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Chen Shui-bian
Chen Shui-bian
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Chen Shui-bian (Chinese: 陳水扁; born 12 October 1950) is a Taiwanese politician and lawyer who served as the fifth president of the Republic of China from 2000 to 2008. Chen was the first president from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), ending the Kuomintang's (KMT) 55 years of continuous rule in Taiwan. He is sometimes referred to by the nickname A-Bian (阿扁).

Key Information

A lawyer, Chen entered politics in 1980 during the Kaohsiung Incident as a member of the Tangwai movement and was elected to the Taipei City Council in 1981. In 1985, as the editor of the weekly pro-democracy magazine Neo-Formosa, he was jailed for libel following publication of an article critical of Elmer Fung, a college philosophy professor who was later elected a New Party legislator. After being released, Chen helped found the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 and was elected a member of the Legislative Yuan in 1989, and Mayor of Taipei in 1994.[1]

Chen won the 2000 presidential election on 18 March with 39% of the vote as a result of a split of factions within the Kuomintang, when James Soong ran for the presidency as an independent against the party nominee Lien Chan, becoming the first non-member of the Kuomintang to hold the office of president. Although Chen received high approval ratings during the first few weeks of his term, his popularity sharply dropped due to alleged corruption within his administration and the inability to pass legislation against the opposition KMT, who controlled the Legislative Yuan. In 2004, he won reelection by a narrow margin after surviving a shooting while campaigning the day before the election. Opponents suspected him of staging the incident for political purposes. However, the case was officially closed in 2005 with all evidence pointing to a single deceased suspect, Chen Yi-hsiung.[2][3]

In 2009, Chen and his wife Wu Shu-chen were convicted on two bribery charges. Chen was sentenced to 19 years in Taipei Prison, reduced from a life sentence on appeal, but was granted medical parole on 5 January 2015.[4][5][6] Chen's supporters have claimed that his trial and sentencing were politically motivated retribution by the Kuomintang for his years in power.[7][8][9]

Early life and education

[edit]

Chen was born to an impoverished tenant farming family of Hoklo ethnicity in Kuantien Township of Tainan County (now part of Tainan City) on the second day of the ninth lunar month in 1950 but was not formally issued a birth certificate until 18 February 1951, because of doubts that he would survive.[10][11]

Chen was educated in Mandarin Chinese, which had replaced Japanese as the national language following the end of the Japanese administration of Taiwan.[12] Academically bright from a young age, he graduated from the prestigious National Tainan First Senior High School with honors. In June 1969, he was admitted to National Taiwan University. Initially a business administration major, he switched to law in his first year and became editor of the school's law review. He passed the bar exams before the completion of his junior year with the highest score, becoming Taiwan's youngest lawyer. He graduated in 1974 with an LL.B. in commercial law.

In 1975, he married Wu Shu-chen, the daughter of a physician.[13] The couple have a daughter, Chen Hsing-yu, who is a dentist; and a son, Chen Chih-chung, who, having received a law degree in Taiwan, gained a Master of Laws from the University of California, Berkeley in 2005.[14]

From 1976 to 1989, Chen was a partner in Formosa International Marine and Commercial Law, specializing in maritime insurance. He held the firm's portfolio for Evergreen Marine Corporation.

Entry into politics

[edit]

Chen became involved in politics in 1980 when he defended the participants of the Kaohsiung Incident in a military court. While his client Huang Hsin-chieh, the leading opposition dissident, and seven co-defendants, including his future Vice President Annette Lu, were found guilty, Chen came to be known for his forceful and colorful arguments. He has stated that it was during this period that he realized the unfairness of the political system in Taiwan and became politically active as a member of the Tangwai movement.[citation needed]

Chen won a seat in the Taipei City Council as a Tangwai candidate in 1981 and served until 1985. In 1984, he founded the pro-opposition Civil Servant Public Policy Research Association, which published a magazine called Neo-Formosa. On 12 January 1985, Chen was sentenced to a year in prison for libel as a result of his editorship of Neo-Formosa, following the publication of an article which claimed that the doctoral dissertation of Elmer Fung, a college philosophy professor (who would later become a New Party legislator), was plagiarized.[15]

While appealing the sentence, he returned to Tainan to run for county magistrate in November 1985. Three days after losing the election, his wife, Wu Shu-chen was hit twice by a hand tractor driven by Chang Jong-tsai as Chen and Wu were thanking their supporters. She was left paralyzed from the waist down. His supporters believed this was part of a government campaign to intimidate him, although another theory says it was a simple traffic accident.[16][17]

Chen lost his appeal in May 1986 and began serving eight months in the Tucheng Penitentiary along with Huang Tien-fu and Lee I-yang, two other defendants in the case. Whilst in Tucheng the 3 prisoners were also joined for a period of time by Chi Chia-wei a prominent gay rights activist in Taiwan.[18] While he was in prison, his wife campaigned and was elected to the Legislative Yuan. Upon his release in 1987, Chen served as her chief counsel.[19] In May 2022, the Transitional Justice Commission overturned Chen, Huang and Lee's libel charges.[20]

In 1989, Chen was elected to the Legislative Yuan and served as the executive director of the Democratic Progressive Party caucus. With the support of some KMT colleagues, Chen was also elected convener of the National Defense Committee. He was instrumental in laying out and moderating many of the DPP's positions on Taiwan independence, including the four ifs. He was reelected to another three-year term in 1992, but resigned in two years to become mayor.[citation needed]

Taipei mayoralty, 1994–1998

[edit]

Chen was elected as the mayor of Taipei in 1994, largely as the result of a vote split between the KMT incumbent Huang Ta-chou and the KMT-spin-off New Party (NP) candidate Jaw Shaw-kong. Unable to find experienced bureaucrats from his own party, Chen and his inner circle of young law school graduates retained many of the KMT administrators and delegated considerable authority.

