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Russian Armed Forces
Russian Armed Forces
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Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
Вооружённые си́лы Росси́йской Федера́ции
Emblem of the Russian Armed Forces
Founded2 November 1721; 304 years ago (1721-11-02)
Current form7 May 1992
Service branches Ground Forces
 Navy
Aerospace Forces
Strategic Rocket Forces
Airborne Forces
Special Operations Forces
HeadquartersMinistry of Defence, Moscow
Leadership
Supreme Commander-in-Chief Vladimir Putin
Minister of Defence Andrey Belousov
Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov
Personnel
Military age18[1]
Conscription12 months[2]
Active personnelrefer to IISS Military Balance
Reserve personnelrefer to post-2022 IISS Military Balance
Expenditure
BudgetUS$149 billion (2024)[3]
(ranked 3rd)
Percent of GDP7.1% (2024)[3]
Industry
Domestic suppliers
Foreign suppliers Belarus (MZKT)
 Iran (HESA)[4]
North Korea[5]
Annual importsUS$905 million (2010–2021)[6]
Annual exportsUS$74.535 billion (2010–2021)[6]
Related articles
HistoryMilitary history of the Russian Federation
RanksArmy ranks
Navy ranks
Aerospace Forces ranks

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,[a] commonly referred to as the Russian Armed Forces, are the military of Russia. They are organized into three service branches—the Ground Forces, Navy, and Aerospace Forces—two independent combat arms (the Strategic Rocket Forces and Airborne Forces),[7] and the Special Operations Forces Command.[8]

The Russian Armed Forces are the world's fifth largest military force, with about one million active-duty personnel and close to two million reservists.[9] They maintain the world's largest stockpile of nuclear weapons,[10] possess the world's second-largest fleet of ballistic missile submarines,[11] and are the only armed forces outside the United States and China that operate strategic bombers.[12] As of 2024, Russia has the world's third-highest military expenditure, at approximately US$149 billion, or over seven percent of GDP,[3] compared to approximately to US$86.5–$109 billion the year before.[13]

The Russian military is a hybrid system that combines conscripts with contracted volunteers;[14] with certain exceptions, Russian law mandates one year of military service for all male citizens aged 18–27.[1][15] Despite efforts to professionalize its ranks since the early 2000s,[16] it remains heavily reliant on conscripts, with contract soldiers being concentrated in cadre and elite units. Russia planned to expand its active personnel to 1.5 million by the end of 2024,[17] which would have made it the second largest active military force after China.[18][19]

Despite its perceived military strength,[20] deficiencies have been noted in Russia's overall combat performance and its ability to effectively project hard power.[21] The ongoing invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has exposed weaknesses such as endemic corruption,[22][23][24] rigid command and control structure,[25] inadequate training,[26] and poor morale.[27] The Russian Armed Forces have experienced successive losses of occupied/annexed territory, the large-scale destruction and squandering of their equipment, and a notably high casualty rate.[28][29][30] Researchers from the U.S.-funded RAND Corporation have observed that Russia continues struggling with military professionalization,[31] but remains capable of rapidly reconstituting its capabilities.[32]

Directly controlled by the Security Council of Russia, the Russian Armed Forces form part of the country's defence services under Russian law, fulfilling this capacity alongside the Border Guard of the Federal Security Service, the National Guard, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Protective Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

Service branches

[edit]

Armed forces under the Ministry of Defence are divided into:[citation needed]

There are additionally two further separate troop branches, the National Guard and the Border Service. These retain the legal status of "Armed Forces", while falling outside of the jurisdiction of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The National Guard is formed on the basis of the former Internal Troops of Russia. The new structure has been detached from the Ministry of Internal Affairs into a separate agency, directly subordinated to the President of Russia. The Border Service is a paramilitary organization of the Federal Security Service, the country's main internal intelligence agency. Both organizations have significant wartime tasks in addition to their main peacetime activities and operate their own land, air and maritime units.

The number of personnel is specified by decree of the President of Russia. On 1 January 2008, a number of 2,019,629 units, including military of 1,134,800 units, was set.[33] In 2010 the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated that the Russian Armed Forces numbered about 1,027,000 active troops and in the region of 2,035,000 reserves (largely ex-conscripts).[34] As opposed to personnel specified by decree, actual personnel numbers on the payroll was reported by the Audit Chamber of Russia as 766,000 in October 2013.[35]

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, between 2005–2009 and 2010–2014, Russian exports of major weapons increased by 37 percent;[36] Russia spent $66.4 billion on arms in 2015,[37] then $69.2 billion in 2016, having taken 3rd place (after the U.S. and China).[38]

History

[edit]

1991-2022

[edit]

The Soviet Union officially dissolved on 25 December 1991. For the next year various attempts to keep its unity and to transform it into the military of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) failed. Over time, some units stationed in the newly independent republics swore loyalty to their new national governments, while a series of treaties between the newly independent states divided up the military's assets.[39]

Apart from assuming control of the bulk of the former Soviet Internal Troops and the KGB Border Troops, seemingly the only independent defence move the new Russian government made before March 1992 involved announcing the establishment of a National Guard.[40] Until 1995, it was planned to form at least 11 brigades numbering 3,000 to 5,000 each, with a total of no more than 100,000. National Guard military units were to be deployed in 10 regions, including in Moscow (three brigades), (two brigades), and a number of other important cities and regions. In Moscow alone 15,000 personnel expressed their desire to service in the new Russian Army, mostly former Soviet Armed Forces servicemen. In the end, President Yeltsin tabled a decree "On the temporary position of the Russian Guard", but it was not put into practice.[41]

After signing the Belavezha Accords on 21 December 1991, the countries of the newly formed CIS signed a protocol on the temporary appointment of Marshal of Aviation Yevgeny Shaposhnikov as Minister of Defence and commander of the armed forces in their territory, including strategic nuclear forces. On 14 February 1992 Shaposhnikov formally became Supreme Commander of the CIS Armed Forces. On 16 March 1992 a decree by Boris Yeltsin created the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the operational control of Allied High Command and the Ministry of Defence, which was headed by President.[citation needed] Finally, on 7 May 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree establishing the armed forces and Yeltsin assumed the duties of the Supreme Commander.[42]

In May 1992, General Colonel Pavel Grachev became the Minister of Defence, and was made Russia's first Army General on assuming the post. By August or December 1993 CIS military structures had become CIS military cooperation structures with all real influence lost.[43]

In the next few years, Russian forces withdrew from central and eastern Europe, as well as from some newly independent post-Soviet republics. While in most places the withdrawal took place without any problems, the Russian Armed Forces remained in some disputed areas such as the Sevastopol naval base in the Crimea as well as in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and in Transnistria. The Armed Forces have several bases in foreign countries, especially on territory of the former Soviet Republics.

In late 2000 Gazeta.ru reported that of 600,000 personnel planned to be dismissed from the various "power ministries," the Armed Forces would be reduced by 365,000.[44]

Both in Soviet and Russian times, corruption has been a significant impediment to the Armed Forces. "The change from Yeltsin to Putin ..had minimal effect on Russian military corruption. Putin, despite his desire to rebuild Russian strength, has not shown himself willing or able to seriously deal with" corruption.[45] From 1991 to 2001, Russian authorities uncovered at least 350 billion rubles' (US$11.5 billion) worth of corruption in the armed forces (with, for comparison, the total defence budget for 2001 being 214 billion rubles). Areas of particular concern identified by a researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment in 2007 included the State Defence Order (perhaps 10-15% realised in 2004); "ghost soldiers," as "it is generally acknowledged that the number of actually serving personnel differs substantially from the authorized number of personnel," and officers at various levels can pocket excess money for themselves; and "the domestic purchases of goods and services, where corrupt officers overpay civilian providers in return for bribes."

Russian stamps honoring soldiers killed in the invasion of Ukraine. As of February 2023, the number of Russian soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine was estimated at nearly 200,000.[46] As of July 2025, Russian casualties in Ukraine were estimated at 1 million.[47]

Invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)

[edit]

On 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave the execute order to for the Armed Forces to begin the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[48][49] On 10 April 2022 General Aleksandr Dvornikov assumed command of the operation.[50] In July 2022, at the same time as the Armed Forces began suffering severe casualties, the Ground Forces began to site ammunition in or near structures which are frequented by civilians due to the human shield benefit, ostensibly because Ukrainian HIMARS had tilted the odds of his strategy of attrition by artillery.[51] Within hours after Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu's signature on the UN-brokered deal to resume Ukraine's Black Sea grain exports, Russia bombed the Port of Odesa.[52][53]

According to Forbes Moscow had committed, as of the end of July 2022, 10 of its Combined Arms Armies to the invasion.[54] The Wagner Group has made a name for itself as Putin's "private army."[55] In June 2023, Putin backed the Ministry of Defense's plan to make mercenary groups sign contracts, which Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin pushed against: these contracts would have placed the Wagner Group under the Ministry's command structure as subordinates and limited Prigozhin's own influence.[56] Later in June, the Wagner Group turned against the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Ministry of Defense[57][58] until a peace deal was reached. According to Prigozhin, part of the reason for his march against Russia was to stop the government from "[dismantling] PMC Wagner."[59]

Russian troops marching in the 2024 Moscow Victory Day Parade

By July 2024, U.S. Army General Christopher Cavoli, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe said that "[t]he Russians are very cleverly adapting technologically and procedurally to many of the challenges that they run into in Ukraine".[60] Cavoli also said in April 2024 that the Russian military has replaced its troop and equipment losses and is larger than it was before the start of the conflict.[61] On 26 June 2024, the UK-based Royal United Services Institute think tank reported that Russia continues to increase the production and sophistication of its main weapons and its defense industry remained highly dependent on foreign imports of critical components.[62] The Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi said on 24 July 2024 that Russians were much better resourced now but also suffer three times higher losses than Ukraine.[63]

According to NATO and Western military officials, approximately 1,200 Russian soldiers were killed or wounded in Ukraine every day on average in May and June 2024.[64][65] In June 2024, it was estimated that approximately 2% of all Russian men aged 20 to 50 had been killed or seriously wounded in Ukraine since February 2022.[66] As of October 2024, it was estimated that over 600,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded while fighting in Ukraine.[67] Military courts have received thousands of AWOL cases since Russia's 2022 mobilization.[68] Pro Asyl said in 2024 that at least 250,000 Russian conscripts had fled to other countries since February 2022.[69]

In November 2024, The Telegraph reported that Russia had for the first time issued a manual to soldiers instructing how to dig and maintain mass graves amid growing casualties. Russia's use of mass graves to bury its soldiers has been documented in occupied parts of Ukraine's eastern Donbas region.[70]

In April 2025, Oleksandr Syrskyi said that Russian troops in Ukraine were now 623,000, increased fivefold since the start of the invasion, and they are increasing by 8,000-9,000 soldiers each month. He also said that Russia's overall mobilization capacity is 20 million people or 5 million people with military training. However, he noted that Russia's advantage in artillery has dropped from 10 to 1 to 2 to 1, mainly because of Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.[71]

In June 2025, Secretary General of NATO Mark Rutte said that Russians "are reconstituting themselves at a rapid pace" and produce multiple times more ammunition than whole of NATO, despite having a much smaller economy. Rutte also assessed that Russia could attack NATO territory within three to five years and called on member-states to increase defense spending to 5% of their GDP.[72]

In October 2025, several sources reported that according to an investigation by the exiled news outlet Vyorstka, Russian military commanders have been executing and torturing their own personnel since the first year of the invasion. As part of the investigation, Vyorstka said it had obtained hundreds of accounts of executions, with the incidents evolving from initially being punishments for drunkenness or disobedience in the trenches into killings over personal conflicts or extortion. Over 12,000 complaints related to abuse has been sent to Russia's Chief Military Prosecutor's Office since the start of the full-scale war, with a particular increase since the second half of 2023. Out of these, only 10 criminal cases have been opened, resulting in five officers being convicted of killing subordinates. According to the investigation, there is an ″unofficial ban″ on investigating field commanders. Russian soldiers speaking to Vyorstka said that the executed personnel were often listed as deserters or as missing in action, while their bodies were buried in forests or left in the battlefield and shot at to imply combats deaths.[73][74][75]

War crimes

[edit]

War crimes committed by the Russian Armed Forces have been documented in several military conflicts, including the Second Chechen War,[76][77] the Russo-Georgian War,[78] and the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[79]

In 2024, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for top Russian military officers Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov, Sergey Kobylash, and Viktor Sokolov for alleged war crimes of directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects in Ukraine.[80] In May 2025, a UN report concluded that the Russian Armed Forces's recurrent drone attacks on civilians in Kherson amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.[81]

Structure

[edit]
Minister of Defence, Andrey Belousov
Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army Valery Gerasimov

The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation serves as the administrative body of the Armed Forces. Since Soviet times, the General Staff has acted as the main commanding and supervising body of the Russian armed forces. "[T]he Soviet General Staff without the MoD is conceivable, but the MoD without the General Staff is not."[82]

Other departments include the Main Intelligence Directorate, the personnel directorate as well as the Logistical Support of the Russian Armed Forces, Railway Troops, Signal Troops and Construction Troops. The Ministry of Defence incorporated the Main Directorate of the Military Police Since 1 December 2012. The Main Directorate of the Military Police oversees subordinated military districts regional directorates of military police.[83] The Chief of the General Staff is currently General of the Army Valery Gerasimov.

