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Islamism in the Gaza Strip
Islamism in the Gaza Strip
Islamism in the Gaza Strip
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Islamism in the Gaza Strip involves efforts to promote and impose Islamic laws and traditions in the Gaza Strip, both by the ruling Hamas government and other Islamist anti-Hamas groups in the region. The influence of Islamic groups in the Gaza Strip has grown since the 1980s. Following Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections and a conflict with supporters of the rival Fatah party, Hamas took complete control of the Gaza Strip,[1][2][3] and declared the "end of secularism and heresy in the Gaza Strip".[4] Gaza human-rights groups accuse Hamas of restricting many freedoms.[2]

In 2009, Ismael Haniyeh officially denied accusations that Hamas intended to establish an Islamic emirate.[5][6] However, Jonathan Schanzer wrote that in two years following the Hamas takeover, the Gaza Strip had exhibited the characteristics of Talibanization,[5] a process whereby the Hamas government had imposed strict rules on women, discouraged activities commonly associated with Western culture, oppressed non-Muslim minorities, imposed sharia law, and deployed religious police to enforce these laws.[5]

According to a Human Rights Watch researcher, the Hamas-controlled government of Gaza stepped up its efforts to "Islamize" Gaza in 2010, efforts that included the "repression" of civil society and "severe violations of personal freedom".[7] Israeli journalist Khaled Abu Toameh wrote in 2009 that "Hamas is gradually turning the Gaza Strip into a Taliban-style Islamic entity".[8] According to Mkhaimar Abusada, a political-science professor at Gaza's Al-Azhar University, "Ruling by itself, Hamas can stamp its ideas on everyone (...) Islamizing society has always been part of Hamas strategy."[9]

Women

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Dress code for women

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1970s to 1980s

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Successful coercion of women by sectors of society to wear Islamic dress or hijab has been reported in Gaza where Mujama' al-Islami, the predecessor of Hamas, reportedly used a mixture of consent and coercion to "'restore' hijab" on urban educated women in Gaza in the late 1970s and 1980s.[10]

1980s to 1990s

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Similar behavior was displayed by Hamas during the First Intifada.[11] Hamas campaigned for the wearing of the hijab alongside other measures, including insisting women stay at home, segregation from men and the promotion of polygamy. In the course of this campaign, women who chose not to wear the hijab were verbally and physically harassed, with the result that the hijab was being worn 'just to avoid problems on the streets'.[12]

2007 Swords of Truth threat

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In 2007, Islamic group Swords of Truth threatened to behead female TV broadcasters if they didn't wear strict Islamic dress. "We will cut throats, and from vein to vein, if needed to protect the spirit and moral of this nation," their statement said. The group also accused the women broadcasters of being "without any ... shame or morals." Personal threats against female broadcasters were also sent to the women's mobile phones, though it was not clear if these threats were from the same group. Gazan anchorwomen interviewed by the Associated Press said that they were frightened by the Swords of Truth's statement.[13]

2009 rules for female lawyers

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After taking control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas tried to enforce Islamic law in the territory, imposing the hijab on women at courts, institutions and schools.[14][15][16]

Some of the Islamization efforts met resistance. When Palestinian Supreme Court Justice Abdel Raouf Al-Halabi ordered female lawyers to wear headscarves and caftans in court, attorneys contacted satellite television stations to protest, including Saudi state media outlet Al Arabiya, causing Hamas' Justice Ministry to cancel the directive.[9]

2009 Detention of Asma al-Ghul

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In 2009, Asma al-Ghul, a female Palestinian journalist, stated that Hamas policemen attempted to arrest her under the pretext that she came to a Gaza beach dressed immodestly and was seen laughing in public. "They accused me of laughing loudly while swimming with my friend and failing to wear a hijab," Ghul told a human rights organization in the Gaza Strip.[clarification needed] "They also wanted to know the identity of the people who were with me at the beach and whether they were relatives of mine." Al-Ghul added that the officers confiscated her passport, and that she had received death threats from anonymous callers following the incident.[17] Regarding the incident, Hamas security commanders[clarification needed] initially said that al-Ghul and her friends were stopped because they were having a mixed party at the beach. Later, one of the commanders said that al-Ghul was stopped for not wearing a hijab while swimming. Another commander said that the offense was smoking nargilas and partying in a public place.[17] Islam Shahwan, the Hamas police spokesman, denied the detention of al-Ghul.[13]

Typical clothing in the 2020s

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In the early 2020s women have tended to dress conservatively in the Gaza Strip, but traditionally Islamic dress codes such as head scarves were not mandatory for all. Gazan Christian women do not often wear headscarves, particularly at Christian gatherings or Christian venues like the YMCA in Gaza City.

Jamila al-Shanti

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Main article: Jamila Abdallah Taha al-Shanti

Islamisation of other women's issues

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In 2009, Hamas banned girls from riding behind men on motor scooters and forbade women from dancing.[18]

The Hamas-led government briefly implemented, then revoked, a ban on women smoking in public.[19] In 2010, Hamas banned the smoking of hookah by women in public, stating that it was to reduce the increasing number of divorces.[20]

In March 2010, Hamas tried to impose a ban on women receiving salon treatment from male hairdressers, issuing orders by Interior Minister Fathi Hammad and threatening offenders with arrest and trial. The group backed down after an outcry. In February 2011, according to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, Hamas attempted to renew the ban, interrogating the five male hairdressers in Gaza City and forcing them to sign declarations that they wouldn't work in women's salons. According to one of the hairdressers, police called the five into a room where an unrelated detainee was chained to a wall by his wrists and told to sign a pledge to give up their profession or face arrest and a 20,000 shekel fine. The man initially refused but signed after his captors threatened "to take you to the cells because what you do is against Sharia". During Hamas's reign over the strip, several beauty parlors and hair salons have been the target of explosions and other attacks, which Hamas has blamed on opposition groups. Male hairdressers for women in the conservative territory are rare.[21][22][23]

In 2013, UNRWA canceled its annual marathon in Gaza after Hamas rulers prohibited women from participating in the race.[24]

In 2015, Hamas banned New Year's Eve celebrations based on the Gregorian calendar, stating that such celebrations "offended the territory's values and religious traditions." This was after the Islamic New Year had begun in October.[25]

Polygamy

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Polygamy has burgeoned under the Hamas government, and the overall rate of marriage has decreased.[26][27] Polygamy was already practised in some Bedouin communities in Israel, and some Palestinians with Israeli citizenship, particularly in the Negev desert (Arabic pronunciation: Naqab) surrounding the Gaza Strip.[28][29][30][31][32]

Book banning

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In 2007, the banning of a book of Palestinian folktales, Speak, Bird, Speak Again, which is a collection of 45 Palestinian folk tales, because of some supposedly lewd content, caused an outcry.[33] The Palestinian novelist Zakariya Mohammed warned that Hamas' decision to ban the book was "only the beginning" and he urged intellectuals to take action. He said: "If we don't stand up to the Islamists now, they won't stop confiscating books, songs and folklore".[34] The decision to ban the book was shortly thereafter reversed due to widespread outcry.[35]

Music and entertainment

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One of the most obvious difference between Hamas and the smaller more fundamentalist groups in the Gaza Strip is music.[36] Hamas do not object to most music,[36] and music has long been a key element of the Palestinian Nationalist movement.[37][38]

Entertainment venue bombings (2006-2007)

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Beginning in October 2006, during the Fatah-Hamas conflict, and continuing into mid-2007, dozens of Internet cafes and music shops in Gaza were attacked by unknown assailants who detonated small bombs outside businesses at night, causing damage but no injuries. Ramzi Shaheen, the Gaza police spokesman, told Ha'aretz in 2007 that the method of operation was always the same but that they had no hard proof as to who was behind the attacks and had yet to make arrests. Ramzi Abu Hilao, a pool hall owner whose establishment was blown up said he had received no prior warning but that, "I received a written message after the bombing from a group called 'The Swords of Truth' that began with a verse from the Quran and said they wanted to correct the bad behavior in Palestinian society."[39] Hamas spokesman Ismail Ridwan denied any connection with the group.[13]

Police said that no credible claims of responsibility had been made for the attacks, dismissing a statement that appeared on a news Web site in December from an unknown group with alleged links to Al-Qaeda. Haaretz noted that, "There has been no conclusive proof that Al-Qaida has established a Gaza branch. Observers believe the vice squad is most likely homegrown."[39]

Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in 2007

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In 2007, the Gaza Strip's Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which at the time claimed to be independent of the Hamas government, beat up a local singer in Gaza after he gave a concert in Khan Younis, according to the London-based newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi.[40]

Arab Idol 2013

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In 2013, Gazan singer Mohammed Assaf won Arab Idol, a regional singing competition TV show. A Hamas spokesperson initially condemned the name and idea of the show as blasphemous, but later a Hamas legislator praised Assaf as the "ambassador for Palestinian art".[41]

ISIS sympathisers in 2021

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In August 2021, ISIS-inspired groups in the Gaza Strip accused Bianco Resort, one of the Gaza Strip's most luxurious seaside tourist sites, of holding a music concert for men and women, before attacking the resort with an explosive device.[42]

Police raid on hip hop concert in 2010

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In April 2010, Hamas sent police to break up the Gaza Strip's first major hip-hop concert, which it viewed as immoral conduct. It said organizers failed to get a permit.[43]

Water park

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Crazy Water Park, Gaza Strip

In 2010, human rights activists said that Hamas stepped up its efforts to impose strict Islamic teachings in the Gaza Strip. Crazy Water Park, one of the Gaza Strip's most popular entertainment sites, was closed down by Hamas for allowing mixed bathing. Two weeks later, the site was set on fire by a group of unknown gunmen. The Hamas government issued a strong condemnation and promised to pursue the perpetrators. The government had already a week earlier ordered the closure of Crazy Water Park for three weeks due to it not having a proper license.[44]

