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De-Sinicization
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| De-Sinicization | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Chinese name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 去中國化 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 去中国化 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hanyu Pinyin | qù Zhōngguó huà | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | De-Chinese-ization | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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| Korean name | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hangul | 탈중국화 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Hanja | 脫中國化 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Literal meaning | De-Chinese-ization | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
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De-Sinicization is a process of eliminating or reducing Han Chinese cultural elements, identity, or consciousness from a society or nation. In modern contexts, it is often contrasted with the assimilation process of Sinicization.
The term has its roots in attempts by ethnic Han to acculturate themselves and adopt non-Han customs, although it is now most frequently used to describe attempts by foreign countries to resist or undo over-reaching Chinese influence.[citation needed]
In Taiwan, since 1987, de-Sinicization has been a political movement to reverse the Sinicization policies of the Chinese Nationalist Party after 1947, which many proponents allege created an environment of prejudice and racism against the local Taiwanese Hokkien and indigenous Taiwanese population, as well as acknowledge the indigenous and multicultural character of the island of Taiwan. In Hong Kong, the term is generally associated with movements that resist centralized control of Hong Kong by the Chinese Communist Party. In North Korea and South Korea, de-Sinicization manifests itself as an opposition to Hanja or words of Chinese origin.
Historical
[edit]Han dynasty General Li Ling defected to the Xiongnu and married a daughter of the Xiongnu Chanyu and acculturated to Xiongnu customs.[citation needed]
People of mixed ancestry or desinicized Han Chinese who adopted steppe people's culture and way of life existed in the sixth and seventh centuries A.D., and some even served in the Sui and Tang dynasties' military.[1]
Xianbei last names were adopted by Han Chinese as was Xianbei culture, militarism and clothing.[2] The Xianbei language was learned by several Han in the northern dynasties.[3] Xianbei surnames were assigned to Han troops and officers in the Northern Zhou.[4][5] Gao Huan and Feng Ba were Han rulers who adopted Xianbei culture. Feng Ba adopted a Xianbei name, Qizhifa 乞直伐.[citation needed]
All ethnicities who were of the literati were possibly called hàn ér(汉儿)[needs context] because ethnic Xianbei were referred to as "damned Chinese" by the Northern Qi.[6] Appearing as culturally Xianbei and at the same time declaring Han Chinese ancestry was done by Gao Huan and the Han family.[7] There was Xianbeification of Han.[8]
Xianbeification happened to some sections of the Liu and Sima Han Chinese families.[9]
The language of the Xianbei was taught to a Han by his father who was an official.[10][11][12]
Tujue culture and language was practiced and spoken by Tang Prince Li Chengqian.[13][14][15] Meanwhile, several other acts of Li Chengqian, especially homosexuality, were also drawing Emperor Taizong's ire.[16][17][18][19] The mixed blood northwestern families were looked down upon by the pure blood Chinese aristocratic families.[20]
Liao dynasty
[edit]The Khitan Liao dynasty arranged for women from the Khitan royal consort Xiao clan to marry members of the Han Chinese Han (韓) clan, which originated in Jizhou (冀州) before being abducted by the Khitan and becoming part of the Han Chinese elite of the Liao and adopting Khitan culture.[21][22][23]
The Han Chinese Geng family intermarried with the Khitan and the Han (韓) clan provided two of their women as wives to Geng Yanyi and the second one was the mother of Geng Zhixin.[24] Empress Rende's sister, a member of the Xiao clan, was the mother of Han Chinese General Geng Yanyi.[25]
Han Durang (Yelu Longyun) was the father of Queen dowager of State Chen, who was the wife of General Geng Yanyi and buried with him in his tomb in Zhaoyang in Liaoning.[26] His wife was also known as "Madame Han".[27] The Geng's tomb is located in Liaoning at Guyingzi in Chaoying.[28][29]
Han clothing and Han culture was practiced by Han women who were seen as Han culture guardians in contrast to Han men who wore Khitan clothing and practiced Khitan culture.[30][31][32]
Ming dynasty
[edit]The early Ming dynasty emperors from Hongwu to Zhengde continued Yuan practices such as hereditary military institutions, demanding Korean and Muslim concubines and eunuchs, engaging in archery and horseback riding, having Mongols serve in the Ming military, patronizing Tibetan Buddhism, with the early Ming emperors seeking to project themselves as "universal rulers" to various peoples such as Central Asian Muslims, Tibetans, and Mongols. However, this history of Ming universalism has been obscured and denied by historians who covered it up and presented the Ming as xenophobes seeking to expunge Mongol influence and presenting while they presented the Qing and Yuan as "universal" rulers in contrast to the Ming.[33][34]
A cavalry based army modeled on the Yuan military was implemented by the Hongwu and Yongle Emperors.[35] Hongwu's army and officialdom incorporated Mongols.[36] Mongols were retained by the Ming within its territory.[37] in Guangxi Mongol archers participated in a war against Miao minorities.[38]
The Zhengde Emperor used Muslim eunuchs who commissioned the production of porcelain with Persian and Arabic inscriptions in white and blue color.[39][40] Muslim eunuchs contributed money in 1496 to repairing Niujie Mosque. Central Asian women were provided to the Zhengde Emperor by a Muslim guard and Sayyid Hussein from Hami.[41] The guard was Yu Yung and the women were Uighur.[42][43] The emperor is remembered alongside his excessive and debauched behavior along with his concubines of foreign origin.[44][45] Zhengde defeated the Mongols under Dayan Khan. Central Asian women were favored by Zhengde like how Korean women were favored by Xuande.[46] In 1517 the Mongols were defeated by Zhengde. Mongol clothing was worn by the military enthusiastic Zhengde emperor. A Uighur concubine was kept by Zhengde like the later Qing emperor Qianlong.[47] Foreign origin Uighur and Mongol women were favored by the Zhengde emperor.[48] Zhengde bedded Tatar (Mongol) and Central Asian women, wore Mongol clothing, was fluent in Mongolian, and adopted Persian, Buddhist, and Mongol names and titles: 威武大將軍太師鎮國公 沙吉敖爛 大寶法王 忽必列.[49] It is speculated that he probably studied Persian and Tibetan as well.[50]
The Imperial exam included archery. Archery on horseback was practiced by Chinese living near the frontier. Wang Ju's writings on archery were followed during the Ming and Yuan and the Ming developed new methods of archery.[51] Jinling Tuyong showed archery in Nanjing during the Ming.[52] Contests in archery were held in the capital for handpicked soldiers of the Guard, who garrisoned the capital.[53]
Equestrianism and archery were favored activities of Zhu Di (the Yongle Emperor).[54]
Archery and equestrianism were frequent pastimes by the Zhengde Emperor.[55] He practiced archery and horseriding with eunuchs.[56] Tibetan Buddhist monks, Muslim women and musicians were obtained and provided to Zhengde by his guard Ch'ien Ning, who acquainted him with the ambidextrous archer and military officer Chiang Pin.[57]
Qing dynasty
[edit]This section may be too long and excessively detailed. (October 2018) |
Some Han Chinese during the Ming dynasty also joined the Manchu Eight banners and became "Manchufied". The Manchu people founded the Qing dynasty.
The Han Chinese banners were known as the "Nikan" Banners, made out of a massive number of Chinese POWs and defectors. Jurchen women married most of these Chinese since they came with no family of their own.[58] There were so many Han Chinese entering the Banners that they soon outnumbered Jurchens.[58] Attempts by Hung Taiji were made to separate Han Chinese and Jurchen banners. In Liaodong, Chinese culture mixed with Jurchen culture. Many bannermen forged genealogies of their origin since they did not have any, and then these decided whether or not they were in a Chinese or a Jurchen banner.[58] The Eight Banners were then created from the old black Han Chinese banners and Jurchen banners. From then on, Han and Jurchen banners were equal. The Mongol Eight banners were also created at this time, and anyone who was not classified into a Chinese or a Mongol banner became a Manchu, an ethnic group which Hung Taiji created.[59]
Manchu bannermen and Han bannermen were not categorized according to blood or ancestry or genealogy; they were categorized by their language, culture, behavior, identification and way of life. Many Chinese bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) were descended from Sinicized Jurchen who spoke Chinese and served the Ming, while some ethnic Manchu Bannermen (Baqi Manzhou) were of ethnic Han origins who had defected to the Jurchens, assimilated into Jurchen language and culture and lived among them in Jilin before 1618.[citation needed]
The Qing regarded Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) and the non Bannerman Han civilian general population (Han min, Han ren, minren) as separate. People were grouped into Manchu Banners and Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) not based on their ancestry, race or blood, but based on their culture and the language they spoke. Ethic Manchu banners included Han who deserted the Ming, had moved to Nurgan (Jilin) as transfrontiersmen before 1618, assimilated with the Jurchen, practiced Jurchen culture, and spoke Jurchen, while Chinese banners (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) included descendants of sinicized Jurchen who had moved to Liaodong, adopted Han culture and surname, swore loyalty to the Ming, and spoke Chinese. Nurhaci conquered Liaodong in 1618 and created the aforementioned Chinese banners.[citation needed]
Before 1618, some Han actively defected to the Jurchen in Nurgan by crossing the frontier into Jurchens' territory, and scholars called these people "trans-frontiersmen." These Han then adopted Jurchen identity and later became part of Manchu Banners. In comparison, some Han in Liaodong only defected after Qing's conquest, and scholars called these people "frontiersmen." This was because Liaodong was the frontier of Ming's territory, and these people never actively tried to cross the border. After the conquest, Qing put them into Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen.)[citation needed]
Han Chinese defectors who fled from the Ming joined the Jurchens in Nurgan before 1618 were placed into Manchu Banners and regarded as Manchu, but the Ming residents of Liaodong who were incorporated into the Eight Banners after the conquest of Liaodong from the Ming from 1618 to 1643 were placed into the separate Chinese Banners (Chinese: Hanjun, Manchu: Nikan cooha or Ujen cooha), and many of these Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) from Liaodong had Jurchen ancestry and were not classified as Manchu by the Qing.[60] Nurhaci's Jianzhou Jurchen Khanate used geography, culture, language, occupation and, lifestyle to classify people as Jurchen or Nikan. Jurchen were those who lived Jurchen lifestyle, used the Jurchen language, and inhabited the original territory. Nurhaci considered those who did the opposite as Nikan (Han Chinese.) Some of these Nikan were of Korean or Jurchen ancestry but spoke Chinese and inhabited in the villages and towns of the newly conquered territory.[60]