In July 2018, the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces was created, restoring a responsibility for ideological training that had been done away with in the Soviet Armed Forces.[84]

The Russian military is divided into three services: the Russian Ground Forces, the Russian Navy, and the Russian Aerospace Forces. In addition there are two independent arms of service: the Strategic Missile Troops and the Russian Airborne Troops. The Armed Forces as a whole are traditionally referred to as the Army (armiya), except in some cases, the Navy is specifically singled out.

Military districts

[edit]
Military districts of Russia as of 2024.

Since 2024, the Ground Forces are distributed among five military districts: Moscow Military District, Leningrad Military District, Southern Military District, Central Military District, and the Eastern Military District. Previously from 2010 to 2024, the Ground Forces, along with the aerospace and naval forces were divided into five districts: Western Military District, Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command, Southern Military District, Central Military District, and the Eastern Military District. From 1992 to 2010, the Ground Forces were divided into six military districts: Moscow, Leningrad, North Caucausian, Privolzhsk-Ural, Siberian and Far Eastern, with the seventh military district: Kaliningrad formed in 1997; in service until 2010.

There is one remaining Russian military base, the 102nd Military Base, in Armenia left of the former Transcaucasus Group of Forces and is incorporated into the Southern Military District.

Colonel General Aleksandr Sanchik, commander of the Southern Military District since November 2024.

Geographically divided, the five districts are:

Russian security bodies not under the control of the Ministry of Defence include the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (now the National Guard of Russia's National Guard Forces Command), the Border Guard Service of Russia (part of the Federal Security Service), the Kremlin Regiment and the rest of the Federal Protective Service, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the country's civil defence service since 1995 and successor to earlier civil defence units.

[edit]
Mordovia, a Russian Navy Zubr-class LCAC
A map of naval bases, shipyards and spent fuel storage sites operated by the Northern Fleet

The Navy consists of four fleets and one flotilla:

Russia has one aircraft carrier which is the Admiral Kuznetsov.[85][86] The ship has been out of commission and in repairs since 2018. The repair process has been hindered by accidents, embezzlement of funds, and other setbacks.[87]

Personnel

[edit]
Russian troops at the 2015 Moscow Victory Day parade
Russian troops marching in the 2015 Moscow Victory Day parade
Members of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces in 2018
Ratnik infantry combat system in reconnaissance variant and AFV crew individual protection kit Ratnik-ZK

Conscription is used in Russia; the term of service is 12 months; and the eligible age is between 18 and 27 years old.[1] Deferments are provided to undergraduate and graduate students, men supporting disabled relatives, parents of at least two children and—upon Presidential proclamation—to some employees of military-oriented enterprises. Men holding a Ph.D., as well as sons and brothers of servicemen killed or disabled during their military service, are released from conscription.[citation needed]

There were widespread problems with hazing in the Army, known as dedovshchina, where first-year draftees are abused by second-year draftees, a practice that appeared in its current form after the change to a two-year service term in 1967.[88] According to Anna Politkovskaya, in 2002, "a complete battalion, more than five hundred men, had been killed not by enemy fire but by beatings".[89] Over a period of 9 months in 2003, 2,500 personnel were accused of dedovshchina, of which half were sentenced.[90] To combat this problem, a new decree was signed in March 2007, which cut the conscription service term from 24 to 18 months. The term was cut further to one year on 1 January 2008.[91][92]

Thirty percent of Russian Armed Forces' personnel were contract servicemen at the end of 2005.[15] For the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces will be a mixed contract/conscript force.[15] The Russian Armed Forces need to maintain a mobilization reserve to have manning resources capable of reinforcing the permanent readiness forces if the permanent readiness forces cannot deter or suppress an armed conflict on their own.[93]

Recruitment into the Russian military are also open to non-Russian citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of which Russia is the largest member.[94] By December 2003, the Russian parliament had approved a law in principle to permit the Armed Forces to employ foreign nationals on contract by offering them Russian citizenship after several years service[95] yet, up to 2010, foreigners could only serve in Russia's armed forces after getting a Russian passport. Under a 2010 Defence Ministry plan, foreigners without dual citizenship would be able to sign up for five-year contracts and will be eligible for Russian citizenship after serving three years.[96][97] The change could open the way for CIS citizens to get fast-track Russian citizenship, and counter the effects of Russia's demographic crisis on its army recruitment. Each soldier in duty receives an Identity Card of the Russian Armed Forces. On 20 September 2022 the State Duma passed a bill which would make Russian citizenship available to foreign soldiers upon 12 months service in the AFRF; previously the service requirement had been set at three years.[98]

Awards and decorations of the Armed Forces are covered at the Awards and Emblems of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation.

In March 2013, Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu promised that all army quarters would have showers by the end of the year.[99]

In 2013, it was reported that:[100] "Compared to 2007, the number of female officers and warrant-officers has dropped by nearly two thirds. There were over 30,000 women serving under a contract [with the armed forces] in 2007, and now there are only slightly more than 11,000 of them, including 4,300 officers of various rank." Lt. Col. Yelena Stepanova, the chief of the social processes monitoring department at the Russian armed forces' sociological research center, said. This trend [was] "not ..special" but correspond[ed] with the general .. reduction of the Russian armed forces."

On 28 May 2022, on the background of the ongoing invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin signed the law which removed the upper age limit for signing first contract for the performance of voluntary military service (earlier this limit was 40 years old).[101][102] Most of the contract soldiers fighting in Ukraine come from poorer sections of the Russian population.[103][104] Signing bonuses for men who went to fight in Ukraine are more than a full year's salary for many people in Russia.[105]

In November 2024, following heavy personnel losses, Russia reduced payments to troops injured in the invasion of Ukraine amidst the Russian government facing increasing war costs due to the large amount of injuries.[106][107] In June 2025, Ukrainian and Western estimates for Russian military casualties in Ukraine surpassed one million.[108]

Age limits for active duty service in Russian Armed Forces (males)[1]
Military rank Conscript service Voluntary service
Lower age limit Upper age limit Lower age limit for signing first contract Upper age limit for signing first contract General upper age limit for tenure Final upper age limit for tenure
Marshal of the Russian Federation None None 18 None 65 70
Army general/Admiral of the fleet
Colonel general/Admiral
Lieutenant general/Vice admiral 60 65
Major general/Counter admiral
Colonel/Captain 1st rank 55
Lieutenant colonel/Captain 2nd rank 50
Major/Captain 3rd rank
Captain/Captain lieutenant
Senior lieutenant
Lieutenant
Junior lieutenant
Senior praporshchik/Senior michman
Praporshchik/Michman
Starshina/Chief ship starshina
Senior sergeant/Chief starshina
Sergeant/Starshina 1st class
Junior sergeant/Starshina 2nd class
Gefreiter/Senior seaman
Private/Seaman 18 27
Age limits for active duty service in Russian Armed Forces (females)[1]
Military rank Conscript service Voluntary service
Lower age limit Upper age limit Lower age limit for signing first contract Upper age limit for signing first contract General upper age limit for tenure Final upper age limit for tenure
Marshal of the Russian Federation None None 18 None 45 70
Army general/Admiral of the fleet
Colonel general/Admiral
Lieutenant general/Vice admiral 65
Major general/Counter admiral
Colonel/Captain 1st rank
Lieutenant colonel/Captain 2nd rank
Major/Captain 3rd rank
Captain/Captain lieutenant
Senior lieutenant
Lieutenant
Junior lieutenant
Senior praporshchik/Senior michman
Praporshchik/Michman
Starshina/Chief ship starshina
Senior sergeant/Chief starshina
Sergeant/Starshina 1st class
Junior sergeant/Starshina 2nd class
Gefreiter/Senior seaman
Private/Seaman

Military education

[edit]
Release of officers of the Air Force Academy in Voronezh
Female students of the Krasnodar Higher Military Aviation School of Pilots

The Russian military education system, inherited from the Soviet Union, trains officer-specialists in narrowly defined military occupational specialties. In this it differs greatly from the American military education system in which newly qualified second lieutenants receive particular specialties in the framework of their "career branch" only after graduation from a military academy or the ROTC.[109] Students of Russian civilian institutions of higher education wishing to join the reserve officer training program cannot choose a military occupational specialty, because each civilian specialty taught by civilian university is attached to a particular military occupational specialty taught by the military training center of the same university by the rector's order. It also differs from the American military education system in which students can choose between available types of ROTC.[citation needed]

The Russian military education system includes:

  • Warrant officer schools, which prepare career warrant officers for active duty service.
  • Higher military schools, which prepare career commissioned officers for active duty service as platoon/company commanders and at equivalent positions (tactical level).
  • Military training centers within civilian institutions of higher education, which prepare reserve commissioned officers who can serve as platoon/company commanders and at equivalent positions (tactical level).
  • Military academies, which improve the military occupational specialty knowledge of commissioned officers to allow them to be appointed to battalion/regiment/brigade commander or equivalent positions (operational-tactical level).
  • Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, which improves skills of officers graduated from military academies to allow them to become highest-ranking military officers (strategic level).
  • Adjunctura is a military analogue of civilian graduate school, which allow commissioned officers to get academic degree of candidate of sciences in military oriented specialties and be appointed to a teaching positions in military academies, military schools, military training centers.
Age limits for admission to military educational institutions[1][110]
Type of military educational institution Persons who have not been on active duty service Persons who are on conscript active duty service or are demobbed from this service Persons who are on voluntary active duty service
Lower age limit Upper age limit Lower age limit Upper age limit Lower age limit Upper age limit
Military school 16 22 18 24 18 27
Military training center (active duty officer program) 16 24
Military training center (reserve officer program) 16 30
Russian military academies and adjunctura entry requirements[110][111]
Type of military educational institution Reached educational level Years of active duty service as commissioned officer Military rank (no lower than) Military position
(years of experience)
Expected number of years of active duty service after graduation until general upper age limit for tenure
Military academy Military school or Military training center no less than 7 years Captain/Captain lieutenant Major's/Captain 3rd rank's positions
(1 year at least)
5 years at least
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia Military academy Major/Captain 3rd rank Colonel's/Captain 1st rank's positions
(1 year at least)
5 years at least
Adjunctura Military school or Military training center no less than 2 years Lieutenant 5 years at least

Reserve components

[edit]

Russian Armed Forces have reserves (Russian: запас; transliteration: zapas) which includes 2 components:[1]

  • Active reserve – Mobilization human reserve (Russian: мобилизационный людской резерв; transliteration: mobilizatsionnyy lyudskoy reserv)
  • Inactive reserve – Mobilization human resource (Russian: мобилизационный людской ресурс; transliteration: mobilizatsionnyy lyudskoy resurs)

By default, at the end of active duty each military personnel is enrolled as a mobilization human resource. This applies equally to conscripts and volunteers regardless of ranks. Furthermore, graduates of civilian institutions of higher education, who have graduated the military training centers of their almae matres, trained under reserve officer program, are enrolled as mobilization Human Resources after their promotion to officer's rank (unlike graduates of such centers, trained under active duty officer program, who are due to be enrolled for active duty after their promotion to officer's rank). Mobilization human resource are replenished with males who reach the age of 27 years old and were not in military service for any reason.[citation needed]

Enrolling in the mobilization human reserve is voluntary and implies the special contract. This possibility is available for each persons, who is in the mobilization human resource already.[112] The initial contract is concluded for 3 years period. Military personnel of mobilization human reserve (reservists) perform part-time duties in military units.[113] Reservists are appointed to a military position in particular military units and are involved in all operational, mobilization, and combat activities of these military units. As a rule, in peacetime time reservists perform their duties 2–3 days per month and during an annual military camp training of 20 to 30 days.[114]

The exact number of reservists is unknown because a relevant paragraph of the Presidential Decree[115] which determines the number of reserve troops is classified. The military units manned by reservists are determined by General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and this information is classified too.