Although it is not clear which Islamist group was behind the action, Islamist militants who objected to mixed-gender socializing destroyed Gaza's water park.[1][2][45][46]

Children's summer camps

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In May 2010, a previously unknown militant group calling itself "The Free of the Homeland" issued a statement criticizing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), for running camps in the Gaza Strip "teaching schoolgirls fitness, dancing and immorality". Two days later, about 20 men armed with assault rifles attacked a UNRWA-run summer camp. The assailants tore up large plastic tents and burned storage facilities at the site, according to an eyewitness. John Ging, UNRWA's director of operations in Gaza, called the incident "an attack on the happiness of children". A Hamas spokesman condemned the attack and pledged authorities "will track down the perpetrators".[43]

In a separate incident in June 2010, a group of about two dozen armed and masked men attacked a UNRWA summer camp in Gaza. The assailants tied up an unarmed guard, then tried to set fire to two tents and a perimeter fence. They also used knives, slashing a plastic swimming pool, blow-up slide and toys. John Ging called it a "cowardly and despicable" attack. Hamas condemned the attack and said it was investigating.[47]

Other prohibitions

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The "Islamic Endowment Ministry" created by the Hamas administration has deployed Virtue Committee members to warn people of the dangers of dating, card playing and immodest dress.[9] The government has also imposed temporary closures on facilities like the cafes of the Crazy Water Park and the Faisal Equestrian Club where men and women were mingling socially.[48][49]

It was reported that young Palestinians in Gaza were being targeted by Islamist gunmen and Hamas security forces for wearing hair gel, with some of them being beaten and shaved against their will.[50]

In 2008, Hamas instructed the main Palestinian telecoms company, Paltel to block access to pornographic internet sites. "Palestinian society suffers because of such immoral sites. We have therefore taken the decision to protect morality, and this remains our policy," said Hamas telecommunications minister Yussef al-Mansi.[51][52]

Men are banned from swimming topless.[17]

Hamas banned public dog walking in May 2017, stating it was to "protect our women and children". Hamas officials stated that the ban was in response to a rise in dog walking on the streets which they stated was "against culture and traditions in Gaza".[53]

Effects on Christian population

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In 2007, about 3,000 Gazans were Christian, out of the total population of 1.5 million.[54] In 2011, the Christian population of Gaza Strip was less than 1,400.[55] Attacks on Christians and their property are rare,[56] with the notable exception of those on The Teacher's Bookshop. A member of the Catholic faith told The Guardian he was stopped by a Hamas official and told to remove a wooden crucifix he was wearing; he refused and was threatened with arrest, but eventually was let go.[57]

In 2007, Islamism was putting pressure on the tiny Christian minority.[58] Following the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007, Abu Saqer, leader of Jihadia Salafiya, a rival group to Hamas,[59] announced the opening of a "military wing" to enforce Muslim law in Gaza. "I expect our Christian neighbors to understand the new Hamas rule means real changes. They must be ready for Islamic rule if they want to live in peace in Gaza."[60] Sheik Saqer has asserted that there is "no need" for Christians in Gaza to maintain a large number of institutions in the territory and demanded that Hamas "must work to impose an Islamic rule or it will lose the authority it has and the will of the people."[61]

In October 2007, Rami Khader Ayyad, owner of Gaza's only Christian bookstore, was abducted, beaten and murdered, after his bookstore was firebombed by an unidentified group attacking targets associated with Western influence. According to Ayyad's family and neighbors, he had regularly received anonymous death threats from people angered by his missionary work. Ismail Haniyeh, leader of Hamas in Gaza, condemned Ayyad's killing and said Hamas "would not allow anyone to sabotage Muslim-Christian relations." Hamas officials made visits to Christian community, and its spokesman promised to bring those responsible to justice. No group claimed responsibility for the murder.[54][62][63]

Ayyad's funeral was attended by 300 Muslims and Christians. The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights stated "This ugly act has no support by any religious group here."[56]

In 2012, a public protest was organized by dozens of Christians who claimed that two Christians were forcibly converted to Islam and were being held against their will. According to two mediators, the two Christians embraced Islam of their own free will. The conversions have the minority Christian population worried, and Huda Al-Amash, the mother of one of the converts, Ramez, stated, "If things remain like this, there'll be no Christians left in Gaza." Gaza's Archbishop Alexious said that the converts should be returned to their families.[64][65]

Conflict between Hamas and more extreme groups

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See also: Islamist anti-Hamas groups in the Gaza Strip

In 2015 – coinciding with the rise of the self-described "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and in the neighbouring "Sinai Province" – the Hamas led government launched a campaign to combat “extremist ideology” in the Gaza Strip.[66]

Taliban comparisons

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Further information: Islam and nationalism

Criticism by other Palestinians

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Palestinian researcher Dr. Khaled Al-Hroub has criticized what he called the "Taliban-like steps" Hamas has taken. He wrote, "The Islamization that has been forced upon the Gaza Strip – the suppression of social, cultural, and press freedoms that do not suit Hamas's view[s] – is an egregious deed that must be opposed. It is the reenactment, under a religious guise, of the experience of [other] totalitarian regimes and dictatorships".[67] Extremist Islamist groups like ISIS object to both Hamas and the Taliban for their nationalism.[68][69][70]

Allegations of "Talibanization" by Hamas

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Jonathan Schanzer, American intelligence analyst: "The Gaza Strip has exhibited the characteristics of Talibanization, whereby the Islamist organization imposed strict rules on women, discouraged activities commonly associated with Western or Christian culture, oppressed non-Muslim minorities, imposed sharia law, and deployed religious police to enforce these laws"[5]

According to Francesca Giovannini of the University of California Berkeley, a growing number of analysts have denounced openly the "systematic, massive and explicit efforts" at 'Talibanization' led by Hamas in the Gaza Strip.[71]

Israeli-Arab journalist Khaled Abu Toameh wrote in 2009 that Hamas is gradually turning the Gaza Strip into a Taliban-style Islamic entity.[8]

In the same year, Martin Peretz, editor-in-chief of The New Republic, wrote that:

The fact is that Hamas is a Taliban state, as one Israeli diplomat put it. This is almost an epiphany, a clarifying truth. Hamas operates against its Palestinian enemies like the Taliban does against its Afghani enemies. Imagine a Hamas squad enters a kindergarten in a kibbutz. Neither the Taliban nor Hamas strive for earthly aims. Armed with instruments of death, they each fight for a heavenly design. But on earth.... The Taliban are not analogous to Hamas. They are identical, equivalent. A ceasefire with Hamas is a delusion. Engage with whom?[72]

Director general of the Palestinian interior ministry, Samir Mashharawi, said to the London daily Al-Hayat: "Hamas aims to establish a mini-state in the Gaza Strip modeled on the Taliban [state] in Afghanistan.".[73] According to Jonathan Fighel, a senior researcher at the International Institute for Counter Terrorism (ICT), the ideological and strategic goal of Hamas is to destroy Israel in order to build on it a Sharia Islamic Taliban-style state.[74]

In 2008, Following the bitter Fatah–Hamas conflict, Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian National Authority, warned the Palestinian people against Hamas: "Hamas have brought Hizballah and Iran... This is a struggle against the Emirate of Darkness and Backwardness. Gaza will turn into a Taliban-style Islamic emirate with Iranian and Syrian support."[75]

Al-Ayyam columnist, Abd Al-Nasser Al-Najjar, called Hamas "the new Taliban" and wrote: "How will the mini-state of the new Taliban [i.e. Hamas] manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip under a suffocating international siege?... Will they implement the laws of Islam?... An Islamic state [ruled by] the new Taliban has become a reality in Gaza."[76]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Islamism in the Gaza Strip

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Islamism in the Gaza Strip denotes the ascendancy of political movements advocating Islamic governance and resistance against , dominated by , a Sunni Islamist organization that has controlled the territory since its violent ouster of forces in June 2007. , originating as the Palestinian branch of the , fuses Islamist ideology with nationalist aspirations, promoting as a religious to liberate and rejecting 's existence as incompatible with Islamic principles. This framework has shaped Gaza's polity, economy, and society, prioritizing militarization and ideological conformity over pluralistic development. Hamas's rule has featured the institutionalization of conservative Islamic practices, including restrictions on dress, gender segregation, and media content aligned with interpretations, alongside suppression of secular opposition and rival Islamist factions like Salafi-jihadists. The group's dual governance—civil administration intertwined with its military wing, the Brigades—has sustained cycles of conflict, including rocket barrages and against , often at the expense of civilian welfare and economic diversification. While Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections democratically, its subsequent authoritarian consolidation and designation as a terrorist entity by multiple governments underscore the tensions between its Islamist vision and international norms.

Historical Development

Early Influences and Muslim Brotherhood Roots (1940s-1980s)

The established a presence in during the 1930s, with branches forming in Gaza amid growing opposition to British rule and Zionist settlement; this expansion was facilitated by ties between Brotherhood founder and Palestinian leaders like Haj Amin al-Husseini, including meetings by al-Banna's brother Abd al-Rahman in 1935. By the 1940s, the group had organized local cells in Gaza focused on and anti-colonial agitation, though its activities remained limited compared to its Egyptian base until after the 1948 war displaced over 200,000 into the Strip. Under Egyptian administration from 1948 to 1967, the Brotherhood operated semi-clandestinely, providing aid through informal welfare networks despite periodic repression by , which accused it of sponsoring border infiltrations into and cracked down following the 1952 Free Officers coup. In the refugee camps of Gaza, the Brotherhood emphasized da'wa (Islamic propagation) and social services, distributing food, establishing Quranic schools, and promoting moral reform to counter secular and communist influences among the displaced population. This approach gained traction in the and early , as the group built a network of mosques and charities that addressed poverty and illiteracy, drawing recruits from youth disillusioned by Egypt's military failures, such as the 1956 . Egyptian authorities tolerated limited Brotherhood activities in Gaza as a bulwark against Nasserist rivals but banned overt political organizing, confining the movement to cultural and religious spheres until the 1967 shifted control to . Following Israel's occupation of Gaza in 1967, the Brotherhood adopted a strategy of non-confrontational institution-building, prioritizing societal Islamization over immediate armed resistance against the Palestine Liberation Organization's secular dominance. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, paralyzed in a 1952 accident and influenced by Brotherhood teachings during studies in , emerged as a key figure; in 1973, he founded as a Gaza-based Islamic association, officially registered as a charity by Israeli authorities in 1979, which enabled it to expand unchecked. focused on constructing over 200 mosques, schools, and clinics by the mid-1980s, alongside the 1978 establishment of the , aiming to inculcate Brotherhood ideology—emphasizing governance, as personal struggle, and rejection of Western secularism—among the youth. Israeli tolerance of Mujama stemmed from its apolitical facade, viewing it as a to leftist factions, though this overlooked the group's long-term Islamist objectives rooted in al-Banna's vision of comprehensive . By the late 1980s, these networks had solidified the Brotherhood's dominance in Gaza's Islamist landscape, setting the stage for militant evolution.