People from both sides often moved over the cultural and territorial division between the Ming Liaodong and Jurchen Nurgan; Han Chinese soldiers and peasants moved into Nurgan while Jurchen mercenaries and merchants moved to Liaodong, with some lineages ended up being dispersed on both sides, and the Jurchen viewed people as Nikan depending on whether they acted like Han Chinese or Jurchens. People from the same lineage, like the Sinicized Jurchen Tong lineage of Fushun in Liaodong, served both Ming and the Qing. Some, like Tong Bunian, stayed as diehard Ming loyalists, while others faithfully served the Qing after Qing's conquest of Liaodong. Qing enrolled the Tongs in the Han Plain Blue Banner. Eventually, Emperor Kangxi transferred some members of the Tong lineage, like Tong Guogang and a few of his close relatives, to the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner because the Tongs requested the transfer.[61][62][63][64]
Tong Guogang said in his application of transferring to a Manchu Banner that the Tongs were of Jurchen origin. However, the authority only transferred Tong Guogang's immediate family and company to the Manchu while leaving other Tong companies as Chinese. It was Qing's policy to transfer every closely related in-law of the emperor into a Manchu Banner, even if they were from another ethnicity. This was the most probable reason why Kangxi accepted Tong's application, despite Tong's insistence of his Jurchen origin.[65] At the beginning of its reign, the Qing was flexible and did whatever was political expedient at the time to determine people's ethnicity. Examples were Tong's transfer from a Han to a Manchu Banner and the assimilation of Han Chinese.[65]
The geographical, political, and cultural division was between the Ming Liaodong and the Jurchen-dominated Nurgan, which traded and interacted with Liaodong through Fushun.[60]
Nurhaci and Hongtaiji both viewed ethnic identity as determined by culture, language, and attitude but not by ancestry (genealogy.) People could change their identities and be transferred from one ethnic banner to another. The Qing associated Mongols with the Mongolian language, nomadism, and horse related activities, Manchus with the Manchu language and foremost being part of the Banners, and Han Chinese with their residence in Liaodong, the Chinese language, agriculture, and commerce.[59] When determining Manchu and Han identities, the Qing disregarded biological determinants and ancestry. Indeed, culture was the primary factor in differentiating between Manchu and Han, and occasionally the Qing blurred or altered people's identities.[66] Classification of peoples was not the motive behind the creation of separate Manchu, Mongol, and Han Banners. People's membership in the different banners primarily depended on whether they spoke Manchu, Mongolian, or Chinese.[67] It has been suggested that the Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) themselves were not very familiar with the exact meaning of "Hanjun", as the Qing changed the definition of what it meant to be a Manchu or a Han Bannerman.[67]
The Manchu official Duanfang had Han Chinese ancestors originating from Zhejiang- towards the end of the Ming, they had defected to the Qing and moved to southern Manchuria from their original home in Zhejiang province, they changed their surname to Tohoro from Tao to make it sound Manchu and registered it in the Manchu Plain White Banner.[68][69] Since the Manchus were willing to accept assimilated strangers, Han Chinese who defected to the Jurchens or were captured by them had integrated well into Manchu society.[70] These Han Chinese transfrontiersman from Liaodong embraced Manchu customs and changed their names into Manchu to the point where[70] they identified as Manchu rather than Chinese and resembles Manchus in their speech, behavior, and looks.[70] It is hard for historians to tell whether a Manchu was originally a Han transfrontiersman since they no longer used Chinese names or regarded themselves as Han Chinese, Frederic Wakeman suggested that is evidence that the Manchu Dahai's ancestors were Han Chinese transfrontiersman.[70] The Jurchen headman of Turun-hoton and arch-enemy of Nurhaci, Nikan Wailan, was also suggested to be a Han transfrontiersman by Wakeman, since his name literally meant "Chinese official".[60]
The Manchu word for Han, "Nikan" was used to describe people who lived like Han Chinese and not their actual ethnic origin, the Han Bannermen (Hanjun) was not an ethnic category and the Han Banners included people of non-Han Chinese blood.[62] When Liaodong was invaded in 1619 by Nurhaci, it became imperative for the Jurchens to secure the loyalty of the Han (Nikan) in Liaodong to their cause, by treating them equally as Jurchens were treated and even seizing Jurchen properties, grains, wealth, possessions and homes to grant them to Han, and having the aristocracy expand to include Han families in order to get Han to defect to Nurhaci's side.[60]
Some Han Bannermen and their lineages became successful members of the Qing nobility and their descendants continued to be awarded noble titles, like that of Li Yongfang who was ennobled by Nurhaci as third class viscount and enrolled in the Plain Blue Chinese Banner (Hanjun, or Han Banner), and his descendants continued to be nobles to the final years of Qianlong's rule and were ennobled with even greater titles.[62] The Manchus gave extensive titles and honors and marriage to Aisin Gioro women to pre-1644 Han defectors, like the marriage of Nurhaci's granddaughter to Li Yongfang and his sons registered in the Chinese Plain Blue banner (Hanjun, or Han Banner), and the title granted to the son of a Ming defector, Sun Sike (Sun Ssu-k'o) in the Chinese Plain White Banner, (Hanjun, or Han Banner) and the marriage of one of Kangxi's daughters to his son.[64]
At the beginning of the Qing, originally the sharpest distinction was drawn by Qing policy to emphasize difference between Han civilians and all Bannermen, and not between Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) and Manchu Bannermen. The Manchus used Nikan to describe Ming subjects in Liaodong who lived a Chinese lifestyle like sinicized Jurchens, Mongols, and Koreans, and not as a racial term for ethnic Han Chinese. A person only had to be originally a Ming subject and not ethnic Chinese to get categorized as a Han bannerman so people of Jurchen origin ended up in Mongol and Chinese Banners.[64] Nurhaci used culture to categorize people and allowed Han transfrontiersmen to identify as Manchu after assimilating, and ethnicity was regarded as flexible when Han Chinese and Mongols families were moved by Kangxi to Manchu Banners from their original Mongol and Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners).[64]
Li Yongfang's rewards for surrendering Fushun to the Jurchens and defecting included promotion in rank, Nurhaci's granddaughter as a wife, battling along with Nurhaci and induction into the Jin aristocracy as a Chinese frontiersman, which was different from how Nurhaci handled both the Han transfrontiersmen who assimilated into Manchu identity and captured Han bondservants.[70] The Chinese frontiersman were inducted into the Han Banners.[69] Nurhaci offered to reward Li Yongfang with promotion and special treatment if he surrendered Fushun reminding him of the grim fate that would await him and Fushun's residents if they continued to resist.[71] Freeholder status was given to Li Yongfang's 1,000 troops after his surrender, and the later Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) Bao Chengxian and Shi Tingzhu also experience good fortune in Qing service after their surrenders in 1622 at Guangning.[65]
Nurhaci used semi-literate interlocutors of Han (Nikan) origin to translate between different languages and trusted them a lot, developing close and friendly personal relations with some of them like Kanggūri and Fanggina. The Han Chinese Gong Zhenglu (Gong Zhengliu) who was abducted in the 1580s by the Jurchens from Liaodong with tens of thousands of others, originally came from Shaoxing in Zhejiang became a close confidant of Nurhaci and tutoring his sons, adopting the Manchu name Onoi, and being showered with wives, slaves, and a house by Nurhaci.[60]
The Manchu leader Nurhaci embarked on the conquest of Liaodong from the Ming dynasty, luring Han Chinese to his side to defect by threatening them with destruction and at the same time also promising them rewards, with important positions.[72] A massive revolt against the Jurchens by the Liaodong Chinese broke out in 1623, due to the Jurchens squeezing the Chinese for labor and stationing Jurchen in Chinese households. Acts of sabotage and slaughter of the Jurchen were carried out by the Chinese rebels in retaliation.[72] Hong Taiji, who succeeded Nurhaci, began to include many Chinese in his government and copy the Chinese style of governing.[72] After defeats inflicted by the Chinese General Yuan Chonghuan upon the Manchus with artillery such as at the Battle of Ningyuan,[73] the Manchu then decided to absorb Han Chinese prisoners who knew how to use guns into their army to supplement their forces.[73]
The Manchus also lured Han Chinese Generals into defecting and joining the Banners by marrying them to women from the Imperial Aisin Gioro family.[74] One Han Chinese General, Li Yongfang (Li Yung-fang) was bribed by the Manchus into defecting by being married to an Aisin Gioro wife, and being given a position in the banners. Many more Han Chinese abandoned their posts and joined the Manchus.[75] A mass marriage of Han Chinese to Manchu women numbering 1,000 took place in 1632 after Prince Yoto came up with the idea. They were either generals or officials.[74] It was said by the Manchu leader that "since the Chinese generals and Manchu women lived together and ate together, it would help these surrendered generals to forget their motherland."[74] Women from the Imperial family were also married to other Han Chinese officials like the Three Feudatories' sons, who defected to the Qing after their conquest of China.[74] The Manchus also created an artillery unit out of Han Chinese, which they used against the Ming army.[75] Han Chinese were also lured by the Manchus into defecting and entering their employ in civil service by granting them privileges such as calling themselves "ministers", while Manchus in the same position were regarded as "slaves".[76]
The Han who classified in different ways had come under Manchu rule in three different eras, before 1618 the Han "transfrontiersmen" who threw in their lot with Nurhaci were effectively only Han Chinese by ancestry and blood since they practiced Jurchen culture and became part of Manchu companies (Niru) within Manchu Banners, while from 1618 to 1622 the Han captured in Liaodong and Liaoxi became either bondservants to Manchu Banners or Han Bannermen, and then finally the Han who deserted the Ming during Hong Taiji's rule to join the Manchu, and these were first placed into separate all Han companies (Niru) attached to Manchu Banners, and then when in 1642 the Manchu Banners ejected all their Han companies they were placed into separate Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners) since they were the mostly not assimilated to Jurchen culture.[77]