The persons who are in mobilization human resource (non-reservists) may be enlisted to military camp trainings in peacetime. The duration of each training can not exceed 2 months, herewith the total duration of such trainings for the entire period of being in mobilization human resource can not exceed 12 months, and a person may be enlisted in such training no more than once every three years.[116]

As of 2009, the number of citizens who can be used for mobilization deployment on an involuntary basis in the case of wartime mobilization was estimated at 31 million.[117]

Reservists are subject to mobilization in wartime first of all. Non-reservists are subject to mobilization secondarily. The mobilization of non-reservists is carried out by taking into account the age category under the article 53 of Federal Law of 28 March 1998, No.53-FZ "About military duty and military service": in order from first category to third category.[118][119]

The first category includes: 1) the persons at the any military rank below that of a commissioned officer (enlisted personnel) and not reached the age of 35 years old; 2) the persons at the any rank from junior lieutenant to captain (captain-lieutenant in naval service) inclusively (junior commissioned officers) and not reached the age of 50 years old; 3) the persons at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively and not reached the age of 55 years old; 4) the persons at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) and not reached the age of 60 years old; 5) the persons at the rank of major general (counter admiral in naval service) or higher (supreme officers) and not reached the age of 65 years old.[118][119]

The second category includes: 1) enlisted personnel in age from 35 but less than 45; 2) junior commissioned officers in the age from 50 but less than 55; 3) commissioned officers at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively in the age from 55 but less than 60; 4) commissioned officers at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) in the age from 60 but less than 65; 5) supreme officers in age from 65 but less than 70.[118][119]

The third category includes: 1) enlisted personnel in the age from 45 but less than 50; 2) junior commissioned officers in the age from 55 but less than 60; 3) commissioned officers at the any rank from major (captain 3rd rank in naval service) to lieutenant colonel (captain 2nd rank in naval service) inclusively in the age from 60 but less than 65; 4) all females in the age less than 45 for enlisted personnel and less than 50 for commissioned officers. The person who has reached the age limit, established for the third category (the second category for persons at the rank of colonel (captain 1st rank in naval service) or higher), is retired and is not subject to mobilization.[118][119]

Age limits in the reserve component of Russian Armed Forces (males)[1]
Military rank Mobilization human reserve Mobilization human resource
Age limit for signing first contract Age limit for tenure First grade
Age limit
Second grade
Age limit
Third grade
Age limit
Marshal of the Russian Federation 65 70
Army general/Admiral of the fleet 65 70
Colonel general/Admiral 65 70
Lieutenant general/Vice admiral 65 70
Major general/Counter admiral 65 70
Colonel/Captain 1st rank 57 65 60 65
Lieutenant colonel/Captain 2nd rank 52 60 55 60 65
Major/Captain 3rd rank 52 60 55 60 65
Captain/Captain lieutenant 47 55 50 55 60
Senior lieutenant 47 55 50 55 60
Lieutenant 47 55 50 55 60
Junior lieutenant 47 55 50 55 60
Senior praporshchik/Senior michman 42 45 35 45 50
Praporshchik/Michman 42 45 35 45 50
Starshina/Chief ship starshina 42 45 35 45 50
Senior sergeant/Chief starshina 42 45 35 45 50
Sergeant/Starshina 1st class 42 45 35 45 50
Junior sergeant/Starshina 2nd class 42 45 35 45 50
Gefreiter/Senior seaman 42 45 35 45 50
Private/Seaman 42 45 35 45 50
Age limits in the reserve component of Russian Armed Forces (females)[1]
Military rank Mobilization human reserve Mobilization human resource
Age limit for signing first contract Age limit for tenure First grade
Age limit
Second grade
Age limit
Third grade
Age limit
Marshal of the Russian Federation 50
Army general/Admiral of the fleet 50
Colonel general/Admiral 50
Lieutenant general/Vice admiral 50
Major general/Counter admiral 50
Colonel/Captain 1st rank 47 50 50
Lieutenant colonel/Captain 2nd rank 47 50 50
Major/Captain 3rd rank 47 50 50
Captain/Captain lieutenant 47 50 50
Senior lieutenant 47 50 50
Lieutenant 47 50 50
Junior lieutenant 47 50 50
Senior praporshchik/Senior michman 42 45 45
Praporshchik/Michman 42 45 45
Starshina/Chief ship starshina 42 45 45
Senior sergeant/Chief starshina 42 45 45
Sergeant/Starshina 1st class 42 45 45
Junior sergeant/Starshina 2nd class 42 45 45
Gefreiter/Senior seaman 42 45 45
Private/Seaman 42 45 45

2005–2008 reform of the reserve officer training system

[edit]

The reserve officer training system, inherited from the Soviet Union, involved selective conscription of graduates of civilian institutions of higher education, who have graduated the military departments of their almae matres and received a commission as an officer. Such person could be conscripted from the reserve of armed forces to active duty, up until the age of 27. The period of active duty of such an officer was several years, and at the end of that period he was due to be enlisted in the reserve of armed forces again. Such officers were called "blazers" in the army's slang (for example, Anatoly Kvashnin was a "blazer").[120]

In 2005, Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov announced a significant reduction in the number of military departments carrying out the training commissioned officers from students of civilian institutions of higher education.[121] By March 2008, 168 of 235 civilian universities, academies and institutions which previously had military departments had lost these units.[122] 37 of 67 civilian universities, academies and institutions which retained military departments became the basis for the establishment of new military training centers.[122] The military training centers focused on training officers for active duty, whilst the military departments focused on training officers for the reserve.[123]

In 2006 the conscription of reserve officers was abolished. Graduates of military departments were not subject to conscription to active duty anymore (with the exception of a wartime mobilization). All graduates of military training centers were due to be enrolled for 3 years active duty upon their university graduation.[124]

2018 beginning of formation of voluntary military reserve force

[edit]

In 2018, Russia started a full-scale formation of a military reserve force based upon volunteers selected from among those who retired from active duty.[114] The Russian military reserve force (Russian: мобилизационный людской резерв, romanizedmobilizatsionny lyudskoy rezerv) is a set of citizens who have signed a contract to perform military service as a reservist. They are appointed to a military position in a particular military unit. They are involved in all operational, mobilization, and combat activities of these military units, unlike other citizens who haven't signed such contracts and who can be used for a mobilization deployment of armed forces on an involuntary basis only in cases stipulated by law.[125]

The deployment of military units composed of reservists, takes minimum time and does not requires any retraining of military personnel. The military units composed of reservists use the same weapons as used by military units, composed of active duty military personnel. Military units staffed by reservists are 100% manned up to wartime standards just like military units staffed by active duty military personnel only. There is no possibility to define by military units designation what we're dealing with - reserve or not reserve military unit. The number of reservists is not presented in open sources and is not among the number of active duty military volunteers which is published by Ministry of Defence. This makes it difficult for establish real troop strength of new Russian military units and formations.

Russian troops in May 2023

2019 reform of the reserve officer training system

[edit]

In 2018 the military departments and the military training centers were abolished.[126] From that moment on, students of civilian institutions of higher education were trained under both officers training programmes (for reserve and for active duty) in the Military Training Centers.[127] In 2019, there were training military centers in 93 civilian institutions of higher education.[128][129]

Mobilization

[edit]

The first mobilization of citizens being in mobilization human resource, conducted on a compulsory basis, in the Russian Federation's history was announced by Presidential Decree of 21 September 2022 No.647 during the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[130]

Budget

[edit]
Soviet and Russian military expenditures in billions of 2015 US dollars
The facade of the National Defense Management Center
The conference room of the National Defense Management Center

Between 1991 and 1997 newly independent Russia's defence spending fell by a factor of eight in real prices.[131] In 1998, when Russia experienced a severe financial crisis, its military expenditure in real terms reached its lowest point—barely one-quarter of the USSR's in 1991, and two-fifths of the level of 1992, the first year of Russia's independent existence.

In the early 2000s, defence spending increased by at least a minimum of one-third year-on-year, leading to overall defence expenditure almost quadrupling over the past six years, and according to Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, this rate is to be sustained through 2010.[132] Official government military spending for 2005 was US$32.4 billion, though various sources, have estimated Russia's military expenditures to be considerably higher than the reported amount.[133]

Estimating Russian military expenditure is beset with difficulty; the annual IISS Military Balance has underscored the problem numerous times within its section on Russia.[133] The IISS Military Balance comments, "By simple observation ... [the military budget] would appear to be lower than is suggested by the size of the armed forces or the structure of the military–industrial complex, and thus neither of the figures is particularly useful for comparative analysis."[134] By some estimates, overall Russian defence expenditure is now at the second highest in the world after the USA.[135] According to Alexander Kanshin, Chairman of the Public Chamber of Russia on affairs of veterans, military personnel, and their families, the Russian military is losing up to US$13 billion to corruption every year.[136]

On 16 September 2008 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that in 2009, Russia's defence budget would be increased to a record amount of $50 billion.[137][138]

On 16 February 2009 Russia's deputy defence minister said state defence contracts would not be subject to cuts this year despite the ongoing financial crisis, and that there would be no decrease in 2009.[139] The budget would still be 1.376 trillion rubles and in the current exchange rates this would amount to $41.5 billion.

Later in February 2009, due to the world financial crisis, the Russian Parliament's Defence Committee stated that the Russian defence budget would instead be slashed by 15 percent, from $40 billion to $34 billion, with further cuts to come.[140] On 5 May 2009, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that the defence budget for 2009 will be 1.3 trillion rubles (US$39.4 billion). 322 billion rubles are allocated to purchase weapons, and the rest of the fund will be spent on construction, fuel storage and food supply.

According to the head of the Defence Committee of the State Duma Vladimir Komoyedov, Russia planned to spend 101.15 billion rubles on nuclear weapons in 2013–2015. "The budget provisions under 'The Nuclear Weapons Complex' section in 2013-2015 will amount to 29.28 billion rubles, 33.3 billion rubles and 38.57 billion rubles respectively," Komoyedov said, Vechernaya Moskva reports.

Komoyedov added that in 2012 the spending on nuclear weapons made up 27.4 billion rubles. The draft law "On the Federal Budget for 2013 and for the planning period of 2014 and 2015" will be discussed in the first reading on 19 October 2012, The Voice of Russia reports.[141]

The Russian government's published 2014 military budget is about 2.49 trillion rubles (approximately US$69.3 billion), the fourth largest in the world behind the US, China and Saudi Arabia. The official budget is set to rise to 3.03 trillion rubles (approximately US$83.7 billion) in 2015, and 3.36 trillion rubles (approximately US$93.9 billion) in 2016.[142] As of 2014, Russia's military budget is higher than any other European nation, and approximately 1/7th (14 percent) of the US military budget.[36]

In 2015, SIPRI found that Russia was the world's second biggest exporter of major weapons for the period 2010–14, increasing exports by 37 per cent. India, China and Algeria accounted for almost 60 percent of total Russian exports. Asia and Oceania received 66 percent of Russian arms exports in 2010–14, Africa 12 percent and the Middle East 10 percent.[36]

In 2017, Russia was reported to have slashed its defense spending by 20%, due to calls by Vladimir Putin to spend money on other initiatives such as healthcare and education. The cut decreased Russia's military spending to $66.3 billion, in which Russia slumped to being the fourth-highest military spender.[143] Russia's 2019 defense budget was US$48 billion and the 2020 figure was $61.7 billion.[144]

However, due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Russian government has dramatically increased military spending to over 85+ billion dollars, returning to third position as the highest military spender in the world. The increase in military spending was needed to recoup losses in the war and reorient Russia into a war economy.[3] On 5 October 2023, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia's spending on defense and security now equals to 6% of its GDP.[145]

Procurement

[edit]
The Sukhoi PAK FA is one of the latest procurement projects of the Russian Armed Forces.

About 70 percent of the former Soviet Union's defence industries are located in the Russian Federation.[146] Many defence firms have been privatised; some have developed significant partnerships with firms in other countries.