Formation of Hamas During the First Intifada (1987-1993)

The First Intifada erupted on December 9, 1987, following a traffic incident in Gaza where an Israeli truck collided with Palestinian vehicles, killing four workers and sparking widespread protests against Israeli occupation. In Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood's local branch, which had operated through the charitable organization Mujama al-Islamiya since its founding in 1978 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, viewed the uprising as an opportunity to assert an Islamist alternative to the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Mujama al-Islamiya, initially tolerated and even licensed by Israeli authorities in 1979 as a non-political Islamic welfare group providing mosques, schools, and clinics, had built a network of grassroots support in Gaza's refugee camps and neighborhoods, contrasting with the PLO's nationalist focus. Hamas, acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), emerged as the armed offshoot of this Brotherhood network in late December 1987, with its first public communique dated December 14, 1987, calling for against and rejecting compromise with the occupier. Led by Yassin alongside figures like and , positioned itself as a defender of Islamic principles amid the 's chaos of stone-throwing youth, boycotts, and underground cells, initially competing with PLO-affiliated factions like for control of protests in Gaza. By early 1988, formalized its structure, issuing leaflets that emphasized religious duty over secular nationalism, and began conducting knifings, Molotov attacks, and kidnappings, which by 1989 accounted for a growing share of violence in Gaza. The group's ideological foundation was codified in its charter, published on August 18, 1988, which declared as "one of the wings of the in " and framed the conflict as a religious struggle for an Islamic (endowment) land from the to the , rejecting any territorial concessions or peace negotiations with . The charter invoked as the sole path to liberation, cited antisemitic tropes from earlier Islamist texts, and portrayed Jews as eternal enemies, reflecting the Brotherhood's transnational influence while adapting it to local Palestinian grievances. This document galvanized recruitment in Gaza, where leveraged Mujama's —such as aid to 40% of Gazan families by the early 1990s—to build loyalty, while its military wing, Brigades, formed in 1991-1992, prepared for escalation beyond the Intifada's non-lethal tactics. By the Intifada's end in 1993, following the , had established itself as a dual social-political-military force in Gaza, with thousands of operatives, challenging the PLO's monopoly and sustaining resistance through bombings and ambushes that killed over 100 during the period. Israeli crackdowns, including the 1989 arrest and deportation of Yassin and 400 members to , inadvertently boosted the group's profile by forging ties with and enhancing its martyr narrative. 's rise capitalized on Gaza's dense population, poverty, and Brotherhood mosques—numbering over 300 by 1987—as mobilization hubs, embedding deeply into the Strip's resistance culture.

Post-Oslo Era and Second Intifada (1993-2005)

Following the signing of the on September 13, 1993, which established limited Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and parts of the under the newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA), rejected the agreement as a betrayal of Islamist principles and a concession to . leaders, including spiritual head Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, denounced the accords for implying recognition of 's right to exist, contrary to the group's charter calling for to liberate all of historic . From Gaza, organized systematic sabotage efforts, including bombings and assassinations targeting both Israelis and PA officials collaborating with the process, to undermine implementation and portray the PA as illegitimate. These actions positioned as the authentic voice of resistance, enhancing its grassroots support through parallel Islamist institutions like charities and mosques that filled gaps in PA governance. In the years leading to the Second Intifada, Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, intensified operations from Gaza, conducting cross-border raids and early improvised explosive attacks while expanding recruitment among disillusioned youth. By 1996, Hamas had carried out multiple suicide bombings inside , such as the August 1995 attack on a Jerusalem bus killing five, which it framed as retaliation for Israeli actions but timed to disrupt peace negotiations. Yassin, operating from despite his paralysis, directed these efforts, providing ideological justification rooted in Islamist duty to resist normalization with . The group's dual civilian-military structure in Gaza allowed it to evade PA crackdowns, fostering a shadow governance that emphasized sharia-based social services over secular PA policies. The Second Intifada erupted on September 28, 2000, following Ariel Sharon's visit to the , triggering widespread clashes in Gaza and the that quickly embraced as an opportunity to revive jihadist momentum against Oslo's perceived failures. In Gaza, coordinated ambushes, mortar fire, and the first launches starting in 2001, targeting Israeli settlements and communities like , while glorifying "martyrdom operations" to rally support. The group claimed responsibility for dozens of suicide bombings during the intifada, including high-profile attacks like the June 1, 2001, Dolphinarium disco bombing in killing 21, mostly youths, which originated from Gaza networks. These operations, often involving bombers dispatched from Gaza mosques, resulted in over 1,000 Israeli fatalities overall, with responsible for a significant portion, bolstering its popularity in Gaza as the PA appeared ineffective against Israeli responses. Israel's counteroperations in Gaza escalated, including targeted killings of Hamas operatives, culminating in the March 22, 2004, helicopter missile strike on Yassin as he exited a mosque after dawn prayers, killing him and eight others. Yassin's successor, , assumed leadership but was assassinated by on April 17, 2004, in a similar , temporarily disrupting command but not halting attacks. , another Gaza-based Islamist group, complemented with parallel suicide operations, such as the October 2003 Maxim restaurant bombing in killing 21, reinforcing the Islamist rejection of negotiations. By 2005, as prepared unilateral disengagement from Gaza settlements, Islamist factions had solidified control over militant activities there, with 's resistance narrative eclipsing Fatah's diplomatic approach amid PA internal divisions and corruption perceptions. This era marked a causal shift: Islamist violence not only derailed but entrenched 's dominance in Gaza's socio-political fabric, setting the stage for future confrontations.

Electoral Victory, Civil Conflict, and Takeover (2006-2007)

In the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections held on January 25, , running as the Change and Reform List, secured a surprise victory by winning 74 of the 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, compared to Fatah's 45 seats, despite receiving only about 44% of the popular vote due to the electoral system's district-based structure favoring concentrated support. The elections, urged by the as part of a push for democratic reform following Yasser Arafat's death in 2004 and Mahmoud Abbas's presidential win in 2005, saw high estimated at around 77%, reflecting widespread disillusionment with Fatah's governance marked by , , and stalled negotiations with . Hamas leader was appointed prime minister in March 2006, forming a government that refused to recognize , renounce violence, or accept prior agreements, prompting the , , and to impose financial sanctions and withhold , which crippled the Authority's budget and exacerbated economic hardship. Tensions between and escalated into sporadic violence starting in late 2005 but intensifying post-election, with mutual assassinations, kidnappings of security personnel, and street clashes in Gaza claiming dozens of lives by mid-2006; for instance, 's Executive Force militia targeted -aligned preventive security forces, while loyalists struck back at operatives. A brief respite came with the Mecca Agreement on February 8, 2007, brokered by , which established a unity government under Haniyeh with participation to share power and security control, but underlying rivalries over armed factions—Hamas's Islamist militias versus 's secular forces—persisted, fueled by ideological divides and competition for patronage in Gaza's impoverished economy. By early June 2007, provocations escalated: forces, reportedly bolstered by covert U.S. arms supplies to counter , clashed with gunmen, but 's Brigades demonstrated superior discipline and unity, launching coordinated attacks on strongholds. The decisive Battle of Gaza unfolded from June 10 to 15, 2007, as Hamas forces overran Fatah-controlled security compounds in a series of ambushes and sieges, killing over 160 Palestinians—mostly Fatah fighters—and routing Abbas's loyalists, who fled or surrendered amid reports of executions and torture by Hamas militants. On June 14, Abbas dismissed the unity government from Ramallah and declared a state of emergency, appointing an emergency cabinet in the West Bank, but Hamas consolidated full control over Gaza's institutions, including border crossings and ministries, effectively partitioning Palestinian governance along factional lines with Hamas enforcing Islamist rule in the Strip. This takeover, rooted in Hamas's military edge from years of clandestine buildup and Fatah's fragmented command, marked the entrenchment of Islamism in Gaza at the expense of secular nationalism, though it isolated the territory further amid international non-recognition.