At Guangning, Shi Tingzhu, a Ming soldier of Jurchen descent but who practiced Chinese culture, had surrendered to Nurhaci's Later Jin in 1622 along with Bao Chengxian and they were eventually placed into Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners), after Bao suggested creating separate Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners). Neither were all Han Chinese in the Eight Banners part of the Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners), nor was the Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners) made out of only Han Chinese, Han Banner membership did not automatically mean they were actual Han Chinese.[77]
The Jurchens under Nurhaci had classified people as Han Chinese (Nikan) according to whether they were former Ming subjects, behaved like Han Chinese, had a Chinese lifestyle, spoke Chinese language, dressed like Han Chinese, and had Han Chinese names, and all Jurchens who had moved to Ming China adopted Chinese surnames.[77] Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) rose to many powerful positions and prominence under Shunzhi, these Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) were descendants of Han defectors in Liaodong who joined Nurhaci and Hong Taiji, in the third or second generation.[70] They "were barely distinguishable from Manchu nobility." Geng Zhongming, a Han bannerman, was awarded the title of Prince Jingnan, and his son Geng Jingmao managed to have both his sons Geng Jingzhong and Geng Zhaozhong become court attendants under Shunzhi and married Aisin Gioro women, with Haoge's (a son of Hong Taiji) daughter marrying Geng Jingzhong and Prince Abatai's granddaughter marrying Geng Zhaozhong.[70]
The mistaken views applied to Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) about race and ethnicity missed the fact that they were actually a "cultural group" since a person could be a Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) without having to be an actual Han Chinese.[78] It was Qianlong who redefined the identity of Han Bannermen by saying that they were to be regarded as of having the same culture and being of the same ancestral extraction as Han civilians, this replaced the earlier opposing ideology and stance used by Nurhaci and Hong Taiji who classified identity according to culture and politics only and not ancestry, but it was Qianlong's view on Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) identity which influenced the later historians and expunged the earlier Qing stance.[61]
Qianlong also promulgated an entirely new view of the Han Bannermen different from his grandfather Kangxi, coming up with the abstract theory that loyalty in itself was what was regarded as the most important, so Qianlong viewed those Han Bannermen who had defected from the Ming to the Qing as traitors and compiled an unfavorable biography of the prominent Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) who had defected to the Qing, while at the same time Qianlong had compiled a biography to glorify Ming loyalists who were martyred in battle against the Qing called "Record of Those Martyred for Their Dynasty and Sacrificed for Purity".[60] Some of Qianlong's inclusions and omissions on the list were political in nature, like including Li Yongfang out of Qianlong's dislike for his descendant Li Shiyao and excluding Ma Mingpei out of concern for his son Ma Xiongzhen's image.[60]
From 1618 to 1629, the Han Chinese from eastern Liaodong who joined the Eight Banners were known as "tai nikan", the Han who defected to the Qing at Fushun were known as Fushan Nikan and were considered part of the Tai Nikan. The Tai Nikan were distinguished from the later Han Chinese who joined the banners between 1629-1643 and originated from western Liaodong, Shanxi, Shandong, and Zhili, and were known as "fu xi baitangga".[60] Both groups were part of the Chinese Banners before the Qing crossed over Shanhai pass in 1644, and as such were both distinguished from Han who were incorporated into the Chinese Banners after 1644 when the Qing ruled China. The pre-1644 Chinese Bannermen were known as "old men" 旧人 .[60] A mass transfer into the Manchu banners of every single Fushun Nikan, and specifically chosen tai nikan, Koreans, and Mongols was enacted by the Qianlong Emperor in 1740.[60]
Manchu Bannermen in Beijing were driven into poverty just decades after the conquest, living in slums and falling into debt, with signs of their plight appearing as soon as 1655. They were driven to the point where they had to sell their property to Han Chinese, in violation of the law.[79]
Originally in the early Qing the Qing emperors both took some Han Chinese as concubines and a 1648 decree from Shunzhi allowed Han Chinese men to marry Manchu women from the Banners with the permission of the Board of Revenue if they were registered daughters of officials or commoners or the permission of their banner company captain if they were unregistered commoners, it was only later in the dynasty that these policies were done away with and the Qing enacted new policies in their xiunu system of drafting Banner girls for the Imperial Harem by excluding daughters of Han commoners.[80]
Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) frequently married Han civilian women and this was permitted by the Qing emperors, however the Qing emperors were distressed to find girls in the Banners as a result of these intermarriages following Han civilian customs in clothing and jewelry when they ended up being drafted for palace service.[80] The Qing formulated policies to remove and shut out daughters of common Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) from serving in the Imperial palace as maids and consorts, exempting them from the draft, asserting that it was doing it out of concern due to the economic plight of Chinese Bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen), however, it may have been doing this after the Qing court was alarmed to find girls from Chinese Banners (Hanjun, or Han Banners) following Han Chinese civilian customs like wearing robes with wide sleeves, feet binding, and wearing a single earring, all of which were contrary to Manchu custom, daughters of Manchu and Mongol bannerman still had to submit to the draft where they would be selected to serve in the Imperial palace as maids or potential consorts.[80] Daughters of Han Bannermen were exempt from having to submit themselves to palace service.[78] It was not permitted for daughters of Chinese Banner (Hanjun, or Han Banner) to enter the selection as concubines to the emperor.[78]
The Manchu bannermen typically used their given name to address themselves and not their family names, while Han bannermen used their family name and given name in normal Chinese style.[81][82]
A lot of Han Chinese bannermen adopted Manchu names, which may have been motivated by associating with the elite. One Han Chinese bannerman named Cui Zhilu who knew Manchu had changed his name to the Manchu Arsai, and the emperor asked him how he came about his name.[65] Chinese bannermen also adopted Manchu personal naming practices like giving numbers as personal names.[65]
Chinese bannermen (Hanjun, or Han Bannermen) manchufied their family names by adding "giya" at the end.[83] However, some Han Chinese bannermen like Zhao Erfeng, Zhao Erxun and Cao Xueqin did not use Manchu names.[83] A lot of other Han Chinese bannermen used Manchufied names, one Han bannermen with a Manchu name of Deming also had a separate Chinese name, Zhang Deyi.[83]
Within the Manchu banner companies, there were various Han Chinese and Mongol persons dispersed among them, and there were Mongol, Korean, Russian, and Tibetan companies in the Manchu Banners. The Manchu Banners had two main divisions between the higher ranking "Old Manchus" (Fo Manzhou, Fe Manju) made out of the main Jurchen tribes like the Jianzhou whom Nurhaci and Hong Taiji created the Manchu Banners from, and the lower ranking "New Manchus" (Chinese transliteration: 伊車滿洲. 衣車滿洲 Yiche Manzhou; Chinese translation: 新滿洲; Manchu: Ice Manju) made out of other Tungusic and Mongolic tribes like the Daur, (Dawoer), Oroqen (Elunchun), Solun (Suolun), Hezhe, Kiakar (Kuyula), and Xibe (Xibo) from the northeast who were incorporated into the Manchu Banners by Shunzhi and Kangxi after the 1644 Qing invasion of Ming China, in order for them to fight for the Qing against the Russian Empire in the Amur River Basin.[84]
De-Sinicization elsewhere
[edit]Hong Kong
[edit]Since the British handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, and increasingly since the mid-2000s when travel restrictions on Mainland Chinese citizens to Hong Kong eased, there has been increasing tension between the local Hong Kong population with the Chinese central government and the Mainland-origin population. While a Hong Kong identity has been present since the colonial period, it became stronger and more pronounced over the last decade, with 53% of Hong Kong residents identifying themselves as solely Hong Kong residents but not Chinese residents (while the figure is over 75% among residents aged 18–29), and 78% of Hong Kong residents identifying themselves as both "Hong Kong citizens" and "Chinese citizens". Furthermore, some youth population of Hong Kong do not even identify themselves as broadly, and ethnically, "Chinese". Less than a fifth of Hong Kongers now identify themselves as exclusively "Chinese".[85][86]
As a British colony for over 150 years, the culture of Hong Kong is unique in its blending of Western and Chinese elements. This cultural difference has been emphasized and embraced by some to distinguish Hong Kong from mainland China.[87] Hong Kong Cantonese differs from other Cantonese varieties as used in the Mainland province of Guangdong, in large part due to the influence of Hong Kong English and code-switching in Hong Kong.
Language differences also play a major role in separating Hong Kong identity from mainland Chinese identity. While Mandarin is the official variety of Chinese in mainland China, the regionally traditional Cantonese variant has long been used in Hong Kong. The increasing presence of Mandarin-speakers in the territory since 1997, and expectations of mainland Chinese for Hong Kong residents to speak Mandarin, has caused conflicts and defensive measures by citizens to protect Cantonese against the encroachment of Mandarin.[88] Such actions include stigmatizing Mandarin as a language of communism, while Cantonese and English language are perceived as languages of democracy; reflecting the political differences between Hong Kong and China. This political linguistic view has also spread among Overseas Chinese communities, the majority of which are historically Cantonese-speaking.[89]
The lack of democratic development in Hong Kong has further eroded a sense of a Chinese identity.[90] Under the one country, two systems policy agreed between the United Kingdom and China as a condition of Hong Kong's return, the territory is guaranteed the right to retain its free way of life for at least 50 years after 1997. However, increasing attempts from the Beijing government to curb democratic institutions and free speech, including the delay of eventual universal suffrage, have drawn continual protests and unrest among locals. This cumulated in the 2014 Hong Kong protests, when the Chinese Communist Party allowed Hong Kongers to vote for the territory's chief executive under the condition that Beijing first approves of the running candidates. The political crises have led to a strengthening of a local Hong Kong identity, with an independence movement beginning to take form as a result.[citation needed]
Taiwan
[edit]Following the retrocession of Taiwan from Japan[91] to the Republic of China in 1945, the Kuomintang-led government promoted a "resinicization" of the island's population,[92][93] sponsoring Chinese calligraphy, traditional Chinese painting, folk art, and Chinese opera.