The recent steps towards modernization of the Armed Forces have been made possible by Russia's economic resurgence based on oil and gas revenues as well a strengthening of its own domestic market. Currently[when?] the military is in the middle of a major equipment upgrade, with the government in the process of spending about $200 billion (what equals to about $400 billion in PPP dollars) on development and production of military equipment between 2006 and 2015 under the State Armament Programme for 2007–2015 (GPV – госпрограмма вооружения).[147]

Mainly as a result of lessons learned during the Russo-Georgian War, the State Armament Programme for 2011–2020 was launched in December 2010. Prime Minister Putin announced that 20–21.5 trillion rubles (over $650 billion) will be allocated to purchase new hardware in the next 10 years. The aim is to have a growth of 30% of modern equipment in the army, navy and air force by 2015, and of 70% by 2020.[148][149][150][151] In some categories, the proportion of new weapon systems will reach 80% or even 100%.[152]

As of 2011, Russia's chief military prosecutor said that 20 percent of the defence budget was being stolen or defrauded yearly.[153] It is suspected that equipment is not properly maintained due to the resulting lack of funds, which may have contributed to equipment failures observed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[29][154]

In 2018, RF Armed Forces adopted 35 types of weapons and military equipment and completed state tests of 21 more.[155] The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) was procured the YeSU TZ (Yedinaya Sistema Upravleniya Takticheskogo Zvena) battlefield management system that same year. The YeSU TZ battlefield management system incorporates 11 subsystems that control artillery, electronic warfare systems, ground vehicles, air defence assets, engineering equipment, and logistics support, among other things.[156]

Twelve missile regiments have been rearmed with Yars ICBMs, 10 missile brigades with Iskander tactical ballistic missile systems, 13 aviation regiments with MiG-31BM, Su-35S, Su-30SM, and Su-34 combat aircraft, three army aviation brigades and six helicopter regiments with Mi-28N and Ka-52 combat helicopters, 20 surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments with S-400 Triumf SAM systems, 23 batteries with Pantsir-S self-propelled anti-aircraft gun-missile systems, and 17 batteries with Bal and Bastion mobile coastal defence missile systems [MCDMSs] since 2012 and as of March 2019.[156]

In early 2023, there were reports that the Russian Defense Ministry purchased more than a thousand tablets with a domestic software for higher-ranking officials and also begun receiving a new line of gliding bombs with a range of tens of kilometers.[157][158]

The New York Times reported on 13 September 2023, citing US and European officials, that Russia overcomes the international sanctions and its missile production now exceeded pre-war levels. It was also reported that Russia now produces more ammunitions than the United States and Europe and it can manufacture 200 tanks and two million units of ammunition in a year.[159] CNN also reported in September 2023 that Russia produces ammunition seven times cheaper and eight times faster than Europe.[160]

In September 2023, various Russian regions launched the production of suicide drones at their own initiatives.[161][162] Vladimir Putin also claimed that the production of main armored vehicles has increased by four times in comparison with the past year and the production of the especially important destruction means by three times.[163]

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense,[164] the Russian Armed Forces received in 2023 several hundreds of thousands of small arms, new and repaired weapon systems, military vehicles and equipment, artillery systems, air defense systems, missiles and bombs, aircraft and helicopters, drones, and also over a million individual armor protection and equipment means.[165][166][167] CNN reported on 11 March 2024 that Russia currently produces about 250,000 artillery shells a month or about 3 million a year which is nearly three times the quantity the US and Europe produce for Ukraine. CNN cited Western intelligence officials and also said that Russia imports ammunition from Iran and North Korea.[168]

In April 2025, General Christopher Cavoli said before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that Russia is replacing its extensive battlefield losses of equipment and munitions at an "unprecedented rate" due to the expansion of industrial capabilities and the transition to a war economy. He also said that North Korea is providing Moscow with "millions" of artillery shells, missiles and weapons systems while Iran provided it with 400 short-range ballistic missiles, hundreds of thousands of artillery shells, thousands of kamikaze drones and the licenses and technology to produce thousands more of such drones inside Russia.[169] Despite this, equipment shortages due to losses in Ukraine led to many reports in early 2025 about Russian soldiers using unconventional measures like donkeys, horses, and civilian cars for transport and assaults.[170][171][172][173][174] The Russian Minister of Defense, Andrey Belousov, said in August 2025 that the Russian Army had been supplied with 22,750 motorcycles, quad bikes and buggies since the beginning of the year.[175]

Nuclear weapons

[edit]
A mobile version of the RS-24 Yars
The Borei-class submarine Alexander Nevsky

As of January 2017, the Federation of American Scientists estimated that Russia has approximately 1,765 deployed strategic warheads, and another 2,700 non-deployed strategic and deployed and non-deployed tactical warheads, plus an additional 2,510 warheads awaiting dismantlement.[176] Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces controls its land-based nuclear warheads, while the Navy controls the submarine based missiles and the Aerospace Forces the air-launched warheads. Russia's nuclear warheads are deployed in four areas:

  1. Land-based immobile (silos), like R-36 and its replacement RS-28 Sarmat.
  2. Land-based mobile, like RT-2PM2 Topol-M and new RS-24 Yars.
  3. Submarine based, like R-29RMU2 Layner and RSM-56 Bulava.
  4. Air-launched warheads of the Russian Aerospace Forces' Long Range Aviation Command

The military doctrine of Russia sees NATO expansion as one of the threats for the Russian Federation and reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to a conventional aggression that can endanger the existence of the state. In keeping with this, the country's nuclear forces received adequate funding throughout the late 1990s. The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles and warheads on active duty has declined over the years, in part in keeping with arms limitation agreements with the U.S. and in part due to insufficient spending on maintenance, but this is balanced by the deployment of new missiles as proof against missile defences.[177]

Russia has developed the new RT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27) missiles that a Russian general claimed to be able to penetrate any missile defence, including the planned U.S. National Missile Defence. The missile can change course in both air and space to avoid countermeasures. It is designed to be launched from land-based, mobile TEL units.[177]

Because of international awareness of the danger that Russian nuclear technology might fall into the hands of terrorists or rogue officers who it was feared might want to use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack other countries, the federal government of the United States and many other countries provided considerable financial assistance to the Russian nuclear forces in the early 1990s.[citation needed] This money went in part to finance decommissioning of warheads under international agreements, such the Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, but also to improve security and personnel training in Russian nuclear facilities.

In the late evening of 11 September 2007, the fuel-air explosive AVBPM or "Father of All Bombs" was successfully field-tested.[178]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
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References

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia

The Russian Armed Forces (Вооружённые Силы Российской Федерации) constitute the uniformed military organization of the Russian Federation, charged with territorial defense, deterrence of aggression, and projection of power to safeguard national interests. As the direct successor to the Soviet Armed Forces, they underwent structural reforms in 2008 to consolidate branches and emphasize professionalization amid revelations of corruption and inefficiency from earlier post-Soviet conflicts. The forces encompass the Ground Forces for land operations, the Navy for maritime domain control, the Aerospace Forces for air and space superiority, the Strategic Rocket Forces for nuclear missile operations, and the Airborne Troops for rapid intervention, with the Special Operations Forces providing capabilities for unconventional missions.
Under the constitution, the President serves as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with executive authority delegated through the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff for operational planning and execution. In response to ongoing demands from the war in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin issued Decree No. 792 on 16 September 2024, expanding the authorized military personnel to 1.5 million effective 1 December 2024, elevating total armed forces strength—including support staff—to approximately 2.4 million and ranking Russia second globally in active troop numbers after China. The Armed Forces maintain the world's largest nuclear arsenal, comprising roughly 4,309 warheads allocated to strategic delivery systems as of early 2025, underpinned by a full nuclear triad of land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers, which forms the cornerstone of Russia's deterrence posture against NATO and other adversaries.
Despite possessing extensive conventional inventories—including over 12,000 main battle tanks and vast artillery reserves—the forces have faced empirical challenges in high-intensity warfare, including logistical vulnerabilities and personnel shortages exposed during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, where initial rapid advances stalled due to inadequate securing of supply lines and underestimation of Ukrainian resistance supported by Western aid, resulting in attrition rates exceeding 1,000 casualties daily at peaks but enabling territorial gains through sustained firepower and recruitment drives exceeding 40,000 monthly by 2025. Reforms have prioritized mass production of drones, electronic warfare systems, and glide bombs to counter precision-guided munitions, reflecting adaptation to attritional conflict rather than the maneuver warfare emphasized in pre-2022 doctrine. This evolution underscores causal factors like institutional corruption—estimated to have wasted billions in procurement—and overreliance on conscripts, though nuclear capabilities and resource mobilization sustain great-power status amid geopolitical isolation.

Historical Background

Imperial and Soviet Foundations

The , reformed by in the early , emphasized conscription from a vast peasant population to sustain prolonged conflicts, achieving resilience through manpower depth and defensive strategies exploiting geographic scale. During the , particularly the 1812 French invasion, Russian forces implemented scorched-earth tactics, denying resources to Napoleon's of approximately 450,000 troops, which suffered over 400,000 casualties from attrition, disease, and combat before retreating. In the (1853–1856), Russia mobilized around 1.7 million soldiers but faced defeat against a coalition including Britain and France, resulting in the Treaty of Paris that demilitarized the and exposed logistical and technological deficiencies. World War I further demonstrated this model, with the empire mobilizing 12 million troops yet incurring 1.7 million deaths and nearly 5 million wounded, underscoring endurance in attritional defense but ultimate collapse amid internal strains. Following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the was formed on January 28, 1918, under , evolving from a small into a conscript-based entity that secured victory in the (1917–1922) through mass mobilization, peaking at 5 million on paper with about 700,000 combat-effective personnel. In , the mobilized over 34 million personnel, leveraging industrialized output from Stalin's Five-Year Plans—starting with the first in 1928 for and emphasizing weapons production in the third (1938–1941)—to reverse initial defeats after 1941 German invasion and achieve victory in 1945 at the cost of 8–10 million military deaths. Postwar, the initiated its nuclear program, detonating the first atomic bomb, , on August 29, 1949, at Semipalatinsk, marking entry into strategic weaponry. Cold War doctrine built on these foundations with massive conventional forces for deterrence, maintaining around 5 million active personnel by the 1980s and forming the on May 14, 1955, as a counter to , integrating Soviet-led armies from . Nuclear parity with the emerged by the late through ICBM deployments, complementing emphasis on quantity—vast tank armies and artillery—over qualitative edges like initiative. However, Stalin's (1937–1938) executed or imprisoned about half of general-grade officers and two-thirds of higher ranks, eroding professionalism and contributing to early WWII command failures by removing experienced leaders. These eras instilled enduring principles of —using territory for phased retreats and counteroffensives—and , prioritizing numerical superiority amid resource constraints, which the post-Soviet Russian Federation inherited alongside approximately 4.3 million personnel upon the USSR's 1991 dissolution. This legacy favored large-scale operations over high-tech precision, reflecting historical adaptations to invasions rather than .

Formation and Early Post-Soviet Challenges (1991–2000)

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991, Russia inherited the majority of Soviet military assets, including most strategic nuclear forces, conventional equipment, and personnel, as other republics rapidly formed their own national armed forces or claimed limited portions through ad hoc agreements within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On March 16, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin established the Russian Ministry of Defense, and on May 7, 1992, he issued decrees formally creating the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, subsuming the remnants of Soviet services—ground forces, air forces, air defense, navy, and strategic rocket forces—under unified Russian command, with Yeltsin assuming the role of supreme commander-in-chief. This transition preserved operational continuity but exposed the new force to immediate fiscal and structural strains, as Soviet-era inertia prioritized maintaining a large, mass-mobilization army incompatible with Russia's shrinking economy and emerging security threats like NATO's eastward posture. The 1990s economic collapse, marked by and GDP contraction exceeding 40% from 1991 to 1998, inflicted severe cuts on military spending, reducing defense appropriations by over 80% in real terms from Soviet peaks and leading to widespread equipment decay, fuel shortages, and maintenance backlogs. Salary arrears became chronic, with often unpaid for months—by mid-1995, the armed forces were described as effectively , prompting mass officer resignations and a brain drain estimated at tens of thousands annually, as professionals sought livelihoods amid hyper-devaluation of ruble-denominated pay. Active personnel plummeted from approximately 4 million Soviet troops in 1991 to about 1.4 million by 2000, reflecting forced downsizing, desertions, and failed recruitment amid pervasive hazing practices known as , which eroded morale and unit cohesion by fostering abuse of conscripts by senior soldiers. This fiscal reality compelled a de facto emphasis on nuclear deterrence over conventional capabilities, as resource constraints precluded modernizing the inherited mass army while expanded, absorbing former states and heightening perceptions of vulnerability in non-nuclear domains. Operational failures in ethnic conflicts, particularly the First Chechen War (December 1994–August 1996), underscored these weaknesses, with Russian forces suffering heavy losses—over 5,000 dead and widespread tactical blunders due to corruption, inadequate training, and command incompetence that allowed Chechen fighters to exploit urban terrain and ambushes effectively. Dedovshchina exacerbated combat ineffectiveness by undermining trust and discipline, contributing to high non-combat attrition like suicides and mutinies, while systemic graft diverted supplies and inflated readiness reports. The war's humiliating withdrawal after the Khasavyurt Accord, followed by renewed fighting in 1999, revealed a force ill-adapted to asymmetric threats, prioritizing quantity over quality amid inherited Soviet doctrines that clashed with post-Cold War fiscal limits and internal instability.

