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Xilingol League
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Key Information
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| Xilingol League | |||||||
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| Chinese name | |||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 錫林郭勒 | ||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 锡林郭勒 | ||||||
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| Mongolian name | |||||||
| Mongolian Cyrillic | Шилийн Гол аймаг | ||||||
| Mongolian script | ᠰᠢᠯᠢ ᠶᠢᠨ ᠭᠣᠣᠯ ᠠᠶᠢᠮᠠᠭ | ||||||
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Xilingol League (also transliterated as Xilin Gol or Shiliin Gol; Chinese: 锡林郭勒盟; Mongolian: 
, Шилийн Гол аймаг, Shiliin Gol aimag, pronounced [ʃɪ̆ˈliŋ ɢɔl ˈɛːmə̆k]) is one of the 3 leagues of Inner Mongolia. The seat is Xilinhot, and the area is 202,580 km2 (78,220 sq mi). The league's economy is based on mining and agriculture.
Xilingol borders Mongolia to the north, Chifeng, Tongliao and Hinggan League to the east, Ulanqab to the west and Hebei to the south.
This is the only prefecture-level division of Inner Mongolia in whose southern border nomadic culture is still vivid. Some divisions, such as Tongliao, have a much higher percentage of Mongolian population, but agriculture is extensive among Khorchin Mongols there. Xilingol League is also the closest Inner Mongolian prefecture-level division to Beijing; although, among those Inner Mongolian prefecture-level divisions bordering Hebei, the province surrounding Beijing, Xilin Gol is also the most unapproachable one. With a significant population of Chakhar Mongols, who speak a Mongolian dialect closely related to the standard dialect of Mongolia, the dialect also spoken in Xulun Hoh Banner, Xilin Gol League's variety is chosen as the standard language of Mongolian in China. Nevertheless, the de facto common standard is a mix of Khorchin-Kharchin and Chakhar, due to the extensive presence of Khorchin Mongolian speakers in China.
Demographics
[edit]In 2000, there were 975,168 inhabitants:
| Ethnic group | no. of inhabitants | share |
|---|---|---|
| Han | 653,226 | 66.78% |
| Mongols | 284,995 | 29.23% |
| Manchu | 26,687 | 2.74% |
| Hui | 11,009 | 1.13% |
| Daur | 784 | 0.08% |
| Other | 519 | 0.04% |
Administrative subdivisions
[edit]Xilin Gol is divided into two county-level cities, one county and nine banners:
| Map | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Mongolian | Hanzi | Hanyu Pinyin | Population (2010) | Area (km2) | Density (/km2) | |
| Xilinhot (city) | ᠰᠢᠯᠢ ᠶᠢᠨ ᠬᠣᠲᠠ (Sili-yin qota) |
锡林浩特市 | Xīlínhàotè Shì | 245,886 | 15,758 | 15.6 | |
| Erenhot (city) | ᠡᠷᠢᠶᠡᠨ ᠬᠣᠲᠠ (Eriyen qota) |
二连浩特市 | Èrliánhàotè Shì | 74,197 | 4,015 | 18.5 | |
| Duolun County | ᠳᠣᠯᠣᠨᠨᠤᠤᠷ ᠰᠢᠶᠠᠨ (Dolonnuur siyan) |
多伦县 | Duōlún Xiàn | 100,893 | 3,773 | 26.7 | |
| Abag Banner | ᠠᠪᠠᠭᠠ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Abaɣ-a qosiɣu) |
阿巴嘎旗 | Ābāgā Qí | 43,574 | 27,495 | 1.6 | |
| Sonid Left Banner (Sonid Jun Banner) |
ᠰᠥᠨᠡᠳ ᠵᠡᠭᠦᠨ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Söned Jegün qosiɣu) |
苏尼特左旗 | Sūnítè Zuǒ Qí | 33,652 | 33,469 | 1.0 | |
| Sonid Right Banner (Sonid Barun Banner) |
ᠰᠥᠨᠡᠳ ᠪᠠᠷᠠᠭᠤᠨ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Söned Baraɣun qosiɣu) |
苏尼特右旗 | Sūnítè Yòu Qí | 71,063 | 26,700 | 2.7 | |
| East Ujimqin Banner (Jun Ujimqin Banner) |
ᠵᠡᠭᠦᠨ ᠤᠵᠤᠮᠤᠴᠢᠨ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Jegün Ujumučin qosiɣu) |
东乌珠穆沁旗 | Dōng Wūzhūmùqìn Qí | 93,962 | 47,554 | 2.0 | |
| West Ujimqin Banner (Barun Ujimqin Banner) |
ᠪᠠᠷᠠᠭᠤᠨ ᠤᠵᠤᠮᠤᠴᠢᠨ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Baraɣun Ujumučin qosiɣu) |
西乌珠穆沁旗 | Xī Wūzhūmùqìn Qí | 87,614 | 22,960 | 3.8 | |
| Taibus Banner | ᠲᠠᠶᠢᠫᠤᠰᠧ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Tayipusė qosiɣu) |
太仆寺旗 | Tàipúsì Qí | 112,339 | 3,415 | 32.9 | |
| Bordered Yellow Banner (Xianghuang Banner) (Hobot Xar Banner) |
ᠬᠥᠪᠡᠭᠡᠲᠦ ᠰᠢᠷᠠ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Köbegetü Sir-a qosiɣu) |
镶黄旗 | Xiānghuáng Qí | 28,450 | 4,960 | 5.7 | |
| Plain and Bordered White Banner (Zhengxiangbai Banner) (Xulun Hobot Qagan Banner) |
ᠰᠢᠯᠤᠭᠤᠨ ᠬᠥᠪᠡᠭᠡᠲᠦ ᠴᠠᠭᠠᠨ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Siluɣun Köbegetü Čaɣan qosiɣu) |
正镶白旗 | Zhèngxiāngbái Qí | 54,443 | 6,083 | 9.0 | |
| Plain Blue Banner (Zhenglan Banner) (Xulun Hoh Banner) |
ᠰᠢᠯᠤᠭᠤᠨ ᠬᠥᠬᠡ ᠬᠣᠰᠢᠭᠤ (Siluɣun Köke qosiɣu) |
正蓝旗 | Zhènglán Qí | 81,967 | 9,963 | 8.2 | |
Demonstrations in 2011
[edit]After the alleged murder of a Mongolian herder, Mergen, by a Chinese truck driver who was blocking the way for Chinese coal trucks to pass through his pasture on May 10, 2011, protests with some thousand protestors broke out in Xilingol.[2] To prevent the spreading of protests, the Chinese government sealed off the Inner Mongolia University for Nationalities in Tongliao and the Nationalities University in Hohhot, the only two universities where lessons are predominantly taught in Mongolian. In addition, it enforced tight control on the internet and shut down QQ chatrooms.[3] To address the underlying issues, the government provided compensation to the family of the victim, brought forth tougher environmental regulations, and dismissed the Communist Party chief of West Ujimqin. The truck driver was tried, found guilty of murder, and sentenced to death[citation needed].