Ideological Foundations

Core Tenets of Islamism: Jihad, Sharia, and Rejection of Israel

in the Gaza Strip, particularly as articulated by and allied groups like , emphasizes as an obligatory armed struggle to reclaim territory viewed as perpetually Islamic endowment (). The explicitly positions as the sole path to resolving the conflict, rejecting diplomatic initiatives or peaceful compromises in favor of holy war against , with Article 13 stating, "There is no solution for the Palestinian problem except by . Initiatives, proposals and international conferences are all a waste of time and availing of nothing." This interpretation frames military action not merely as defense but as a religious imperative to expand Islamic dominion, drawing on selective hadiths that endorse violence against as a precursor to apocalyptic judgment. While issued a 2017 policy document pragmatically accepting a Palestinian state on borders for tactical purposes, it reaffirmed the legitimacy of "all means of resistance," including armed , without renouncing the charter's core militant ethos. Sharia serves as the foundational legal and moral code for Islamist governance in Gaza, with the Hamas charter designating the Quran as its constitution and Islam as the guiding ideology for state and society. Article 8 of the charter encapsulates this by affirming, "Allah is its [Hamas's] target, the Prophet is its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the loftiest of its wishes." Proponents argue that only under sharia can authentic justice prevail, rejecting secular or Western legal systems as corrupt and incompatible with divine sovereignty. This tenet manifests ideologically in calls for an Islamic caliphate-like order where personal conduct, family law, and public policy align with strict interpretations of fiqh, including hudud punishments and gender segregation, though practical implementation has been tempered by wartime exigencies and aid dependencies. The rejection of Israel's existence forms an existential pillar, rooted in the doctrine that historic Palestine constitutes inalienable Islamic land unfit for non-Muslim sovereignty. Hamas's founding charter asserts in Article 11 that "The land of Palestine is an Islamic [endowment] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day," precluding any partition or recognition of Jewish as a violation of religious trust. This stance intertwines with and by portraying Israel not as a political adversary but as an occupier whose eradication is divinely mandated, evidenced by charter references to exterminatory hadiths and the absence of reciprocity in peace processes. The 2017 document, while de-emphasizing some antisemitic rhetoric for broader appeal, upholds armed resistance against the "Zionist entity" and omits any endorsement of 's legitimacy, preserving the ideological commitment to its dissolution. Such tenets distinguish Gazan from secular by subordinating territorial to theological absolutism.

Hamas Charter, Evolution, and Muslim Brotherhood Linkage

Hamas originated as a Palestinian offshoot of the , with its founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin establishing the group in December 1987 during the as the militant arm of the Brotherhood's Gaza branch, which had focused on social and religious activities since the . The Brotherhood's influence infused Hamas with an Islamist ideology emphasizing , governance, and the rejection of secular nationalism, adapting the transnational Brotherhood model to local Palestinian resistance against . This linkage positioned Hamas as a synthesis of pan-Islamic revivalism and , diverging from the Brotherhood's earlier quietist approach in Gaza by prioritizing armed struggle. The group's foundational document, the "Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement," was published on August 18, 1988, explicitly framing as a Brotherhood extension dedicated to liberating all of historic through . Key provisions include Article 13, which rejects political compromise or negotiation as solutions, insisting that "there is no solution for the Palestinian question except through ," and Article 7, which invokes a prophesying ' victory over on the Day of Judgment. The charter portrays as an illegitimate Zionist entity to be eradicated, incorporates antisemitic tropes such as references to the Protocols of the Elders of , and mandates raising generations for perpetual holy war against and Western imperialism. Over time, Hamas' ideology evolved pragmatically while retaining core Brotherhood-inspired commitments to Islamist supremacy and armed resistance, influenced by needs and regional alliances. In May 2017, issued "A Document of General Principles and Policies," a 42-point statement supplementing rather than superseding the 1988 charter, which toned down overt by claiming the conflict targets "Zionist occupiers" rather than per se and pragmatically referenced a state on 1967 borders without recognizing . However, it reaffirmed rejection of 's existence, endorsed comprehensive resistance including military action, and upheld as the basis for , signaling tactical moderation for international legitimacy amid electoral and diplomatic pressures rather than ideological renunciation. This evolution reflects ' shift from pure militancy to hybrid in Gaza, yet Brotherhood roots persist in its fusion of (proselytization) with violent .

Distinctions from Secular Palestinian Nationalism

Islamism in Gaza, as embodied by , derives its legitimacy from religious doctrine rather than secular national identity, positing the land of as an —an Islamic endowment consecrated for Muslim generations in perpetuity, precluding any territorial concessions or peaceful resolution short of . This contrasts sharply with secular , led by and the PLO, which frames the struggle as a political and amenable to and , without invoking divine mandate. explicitly denounces as antithetical to Islamic , asserting that "secularism completely contradicts religious ideology" and that attitudes and decisions must stem from religious principles. In terms of conflict resolution, Islamist rejection of Israel's legitimacy is absolute and religiously grounded, with the 1988 Hamas Covenant prohibiting recognition, negotiation, or surrender of any part of , viewing such acts as betrayal of Islamic trust. Secular nationalists, however, pursued diplomatic engagement; the PLO formally recognized Israel's right to exist in exchange for Israeli acknowledgment of Palestinian representation during the 1993 , aiming for a based on 1967 borders. Hamas opposed these accords as capitulation, launching suicide bombings during the Second Intifada to derail them, prioritizing religious militancy over pragmatic state-building. Governance under Islamism emphasizes enforcement of Sharia-derived norms, including restrictions on gender mixing, mandatory veiling for women, and suppression of secular or liberal expressions deemed un-Islamic, as seen in Gaza post-2007 where declared an end to " and ." Fatah's administration in the , by contrast, maintains a more secular legal framework inherited from prior systems, with less emphasis on religious policing and greater tolerance for diverse social practices, reflecting its nationalist rather than theocratic orientation. Ultimately, while both movements share anti-Israel militancy and Palestinian territorial aspirations, subordinates to a pan-Islamic vision of restoring dar al-Islam, rejecting hybrid secular-religious governance in favor of comprehensive Islamization; secular prioritizes sovereign statehood through alliances and elections, accommodating non-religious without mandating supremacy.

Key Islamist Organizations

Hamas: Structure, Leadership, and Dual Role

Hamas operates as a hierarchical organization divided into distinct yet interconnected wings, primarily the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades as its military arm, responsible for armed operations including rocket attacks, tunnel networks, and against , and a political apparatus encompassing the Political Bureau and the Shura Council for strategic decision-making and external diplomacy. The military wing, estimated to have numbered around 30,000 fighters prior to the October 2023 escalation, maintains operational autonomy in Gaza under local commanders while coordinating with the broader leadership on major actions. Complementing these are social welfare networks, often termed da'wa institutions, which provide education, healthcare, and charity services to build popular support and embed the group within Gazan society, though these have been repurposed for fundraising and recruitment. This structure allows compartmentalization, with military cells operating semi-independently to withstand decapitation strikes, as evidenced by the group's resilience following the assassinations of key figures. Leadership is collegial and decentralized, featuring a Gaza-based military council for tactical execution and an external Political Bureau, historically headquartered in Qatar or Turkey, for political maneuvering and resource allocation from patrons like and . Founding leader Yassin established this model in 1987, but successive heads—such as (2004–2017) and (2017–2024)—emphasized exile-based oversight to evade Israeli targeting, while Gaza commanders like (until his death on October 16, 2024) handled on-ground control. By mid-2025, following the killings of Sinwar and his brother Mohammed Sinwar in May 2025, Izz al-Din al-Haddad emerged as the senior military leader in Gaza, coordinating remaining forces amid ongoing Israeli operations and ceasefire negotiations. Figures like continue to represent externally, advocating positions such as phased hostage releases tied to territorial concessions. Decision-making involves consensus within the Shura Council, but military imperatives often override political caution, as seen in the , 2023, attack planned primarily by Gaza leadership. Hamas's dual role manifests in its simultaneous pursuit of Islamist militancy and , ruling Gaza de since ousting in June 2007 after its 2006 electoral , where it secured 44% of votes and 74 of 132 parliamentary seats by promising resistance and anti-corruption reforms. In administration, it manages civil services, enforces sharia-influenced laws, and distributes —estimated at $500 million annually pre-2023 from international donors, much of which funds like dual-use tunnels and production sites embedded in areas. This integration blurs lines between and warfare, enabling through welfare dependency while justifying militancy as muqawama (resistance) against occupation, though it has led to economic isolation via blockades and sanctions from , the U.S., and EU, who designate the entire organization—including its arms—as terrorist due to its charter's calls for and rejection of Israel's existence. Post-2023 war degradation has shifted it toward guerrilla survival and shadow , adapting by decentralizing cells and leveraging informal networks rather than formal bureaucracies, yet retaining power over reconstruction to prevent rival factions from gaining ground. This duality sustains among supporters by framing hardships as sacrifices for ideological , but critics, including Palestinian rivals, argue it prioritizes armament over development, diverting resources—such as 2023 estimates of $100 million in Iranian —toward conflict perpetuation.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Iranian Ties

The (PIJ), founded in 1981 in the by , a Palestinian from influenced by the 1979 , emerged as a militant Islamist group prioritizing armed jihad to destroy and establish an over all of historic . Shaqaqi, who had studied in and absorbed elements of revolutionary , positioned PIJ as more exclusively focused on military confrontation than the politically oriented , rejecting negotiations or interim accords like the process. Despite its Sunni orientation, PIJ's ideology aligned closely with Iran's export of revolutionary zeal, emphasizing perpetual struggle against perceived Zionist occupation without the Muslim Brotherhood's emphasis on social welfare networks. Iran has served as PIJ's primary external backer since the late 1980s, channeling support through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to sustain operations in Gaza, where PIJ maintains an estimated 1,000-8,000 fighters organized into specialized units for rocketry, sniping, and naval incursions. This patronage includes annual financial transfers historically totaling around $100 million to Palestinian Islamist groups like PIJ and combined, with PIJ receiving a significant portion to fund salaries, , and such as networks. Iranian enables PIJ's independence from Hamas's governance in Gaza while facilitating coordination, as evidenced by joint rocket barrages exceeding 4,000 projectiles in May 2023. Military assistance from encompasses weapons smuggling—primarily short-range rockets, anti-tank guided missiles, and drones routed via and Sinai—and training programs for PIJ operatives in , , or , enhancing capabilities in . PIJ's participation in the , 2023, attacks on , involving hundreds of its militants in border breaches and hostage-taking, reflected this bolstered operational readiness, with Iranian advisors reportedly providing tactical input through proxies. The IRGC-QF's role extends to strategic guidance, positioning PIJ as a complementary force to in Tehran's "axis of resistance" to encircle . High-level ties are maintained through frequent visits by PIJ Secretary-General to , including meetings with Supreme Leader , Foreign Minister , and Secretary Ali Akbar Ahmadian in 2023-2025, where operational coordination and resource commitments were discussed. These interactions underscore Iran's geostrategic aim to sustain in Gaza, compensating for PIJ's smaller scale by amplifying its role in escalations that divert Israeli resources. Despite Sunni-Shiite doctrinal variances and past frictions over Iran's Syrian intervention, the relationship endures as a , with PIJ reliant on Iranian aid amid sanctions and lacking Hamas's diverse funding streams.