Reforms and Conflicts under Putin (2000–2014)

Following Vladimir Putin's ascension to the presidency in 2000, the Russian Armed Forces underwent initial stabilization measures amid economic recovery driven by rising oil prices, which enabled defense spending to increase from approximately $4.3 billion in 2000 to over $32 billion by 2008. These funds supported modest procurement and personnel retention efforts, shifting focus from the conscript-dominated force inherited from the toward partial professionalization, though systemic inefficiencies like and equipment obsolescence persisted. Anatoly Serdyukov's appointment as Defense Minister in November 2007 initiated sweeping "New Look" reforms announced in October 2008, aimed at creating a more mobile, brigade-based structure responsive to regional conflicts rather than large-scale conventional wars. Key changes included reducing the officer corps from around 350,000 to 150,000 by eliminating redundant administrative roles and introducing a three-tier command system with brigades as the primary tactical units, replacing outdated divisions and regiments; by , the ground forces had transitioned to about 80 permanent-readiness brigades. Reforms also expanded contract (professional) service personnel to approximately 200,000 by , reducing reliance on short-term conscripts while establishing roles to bridge leadership gaps, though implementation faced resistance from entrenched military elites. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian War, triggered by Georgia's offensive into South Ossetia on August 7, tested these early changes, with Russian forces achieving a swift victory by August 12 through air superiority and ground advances that routed Georgian units and secured buffer zones. The operation demonstrated improvements in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) integration, including effective use of electronic warfare to disrupt Georgian networks, but exposed critical logistics shortcomings, such as poor supply lines and reliance on unarmored trucks, which delayed advances and highlighted the force's vulnerability to modern peer threats. These revelations prompted accelerated post-war investments, including $200 billion allocated for rearmament through 2018, prioritizing mobility and precision fires over mass mobilization. The 2014 annexation of Crimea exemplified the evolving hybrid approach, where unmarked forces—derisively called by observers—deployed rapidly from February 27 to seize key infrastructure like the Simferopol airport and Ukrainian naval bases without insignia or overt declaration, enabling deniability under the doctrine of maskirovka (). Supported by local pro-Russian militias and information operations, these tactics neutralized Ukrainian resistance with minimal casualties and no full-scale invasion, achieving control by March 18 through a disputed , thus validating Russia's preference for non-attributable, limited interventions over traditional warfare. , with GDP expanding over 7% annually from 2000 to 2008, underpinned these capabilities by funding modernization, yet reforms yielded mixed results: while brigade readiness improved, persistent corruption—exemplified by the 2012 Oboronservis scandal involving $1 billion in fraudulent property deals—led to Serdyukov's dismissal in November 2012 and underscored uneven graft reduction despite purges.

Modernization and Hybrid Operations (2014–2021)

Following the annexation of in , Russia accelerated military modernization under the State Armament Program for 2011–2020 (GPV-2020), which allocated approximately 20 trillion rubles (about $280 billion at 2014 exchange rates) to procure advanced weaponry, aiming to equip the armed forces with 70% modern systems by 2020. The program prioritized precision-guided munitions, such as upgraded Kalibr cruise missiles, and hypersonic systems including the , publicly unveiled in March 2018 with claimed speeds exceeding Mach 10 and ranges up to 2,000 km when deployed from MiG-31 fighters. Independent assessments indicated partial fulfillment, with official Russian reports claiming around 70% modernity in key categories like by late 2020, though ground forces lagged at approximately 50–60% due to production bottlenecks, corruption, and Western sanctions limiting components. The intervention in , beginning on September 30, 2015, served as a live testing ground for these capabilities, enabling the first combat use of Kalibr missiles launched from ships and submarines against targets in , demonstrating long-range precision strikes over 1,500 km. Russian forces deployed Orlan-10 and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for and strikes, integrating them with Su-34 bombers and S-400 air defenses at the Khmeimim base, which highlighted expeditionary including rapid airfield construction and naval task group sustainment. However, operational data revealed sustainment challenges, such as high attrition rates for precision munitions (e.g., initial Kalibr and Kh-101 stocks depleted faster than anticipated) and difficulties in maintaining coordination over extended lines, prompting doctrinal adjustments toward "non-contact" warfare emphasizing standoff fires. Hybrid operations expanded during this period, incorporating private military companies like the as deniable proxies in Ukraine's region from 2014 and later in , where they conducted ground assaults and secured oil fields, allowing Russia to blur lines between regular forces and irregulars while minimizing official casualties. Cyber capabilities complemented these efforts, with state-linked actors conducting influence operations, such as disinformation campaigns during the 2016 U.S. election and disruptive attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure in 2015–2016, integrated into broader "information confrontation" doctrine to achieve effects below kinetic thresholds. Arctic investments enhanced strategic positioning, with the Northern Fleet redesignated as a on December 1, 2014, receiving upgrades including Yasen-class submarines capable of launching Kalibr missiles and reactivation of bases like for hypersonic and deployments. By January 1, 2021, the fleet achieved military district-equivalent status, incorporating ground, air, and naval assets to project power amid resource competition, though empirical exercises exposed gaps in sustained high-latitude operations. Russian state media often overstated seamless integration of these systems, but field tests and deployments indicated persistent doctrinal shortfalls in joint maneuver and logistics, where advanced munitions succeeded in isolation but struggled against adaptive adversaries requiring full-spectrum coordination.

Organizational Structure

According to the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation approved on December 25, 2014, the military organization of the state is a complex comprising state administration and military command and control bodies, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military units, and bodies that form its basis, as well as the country's defense-industrial complex, with joint activities aimed at preparing for and conducting armed defense. The Armed Forces constitute the core of this military organization.

Service Branches

The Russian Armed Forces are organized into four principal service branches: the Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces, , and , each with distinct roles that prioritize land-based in line with Russia's geostrategic emphasis on Eurasian continental defense over global blue-water operations. The Ground Forces dominate the overall structure and , reflecting a historical and causal reliance on massed armored and formations for territorial control and , while the other branches provide supporting nuclear, air, and maritime deterrence capabilities. This division maintains operational autonomy for strategic assets like nuclear missiles, differing from integrated models in Western militaries such as the , where nuclear forces are subsumed under air and naval services to streamline command. The Ground Forces form the doctrinal core, tasked with conventional , territorial defense, and rapid maneuver operations using motorized rifle brigades and tank armies; as of early 2025 estimates, they comprise approximately 300,000 active personnel out of the expanded total force, equipped with thousands of main battle tanks including upgraded variants, though production of next-generation platforms remains limited due to cost and complexity constraints. This branch's dominance stems from Russia's vast land borders and emphasis on attrition-resistant ground offensives, interrelating with other services through joint commands for integrated fire support rather than independent expeditionary roles. The Aerospace Forces, established in 2015 via merger of the Air Force and Aerospace Defense Troops, integrate air combat, strategic bombing, and space-based reconnaissance under a unified command to enhance domain control; they operate an inventory of roughly 3,700 aircraft, including multirole fighters like the Su-35 and a growing number of fifth-generation Su-57 stealth platforms, with deliveries accelerating amid wartime demands. This structure supports Ground Forces operations through close air support while maintaining independent strategic aviation for long-range strikes, though maintenance and pilot shortages limit sustained high-tempo employment. The , with around 150,000 personnel, focuses on submarine-centric deterrence rather than surface fleet projection, featuring advanced Yasen-class nuclear attack submarines for anti-surface and undersea warfare; significant losses in the Black Sea Fleet—estimated at one-third of its warships damaged or destroyed by mid-2025 due to Ukrainian strikes—have constrained surface operations, forcing reliance on dispersed basing and submarine patrols for regional influence. These setbacks highlight the Navy's secondary role in doctrine, primarily augmenting capabilities via ballistic missile submarines while ceding blue-water ambitions to resource land forces. The operate as a distinct dedicated to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), embodying Russia's prioritization of assured nuclear retaliation through mobile and silo-deployed systems like the ; this separation ensures dedicated oversight of approximately half of Russia's operational strategic warheads, contrasting with unified U.S. nuclear command by preserving a specialized service for rapid escalation control in deterrence scenarios. Inter-branch coordination occurs via the General Staff, but the Rocket Forces' autonomy underscores a causal focus on survivable second-strike capacity over integrated conventional-nuclear operations.

Military Districts and Operational Commands

The Russian Armed Forces' territorial organization is structured around military districts functioning as joint operational commands, designed to facilitate rapid deployment, theater-level coordination, and continental defense against perceived threats from in the west and potential adversaries in the east. Following the 2008–2012 military reforms, the previous six districts were consolidated into four: the (headquartered in ), (Rostov-on-Don), (Yekaterinburg), and (Khabarovsk). These districts integrate ground, aerospace, and supporting forces under unified commanders, emphasizing interoperability for large-scale operations rather than the prior Soviet-era administrative silos. In response to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and heightened tensions with , the was partitioned into the and Leningrad Military Districts, effective March 1, 2024, resulting in five districts overall by mid-2025. The split aims to streamline command for European contingencies, with the Leningrad District covering northwestern regions including the Baltic Fleet's land components and the District focusing on central and potential mobilization hubs. This reconfiguration reverses aspects of the 2010 consolidation, prioritizing administrative granularity for force generation amid ongoing combat attrition. The has expanded significantly since 2014, incorporating and following annexation, and further integrating the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, along with occupied portions of and oblasts via presidential decrees in late 2022 and early 2024. These additions extend the district's operational theater to over 1 million square kilometers, serving as a forward base for and operations while reinforcing buffers against southern flanks. New combined-arms formations, including motorized rifle divisions and artillery brigades, have been raised within the district for the theater, drawing on local conscripts and contract personnel to sustain frontline commitments through 2025. Military districts play a central role in mobilization and reserve management, acting as regional depots for personnel and equipment activation. During the September 2022 partial , district commands coordinated the call-up of approximately 300,000 reservists, primarily from western and southern regions, to replenish units depleted in ; this involved territorial recruitment centers under district oversight, though implementation varied by governorate responsiveness and led to uneven force quality. The Central and Eastern Districts, oriented toward Siberian heartlands and Pacific defenses, maintain larger reserve pools for hypothetical escalations against or Central Asian instability, underscoring Russia's doctrine of mass over precision in protracted conflicts. The Russian Navy operates four primary fleets: the , Pacific Fleet, , and , each aligned with specific geographic theaters and strategic priorities. The , headquartered in on the near , serves as the primary bastion for Russia's forces, including submarines (SSBNs) based in facilities like Zapadnaya Litsa and Gadzhiyevo, emphasizing operations and strategic deterrence. The Pacific Fleet maintains its headquarters in , with key submarine basing at on the and surface operations from , focusing on power projection across the vast Pacific theater. The operates from in the Kaliningrad exclave, providing Russia with ice-free access to the and supporting regional denial capabilities amid proximity. The , traditionally centered on in , has faced severe degradation since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with Ukrainian strikes sinking the flagship cruiser Moskva in April 2022 and destroying or damaging approximately 24 vessels—representing about 33% of its combat ships—prompting partial relocation to and a shift toward standoff missile operations. Russian naval basing prioritizes fortified, submarine-centric infrastructure over expansive surface fleets, with Murmansk-area facilities safeguarding SSBNs against penetration and Sevastopol historically enabling Mediterranean access, though recent losses have exposed vulnerabilities in surface assets. Doctrine has evolved toward anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), leveraging submarine-launched Kalibr cruise missiles for precision strikes—as demonstrated in Black Sea operations—and hypersonic systems like Zircon to offset weaknesses in blue-water capabilities, abandoning ambitious carrier-centric visions in favor of asymmetric underwater and missile dominance. By 2025, this approach reflects resource constraints, with personnel reductions to 119,000 navy-wide and a coastal defense emphasis in fleets like the Northern.

Central Command and Ministry of Defense

The President of the Russian Federation serves as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, exercising ultimate authority over military operations and directing the Ministry of Defense (MoD). This centralized structure positions the President at the apex of decision-making, with the power to appoint key leaders and approve strategic deployments. The MoD, as the primary administrative body, oversees budgeting, procurement, and operational planning, while the General Staff, led by Chief since November 9, 2012, functions as the central organ for warfighting strategy and coordination. Andrei Belousov has held the position of Defense Minister since May 14, 2024, succeeding , who served from November 2012 until his reassignment to the Security Council amid scrutiny over military performance in . Belousov's appointment, as an economist with prior roles including , emphasizes integrating defense with wartime economic mobilization, reflecting priorities for sustained resource allocation. The General Staff integrates intelligence from the Main Intelligence Directorate (), a unit under its purview responsible for foreign and support, alongside inputs from the (FSB) for and internal threats. This fusion aids centralized planning but has faced criticism for overlapping mandates that prioritize regime loyalty over operational efficiency. The June 2023 mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin exposed fissures in command loyalty, prompting purges including the August 2023 dismissal of General Sergei Surovikin from his role as Aerospace Forces commander due to suspected affiliations. Surovikin's removal, confirmed via and linked to post-mutiny investigations, underscored efforts to enforce hierarchical . Russia's vertical command model, characterized by top-down orders with limited initiative, facilitates rapid escalation to nuclear thresholds under presidential control but contrasts with Western decentralized approaches that devolve tactical authority to enhance adaptability. This rigidity, rooted in Soviet-era practices, prioritizes strategic unity over battlefield flexibility, as evidenced by persistent reports of delayed adaptations in ongoing conflicts.