References
[edit]- ^ 内蒙古自治区统计局、国家统计局内蒙古调查总队 (2016). 《内蒙古统计年鉴－2016》. China Statistics Press. ISBN 978-7-5037-7901-5.
- ^ Ben Blanchard and Sui-Lee Wee (Reuters), Friday, May 27, 2011: Parts of Inner Mongolia 'under martial law' as protests spread. E.g. at [1][dead link].
- ^ "Southern Mongolian Human Rights Information Center".
External links
[edit]- Official website (in Chinese)
- Official website Archived 2017-10-27 at the Wayback Machine (in Mongolian)
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43°56′N 116°05′E / 43.93°N 116.09°E
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Xilingol League
View on Grokipediafrom Grokipedia
Xilingol League (Chinese: 锡林郭勒盟; Mongolian: Силийн гол аймаг, Sili-yin Gool ayimag) is a prefecture-level administrative division located in the central part of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China. Encompassing 203,000 square kilometers primarily of steppe and grassland terrain, it supports a traditional pastoral economy centered on livestock herding, with annual production reaching 8 million units across 180,000 square kilometers of usable grassland. The league's permanent population stands at 1.04 million, of which approximately 30 percent are ethnic Mongols.[1] Historically significant as the cradle of Mongolian culture during the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368), Xilingol League includes the ruins of Xanadu (Shangdu), Kublai Khan's summer capital, designated a UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site for its fusion of nomadic and agrarian elements. The region borders Mongolia along 1,103 kilometers, facilitating trade through two national first-class ports, Erenhot and Zhuengadabuqi. Administratively, it is governed from Xilinhot City and divided into 12 county-level units, including banners that reflect traditional Mongol organizational structures.[1] The economy reflects the league's resource endowment, with 2022 GDP totaling 114.87 billion yuan, driven by primary industries (17.04 billion yuan from agriculture and herding), secondary sectors including mining (59.54 billion yuan), and tertiary services (38.28 billion yuan). Abundant mineral reserves underpin industrial growth, encompassing 144.8 billion tons of coal, 320 million tons of petroleum, and 3,200 tons of germanium—accounting for 70 percent of China's and 35 percent of global supply. Emerging clean energy initiatives, such as wind power developments, complement traditional herding amid efforts to balance ecological pressures from grazing and extraction.[1][2][3]
Geography
Location and Borders
Xilingol League occupies the central portion of China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, extending across latitudes 42°32′–46°51′ N and longitudes 111°14′–120°12′ E, covering an area of approximately 202,580 square kilometers.[4][5] This positioning situates the league on the southeastern edge of the Mongolian Plateau, facilitating its role as a key grassland region in northern China.[6] The league's northern boundary abuts Mongolia, forming part of China's international frontier in the region.[6] To the south, its territory interfaces with Hebei Province, marking the only such direct provincial adjacency for any league in Inner Mongolia. Internally within the autonomous region, Xilingol borders Ulanqab City to the west, and Chifeng City, Tongliao City, and Hinggan League to the east.[7][8] These borders encompass a diverse array of administrative divisions, including banners and municipalities that extend to these limits.[9]Climate and Terrain
The terrain of Xilingol League consists primarily of plateau plains with gentle rolling hills and undulating grasslands, forming part of the central Inner Mongolian Plateau.[10] Elevations range from approximately 760 m to 1960 m, with an average of about 1100 m above sea level.[11] [10] The landscape features vast open steppes interspersed with low mountains, 20 major rivers, and over 1300 lakes, including 672 freshwater bodies, which contribute to a diverse hydrological network divided into eastern, central, and western drainage systems.[12] The region experiences a mid-temperate arid to semi-arid continental monsoon climate, characterized by significant seasonal temperature variations and low overall humidity.[13] Annual average temperatures range from 0°C to 3°C in most areas, dropping below 0°C in northern districts near the China-Mongolia border, with monthly averages reaching a low of -12°C to -25°C in January and highs of 13°C to 25°C in July.[13] [14] Precipitation averages 200–300 mm annually across the league, with higher amounts (up to 400 mm) in eastern mountainous zones and lower (<150 mm) in the west; rainfall is highly seasonal, concentrated from June to August, comprising the majority of the yearly total.[13] [10] Winters are long, cold, and dry with frequent strong winds and occasional snow, while springs bring dust storms due to low vegetation cover, and summers are relatively warm and the only wet period supporting grassland growth.[15] [13]Grasslands and Natural Features
The Xilingol League encompasses vast temperate steppes that form one of China's four major grassland regions, covering over 90% of its total land area and spanning approximately 191,400 square kilometers of grassland ecosystems.[14][16] These grasslands, representative of Eurasian temperate zones, feature dominant vegetation types including Stipa grandis and Leymus chinensis communities, supporting traditional pastoral productivity through high-quality forage grasses.[15] The region's arid to semi-arid climate fosters a fragile ecosystem sensitive to climatic variations and human activity, with desertified lands comprising about 51.5% and sandy areas 34.5% of the territory.[17] Terrain in the league slopes gradually from south to north, with low mountains and hills predominating in the southern and eastern sectors, interspersed with basins and flat plains extending westward and northward.[7] Key hydrological features include the Xilin Gol River, which traverses the grasslands and sustains meadow ecosystems amid the steppe expanse.[18] Diverse landforms such as valleys, downlands, lava terraces, and eolian sandylands contribute to habitat variability, with grasslands as the primary matrix.[19] Biodiversity thrives in protected zones like the Xilin Gol Biosphere Reserve, encompassing 856 higher plant species—including endemic tulips and Mongolian almonds—alongside 230 vertebrate species and 527 insects, underscoring the area's role as a critical ecological barrier in northern China.[20] These features collectively define a landscape of ecological significance, where steppe vegetation provides foundational ecosystem services despite ongoing pressures from degradation and desertification.[4][21]History
Pre-20th Century Developments
