instrumentation to capture blast effects, seismic waves, and data essential for validating the weapon's design. The test device, internally designated "," was a plutonium implosion-type fission bomb raised 100 feet atop a tower to simulate airburst effects and enhance . It featured a 6.2-kilogram sphere of surrounded by high explosives arranged in 32 converging lenses—shaped charges of fast- and slow-burning compositions—to uniformly compress the core into supercriticality, initiating an exponential . This implosion method addressed 's high rate, which risked pre-detonation in simpler gun-assembly designs due to reactor-produced impurities like plutonium-240. The explosion released equivalent to approximately 20 kilotons of TNT, producing a fireball visible for hundreds of miles, a shockwave that shattered windows 120 miles away, and a ascending to 12 miles. Directed by , scientific director of Los Alamos Laboratory, the test involved over 200 scientists and engineers, including , who estimated the yield from blast displacement observations at around 10 kilotons—close to initial predictions. Oppenheimer selected the name "," drawing from John Donne's , reflecting the project's culmination of theoretical and engineering under wartime secrecy. Post-detonation analysis confirmed the implosion's success, with the plutonium core achieving the necessary density for sustained fission despite engineering challenges like explosive symmetry. The Trinity detonation empirically verified the plutonium bomb's reliability, enabling accelerated production and assembly of two operational weapons: a uranium gun-type device and a plutonium implosion bomb identical in design to Gadget. Without this proof-of-concept, deployment risks would have remained unquantified, as no prior full-scale data existed on nuclear yield, radiation fallout, or blast hydrodynamics. Initial fallout dispersed trinitite—fused green glass from desert sand—across the site, with light precipitation causing localized contamination but no immediate off-site health impacts beyond the evacuated zone. This test's data directly informed targeting and effects estimates for the ensuing combat detonations, transitioning nuclear weapons from experimental prototypes to deployable arsenal components.

Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki

On August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m. local time, the U.S. Army Air Forces B-29 bomber Enola Gay, commanded by Colonel Paul Tibbets, released the "Little Boy" uranium-235 gun-type fission bomb over Hiroshima, a city of approximately 350,000 residents that housed military headquarters and served as a major port. The device detonated at an altitude of 580 meters (1,900 feet), producing a yield of about 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent, generating a fireball reaching temperatures of several million degrees Celsius, a blast wave that leveled structures within a 1.6-kilometer radius, and thermal radiation causing severe burns up to 3 kilometers away. Approximately 70,000–80,000 people died immediately from the blast, heat, and collapsing buildings, with total fatalities by the end of 1945 estimated at 90,000–140,000, including deaths from acute radiation syndrome and injuries. Three days later, on August 9, 1945, the B-29 Bockscar, piloted by Major Charles Sweeney, dropped the "Fat Man" plutonium-239 implosion-type bomb over Nagasaki, an industrial center with shipyards and munitions factories, after diverting from the primary target of Kokura due to cloud cover. Detonating at 11:02 a.m. local time over the Urakami Valley at 503 meters (1,650 feet), the explosion yielded 21 kilotons of TNT equivalent—about 40% more powerful than Little Boy—resulting in a similar but somewhat contained destruction pattern due to the bomb's release over a valley that channeled the blast. An estimated 35,000–40,000 perished instantly from blast and fire effects, with cumulative deaths reaching 60,000–80,000 by year's end, factoring in radiation-induced illnesses. The bombings inflicted unprecedented destruction: in Hiroshima, over 90% of buildings within 1.6 kilometers of ground zero were destroyed, while Nagasaki saw similar devastation concentrated in the target valley, sparing some peripheral areas. Fires ignited by thermal radiation consumed large sections of both cities, exacerbating casualties through asphyxiation and burns. Initial radiation effects were limited primarily to acute exposures within 1–2 kilometers, causing nausea, hemorrhaging, and bone marrow failure in survivors, though long-term cancer risks emerged later. These events prompted Japan's Supreme War Council to convene urgently, contributing to Emperor Hirohito's intervention on August 10 announcing conditional surrender terms, formalized on August 15 after Soviet entry into the Pacific War. Casualty figures remain debated due to incomplete records, wartime chaos, and varying definitions of bombing-related deaths, with Japanese estimates often higher than U.S. assessments; for instance, a 1946 U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey pegged Hiroshima's toll at around 66,000 immediate dead, while survivor cohorts and radiation studies support elevated totals including indirect effects. Postwar investigations by the U.S. occupation forces and Japanese authorities documented widespread survivor injuries, including keloid scars from burns and elevated leukemia rates peaking in 1949–1950, underscoring the bombs' unique radiological impact beyond conventional explosives.

Strategic Rationale and Ethical Debates

The United States pursued the development and deployment of atomic bombs during World War II primarily to compel Japan's unconditional surrender and avert the anticipated massive casualties of a planned invasion, known as Operation Downfall. Military planners estimated that invading Japan's home islands could result in up to 1 million American casualties, including 250,000 to 268,000 in the initial phase on Kyushu alone, based on fierce resistance observed in battles like Iwo Jima and Okinawa. President Harry S. Truman, informed of these projections after assuming office in April 1945, viewed the bombs as a means to end the war swiftly, justifying the Manhattan Project's $2 billion investment and sparing further American lives amid ongoing conventional bombing campaigns that had already inflicted heavy losses, such as the March 1945 firebombing of Tokyo which killed over 100,000 civilians. Following the successful test on July 16, 1945, and Japan's rejection of the Declaration's demand for on July 26—interpreted as defiance via Kantarō Suzuki's "" response—Truman authorized the bombs' use against urban targets with military significance, selecting and for their intact status to maximize psychological impact. The bombings on August 6 and 9, respectively, preceded Japan's surrender announcement on August 15, which Emperor attributed to the "new and most cruel bomb" in his rescript, though Soviet entry into the on August 8 also factored into the decision-making. Proponents of the strategy argued it aligned with principles, where Japan's militarized society and tactics like attacks necessitated decisive force to break resolve, as evidenced by a failed military coup on August 14-15 attempting to reject surrender terms. Ethical debates emerged immediately among scientists and policymakers, with the June 1945 urging a demonstration explosion rather than combat use to avoid moral culpability for mass civilian deaths and potential escalation, while the July 1945 Szilard Petition, signed by 70 scientists, opposed bombing on humanitarian grounds. Critics, including some post-war analysts, contend the bombs were unnecessary as was nearing collapse from naval and conventional bombing, with surrender possibly imminent after Soviet intervention, and that targeting cities violated just war principles by prioritizing non-combatants over military objectives. Supporters counter that Japanese leadership, dominated by hardline military factions, showed no intent to capitulate without overwhelming shock—diaries and intercepts reveal plans for protracted defense—and that alternatives like intensified would prolong suffering, including starvation for millions of Japanese civilians. These debates persist, informed by declassified documents revealing Truman's focus on over diplomatic signaling to the , though revisionist interpretations sometimes overemphasize geopolitical motives amid institutional biases in academia favoring anti-nuclear narratives. Empirical outcomes—Japan's rapid capitulation after the second bomb, averting —support the causal efficacy of the strategy, while ethical realism weighs the bombs' 129,000-226,000 immediate deaths against projected invasion tolls exceeding 10 million total , including Japanese, in a conflict where both sides had already embraced indiscriminate tactics.