Salafi-Jihadi Factions and Extremist Offshoots

Salafi-jihadi factions in the emerged primarily in the mid-2000s, drawing inspiration from global jihadist networks like , and intensified after Hamas's 2007 takeover as challengers to its authority. These groups adhere to a purist interpretation of Salafism emphasizing transnational , strict enforcement of , and rejection of Hamas's as insufficiently Islamic. Unlike Hamas, which balances militancy with governance and pragmatic truces, Salafi-jihadis prioritize offensive against perceived apostates—including Hamas—and "far enemies" like and the West, often leading to violent clashes that Hamas suppresses to maintain control and avert broader Israeli responses. One early and prominent group was , founded in late 2008 by Sheikh Abdel Latif Abu Murkhiyeh, a former member who pledged allegiance to . Based in , the group sought to establish an Islamic emirate in Gaza, denouncing for democratic participation and (truces) with as betrayal of jihad. On August 14, 2009, after Abu Murkhiyeh declared the emirate during Friday prayers at the Ibn Taymiyyah Mosque, forces raided the site, killing Abu Murkhiyeh and 13-24 members in clashes that also wounded over 100, effectively dismantling the organization but highlighting Salafi-jihadi defiance. Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam), linked to the and formed around 2005-2006, represents another Salafi-jihadi offshoot with ties to smuggling networks and attacks on and . The group, which splintered from broader Islamist circles, has conducted cross-border raids, including the 2006 abduction of BBC journalist alongside , and rocket fire into . Operating from Gaza's border areas, it criticizes 's moderation and has faced repeated crackdowns, yet persists in low-level activities like training and propaganda, as seen in 2020 videos of fighters enforcing rulings under sharia. Jaysh al-Umma, an al-Qaeda-aligned faction emerging around 2006 in Khan Younis, exemplifies ongoing Salafi-jihadi resilience through sporadic rocket attacks on and ideological broadsides against "resistance" leaders for nationalism over caliphate restoration. Led by figures like Sheikh Mujahid Abu Hafs al-Maqdisi, the group claimed in December 2023 to have targeted Israeli forces in Gaza, framing operations as fulfillment of global jihad duties amid the post-October 7 conflict. has periodically arrested members to curb escalation, but these factions' small cells—estimated in dozens to low hundreds—continue underground recruitment via mosques and prisons, fueled by disillusionment with 's governance compromises. Smaller ISIS-inspired offshoots, such as those active in 2015 raids on Egyptian positions and internal attacks, further pressured , prompting crackdowns like the November 2017 arrest of 20 militants after an anti- bombing. These groups' globalist —prioritizing (declaring Muslims apostates) and attacks on "near enemies" like —contrasts with 's defensive focus, resulting in over 100 Salafi-jihadis killed or arrested in clashes since 2009, though their threat endures due to ideological appeal among radicalized youth.

Governance and Policy Implementation

Political and Administrative Control Post-2007

Following its violent seizure of control in the during the Battle of Gaza from June 7 to 14, 2007, established a one-party authoritarian regime, expelling officials and consolidating power over political institutions and administrative functions. This takeover divided Palestinian governance, with ruling separately from the -dominated Palestinian Authority in the , ignoring President Mahmoud Abbas's dismissal of the -led cabinet. integrated its organizational structure with state-like apparatuses inherited from the Palestinian Authority, creating a hybrid party-state model where movement loyalists dominated executive roles and bureaucracy. The executive branch operated under a appointed by —initially from 2007 to 2017, followed by figures like Ismail al-Ashqar—overseeing ministries such as interior, health, education, and finance, staffed preferentially with supporters to ensure ideological alignment and reduce opposition influence. The Palestinian Legislative Council, paralyzed by the split and lack of quorum, held no sessions after 2007, eliminating legislative checks and rendering governance unaccountable to electoral processes. Administratively, maintained continuity in civil services like salary payments partially funded by the Ramallah-based , while parallel structures, including an Executive Force under the interior ministry, enforced compliance and sidelined Fatah-linked personnel. Judicial control was centralized through a system blending Palestinian with oversight, initially relying on reconciliation committees amid a post-takeover , but evolving into functional courts staffed by secularly trained judges who deferred deeper Islamization. However, legitimacy suffered from the territorial divide and politicized appointments, with rulings often aligning with regime priorities over impartiality. Security apparatuses, including police and intelligence units, imposed "soft " by monitoring , restricting public gatherings, and controlling media and NGOs, while applying harsher measures against affiliates through arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings. This structure prioritized regime survival over transparency or pluralism, with no effective oversight mechanisms for budgeting, procurement, or operations, as noted in assessments of opacity. Hamas's grip persisted through intimidation and co-optation, preventing rival political activity and maintaining Islamist dominance without further elections, even amid economic pressures and external sanctions. By 2023, ongoing conflict disrupted formal administration, but core control mechanisms remained embedded in Hamas's parallel networks.

Economic Strategies, Aid Diversion, and Sanctions Evasion

Following its 2007 takeover of the , Hamas established monopolistic control over economic activities, imposing taxes and fees on imports, exports, and local businesses, which generated hundreds of millions annually. This taxation regime, often enforced through , quickly surpassed external sources like Iranian support as ' primary revenue stream, with estimates ranging from $350 million to $630 million per year derived from duties on tunnel-smuggled goods, official crossings, and commercial operations. Hamas-affiliated entities, including firms and companies, further consolidated this control by dominating key sectors such as cement and fuel distribution, prioritizing military infrastructure like tunnels over civilian development. To evade designating it a terrorist organization, developed a shadow economy reliant on networks, particularly via underground connecting Gaza to , which facilitated the illicit trade of consumer goods, weapons, and raw materials while bypassing restrictions. These , numbering in the hundreds before repeated crackdowns, generated revenue through smuggling fees and supported ' military buildup, with tunnel operators paying protection taxes to the group. Additionally, utilized cryptocurrencies and noncustodial wallets to obscure financial flows, enabling fundraising from global donors while avoiding traditional banking scrutiny and sanctions enforcement. Foreign state funding supplemented these internal mechanisms, with providing over $1 billion in direct transfers since 2012—often coordinated with Israeli approval for civil salaries and fuel—but ultimately bolstering ' governance and operational capacity. contributed an estimated $100 million annually in , including cash, weapons components, and , routed through evasion tactics like front companies. leaders also managed an portfolio valued at around $500 million, including in , , and the , which yielded profits reinvested into Gaza operations despite U.S. and allied sanctions targeting these assets. Allegations of diversion persist, with Israeli claiming skimmed up to 25% of supplies for resale or use, including selling seized on black markets as documented in captured internal records; however, U.S. and UN reviews in 2025 found no systematic evidence of widespread theft from pipelines, attributing resource strains more to governance priorities than direct pilferage. ' economic model thus sustains militancy by blending coercive local extraction with sanctioned foreign inflows, enabling an annual budget of up to $350 million amid Gaza's pervasive .

Enforcement of Islamic Norms in Daily Life

Since seizing control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas authorities have implemented measures to enforce conservative interpretations of Islamic norms in public life, including through security forces, judicial rulings, and promotional campaigns aligned with Sharia principles. These efforts target behaviors deemed incompatible with Islamist values, such as immodest dress, gender mixing, and consumption of prohibited substances, often via patrols by police or dedicated "morality" units. Dress codes form a core aspect of daily enforcement, with Hamas launching targeted drives in 2009 to mandate hijabs and loose clothing for women, prohibit shirtless men on beaches, and segregate sexes in public spaces like coastal areas. Security personnel patrolled beaches to disperse mixed-gender groups and unmarried couples, while shopkeepers faced orders to cover or remove mannequins displaying women's clothing, including underwear packaging. Similar restrictions extended to professional settings, such as a 2009 supreme court directive barring female lawyers from court without headscarves and dark robes. Hamas-affiliated morality police have conducted arbitrary arrests and interrogations for perceived violations, including beatings of detainees accused of "immoral" acts like unauthorized gender interactions, followed by coerced pledges to adhere to Islamic teachings. These operations, reported as early as 2009, persisted into the 2010s, with documenting dozens of such cases lacking legal basis in codified law. Prohibitions on alcohol and reflect broader Sharia-derived bans, rendering their possession, sale, or consumption illegal under governance, though underground production persists amid economic constraints. Public faces curtailment to avoid "Western" influences, with closures or restrictions on venues promoting mixed socializing or non-Islamic leisure. In family and mobility matters, a 2021 court ruling mandated that women obtain consent from a male guardian—such as a or —for international travel, reinforcing patriarchal oversight in daily decision-making.