The territory encompassing modern Xilingol League has been a pastoral steppe region inhabited by nomadic Mongol tribes since at least the 13th century, serving as a key area for livestock herding and tribal confederations amid the broader Mongol expansions under Genghis Khan's unification in 1206. In 1256, Kublai Khan established Shangdu (Xanadu) as a summer capital and secondary residence within the region, now located in Zhenglan Banner, where it functioned as an administrative and cultural center blending Mongol nomadic traditions with Chinese imperial influences during the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368).[7] This site symbolized the Yuan's peak, hosting palaces, gardens, and assemblies that facilitated governance over vast territories, though it declined after the dynasty's fall in 1368 amid civil wars and abandonment by subsequent rulers.[22] Following the Yuan collapse, the area reverted to fragmented Mongol khanates, primarily under the Chahar Mongols, who maintained semi-independent nomadic polities engaging in raids and alliances across the Mongolian plateau into the Ming era (1368–1644).[23] By the early 17th century, the Chahar khan Ligdan Khan attempted to revive Mongol unity but faced defeats, leading to Qing dynasty incursions; after his death in 1634, Qing forces progressively subdued Chahar territories through military campaigns and alliances.[24] During the Shunzhi Emperor's reign (1644–1661), the Qing formalized control by reorganizing Chahar lands into banner systems, with ten banners in the Xilin River (Gol) vicinity coalescing into an alliance that laid the administrative foundation for Xilingol as a league (aimag), emphasizing hereditary Mongol nobility under Manchu oversight.[25] By 1675, the Qing further subdivided Chahar jurisdictions into four colored aimags (blue, white, yellow, and red) to streamline tribute collection, banner loyalty, and border defense against Oirat threats, integrating Xilingol's banners into this structure while preserving Mongol customary law for internal affairs.[26] Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the league's economy centered on sheep, horse, and cattle pastoralism, with periodic Qing garrisons and monasteries reinforcing cultural continuity, though overgrazing and droughts occasionally strained resources; no major revolts disrupted Qing authority here, unlike in Outer Mongolia.[23] This period solidified the region's role as a buffer zone, with population estimates around 1900 placing Mongol herders at several hundred thousand across banners, supported by transhumant cycles tied to seasonal grasslands.[27]Establishment and Integration into PRC
The Xilingol League's modern administrative framework emerged amid the establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region on May 1, 1947, initiated by Mongolian leaders aligned with the Chinese Communist Party in territories under their control, incorporating traditional banner alliances from the Qing dynasty era into a new regional autonomy structure.[28] This formation predated the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) by two years and positioned the league—then comprising banners around the Xilin River—as a key component of the nascent autonomous governance, emphasizing ethnic Mongol administration while subordinating it to communist oversight.[26] Following the PRC's proclamation on October 1, 1949, Xilingol League was directly incorporated into the central government framework without significant disruption, as the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region had already been operating under CCP directives since 1947; formal reorganization in 1950 affirmed its status as one of the region's leagues, equivalent to prefectures elsewhere in China, with boundaries adjusted to consolidate control over pastoral territories.[29] In 1958, administrative reforms merged Xilingol League with the adjacent Chahar League, expanding its territory and renaming the combined entity Xilingol League to streamline governance and resource allocation under socialist planning.[26] These changes prioritized integration into national economic systems, including collectivization of grasslands, while retaining nominal ethnic autonomy.[26]Administrative Divisions
Banners and Municipalities
Xilingol League is subdivided into 12 county-level administrative divisions: two county-level cities, one county, and nine banners.[7] The county-level cities are Erenhot and Xilinhot, with Xilinhot serving as the seat of the league's government.[7] Duolun serves as the sole county.[7] The banners, which are traditional Mongolian administrative units equivalent to counties, include Abag Banner, Sunite Left Banner, Sunite Right Banner, East Ujimqin Banner, West Ujimqin Banner, Taibus Banner, Xianghuang Banner, Zhengxiangbai Banner, and Zhenglan Banner.[7]| Type | Name |
|---|---|
| County-level city | Erenhot |
| County-level city | Xilinhot |
| County | Duolun |
| Banner | Abag Banner |
| Banner | Sunite Left Banner |
| Banner | Sunite Right Banner |
| Banner | East Ujimqin Banner |
| Banner | West Ujimqin Banner |
| Banner | Taibus Banner |
| Banner | Xianghuang Banner |
| Banner | Zhengxiangbai Banner |
| Banner | Zhenglan Banner |
Governance Structure
Xilingol League functions as a prefecture-level administrative division within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, subordinate to the regional government and the Inner Mongolia Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC). Its governance follows the standard Chinese administrative framework, emphasizing CPC leadership over executive, legislative, and consultative organs. The CPC Xilingol League Committee holds ultimate authority, directing policy implementation, cadre appointments, and ideological work across the league's subordinate units, including banners, counties, and municipalities.[30] The executive branch is the Xilingol League Administrative Office (锡林郭勒盟行政公署), headquartered in Xilinhot City at 30 Nadamu Street, which manages daily administration, economic planning, and public services. This office is led by the mengzhang (盟长, league commissioner), currently Guo Yufeng, a Mongol male born in January 1970 with a bachelor's degree in literature, who also serves as deputy secretary of the league CPC committee and party group secretary of the administrative office; he assumed these roles following an appointment announced on December 21, 2024.[31][32] The mengzhang oversees departments such as development and reform, finance, education, and public security, coordinating with banner-level governments on issues like grassland management and resource allocation.[30] Legislative functions are handled by the Xilingol League People's Congress Working Committee (锡林郭勒盟人大工委), which convenes sessions to approve budgets, elect officials, and enact local regulations, though its powers are constrained by higher-level directives from the regional people's congress. The Xilingol League Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (政协) provides advisory input from non-CPC representatives, focusing on ethnic harmony, economic development, and cultural preservation in this Mongol-majority area. The league secretary of the CPC committee, Zhang Baicheng (born November 1968), chairs the party committee and directs overarching strategy, currently also serving as vice chairman of the Inner Mongolia Political Consultative Conference.[30] This structure ensures centralized control while incorporating traditional Mongolian administrative elements, such as banner (旗) autonomy under league oversight.[32]Demographics