1994 Taipei City mayoral election result
Party # Candidate Votes Percentage
Independent 1 Ji Rong-zhi (紀榮治) 3,941 0.28%
New Party 2 Jaw Shaw-kong 424,905 30.17%
Democratic Progressive Party 3 Chen Shui-bian 615,090 43.67%
Kuomintang 4 Huang Ta-chou 364,618 25.89%
Total 1,408,554 100.00%
Voter turnout

During his term, Chen received accolades for his campaigns to drive illegal gambling and prostitution rackets out of Taipei. He levied large fines on polluters and reformed public works contracts. Chen renamed many of the roads in Taipei, most notably the road which runs between KMT headquarters to the Presidential Palace from Chieh-shou Road (介壽路) to Ketagalan Boulevard in an effort to acknowledge the aboriginal people of the Taipei basin. Chen also made highly publicized evictions of longtime KMT squatters on municipal land, and ordered Chiang Wei-kuo's estate demolished. Chen was also named one of Asia's rising stars, and Taipei became one of the top 50 cities in Asia according to Time Asia magazine.

Despite receiving more votes both in absolute and in percentage terms than his 1994 campaign, Chen lost the mayoral election of 1998 to the KMT's candidate and future president Ma Ying-jeou in large part because the KMT was able to gain the support of New Party supporters. In his first autobiography, "The Son of Taiwan", Chen wrote that he was not entirely upset about losing the re-election as it gave him opportunity to find out what areas in his political career he could improve. For example, he wrote that mainland Chinese people generally approved of his social and economic improvements in Taipei, but they ultimately voted for Ma because of ethnic tensions.

1998 Taipei City mayoral election result
Party # Candidate Votes Percentage
Democratic Progressive Party 1 Chen Shui-bian 688,072 45.91%
Kuomintang 2 Ma Ying-jeou 766,377 51.13%
New Party 3 Wang Chien-shien 44,452 2.97%
Total 1,498,901 100.00%
Voter turnout

He also traveled extensively nationwide and abroad. In South Korea, he met with president Kim Dae-jung, who presented him with an award.[21] He also met with Japanese prime minister Yoshiro Mori, who promised that he would celebrate if he won the 2000 presidential elections. Due to political complications, this promise was not fulfilled until late 2003. [citation needed]

Presidency, 2000–2008

[edit]

First term

[edit]
Election results by county (Green: DPP, Orange: Soong-Chang)

In an election similar to Taipei's in 1994, Chen won the 2000 presidential election on 18 March 2000, with 39% of the vote as a result of a split of factions within the Kuomintang, when James Soong ran for the presidency as an independent against the party nominee Lien Chan.

Lacking a clear mandate and inheriting a bureaucracy largely loyal to the KMT, Chen tried to reach out to his opposition. He appointed the KMT conservative mainlander Tang Fei, a former general and the incumbent defense minister, as his first premier. Only about half of Chen's original cabinet were DPP members, as few DPP politicians had risen above the local level. Although a supporter of Taiwan independence, Chen moderated his stance during his campaign and pledged the Four Noes and One Without in his inaugural address—that as long as the People's Republic of China has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, he would not declare independence nor change the national symbols of the Republic of China. He also promised to be, "president of all the people" and resigned his chairmanship from the DPP. His approval rating reached around 70%.[22]

Chen's administration ran into many problems, and its policies were constantly blocked by the pan-Blue coalition-controlled legislature. The stock market lost over half its value within a year and unemployment reached 4.5% in part because of the Asian stock market crash. While Chen's detractors blamed Chen's poor leadership for the economic crisis, the administration blamed the legislature for blocking its relief efforts.

More troublesome for Chen was the political showdown over the construction of the Number Four Nuclear Power Facility. This multibillion-dollar project in Gongliao District was already one-third completed and favored by the pro-business KMT as a means of avoiding an energy shortage. However, the environmentalist DPP strongly objected to the expansion of nuclear power. Premier Tang had threatened to resign if the project were canceled, and Chen accepted his resignation on 3 October 2000, only four and a half months after both had taken office. Chen appointed his political ally Chang Chun-hsiung as Tang's replacement. On 27 October, Chang announced that the government would halt construction. But less than an hour earlier, Chen had met with Lien Chan to reconcile differences[citation needed]. Lien had asked Chen to leave the matter for the Legislative Yuan to decide and Chen seemed receptive to the suggestion. When Chang's announcement came out, Lien was furious and the KMT began an effort to recall the president. The Council of Grand Justices intervened and declared that it was the legislature and not the cabinet that had the power to decide on the issue. This was widely seen as the end of Chen's attempts to face the pan-Blue groups head on. By the end of his first year in office, Chen's approval ratings had dropped to 25%.[citation needed]

During the summer of 2001, Chen flew to Los Angeles, Houston, and New York City, where he met with members of the U.S. Congress. The mayor of Houston presented Chen with a key to the city and gave him cowboy clothing. His trip to New York was a first for a head of state from Taiwan as there was unwritten agreement between the US and China that no head of state from Taiwan would be permitted to visit either New York or Washington, D.C.[citation needed]

After his first year in office, Chen moved away from sending conciliatory gestures. In the summer of 2002, Chen again became the chairman of the DPP. During his tenure, images of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo disappeared from public buildings. The word "TAIWAN" is now printed on new ROC passports. Also continuing a trend from the previous administration, the Education Ministry revised the school curriculum to be more Taiwan-centered. Government websites have also tended to promote the notion that China is synonymous with the PRC instead of the ROC as was mandated by the KMT. The "Free China Review" was renamed the Taiwan Review and Who's Who in the ROC was renamed Who's Who in Taiwan. In January 2003, a new Taiwan-Tibet Exchange Foundation was formed but the Cabinet-level Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission was not abolished. Though Chen has proposed talks with the PRC, relations remain deadlocked as Chen refused to pledge to the One-China policy, as required by the PRC for talks to begin. Such a pledge seemed unlikely for Chen since there remained strong opposition within his own party. Despite these symbolic gestures, Chen moved away from "no haste, be patient" policy and opened the three mini links.[23][24][25][26]

Re-election campaign

[edit]
Election results by county (Green: DPP, Blue: Lien-Soong)

In late 2003, he signed a controversial referendum bill, which he had supported but was heavily watered down by the pan-Blue majority legislature. One concession that the legislature made was to include a provision for an emergency defensive referendum and during the legislative debates it was widely believed that this clause would only be invoked if Taiwan was under imminent threat of attack from China as has been so often threatened. Within a day of the passage of the referendum bill, Chen stated his intention to invoke this provision, citing PRC's over 450 missiles aimed directly at the Taiwanese. Pan-Blue believed that his bill was only intended to benefit Chen in the coming election, as whether PRC removes the missiles would not be pressured or decided by referendum result.