Postwar Monopoly and Soviet Breakthrough

U.S. Nuclear Superiority Period

Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, the United States maintained an unchallenged monopoly on nuclear weapons until the Soviet Union's first test in August 1949. Initially, the U.S. arsenal consisted of just two operational bombs at the war's end, with production constrained by limited fissile material and industrial scaling. By the end of 1946, the stockpile had grown to nine bombs, reflecting a production rate of approximately two per month; this expanded to 13 by 1947, 50 by 1948, and around 170–200 by mid-1949. These weapons, primarily plutonium-based implosion designs similar to the Fat Man, were stored under strict military custody at sites like Kirtland Army Air Field, with delivery reliant on modified B-29 Superfortress bombers. The small size of the arsenal limited its practical deterrence value against potential Soviet aggression in Europe, where U.S. conventional forces were demobilizing rapidly while the Red Army held numerical superiority. Nonetheless, the monopoly informed U.S. strategy, including contingency plans like Operation Pincher (1946), which envisioned preemptive strikes on Soviet cities using atomic bombs to offset ground force disadvantages. Domestically, the Atomic Energy Act of August 1946 transferred control from the military to the civilian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established to oversee production and research while prohibiting sharing technology with allies or adversaries. Diplomatically, the U.S. sought to leverage its superiority through the Baruch Plan, proposed by Undersecretary of State Bernard Baruch on June 14, 1946, which called for an international Atomic Development Authority under UN auspices to regulate fissile materials and eliminate weapons, contingent on verifiable safeguards and Soviet renunciation of veto power in enforcement. The Soviets rejected it, viewing the phased U.S. disarmament as insufficient to dismantle the existing monopoly immediately and insisting on unilateral destruction of American bombs beforehand, a stance that entrenched mutual suspicion and accelerated covert Soviet programs. This period's superiority thus shaped early Cold War dynamics, enabling U.S. signaling—such as deploying B-29s to Britain during the 1948 Berlin Blockade—but without compelling Soviet restraint on expansionist moves like the 1948 Czech coup.

Soviet Joe-1 Test and Espionage Revelations

The Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device, internally designated RDS-1, on August 29, 1949, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan, marking the end of the United States' nuclear monopoly. The implosion-type plutonium bomb, yielding an estimated 22 kilotons, closely resembled the U.S. Fat Man design in its core components and initiation mechanism. U.S. detection occurred through radioactive fallout sampled by Air Force WB-29 aircraft flying long-range reconnaissance missions; analysis of fission products, including ratios of barium isotopes, confirmed a nuclear explosion by early September, with epicenter pinpointed to Semipalatinsk and time estimated at 0100 GMT on the test date. The test stunned American policymakers and intelligence analysts, who had projected Soviet acquisition of a bomb no earlier than mid-1953 based on assessments of industrial capacity, uranium resources, and technical hurdles like plutonium production. Prior estimates from the CIA and Atomic Energy Commission assumed a timeline of 1950-1953, underestimating Moscow's progress despite awareness of espionage risks. The revelation prompted President Truman's public announcement on September 23, 1949, accelerating U.S. pursuit of thermonuclear weapons and reorienting national security strategy toward mutual deterrence. Post-test investigations uncovered extensive Soviet penetration of the Manhattan Project via espionage networks. In January 1950, British physicist Klaus Fuchs, who had worked at Los Alamos from 1944 to 1946, confessed to MI5 interrogators that he had transmitted detailed schematics on plutonium bomb implosion lenses, initiator designs, and high-explosive compression techniques to Soviet handlers starting in 1945. Fuchs's admissions, corroborated by decrypted Venona cables, implicated U.S. courier Harry Gold and unraveled a chain leading to Julius Rosenberg, an electrical engineer who recruited contacts within the project, including his brother-in-law David Greenglass, a Los Alamos machinist who sketched lens molds and explosive configurations. Rosenberg and his wife Ethel were arrested in July and August 1950, respectively; their 1951 trial established Julius's role in coordinating atomic secrets to Soviet agents, though Ethel's involvement centered on typing notes rather than direct transmission. Espionage revelations highlighted how stolen data—particularly Fuchs's contributions on implosion physics, which Soviet scientists independently struggled with due to theoretical gaps—enabled RDS-1's rapid replication of proven U.S. designs, shortening development by 18 to 24 months according to declassified analyses. While Soviet physicists like Igor Kurchatov advanced domestic research on uranium enrichment and reactors, espionage provided confirmatory blueprints and averted dead-end experiments, as evidenced by RDS-1's near-identical yield and assembly to Fat Man. The network's exposure, via Fuchs's confession and Venona decryptions revealing over 300 atomic-related messages, intensified U.S. counterintelligence but affirmed Stalin's prioritization of human intelligence over indigenous innovation for strategic parity. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed in June 1953 after conviction for conspiracy to commit espionage, underscoring the perceived gravity of leaks that bridged Soviet technical deficiencies.

Thermonuclear Era

U.S. Hydrogen Bomb Development

Following the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb test in August 1949, U.S. policymakers intensified efforts to develop thermonuclear weapons, driven by fears of strategic inferiority. On , 1950, President publicly announced his decision to authorize the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to pursue "all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called or superbomb," marking a shift from initial postwar restraint. This directive came amid internal debates, with and the AEC's General Advisory Committee opposing accelerated development on grounds of technical uncertainty, moral implications, and the risk of an , arguing that such weapons could destabilize global security without reliable defenses. In contrast, physicist , a veteran, advocated persistently for the hydrogen bomb since 1946, viewing it as essential for maintaining U.S. deterrence against potential Soviet advances. Progress stalled until a conceptual breakthrough in early 1951, when Teller and mathematician devised the staged radiation implosion design, known as the Teller-Ulam configuration. This approach utilized X-rays from a fission primary stage to compress and ignite a secondary fusion stage, enabling efficient megaton-yield explosions without relying on unproven classical super designs. The configuration, detailed in a classified Los Alamos report on March 9, 1951, resolved prior compression challenges and paved the way for practical thermonuclear weapons. Development accelerated under the AEC and Los Alamos Laboratory, incorporating liquid as fusion fuel despite logistical complexities. The culmination occurred during at , where the "Mike" shot on November 1, 1952, detonated the first thermonuclear device, yielding 10.4 megatons—over 700 times the bomb's power—and vaporizing Island, creating a 1.9-mile-wide crater. Though the 82-ton device was too bulky for delivery as a , it validated the Teller-Ulam principle, confirming fusion's viability and shifting U.S. nuclear strategy toward multi-megaton capabilities. Subsequent tests, like Operation Castle's Bravo shot in 1954, refined dry-fuel designs for deployable warheads, solidifying American thermonuclear supremacy until Soviet successes.

Soviet Thermonuclear Advances

The Soviet thermonuclear weapons program accelerated following the RDS-1 atomic test on August 29, 1949, with Joseph Stalin authorizing a major initiative to achieve multi-megaton yields, driven by strategic imperatives to match perceived U.S. advances. Under the direction of Igor Kurchatov, the overall atomic effort head, a dedicated team pursued two parallel design paths: the "sloika" (layer cake) configuration, which interleaved fission and fusion materials for partial thermonuclear boosting, and a staged radiation-implosion approach akin to emerging Western concepts. Physicist Andrei Sakharov emerged as the central figure, proposing innovative layering techniques that addressed compression challenges in fusion reactions, earning him recognition as the "father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb." While espionage from sources like Klaus Fuchs provided awareness of U.S. fission-boosted ideas, Soviet thermonuclear progress relied predominantly on indigenous theoretical work, as Fuchs's intelligence on staging was incomplete and lagged behind Sakharov's independent breakthroughs. The first milestone came with RDS-6s (NATO designation Joe-4), detonated on August 12, 1953, at the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan, atop a 30-meter tower. This 7-ton device, deliverable by Tu-16 bomber, employed a sloika design with alternating uranium-238, lead, and lithium deuteride layers inside a fission primary, achieving a yield of 400 kilotons—roughly ten times that of RDS-1 but still primarily fission-driven with fusion augmentation rather than a true multi-stage thermonuclear detonation. The test validated boosting concepts but highlighted limitations in scaling to megaton ranges without radiation-case implosion, prompting intensified focus on staged designs amid U.S. successes like Ivy Mike. By mid-1955, Sakharov and collaborators, including Yakov Zel'dovich and Vitaly Ginzburg, refined a two-stage configuration using a fission primary to generate X-rays that compressed a secondary fusion capsule, independent of full foreign blueprints. This culminated in RDS-37, air-dropped from a Tu-95V bomber over Semipalatinsk on November 22, 1955, at an altitude of about 1,500 meters, producing a nominal yield of 1.6 megatons (actual estimates 1.4–1.6 Mt). The device weighed 26 tons and marked the Soviet Union's entry into deployable thermonuclear capability, with fusion contributing over 75% of the energy, though early iterations suffered from inefficiencies in tritium breeding and tamper materials compared to optimized U.S. variants. Subsequent refinements enabled rapid iteration, including dry-fuel designs by 1956, solidifying parity in destructive potential and escalating Cold War deterrence dynamics.