Population Trends
The population of Xilingol League has exhibited steady but modest growth over the past two decades, reflecting low natural increase rates and limited net migration in this expansive pastoral region. According to official census data, the total population stood at 975,168 in the 2000 census, rising to 1,028,022 by 2010 and reaching 1,107,075 in the 2020 census.[33] This represents an average annual growth rate of approximately 0.52% from 2000 to 2010 and 0.74% from 2010 to 2020, significantly below China's national averages during those periods.[33]| Census Year | Population | Annual Growth Rate (Previous Decade) |
|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 975,168 | - |
| 2010 | 1,028,022 | 0.52% |
| 2020 | 1,107,075 | 0.74% |
Ethnic Composition and Migration
According to the Seventh National Population Census conducted in 2020, Xilingol League had a resident population of 1,107,075, with Han Chinese comprising 728,623 individuals or 65.81% of the total.[36] Mongols numbered 334,868 or 30.25%, while other ethnic minorities totaled 43,584 or 3.94%, including Manchu, Hui, and Daur groups.[36] This distribution reflects a higher concentration of Mongols compared to Inner Mongolia's overall ethnic makeup, where Mongols constitute about 17% amid a Han majority exceeding 78%. The league hosts 45 recognized ethnic groups, though non-Han and non-Mongol populations remain marginal in aggregate.[37] From the 2010 to 2020 censuses, the Han proportion declined slightly from 66.33% to 65.81%, with their absolute numbers rising by 46,747 or 6.86%.[38] Mongol numbers grew by 25,104 or 8.10%, increasing their share from 30.13% to 30.25%, while other minorities expanded by 7,202 or 19.80%.[38] These shifts indicate modestly faster growth among minorities, potentially driven by targeted policies favoring ethnic autonomy regions, though Han remain the demographic plurality due to sustained inflows and urban economic opportunities in sectors like mining and pastoral industry.[38] Han migration to Xilingol League accelerated in the early 20th century following the Qing dynasty's decline, as settlers sought arable land and refuge amid regional instability, with further influxes as "Mongol followers" serving nomadic elites. Post-1949 integration into the People's Republic of China intensified this through state-directed settlement for grassland reclamation, collectivization, and resource development, transforming Mongols from a pre-1912 majority to a minority by the late 20th century across Inner Mongolia.[39] In Xilingol specifically, Han settlement concentrated in urban centers like Xilinhot and Erenhot, drawn by coal mining and infrastructure projects, while Mongols predominate in rural banners, sustaining traditional herding amid ongoing environmental and policy pressures.[40] Recent decades show stabilized ethnic ratios, with limited net migration reflecting economic maturation and restrictions on nomadic relocation.[41]Economy
Primary Sectors: Mining and Energy
The Xilin Gol League possesses substantial coal reserves, with proven deposits totaling 144.8 billion tons, predominantly lignite (brown coal), positioning it as a key component of China's national coal strategy.[42] This resource base supports large-scale surface mining operations, integrated with power generation under the league's coal-electricity development model, which has expanded significantly since the early 2000s.[43] Prior to 2005, raw coal output and electricity production remained low, but subsequent policy-driven growth elevated the league to one of China's 14 planned million-ton-scale coal bases.[44][45] Mining activities are concentrated in areas such as Chagannuoer, Wujianfang, and Hesigewula within the Xilin Gol Coal-Electricity-Power Base, where extraction contributes to national energy security amid rising demand.[46] Coal production has been bolstered by directives to increase output, as seen in 2021 when over 70 Inner Mongolian mines, including those in the league, were ordered to raise yields by nearly 100 million tons to alleviate power shortages.[47] The sector's integration with electricity generation—exemplified by facilities like the 1.32 GW Xilin Gol North Shengli lignite-fired power plant—facilitates direct coal-to-power processing, reducing transport emissions but intensifying local ecological pressures from mining and combustion.[48][43] Nine large-scale coal-fired power plants operate in the league, supporting grid exports and regional industrialization.[45] While coal dominates, rare earth elements are present in Inner Mongolia's broader deposits, though specific extraction in Xilin Gol remains limited compared to coal, with the league's mineral focus prioritizing fossil fuels over metals like copper or zinc.[49][50] Economic analyses indicate that this mining-energy nexus has driven GDP contributions from primary industries, reaching 17.044 billion RMB in 2022, though it correlates with heightened sulfur dioxide emissions and land use changes from open-pit operations.[51][43] Ongoing projects, such as the resumption of the West No. 1 Mine in 2022, underscore continued reliance on coal amid national energy policies favoring self-sufficiency.[52]Agriculture, Livestock, and Pastoralism