Images of Chiang Kai-shek were removed from public buildings. Chen's portrait was hung at a location in the presidential office that previously displayed a portrait of Chiang.

In October 2003, Chen flew to New York City for a second time. At the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, he was presented with the Human Rights Award by the International League of Human Rights. In the subsequent leg of the trip to Panama, he met with US Secretary of State Colin Powell and shook hands with him. This high-profile trip raised Chen's standing in opinion polls ahead of his opponent Lien Chan for the first time at 35%, according to Agence France-Presse.

His use of the referendum in combination with his talk of a new constitution lead many among his reunification critics to believe that he would attempt to achieve Taiwan independence in his second term by invoking a referendum to create a new constitution that would formally separate Taiwan from any interpretation of China. This caused the government of the United States to follow the lead of Chen's political critics and issue a rare rebuke of Chen's actions.

Chen was shot in the stomach while campaigning in the city of Tainan on Friday, 19 March 2004, the day before polls opened on Saturday. His vice-president Annette Lu was also reportedly shot in the leg in the same incident. The following day, Chen narrowly won the election with a margin of less than 30,000 votes out of 12.9 million votes counted. Both of his referendum proposals were rejected due to insufficient turnout, in part by the pan-Blue boycott. Those that did vote for the referendum overwhelmingly favored it. Pan-Blue candidate Lien Chan refused to concede and sued both for a recount and for a nullification of the outcome while supporters held a week-long protest led by the pan-Blues front of the presidential office in Taipei. He also claimed that the shooting was staged by Chen to win sympathy votes.

Throughout the election, Chen planned to hold a referendum in 2006 on a new constitution to be enacted upon the accession of the 12th-term president in May 2008. After the election, he sought to reassure critics and moderate supporters that the new constitution would not address the issue of sovereignty, and that the current constitution was in need of comprehensive reform after more than a decade of patchwork revision.

Second term

[edit]

On 20 May 2004, Chen was sworn in for his second term as president amid continued mass protests by the pan-blue alliance over the validity of his re-election. Having heard protests from pro-independence figures in Taiwan, he did not explicitly re-state the Four Noes and One Without but did state that he reaffirmed the commitments made in his first inaugural. He defended his proposals to change the constitution, but asked for constitutional reform to be undertaken through existing procedures instead of calling for a referendum for an entirely new constitution which was proposed by former president Lee Teng-hui. This would require approval by a three-fourths majority of the National Assembly which could authorize a referendum. This has two major implications. First, by going through existing constitutional amendment procedures, this has the symbolic effect of maintaining continuity with the existing constitution which was originally written in China. Second, this has the practical effect of requiring the Chen administration to get the consent of the opposition pan-Blue coalition to pass any amendments, and while the opposition is willing to consider constitutional reforms that would increase governmental efficiency, they are unlikely to support anything that would imply a de jure declaration of independence.

However, even these seemingly conciliatory gestures did not quell unease by his critics at his election. Some have pointed out that he qualified his statements on the constitution with the statement that this is a personal suggestion. Furthermore, it is widely believed in Taiwan that some of these gestures were essentially forced on him again by pressure from the United States and the PRC. The PRC has stated many times that it cares little about what Chen says, but will watch closely in the next few months to see what he does, a standard sentence that Communist China continues to quote.

Chen Shui-bian addressed his opening speech at 2006 Taiwan Sports Elite Awards

Three days before Chen's inauguration, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC issued what has become known as the May 17 Declaration. In that declaration, China accused Chen of continuing with a creep toward independence, having merely paid lip service to his commitments in his first term of office, and reiterated that there would be consequences if Chen did not halt policies toward Taiwan independence, but at the same time offered major concessions if Chen would accept the One China Principle.

In late 2004, in effort to maintain the balance of power in the region, Chen began eagerly pushing for a US$18 billion arms purchase from the United States, but the Pan-Blue Coalition repeatedly blocked the deal in the legislature. Criticism has been made of this, citing contradictory arguments used, such as that the weapons were not what Taiwan needed, or that the weapons were a good idea but too expensive. By late 2006, the KMT had signalled it would support some of the arms sale being approved, but failed to pass a revised arms bill by the end of the legislative session in early 2007, despite promises by then KMT chairman, Ma Ying-jeou, to do that.

Chen announced on 5 December that state-owned or private enterprises and foreign offices bearing the name "China", such as China Airlines, the China Steel Corporation, and Chinese Petroleum Corporation, would be renamed to bear the name "Taiwan." On 14 December 2004, following the failure of the Pan-Green coalition to gain a majority of seats in the 2004 ROC legislative election (as many had expected to occur), Chen resigned as chairman of the DPP. This dashed hopes that the stalemate that plagued Chen's first term would end.

At the funeral of Pope John Paul II, Chen (far left), whom the Holy See recognized as the head of state of China, was seated in the front row (in French alphabetical order) beside the first lady and president of Brazil.

In 2005 Chen became the first ROC president to visit Europe, when he attended the funeral of Pope John Paul II in the Vatican City (the Holy See continues to maintain diplomatic relations with the ROC). In order to shore up diplomatic support, it is common for the ROC president to visit the ROC's remaining diplomatic allies; however, past presidents had been prevented from visiting the Vatican because such a visit would require passage through Italy, which maintains relations with the PRC. Under agreement with the Vatican, Italy permitted all guests to the funeral passage without hindrance and Chen was received at the airport in his capacity as a foreign head of state. In this religious ceremony where U.S. president George W. Bush greeted Iranian president Khatami, Chen did not seem to attempt to a high profile of himself by reaching out to other heads of states such as Bush or British prime minister Tony Blair. Chen was named one of the Time 100 for 2005.[27]

Later in the year, Chen traveled to Miami in stopover for a forum in the Caribbean. He met with members of the U.S. Congress through video conference and was invited to visit Washington, D.C. On his way back, he was originally scheduled to fly through San Francisco. However, he changed course and stopped-over at the United Arab Emirates. The head of state greeted him and hosted a formal state dinner, infuriating the Chinese officials. Chen made his way back after making a stopover at Jakarta. His request for a pitstop at Singapore was denied; authorities cited weather problems.