De-Sinicization occurred most rapidly between 1992 and 2005, according to a survey by the National Chengchi University about national identity in Taiwan. Identification as "Chinese" during this time dropped from 26.2% to 7.3%, "Taiwanese" identity increased from 17.3% to 46.5%, and identification as both Taiwanese and Chinese dropped from 45.4% to 42.0%.[94] The autocratic administrations of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching Kuo claimed legitimacy as pan-Chinese leaders because the Republic of China's National Assembly was elected from all over China (in 1947), rather than just from Taiwan. However, the Lee Teng-hui administration (1988–2000) began to desinicize the polity by abolishing this Assembly in 1991, to form a parliamentary body with a Taiwan-only electorate.[94] In academia, de-Sinicization in the late 1980s and 1990s resulted in the replacement of the word "China" in the names of institutions to "Taiwan", creating the "Taiwan Legal Association", "Taiwan Political Science Association", "Taiwan Sociological Association", and "Taiwan History Association". As part of this movement, some Taiwanese historians downplayed the abuses of Japan's colonial administration, referring to it as "rule" rather than "occupation"; and the Taiwan History Association claimed that Taiwan's history was a part of Japanese, rather than Chinese, history.[94]
In 2001, proponents of Taiwanization began characterizing de-Sinicization 2001 as a part of the movement to emphasize a local Taiwan-based identity in opposition to the political leadership that had historically identified with China and Chinese culture.[95]
De-Sinicization accelerated under the Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008), with the pro-Taiwan independence Democratic Progressive Party in control of the Executive Yuan. Chen's Minister of Education, Tu Cheng-sheng, directed the rewriting of high school history textbooks to abolish the "remnants of greater Chinese consciousness" (大中國意識的沈痾). This textbook's de-Sinicization included the separation of Taiwanese history and Chinese history into separate volumes, a ban on the term mainland China, and the portrayal of Chinese immigration to Taiwan during the Qing dynasty as "colonization".[citation needed]
Concurrently, Chen introduced the One Country on Each Side concept in 2002, which posited that China and Taiwan are separate countries, while ordering the addition of the words "Issued in Taiwan" on Republic of China passports.[94] That same year, Tu's department chose to invent its own romanization system for Mandarin Chinese, Tongyong Pinyin, designed by a Taiwanese scholar rather than adopting the internationally well-known Hanyu Pinyin system developed by the People's Republic of China and used in other countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. In 2003, the government abolished the longstanding policy of using Mandarin as the sole language of government, which in practice promoted the second-largest language on the island, Taiwanese Hokkien, to fulfill many of the functions of a national language.[94] From 2004, the map of the "Republic of China" no longer includes mainland China.[citation needed]
From 2005, Chen's Executive Yuan also initiated the Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign, which sought to remove the words "China" or "Chinese" from public and private organizations. This included the renaming of state bodies such as the "Overseas Chinese Affairs Council" (which became the "Overseas Community Affairs Council"), persuading private organizations like China Airlines to change their name, and also the purging of references to mainland China in nearly 100 administrative laws. In 2006, Chen abolished the National Unification Council and its Guidelines for National Unification.[94] In February 2007, Chen's government changed the name of Chunghwa Post (China Post) to Taiwan Post, Chinese Petroleum Company to "CPC Corporation, Taiwan, and China Shipbuilding Corporation to "CSBC Corporation, Taiwan".[96]
The name changing issue was a topic in the Republic of China presidential elections in Taiwan in March 2008. Former Taipei mayor Ma Ying-Jeou was elected as the President, whereupon he sought to reverse some of the de-Sinicization policies of Chen.[97] On 1 August 2008, the postal service resolved to reverse the name change and restore the name "Chunghwa Post".[98] As of 1 January 2009, Tongyong Pinyin was abolished by the government in favor of Hanyu Pinyin. On 28 September 2009, Ma celebrated the 2559th birthday of Confucius at the Taiwan Confucian Temple, which was built in 1665. And on 1 January 2011, President Ma entitled his New Year's address "Building up Taiwan, Invigorating Chinese Heritage", which stressed "Chinese culture and virtues, such as benevolence, righteousness, filial devotion, respect for teachers, kindness, and simplicity".[97]
In the run-up to the 2024 Taiwanese general election, Chinese state media accused the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of undertaking a de-sinicization campaign in the education sector.[99]
Japan
[edit]Around the time of the Meiji Restoration, debates arose in Japan regarding the "Datsu-A Ron" (Leaving Asia theory) and the perceived backwardness of China, leading to discussions on whether to abolish Kanji (Chinese characters) and fully adopt Kana or the Roman alphabet. Ultimately, the idea of reducing the number of Kanji, proposed by Fukuzawa Yukichi, became mainstream. In 1873, he compiled the elementary school textbook Moji no Oshie (The Teaching of Characters), stating in its preface that although Kanji are difficult to learn, the Japanese language already contains a large accumulation of them, making immediate abolition impractical. He suggested initially limiting Kanji usage, with the goal of eventual abolition when circumstances allowed. In his own textbook, he used only 802 Kanji.
After World War II, under the suggestion of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) to promote the Romanization of Japanese, the Japanese government established the Tōyō Kanji list (General Use Kanji) in 1946, which was intended to strictly limit the number of Kanji used, with the ultimate goal of complete abolition. However, in the 1980s, the Tōyō Kanji list was replaced by the Jōyō Kanji list (Regular Use Kanji), and the abolition of Kanji was no longer the objective.This is because Kana are not purely phonetic characters; for example, Kana do not indicate pitch accents (アクセント). Both "chopsticks" (箸) and "bridge" (橋) are written as "はし" (hashi). In Kana, "chopsticks" (箸) is pronounced as "はし" with a high-low pitch pattern (háshi), while "bridge" (橋) is pronounced as "はし" with a low-high pitch pattern (hashí). When speaking, the meaning of words must be distinguished by these pitch patterns. Writing without Kanji would cause confusion due to homophones.[100]
Thailand
[edit]Vietnam
[edit]Hoa people, or ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, form a significant minority in the country with a presence traced from the Nanyue era and became organized since the foundation of Later Lê dynasty.[101] Chinese immigration to Vietnam peaked during the late 19th to mid-20th century, when China experienced political turmoil and life quality stagnation, as well the communist takeover in 1949 and business incentives provided by the French colonial government. The Hoa largely integrated well, forming a large portion of the Vietnam's middle and upper class and playing an important role in its economy.[102] In addition to their native dialects and/or Cantonese (the lingua franca of Chinese in Southeast Asia), Vietnamese proficiency rates among the Hoa were extremely high and were the largest among Vietnam's ethnic minority groups.[103] Most Hoa eventually considered themselves as Vietnamese first and then Chinese, with those with origins not from mainland China identifying themselves to their specific place, such as "Hong Kong Chinese" or "Macau Chinese", especially in South Vietnam.[104]
Following the Fall of Saigon and communist reunification of the Vietnam, most Hoa in the former South Vietnam opted to immigrate to other countries, especially the United States, France and Australia, rather than communist-controlled China. Only ethnic Chinese persecuted by government in northern Vietnam chose to immigrate back to China, especially to Guangxi Province.[105] Overseas Chinese with origins from Vietnam usually interact with both local Chinese and Vietnamese communities. However, the presence of non-Cantonese speaking and/or mainland Chinese-descended communities results in the community identifying itself with the Vietnamese community instead, as in the case with the Chinese community in France.[citation needed]
North Korea
[edit]Using Hanja (한자,漢字), or Chinese characters in Korean language, was banned in 1949 in North Korea by Kim Il Sung. Kim banned the use of hanja because he viewed the abolishment of hanja as a symbol of decolonization and Korean nationalism.[citation needed]
South Korea
[edit]Hangul was made the official script of the Korean language since 1948, replacing Hanja, and Hanja is not required to be learned until high school as an elective course in South Korea. Former Mayor of Seoul Lee Myung-bak's move to change Seoul's official Chinese name from Hancheng (漢城) to Shou'er (首爾) in 2005 as a model of de-Sinicization.[106] The previous name, pronounced Hànchéng in Mandarin and Hanseong in Korean, is an old name for Seoul. Hanseong was derived from the Han River, and literally means "Walled City on the Han (Wide) River" but the name can be misinterpreted as Han Chinese City. The new name Shou'er carried no such connotation, and was close in both sound and meaning to Seoul, which, uniquely among Korean place names, does not have a Sino-Korean name. See also Names of Seoul.[citation needed]
Kyrgyzstan
[edit]The Dungans of Kyrgyzstan represent a less conscious process of de-Sinicization, during which, over the course of a little more than a century (since the Hui Minorities' War), a Hui Chinese population became alienated from the literary tradition and local culture of Shaanxi and Gansu.[citation needed]
Indonesia
[edit]See also
[edit]References
[edit]Citations
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- ^ Orient. Maruzen Company. 2004. p. 41.
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- ^ Hsueh-man Shen; Asia Society; Asia Society. Museum (1 September 2006). Gilded splendor: treasures of China's Liao Empire (907-1125). Museum für Ostasiatische Kunst (Berlin, Germany), Museum Rietberg. 5 continents. p. 106. ISBN 978-88-7439-332-9.
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- ^ Johnson, Linda Cooke (2011). Women of the Conquest Dynasties: Gender and Identity in Liao and Jin China. University of Hawaiʻi Press. ISBN 9780824870300.
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- ^ Slobodnik, Martin (2004). "Martin Slobodník: "The Relations between the Chinese Ming Dynasty and the Tibetan Ruling House of Phag-mo-gru in the Years 1368-1434: Political and Religious Aspects", Asian and African Studies, Vol. 13 (2004), No. 2, pp. 155-171". Asian and African Studies. 13 (2).
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{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) - ^ Diamond, Larry; Plattner, Marc; Chu, Yun-han; Tien, Hung-mao (1997). Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges. JHU Press. p. 293.
[During] extended Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945)... the native elite was subordinated first to a state-orchestrated desinicization campaign and later a Japanization movement that proceeded in earnest during the Pacific war.... the state's [subsequent] effort to establish the supremacy of Chinese identity... through resinicization and Mandarinization programs [occurred] despite many shared ethnic heritages between the native and the newly arrived emigre group.
- ^ Sharma, Anita; Chakrabarti, Sreemati (2010). Taiwan Today. Anthem Press. pp. 21–22.
[T]he people of Taiwan have been enmeshed in a century long struggle with state-sponsored cultural programmes, from 'desinicization' at the early stage of colonial rule, to 'Japanization' at the subsequent stage, and to 'resinicization' under the KMT rule.
- ^ a b c d e f Hao, Zhidong (2010). "De-Sinicization under Lee and Chen and the Role of Intellectuals". Whither Taiwan and Mainland China? National Identity, the State, and Intellectuals. Hong Kong University Press. pp. 49–58.
- ^ Makeham, John (2008). Lost Soul: "Confucianism" in contemporary Chinese academic discourse. Harvard University Asia Center. p. 85.
Many proponents of indigenization in Taiwan regard it quite specifically as a project of De-Sinicization: an attempt to remove the yoke of "Chinese" colonial hegemony so that Taiwan's putative native (bentu) identity can be recognized and further nurtured.