Xilingol League, encompassing approximately 180,000 square kilometers of grassland that constitutes 90% of its land area, relies predominantly on pastoralism as the foundation of its primary sector economy, with livestock rearing far outpacing crop agriculture due to the semi-arid steppe environment. Traditional herding focuses on sheep, goats, cattle, and horses, supporting over 210,000 herder households as of the early 2010s, each typically managing around 1 square kilometer of allocated pasture under the Household Production Responsibility System introduced in the 1980s. This system privatized grassland and livestock contracts to households, leading to rapid herd expansion from 12.6 million sheep units in 1980 to 22.7 million by 1997, though actual head counts grew from about 1.02 million large livestock in 1978 to 11.7 million by 2011, reflecting intensified production but straining forage resources.[53][54][15] Crop agriculture remains limited, confined to irrigated oases or river valleys suitable for forage grains, vegetables, and minor cereals, often integrated as supplementary feed production for livestock rather than standalone farming; historical efforts to expand intensive agriculture through subsidies in resettlement programs have yielded mixed results, with pastoral output dominating local GDP contributions from the primary sector. Livestock structure emphasizes meat and dairy production, including high-quality beef from free-range cattle and cashmere from goats, but faces challenges from overgrazing, evidenced by available grassland per sheep unit declining from 1.42 hectares in 1980 to 1.05 hectares by 1990, and degradation affecting 48.6% of pastures by the late 1990s. Recent policies, such as the Grassland Ecological Compensation Policy implemented since 2011, aim to enforce grass-livestock balance by subsidizing reduced stocking rates and promoting rotational grazing, though herder production efficiency remains low at an average of 0.43, constrained by drought frequency averaging 4.94 months per year from 1980 to 2020.[53][55][56] Adaptation strategies among herders include herd diversification, supplemental feeding, and migration to mitigate extreme weather, yet persistent population growth and policy-driven sedentarization have intensified pressure on grasslands, prompting ongoing assessments of carrying capacity and ecological restoration to sustain long-term viability. In Xilingol, these dynamics underscore a shift toward sustainable intensification, with studies highlighting the need for better integration of natural forage supply and livestock demand to improve beef quality and economic returns without further degradation.[57][58]Economic Growth and Policy Impacts
The economy of Xilingol League has exhibited steady growth in recent years, driven primarily by resource extraction and agro-pastoral industries. Gross domestic product reached 114.865 billion RMB in 2022 and increased to 118.480 billion RMB in 2023, reflecting a nominal growth of approximately 3.15%.[59] This expansion aligns with broader trends in Inner Mongolia, where coal mining and related energy integration have been key contributors, with Xilingol serving as a major coal production hub integrated into power generation projects that boost local output but also elevate environmental costs such as SO2 emissions and per capita pollution levels.[43] Dairy production, leveraging the league's vast grasslands, has further supported growth, with enterprises like Mengniu capitalizing on pastoral resources for national supply chains. National policies have profoundly shaped this trajectory, often prioritizing resource mobilization over ecological sustainability. The Household Production Responsibility System, implemented in the early 1980s, privatized grassland use and initially raised herder incomes through market-oriented livestock rearing, but it inadvertently encouraged overgrazing and degradation by fragmenting communal management, leading to reduced long-term productivity in areas like Sunite Left Banner.[27] Similarly, the Grassland Contract Policy of the 1980s allocated pastures to households, enhancing short-term economic incentives for dairy and meat production yet exacerbating soil erosion and biodiversity loss, as evidenced by persistent declines in steppe carrying capacity since the policy's inception.[60] More recent interventions, including ecological resettlement programs since 2000, have relocated pastoralists to reduce pressure on degraded lands and combat sandstorms, but these have disrupted traditional livelihoods, with herders reporting income volatility and dependency on subsidies amid urbanization pushes.[55] Coal-electricity integration policies have amplified economic output by linking mining to downstream power plants, yet they heighten reliance on non-renewable resources, diminishing resilience to market fluctuations and environmental regulations.[61] Payment for ecosystem services schemes, such as grassland restoration initiatives, offer compensation to herders—valued at levels below public sector willingness to pay—aiming to balance restoration with income, though empirical assessments indicate mixed efficacy in reversing degradation while sustaining growth.[62] Emerging green development strategies, promoted under national carbon neutrality goals, seek to diversify into renewables like wind energy, potentially mitigating mining's dominance but challenging the league's fossil fuel-dependent fiscal base.[63]Infrastructure and Development
Transportation Networks
The road network in Xilingol League forms the primary mode of transportation, comprising three national highways—G207, G208, and G303—and eight provincial highways that connect major towns and facilitate access to grasslands and mining areas.[26][7] Expressways such as the Angong Expressway, which links Ulanqab City to Zhenglan Banner and spans junctions with Xilingol, enhance inter-regional connectivity, with construction starting in 2021.[64] In 2025, the league initiated 32 sand-crossing highway projects totaling 459.3 kilometers to combat desertification and improve rural access, with 28 projects already under construction.[65][66] Highway 99, a 300-kilometer scenic route, supports tourism by attracting over 1.78 million visitors through mid-2025.[67] Railway infrastructure includes four major lines extending to Hohhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia, and linking key internal towns for freight and passenger transport, particularly supporting coal and mineral exports.[7] The Taizicheng–Xilinhot railway, a 394-kilometer electrified line designed for speeds up to 160 km/h with four passenger stations, advanced civil engineering by early 2024 to bolster regional economic integration.[68] Erenhot serves as a critical border rail hub connecting to Mongolia's network via the international crossing at Zamyn-Üüd, facilitating cross-border trade.[69] Normal-speed trains operate from cities like Baotou (11–13 hours) and Hohhot (10–13 hours) to Xilinhot, with no high-speed rail service available as of 2025.[70] Air transport is centered on Xilinhot Airport (IATA: XIL), located 9.5 kilometers from the administrative center, serving as the league's main gateway for domestic flights.[70] Erenhot Saiwusu International Airport (IATA: ERL), equipped to 4C standards with a 2,400-meter runway built in 2008, handles international and domestic routes, including connections to Beijing.[71] Holingol Airport provides supplementary access near the Wulagai Grassland, accommodating regional travel.[70] These facilities support limited passenger volumes, prioritizing cargo for the league's resource-based economy.[69]Urbanization and Settlement Patterns