On 28 February 2006, Chen announced that the National Unification Council, which was set up in 1990 to create guidelines for unification with China if it adopted democracy, would "cease to function". He took care to use this phrase rather than "abolish" because he had promised during his 2000 campaign that he would not abolish the council or its guidelines.[28] Adam Ereli, deputy spokesman of the US State Department, issued a statement on 2 March 2006, that the understanding of the United States was that the difference between "abolish" and "ceasing activity" implied no change in the status quo.[29]

On 3 May 2006, Chen canceled plans to pass through the United States on his way to Latin America. He was hoping to stop by either San Francisco or New York City to refuel and stay overnight, but the US refused his request instead limiting him to a brief refuelling stopover in Anchorage, Alaska, where Chen would not be allowed to step off the plane. Chen and Taiwan saw this as a snub and led to Chen's cancellation. The trip to Latin America continued, however, without a US stopover. The US State Department claimed that the Alaska stopover offer was consistent with its previous accommodations. However, former Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui was granted a visit to Cornell University eleven years earlier. More recently, in addition, Taiwan's leaders have in general been granted permission to stopover in the United States for brief periods before continuing on to other countries. This recent American stance is interpreted by Taiwan to be an expression of the increasing irritation the United States feels towards Taiwan and Chen's seemingly pro-independence gestures. Chen attended the inauguration of Óscar Arias, the president of Costa Rica, one of the few countries that recognized the Republic of China at that time. Laura Bush was also present to represent U.S. president George W. Bush. Chen seized the opportunity, approached her and shook her hands, while Chen's aide produced a camera immediately for an impromptu photo-op. Chen's supporters saw this act as a step forward in Taiwan's struggle for diplomatic recognition, while his detractors claimed that it was a grave breach of international etiquette and put Taiwan to shame.

Shui-bian Chen visited 2007 Taipei International Flower Exhibition.

On 12 May 2007, Premier Su Tseng-Chang resigned his position, and Chen soon appointed Chang Chun-hsiung to fill the vacant premiership. During Chen's tenure, beginning in 2000, the country has seen six different premiers in the past seven years. During the same period of time, from 2000 onward, the Democratic Progressive Party has also seen seven different chairmen.

Chen's tenure as president expired on 20 May 2008, yielding to successor Ma Ying-Jeou. From his election to his first term to his last days as president, Chen's approval ratings fell from 79% to just 21%.[30]

Corruption scandals

[edit]

In May 2006, his approval rating fell to around 20% after a series of scandals centered on his wife and son-in-law.[31] Support from his own party had also dropped with a few prominent members, such as Shih Ming-teh, calling for his resignation in the Million Voices Against Corruption, President Chen Must Go campaign. On 24 May 2006, his son-in-law, Chao Chien-ming, was taken into custody by the Taipei police on charges of insider trading and embezzlement by the opposition party. This was a setback for the Chen Shui-bian administration.[31] In related charges, there were accusations from the opposition party that Chen Shui-bian's wife was involved in trading stocks and obtaining Pacific Sogo Department Store's gift certificates illegally in exchange for settling the disputed ownership.[citation needed]

On 1 June 2006, Chen declared that he was handing control of governmental matters to Premier of the Republic of China, Su Tseng-chang, and announced he would not be involved in campaigning. He also stated that he was retaining authority on matters that the constitution required him to retain authority over, presumably foreign affairs and defense policy, as well as relations with the PRC.[32]

On 20 July 2006, opposition politicians accused that Chen had used a total of NT$10.2 million (US$310,000) worth of "fake invoices" to claim expenses after the National Audit Office found irregularities in presidential office accounts. The Taiwan High Court Prosecutors' Office investigated over this accusation.[33] In a press release, the presidential office responded that the president assured the investigators that he did not pocket a single cent of the fund. During questioning at the presidential Office on the afternoon of 7 August 2006, the president detailed to the prosecutor how he spent the fund and presented relevant receipts and bank remittance statements.[34]

Chen also lost a libel case brought on successfully by PFP chairman James Soong. Soong sued the president after Chen repeatedly accused him of secretly meeting the director of the People's Republic of China's Taiwan Affairs Office. Soong successfully sued Chen for NT$3 million.[35]

On 3 November 2006, Chen's wife Wu Shu-chen and three other high-ranking officials of the Presidential Office were indicted of corruption of NT$14.8 million (US$450,000) of government funds using faked documents. Due to the protection from the constitution against prosecution of the sitting president, Chen could not be prosecuted until he left office, and he was not indicted, but was alleged to be an accomplice on his wife's indictment.[36] The prosecutor of the case indicated that once Chen left office, his office would start the procedures to press charges against Chen. The indictment filed by prosecutors states that the indicted persons obtained government funds earmarked for secret foreign affairs, yet of six supposed secret diplomatic missions, there was sufficient evidence presented for only two. Of the remaining four, it was concluded that one did not exist, and in the case of the other three, the invoices presented were not found to be related to the secret missions.[citation needed]

The pan-Blue coalition, after receiving the news, demanded to call for another recall motion unless Chen resigned immediately. Another small party that backed Chen previously, Taiwan Solidarity Union, said they would likely to support the upcoming recall measure. If the recall had passed, it would have been up to the voters to decide Chen's fate in a referendum.

Leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party met together to discuss the unfavorable charges. The meeting ended when party leaders demanded Chen to explain the accusation within three days. There had long been rumblings inside the DPP that Chen has become their liability and should recall him before the presidential election. If Chen had resigned, he would have been the first Taiwanese president to step down and the vice-president, Annette Lu, would likely have taken power.

After the prosecutor announced the indictment, the campaign leader Shih proclaimed that the indictment was the historical high point in Taiwan and the month-long campaign was a success.[citation needed]

In a press conference 5 November 2006, Chen rebutted the charges against his wife and members of his presidential office. He said that Taiwan government offices advised him to prepare the receipts in such a fashion, and that after six years of doing so, it is strange that they would never mention an irregularity if it was not the right way to do it. He promised that all of the money actually went to diplomatic missions and did not go into any private pockets. Furthermore, he mentioned that when he took office, he thought his salary was so excessive that he cut his own salary in half, and that reduction is more than the amount he is accused of embezzling, so there is no need for him to take that money. In addition, he said that if the charges against his wife were proven in a court of law just as they were charged, then he would at that time step down as President of the Republic of China.[citation needed]

In defense of Chen, journalist Therese Shaheen of The Wall Street Journal Asia pointed out that controversy surrounding Chen can be in part attributed to the radical reforms he has tried to implement since stepping into power.[37]

Recall motion

[edit]

In mid-June 2006, opposition pan-blue camp lawmakers initiated a recall motion that would allow the voters to remove Chen from power via a public referendum. On 20 June, Chen addressed the nation by television, denying any involvement of the first family or himself (other than his son-in-law) in any of the alleged scandals, or "directly" accepting the department's gift certificates.[38] The motion was not passed. Of 221 lawmakers in the legislature, all 119 pan-blue and independent legislators voted in favor of the measure, 29 votes short of the two-thirds majority needed to pass the motion. Pan-Green legislators from the president's own party, the DPP, refused to receive ballots. Pan-Green legislators from the allied TSU cast abstaining ballots. No legislator voted against the recall motion.