Cold War Arms Race and Deterrence

Arsenal Expansion and Delivery Systems


The expansion of nuclear arsenals during the Cold War reflected escalating deterrence requirements, with the United States increasing its stockpile from 299 warheads in 1950 to 18,638 by 1960 and peaking at 31,255 in 1967, driven by fears of Soviet parity and the need for overwhelming retaliatory capacity. The Soviet Union, starting from zero in 1949, accelerated production post-Joe-1 test, reaching approximately 1,600 strategic warheads by 1960 and eventually surpassing U.S. totals to around 40,000 by the mid-1980s, emphasizing quantitative superiority to offset technological lags. This buildup prioritized not only raw numbers but also diversification to mitigate first-strike vulnerabilities, as early stockpiles were concentrated and susceptible to preemptive attacks.
Delivery systems shifted from vulnerable strategic bombers to hardened, survivable missiles, forming the nuclear triad of air, land, and sea-based platforms by the early 1960s. Initially, the U.S. relied on long-range bombers like the B-52 Stratofortress, introduced in 1955 and capable of delivering multiple thermonuclear weapons over intercontinental distances, though these faced interception risks from improving Soviet air defenses. To counter this, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) such as the Thor (deployed 1958) and Jupiter were forward-deployed in Europe and Turkey, bridging gaps until true intercontinental systems matured. The U.S. pioneered operational ICBMs with the SM-65 Atlas in 1959, followed by the Titan I in 1962 and the solid-fueled Minuteman series starting in 1962, which allowed rapid launch and silo hardening for second-strike assurance; by 1965, over 1,000 ICBMs were deployed. Parallel sea-based deterrence emerged with the Polaris A-1 SLBM, first deployed on USS George Washington in 1960, enabling submerged launches from submarines and reducing detectability compared to surface ships or land silos. The Soviet R-7 Semyorka ICBM, tested successfully in 1957, entered limited service but suffered from slow fueling and low readiness, prompting shifts to more reliable systems like the UR-100 by the mid-1960s.
These advancements culminated in the triad's maturation, where by the late , U.S. forces included roughly 1,000 bombers, 1,000 ICBMs, and 30 SLBM-equipped submarines, ensuring no single strike could disarm the arsenal. Soviet deployments mirrored this, with heavy emphasis on land-based ICBMs like the SS-9, though submarine forces lagged until Delta-class boats in the 1970s. Arsenal growth and system proliferation were tempered by emerging talks, yet continued unabated until SALT I in 1972 capped strategic launchers at 1,710 for the U.S. and 2,358 for the USSR.

Doctrines of Massive Retaliation and MAD

The doctrine of massive retaliation emerged as a cornerstone of U.S. nuclear strategy during the Eisenhower administration, formalized through National Security Council document NSC 162/2 on October 30, 1953, as part of the broader "New Look" policy aimed at integrating deterrence with fiscal restraint. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles publicly articulated the policy in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, declaring that the United States would respond to Soviet or communist aggression with "massive retaliatory power," potentially involving nuclear strikes far exceeding the scale of the provocation to deter even limited incursions. This approach sought to leverage America's nuclear monopoly and superiority—while it lasted—to counter Soviet conventional advantages in Europe and Asia without the expense of large-scale conventional rearmament, reducing defense budgets from $41 billion in 1953 to $31 billion by 1955. The rationale rested on the principle that the threat of overwhelming, all-out nuclear response would impose unacceptable costs on aggressors, avoiding protracted conflicts like the Korean War, which had cost over 33,000 U.S. lives. Implementation emphasized strategic airpower, with bombers like the B-52 positioned for rapid global strikes, but the doctrine faced practical limitations during crises such as the 1954 Indochina conflict, where nuclear threats proved bluffable and highlighted the risks of automatic escalation over peripheral issues. By the late 1950s, as Soviet nuclear capabilities advanced with intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched systems, the unilateral assurance of massive retaliation eroded, prompting a doctrinal shift toward mutual vulnerability. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) crystallized in the 1960s under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, evolving from massive retaliation by acknowledging Soviet parity and focusing on secure second-strike forces capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage"—estimated as destroying 20-40 Soviet cities, 50% of industry, and 25% of the population—even after a first strike. This deterrence relied on the nuclear triad of land-based ICBMs, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles like the Polaris, approved in 1956 and first deployed in 1960, ensuring retaliatory strikes could not be preempted. McNamara's speeches, such as those in Ann Arbor and Athens in the mid-1960s, underscored countervalue targeting of civilian and economic centers to maintain stability through mutual fear of annihilation, rejecting first-use incentives and finite deterrence models. MAD's practice involved command-and-control systems for assured response, reinforced by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which limited defenses to preserve vulnerability as a deterrent stabilizer. Unlike massive retaliation's emphasis on U.S. dominance, MAD accepted reciprocal devastation as the grim equilibrium preventing war, though it invited critiques for moral hazards and escalation risks; U.S. targeting evolved by the 1970s to include limited nuclear options under NSDM-242 (1974) for flexibility without undermining the core mutual threat. This framework underpinned Cold War stability, with U.S. arsenals peaking at around 8,000 warheads by the 1970s, calibrated to guarantee retaliation amid Soviet buildup.

Brinkmanship Crises

The policy of , articulated by U.S. during the Eisenhower administration, involved pushing international disputes to the verge of armed conflict—potentially nuclear—to compel adversaries to retreat, relying on the credibility of U.S. nuclear superiority to deter aggression without actual combat. Dulles emphasized this approach in public statements, such as a 1955 interview where he described the need to convince enemies that the U.S. would not recoil from the "brink" of war, framing it as an extension of doctrine to counter limited communist probes. The of 1954–1955 exemplified early brinkmanship when the (PRC) bombarded Nationalist Chinese islands near the mainland, prompting President to warn of U.S. intervention, including implicit nuclear threats against PRC coastal targets to defend . U.S. forces conducted large-scale naval exercises, and declassified records indicate Eisenhower privately considered tactical nuclear strikes on Chinese airfields if escalation continued, deterring a full PRC invasion but accelerating Mao Zedong's decision to pursue an independent nuclear arsenal. Tensions reignited in the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis on August 23, 1958, as the PRC shelled Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu islands with over 400,000 artillery rounds in the first week, aiming to isolate Nationalist defenses and test U.S. resolve. Eisenhower responded by deploying the 7th Fleet, authorizing nuclear-armed Matador missiles to Taiwan, and publicly hinting at "whatever is appropriate" measures, including nuclear options against mainland bases; U.S. intelligence estimated a high risk of nuclear exchange, later assessed by analysts as exceeding that of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis due to China's conventional inferiority and U.S. forward-deployed atomic bombers. The PRC halted major bombardments on October 6, 1958, after U.S. resupply operations succeeded and diplomatic backchannels conveyed resolve, though sporadic firing continued into 1959; Chinese sources later acknowledged the nuclear signaling influenced Beijing's restraint, avoiding all-out assault. The Berlin Crisis of 1958–1961 marked another flashpoint, beginning with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's November 27, 1958, ultimatum demanding Western withdrawal from access rights in within six months, threatening a separate peace treaty with to end Allied occupation. Eisenhower rejected the demands, reinforcing U.S. troop commitments and conventional forces in Europe while maintaining nuclear deterrence posture, which Khrushchev countered by boasting of Soviet missile advances to offset U.S. superiority. Under President , who inherited the standoff, U.S. strategy shifted toward but retained brinkmanship elements; a June 1961 Vienna summit saw Khrushchev reiterate pressures, leading to heightened alerts. The crisis peaked on October 27–28, 1961, at Checkpoint Charlie, where ten U.S. M48 tanks faced ten Soviet T-55s across a barricade, with both sides' forces equipped for rapid nuclear escalation—U.S. plans included tactical atomic weapons for potential breakout operations. Kennedy ordered tanks withdrawn after 16 hours to de-escalate, a move Khrushchev reciprocated, averting direct clash; the standoff underscored brinkmanship's perils, as declassified Soviet records reveal Khrushchev's nuclear bluffs aimed to exploit perceived U.S. hesitancy without intending full war. Khrushchev abandoned the formal ultimatum but erected the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961, to stem refugee flows, stabilizing the divided city without triggering general conflict. These episodes demonstrated brinkmanship's role in preserving status quo through credible nuclear risks, though they exposed miscalculations, such as underestimating adversaries' resolve, influencing subsequent doctrines toward reduced reliance on all-or-nothing threats.

Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 marked the closest approach to nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, stemming from the secret deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles to Cuba. In response to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion and perceived U.S. threats, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev authorized the placement of approximately 40-50 nuclear warheads, including medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) such as the SS-4 Sandal (range up to 1,020 miles) and intermediate-range SS-5 Skean systems, along with tactical weapons like the Luna short-range missile and nuclear torpedoes on submarines. These deployments aimed to offset U.S. Jupiter MRBMs stationed in Turkey and Italy since 1961, which could strike Soviet territory, while reducing U.S. strategic advantage—where the U.S. possessed over 3,500 strategic warheads compared to the Soviet Union's roughly 300. On October 14, 1962, U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft captured photographic evidence of MRBM launch sites under construction near San Cristóbal, Cuba, prompting President John F. Kennedy to convene the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) on October 16. Intelligence confirmed the missiles could target major U.S. cities, slashing warning times to as little as 4-7 minutes from Cuba versus hours from Soviet bases. ExComm debated options including airstrikes, invasion, or diplomacy, rejecting immediate military action due to risks of Soviet nuclear retaliation against U.S. allies in Europe or escalation via the Soviet arsenal, which included over 100 aircraft capable of delivering bombs to U.S. targets. Instead, on October 22, Kennedy announced a naval "quarantine" (blockade) of Cuba to halt further shipments, raising U.S. forces to DEFCON 2—the highest readiness short of war—and alerting Strategic Air Command bombers. Escalation peaked on October 27, dubbed "Black Saturday," amid multiple near-misses highlighting miscalculation risks in a nuclear-armed standoff. A U.S. U-2 was shot down over Cuba by Soviet surface-to-air missiles, killing the pilot and nearly prompting retaliatory strikes debated by ExComm. More critically, four Soviet Foxtrot submarines, each armed with a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo, faced U.S. naval harassment; aboard B-59, Captain Valentin Savitsky, believing war had begun after depth charges, ordered arming the weapon, but Executive Officer Vasily Arkhipov vetoed launch, requiring consensus under standing orders. Soviet forces in Cuba held tactical nuclear authorization from Khrushchev, unknown to U.S. planners, potentially enabling local commanders like General Pliyev to use them against an invasion without Moscow's approval, complicating U.S. calculations of limited war feasibility. U.S. nuclear superiority deterred Soviet conventional response in Europe but amplified fears of uncontrolled escalation, as simulations indicated millions of casualties from mutual strikes. Resolution came on October 28 when Khrushchev publicly agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles, verified by U.S. overflights, in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade and a secret deal to withdraw missiles from by April 1963. The crisis exposed asymmetries: Soviet missiles threatened U.S. homeland directly but lacked the survivability of U.S. submarine-launched systems, influencing Khrushchev's retreat to avoid nuclear exchange where U.S. forces held escalation dominance. It validated nuclear deterrence's stabilizing effect against great-power war, as rendered invasion untenable despite U.S. conventional edge, though critics note via succeeded more through diplomatic backchannels than threats alone. Outcomes included the June 1963 Moscow-Washington for and the August 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, limiting atmospheric tests to reduce fallout and technical uncertainties.

Anti-Nuclear Movements and Their Critiques

Anti-nuclear movements gained prominence in the 1950s, driven by public alarm over radioactive fallout from atmospheric nuclear tests and the specter of mutual assured destruction. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto, issued on July 9, 1955, by philosopher Bertrand Russell and physicist Albert Einstein (who signed days before his death), warned of the existential risks posed by thermonuclear weapons and urged scientists to advocate for peaceful conflict resolution over militarism. This document catalyzed international efforts, including the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, initiated in 1957, which brought together scientists to discuss arms control and de-escalation. In the United States, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) formed in 1957, mobilizing petitions and protests against continued testing, while the United Kingdom saw the launch of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1958, which organized annual Aldermaston marches drawing tens of thousands. These early campaigns contributed to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of August 5, 1963, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, , and , motivated in part by health concerns over strontium-90 fallout documented in studies like those from the , which revealed elevated radiation levels in children's teeth. However, movements often extended beyond testing to demand broader , including moratoriums on weapons production. The 1960s saw groups like conduct nonviolent actions, such as mass protests and at test sites, amplifying pressure. The 1980s marked a resurgence, particularly with the Nuclear Freeze Campaign launched by Randall Forsberg in 1980, proposing a mutual U.S.-Soviet halt to the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons to break the arms race cycle. The initiative secured victories in local referendums, with 59 of 62 Massachusetts towns approving in 1980, and culminated in a June 12, 1982, rally in New York City attended by over 1 million people—the largest political demonstration in U.S. history at the time. Endorsed by diverse groups including religious organizations and labor unions, it influenced Democratic platforms and pressured the Reagan administration to moderate its rhetoric, such as Reagan's 1983 acknowledgment that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Critiques of these movements highlight their strategic limitations and occasional alignment with adversarial interests. Detractors argue that calls for immediate freezes ignored asymmetries in verification capabilities and Soviet non-compliance with prior agreements, potentially freezing the U.S. at a disadvantage while the USSR maintained superiority in certain delivery systems and continued covert development. Moreover, some organizations, such as the World Peace Council, which supported anti-nuclear protests, operated as Soviet fronts, receiving funding and direction to undermine Western resolve during the Cold War, as evidenced by declassified records of active measures aimed at amplifying European and American dissent against NATO deployments. Academic and policy analyses note that while movements heightened public awareness and contributed to test bans reducing environmental hazards, they overstated the inevitability of accidental war and undervalued deterrence's role in preventing direct superpower conflict from 1945 to 1991, with no empirical instances of nuclear use post-Hiroshima attributable to restraint rather than arsenal restraint. Sources sympathetic to the movements, often from disarmament advocacy circles, emphasize their normative impact in stigmatizing nuclear use, yet overlook how U.S. military modernization in the 1980s—despite protests—exerted economic pressure on the collapsing Soviet economy, facilitating subsequent arms reductions under Gorbachev rather than unilateral concessions. This pattern reflects a broader critique of institutional biases in academia and media, where left-leaning narratives frequently prioritize pacifism over power-balancing realism, diminishing scrutiny of authoritarian nuclear buildups.

Proliferation Dynamics

Early Adopters: Britain, France, and China

The United Kingdom pursued nuclear weapons independently after the United States curtailed wartime collaboration under the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, which restricted information sharing with allies. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee authorized the High Explosive Research project in 1947 to develop plutonium production reactors and an atomic bomb, motivated by the need to maintain strategic influence amid emerging Soviet threats and declining imperial power. Construction of reactors at Windscale began that year, yielding weapons-grade plutonium by 1950. The UK's first nuclear test, Operation Hurricane, detonated a 25-kiloton plutonium implosion device on October 3, 1952, aboard HMS Plymouth in the Montebello Islands off Western Australia, confirming independent capability without full reliance on American designs. This test yielded data equivalent to U.S. assessments, enabling deployment of the Blue Danube bomb by 1953, though thermonuclear development lagged until the 1958 U.S.-UK Mutual Defence Agreement restored cooperation. France initiated its nuclear program in the late 1940s under the Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique, but political instability delayed militarization until Charles de Gaulle's return to power in 1958. De Gaulle, skeptical of U.S. NATO guarantees after the 1956 Suez Crisis exposed French vulnerability, formalized the force de frappe doctrine for an independent deterrent capable of striking major powers, authorizing 15-20 operational bombs by 1965. The program emphasized plutonium production at Marcoule and uranium enrichment, achieving a testable device by 1959 despite resource constraints. France's inaugural test, Gerboise Bleue, exploded a 70-kiloton plutonium implosion bomb on February 13, 1960, in the Reggane region of the Algerian Sahara, marking the fourth nation to join the nuclear club and validating a design derived from open-source intelligence and limited espionage. Subsequent tests in Algeria until 1966, amid the Algerian War, transitioned to Pacific atolls post-independence, with France attaining thermonuclear status in 1968. China's nuclear ambitions stemmed from Mao Zedong's 1955 Politburo directive to counter U.S. nuclear superiority, particularly after the Korean War armistice and Taiwan Strait tensions, with initial Soviet assistance providing blueprints, uranium, and a gaseous diffusion plant until the 1960 Sino-Soviet rift forced self-reliance. The "Two Bombs, One Satellite" project mobilized 500,000 personnel, exploiting domestic uranium deposits and crash industrial programs in Xinjiang and Qinghai, producing weapons-grade uranium via calutrons and plutonium reactors by 1964. On October 16, 1964, China detonated its first device—a 22-kiloton uranium implosion bomb—at Lop Nur, using a tower-mounted assembly enriched to 90% U-235, surprising U.S. intelligence with its speed despite technological isolation. This test, codenamed 596 after the month-day of Mao's approval, enabled rapid follow-on developments, including a thermonuclear test in 1967, shifting global deterrence dynamics by arming a communist power outside superpower alliances.