Xilingol League has undergone rapid urbanization, with the proportion of urban population rising from 22.84% in 2000 to 51.78% in 2016, driven by economic diversification, mining activities, and policy-induced resettlement of pastoralists.[72] This shift reflects broader trends in Inner Mongolia's farming-pastoral zones, where human settlements have increasingly concentrated in administrative centers and border hubs, altering traditional nomadic patterns toward semi-sedentary or fixed rural clusters and expanding urban peripheries.[73] Key urban settlements include Xilinhot, the league's capital, where the population expanded from 173,796 in 2000 to 349,953 by the 2020 census, fueled by its role as a regional administrative, commercial, and service hub amid grassland pastoralism.[74] Erenhot, a county-level city on the Sino-Mongolian border, has developed as a trade and logistics node, with infrastructure growth supporting cross-border rail and road links, though it features expansive, partly underutilized developments characteristic of frontier urbanization.[75] Other banner capitals, such as those in East and West Ujimqin, exhibit clustered townships integrated with surrounding pastoral lands, where suitability for human settlements has improved due to enhanced ecological management and energy sector investments.[76] Settlement patterns historically emphasized dispersed, mobile herding across vast grasslands, but rural-urban migration—accelerated by income disparities, with urban residents earning up to 24,000 yuan more annually than pastoralists by recent estimates—has promoted consolidation into township centers and reduced nomadic mobility.[77] Government initiatives, including grassland restoration and livelihood transitions, have resettled herders into fixed housing near towns, mitigating land degradation while fostering hybrid patterns of seasonal grazing and urban employment, particularly among male household members who maintain pastoral ties.[55] Urban expansion correlates with infrastructure like roads and mines, contributing to net area increases in built-up zones between 1975 and 2015, though this has intensified pressures on fragile ecosystems.[78]Culture and Society
Traditional Mongolian Nomadic Practices
Traditional Mongolian nomadic practices in the Xilingol League centered on pastoral herding of the "five snouts"—horses, camels, cattle (or oxen), sheep, and goats—which formed the economic and cultural backbone of herder households.[27] These livestock were managed in small suprafamilial units of 2 to 20 households that shared labor, resources, and rotational responsibilities for herding, milking, and processing products like dairy, wool, and hides.[27] Horses held particular prestige for transportation, scouting pastures, and warfare, while sheep and goats dominated in numbers for meat, milk, and fiber; a single noble household in Xilingol might control thousands, such as 3 horse herds, 1 camel herd, 1 cattle herd, and 10 sheep herds as documented in 1949.[27] Herders held customary use-rights to grasslands under feudal or state ownership, often via the sureg contract system where they received 20-30% of newborn livestock in exchange for management.[27] Seasonal migrations, known as otor for short-term relocations to optimal grass, followed fixed routes determined by terrain, water, and climate to prevent overgrazing and allow pasture recovery.[79] Winter-spring camps (November to May) emphasized settled grazing near southern protected areas with supplemental stored forage and partial animal confinement to conserve energy during harsh conditions.[80] In contrast, summer-autumn movements (June to October), often covering 35-110 kilometers post-Qingming Festival, shifted herds northward for rotational pure grazing divided by livestock species and sub-regions to exploit lush growth while minimizing soil compaction.[80] Family heads selected migration dates, with rituals invoking nature spirits; wives led processions in ceremonial dress, children assisted in yurt disassembly and livestock preparation, embedding mobility in intergenerational knowledge transmission and communal harmony.[79] Herd management incorporated adaptive techniques for sustainability, including species-specific grouping (e.g., cattle in flatter areas, sheep on slopes), selective breeding for local resilience, and autumn culling of 27-32% of sheep and goats to balance populations.[80] Castration occurred at young ages—lambs at 3 months, horses at 3-4 years—to control breeding and improve meat quality, alongside preventive measures like spring house cleanings for parasite control and bloodletting therapy for health.[80] Yurts served as portable homes, dismantled and reassembled efficiently, while practices fostered ecological stewardship through monitored carrying capacities and pasture cleaning, reflecting a holistic interdependence of herders, animals, and Xilingol's steppe ecosystems prior to mid-20th-century sedentarization policies.[79][27]Cultural Preservation and Han-Mongol Interactions
Efforts to preserve Mongolian culture in Xilingol League include annual celebrations of the Naadam Festival, featuring traditional sports such as horseracing, wrestling, and archery, with the 35th Inner Mongolia Grassland Naadam held on July 19, 2025, despite inclement weather.[81] Local government initiatives also promote intangible cultural heritage, encompassing Mongolian artistry, daily practices, and spiritual elements, as highlighted in regional documentation from 2025.[82] Additionally, since 2017, authorities have instituted a "Mongolian Clothing Day" in Mongolian-language primary schools and kindergartens to encourage traditional attire and cultural continuity.[83] Han-Mongol interactions have intensified due to decades of Han Chinese migration into Inner Mongolia, including Xilingol League, where Han settlers now form a demographic majority across the broader region, outnumbering Mongols approximately 6:1 as of recent estimates, driven by economic opportunities in mining, agriculture, and urbanization.[84] This influx, accelerating since the mid-20th century via policies like the Cultural Revolution-era "sent-down youths" program, has fostered intermarriage and economic interdependence but also contributed to cultural shifts, with Mongols comprising only about 17% of Inner Mongolia's population overall.[85] [86] In Xilingol, where the permanent population reached about 1.1 million by 2025 with Mongols historically forming a primary ethnic group, such interactions manifest in bilingual environments, yet Han dominance in urban areas has pressured traditional nomadic practices.[26] Educational policies exemplify these dynamics, with Mongolian-medium schools like those in Xilingol operating as of 2017 to teach in the local dialect, closely related to standard Mongolian.[87] However, since 2020, regional mandates have required ethnic schools to use standard Mandarin for core subjects like language, history, and ethics, reducing Mongolian instructional time to as little as one hour daily and sparking protests among Mongols in Xilingol, who view it as eroding linguistic heritage.[88] [89] These reforms, framed officially as promoting national unity, have been criticized by ethnic advocates as accelerating Sinicization, with herders and educators in Xilingol expressing fears of cultural dilution amid Han-majority influences.[90] [91] Despite preservation initiatives, empirical trends indicate declining Mongolian language proficiency among youth due to these interactions and policy priorities favoring Mandarin integration.[92]Environment