Personnel and Manpower

Conscription and Contract Service

Mandatory military service in Russia requires male citizens aged 18 to 30 to serve for 12 months, with conscription conducted biannually in spring and autumn campaigns. The spring 2025 draft targeted 160,000 recruits, the highest since 2011, while the autumn draft aimed for 135,000, reflecting increased manpower needs amid ongoing conflicts. These drafts fill approximately one-third of active-duty positions, but compliance remains challenged by widespread evasion tactics, prompting stricter enforcement measures such as expanded border controls and travel bans for draft-eligible men. Since military reforms initiated in 2008, has prioritized transitioning to a contract-based (kontraktniki) to enhance professionalism and reduce reliance on conscripts, who are legally barred from deployments outside Russian territory. By 2025, the Ministry of Defense set a target of recruiting 340,000 new contract soldiers annually, supported by substantial financial incentives including federal one-time signing bonuses of up to 2 million rubles, supplemented by regional payments reaching 3 million rubles in areas like . These efforts have contributed to overall expansion, with active personnel exceeding 1.3 million in 2025 and plans to reach 1.5 million by 2026 through sustained contract enlistments. Contract soldiers generally receive more extensive training and exhibit higher motivation compared to conscripts, whose abbreviated preparation—often limited to basic skills amid resource constraints—has drawn criticism for inadequacy in demands. This disparity underscores the drive, yet persistent demographic pressures from Russia's rate dropping to historic lows—around 1.4 births per woman—shrink the pool of eligible recruits, compounding evasion and complicating long-term manpower sustainability.

Officer Training and Education

Officer training in the Russian Armed Forces occurs primarily through a network of higher military educational institutions, where candidates typically enter after completing or civilian universities via competitive exams and medical checks. These programs last 4–5 years for initial commissioning, focusing on branch-specific curricula that combine theoretical instruction in , tactics, and leadership with basic practical drills. Key institutions include the Academy of the Armed Forces in , which succeeded the historic and trains ground forces officers in operational art and tactics; the Zhukovsky–Gagarin Air Force Academy for personnel; and the for naval officers. As of 2024, Russia maintains approximately 41 such universities, academies, institutes, and colleges dedicated to officer development, alongside specialized schools for technical and staff roles. Training methodologies retain Soviet-era emphases on doctrinal , rote memorization of regulations, and theoretical lectures, often prioritizing mathematical modeling and scripted exercises over adaptive, simulation-driven scenarios that foster initiative. While post-2010 reforms introduced more computer-based simulations to offset live-fire costs and resource constraints, practical field training remains limited by equipment shortages and , resulting in officers less prepared for dynamic, peer-level conflicts compared to counterparts. This rigidity stems from a centralized controlled by the Ministry of Defense, which discourages deviation from approved tactics and undervalues decentralized . Promotions within the officer corps follow a hierarchical structure outlined by the Ministry of Defense, theoretically based on service length, performance evaluations, and completion of advanced courses at institutions like the of the General Staff. In practice, patronage networks and political loyalty frequently supersede pure merit, particularly for flag-rank advancements, as evidenced by appointments favoring connections to Defense Minister or regional commanders over battlefield results. The invasion of since February 2022 exacerbated cadre shortages, with confirmed military deaths exceeding 140,000 by October 2025—including a disproportionate share of mid-level officers due to their forward roles—prompting abbreviated training pipelines, such as 2–3 month "lieutenant schools" for rapid commissioning of contract volunteers and academy graduates. Cultural issues, including the persistence of —a hazing tradition originating in conscript units but infiltrating officer training environments through shared barracks and peer enforcement—undermine professionalism by fostering abuse, corruption, and low morale among junior cadres. Officers often fail to curb such practices, perpetuating a cycle where fear and conformity replace , as documented in reports of non-commissioned and junior officer complicity in mistreatment. Conversely, deployments to from 2015 onward provided combat seasoning to thousands of officers, with over 85% of regimental and larger formation commanders gaining experience there by 2021, enabling refinements in precision strikes, , and joint operations that informed later doctrines despite the operation's limited scale.

Reserves, Mobilization, and Force Expansion

The Russian Armed Forces maintain a reserve force nominally comprising approximately 2 million personnel, primarily drawn from former conscripts and contract soldiers who have completed service, though the actual readiness and trainability of this pool remain limited due to outdated training protocols and high attrition from civilian life. Reforms initiated after the 2008 Georgia conflict and continued through 2019 emphasized transitioning from a conscript-heavy structure to more professional elements, including the establishment of territorial volunteer battalions and enhanced reserve officer training programs to bolster rapid mobilization capabilities, yet these efforts yielded mixed results with persistent gaps in equipment and cohesion. By 2024, legislative changes formalized the integration of volunteer formations into the defense framework, providing them with funding and legal status to serve as a bridge between active forces and full reserves. On September 21, 2022, President announced a partial targeting 300,000 reservists with prior military experience to reinforce operations in , marking the first such large-scale call-up since the Soviet era. The process revealed significant logistical shortcomings, including inadequate screening, insufficient training facilities, and supply chain disruptions, leading to widespread inefficiencies such as delayed deployments and equipment shortages. Public backlash manifested in protests across major cities, mass emigration of eligible men estimated in the hundreds of thousands, and elevated rates, prompting Putin to declare the complete by October 31 despite falling short of targets and imposing harsher penalties for evasion, including up to 10 years imprisonment for or surrender. These outcomes underscored the challenges of adapting a Soviet-inherited mass- model—optimized for high-attrition conflicts with minimal regard for individual welfare—to , where volunteer retention and precision prove decisive, as evidenced by contrasts with all-volunteer forces like the U.S. military's sustained operational tempo without domestic upheaval. In response to mobilization's fallout, Russian authorities pivoted to aggressive contract-based from 2023 onward, offering financial incentives exceeding 2 million rubles per enlistee in some regions to expand forces without repeating mass call-ups, achieving reported surges of up to 40,000–60,000 monthly sign-ups by mid- through campaigns and regional bounties. Official figures claim over 440,000 contract soldiers added in 2024 and approximately 280,000 by September , though independent analyses based on budget expenditures suggest lower verified numbers, around 37,900 in the second quarter of alone, indicating potential overstatement amid declining trends later in the year. This approach, supplemented by convict recruits and foreign volunteers, aims to reach 1.5 million active personnel by 2026 via a September 2024 decree increasing overall armed forces strength to 2.38 million including reserves, prioritizing contract service over to mitigate social resistance while sustaining attrition-heavy operations. Such expansion reflects a doctrinal emphasis on numerical superiority in prolonged conflicts, yet it strains demographic resources and risks further erosion without addressing underlying deficiencies.

Demographic and Morale Challenges

Russia's demographic profile presents significant challenges to sustaining its armed forces, characterized by a fertility rate of approximately 1.4 children per woman as of 2023, contributing to an aging and a shrinking cohort of military-age males. The ongoing war in has intensified this crisis through high casualties, emigration of over 1 million people since 2022, and excess male mortality, resulting in a projected and labor shortages that limit voluntary pools. Urban and educated youth increasingly evade service due to its unpopularity and perceived risks, forcing reliance on recruits from ethnic minorities, rural poor regions, and older individuals, with reports of Siberian centers accepting personnel of "extremely advanced age" with chronic health issues by October 2025. To address manpower shortages, Russian authorities have expanded recruitment from non-traditional sources, including coerced Central Asian migrants—estimated at least 20,000 by August 2025—and prisoners via penal units such as , with up to 100,000 convicts released to fight since 2022. Despite a record spring of 160,000 in 2025 and financial incentives, contract recruitment rates have declined amid heavy losses and uneven pay, particularly in economically disadvantaged areas like . Cumulative casualties exceed 1 million total (killed and wounded) by mid-2025 per Western estimates, far surpassing official Russian figures and narratives of minimal losses, depleting experienced personnel and straining replacement capabilities. Morale within the Russian armed forces remains uneven, undermined by persistent hazing practices known as dedovshchina, which involve systematic abuse of junior conscripts and continue despite post-2010 reforms, fostering resentment and psychological trauma. Poor living conditions, inadequate equipment, and high attrition rates exacerbate disillusionment, particularly among conscripts, though defensive operations have shown tactical resilience bolstered by financial bonuses reaching up to 2 million rubles for contract service. Surveys from 2022–2024 indicate mixed loyalty, with public support for the war hovering around 70–80% per state-influenced polls but tied more to economic incentives and patriotism than ideological conviction, while underlying strains prevent systemic collapse through authoritarian repression and information controls. No evidence suggests imminent morale-driven disintegration, as coercive measures and selective propaganda sustain cohesion amid ongoing attrition.

Equipment and Capabilities

Conventional Ground and Air Forces

The maintain a large inventory of armored vehicles, with approximately 12,000 main battle tanks reported prior to the 2022 invasion of , including extensive stored reserves of variants that have been reactivated to sustain operations. analysis as of October 2025 reveals severe depletion of these strategic reserves, reducing usable T-72B tanks in decent condition to just 92 from an initial 7,342, with many others in poor states requiring extensive refurbishment. In the , visually confirmed tank losses exceed 4,000 units through October 2025, primarily and T-80 models, reflecting high attrition rates in offensive maneuvers. Annual production of modern T-90M tanks has tripled to 280-300 units since 2022, yielding 540-630 total since the war's onset, though this is supplemented by refurbishing older rather than net expansion. Artillery remains a cornerstone of Russian ground capabilities, emphasizing quantity for in positional warfare, with over 6,000 self-propelled systems including the howitzer, which provides 152mm mobile firepower with ranges up to 29 km in upgraded variants. Confirmed losses of Msta-S units surpass 250 by mid-2025, yet production and reserves sustain numerical superiority over adversaries, enabling daily barrages exceeding 10,000 rounds in peak phases of the Ukraine conflict. This volume supports attrition strategies, where sustained compensates for vulnerabilities in maneuver units exposed to drones and precision-guided munitions. The Russian Aerospace Forces field around 1,000 fixed-wing combat aircraft as of 2025, concentrated on multirole fighters like the Su-35 (over 100 active) and a small fleet of Su-57 stealth platforms, prioritizing air superiority and ground attack roles. Russia maintains niche technological strengths in air defense systems, including the S-400 Triumf capable of engaging targets up to 400 km and the S-500 Prometheus designed for intercepting hypersonic threats at ranges up to 600 km. In , air operations have faced constraints from integrated air defenses, restricting suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions and resulting in fewer than 100 confirmed fixed-wing losses but minimal deep strikes due to risk aversion. Adaptations include reliance on unmanned systems, such as Lancet loitering munitions, which have conducted thousands of sorties for on high-value targets, bypassing manned aircraft limitations. Empirically, Russia's conventional forces leverage sheer numbers for attritional endurance, with ground quantities facilitating incremental gains despite qualitative gaps in sensors and networking compared to NATO equivalents. Air assets lag in avionics sophistication but gain asymmetric advantages from hypersonic munitions like the Kinzhal missile, which has seen extensive combat use in Ukraine achieving Mach 10 speeds for penetrating defenses in conventional strikes. Overall modernization efforts focus on incremental upgrades to Soviet-era platforms, offset by wartime losses that strain sustainability without broader industrial surges. The Russian Navy's submarine force numbers approximately 70 vessels as of mid-2025, comprising diesel-electric classes such as the (around 20-25 units) and newer Lada-class (3-4 units), alongside nuclear-powered platforms like the Borei-class, which carry submarine-launched ballistic s central to deterrence strategies. The surface fleet includes about 80 major combatants, such as frigates, corvettes, and aging Soviet-era cruisers and destroyers, though overall operational readiness is hampered by maintenance issues and an inventory of over 220 warships that skews toward smaller vessels and patrol craft. These assets prioritize asymmetric capabilities over blue-water projection, with enabling covert operations and missile launches while surface units focus on coastal defense and escort roles. The has suffered catastrophic attrition since 2022, with at least 22 ships and boats destroyed by mid-2024, including missile carriers and landing ships, escalating into 2025 with further strikes that have confined remaining vessels to distant ports and rendered the fleet functionally inactive for offensive operations. Ukrainian maritime drones and missiles have exploited Russian vulnerabilities in littoral waters, forcing relocations and highlighting deficiencies in air defense and damage control, with cumulative losses exceeding one-third of pre-war strength. Russian maritime doctrine emphasizes over control, particularly in littoral and near-sea zones, integrating anti-ship missiles, submarines, and coastal defenses to complicate adversary access under an framework. Long-range strikes via Kalibr cruise missiles from submarines and surface ships, alongside emerging hypersonic systems that have been tested under combat conditions in Ukraine, have proven effective for standoff attacks, compensating for limited fleet mobility. However, ambitions for carrier-based operations have faltered, as evidenced by the Admiral Kuznetsov—Russia's only —which has endured multiple fires, engine failures, and construction mishaps, leading to its effective decommissioning and scrapping discussions by October 2025 without meaningful combat deployment. By 2025, has pivoted toward missile-centric and unmanned systems to offset surface hull losses, with adaptations including enhanced kinetic defenses against drones, barrier deployments, and reliance on submarine-launched precision strikes rather than traditional fleet maneuvers. This shift underscores a doctrinal evolution prioritizing attrition-resistant, land-sea integrated fires over vulnerable capital ships, though persistent industrial constraints limit scaling.