Non-Proliferation Treaty Framework

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) emerged from negotiations in the mid-1960s, driven by concerns over rapid following China's first test in October 1964 and fears of additional states acquiring weapons amid regional tensions, such as in the and . The and , as principal negotiators, sought to codify a framework distinguishing nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—defined as those that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967—from non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), while incorporating demands from NNWS for commitments and access to peaceful . Opened for signature on July 1, 1968, in Washington, , and , the treaty entered into force on March 5, 1970, after ratification by the required 40 states, including the , , and USSR. The NPT's structure rests on three interconnected pillars: non-proliferation, , and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Under Articles I and II, NWS pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or assist NNWS in acquiring them, while NNWS commit to forgoing development, acquisition, or receipt of such weapons. Article III mandates NNWS acceptance of (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear activities to verify compliance, enhancing verification through inspections and reporting. Article IV affirms the inalienable right of all parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, subject to safeguards, while Article VI obliges NWS to pursue good-faith negotiations toward complete . The five recognized NWS—, (as USSR successor), , , and —hold permanent status, a provision that has drawn accusations of enshrining inequality by freezing the nuclear hierarchy as of 1967. Ratification expanded rapidly, reaching 43 parties by 1970 and nearly 190 by the 1990s, making it the most adhered-to arms control agreement globally. A 25-year duration was set, with provisions for extension; at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, parties agreed to indefinite extension alongside principles for strengthening safeguards and disarmament efforts. Review conferences occur every five years, preceded by preparatory committees, to assess implementation, though consensus has often eluded them due to disputes over disarmament progress and compliance allegations. The 2010 conference yielded an action plan on all pillars, but subsequent gatherings, including the 2015 and postponed 2020/2022 events, highlighted divisions, with no final document adopted in 2022 amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine and concerns over nuclear rhetoric. Challenges to the framework include non-signatories and withdrawals that underscore its limitations. , and Israel never joined, citing the treaty's discriminatory nature in privileging existing NWS and failing to mandate time-bound disarmament; India conducted its first test in 1974 partly as a response, followed by Pakistan's program and Israel's undeclared arsenal. acceded as an NNWS in 1985 but withdrew effective January 10, 2003, alleging U.S. hostility violated the treaty's spirit, leading to its nuclear tests starting in 2006. Critics from non-aligned and developing states argue the NPT perpetuates nuclear apartheid by constraining technology transfers and ignoring vertical proliferation among NWS, whose arsenals peaked at over 70,000 warheads combined in the before reductions to approximately 12,000 by 2023. Despite these, empirical evidence shows the treaty has constrained horizontal proliferation, with only nine states possessing nuclear weapons as of 2025, far fewer than projections of 25-30 absent such norms. Enforcement relies on UN Security Council referrals for violations, as with in 1991 and via IAEA findings, though geopolitical vetoes limit action.

India-Pakistan Nuclearization

India's nuclear program originated in the 1940s but accelerated after the 1962 Sino-Indian War and China's 1964 nuclear test, leading to the development of plutonium reprocessing capabilities using a Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor. On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, code-named "Smiling Buddha," at the Pokhran test site in Rajasthan, detonating a plutonium device with an estimated yield of 6-15 kilotons, which New Delhi described as a peaceful nuclear explosion for civilian purposes despite its military implications. This event prompted international sanctions and spurred Pakistan's covert nuclear efforts, as Islamabad viewed it as a direct threat amid ongoing territorial disputes over Kashmir and prior wars in 1947, 1965, and especially 1971, when Pakistan lost its eastern wing. Pakistan's program, initiated in the early 1970s under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, gained momentum through metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who in the mid-1970s acquired centrifuge designs for uranium enrichment by exploiting contacts at URENCO in the Netherlands, establishing the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta. Neither India nor Pakistan signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), rejecting its discriminatory structure that perpetuated the nuclear monopoly of the five recognized powers. By the 1980s and 1990s, both nations advanced toward weaponization: India developed plutonium-based bombs and delivery systems like the Prithvi missile, while Pakistan focused on uranium implosion devices and tested the Ghauri missile in 1998, capable of reaching Indian targets. Tensions escalated with India's 1998 Pokhran-II preparations, driven by perceived threats from China's arsenal and Pakistan's enrichment progress. On May 11 and 13, 1998, conducted five underground tests at , including a claimed thermonuclear device (Shakti-I) with a reported yield of 45 kilotons, two fission devices, and low-yield experiments, though seismic data and expert analyses suggested total yields closer to 10-20 kilotons, questioning the thermonuclear success. responded swiftly on May 28 with five simultaneous tests at Ras Koh Hills in , claiming yields up to 35-40 kilotons for a boosted device, but seismic estimates indicated a combined yield of approximately 9 kilotons; a sixth test followed on May 30. These overt detonations marked both nations' emergence as de facto nuclear-armed states, ending decades of ambiguity and triggering UN Security Council Resolution 1172 condemning the tests, imposing sanctions, and urging adherence to non-proliferation norms. Post-tests, India formalized a nuclear doctrine in 2003 emphasizing a "credible minimum deterrent," no-first-use against nuclear-armed states, and non-use against non-nuclear states, while maintaining a triad of delivery systems. Pakistan adopted a policy of no-first-use against non-nuclear states but reserved the right to first use against nuclear adversaries like India, focusing on tactical weapons to counter conventional asymmetries, as articulated in response to India's "Cold Start" contingencies. Both established hotlines and confidence-building measures, such as the 1988 non-attack agreement on nuclear facilities, but proliferation risks persisted, exemplified by A.Q. Khan's network supplying technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea until its 2004 exposure. The 1998 tests intensified regional instability, with neither state ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and ongoing arsenal growth—India to an estimated 160 warheads and Pakistan to 170 by 2023—reflecting mutual deterrence amid unresolved conflicts.