Grassland Ecology and Degradation Drivers
The Xilin Gol League encompasses vast semi-arid grasslands representing a core segment of the Eurasian steppe ecosystem, characterized by chestnut soils and dominated by typical steppe vegetation such as Stipa grandis and Leymus chinensis.[19] These grasslands cover over 90% of the league's area, functioning as a critical ecological barrier against desertification for northern China while supporting biodiversity in meadow and temperate steppe subtypes.[14] The region's climate features low precipitation (250-400 mm annually) and strong winds, fostering resilient plant communities adapted to seasonal dormancy and nutrient cycling via grazing-mediated herbivory.[4] Biodiversity in the Xilin Gol steppe includes key herbivores like Przewalski's horse and Mongolian gazelle, alongside microbial and soil fauna essential for carbon sequestration and soil stability.[93] As China's first grassland biosphere reserve established in 1987, the area preserves representative steppe dynamics, with ecosystem services such as water retention and windbreak functions vital for regional stability.[17] Vegetation productivity peaks in mesic zones but varies with topographic gradients, underscoring the steppe's role in global grassland ecology.[94] Grassland degradation in Xilin Gol manifests as reduced vegetation cover, soil erosion, and desertification, with overgrazing identified as the dominant driver through excessive livestock pressure exceeding carrying capacity.[58] Livestock numbers, including sheep and cattle, have intensified post-1980s reforms, leading to bare patches and lowered forage quality, as evidenced by NDVI declines in heavily grazed banners.[95] Human factors such as sedentarized pastoralism and suboptimal grazing rotations exacerbate this, with settlement patterns concentrating herds and disrupting natural recovery cycles.[96] Climatic variability, including prolonged droughts and rising temperatures, compounds anthropogenic pressures, accounting for the primary influence on desertification severity per geospatial analyses of banners from 2000-2020.[12] Wind erosion further accelerates degradation in exposed areas, while land-use shifts like cropland abandonment create yardang formations that propagate sand encroachment.[97] Despite some restoration since 2000 via policy interventions, degradation persists in 20-30% of grasslands, driven by a interplay where overgrazing amplifies climate-induced stressors rather than vice versa.[4][98]Mining and Industrial Impacts
Xilingol League possesses substantial coal reserves estimated at 114.8 billion tons, supporting extensive surface mining operations across an area of 3,340 km², which constitute a core component of its industrial base integrated with coal-fired power generation.[46] In 2018, coal production reached 105.85 million tons, accompanied by 31.67 billion kWh of electricity output, primarily from large-scale coal-electricity bases that leverage local resources for national energy supply.[99] These activities have driven economic expansion, with coal mining and related industries contributing significantly to regional GDP growth, though they impose substantial external environmental costs quantified in broader Inner Mongolian coal contexts at tens of billions of yuan annually, encompassing health damages, ecosystem losses, and pollution abatement expenses.[100] Environmentally, surface coal mining has accelerated grassland degradation in this semi-arid steppe region, where over 90% of the 114,364 km² league area consists of grasslands vulnerable to disturbance.[46] In the Shengli Mining Area, a representative site, mining activities from 2002 to 2023 occupied 8,568.45 hectares (8.39% of the local study area), converting high-carbon-density grasslands (averaging 13.96 tons per hectare) to low-density mining lands like open pits (2.17 tons per hectare), dumping sites, and industrial zones.[101] This land-use shift resulted in a total carbon storage loss of 187.15 kilotons over the period, with an annual average decline of 8.91 kilotons, of which 91.92 kilotons were directly attributable to mining-induced grassland conversion.[101] Associated ecological disruptions include soil erosion, habitat fragmentation, biodiversity reduction, and elevated risks of geological hazards, compounded by mining wastewater and dust emissions.[102] Water resources face severe strain from coal extraction and power plant operations, with disturbed hydrological cycles leading to contamination by heavy metals, sulfates, and ammoniacal nitrogen in local aquifers and surface waters, while air quality remains relatively stable despite sulfur dioxide emissions from integrated coal-electricity processes.[46] [43] Overall ecosystem integrity scores moderately, but sustained mining expansion threatens long-term sustainability, as evidenced by integrated assessments rating the environmental effects of these bases at 0.64 on a normalized scale, highlighting water pollution as the primary vulnerability requiring mitigation strategies like enhanced reclamation and pollution controls.[46]Restoration and Green Initiatives