Social and Cultural Transformations

Regulations on Women, Dress, and Gender Roles

Following its 2007 takeover of the , Hamas authorities progressively enforced conservative Islamic dress codes on women, mandating the and loose, concealing clothing in public spaces, schools, and workplaces as a reflection of sharia-derived norms. In September 2009, the Hamas Education Ministry ordered female students to wear full Islamic attire, including headscarves, under threat of expulsion, framing it as protection against "temptation." Enforcement involved raids by security forces and the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice Committee, a apparatus akin to similar bodies in other Islamist regimes, which targeted women for Western-style clothing such as or short sleeves, subjecting them to verbal warnings, fines, or arrests. Public venues saw heightened scrutiny, with patrols on Gaza beaches in October 2009 dispersing mixed-gender groups of unmarried individuals and prohibiting men from appearing shirtless, while ordering shopkeepers to remove provocative displays. In July 2010, interior ministry directives banned lingerie shop windows from showing scantily clad mannequins or models, requiring coverings or removal to prevent "immoral temptations," with non-compliant stores facing closure. These measures extended to professional settings; in July 2009, Gaza's chief Islamic judge mandated headscarves for female lawyers in court, citing religious obligations over prior secular allowances. Gender segregation policies reinforced hierarchical roles, confining women primarily to domestic spheres while limiting their public participation unless aligned with Islamist priorities. Hamas's 1988 charter delineates women's societal function as nurturing "men" for , prioritizing motherhood and homemaking over independent agency. A 2013 education law required full separation of boys and girls in schools from age nine, prohibited instructors in girls' institutions, and mandated female teachers for upper-grade girls, ostensibly to uphold but effectively curtailing mixed educational opportunities. Mobility restrictions further entrenched male guardianship, with a February 2021 ruling by a Hamas-run court stipulating that women need approval from a male relative—, , or brother—to travel abroad, applying even to those over 18 and exacerbating isolation amid Gaza's . Non-compliance invited social ostracism or vigilante pressure, as Islamist factions coerced adherence through intimidation during the and sustained it post-2007 via institutional levers, though sporadic resistance persisted among urban women. These regulations, justified by as cultural preservation, have demonstrably reduced women's workforce participation to under 20% by limiting access to unsegregated professions and public life.

Restrictions on Media, Entertainment, and Education

Since seizing control of the in 2007, has imposed stringent controls on media operations, requiring outlets to align with its ideological and political directives. The group dominates Gaza's primary media infrastructure, including two newspapers and a channel, through which it disseminates while exerting pressure on independent reporting. Journalists face routine intimidation, including threats, assaults, and restrictions on access to sensitive areas, as documented by Gaza-based reporters who described security agents blocking coverage and enforcing to avoid reprisals. Foreign journalists critical of have been expelled from Gaza for unfavorable reporting, underscoring the regime's intolerance for dissenting narratives. Independent journalism is effectively absent, with many accredited reporters functioning as operatives under press credentials, blurring lines between media and militant activities. Entertainment faces severe curtailments rooted in Islamist interpretations of modesty and cultural purity, with Hamas prohibiting mixed-gender performances and public concerts deemed un-Islamic. In 2019, authorities issued a banning co-educational school concerts at institutions like the National Conservatory, forbidding boys and girls from sharing stages to prevent "temptation," a measure that drew backlash from educators but was upheld by Hamas hardliners. Street concerts were outlawed by the Hamas-affiliated Ministry of the Interior in 2022, silencing public musical expression and limiting artists' opportunities, as is viewed as a potential vector for Western cultural infiltration. Rap and hip-hop genres have been targeted, with Hamas banning performances in 2013 and 2018, forcing the few remaining artists to relocate or cease activities; traditional singing is permitted only in male-only, instrument-free formats glorifying or resistance against . Periodic crackdowns, such as the 2012 ban on loudspeakers and parties during exam seasons, further suppress recreational outlets, contributing to a cultural environment where and centers operate underground to evade enforcement. Educational reforms under emphasize Islamization, integrating jihadist themes and anti-Israel indoctrination into the curriculum to mold youth toward militant ideologies. Following its takeover, developed proprietary textbooks in , doubling instructional time for national education to instill values of armed struggle and Islamic governance, replacing or supplementing Palestinian Authority materials with content that glorifies martyrdom and vilifies . Recent analyses of Gaza's school curricula reveal persistent antisemitic incitement, including directives to confront "with a stone and a knife," alongside praise for violence, violating international standards for as outlined by benchmarks. Gender segregation is enforced in schools, aligning with broader Islamist norms, while UNRWA-operated facilities—historically reliant on contested textbooks—have been repurposed by for weapons storage, exacerbating disruptions and embedding radical content. These changes foster a generation primed for conflict, with madrassas gaining traction as vehicles for intensified religious instruction under rule.

Impacts on Minorities, Including Christians

The Christian population in Gaza, consisting mainly of Greek Orthodox and Catholic adherents, numbered around 3,000 prior to Hamas's and had dwindled to fewer than 1,000 by 2023, a decline linked to Islamist-enforced social pressures, , and sporadic rather than solely economic or conflict-related factors. This shrinkage reflects broader patterns of in Hamas-controlled areas, including demands for adherence to Islamic norms, which have accelerated among the community. Targeted violence has included the October 7, 2007, murder of Rami Ayyad, manager of Gaza City's sole Christian bookstore affiliated with the Protestant Holy Bible Society; the perpetrator was later identified as Ashraf Abu Laila, a member of Hamas's Brigades military wing. Between 2007 and 2011, multiple acts of aggression against Christians occurred following Hamas's consolidation of power, contributing to a climate of . Coercive pressures extend to forced conversions and kidnappings, as evidenced by 2012 incidents where Gaza's publicly protested the abduction of at least five congregants, including 24-year-old Ramez al-Amash, by Islamist groups seeking to impose conversions; the church described these as efforts to erode the minority's presence. Christian women face routine harassment to veil and conform to sharia-derived dress codes, while church leaders have received death threats from militants, prompting several to flee the Strip. These dynamics have fostered pervasive fear, limiting public expressions of faith such as bell-ringing or visible crosses, and reinforcing to avoid reprisals from security forces or affiliated extremists. No significant non-Christian religious minorities remain in Gaza, as Jewish residents were expelled in the and other groups like Baha'is lack a documented presence under Islamist rule.

Military and Security Policies

Buildup of Militant Capabilities: Rockets, Tunnels, and Training

Following Hamas's takeover of the in June 2007, the group significantly expanded its military infrastructure, diverting resources from civilian aid and governance to enhance offensive capabilities against . This buildup included domestic production of unguided rockets, construction of an extensive underground network, and systematic training programs for fighters, often incorporating ideological . Iranian technical assistance and via tunnels facilitated technological advancements, enabling Hamas to amass an estimated 10,000 rockets by 2023, including longer-range variants. Hamas developed local rocket manufacturing facilities, producing variants of the Qassam series—initially short-range (2-12 km) weapons improvised from civilian materials like fertilizer and pipes—evolving into more sophisticated models post-2007. By 2014, the group unveiled the M-75 rocket with a 75 km range, capable of reaching central , alongside imports of Iranian-designed and Grad systems smuggled through and . In the 2014 conflict, fired approximately 4,500 rockets, demonstrating improved accuracy and payload through trial-and-error testing and external expertise. Arsenal growth continued, with production sites embedded in civilian areas to deter strikes, yielding barrages of over 4,000 projectiles in the initial days of the October 2023 assault. The tunnel network, dubbed the "Gaza Metro," expanded dramatically after for smuggling weapons, launching cross-border raids, and serving as command bunkers, with construction relying on manual labor and imported cement intended for civilian use. Early offensive tunnels extended into , such as a 1.7 km shaft discovered in 2013 intended for kidnapping and attack. By 2021, leader claimed over 500 km of tunnels; Israeli assessments later revised this to 350-450 miles (560-720 km), with depths up to 70 meters and features like rail systems, ventilation, and blast doors. These structures enabled sustained operations, including the infiltration routes used in the , 2023, attacks, where militants emerged from at least 60 breach points. Training regimens intensified post-2007, with establishing camps for thousands of recruits, including youth programs militarizing teenagers through weapons handling, physical conditioning, and jihadist ideology. Annual summer camps from 2010 onward trained boys aged 15-17 in use, anti-tank missiles, and tunnel navigation, attracting up to 37,000 participants by 2013 and embedding resistance narratives to ensure generational continuity. Joint exercises with allies like from 2020 simulated mass assaults, as seen in videos preceding the 2023 offensive, where fighters practiced , bulldozer tactics, and coordinated breaches. Even amid ongoing conflict, recruited and trained thousands more fighters by early 2025, leveraging Gaza's schools and mosques for ideological preparation.

Internal Security Apparatus and Suppression of Dissent

The internal security apparatus of in the encompasses the Civil Police—originally formed as the Executive Force in May 2006 under Interior Minister —and affiliated intelligence and paramilitary units, which collectively enforce order, monitor populations, and neutralize internal threats to the group's Islamist governance. These entities operate alongside the Brigades' internal branches, utilizing surveillance, checkpoints, and detention facilities to maintain dominance, with forces redeployed en masse post-conflict, such as the 7,000 security personnel recalled in October 2025 to reassert control over Israeli-vacated areas. also leverages allied criminal clans for informal enforcement, extending its reach beyond official structures to intimidate rivals and deter dissent. Suppression tactics include arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial executions targeting critics, journalists, affiliates, and ordinary protesters, with documenting routine abuses by security services since the 2007 takeover, such as beatings and prolonged to extract confessions or silence opposition. In underground prisons uncovered in 2025, has detained and abused rivals, including suspected collaborators and clan leaders, to consolidate power amid post-war vacuums, often without . Dissent suppression intensified during economic protests and wartime discontent; for instance, in March 2025, thousands demonstrated against rule in cities like and , chanting for an end to governance failures, only for masked militants armed with guns and batons to disperse crowds through assaults and arrests, halting what had been the largest such uprising since 2007. reported similar reprisals in May 2025, where security forces targeted anti- protesters with detentions and threats, framing criticism as collaboration to justify crackdowns and uphold the regime's monopoly on power. Post-ceasefire in October 2025, escalated public executions and clan skirmishes to quash challenges, including gun battles in northern Gaza, underscoring a pattern of violent reconsolidation to prevent fractures in its authoritarian control.