- ^ ":::::Welcome to Taiwan POST:::::". Archived from the original on 10 May 2007. Retrieved 5 January 2011.
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De-Sinicization
View on GrokipediaConceptual Foundations
Definition and Etymology
De-Sinicization refers to the systematic effort to eliminate or diminish Chinese (Sinic) cultural, linguistic, historical, and identitarian influences within a society, typically to promote indigenous or localized elements and assert a distinct non-Chinese identity.[5] This process contrasts with Sinicization, which entails the assimilation of non-Chinese groups into Chinese cultural norms, language, and governance structures.[6] In practice, de-Sinicization often manifests through reforms in education, media, and public policy that reframe narratives away from pan-Chinese unity toward regional autonomy, as observed in contemporary contexts like Taiwan where it counters perceived mainland Chinese dominance.[7] The etymology of "de-Sinicization" derives from the English prefix "de-", denoting reversal or removal (as in "decolonization" or "denazification"), affixed to "Sinicization." The base term "Sinicization" first appeared in English in 1885, formed by derivation from "Sinic" (relating to China, from Latin Sinae, the ancient Roman name for China) combined with the suffix "-ization," indicating the act of making something Chinese in character or subjecting it to Chinese influence.[6] While Sinicization has historical roots in imperial Chinese assimilation policies dating back centuries, the compound "de-Sinicization" gained prominence in the late 20th century, particularly in analyses of Taiwanese cultural policies under presidents like Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000), where it described shifts toward Taiwan-centric identity amid democratization and reduced emphasis on shared Chinese heritage.[7] Earlier conceptual parallels exist in ethnic Han adaptations of non-Han customs during dynastic eras, though the modern term specifically addresses postcolonial or anti-hegemonic resistance to Chinese cultural expansion.[5]Distinction from Sinicization and Related Processes
De-sinicization constitutes a deliberate reversal of Sinicization, involving policies and cultural shifts aimed at diminishing the dominance of Han Chinese linguistic, historical, and ideological elements in favor of localized identities, such as those emphasizing indigenous Austronesian heritage or colonial-era influences like Japanese rule in Taiwan. Sinicization, by contrast, refers to the assimilation of non-Han groups into the cultural, linguistic, and political framework of the Han Chinese majority, often through mechanisms like mandatory Mandarin education, Confucian ethical integration, and administrative centralization, as historically applied to ethnic minorities within China or neighboring regions under imperial influence.[8][9] This directional opposition underscores de-sinicization as a defensive or identity-affirming response, typically in peripheral or contested territories, whereas Sinicization functions as an expansive, state-driven homogenization process, exemplified by Qing dynasty policies toward Mongols and Tibetans or contemporary efforts in Xinjiang involving re-education camps and cultural erasure.[10] In Taiwan, the distinction manifests politically: Sinicization was advanced by the Kuomintang regime from 1949 onward through curricula portraying Taiwan as an inseparable part of a greater Chinese civilization, fostering a unified "Chinese" identity via textbooks that prioritized imperial history and classical Chinese texts. De-sinicization emerged post-martial law as a counter-movement, particularly under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations of Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000) and Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), which reformed education to highlight Taiwan's distinct experiences—such as Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese colonial periods—reducing emphasis on dynastic China and promoting Hoklo (Taiwanese Minnan) dialect alongside indigenous languages, thereby challenging the pan-Chinese narrative.[1][2] These efforts, while framed by proponents as cultural reclamation, have been critiqued by opponents as ideologically driven distortions that overlook Taiwan's predominant Han demographic and shared linguistic roots with Fujianese Chinese.[11] Related processes, such as nativization or Taiwanization, intersect with de-sinicization but differ in scope; nativization broadly seeks to elevate pre-Sinicized elements like Formosan aboriginal customs, whereas Sinicization equivalents in other contexts—such as Russification in Central Asia or Arabization in the Middle East—involve supplanting local traditions with a core ethnic or imperial paradigm, often via coercive state apparatus. Unlike these unidirectional assimilations, de-sinicization lacks a universal template, adapting to specific historical grievances, as in Japan's early Meiji-era "de-Sinicization" within its "Leave Asia" doctrine, which rejected Confucian orthodoxy for Western modernization while retaining selective Japanese adaptations of Chinese elements.[12] In essence, de-sinicization prioritizes differentiation and pluralism over the monolithic cultural convergence inherent to Sinicization.[13]Historical Instances
Dynastic Efforts in China and Border Regions
The Liao dynasty (907–1125), founded by the Khitan people, established a dual administrative system to segregate Khitan nomadic and tribal governance in the north from Han Chinese bureaucratic practices in the south, thereby preserving Khitan military traditions and customs against assimilation.[14] This northern administration operated as a khanate with emphasis on pastoralism and clan structures, while the southern system adopted Confucian elements for conquered Han territories, limiting cultural intermingling.[15] The Jin dynasty (1115–1234), led by the Jurchen, similarly implemented a dual governance framework dividing Jurchen-held northern regions—governed through tribal hierarchies and military obligations—from Han southern areas under civil administration, resisting full adoption of Han scholarly norms.[15] Emperor Shizong (r. 1161–1189) actively promoted a Jurchen revival, enforcing traditional practices such as archery and equestrian skills among elites and critiquing the erosion of ethnic distinctiveness through Han influences, though Sinicization advanced in administrative and cultural spheres over time.[16] In the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), Mongol rulers enforced a four-class hierarchy—comprising Mongols at the apex, followed by Semu (non-Mongol, non-Han groups like Central Asians), Hanren (northern Han), and Nanren (southern Han)—to maintain ethnic stratification and curb assimilation, with privileges like exemption from certain taxes and corvée limited to upper classes.[17] Segregation policies prohibited Han subjects from learning the Mongol language, adopting Mongol attire, or bearing Mongol names, reinforcing Mongol identity through separate residential quarters and military units in urban centers like Dadu (modern Beijing).[15] The Qing dynasty (1644–1912), under Manchu rule, institutionalized the Eight Banners system as a parallel socio-military structure for Manchus, organizing over 1 million bannermen by 1700 into ethnically distinct units with hereditary lands and obligations to uphold Manchu horsemanship, archery, and queue hairstyles, countering Han sedentary influences.[15] Emperors such as Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) issued repeated edicts mandating Manchu language education and criticizing bannermen for adopting Han customs like footbinding or scholarly pursuits over martial training, while Qianlong (r. 1735–1796) sponsored trilingual (Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian) translations of Confucian classics to balance preservation with governance needs.[18] In border regions like Manchuria, Qing prohibition policies from the 1650s onward banned Han migration and land reclamation to safeguard the Manchu ancestral homeland, restricting settlement to bannermen and indigenous groups until partial lifts in the 19th century.[18] Similar indirect rule via the Lifan Yuan court preserved Mongol tribal alliances in Inner Asia, limiting Han bureaucratic penetration and sustaining nomadic customs through patronage of Tibetan Buddhism and banner garrisons.[15] Despite these measures, demographic shifts and administrative necessities eroded ethnic separations by the dynasty's later decades.Pre-Modern Resistance in Neighboring States
In Vietnam, resistance to Chinese cultural and political domination manifested through persistent rebellions during the periods of direct rule known as Bắc thuộc, spanning from 111 BCE to 939 CE. A prominent example was the uprising led by the Trưng sisters—Trưng Trắc and Trưng Nhị—in 40 CE against Han dynasty administrators in Jiaozhi province, which successfully captured sixty-five citadels and established a brief independent regime before suppression in 43 CE by General Ma Yuan. This revolt symbolized Vietnamese determination to preserve indigenous leadership and customs amid efforts at assimilation, including the imposition of Chinese administrative systems and Confucian ideals. Despite adopting elements such as the Chinese script and bureaucratic models, Vietnamese society maintained distinct linguistic roots in Austroasiatic languages and animist traditions, thwarting full Sinicization over nearly a millennium of intermittent control.[19][20][21] The culmination of this resistance occurred in 938 CE, when Ngô Quyền decisively defeated the Southern Han invasion at the Battle of Bạch Đằng River, employing wooden stakes in the tide to trap and destroy the enemy fleet, thereby securing Vietnam's independence and ending the fourth era of Chinese domination. Subsequent dynasties, such as the Ngô (939–965 CE), reinforced national identity by adapting but not wholly embracing Chinese influences, fostering a hybrid culture that prioritized Vietnamese sovereignty and agrarian traditions over imperial centralization.[22] In Korea, the Joseon dynasty (1392–1897 CE) pursued cultural preservation against pervasive Chinese influence by innovating indigenous systems, most notably through King Sejong the Great's creation of Hangul in 1443 CE (promulgated in 1446 CE). Designed as a phonetic alphabet to enable widespread literacy among commoners—bypassing the complexity of Chinese characters (Hanja), which elites favored for their association with Confucian scholarship—Hangul represented an effort to democratize knowledge and assert Korean linguistic autonomy, though it faced initial aristocratic opposition. Joseon intellectuals further distinguished their realm by rejecting the Manchu-led Qing dynasty's legitimacy after its conquest of Ming China in 1644 CE, viewing Joseon as the orthodox successor to Ming Confucianism and limiting substantive adoption of Qing customs despite tributary obligations imposed by invasions in 1627 and 1636 CE.[23][24][25] Japan's pre-modern divergence from Chinese models accelerated during the Heian period (794–1185 CE), when official diplomatic missions to Tang China, which had facilitated imports of governance, Buddhism, and script since 630 CE, ceased in 894 CE under Sugawara no Michizane's counsel amid Tang's internal decline. This halt allowed Japan to indigenize borrowed elements, developing hiragana and katakana syllabaries alongside kanji to express native phonetics and literature, as seen in the flourishing of court poetry and tales like The Tale of Genji (c. 1000 CE). While retaining selective Sinic influences in bureaucracy and aesthetics, Japan's island geography and emphasis on imperial divinity fostered a distinct cultural trajectory, resisting political subordination and prioritizing local refinement over wholesale emulation.[26]Modern Applications in Taiwan
Educational and Curricular Reforms