After Wu was indicted, the Pan-Blue parties renewed calls to recall Chen, and TSU at first indicated that it would support the recall this time, but then said it would only support the new recall motion if "concrete evidence concerning corruption is presented".[39]

The "Besiege the Presidential Office" demonstration on 10 October 2006

On 1 September 2006, political activist Shih Ming-te launched an anti-corruption campaign. The movement accused Chen of corruption and asked for his resignation. By 7 September, more than one million signatures were collected, each with a donation of NT$100 (approximately US$3.00).[40] On 9 September, tens of thousands of people demonstrated in the streets of Taiwan, wearing red. According to organisers, around 200,000 to 300,000 people joined the protest outside the presidential offices, but the police used aerial photography crowd counting techniques to put the number at about 90,000.[41] Shih Ming-teh confirmed that most of his supporters are from the pan-Blue coalition in a September interview in The New York Times.

2008 elections

[edit]

In the legislative election in 2008, Chen's party suffered a clear defeat, and Chen subsequently resigned as party chairman. With Chen's resignation and Frank Hsieh's ascension as the party's new chairman, the DPP has changed chairmen seven times since Chen took office in 2000.

In the presidential election on 22 March 2008, Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou defeated DPP candidate Frank Hsieh.

Post-presidency

[edit]
Chen (right) with former President of South Korea Kim Young-sam (2008)

Chen stepped down on 20 May 2008, the same day that Ma Ying-jeou took office as the new president of the Republic of China.[42] No longer bearing the title of president, Chen left the Presidential Office Building, and his presidential immunity was removed. He was placed under restrictions, such as confinement to Taiwan, by prosecutors as a result of allegations of corruption and abuse of authority, both of which he was later charged guilty of.[clarification needed] One fraud case involved the handling of a special presidential fund used to pursue Taiwan's foreign diplomacy.

President Ma Ying-jeou declassified government documents which aided the investigation into Chen's usage of special government funds. Chen's lawyers responded by suing Ma, on 6 August 2008, alleging Ma's declassification of the documents that were initially classified by Chen to be "politically motivated". The documents consisted mainly of receipts and other records of special expenses, which according to Ma's chief aide assured pose no danger to the country's interests once declassified.[43]

After two years of investigation, it was found that Chen Shui-bian received millions from the owners of the TCC Company after the government bought the Longtan land, which was then integrated into the Science Park project.[44] There were several other instances of corruption, which became the subject of a graft trial that also included the former president's wife and 11 other co-defendants. The trial revealed that Chen and his wife amassed a total of NT$800 million and some were laundered overseas.[45] The former president was found guilty by the Taipei District Courts of violating Punishment of Corruption Act (貪污治罪條例), Money Laundering Control Act (洗錢防制法), and Criminal Code (刑法).[45]

On 11 September 2009, Chen received a life sentence and was fined NT$200 million[46] (US$6.13 million) for embezzlement, bribery and money laundering involving a total of US$15 million (NT$490 million) in funds while in office from 2000 to 2008.[47] Supporters of Chen contended that the prosecution was politically motivated.[48][49] Chen is the first ROC president to receive a prison sentence.[50]

On 8 June 2010, the Taipei District Court found Chen not guilty of embezzling diplomatic funds.[51][52] On 11 June 2010, the High Court decided to reduce Chen's life sentence to 20 years.[53][54] Through several court cases and pleads for bail, the High Court rejected his request for bail and continued to detain him in jail for another 5 months.[55][56][57][58] The detention led Chen's supporters to protest that the detention of Chen for more than 600 days without proving him guilty[clarification needed] was illegal, inhumane and unjust, and a result of political revenge by the part of the Kuomintang (KMT).[59][60] The Yellow Ribbon Movement took to demonstration over alleged exploitation of justice and political revenge.[61]

Meanwhile, on 17 August 2010, both the Taipei District Court and the High Court found ex-deputy military minister, Ke Cheng-Hen (柯承亨), not guilty of revealing non-military secrets to former president Chen Shui-Bian.[62]

The parliament with a KMT and pan-Blue coalition majority passed an amendment to the "preferential treatment for retired presidents and vice presidents act" (卸任總統副總統禮遇條例) on 19 August 2010.[63] Introduced by the KMT, the amendment stipulated that former presidents and vice presidents will be stripped of courtesy treatment, including their monthly allowance and annual expenses, if convicted by a court of grave offense(s), such as sedition and graft. The number of bodyguards assigned to former presidents and vice presidents who are convicted of corruption in a first trial will also be reduced. Former president Chen's son stated the act was created to target the now imprisoned former president.[64][65][66]

In July 2016, the United States Department of Justice announced it returned "approximately $1.5 million to Taiwan, the proceeds of the sale of a forfeited New York condominium and a Virginia residence that the United States alleged in its complaint were purchased with the proceeds of bribes." It also stated that Hong Kong and Swiss bank accounts, shell companies, and a St. Kitts and Nevis trust were used to launder the bribes that paid for the American properties. It was an inter-agency and international effort between the U.S. Justice Department, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations, and Taiwan's Supreme Prosecutors Office's Special Investigations Division.[67]

Health and medical parole

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In September 2012, Chen was admitted to Taoyuan General Hospital after complaints of having difficulty urinating, where it was concluded that he had suffered from a minor stroke. He was subsequently transferred to the Taipei Veterans General Hospital for further testing, where he was diagnosed with sleep apnea, severe depression and other cognitive disorders. His symptoms included stuttering and memory loss.[68][69]

He attempted suicide on Sunday, 2 June 2013.[70] In January 2015, Chen was released from prison on medical parole due to his ailing (but undiagnosed) condition.[71]

His time spent under medical parole does not count toward his prison sentence.[72] Part of the terms of his medical parole stipulate that he cannot participate in public political discussions. In January 2021, he started a radio show of non-political nature. Some people called this issue out because Chen Shui-bian appeared to be in perfect health.[73]

Two former DPP presidents, Chen and Tsai Ing-wen attending the 113th Double Tenth Day in 2024.