Xilingol League has implemented extensive grassland restoration programs since 2000, completing ecological restoration of 23.3 million mu (approximately 1.55 million hectares) of forest and grassland in sandy areas to combat desertification.[103] These efforts include reseeding native grasses, fencing to prevent overgrazing, and afforestation, contributing to a regional greening trend observed from 2000 to 2020, where human activities accounted for 45% of improved grassland productivity.[14] In the Hunshandake Sandy Land, a key focus area, the league planned treatment of 31.99 million mu in 2023, targeting coverage of 11.2 million mu through aerial seeding and mechanical sand fixation.[104] Payment for ecosystem services (PES) schemes have supported restoration by compensating herders for reducing livestock numbers and adopting sustainable grazing, with studies in Inner Mongolia showing varied willingness to participate based on economic incentives versus ecological benefits.[62] Natural recovery approaches, emphasizing careful land management over intensive planting, have proven effective in enhancing carbon sequestration in Xilingol's sandy grasslands, outperforming sown pastures in soil carbon storage.[105][106] Ecological restoration has also amplified sand fixation services, extending benefits to downwind areas through reduced wind erosion.[107] Green initiatives extend to sustainable agriculture, with Xilingol designated as China's first green sheep-farming city in July 2021, promoting low-density grazing and organic certification to preserve grassland integrity while boosting herder incomes.[108] Development of scenic areas integrates tourism with conservation, rehabilitating degraded lands into protected zones that support biodiversity and local economies, as showcased in international forums in 2025.[63] Despite these advances, assessments indicate ongoing pressure from carrying capacity deficits, underscoring the need for continued monitoring to ensure restoration sustains ecological security amid coal mining and pastoral demands.[109][4]Controversies and Social Issues
2011 Unrest and Protests
In May 2011, ethnic Mongolian herders in Xilingol League protested against coal mining operations that encroached on traditional grazing lands, exacerbating environmental degradation and resource competition with Han Chinese migrant workers.[110][111] The unrest was triggered on the night of May 10, when a 35-year-old herder named Mergen was fatally struck by a coal truck driven by Han Chinese worker Li Lindong while attempting to block a convoy from crossing protected pastureland near Xilinhot city.[110][112] Li dragged Mergen's body approximately 145 meters before stopping, an act local authorities later deemed intentional, leading to Li's execution sentence in June 2011 and prison terms for accomplices, including life imprisonment for passenger Lu Xiangdong.[112][113] Protests escalated rapidly, with herders in Abag Banner clashing with mining workers on May 15 to halt unauthorized extraction activities that locals claimed damaged grasslands and water sources critical for nomadic livestock.[111] By May 25, approximately 2,000 Mongolian students marched in Xilinhot, converging on government buildings to demand a thorough investigation into Mergen's death, stricter environmental regulations on mining, and safeguards for Mongolian language education amid perceived cultural assimilation pressures from Han-dominated policies.[114] Demonstrations spread across multiple banners in Xilingol League and into other Inner Mongolian regions, involving school closures and calls for halting coal transport that protesters argued polluted air, soil, and rivers while prioritizing industrial output over indigenous land rights.[115][41] A parallel incident on May 11 saw another herder killed during confrontations over mining pollution, intensifying demands for accountability and fueling broader ethnic grievances rooted in economic displacement, where rapid coal development—Xilingol being a key extraction hub—has drawn thousands of Han laborers, altering demographic balances and traditional livelihoods.[110][116] Chinese authorities responded with a security crackdown, deploying paramilitary forces to university gates and protest sites, imposing partial martial law in affected areas, and detaining organizers, which quelled visible unrest within days but drew criticism from human rights monitors for suppressing ethnic minority voices on environmental and cultural issues.[117][110] State media emphasized legal resolutions like the truck driver's punishment while downplaying systemic drivers such as unchecked mining expansion, whereas international reports highlighted underlying ethno-environmental conflicts, noting that official narratives often minimize Han-Mongol frictions to maintain stability narratives.[118][41] The events underscored causal links between resource extraction incentives and social tensions, with herders' actions reflecting direct defense of ecological dependencies rather than abstract separatism.[119]Ethnic Tensions and Land Disputes
In Xilingol League, ethnic tensions between indigenous Mongolians and Han Chinese have intensified due to competing land uses, particularly the expansion of coal mining and associated infrastructure into traditional grazing pastures. Mongolian herders, reliant on nomadic livestock practices, have faced displacement and livelihood threats from mining operations that prioritize resource extraction for national energy needs, often involving Han-dominated companies and migrant workers. These activities have led to grassland degradation through heavy truck traffic, which generates dust pollution, soil compaction, and vegetation loss, reducing carrying capacity for herds by up to 30-50% in affected areas according to local environmental assessments.[41][111][120] Land disputes frequently manifest as herders physically blocking mining convoys to protect their usufruct rights under China's grassland tenure system, which nominally grants herders grazing quotas but allows state-approved development to override them. Such confrontations have resulted in injuries and deaths, including cases where herders were struck by vehicles, fueling perceptions among Mongolians of systemic favoritism toward Han economic interests over minority pastoral traditions. For instance, in Xilinhot municipality, herders reported ongoing encroachments by mining freight routes that bisect pastures, prompting protests as early as 2011 and recurring clashes thereafter.[121][110][111] Han settlement patterns exacerbate these frictions, as state-sponsored migration for mining and farming has increased the Han population share in rural Xilingol from around 20% in the 1990s to over 40% by the 2010s, leading to direct competition for arable and grazing land. Mongolian activists attribute this to policies that incentivize Han influx for development while restricting herder mobility through fencing and privatization schemes, which empirical studies link to accelerated desertification and herder poverty. Authorities have responded with compensation programs and relocations, but herders often reject these as inadequate, viewing them as coercive assimilation tactics that undermine ethnic autonomy. In 2013, police probed specific clashes in Inner Mongolia involving herder-settler land grabs, underscoring persistent unresolved grievances.[122][123][53]References
- https://www.wikidata.org/wiki/Q573124