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan's educational system began shifting from a China-centric curriculum, which emphasized imperial Chinese history and classical literature, toward one highlighting local Taiwanese experiences and multicultural heritage.[27] This transition accelerated under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations, with reforms explicitly aimed at distinguishing Taiwanese identity from Chinese influences, often termed de-Sinicization.[2] Key changes included separating Taiwanese history from Chinese history in textbooks and reducing the prominence of classical Chinese texts, which proponents argued fostered indigenous perspectives while critics, including Kuomintang (KMT) figures, viewed as eroding cultural roots tied to broader Sinic traditions.[28] In 1997, under President Lee Teng-hui's KMT administration, the Ministry of Education introduced the "Getting to Know Taiwan" textbook series for junior high schools, marking an early de-Sinicization step by treating Taiwan's history as distinct from China's, incorporating events like the 1947 February 28 Incident and White Terror period as central to local narrative rather than peripheral to a unified Chinese story.[27] [28] This was followed by DPP President Chen Shui-bian's 2000-2008 tenure, which in 2004 proposed and by 2006 implemented Taiwanese history as a standalone subject in a "concentric circle" structure—prioritizing Taiwan at the core, with China and the world as secondary layers—and authorized revisions to approximately 5,000 textbook phrases to emphasize Taiwan's sovereignty, such as changing "both sides of the Taiwan Strait" to references implying separate entities.[27] These adjustments reduced the chronological linkage of Taiwan to pre-1949 Chinese history, portraying post-war KMT arrival as an external migration rather than a national continuity.[28] Under DPP President Tsai Ing-wen from 2016 onward, the 2019 "108 Curriculum" guidelines further advanced these reforms by restructuring high school history into modular units on Taiwan, East Asia, and world history, effectively minimizing dedicated China-focused content and promoting "multi-perspective" approaches that highlighted colonial-era Japanese rule and indigenous narratives over imperial Chinese dynasties.[2] [29] In literature and language education, the guidelines halved compulsory classical Chinese readings from 30 to 15 texts for middle and high school students, aiming to boost comprehension and allocate space for Taiwanese vernacular works and indigenous languages, though opponents like educator Alice Ou labeled it a "desinicization" eroding heritage comprehension.[2] [30] Complementary policies expanded mother-tongue instruction for the 16 recognized indigenous languages and Taiwanese Hokkien, with elementary schools normalizing such classes by 2002 and increasing hours under DPP rule to preserve non-Sinic elements amid Mandarin dominance.[31] These reforms faced reversals under KMT President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), who in 2015 attempted "fine-tuning" to reintegrate Chinese historical links—such as restoring "Ming-Zheng dynasty" terminology and softening depictions of KMT repressions—prompting the Black Island Nation Youth protests, including student occupations of the Ministry of Education and a fatal self-immolation that galvanized opposition and contributed to DPP's 2016 electoral victory.[27] [28] Post-2016, Tsai's government rescinded Ma's changes, reinstating Taiwan-centric guidelines.[28] Empirical outcomes include improved PISA reading scores (Taiwan ranked 5th in 2022 from 16th in 2018), attributed by supporters to reduced classical Chinese burden, though KMT-led protests in 2023 decried the 108 Curriculum as promoting "Taiwan independence" indoctrination over factual heritage.[2] Such partisan divides underscore how curricular shifts serve nation-building, with de-Sinicization correlating to rising self-identified Taiwanese identity from under 20% in the 1990s to over 60% by 2023, per surveys, amid Beijing's cross-strait pressures.[13]Linguistic and Cultural Policies
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwan's linguistic policies began shifting away from the Kuomintang's Mandarin-only mandate, which had suppressed local languages including Taiwanese Hokkien, Hakka, and indigenous tongues since 1949 to enforce cultural assimilation.[32] This reversal accelerated under Democratic Progressive Party administrations, prioritizing the revitalization of non-Mandarin languages to foster distinct Taiwanese identities amid perceived Chinese cultural dominance. Usage of Taiwanese Hokkien, spoken by over 70% of the population as a first language in the mid-20th century, has declined by approximately 60% across three generations due to prior suppression and urbanization.[33] The Development of National Languages Act, enacted on January 9, 2019, designates Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, Hakka, the 16 indigenous languages, and Taiwanese Sign Language as official national languages, mandating their development, public use, and integration into education and media to safeguard linguistic diversity.[34] Complementing this, the 2022-2026 National Languages Development Plan outlines seven strategies, including curriculum integration, media promotion, and community programs, allocating budgets for teacher training and digital resources to reverse endangerment rates—where only about 30% of children actively use Taiwanese Hokkien.[35] [36] Earlier measures, such as the 2017 Indigenous Languages Development Act, provide targeted revitalization for Austronesian languages spoken by Taiwan's 16 recognized tribes, emphasizing immersion programs and legal protections against further erosion.[37] These efforts have increased mandatory school hours for mother-tongue instruction, though implementation varies, with indigenous language proficiency remaining low at under 10% fluency among youth in some communities.[38] Culturally, policies under the Ministry of Culture have redirected funding from classical Chinese heritage toward contemporary Taiwanese and indigenous expressions, including subsidies for local arts festivals, museum exhibits in native languages, and media quotas for non-Mandarin content to diminish reliance on Sinic narratives.[34] Since the early 2000s, initiatives like the Hakka Basic Act and promotion of Austronesian cultural ties have supported heritage sites and performances highlighting pre-Han migration histories, countering KMT-era emphasis on shared Chinese ancestry.[39] This includes efforts to romanize or adapt Taiwanese Hokkien scripts independently of standard Chinese characters, though proponents of deeper de-Sinicization advocate purging Sino-Taiwanese loanwords, sparking debate over linguistic purity versus practical hybridity.[40] Such measures aim to preserve multicultural pluralism but face criticism from opponents who view them as ideologically driven erosion of shared East Asian roots, potentially isolating Taiwan from continental influences.[2]Political and Identity Dimensions
In Taiwan, de-Sinicization in the political sphere manifests through policies and rhetoric that prioritize a sovereign Taiwanese nation-state identity over historical ties to mainland China, particularly under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations since 2000.[41] This includes rejection of the "1992 Consensus," a framework implying "one China" interpretations favored by the Kuomintang (KMT), and emphasis on Taiwan's de facto independence as a democratic entity distinct from the People's Republic of China (PRC).[42] For instance, President Tsai Ing-wen (2016–2024) framed Taiwan's identity in speeches as rooted in democratic values and indigenous pluralism rather than Han Chinese cultural hegemony imposed during the KMT's martial law era (1949–1987).[43] These efforts align with transitional justice measures, such as the 2017 Promotion of Transitional Justice Act, which dismantled authoritarian institutions like the KMT's party assets committee and removed symbols of Chinese restorationism, thereby decoupling political legitimacy from Sinic narratives of reclaiming the mainland.[44] Public opinion data underscores a corresponding shift in self-identification, with polls consistently showing a decline in dual Taiwanese-Chinese identities and a rise in exclusive Taiwanese affiliation, correlating with DPP governance and PRC military pressures.[4] According to National Chengchi University's Election Study Center, the proportion identifying solely as Taiwanese increased from 17.6% in 1992 to 63.3% by mid-2023, while those identifying as both Taiwanese and Chinese fell from 25.5% to 30.4%, and solely Chinese dropped to 2.4%.[3] A December 2024 poll by the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation reinforced this, with 83.3% selecting "Taiwanese" over "Chinese" (8.4%), attributing the trend to generational changes and perceived threats from Beijing.[45] Political alignment influences these views: DPP supporters are over 90% likely to identify exclusively as Taiwanese, compared to under 20% among KMT backers.[4] Identity politics also intersect with electoral dynamics, where de-Sinicization rhetoric bolsters DPP appeals to younger voters emphasizing indigenous and Austronesian heritage over mainland Han lineages. Critics, including KMT figures, argue such policies exacerbate cross-strait tensions without addressing economic dependencies on China, yet empirical support for status quo maintenance—implicitly rejecting unification—reached 84.5% in 2023 NCCU surveys.[46] Under President Lai Ching-te (elected 2024), this dimension persists through initiatives like enhanced civic education on Taiwan's multiparty democracy, contrasting it with PRC authoritarianism to foster a resilient national consciousness unbound by Sinic irredentism.[2]De-Sinicization in Other Contemporary Contexts
Hong Kong's Anti-China Movements
Hong Kong's anti-China movements, often framed within localist ideologies, gained prominence after the 1997 handover as responses to perceived encroachments on the city's autonomy under the "one country, two systems" framework. These movements sought to resist Beijing's political and cultural integration efforts, including restrictions on electoral reforms and policies promoting Mandarin over Cantonese, thereby aligning with de-Sinicization by emphasizing a distinct Hong Kong identity rooted in colonial-era institutions, rule of law, and local customs rather than mainland norms.[47][48] Localist sentiments intensified amid economic frictions, such as influxes of mainland tourists and immigrants, which some residents viewed as diluting Hong Kong's resources and cultural fabric, leading to derogatory labels like "locusts" for mainland visitors.[49] The 2014 Umbrella Movement marked a pivotal escalation, triggered by Beijing's August 31 decision to limit chief executive elections to pre-approved candidates, sparking 79 days of occupations in central districts from September 28 to December 15. Protesters, numbering in the hundreds of thousands at peaks, demanded genuine universal suffrage as promised in the 1997 Sino-British Joint Declaration, using umbrellas to shield against police tear gas and pepper spray on the opening day.[50][51] The movement's failure to secure concessions highlighted fractures within the pro-democracy camp, birthing more radical localist factions advocating self-determination or independence to counter what participants saw as inevitable assimilation.[47] Building on this, the 2019 protests erupted on June 9 against a proposed extradition bill allowing transfers to mainland China, drawing up to 2 million participants—nearly one-third of the population—in initial marches, evolving into broader demands for democratic reforms, police accountability, and retraction of the bill.[52] Clashes intensified from June 12, with police deploying tear gas, rubber bullets, and arrests totaling over 10,000 by year's end, while protesters resorted to vandalism, including the July 1 storming of the Legislative Council.[53] The bill's withdrawal in September failed to quell unrest, which persisted into 2020, reflecting deep-seated fears of eroding judicial independence and freedoms amid Beijing's influence.[54] These movements embodied de-Sinicization through cultural assertions, such as prioritizing Cantonese-language education and rejecting "patriotic" curricula that emphasized mainland history over local narratives. Independence advocates, including figures like Edward Leung and groups like Hong Kong Indigenous, pushed for secession via referendums, though they remained marginal electorally, capturing under 10% in 2016 legislative races before Beijing's 2020 national security law criminalized such advocacy, leading to over 100 arrests of activists and mass emigration of 500,000 residents by 2023.[48][47] The law's enforcement, imposing life sentences for secession or subversion, effectively dismantled organized resistance, underscoring causal tensions between Hong Kong's promised high autonomy and mainland centralization.[52]Southeast Asian Cases