Cross-Border Attacks and Perpetual Conflict Dynamics

Following Hamas's seizure of control in Gaza in June 2007, militant groups under its umbrella, including the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, initiated sustained cross-border attacks on , primarily through indiscriminate rocket and mortar barrages targeting civilian areas. These attacks escalated from sporadic launches to organized campaigns, with over 20,000 projectiles fired from Gaza into since 2005, causing dozens of Israeli civilian deaths, thousands of injuries, and widespread in border communities. The weaponry evolved from short-range Qassam rockets to longer-range Iranian-supplied Grad and models, enabling strikes on cities like , , and . Key escalations included a surge of over 3,000 rockets in late 2008, prompting Israel's Operation Cast Lead from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, which aimed to degrade launch capabilities; approximately 4,000 projectiles in 2012 preceding Operation Pillar of Defense in November; and over 4,500 rockets during the 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers, leading to Operation Protective Edge from July 8 to August 26, 2014. In May 2021, amid clashes in , Gaza militants fired over 4,000 rockets in 11 days, triggering Operation Guardian of the Walls. These patterns persisted, with smaller barrages—such as hundreds in 2018-2019 "March of Return" protests—involving incendiary devices and occasional ground incursions, like the August 2011 attack killing eight Israelis near . The dynamics of these attacks foster perpetual conflict by design, as employs violence not merely for tactical gains but to sustain an ideological framework rooted in rejectionist , framing as an existential enemy to mobilize support and divert attention from internal governance shortcomings. leaders have articulated resistance as a religious , with barrages timed to exploit Israeli restraint or provoke responses that generate Palestinian casualties, which are then leveraged in to portray as the aggressor and as defender. This cycle—attack, retaliation, reconstruction via international aid redirected to ends—prevents diplomatic normalization, reinforces 's monopoly on power by suppressing moderates, and secures from patrons like , who supply 80-90% of Gaza's advanced weaponry. Empirical patterns show lulls in attacks correlating with ceasefires that allow regrouping, only for renewed volleys to derail peace processes, ensuring conflict's endurance over resolution. Israeli operations, while degrading infrastructure, have historically failed to eliminate leadership or stockpiles fully, partly due to 's use of civilian embeds, perpetuating the model.

Internal and External Conflicts

Rivalry with Fatah and Palestinian Authority

The rivalry between and , the dominant faction within the Palestinian Authority (PA), stems from fundamental ideological divergences, with adhering to an Islamist worldview inspired by the , advocating for an in historic and the rejection of Israel's legitimacy, while pursues secular , emphasizing pragmatic negotiations and a . These differences intensified after 's founding in 1987 as an offshoot of the , positioning it in opposition to 's dominance in the (PLO). Tensions escalated following Hamas's victory in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, where it secured 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, compared to Fatah's 45, amid widespread dissatisfaction with Fatah's perceived and ineffective governance. A short-lived formed in March 2007 under PA President failed due to disputes over security control and international aid conditions, leading to armed clashes. The rivalry culminated in the Battle of Gaza from June 10 to 15, 2007, during which Hamas forces rapidly overran Fatah-aligned security installations, executing a violent takeover that resulted in over 160 deaths, including summary executions of Fatah members, and the expulsion of thousands of Fatah loyalists from Gaza. 's Executive Force, numbering around 6,000 fighters, exploited superior organization and surprise attacks, such as throwing rivals from rooftops and shooting others in the legs, to seize full control of the , while Fatah retained authority in the . This split entrenched a division of Palestinian territories, with the PA under Fatah withholding civil servant salaries in Gaza and accusing Hamas of coup-like authoritarianism. Post-2007, sporadic violence persisted, including Hamas's internal crackdowns on supporters in Gaza, such as arrests and documented in 2009, while faced internal purges in the . Multiple reconciliation efforts— including the 2007 Mecca Agreement, 2011 deal, 2012 pact, 2014 unity government, and 2017 accord—collapsed primarily over irreconcilable demands for unified security control, Hamas's refusal to cede Gaza's military apparatus or recognize past PLO agreements with , and mutual accusations of sabotage. By 2023, over a dozen such initiatives had failed, perpetuating fragmentation and hindering unified Palestinian . The enduring , exacerbated by Hamas's prioritization of armed resistance over electoral , has weakened overall Palestinian leverage, as evidenced by stalled international recognition efforts tied to the PA's control.

Clashes with Salafi Extremists and ISIS Sympathizers

, rooted in the tradition, has repeatedly clashed with Salafi-jihadi factions in the that espouse a more puritanical, globalist interpretation of , viewing as compromised by its nationalist focus, electoral participation, and tactical truces with . These groups, including affiliates and later sympathizers, have challenged Hamas's monopoly on militancy, leading to armed confrontations, arrests, and executions to preserve governance control. Ideological rifts center on Hamas's perceived —such as enforcing punishments inconsistently or prioritizing Palestinian statehood over restoration—prompting Salafi attacks on Hamas security forces and infrastructure. A pivotal early clash occurred on August 14, 2009, when , a Salafi-jihadi group founded in late 2008 and aligned with , seized the Ibn Taymiyyah mosque in and declared an "Islamic emirate" under leader Abdel-Latif Moussa, directly challenging authority. Hamas forces stormed the mosque in the ensuing Battle of Rafah, killing at least 24 people, including Moussa and several commanders, while suffering around 20 deaths and capturing over 200 suspects. The operation dismantled Jund Ansar Allah's core, but remnants persisted, highlighting 's intolerance for rival Islamist challengers amid its post-2007 consolidation of power. The rise of ISIS in 2014 amplified tensions, as Gaza-based Salafi cells pledged (allegiance) to the , criticizing as "murtadd" (apostate) for suppressing jihadists and collaborating with against Sinai militants. In May 2015, ISIS sympathizers from the Sheikh Battalion ambushed a checkpoint near , killing one officer, followed by rocket attacks on claimed by ISIS proxies like the "Supporters of the Islamic in Gaza and Sinai." responded with a sweeping crackdown, raiding Salafi strongholds, executing leaders like Abdullah al-Ashqar of Jaysh al-Umma, and detaining hundreds, which quelled overt threats but drove sympathizers underground or toward Sinai cross-border ties. Subsequent years saw sporadic violence, including 2017 assassinations of commanders attributed to affiliates and 2019 raids disrupting Salafi networks amid the ongoing war with . These clashes underscore 's pragmatic authoritarianism, prioritizing territorial control and external alliances over ideological purity, while Salafi extremists exploit Gaza's isolation to recruit via decrying as a "tyrant regime." By 2023, pre-October 7 estimates placed active sympathizers at several hundred, though 's internal security apparatus—via the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades—has largely contained them through targeted killings and surveillance, preventing emirate declarations or mass defections.

Alliances with Iran, Qatar, and Regional Actors

Hamas, the dominant Islamist organization governing the since 2007, has maintained a with despite ideological differences between Sunni Hamas and Shia , primarily centered on mutual opposition to . provides substantial military and financial support to , including an estimated $70 million to $100 million annually for weapons procurement and operations, along with training and technical expertise for rocket and drone development. In June 2025, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) intelligence revealed that 's (IRGC) planned to transfer arms shipments valued at nearly $50 million to in Gaza, including advanced weaponry smuggled via and other routes. This support intensified following the October 7, 2023, attack on , with facilitating coordination among proxy groups in what is termed the "Axis of Resistance." Qatar has emerged as a key financial and diplomatic patron of , hosting its political leadership in since the early 2000s at the request of the to facilitate . Between 2018 and 2023, disbursed hundreds of millions in monthly cash payments to Gaza under Hamas control, including $200 million in 2018 alone for salaries, fuel, and , with Israeli government approval to prevent . While Qatari officials assert that aid is coordinated with and the U.S. and not directly militarized, critics argue it bolsters Hamas's and military resilience, enabling the group to maintain "financial solidity" amid conflict. In September 2025, hosted a summit involving Hamas representatives amid ongoing negotiations, prompting Israeli threats against leaders sheltered there. Beyond and , Hamas coordinates with regional actors through shared anti-Israel objectives, including in , which provides tactical training and joint operational planning as part of Iran's proxy network. offers political backing, viewing as a legitimate rather than a terrorist group, and has hosted Hamas figures while supplying indirect support via rhetoric and diplomacy. Relations with have fluctuated; initially opposed the Assad regime during the but sought reconciliation by 2022 to access Iranian supply lines through Syrian territory. These alliances enable to sustain protracted conflict, with acting as the primary enabler of military capabilities and ensuring political survival and funding diversification.

Assessments and Controversies

Claims of Achievements: Welfare Provision and Resistance

Hamas has long claimed significant achievements in welfare provision through its dawa (Islamic charitable) network, which encompasses thousands of institutions offering , healthcare, and social aid in Gaza. Prior to its 2007 takeover, these services— including schools emphasizing Islamist curricula, clinics, orphanages, and food distribution programs—were credited by supporters with building grassroots loyalty and outperforming the Palestinian Authority's (PA) often corrupt or inefficient alternatives, contributing to Hamas's 2006 electoral victory. Following governance in Gaza, Hamas maintained an estimated 40,000 to 50,000 civil servants across ministries handling utilities, , and health, framing this as fulfilling Islamic duties of (zakat and community support) while embedding resistance ideology in daily life. Proponents, including Hamas officials, assert these efforts mitigated and exacerbated by blockades and conflicts, with programs promoting family values and self-reliance under Islamist principles. For instance, Hamas-linked charities have distributed to hundreds of thousands annually, positioning the group as a welfare alternative to international donors perceived as politically conditional. However, independent analyses note that such claims often overlook the dual-use of welfare for and control, with resources diverted from needs. In terms of resistance, Hamas portrays its military apparatus as a core achievement, claiming sustained deterrence against through rocket barrages, tunnel networks, and guerrilla tactics that have inflicted casualties and economic costs on across multiple conflicts since 2007. The group has repeatedly declared "victories" after operations like those in 2014 and 2021, asserting survival despite Israeli airstrikes as proof of strategic resilience and divine favor. The October 7, 2023, attack—resulting in over 1,200 Israeli deaths and hostage captures—was hailed by leaders as shattering 's sense of security, restoring Palestinian agency on the global stage, and achieving long-term goals of prioritizing resistance over accommodation. has self-reported minimal losses (around 6,000 fighters) relative to operational gains, crediting innovations like drone strikes and ambushes for ongoing "surprises" against Israeli forces into 2025. These narratives emphasize embedding a " of resistance" in Gaza's youth via summer camps and , viewing endurance as ideological triumph even amid territorial setbacks.