Chen currently serves as the host of a radio program.

Position on Taiwan's political status

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In 1999, the Democratic Progressive Party amended its charter to regard Taiwan as already independent as the ROC, and therefore it was unnecessary to declare independence. In his 2000 inauguration speech, Chen struck a more moderate tone and pledged to the Four Noes and One Without: that as long as the PRC did not intend to use military force against Taiwan, he would not declare independence, change the name of the country to "Republic of Taiwan", push for the inclusion of "special state-to-state relations" in the Constitution, or promote a referendum on independence. In addition, he pledged not to abolish the National Unification Council. However, in August 2002, frustrated by a lack of reciprocation from the PRC, he described the relationship as "one country on each side" and initiated a referendum on cross-strait relations in 2004, returning to a more confrontational stance.[74]

In a 2007 interview with the New York Times, Chen reiterated the DPP stance that Taiwan was already independent.[75]

Post-presidency, Chen has expressed his wishes to one day visit the village in Fujian which his ancestors migrated from in the 18th century.[76][77] In 2018, Chen, along with Lee Teng-hui, expressed support for a Formosa Alliance plan to amend the referendum act to allow for a 2019 referendum on de jure independence, though neither goal was realized by the planned date.[78]

Honours

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Foreign

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Chen Shui-bian (Chinese: 陳水扁; Pe̍h-ōe-jī: Tân-chúi-píⁿ; born 12 October 1950) is a Taiwanese and who served as the tenth president of the Republic of China () from 2000 to 2008, becoming the first leader from the (DPP) and ending the 's decades-long hold on power. A native of rural County, Chen rose through local politics, serving as mayor from 1994 to 1998 where he gained popularity for anti-corruption efforts and urban improvements before winning the presidency amid a split in the vote. During his tenure, Chen's administration emphasized Taiwanese identity over Chinese heritage, pursued diplomatic initiatives like a 2007–2008 on UN membership as "," and navigated cross-strait tensions exacerbated by his independence-leaning rhetoric, though constrained by a hostile legislature controlled by opposition parties. His presidency concluded amid mounting corruption scandals involving of public funds and exceeding tens of millions of U.S. dollars, leading to his 2009 conviction on multiple counts including graft and , for which he and his wife received life sentences that were subsequently reduced through appeals before his release on medical parole in 2015.

Early years

Family background and childhood

Chen Shui-bian was born on October 12, 1950, in Guantian Township (now Guantian District), Tainan County, , into an impoverished tenant farming family of Hoklo ethnicity. His parents were illiterate farmers who neither owned nor rented land, subsisting by harvesting sugarcane and rice for landlords under a system prevalent in rural southern during the post-war era. The family was classified as a "third-level poor household" in the government's income stratification, emblematic of the economic hardships faced by many indigenous Taiwanese agrarian communities under rule. As the eldest of four children—with one younger brother and two sisters—Chen experienced a childhood defined by manual labor and scarcity. He often prepared meals for the family while his parents toiled in the fields, a routine that underscored the physical demands and limited opportunities in their village setting. Originally intended to be named "Chen Shui-bian" (陳水遍), symbolizing abundant water for crops to alleviate risks, the registration error by local officials resulted in "Shui-bian" (水扁), altering the characters but not the aspirations tied to agricultural survival. These circumstances instilled resilience and a drive for self-improvement through , as formal schooling offered one of the few pathways out of entrenched . Chen's early in studies, despite the absence of familial academic precedent, positioned him to secure scholarships later, breaking from the cycle of tenant farming that constrained his relatives.

Education and early influences

Chen Shui-bian enrolled in the Law Department of in 1969, drawn by his strong academic record from rural County schools where he excelled as the top student. He graduated in 1975, receiving an award for outstanding performance, which underscored his diligence amid financial hardships from his impoverished farming family background. While still a , Chen passed Taiwan's rigorous in 1974, enabling him to qualify as a before completing his degree—a rare achievement reflecting his intellectual aptitude and self-taught preparation. He initially joined a prestigious maritime law firm in , focusing on commercial cases that honed his legal skills but offered little initial exposure to political matters. His early influences stemmed from the stark rural-urban divide and the Kuomintang's authoritarian governance, which suppressed dissent and limited opportunities for native Taiwanese like him, fostering a commitment to legal advocacy as a tool for challenging systemic injustices. This period crystallized his view of education and as pathways to , shaped by personal experiences of economic marginalization under one-party rule rather than ideological indoctrination.

Entry into politics

After graduating from the Law Department of in 1974, Chen Shui-bian had passed the national with the highest score in 1973, qualifying him as one of Taiwan's youngest lawyers at age 23. He joined the Formosan International Marine and firm in shortly thereafter, focusing on maritime and commercial litigation, and remained associated with the firm in various roles until 1989. This early practice established his reputation in business law under the constraints of , where legal challenges to government authority carried significant personal risk. A pivotal shift occurred in February 1980, when Chen accepted an invitation to join the defense team for activists prosecuted following the —a December 1979 protest against press censorship that escalated into clashes with authorities, resulting in arrests and trials symbolizing resistance to one-party rule. He specifically represented Huang Hsin-chieh, a prominent tangwai (non-KMT) leader charged with , in a case where most lawyers declined involvement due to fears of reprisal. The trials highlighted systemic suppression of dissent, with defendants facing up to life sentences under national security laws; Chen's participation, though unsuccessful in acquittals, drew public attention to procedural injustices and galvanized opposition networks. This experience propelled Chen into human rights activism, aligning him with the emerging advocating multiparty democracy and civil liberties. In 1984, he joined the executive committee of the newly founded Association for , an organization dedicated to monitoring abuses, supporting political prisoners, and pressing for legal reforms amid ongoing . Through subsequent cases, Chen continued defending dissidents and journalists, often , which intertwined his legal practice with political advocacy and contributed to eroding the regime's legitimacy, though it also exposed him to and professional ostracism by establishment bar associations. His activism emphasized evidentiary challenges to state narratives, fostering a cadre of reform-minded attorneys who later influenced post-1987.