In post-colonial Southeast Asia, de-Sinicization efforts primarily targeted ethnic Chinese communities through state-driven assimilation policies aimed at integrating them into dominant national identities, reducing cultural distinctiveness, and addressing concerns over economic dominance or divided loyalties amid nation-building. These measures often included restrictions on Chinese language use, naming conventions, education, and public cultural practices, reflecting causal pressures from anti-communist sentiments during the Cold War and efforts to consolidate indigenous-majority rule following independence from European powers.[5] Indonesia's New Order regime under President Suharto (1966–1998) implemented rigorous assimilation policies for the approximately 3% ethnic Chinese population, which controlled significant portions of the economy. In 1967, Presidential Instruction No. 14 barred Chinese Indonesians from retail trade in rural areas to curb perceived economic enclaves, while subsequent decrees banned Chinese-language publications, schools, and characters in public signage by 1978. The regime further mandated adoption of Indonesian names via a 1978 citizenship regulation, prohibited Chinese-medium education, and suppressed festivals like Chinese New Year in public spaces, framing these as necessary for national unity after the 1965 anti-communist purges that killed or displaced hundreds of thousands, including many ethnic Chinese. These policies effectively diminished overt Chinese cultural markers, though underground preservation persisted, and were justified as countering "extraterritorial" ties to China amid fears of communist infiltration.[55][56][57] Thailand pursued a more gradual Thaification process, encouraging ethnic Chinese—estimated at 10–14% of the population in the mid-20th century—to adopt Thai surnames, language, and customs through incentives like citizenship grants tied to assimilation. From the 1930s onward, policies under Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram promoted Thai names via the 1939 Name Act, restricted Chinese schools in favor of Thai curricula, and fostered intermarriage, particularly among elites; by the 1950s, over 80% of Sino-Thai adopted Thai names, with royal intermarriages accelerating elite integration. This approach, rooted in 19th-century immigration waves, prioritized economic contributions while diluting Chinese identity, resulting in high rates of cultural blending where descendants primarily identify as Thai, speak Thai as a first language, and participate in Thai Buddhist practices.[58][59] In Malaysia, de-Sinicization elements emerged during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), when British and Malay authorities sought to detach ethnic Chinese (about 37% of the population) from communist insurgent networks linked to China by promoting loyalty to Malaya through resettlement in "New Villages" and emphasis on English or Malay education over Chinese. Post-independence, the 1971 New Economic Policy (NEP) indirectly pressured Chinese assimilation by reserving 30% of corporate equity and university spots for Bumiputera (Malays and indigenous groups), aiming to redistribute wealth from Chinese-dominated sectors without overt cultural bans, though it fueled emigration and reduced Chinese cultural institutional power.[60] Vietnam's de-Sinicization focused on linguistic and historiographic reforms to assert indigenous identity against historical Chinese domination (111 BCE–939 CE and later intervals). The adoption of the Latin-based Quốc Ngữ script, promoted by French colonial authorities and standardized post-1945 independence, replaced chữ Hán (Chinese characters) and chữ Nôm by the mid-20th century, enabling broader literacy and distancing from Confucian scriptural traditions; by 1955, Vietnamese law mandated Quốc Ngữ in education and administration. 20th-century historiography, influenced by nationalist scholars, emphasized Austroasiatic roots and minimized Sinic borrowings, constructing a narrative of continuous Vietnamese sovereignty predating Chinese influence to counter claims of cultural derivation.[61][62]Korean Peninsula Developments
In both North and South Korea, de-Sinicization has historically involved the prioritization of the Korean alphabet, Hangul, over Hanja (Chinese characters), reducing reliance on Sino-Korean vocabulary and script in education, media, and official documents. North Korea accelerated this process post-1945, mandating exclusive use of Hangul by 1949 to foster linguistic independence aligned with Juche ideology, which emphasizes self-reliance and rejection of external cultural dominance, including from China.[63] South Korea followed suit, phasing out mandatory Hanja education in schools by the 1980s and promoting Hangul-only policies in public signage and publications to reinforce national identity distinct from historical Sinic influences.[64] South Korea's contemporary de-Sinicization efforts intensified in response to China's Northeast Project, launched in 2002 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, which classified ancient Korean kingdoms like Goguryeo (37 BCE–668 CE) as part of Chinese ethnic history rather than an independent Korean state. This prompted widespread backlash in South Korea, including public protests and academic critiques labeling the project as an attempt at historical appropriation to justify territorial or cultural claims amid Northeast Asian geopolitical shifts.[65] In December 2003, the South Korean government issued an official report rejecting these assertions, asserting Goguryeo's Korean origins based on archaeological and textual evidence from Korean sources, and established the Goguryeo Research Foundation in 2004 to systematically document and promote its national heritage.[66] Subsequent disputes over cultural elements, such as China's 2020 UNESCO bid linking kimchi to Chinese pao cai or claims on hanbok origins, further galvanized South Korean institutions to assert proprietary Korean traditions through international registrations and media campaigns.[67] North Korea's approach to de-Sinicization centers on ideological insulation via Juche, formalized in the 1970s, which portrays Korean history and culture as uniquely autochthonous, minimizing Chinese tributary influences in state narratives despite economic dependencies. Tensions peaked during China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when Pyongyang distanced itself from Beijing's radicalism, purging pro-Chinese elements and emphasizing Korean ethnic purity in historiography to prevent cultural assimilation.[68] State media and education continue to frame ancient kingdoms like Gojoseon as foundational to Korean sovereignty, independent of Chinese imperial narratives, reinforcing anti-hegemonic rhetoric against perceived expansionism.[69] These developments reflect broader efforts on the peninsula to preserve indigenous historical agency amid China's rising assertiveness, though North Korea's isolation limits public discourse compared to South Korea's open societal debates and alliances, such as strengthened U.S. ties, to counterbalance Chinese influence.[70] Empirical assessments, including polls showing declining favorable views of China in South Korea (from 77% in 2013 to 34% in 2023), indicate growing resonance of these identity assertions.[71]Motivations and Causal Factors
Preservation of Indigenous Identities
Under the Kuomintang (KMT) regime from 1949 to the 1990s, Taiwan's indigenous peoples—comprising Austronesian groups speaking Formosan languages and numbering approximately 2% of the population, or around 570,000 individuals as of recent estimates—faced systematic Sinicization policies that prioritized Mandarin Chinese and Han cultural norms, leading to widespread assimilation and cultural erosion.[72] These efforts included banning indigenous languages in schools, enforcing Chinese naming conventions, and relocating communities to facilitate Han settlement, which accelerated the decline of at least 10 Formosan languages to extinction and rendered four others moribund by the early 21st century.[73] [74] Plains indigenous groups, in particular, lost traditional territories to Han agricultural expansion starting in the 17th century and intensifying under Japanese and KMT rule, resulting in intergenerational language shift where younger generations adopted Mandarin or Taiwanese Hokkien as primary tongues.[75] This process not only diminished linguistic diversity but also contributed to socioeconomic disparities, with indigenous communities experiencing higher unemployment and poverty rates compared to the Han majority.[76] De-Sinicization emerged as a counterforce, motivated by the imperative to reclaim and preserve these distinct indigenous identities against further absorption into a homogenized Chinese cultural framework. Proponents argue that reducing emphasis on mainland Chinese heritage—evident in KMT-era curricula glorifying classical Chinese texts—allows space for multicultural Taiwanese identity that elevates indigenous histories, rituals, and governance systems, such as tribal councils and animist practices, which had been marginalized as "primitive" under assimilationist policies.[77] In Taiwan, this motivation gained traction post-martial law in 1987, aligning with democratization and indigenous rights movements that highlighted Sinicization's role in erasing pre-Han narratives, including Austronesian migration origins distinct from continental Chinese lineages.[1] Empirical data from language surveys show that without such reversals, Formosan speaker numbers could drop below critical thresholds for viability, as seen in cases like Kanakanavu where fluent elders number fewer than 10.[74] Policy responses under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations have operationalized this preservation drive through targeted revitalization, including the 2019 National Languages Development Act, which legally equates indigenous languages with Mandarin for official use and allocates funding for community-led education.[34] Successive six-year plans since 2000 have shifted from top-down preservation to participatory models, incorporating indigenous input in curriculum design and teacher certification, resulting in modest gains like increased elementary-level instruction in languages such as Amis and Atayal.[38] [78] These measures stem from a causal recognition that unchecked Sinicization perpetuates identity dilution, as evidenced by pre-2000 assimilation rates where over 80% of indigenous youth reported limited proficiency in ancestral tongues.[79] Critics within indigenous circles, however, note persistent challenges, including urban migration eroding transmission and uneven resource distribution favoring larger tribes.[80] In broader de-Sinicization contexts, such as Southeast Asian states with Chinese diasporas, similar motivations arise where indigenous or local ethnic groups resist cultural dominance to safeguard non-Sinitic traditions, though Taiwan's case exemplifies the most structured linkage to national identity formation.[11] Overall, this motivation underscores a first-principles defense of cultural pluralism: empirical patterns of language loss under assimilationist pressures necessitate proactive decoupling from expansive Sinic influences to sustain viable indigenous polities.[81]Response to Chinese Political and Cultural Expansion