Challenges from Rogue and Threshold States

Israel's Opacity and Undeclared Arsenal

Israel has adhered to a policy of nuclear opacity since the inception of its program, neither confirming nor denying possession of nuclear weapons, which allows strategic ambiguity in deterrence while avoiding international pressure to join treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This approach, rooted in decisions by leaders such as David Ben-Gurion, prioritizes existential security amid repeated conventional threats from neighboring states, enabling Israel to maintain a credible deterrent without overt escalation. The policy has persisted despite leaks and foreign intelligence assessments, with Israeli officials consistently deflecting inquiries by emphasizing peaceful nuclear research under IAEA safeguards for non-weapons facilities. The program originated in the mid-1950s, driven by fears of annihilation following Israel's founding amid hostile Arab coalitions, with initial efforts focused on production via a heavy-water . provided critical assistance starting in 1957, including the design and construction of the () complex under a secret agreement tied to Israel's support in the 1956 , supplying technology for a 24-megawatt thermal capable of yielding weapons-grade . Construction began in 1958, and the achieved criticality between 1962 and 1964, with French cooperation ending by amid diplomatic shifts but Israel proceeding independently, including reprocessing facilities for extraction. U.S. intelligence detected the project in late , initially assessing it as weapons-oriented despite Israeli claims of civilian intent, leading to tacit U.S. acceptance by the late 1960s after inspections revealed evasion. Israel is estimated to have assembled its first deliverable nuclear weapon by late 1966 or early 1967, making it the sixth nuclear-armed state, with capabilities demonstrated implicitly during the 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur War through alerts that signaled readiness. A possible nuclear test occurred on September 22, 1979, in the South Atlantic, detected as a double flash by U.S. Vela satellites—consistent with a low-yield fission device—and assessed by CIA analysis as having over 90% probability of being a nuclear event, potentially conducted jointly with South Africa using an Israeli device. The incident remains unacknowledged, but declassified documents indicate U.S. suspicions of Israeli involvement, though public diplomacy framed it as inconclusive to avoid proliferation precedents. In 1986, former technician disclosed detailed evidence of 's arsenal to the Sunday Times of , including photographs revealing plutonium reprocessing, advanced warhead designs like thermonuclear boosts, and production capacity for up to 200 weapons, confirming capabilities far beyond reactor fuel needs. 's revelations, smuggled out before his kidnapping and 18-year imprisonment by , provided the first public proof of an operational stockpile, though maintained opacity by neither affirming nor refuting specifics. As of 2025, Israel possesses an estimated 80 to 90 plutonium-based nuclear warheads, sufficient for aircraft delivery via F-15 and F-16 fighters, submarine-launched cruise missiles from Dolphin-class vessels, and possibly Jericho missile systems, with enough fissile material for additional devices if expanded. These estimates derive from plutonium production models at Dimona (approximately 750–1,110 kg accumulated) and align with independent assessments excluding tritium-boosted or fusion weapons due to opacity constraints. The arsenal supports a doctrine of last-resort deterrence against overwhelming conventional or nuclear threats, untested publicly but refined through simulations, underscoring opacity's role in preserving regional stability amid non-NPT status and rivals' pursuits.

North Korea's Breakout and Tests

North Korea's nuclear program originated in the 1950s with Soviet assistance for civilian purposes but shifted toward weapons development by the 1980s, including construction of the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. The 1994 Agreed Framework temporarily froze plutonium reprocessing in exchange for light-water reactors and fuel oil, but revelations in October 2002 of a covert highly enriched uranium (HEU) program—intended to produce fissile material for bombs—led to the framework's collapse. In response, North Korea ordered IAEA inspectors out on December 27, 2002, and announced on January 10, 2003, its immediate withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), becoming the first state to do so and citing U.S. hostility as justification. This withdrawal marked North Korea's nuclear breakout, enabling resumption of activities at Yongbyon, where it reprocessed approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods to extract up to 30 kilograms of plutonium by 2007—sufficient for several weapons if further purified. Parallel efforts advanced HEU via undeclared centrifuges, with evidence of foreign procurement networks supporting expansion at sites like Kangson. By 2006, North Korea had produced enough fissile material for 6-8 bombs, combining plutonium and estimated HEU stocks, though delivery systems lagged until later missile tests. The program persisted amid six-party talks (2003-2009), which yielded temporary disablement of Yongbyon in 2007 but failed to achieve verifiable dismantlement, as North Korea rejected full inspections and fuel rod disposition. North Korea conducted its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, at the Punggye-ri site, registering a seismic magnitude of 4.3 equivalent to under 1 kiloton yield—likely a plutonium-based fission device that partially fizzled due to incomplete implosion. A second test followed on May 25, 2009 (seismic 4.7, yield 2-6 kilotons), demonstrating improved reliability shortly after expelling verification teams. The third test on February 12, 2013 (seismic 5.1, yield 6-16 kilotons) occurred amid heightened rhetoric post-U.S. "pivot to Asia." Subsequent tests escalated sophistication: January 6, 2016 (seismic 5.1, yield ~10 kilotons), claimed as a hydrogen bomb but assessed as boosted fission; September 9, 2016 (seismic 5.3, yield 10-20 kilotons); and September 3, 2017 (seismic 6.3, yield 100-250 kilotons), the most powerful, with seismic data suggesting a two-stage thermonuclear design tested in a vertical shaft to contain fallout. These detonations, monitored via global seismic networks, confirmed North Korea's ability to miniaturize warheads for ballistic missiles, with post-2017 moratorium on tests shifting focus to solid-fuel ICBMs like capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. By 2018, estimates placed North Korea's arsenal at 20-60 warheads, expandable to 100 by 2020 given ongoing fissile production at Yongbyon and suspected second sites.

Iran's Program and JCPOA Controversies

Iran's nuclear program originated in the 1950s under the Pahlavi monarchy, receiving assistance from the United States through the Atoms for Peace initiative, which included a research reactor supplied in 1967. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, entering it into force in 1970 as a non-nuclear-weapon state committed to peaceful use only. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the program persisted amid international suspicions of diversion toward weapons development, though Iran maintained it was for civilian energy and medical isotopes. Undeclared nuclear activities were exposed in August 2002 by an Iranian opposition group, revealing the enrichment facility and Arak heavy-water reactor, prompting (IAEA) inspections that uncovered traces of highly and plutonium reprocessing experiments inconsistent with declared purposes. The IAEA's 2003 reports documented Iran's failure to report and activities since , leading to UN Security Council sanctions starting in 2006 for non-compliance with safeguards obligations. In December 2015, the IAEA's final assessment concluded Iran had conducted coordinated nuclear weapons-related experiments until 2003, with some activities continuing until 2009, though U.S. intelligence assessments maintain no resumption of a structured weapons program thereafter. Negotiations culminated in the (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, between and the (U.S., , , , , ), endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Key provisions required to reduce operational centrifuges by two-thirds, cap enrichment at 3.67% (far below the 90% weapons-grade threshold), limit low-enriched stockpile to 300 kg, modify the Arak reactor to prevent plutonium production, and implement enhanced IAEA monitoring, including continuous surveillance at key sites, in exchange for phased sanctions relief. complied initially, with IAEA verification confirming implementation by January 2016, extending its potential "breakout time"—the period to produce enough for one bomb—from 2-3 months pre-deal to about 12 months. Critics, including U.S. congressional Republicans and Israeli officials, argued the JCPOA failed to eliminate Iran's nuclear infrastructure or know-how, featuring "sunset clauses" allowing restrictions to lapse after 10-15 years, omitting development central to delivery, and relying on unverifiable Iranian self-reporting for past military dimensions. Proponents countered that it verifiably constrained capabilities and opened pathways for broader , though of Iran's pre-deal fueled regarding long-term adherence. On May 8, 2018, President announced U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, citing its inadequacy in preventing an Iranian bomb path, enrichment of regime finances for , and lack of permanent curbs on missiles or inspections of military sites, reimposing "maximum pressure" sanctions that halved 's oil exports. initially adhered until 2019, then incrementally violated limits, installing advanced centrifuges, exceeding stockpile caps, and enriching to 4.5% then 20% by 2020, and 60%—near weapons-grade—by April 2021, reducing breakout time to weeks. IAEA reports documented 's removal of monitoring equipment and denial of inspector access, eroding verification and revealing undeclared uranium particles at multiple sites. By May 2025, IAEA estimates indicated possessed over 5,500 kg of , including hundreds of kg at 60%, sufficient for multiple weapons if further processed, with breakout time approaching zero amid non-cooperation. On June 12, 2025, the IAEA Board declared in breach of safeguards for unexplained traces and opacity, prompting Israeli strikes on facilities like and Taleghan 2, disrupting centrifuges but leaving with retained expertise and stockpiles to rebuild rapidly. As of October 2025, continues reconstruction, maintaining threshold status without overt weaponization, though U.S. assessments affirm no active bomb program resumption post-2003 despite advanced capabilities.