Criticisms: Authoritarianism, Economic Failures, and Civilian Exploitation

has exercised authoritarian governance in the since its violent takeover in June 2007, consolidating power through a monopoly on and systematic suppression of political rivals and dissenters. The group's internal security apparatus, including the Executive Force and police units, has quashed Fatah-linked disturbances and broader opposition, often via arbitrary arrests, , and extrajudicial executions. classifies as "Not Free," assigning it a 2024 score of 11 out of 100, reflecting near-total denial of political rights—such as free elections, absent since 's 2006 victory—and , including assembly and expression, amid routine crackdowns on unapproved protests and critics. Economic mismanagement under has perpetuated chronic and dependency, despite inflows exceeding $30 billion in international from 2007 to 2023, much of which was diverted from civilian needs to like tunnels and rockets. Gaza's unemployment rate hovered above 45% pre-October 2023, with youth nearing 70%, as prioritized ideological warfare over development, leading to industrial collapse and agricultural decline. The noted in 2023 that declining donor exacerbated Gaza's , with 's governance failing to achieve sustainable growth or meet UN by 2030. scandals, including exposed by journalists facing , have further eroded public trust, with surveys indicating 71% of Gazans viewed institutions as corrupt by March 2023. Hamas's exploitation of civilians manifests in deliberate strategies that endanger non-combatants to advance military objectives, including embedding rocket launchers, command centers, and tunnels within densely populated areas to deter Israeli strikes and maximize casualty . The group has prevented evacuations from combat zones, forcibly retained residents as shields, and recruited children into militant roles, contributing to over 80% of Gaza's population relying on aid that routinely diverts—confiscating supplies for fighters and selling them on black markets. Such tactics, documented in multiple investigations, prioritize over civilian welfare, fostering perpetual vulnerability amid 's rejection of ceasefires that could enable reconstruction.

Comparisons to Taliban-Style Rule and "Talibanization" Debates

Observers have drawn parallels between Hamas's governance in the since its 2007 takeover and the Taliban's rule in during the , characterizing the former as a process of "Talibanization" involving the progressive imposition of strict Islamist norms, moral policing, and suppression of secular freedoms. Analyst , in a assessment, argued that within two years of the coup, Hamas exhibited Taliban-like traits, including the establishment of courts with appointed judges, vice squads targeting entertainment venues such as music shops and pool halls via bombings in June 2007, and mandates for female lawyers to wear headscarves by July . These measures echoed the Taliban's enforcement of punishments, bans on non-religious music, and gender-specific dress codes, fostering an environment where Islamist ideology permeated public life. Similarities extend to restrictions on women and public behavior, with deploying armed patrols on Gaza beaches in October 2009 to enforce conservative dress, prohibiting shirtless men, mixed-gender groups of unmarried individuals, and displays of female mannequins in shops without full covering. In education, authorities imposed Islamic dress codes requiring hijabs for female students starting September 2009, prompting criticism from for violating personal freedoms. By April 2013, Gaza's -run parliament enacted laws mandating gender segregation in schools from age nine and barring teachers from instructing female students beyond that age. A 2021 ruling by a -affiliated Islamic court further required women to obtain permission from a guardian for travel, mirroring guardianship systems that limit female mobility without approval. At the -linked , hijabs remained mandatory for women as of 2023, according to Department reports. Debates over "Talibanization" center on the extent and intent of these policies, with critics like Schanzer contending they represent a deliberate shift toward theocratic authoritarianism, evidenced by over 50 attacks on Christian sites post-2007, including the bombing of the Rosary Sisters School on June 14, 2007, and the murder of bookstore owner Rami Ayyad in October 2007. Proponents of Hamas, such as outlets aligned with Palestinian advocacy groups, counter that such comparisons are overstated, asserting in 2010 that Gaza lacked the Taliban's level of extremism or public executions, and that social conservatism reflects broader cultural norms rather than imposed fundamentalism. However, empirical patterns of enforcement—such as the destruction of entertainment facilities and institutionalization of sharia—align more closely with Taliban governance models than with secular or pluralistic systems, as noted in comparative analyses emphasizing both groups' roots in conservative Sunni traditions aimed at societal Islamization over global jihad. Schanzer reiterated the relevance of these dynamics in 2024, linking them to Hamas's enduring control despite military pressures. While Hamas avoids the Taliban's overt spectacles like instrument burnings or stonings, its incremental policies have sustained debates about creeping theocratization, with some analysts arguing that resource constraints and external temper implementation compared to Afghanistan's interior rule, yet core ideological drivers—jihadist in mosques and schools, alongside suppression of —persist as hallmarks of similarity. This framing underscores causal between Islamist militancy and governance outcomes, where ideological purity overrides pragmatic reforms, as evidenced by 's prioritization of networks and production over diversification since 2007.

Recent Developments (2010s-2025)

Escalations Leading to October 7, 2023, Attack

Following the , and allied groups in the maintained sporadic cross-border attacks, including rocket launches and incendiary devices, to pressure while avoiding full-scale confrontation. Between 2015 and 2017, Gaza militants fired over 100 rockets into , often in response to Israeli airstrikes on targets, perpetuating a cycle of low-intensity escalation. These actions, coordinated by 's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, aimed to assert resistance credentials amid internal governance challenges and external blockade conditions. The 2018–2019 Great March of Return protests marked a significant escalation, organized by with participation from its militants and civilians demanding the lifting of the Gaza and the for . Weekly demonstrations at the Gaza- border involved attempts to breach the security fence, stone-throwing, and the launch of incendiary kites and balloons that ignited over 1,000 fires in southern , destroying agricultural land and forests across 35 square kilometers. leaders, including , publicly endorsed the protests as a form of "popular resistance," with militants using the crowds as cover for attacks, resulting in over 30,000 incidents of violence documented by Israeli forces. The protests led to more than 6,000 injuries among participants, including to gunmen attempting infiltrations, while sustaining 's narrative of unrelenting against Israeli "occupation." In May 2021, initiated a major rocket campaign from Gaza, firing over 4,000 projectiles toward Israeli population centers over 11 days, triggered by clashes in Jerusalem's neighborhood and compound but framed by as retaliation for broader Israeli policies. The barrage, supported by Iranian-supplied precision-guided munitions, overwhelmed Israel's system intermittently and caused civilian casualties, including the death of two Thai workers and widespread property damage. justified the escalation as defending Palestinian honor, revealing its strategy of leveraging distant events to mobilize Gaza's arsenal, which had been expanded through and local manufacturing despite Egyptian and Israeli border controls. The conflict ended in a after Israeli airstrikes degraded 's capabilities, but it demonstrated the group's willingness to risk Gaza's infrastructure for ideological gains. Tensions persisted into 2022–2023 with indirect Hamas involvement in clashes led by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a smaller but aligned Islamist faction. In August 2022, following an Israeli preemptive strike on a PIJ commander, Gaza militants launched over 1,100 rockets, with Hamas providing logistical support and refraining from direct participation to preserve forces for larger operations. Similarly, in May 2023's Operation Breaking Dawn, PIJ fired more than 1,000 rockets after Israeli arrests in the West Bank, again with Hamas's tacit backing, including shared tunnel networks and ammunition. These episodes, totaling thousands of projectiles, tested Israeli defenses and maintained pressure on border communities, while Hamas secretly trained elite Nukhba forces and amassed weapons, including Iranian drones and anti-tank missiles, under the guise of reconstruction aid. Such escalations underscored Hamas's long-term preparation for a coordinated offensive, exploiting perceived Israeli complacency and internal divisions.

War Aftermath, Governance Challenges, and Deradicalization Prospects

The Israel-Hamas war, initiated by Hamas's , 2023, attack, concluded with a U.S.-brokered on October 8, 2025, leaving Gaza in ruins with over 67,000 Palestinian deaths reported by the Hamas-controlled and widespread infrastructure devastation, including the near-total collapse of the healthcare system where 94% of facilities were damaged or destroyed. Approximately 53% of Gaza remained under Israeli control immediately post-, complicating immediate returns and distribution, while Hamas's tactic of embedding assets in civilian areas contributed causally to the scale of urban destruction observed across densely populated zones. In the ceasefire's wake, has mobilized around 7,000 fighters to reassert dominance over Gaza, engaging in street clashes with rival Palestinian factions and suppressing dissent amid residents' returns to rubble-strewn homes, yet faces acute governance voids including the absence of a unified administration capable of coordinating basic services like and , which remain intermittent for most of the 2.3 million . Reconstruction efforts, such as U.S. proposals to prioritize non-Hamas-controlled areas with rapid techniques, aim to sideline the group by demonstrating alternative prosperity models, but 's refusal to fully —conditioned on broader Palestinian statehood—blocks comprehensive rebuilding, perpetuating dependency and where pre-war GDP hovered below $1,000 annually. Deradicalization prospects in Gaza remain constrained by Hamas's ideological monopoly over education, mosques, and social institutions, which have systematically inculcated jihadist narratives since 2007, fostering generational entrenchment that resists external interventions without the group's comprehensive dismantlement. Programs modeled on successful Middle Eastern deradicalization efforts, such as Saudi Arabia's ideological rehabilitation of thousands of militants through theological counter-narratives and vocational reintegration, could theoretically apply but falter in Gaza due to Hamas's armed veto power and the lack of a deradicalized governance alternative, with post-ceasefire analyses indicating persistent recruitment incentives tied to unresolved grievances and Iranian funding streams. Long-term success metrics, including reduced incitement in curricula and mosque sermons, verifiable disarmament of non-state militias, and measurable declines in youth radicalization indicators, have not materialized amid ongoing factional violence, underscoring that causal removal of Islamist governance structures precedes any viable moderation pathway.

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