Involvement with Democratic Progressive Party

Chen Shui-bian formally joined the (DPP) in 1987, shortly after his release from an eight-month prison term for libeling a official in his legal and journalistic work. The DPP had been founded on September 28, 1986, as Taiwan's first organized opposition party following the partial lifting of , drawing from the earlier tangwai (outside-the-party) movement to push for full , protection of , and recognition of Taiwan's separate political status from the . Chen's affiliation aligned him with the party's core advocates for ending one-party rule and amending repressive laws, though the DPP's early platform included calls for a plebiscite on national status that challenged the ruling 's unification-oriented constitutional framework. In the 1989 legislative elections, Chen secured a seat in the representing Taipei's fourth district as the DPP candidate, defeating incumbent Chen Chi-ming with approximately 45% of the vote in a multi-candidate race; he was reelected in 1992 with a similar margin. Serving until 1994, Chen focused on legislative efforts to repeal Article 100 of , a sedition statute inherited from the martial law era that criminalized speech promoting , (including independence), or overthrow of the government, with penalties up to . His advocacy contributed to the article's eventual suspension in 1991 and full repeal in 1992, marking a key victory for DPP-led reforms toward free expression amid Taiwan's democratic transition. As a DPP legislator, Chen emerged as a vocal critic of Kuomintang dominance, participating in interpellation sessions that exposed corruption and pushed for transparency in government procurement and media controls. He aligned with the party's emphasis on Taiwanese identity and self-determination, often framing debates in terms of local sovereignty against perceived mainland-centric policies, though internal DPP factions debated the pace of independence rhetoric to avoid provoking Beijing. By 1994, his legislative record positioned him as a rising figure in the DPP, leading to his nomination for Taipei mayoralty, where the party sought to expand beyond its minority status in the national legislature (holding 21 of 164 seats post-1992 elections).

Taipei mayoralty

1994 election and administration

The 1994 Taipei mayoral election marked the first direct popular vote for the position, following the conversion of Taipei into a special municipality and the end of appointed mayors by the . Held on December 3, 1994, the election saw (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-bian secure victory primarily due to a split in the (KMT) vote between incumbent mayor Huang Ta-chou and media executive challenger . Chen's win represented a breakthrough for the opposition DPP against the long-dominant KMT, which had controlled the capital through appointed leadership since 1967. As mayor from December 1994 to December 1998, Chen prioritized administrative reforms, including initiatives to enhance efficiency and transparency in municipal operations. His administration focused on practical urban , launching campaigns to streamline through infrastructure adjustments and enhancements, which contributed to measurable reductions in congestion. Chen also targeted and illegal activities, such as operations, enforcing stricter regulations and inspections that disrupted entrenched networks and improved public . These efforts garnered significant approval ratings during his term, positioning as a testing ground for opposition-led amid Taiwan's . Despite these accomplishments, Chen's tenure faced challenges from partisan opposition and fiscal constraints inherited from prior KMT administrations, setting the stage for his 1998 reelection bid.

Key policies, achievements, and controversies

Chen Shui-bian's administration as Taipei mayor from December 1994 to December 1998 focused on modernizing urban infrastructure and governance. He prioritized accelerating the construction of the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system, with the initial Danshui Line segment opening on March 28, 1996, marking the city's first operational subway line and easing chronic traffic congestion. This initiative built on prior planning but expedited progress amid delays from previous Kuomintang-led administrations, contributing to expanded network segments by the end of his term. Key policies included civil service reforms to enhance efficiency and transparency, such as streamlining bureaucratic processes and promoting in city operations. Chen launched the District Environment Improvement Program in 1996, targeting neighborhood revitalization through infrastructure upgrades, , and aesthetic enhancements to combat in older districts. Public safety measures featured crackdowns on illegal sex establishments, stricter enforcement of drunk-driving laws, and mandates for usage, aiming to reduce crime and accidents in a densely populated . He also advanced "city-to-city " to foster international ties, compensating for Taiwan's limited formal recognition by establishing sister- agreements and cultural exchanges. Achievements encompassed breaking the Kuomintang's long-held monopoly on Taipei's executive, symbolizing a shift toward multiparty local governance, and initiating green space expansions to improve livability, including parks developed on cleared sites. These efforts garnered support from urban reformers but strained relations with the central KMT government, which controlled budgets and approvals, often hindering project funding and implementation. Controversies arose from aggressive tactics, notably the demolition of squatter settlements—estimated at thousands of structures—to create public parks, displacing low-income residents and sparking protests defended by some allies. Critics, including opposition lawmakers, accused the administration of insufficient relocation support and heavy-handed enforcement, fueling perceptions of elitist priorities over social welfare. Despite polling higher in absolute votes than in 1994, Chen lost the 1998 re-election to candidate , attributed by analysts to voter fatigue, policy disputes, and partisan backlash amid economic slowdowns. No major charges emerged during his mayoralty, though later presidential-era scandals retroactively colored assessments of his integrity.