Post-Cold War Reductions and Resurgence

Arms Control Treaties and Stockpile Cuts

Following the in 1991, the and initiated significant bilateral measures to curb their oversized nuclear arsenals, driven by reduced geopolitical tensions and economic pressures on . These efforts built on late-Cold War negotiations but accelerated post-1991, emphasizing verifiable limits on strategic delivery systems and warheads. Unilateral announcements complemented formal treaties; for instance, U.S. President declared in September 1991 the withdrawal of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons from forward deployments and elimination of others, prompting reciprocal Soviet actions under . The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (), signed on July 31, 1991, by the U.S. and the (with as successor state), entered into force on December 5, 1994, capping deployed strategic warheads at 6,000 per side and accountable strategic launchers at 1,600. Implementation involved dismantling over 80% of excess systems by 2001, marking the first treaty to reduce, rather than merely limit, deployed strategic nuclear forces. , signed in January 1993, aimed to halve START I limits to 3,000-3,500 warheads and ban multiple warheads on land-based missiles, but it was never ratified by due to U.S. national plans and expired unentered in 2003. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), or Moscow Treaty, signed on May 24, 2002, by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, entered into force on June 1, 2003, committing both sides to operationally deployed strategic warheads not exceeding 1,700-2,200 by December 31, 2012; it lacked detailed verification but superseded START II provisions. This was followed by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed April 8, 2010, and entering force February 5, 2011, which limited deployed strategic warheads to 1,550, deployed and non-deployed launchers to 800, and deployed launchers to 700, with robust on-site inspections (18 annually until Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine curtailed them). Extended by five years in 2021 to February 5, 2026, New START saw Russia suspend participation in February 2023 amid tensions over Ukraine, though it has not exceeded limits as of 2025. These treaties facilitated deep stockpile reductions, with the U.S. and Russia dismantling thousands of warheads; the U.S. alone retired 12,088 nuclear warheads from fiscal years 1994 through 2023. Total inventories declined from peaks exceeding 30,000 warheads each in the 1980s to approximately 3,700 for the U.S. and 4,380 for Russia by 2023, representing over 80% cuts in operational forces.
YearU.S. Stockpile (approx. total warheads) Stockpile (approx. total warheads)
199121,00030,000+
200210,00020,000+
20105,10012,000
20233,7004,380
The table above illustrates aggregate trends from declassified and estimated data, excluding retired but undeployed warheads awaiting dismantlement; precise figures remain classified, but reductions reflect treaty compliance and unilateral decisions to retire aging systems. Despite successes, challenges emerged, including the U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) in August 2019 after alleging Russian violations of its 1987 ban on ground-launched missiles of 500-5,500 km range, which had eliminated 2,692 such systems by 1991. Overall, post-Cold War halved strategic arsenals multiple times, stabilizing deterrence while exposing verification strains from emerging technologies like hypersonics.

End of Testing and Simulation Advances

The United States imposed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing effective October 1, 1992, following the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment to the fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act, which initially banned testing for nine months and was later extended indefinitely by President Bill Clinton in July 1993. This marked the end of U.S. full-scale testing after 928 detonations, primarily underground at the Nevada Test Site. France conducted its final nuclear test on January 27, 1996, at Moruroa Atoll, concluding 210 tests since 1960, while China ended its program with a test on July 29, 1996, after 45 detonations. Russia ceased testing in 1990, following the Soviet Union's last underground explosion. These national moratoria paved the way for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), opened for signature on September 24, 1996, which prohibits all nuclear explosions, whether for weapons or peaceful purposes. As of 2025, 187 states have signed and 178 have ratified the treaty, but it has not entered into force due to the requirement for ratification by 44 specified "Annex 2" states, including holdouts like the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and North Korea. The major nuclear powers have largely adhered to the testing restraint, with North Korea as the primary exception, conducting six tests between 2006 and 2017. In response to the testing halt, the U.S. Department of Energy established the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) in 1995 to certify the safety, reliability, and performance of its nuclear arsenal without explosive tests, relying on non-nuclear experiments, enhanced surveillance, and computational modeling. A core component, the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) program, deploys high-performance supercomputers at national laboratories such as Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia to simulate nuclear weapon physics, including fission, fusion processes, material aging, and hydrodynamic behaviors. These simulations have advanced dramatically since 1992, enabling three-dimensional modeling of weapon performance with predictive accuracy validated against historical test data, though they cannot replicate the full integrated effects of a nuclear explosion. Other nuclear states have pursued analogous simulation capabilities; for instance, and the collaborate on shared simulation facilities like the Énergie et Simulation pour la Sécurité Nucléaire (ESSN) at the , while maintains computational infrastructure at institutions like the Russian Federal Nuclear Center. These advances support maintenance and modernization—such as refurbishments under the U.S. program—without resuming tests, though critics argue that prolonged reliance on simulations risks uncertainties in long-term weapon efficacy amid evolving threats. The SSP's annual assessments, informed by ASC data, have certified the U.S. as reliable through fiscal year 2024, underpinning post-Cold War deterrence amid arsenal reductions.

The Second Nuclear Age

Multipolar Proliferation and Regional Instabilities

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by states beyond the initial U.S.-Soviet bipolar framework marked the onset of multipolar proliferation, diversifying global nuclear dynamics and fostering regional instabilities through localized deterrence competitions and escalation risks. Beginning with the United Kingdom's successful test on October 3, 1952, followed by France on February 13, 1960, and China on October 16, 1964, these developments eroded exclusive superpower control over nuclear technology and introduced independent actors with varying strategic doctrines. This shift complicated arms control efforts, as regional powers pursued arsenals to counter perceived existential threats, often amid ongoing territorial disputes or ideological rivalries, heightening the potential for miscalculation in crises lacking the stabilizing mutual vulnerability of bipolar mutual assured destruction. Clandestine proliferation networks amplified these risks by enabling technology transfer to unstable regions, exemplified by the A.Q. Khan smuggling operation, which from the late 1970s to 2003 supplied Pakistan-derived uranium enrichment centrifuges, designs, and expertise to , , and . Operating through intermediaries in over 20 countries, Khan's network circumvented export controls, providing nearly complete blueprints for P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, which facilitated 's Natanz facility development and 's Yongbyon program acceleration. This diffusion not only shortened breakout timelines for these recipients but also intensified regional tensions, such as 's pursuit amid Sunni-Shiite proxy conflicts and Israeli preemptive postures, and 's threats correlating with heightened Korean Peninsula militarization. In a multipolar environment, these proliferations engender cascading effects, where one state's acquisition prompts neighbors to hedge or pursue symmetric capabilities, undermining non-proliferation norms and elevating inadvertent escalation probabilities during conventional clashes. Analyses indicate that regional nuclear dyads, unlike pairs, often feature asymmetric force postures, limited reconnaissance, and immature safety protocols, increasing vulnerability to unauthorized launches or preemptive strikes in high-stakes disputes. For instance, post-Cold War fears of Soviet successor state fissile material diversion underscored how multipolarity could fragment command chains, though actual transfers remained contained; nonetheless, the precedent informed ongoing concerns over black-market cascades in the and . Strategic stability in this context deteriorates further due to intersecting rivalries, as seen in potential South Asian or East Asian chains where China's arsenal influences Indian responses, indirectly spurring Pakistani countermeasures. Multipolarity thus demands tailored deterrence, yet erodes global efficacy, with regional actors prioritizing survivable second-strike forces amid coercive signaling, such as veiled threats in territorial standoffs. Empirical assessments highlight that while proliferation has not yet triggered direct nuclear use, the cumulative effect—coupled with threshold states' advances—amplifies systemic risks, necessitating robust verification regimes to mitigate inadvertent pathways.