Nuclear Triad and Strategic Weapons

Russia's consists of land-based intercontinental s (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and submarine-launched s (SLBMs) from submarines (SSBNs), forming the core of its strategic nuclear deterrent. As of early 2025, approximately 4,309 warheads are assigned to these long-range strategic delivery systems. The manage the ICBM component, with around 206 missiles deployed in mobile and silo-based configurations, capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The , a liquid-fueled super-heavy ICBM designed to replace older systems like the R-36M, remains in limited deployment following development delays, with capabilities for up to 10 large warheads or hypersonic glide vehicles. The air leg relies on Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers, with an estimated 55 Tu-95MS and 16 operational Tu-160 aircraft as of mid-2025, though Ukrainian drone strikes in June 2025 destroyed several Tu-95s, reducing fleet readiness. These platforms can deliver cruise missiles such as the and Kh-102, supporting standoff nuclear strikes. The sea-based leg features Borei-class (Project 955/955A) SSBNs, with eight to ten vessels operational or recently commissioned by late 2025, each armed with 16 Bulava (RSM-56) SLBMs capable of MIRVed warheads. Modernization efforts include the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, deployed on converted ICBMs for maneuverable reentry at speeds exceeding Mach 20, enhancing penetration of missile defenses. The Poseidon (Status-6) nuclear-powered underwater drone, intended for autonomous delivery of a multi-megaton warhead, remains in testing with no confirmed operational deployment as of 2025. The Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile debuted operationally in November 2024 against targets in Ukraine, featuring MIRV capabilities and hypersonic speeds, signaling expansion beyond traditional ICBM ranges. Russian nuclear doctrine emphasizes deterrence through the triad's survivability and retaliatory potential, rejecting a strict no-first-use policy in favor of authorizing nuclear response to existential threats from conventional or nuclear attacks. Amendments approved in 2024 lowered thresholds for potential use, including against non-nuclear aggression supported by nuclear powers, aligning with an "escalate to de-escalate" posture that leverages limited nuclear employment to halt conventional conflicts on favorable terms. This contrasts with observed conventional force shortcomings, positioning nuclear capabilities as the regime's ultimate safeguard.

Budget, Procurement, and Industrial Base

Funding Levels and Economic Impact

Russia's military expenditure for is estimated at 15.5 trillion rubles, equivalent to approximately $160 billion and representing about 6.3–7.2 percent of GDP, marking a real-terms increase of 3.4 percent from 2024 levels. This escalation reflects a shift to sustained war footing, with defense allocations rising from around 4 percent of GDP in the years immediately preceding the 2022 invasion of to current levels exceeding 6 percent, driven by operational demands in and broader strategic priorities. The funding surge has been partially sustained through sanctions evasion, particularly via elevated oil exports to and , which have absorbed redirected crude volumes and provided revenue streams insulating from Western restrictions on energy sales. These trade dynamics have enabled fiscal resilience, contributing to GDP growth averaging over 3 percent annually since 2022 despite initial forecasts of economic collapse from sanctions. Economically, elevated defense spending has induced labor reallocation toward the military-industrial sector, with real wages rising more than 20 percent since 2022 amid reduced labor supply from and , fueling demand in defense production. This has propped up short-term growth but exacerbated , projected at 6.8–8 percent by end-2025, alongside supply-side constraints like shortages. Looking to 2026, draft budgets indicate a potential plateau or slight decline in nominal outlays to around 12.6–13 rubles, with reduced reliance on oil revenues offset by domestic hikes, including an increase in VAT from 20 to 22 percent and progressive income tax adjustments expected to generate over 1 rubles in additional revenue. Growth projections cool to 1–1.3 percent, highlighting vulnerabilities in a war-dependent facing persistent inflationary pressures and fiscal deficits around 1.2–1.6 percent of GDP.

Procurement Programs and Modernization Efforts

The State Armament Program for 2018–2027 (GPV-2027) outlined ambitious acquisition targets to equip the Russian Armed Forces with advanced systems, allocating resources for platforms like the Su-57 stealth fighter and tank. However, fulfillment rates have lagged significantly for high-end items; of 76 Su-57s planned, only about 20 were delivered by 2025 due to engine development delays, issues, and costs prioritizing operational needs over serial production. The program similarly stalled, with initial goals of hundreds of units curtailed to near-zero beyond prototypes and testing batches, as per-unit costs approached $4–6 million amid fiscal constraints and reliability concerns. Following the 2022 invasion of , procurement shifted toward wartime surges in volume production, emphasizing munitions, drones, and to sustain attrition-based operations. Drone output escalated dramatically, reaching 1.5 million units in 2024 per official directives, with long-range models increasing from 15,000 in 2024 to over 30,000 in 2025 through factory expansions and simplified designs. production ramped up via retooling of civilian facilities and labor shifts, reportedly tripling annual shell output to 2–3 million by 2025 from pre-war baselines of under 1 million, though and precision guidance remain inconsistent. This pivot highlighted industrial capacity for mass output but exposed bottlenecks in skilled labor and raw materials. Import substitution initiatives, accelerated by Western sanctions since 2022, yielded mixed self-reliance gains, with domestic sourcing of basic electronics and components rising through state mandates and evasion tactics like parallel imports from Asia. Reliance on Western high-tech inputs halved from 2022 to 2023 via partnerships with China, Iran, and North Korea for dual-use goods, enabling sustained low-to-mid-tier production. Yet, persistent dependencies in semiconductors and engines have limited qualitative modernization, fostering criticism that efforts prioritize sheer quantity—such as refurbished Soviet derivatives—over breakthrough innovations, thereby capping strategic edges against peer adversaries.

Corruption, Inefficiency, and Sanctions Effects

Corruption has long permeated the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), with a 2011 admission by a military prosecutor estimating that approximately 20% of the annual defense budget is lost to by officials, generals, and contractors. This systemic graft manifests in scandals, where inflated contracts and kickbacks divert funds from operational readiness, fostering a patrimonial culture prioritizing personal loyalties and clan networks over meritocratic competence. Major exposures occurred during Anatoly Serdyukov's tenure as defense minister from 2007 to 2012, culminating in the Oboronservis scandal, where officials mismanaged billions of rubles in military property sales, leading to Serdyukov's dismissal in November 2012. His aide Yevgeniya Vasilyeva was convicted in 2015 on multiple fraud charges related to the affair. In the 2020s, probes intensified, exemplified by the April 2024 arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov for embezzlement and bribery, resulting in a 13-year sentence in July 2025 for siphoning state funds and laundering proceeds. These cases highlight ongoing vulnerabilities in contract oversight, though prosecutions often spare higher echelons, perpetuating inefficiency. Such corruption exacerbates operational inefficiencies, including redundant (R&D) efforts across state enterprises and inadequate maintenance regimes that degrade equipment longevity. Resource misallocation favors patronage-driven projects over streamlined innovation, contributing to reliance on outdated Soviet-era designs amid "innovation stagnation." Post-2022 invasion, partial reforms have targeted graft through high-profile arrests, but entrenched limits merit-based advancements, sustaining capability gaps in and sustainment. Western sanctions imposed after the February 2022 invasion have compounded these issues by restricting access to for and precision systems, slowing production rates for and missiles. Chip shortages have grounded portions of Russia's jet fleet and hampered upgrades, with leaked documents indicating reliance on pre-sanction stockpiles. However, parallel imports via intermediaries in , , and the UAE have mitigated impacts, enabling evasion of export controls on dual-use components and sustaining output at elevated but constrained levels. This circumvention raises costs and dependencies, underscoring how corruption-weakened institutions hinder adaptive resilience.

Doctrine, Operations, and Performance

Military Doctrine and Strategic Posture

The Russian Military Doctrine, formally approved on December 26, 2014, by President Vladimir Putin, outlines the state's views on armed defense preparation and protection, emphasizing a defensive orientation while acknowledging the need for proactive measures against perceived external threats. It identifies primary military dangers as stemming from NATO's eastward expansion, which Russia views as encroaching on its strategic buffers and violating post-Cold War assurances against alliance enlargement, as well as the buildup of NATO infrastructure near Russian borders. The doctrine highlights hybrid threats, including information-psychological operations, color revolutions, and non-state actors, as integral to modern conflicts, necessitating integrated responses across military, informational, and diplomatic domains. Russia's strategic posture integrates (A2/AD) capabilities to deter and complicate potential aggressions, particularly in regions like the Baltic and Black Seas, where layered air defense systems, coastal missiles, and electronic warfare assets aim to neutralize superior conventional forces. This approach reflects a doctrinal balance between defensive consolidation—leveraging geographic depth for attrition-based warfare—and offensive elements, such as preemptive strikes if an attack appears imminent, rooted in the principle that Russia's expansive territory demands buffer zones to prevent historical patterns of invasion from the west. The posture prioritizes and firepower over Western-style precision, with and maneuver forces central to operations, though it incorporates multi-domain integration for dominance and rapid response to hybrid incursions. By 2023–2025, doctrinal evolutions, informed by operational experiences, have amplified emphasis on electronic warfare (EW) as a force multiplier to counter precision-guided munitions and unmanned systems, alongside reinforced hybrid tactics blending conventional, cyber, and informational elements. Updates to ancillary documents, such as the 2023 Foreign Policy Concept, frame great-power competition with the West as a core driver, justifying escalation thresholds that lower the nuclear barrier in response to existential conventional threats, though conventional forces remain the primary warfighting arm. Critiques from analysts note that this nuclear-centric rhetoric may obscure underlying conventional deficiencies, including equipment obsolescence and training gaps, potentially incentivizing reliance on strategic deterrence over holistic modernization, a dynamic exacerbated by geographic imperatives for territorial control amid peer competition.

Performance in Key Conflicts (Chechnya, Georgia, Syria)

In the (1994–1996), Russian forces encountered severe difficulties in urban combat, particularly during the Battle of in December 1994–January 1995, where poorly prepared motorized rifle units suffered heavy losses to Chechen fighters using guerrilla tactics and anti-tank weapons; estimates indicate Russian military fatalities exceeded 5,500, with equipment losses including over 100 armored vehicles destroyed or captured in the city alone. Aviation assets fared poorly, with roughly one in ten helicopters lost and one in four damaged due to inadequate suppression of enemy air defenses and exposure to man-portable systems. The campaign's failure culminated in a humiliating withdrawal under the in August 1996, highlighting deficiencies in coordination, intelligence, and adaptation to , with total Russian casualties approaching 14,000 dead or missing. The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) saw improved tactical execution through massive artillery barrages and air strikes to soften resistance before ground advances, enabling recapture of by February 2000, though at the cost of extensive civilian infrastructure destruction and over 25,000 non-combatant deaths attributed to indiscriminate . Russian military deaths totaled around 7,000–8,000, with fewer equipment losses than the first war due to reliance on standoff fires rather than direct assaults, but urban fighting persisted as a , exposing troops to ambushes and IEDs. Long-term stabilization shifted to proxy militias under , comprising former rebels integrated as "," which reduced federal troop commitments but entrenched a brutal model dependent on local strongmen rather than conventional forces. During the 2008 , Russian troops demonstrated rapid deployment capabilities, mobilizing 58th Army units from bases in North to overrun and advance to Gori within five days of hostilities commencing on , validating short-axis maneuver against a smaller opponent despite initial Georgian strikes. Logistics strains emerged, including fuel shortages and supply convoy vulnerabilities, while air operations achieved dominance but inflicted limited damage due to poor precision and Georgian air defenses downing several Russian , with total losses comprising about 3–4 fixed-wing planes and minimal ground beyond self-detonated captured Georgian assets. Concurrent cyber operations, involving DDoS attacks on Georgian and media sites starting July 20, 2008, disrupted communications but lacked integration with kinetic strikes, serving more as psychological pressure than decisive enabler. Russia's intervention in Syria from September 2015 emphasized airpower projection, with the Aerospace Forces conducting over 30,000 sorties by 2018, including initial long-range strikes using 26 Kalibr cruise missiles launched from ships on October 7, 2015, targeting rebel positions and demonstrating standoff precision capabilities against and opposition groups. Ground involvement remained limited to and marine units for advising and securing bases like Khmeimim, relying heavily on Syrian Arab Army proxies, militias, and later contractors for offensives such as (March 2016) and (September 2017), which exposed sustainment challenges including equipment attrition from desert conditions and vulnerability to MANPADS, with Russian fatalities officially at 103 but estimates exceeding 200 including contractors. While these operations preserved the Assad regime and tested hypersonic weapons and electronic warfare systems, they revealed overreliance on allies for territorial control and inflated claims of militant kills, with independent assessments questioning the strategic depth beyond regime survival. Across these conflicts, Russian forces secured tactical victories—defeating Chechen insurgents through attrition and proxies, ejecting Georgian troops from separatist regions, and bolstering Syrian allies via air dominance—but recurrent issues like logistical fragility, urban combat ineptitude, and proxy dependence underscored limitations in sustained independent operations, with empirical losses (e.g., thousands of vehicles and aircraft in alone) informing partial adaptations yet persistent overestimation of conventional prowess.