De-Sinicization efforts in Taiwan have been propelled by the People's Republic of China's (PRC) escalating political and cultural expansionism, which seeks to erode Taiwan's de facto sovereignty through unified front operations, propaganda, and hybrid influence tactics aimed at eventual unification.[82] The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs cultural affinities—such as shared Confucian values, language, and ethnic ties—to normalize reunification narratives, including through state media videos blending traditional festivals with military imagery and songs like "Reunification is Winning."[83] These initiatives, part of broader united front strategies, target Taiwanese civil society, religious groups (e.g., via Mazu temples), and media proxies to foster pro-Beijing sentiment and exploit domestic polarization between pro-independence and pro-status quo factions.[82] In response, Taiwanese policymakers have pursued de-Sinicization to insulate society from such penetration, viewing it as essential for preserving democratic institutions against CCP coercion, as evidenced by Beijing's 2022 white paper reiterating Taiwan's subordination to the PRC.[84] Educational reforms exemplify this counterstrategy, with curriculum changes since the 1990s reducing emphasis on classical Chinese texts and imperial history to prioritize Taiwan's localized heritage and mitigate perceived indoctrination risks from Beijing-aligned narratives.[2] For instance, revisions have contextualized Chinese history within East Asian frameworks rather than as central, aiming to diminish cultural deference to the mainland amid rising CCP soft power attempts via censored media and economic incentives, which have largely backfired due to events like the 2015 Chou Tzuyu flag controversy and Hong Kong's 2019 crackdown.[85] These policies correlate with empirical shifts in identity: by 2023, 63% of Taiwanese identified exclusively as "Taiwanese," up from prior decades, reflecting backlash against PRC tactics that blend cultural appeals with political pressure.[85] Complementary measures include media literacy programs, bans on Chinese tech in public sectors, and regulations on foreign funding to political and religious entities, all designed to reduce vulnerability to hybrid threats without fully severing cultural exchanges.[82] Beyond education, de-Sinicization manifests in broader identity-building to counter PRC's exploitation of kinship networks and social trust for unification goals, as seen in efforts to diversify economic ties away from mainland dependency and promote Taiwan-specific cultural exports like baseball achievements.[83] This response is causally tied to intensified PRC aggression, including military gray-zone activities and disinformation campaigns, which have heightened public resolve: over 67% of Taiwanese supported government deportations of pro-unification influencers in 2025 polls.[86] While critics from Beijing frame these moves as erasing shared Han heritage for separatist ends, empirical data on failed soft power—evident in declining appeal of Chinese dramas and rising youth Taiwanese identification—underscore de-Sinicization's role in causal resilience against expansionist overreach.[85][2]Nation-Building in Post-Colonial Settings
In post-colonial contexts, de-Sinicization has functioned as a mechanism for forging cohesive national identities by diminishing Han Chinese cultural dominance, particularly where historical Sinicization intertwined with colonial legacies or diaspora influences. This process aids nation-building by redirecting collective loyalty toward indigenous or localized narratives, countering perceptions of external cultural hegemony that could undermine state legitimacy. For instance, in territories transitioning from foreign rule—whether European, Japanese, or mainland Chinese impositions—policymakers employed de-Sinicization to prioritize vernacular languages, histories, and symbols, thereby consolidating sovereignty and reducing ethnic fractiousness.[87][1] Taiwan exemplifies this dynamic following the 1945 end of Japanese colonial administration and the subsequent Kuomintang (KMT) era of imposed Mandarin-centric Sinicization from 1947 onward. Democratization after martial law lifted in 1987 enabled shifts toward Taiwanization under President Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000), including educational reforms from 1996 to 1999 that replaced China-oriented textbooks with Taiwan-focused curricula, such as the 1997 "Getting to Know Taiwan" program emphasizing local history and Hoklo (Taiwanese Minnan) language promotion. These measures evolved into explicit de-Sinicization under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) President Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), who introduced the 2001 Nine-Year Curriculum Guidelines limiting historical narratives to post-1500 events to highlight Taiwan's distinct trajectory and implemented 2003 remapping initiatives to visualize Taiwan as a standalone entity. The motivation stemmed from establishing Taiwanese subjectivity amid threats of absorption into Chinese identity, fostering unity among diverse groups like Hoklo, Hakka, and indigenous populations by severing cultural subordination to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1] In Southeast Asian post-colonial states, de-Sinicization similarly propelled nation-building by assimilating ethnic Chinese minorities—often viewed as economically dominant and politically suspect—into dominant indigenous frameworks, especially post-1945 independences. Indonesia's New Order regime under Suharto (1966–1998) enforced assimilation from the 1960s, banning Chinese-language schools, media, and public customs by 1967, prohibiting Chinese surnames via 1972 regulations, and restricting organizations to erode "Chineseness" amid anti-communist purges linking overseas Chinese to PRC influence. Malaysia post-1957 independence regulated Chinese economic roles through policies like the 1971 New Economic Policy, which privileged bumiputera (indigenous Malay) advancement, implicitly pressuring cultural dilution via intermarriage and localization to avert communal tensions rooted in colonial-era divides. These efforts were causally driven by imperatives for national unity, countering fears of dual loyalties during Cold War alignments against communism, and addressing colonial legacies that amplified Chinese visibility in commerce, thereby enabling states to construct monolithic identities centered on pribumi (native) or Malay primacy.[87][88][5]Criticisms, Controversies, and Counterarguments
Claims of Cultural Erasure and Historical Revisionism
Critics of de-Sinicization in Taiwan, particularly from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and mainland Chinese authorities, argue that educational reforms under Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administrations have systematically diminished the role of classical Chinese literature and history, effectively erasing shared cultural heritage. For instance, revisions to high school curricula since the early 2000s have reduced the emphasis on canonical texts like those of Confucius and Mencius, replacing portions with indigenous Taiwanese or Austronesian-focused content, which opponents claim severs students from their Han Chinese ancestral roots comprising over 95% of the population.[2][89] Historical revisionism allegations intensified in December 2023 when KMT lawmakers protested textbook changes that integrated Chinese history into a broader "East Asian" framework rather than as a central narrative, asserting this downplays Taiwan's millennia-long ties to the mainland and promotes a fabricated "Taiwanese-only" identity disconnected from empirical records of migration and governance under Chinese dynasties. Mainland spokespersons echoed these concerns in May 2025, condemning DPP leader Lai Ching-te's policies for "erasing" explicit recognition of Han ethnicity in official documents and curricula, which they described as an assault on cross-Strait cultural continuity evidenced by linguistic and genetic affinities.[90][91][89] In broader de-Sinicization efforts, such as renaming streets and public spaces to remove references to Chinese historical figures, detractors from pro-unification perspectives contend this constitutes cultural erasure by marginalizing artifacts of shared Sinic civilization, including temples and festivals with origins traceable to mainland traditions predating DPP governance. These claims are often framed by critics as politically motivated distortions, with state media on the mainland highlighting specific instances like the 2025 curriculum adjustments that allegedly prioritize "de-Sinicized" narratives over verifiable archaeological evidence of ancient Chinese influence in Taiwan.[92][93][94] Opposition voices within Taiwan, including KMT figures, have further accused reforms of fostering historical amnesia by underrepresenting events like the Republic of China's role in World War II victories against Japan, which they argue revises facts to align with separatist agendas rather than acknowledging documented alliances and territorial recoveries. While proponents of the reforms view them as correcting prior KMT-era Sinicization biases, the erasure claims persist, supported by surveys indicating public division, with around 40% of respondents in 2024 polls expressing concern over diminished Chinese cultural education.[28][2]Political Instrumentalization and Partisan Debates
In Taiwan, de-Sinicization efforts, particularly in education, have been instrumentalized by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to assert a distinct Taiwanese identity separate from mainland Chinese influence, serving as a mechanism to consolidate support among voters favoring localization over unification. Under President Tsai Ing-wen, the 2019 108 Curriculum guidelines reduced mandatory classical Chinese texts in high school literature from 30 to 15 selections, with the Ministry of Education stipulating that classical Chinese retain 35-45% of overall content to prioritize modern comprehension skills.[2] DPP figures, including 2024 presidential candidate William Lai, have framed these reforms not as erasure but as flexible guidelines correcting the KMT's historical emphasis on China-centric narratives, pointing to empirical gains like Taiwan's PISA reading ranking improvement from 16th in 2018 to 5th in 2022.[2] Opposition from the pan-Blue camp, led by the Kuomintang (KMT), portrays these policies as partisan de-Sinicization aimed at ideological indoctrination and cultural severance, leveraging public discontent to rally culturally conservative bases during elections. In the lead-up to the January 2024 presidential vote, KMT candidate Hou Yu-ih vowed a curriculum overhaul, amplifying criticisms from educators like Alice Ou, who on December 4, 2023, decried the guidelines as "shameless" for diminishing classical Chinese, previously comprising 45-65% of language materials.[90][2] Similar accusations recurred under prior DPP President Chen Shui-bian, whose 2004 standalone Taiwanese history curriculum drew KMT protests for "turning back on ancestors," highlighting how such debates recur cyclically to frame opponents as threats to heritage.[2] These exchanges underscore a broader partisan rift tying de-Sinicization to cross-strait tensions, with KMT critiques aligning with Beijing's narrative—evident in over 140 People's Republic of China media articles from 2023 decrying DPP actions as futile against shared cultural roots—while DPP counters emphasize reclamation from KMT's martial law-era (1949-1987) Sinicization, which suppressed local languages and histories.[2][1] Critics within Taiwan, including some academics, argue the reforms risk exam-textbook misalignment and exacerbate urban-rural educational divides, yet both parties exploit the issue for electoral mobilization rather than resolving underlying identity fault lines empirically.[2]Empirical Assessments of Effectiveness
In Taiwan, longitudinal surveys by the National Chengchi University Election Study Center demonstrate a marked shift toward exclusive Taiwanese identity, rising from 17.3% in 1992 to 62.4% in June 2023, while self-identification as exclusively Chinese declined from 25.5% to 2.4% over the same period.[3] This trend correlates with de-Sinicization policies initiated in the 1990s under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), including curriculum reforms emphasizing Taiwanese history and indigenous languages, though critics attribute part of the change to generational turnover and reactions to mainland China's assertiveness rather than policy alone.[95] A 2024 Pew Research Center survey reinforces this, finding 67% of respondents identifying primarily as Taiwanese versus 3% as primarily Chinese.[4] Causal evidence from a 2022 study exploiting Taiwan's 2006 high school history curriculum reform—which decoupled Taiwan-specific history from broader Chinese narratives—indicates that exposure to the revised curriculum increased exclusive Taiwanese identification by approximately 10 percentage points among students in regular-track schools compared to vocational tracks less affected by the change.[96] The reform, part of broader de-Sinicization efforts to foster distinct national consciousness, used representative survey data from over 1,000 respondents to isolate curriculum effects from confounding factors like family background, suggesting policies can shape identity formation, though long-term persistence remains subject to political cycles, as Taiwanese identity dipped temporarily post-2016 before rebounding.[97]| Year Range | Taiwanese Only (%) | Chinese Only (%) | Both (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1992 | 17.3 | 25.5 | 57.2 |
| 2000 | 36.9 | 12.5 | 50.6 |
| 2010 | 51.0 | 3.8 | 45.2 |
| 2020 | 64.3 | 2.6 | 31.4 |
| 2023 | 62.4 | 2.4 | 33.2 |