China's Arsenal Growth and Assertiveness

China's nuclear arsenal has expanded rapidly since the late 2010s, transitioning from a posture emphasizing minimal deterrence to a more robust triad capable of assured retaliation against potential adversaries, including the . Estimates indicate the operational stockpile surpassed 600 warheads by mid-2024, more than doubling from approximately 290 in 2019, with projections for further growth to over 1,000 by 2030. This buildup includes the construction of at least 320 new (ICBM) silos across three fields discovered via starting in 2021, enhancing launch amid concerns over U.S. missile defenses. Modernization efforts focus on diversifying delivery systems and improving penetration capabilities. The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force has deployed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on the DF-41 road-mobile ICBM, operational since around 2019, which can carry up to 10 warheads and reach U.S. territory. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles have advanced with the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs, carrying JL-2 SLBMs, and development of the quieter Type 096 SSBN with longer-range JL-3 missiles expected in the late 2020s. Aerial capabilities are bolstered by the nuclear-capable H-6N bomber, an upgraded version of the Soviet-era design, enabling air-launched ballistic missiles for extended standoff range. These developments, documented in U.S. Department of Defense assessments and independent analyses, prioritize redundancy to counter preemptive strikes, though Chinese official statements maintain a no-first-use policy without confirmed doctrinal shifts. This arsenal growth coincides with heightened assertiveness in regional disputes, particularly over Taiwan, where nuclear capabilities underpin deterrence against U.S. intervention. Beijing's expansion is framed in state media and analyses as a response to perceived U.S. encirclement and arms control erosion, enabling more aggressive conventional posturing—such as increased military drills around Taiwan—without immediate escalation risks. The buildup raises concerns of an unregulated arms race, as China's fissile material production capacity—estimated at enough for 1,500 warheads by 2035—outpaces transparency commitments under frameworks like the NPT. While People's Liberation Army writings emphasize "active deterrence," the lack of arms control engagement with the U.S. or Russia amplifies strategic instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Russian Modernization and Ukraine Threats

Russia initiated a multi-decade nuclear modernization program in the early 2000s to replace Soviet-era delivery systems across its strategic triad, with the effort accelerating under the state armament program spanning 2011–2020 and subsequent extensions. By 2025, the program had reached its late stages, with approximately 88% of strategic launchers modernized, including the deployment of RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) since 2010 and the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM entering service following successful tests in 2022. Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities advanced through Borei-class submarines equipped with Bulava missiles, while air-launched systems featured upgraded Tu-95MS and new Tu-160M bombers. Novel systems like the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, deployed on ICBMs since 2019, and the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone were introduced to enhance survivability and penetration against missile defenses. Russia's estimated nuclear stockpile stood at nearly 5,460 warheads in 2025, including about 1,718 deployed strategic warheads, maintaining parity with the under the suspended treaty limits of 1,550 deployed warheads. Tactical nuclear weapons, numbering around 1,912 in operational stockpiles, underwent upgrades including low-yield options for battlefield use, with storage sites renovated in regions like and near . These enhancements emphasized mobility, such as rail- and road-mobile ICBMs, to counter preemptive strikes, reflecting a doctrine prioritizing nuclear deterrence amid perceived conventional inferiority. The 2022 intensified nuclear signaling, with President issuing explicit threats in February 2022, warning of consequences "such as you've never seen" if Western intervention occurred, and placing forces on high alert. Subsequent rhetoric escalated after Ukrainian counteroffensives and Western arms supplies, including Putin's September 2022 statement post-referendums in annexed territories that nuclear response would follow attacks on soil. suspended participation in in February 2023, citing U.S. support for , while refusing on-site inspections and increasing launcher movements to obscure compliance. In November 2024, Putin signed an updated nuclear doctrine lowering the threshold for use, permitting nuclear strikes against conventional attacks—by nuclear or non-nuclear states—threatening Russia's "very existence," and extending guarantees to Belarus. This followed deployments of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in 2023, expanding Russia's forward posture. Analysts attribute these shifts to compensating for stalled conventional advances in Ukraine, with threats aimed at deterring NATO escalation rather than indicating imminent use, though risks persist from miscalculation amid ongoing missile exchanges and sabotage near nuclear sites like Zaporizhzhia.

U.S. Upgrades and Eroding Arms Control

The United States has pursued a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear arsenal since the early 2010s to address aging infrastructure and evolving threats from peer competitors. This program encompasses upgrades across the nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers, alongside warhead life extensions and new production. The Department of Defense and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) justify these efforts as essential for maintaining a credible deterrent against Russia and China, whose own nuclear expansions have heightened risks of instability. Key initiatives include the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM, intended to replace the Minuteman III starting in the early 2030s, with deployment of the W87-1 warhead featuring an insensitive high explosive primary and plutonium pit akin to the existing W87. The Columbia-class submarine program will succeed the Ohio-class SSBNs from 2031, carrying Trident II D5LE SLBMs upgraded with W76-2 low-yield and W88 warheads, the latter undergoing Alteration 370 for enhanced safety and performance. The Air Force's B-21 Raider bomber will integrate with modernized air-launched cruise missiles and the B61-12 gravity bomb, whose life-extension program—consolidating variants 3, 4, 7, and 10 with improved accuracy and a tail kit—was completed in early 2025 at a cost of approximately $9 billion. These upgrades face significant cost overruns and delays; the Congressional Budget Office projects $946 billion for nuclear forces from 2025 to 2034, with Sentinel alone exceeding initial estimates due to requirements for renovating 450 launch facilities and integrating cybersecurity. The NNSA's plutonium pit production at Los Alamos and Savannah River sites aims to support new warheads like the W87-1, scheduled for initial production around 2030-2031, though capacity constraints persist. Parallel to these developments, arms control frameworks have deteriorated, exemplified by the New START Treaty, which limits deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 per side but expires on February 5, 2026, with no verified extension or successor in place. Russia suspended participation in February 2023 amid the Ukraine conflict, halting inspections and data exchanges, though President Putin announced in September 2025 that Russia would adhere to limits for one additional year to promote "global stability." U.S. officials cite Russia's non-compliance, deployment of novel systems like the Poseidon torpedo, and refusal to include tactical weapons or China's arsenal in talks as barriers to progress. The erosion stems from broader geopolitical shifts, including China's rapid growth—estimated at over 500 warheads by —and Russia's doctrinal emphasis on nuclear escalation, rendering bilateral U.S.- limits insufficient for multipolar deterrence. Without New START's verification, both nations retain upload potential to double deployed warheads quickly, incentivizing U.S. upgrades to hedge against unconstrained rivals rather than mutual reductions. Proponents argue this modernization sustains extended deterrence for allies, while critics, including some advocates, contend it perpetuates escalation risks absent renewed negotiations.

Global Stockpiles and Emerging Risks (2020s)

As of early 2025, the global inventory of nuclear warheads totaled approximately 12,241, with roughly 9,614 assigned to military stockpiles for potential operational use and about 3,912 deployed on missiles or at bomber bases. and the together accounted for nearly 90 percent of the total, though their stockpiles remained stable year-over-year amid ongoing dismantlements of retired warheads. All nine nuclear-armed states—, the , , , the , , , and —continued comprehensive modernization programs, introducing new delivery systems, warhead designs, and production facilities, which reversed the post-Cold War trend of net reductions. The following table summarizes estimated military stockpiles by country as of 2025:
CountryMilitary Stockpile
Russia4,309
United States3,700
China600
France290
United Kingdom225
Pakistan170
India180
Israel90
North Korea50
Total~9,614
China's arsenal expanded most rapidly, increasing by about 100 warheads annually since 2023, with evidence of mating some warheads to missiles for potential alert status, signaling a shift toward a more assertive posture. and each added modestly to their production and delivery capabilities, while North Korea's estimated 50 warheads belied its growing infrastructure for up to 40 additional assemblies. These developments occurred against a backdrop of slowing global dismantlements, with the pace of reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals decelerating compared to prior decades. Emerging risks in the 2020s stemmed primarily from the erosion of bilateral arms control, technological disruptions, and heightened geopolitical tensions. The impending expiration of the New START treaty in 2026, coupled with Russia's suspension of participation in 2023, eliminated verification mechanisms and fueled mutual suspicions, potentially accelerating an unconstrained arms competition. Modernization efforts, including hypersonic glide vehicles and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in Russia, China, and others, raised concerns over first-strike capabilities and crisis stability, as faster, harder-to-intercept systems could compress decision timelines for leaders. Cyber vulnerabilities in command-and-control networks posed additional threats, with potential for disruptions mimicking attacks and triggering escalatory responses, while artificial intelligence integration into early-warning systems introduced risks of miscalculation from algorithmic errors. Regional instabilities amplified these dangers, as nuclear doctrines increasingly emphasized weapons for battlefield or limited-war scenarios rather than solely deterrence. Russia's threats of nuclear use in the Ukraine conflict since 2022 demonstrated lowered thresholds, while India's no-first-use policy faced tests amid border clashes with China and Pakistan. Proliferation pressures persisted, with Iran's uranium enrichment nearing weapons-grade levels despite sanctions, and non-state actors potentially accessing radiological materials, though state programs remained the primary concern. Overall, the multipolar distribution—contrasting the bipolar U.S.-Soviet era—complicated deterrence dynamics, increasing the likelihood of inadvertent escalation in multi-front crises.

References

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