Russo-Ukrainian War (2022–Present): Phases and Adaptations

The Russian Armed Forces launched a full-scale invasion of on , 2022, initially deploying approximately 190,000 troops in a multi-axis offensive aimed at rapid decapitation strikes on and other major cities. This phase, characterized by armored thrusts from the north, east, and south, achieved early encirclements such as the airport on but stalled due to logistical overextension, Ukrainian resistance, and terrain challenges, leading to a withdrawal from by early April 2022. Russian forces suffered significant equipment losses, including over 1,000 tanks visually confirmed destroyed or captured by mid-2022, marking the failure of the blitzkrieg-style operation. Following the northern retreat, Russian operations shifted to the region in April 2022, emphasizing attritional grinding along fortified lines in and oblasts. By late 2022, forces consolidated gains around Severodonetsk and , capturing the latter in July after prolonged urban combat that highlighted Russian advantages in artillery volume but exposed vulnerabilities in . The 2023 phase intensified this attrition, with incremental advances toward —fully secured by May 2023—at the cost of heavy infantry assaults, often relying on poorly trained mobilized recruits, resulting in estimated Russian casualties exceeding 100,000 by year's end according to independent media tallies cross-referenced with records. Ukrainian counteroffensives, such as in and earlier, recaptured some territory but failed to break Russian defensive belts, underscoring the effectiveness of layered minefields and dragon's teeth obstacles. In 2024, Russian forces adapted to offensive momentum, capturing in February after encircling Ukrainian defenders and transitioned to broader pushes, including the ongoing Pokrovsk direction offensive starting May 2024, where advances reached within 10-15 km of the hub by October 2025. Territorial gains accelerated in late 2024 and 2025, with Russian claims of nearly 5,000 square kilometers seized in 2025 alone, though independent geospatial analysis estimates around 3,500 square kilometers for the year, primarily in via small-unit infantry probes supported by glide bombs. These advances, averaging 70-75 per square kilometer gained in mid-2025, reflect a meat-grinder approach yielding net territorial progress despite total Russian surpassing 900,000 by October 2025 per aggregated Western estimates, with confirmed deaths around 220,000 via open-source obituaries. Ukrainian and Western , including over $100 billion in support since 2022, has enabled defensive holds and counterstrikes like the Kursk incursion in August 2024 but has not reversed the cumulative Russian control of approximately 18-20% of . A notable escalation occurred on November 21, 2024, when deployed the Oreshnik for its combat debut, striking a military-industrial facility in with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, demonstrating hypersonic capabilities (Mach 10+ speeds) and signaling potential for deeper strikes amid stalled negotiations. This non-nuclear use, paired with Iskander missiles, bypassed some Ukrainian air defenses but highlighted Russia's prioritization of strategic deterrence over tactical dominance. Russian adaptations have emphasized technological and doctrinal shifts to counter Ukrainian drone and precision fires. By 2025, forces integrated swarms of low-cost FPV drones for and strikes, achieving battlefield effects equivalent to in suppressing Ukrainian , while electronic warfare systems like those jamming Starlink-dependent operations disrupted up to 80% of incoming Ukrainian UAVs in key sectors. Defensive fortifications evolved into "drone-proof" networks of trenches, decoys, and low-profile strongpoints, enabling advances under glide-bomb cover from Su-34 bombers operating beyond MANPADS range. Troop commitments grew to approximately 450,000 in the theater by early 2025, bolstered by partial and , allowing sustained pressure despite attrition rates that would overwhelm smaller armies. These changes, informed by real-time data, have tilted operational dynamics toward Russian firepower superiority, prolonging the conflict without decisive breakthroughs.

Assessments of Effectiveness and Lessons Learned

Post-war analyses of the Russian Armed Forces' performance in the highlight a mixed record, with demonstrated resilience in sustaining high-volume offset by persistent operational vulnerabilities that have precluded decisive breakthroughs. Independent assessments, including those from Western think tanks, indicate that while Russian forces have not collapsed under pressure—contrary to early predictions of a ""—they have incurred substantial costs for incremental territorial gains, averaging 68 to 75 casualties per square kilometer advanced in mid-2025. This reflects a shift from initial maneuver-oriented ambitions to a grinding positional conflict, where Russia's historical emphasis on and industrial endurance has proven more adaptive than precision-strike doctrines favored by militaries. Key strengths include overwhelming artillery firepower, enabled by annual production rates exceeding 2 million 152mm shells as of 2024, with continued scaling in 2025 through domestic factories and imports from allies like . The nuclear triad provides an unchallenged deterrent umbrella, constraining escalation options for adversaries and allowing Russia to absorb conventional losses without existential risk. Adaptations observed in 2025, such as emergent combined-arms tactics integrating drones and electronic warfare, have been tested in exercises like Zapad 2025, drawing directly from frontline experiences to mitigate early deficiencies in coordination. However, weaknesses persist in air-ground integration, where to secure air superiority has forced reliance on ground-based fires and exposed to Ukrainian drones and , compounded by officer shortages and rigid hierarchies that limit initiative at lower levels. Lessons learned have prompted internal reforms, including intensified drives—claiming success in contract soldier enlistments—and doctrinal shifts toward fortified defenses and sustained over rapid offensives. Russian discourse, as analyzed in 2025, acknowledges gaps in preparing for peer-level conflicts involving dominance and autonomous systems, prompting prioritization of combined-arms training despite entrenched Soviet-era structures. Overall, the conflict underscores that attrition favors Russia's demographic and industrial base in prolonged wars but exposes inefficiencies against agile, tech-enabled defenses, favoring evolutionary tweaks over revolutionary overhaul.

Controversies and Criticisms

Internal Reforms and Systemic Issues

, the entrenched system of hazing and bullying by senior conscripts against juniors, remains a significant internal challenge in the Russian Armed Forces, fostering a of violence that has led to numerous suicides and eroded unit cohesion critical for combat readiness. Official efforts to mitigate it through expanding contract-based service—intended to limit exposure of short-term conscripts to abusive hierarchies—have yielded partial results, but the practice persisted among partial mobilization recruits in 2022, exacerbating morale issues during the early phases of operations in . In response to the June 2023 Wagner Group mutiny led by , Russian authorities initiated widespread loyalty purges within the armed forces, targeting officers and units suspected of sympathy or inaction, including the detention and dismissal of figures like General Sergei Surovikin. These measures, while aimed at ensuring command reliability, disrupted leadership continuity and highlighted underlying fractures in trust between political leadership and military ranks. The appointment of Andrei Belousov as Minister of Defense in May 2024 marked a shift toward intensified campaigns, resulting in the of several deputy ministers and senior procurement officials on embezzlement charges by late 2024, as part of broader efforts to streamline and reduce graft's impact on operational effectiveness. Complementary reforms included enhanced training protocols to address deficiencies exposed in ongoing conflicts, though implementation faces resistance from entrenched bureaucratic inertia. A rigidly top-down command structure perpetuates systemic inefficiencies by discouraging initiative at junior levels, prioritizing obedience over tactical adaptability and contributing to delays in during dynamic scenarios. Despite these constraints, the armed forces have achieved notable success in volunteer recruitment, enlisting over 360,000 contract soldiers and volunteers in 2025 alone through financial incentives and regional campaigns, bolstering manpower sustainability without full reliance on . This expansion has partially offset readiness gaps from and purges by fostering a more professional core force.

Conduct in Operations and Allegations of Violations

In the First and Second Chechen Wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), Russian forces were documented committing atrocities including summary executions, torture, and enforced disappearances, with the ruling responsible for failing to investigate such acts systematically. A Russian admitted in 2001 to widespread crimes by troops during search operations in . During Russia's intervention in the starting in 2015, airstrikes by Russian forces resulted in significant civilian casualties, with UN estimates attributing over 400 civilian deaths in the first two months alone, including strikes on residential areas, markets, and hospitals. documented patterns of unlawful attacks on civilian infrastructure in province between 2019 and 2020, contributing to thousands of deaths amid operations targeting opposition-held areas. Russian officials denied deliberate targeting of civilians, attributing casualties to proximity of militants to populated zones and fog-of-war errors. In the since , verified incidents include summary executions of civilians in Bucha by Russian troops, as detailed in a 2022 UN Office report based on witness testimonies and forensic evidence, with bodies showing signs of close-range shootings post-occupation. contradicted Russian claims that bodies appeared only after their withdrawal, showing some present during occupation. denied responsibility for Bucha killings, alleging Ukrainian staging or false flags to discredit its forces. In , Russian assaults from to May 2022 caused thousands of civilian deaths through indiscriminate shelling and strikes on shelters, including a 2022 theater bombing that killed at least 12 and likely many more, per International's geospatial and witness analysis. investigations identified specific Russian units responsible for laws-of-war violations amounting to potential war crimes. countered that Ukrainian forces used civilian sites for military purposes, denying intentional civilian targeting. The issued arrest warrants in March 2023 for President and Children's Rights Commissioner over the unlawful of Ukrainian children, and in June 2024 for former Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff for directing strikes on civilian infrastructure. Russia rejected the warrants as politically motivated and lacking jurisdiction. Use of cluster munitions has occurred on both sides, with Russia employing them extensively since 2022 causing over 1,200 civilian casualties by mid-2025 per monitoring groups, while Ukraine's use—supplied by the —increased post-July 2023, harming civilians in contested areas. Treatment of prisoners of war has raised bilateral concerns, with UN reports documenting and poor conditions for Ukrainian POWs in Russian custody, including beatings and forced confessions, though recommending improvements for detainees held by both parties. Russian authorities claimed compliance with , while accusing Ukraine of similar abuses. The of Justice's preliminary measures in March 2022 ordered Russia to suspend operations, citing plausibility of rights violations under the , but its 2024 ruling limited to assessing Russia's claim of Ukrainian genocide in without broader endorsement of genocidal acts by Russia. No ICJ finding confirmed genocide by Russian forces. Russia has highlighted Ukrainian strikes on markets and residential areas, such as shelling causing civilian deaths, as comparable violations amid mutual urban combat.

Geopolitical Context and Western Narratives

The Russian Armed Forces' operations, particularly in Ukraine since 2022, occur amid longstanding geopolitical tensions exacerbated by NATO's eastward enlargement, which added 16 new members since the Cold War's end in 1991, including former Warsaw Pact states and Soviet republics abutting Russia. Russian leadership, including President Vladimir Putin, has framed such expansion as a direct security threat, violating informal post-Cold War assurances against advancing alliance borders toward Russia, prompting preemptive measures to avert encirclement rather than unprovoked aggression as portrayed in dominant Western accounts. From a causal standpoint, this dynamic reflects mutual great-power competition, where Russian actions prioritize buffer zones against perceived NATO encroachment, contrasting narratives that attribute the conflict solely to revanchism without addressing the alliance's role in escalating proximity to Russian core interests. Western media and analytical coverage has disproportionately highlighted Russian military shortcomings—such as initial logistical failures in 2022—while downplaying or contextualizing Ukrainian irregularities, including the integration of the , which originated with documented neo-Nazi affiliations and far-right symbolism before its formal absorption into national forces. This selective focus aligns with institutional biases in mainstream outlets and academia, which often amplify critiques of while minimizing allied flaws, yet empirical assessments by 2025 indicate Russian forces' adaptation, including rebuilt offensive capabilities and territorial gains, challenging early predictions of collapse. Hypothetical NATO membership for would, from Moscow's viewpoint, install offensive infrastructure on 's border, risking escalation akin to U.S.-led interventions elsewhere that provoked insurgencies without equivalent global condemnation. Sanctions imposed by the U.S., , and allies since 2022 aimed to isolate economically but have yielded limited strategic impact, with GDP growth sustained through wartime mobilization and trade pivots, exposing overestimations of vulnerability in initial Western projections. 's resilience stems partly from deepened military-technical ties with , , and , which have supplied drones, , and munitions to offset Western restrictions, forming a counter- that bolsters operational continuity against isolation narratives. This interplay underscores reciprocal hypocrisies, as U.S. drone campaigns in sovereign territories—resulting in civilian casualties—faced muted international backlash compared to analogous Russian strikes, revealing narrative inconsistencies rooted in alliance affiliations rather than uniform application of principles.

References

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