Path to presidency

2000 presidential campaign

Chen Shui-bian, serving as since 1994, secured the (DPP) presidential nomination in 1999 after a competitive primary against candidates including Hsu Hsin-liang. He selected legislator Lu Hsiu-lien () as his vice presidential running mate, appealing to female voters and pro-independence supporters within the DPP base. The campaign focused on themes of political reform, , and , positioning Chen as a continuation of outgoing President Lee Teng-hui's "Taiwanization" agenda while distancing from the DPP's more radical independence rhetoric to broaden appeal. To mitigate fears of provoking mainland China, Chen pledged during the campaign to preserve the cross-strait , explicitly promising no formal , no change to the Republic of China's name or , and no immediate push for constitutional changes emphasizing Taiwan's separate status—commitments that echoed Lee's policies and aimed to reassure business interests and centrist voters wary of economic disruption. He also proposed opening direct transportation, trade, and communication links (the "") across the under reciprocal conditions, alongside vows to combat "black gold" politics and money-driven influence in governance. Endorsements from figures like National Policy Advisor Lee Yuan-tse bolstered Chen's image among intellectuals and added an estimated 3% to his support in polls. The race's dynamics shifted decisively due to a fracture in the (KMT)-led pan-blue camp, where ran as the official KMT nominee with Vincent Siew, while former Taiwan provincial governor mounted an independent bid backed by defectors, splitting the conservative and pro-unification electorate. This division, exacerbated by internal KMT favoritism toward Lien and perceptions of Soong's stronger grassroots appeal, prevented a unified opposition front despite their combined polling near 60%. Chen capitalized by portraying himself as an outsider to entrenched power, leveraging media savvy and youth-oriented rallies, though his victory remained precarious given the DPP's minority status in the legislature. The election occurred on March 18, 2000, with Chen and Lu securing 6,463,946 votes (39.3%) against Soong's 4,664,972 (36.8%) and Lien's 4,001,131 (23.1%), marking the first from the KMT after over five decades of rule. reached 82.7%, reflecting high public engagement amid the competitive field. Analysts attribute Chen's win primarily to the KMT vote split rather than a DPP mandate, as pan-blue candidates together outpolled him by over 20 points, compounded by voter fatigue with KMT scandals and Lee's subtle signals favoring reformist change.

Inauguration and initial challenges

Chen Shui-bian was inaugurated as the tenth President of the Republic of China on May 20, 2000, at the Presidential Office Building in , marking the first transfer of power from the (KMT) to the (DPP) in Taiwan's history. The ceremony commenced at 9:00 a.m., with Chen and sworn in by Council of Grand Justices President Weng Yueh-sheng. In his inaugural address, Chen outlined a conciliatory stance toward , articulating the "Four No's Plus One" policy: no , no change to the national title of "Republic of China," no inclusion of the notion of in the , and no promotion of the "two states" theory, provided refrained from military threats; the "plus one" referred to future across the strait. This pledge aimed to ease tensions following the contentious 2000 election, where Chen secured 39.3% of the vote amid a KMT vote split. Facing a where the DPP held only about 30% of seats, Chen governed as a minority president without a parliamentary , inheriting a KMT-dominated body that obstructed many initiatives. To foster cross-party cooperation, he appointed Tang Fei, a retired KMT air force general born on the mainland, as , alongside a cabinet comprising roughly half non-DPP members to signal inclusivity and stability. This approach reflected the absence of a firm popular mandate and the need to navigate partisan divisions, though it drew criticism from DPP hardliners expecting bolder pro-independence moves. Early challenges included legislative gridlock on reforms, economic recovery from the lingering Asian , and balancing DPP constituencies' demands—such as halting the Fourth —with pragmatic governance. Cross-strait relations remained tense, with viewing Chen's election warily despite his inaugural reassurances, while domestic protests and opposition scrutiny tested the new administration's ability to deliver on campaign promises like and amid polarized debates.

Presidency (2000–2008)

First term: Domestic policies and reforms

Upon assuming office in May 2000, Chen Shui-bian prioritized measures as a core campaign promise to dismantle entrenched "black gold" politics associated with the prior regime. In January 2002, he publicly commended the formation of specialized units within the , framing it as a milestone in eradicating systemic graft that had permeated Taiwan's political and business spheres. These efforts included heightened investigations into official misconduct and legislative pushes for stricter asset disclosure rules for public officials, though implementation was hampered by opposition control of the , resulting in limited prosecutorial successes during the term. Financial restructuring emerged as another key initiative, addressing vulnerabilities exposed by the , including non-performing loans exceeding NT$2 trillion (approximately US$60 billion) in state-owned banks. In , Chen's administration launched the First Financial Reform, which involved merging over 50 undercapitalized financial institutions, enhancing regulatory oversight by the Financial Supervisory Commission, and recapitalizing major banks through government injections totaling NT$200 billion. These measures aimed to consolidate a fragmented sector—previously comprising more than 50 commercial banks—into fewer, more competitive entities, with 15 mergers completed by 2003; however, critics noted uneven progress and persistent political interference in state-linked firms. In and , Chen pursued reforms to foster a distinct Taiwanese identity, reducing emphasis on Chinese-centric narratives inherited from martial law-era curricula. This included revising textbooks to highlight and indigenous perspectives, with the Ministry of Education issuing guidelines in 2004 that bifurcated Taiwanese and Chinese in high school instruction, prompting protests from pro-unification groups who argued it distorted factual continuity. Enrollment in Taiwanese-language programs expanded, and received targeted funding increases, aligning with broader efforts; yet, legislative gridlock delayed full adoption, and the changes fueled partisan divides without resolving underlying debates over historical accuracy. Social welfare advancements included completing legislation for expanded social security by 2002, incorporating provisions for the elderly amid Taiwan's aging population, where over 9% were aged 65 or older by 2000. These reforms built on prior frameworks but introduced universal coverage elements, with budget allocations rising to NT$100 billion annually for health and pension enhancements; implementation faced fiscal constraints and opposition scrutiny, yielding incremental rather than transformative gains. Overall, Chen's domestic agenda operated under , as the held only a legislative minority, constraining ambitious overhauls and shifting focus toward incremental executive actions.

First term: Economic performance and critiques

During Chen Shui-bian's first term from May to May 2004, Taiwan's economy experienced a sharp contraction in followed by gradual recovery, influenced by global factors including the dot-com bust and reduced demand for electronics exports. Real GDP growth was approximately 6.4% in (pre-full term implementation), plummeted to -2.2% in amid the global slowdown, then rebounded to 3.5% in and around 3.8% in 2003. rose from 3% in to 4.5% in , remaining elevated at about 4.4% by 2004, reflecting manufacturing layoffs and slower job creation in export sectors. The Weighted Index (TAIEX) declined significantly post- bubble, dropping over 50% from its peak by mid- before partial stabilization. These trends aligned with broader East Asian recovery patterns, driven by demand resurgence, though Taiwan's heavy reliance on tech exports amplified vulnerabilities. Key economic policies included financial reforms to address non-performing loans from the late 1990s Asian crisis and liberalization of cross-strait investment. In November 2001, amid , the administration lifted ceilings on Taiwanese investments in to stimulate outbound capital and exports, allowing up to 50% of net assets for direct investment. Other measures involved fiscal stimulus packages, including infrastructure spending and tax incentives for high-tech industries, which contributed to export growth averaging 5-7% annually by 2003. However, legislative gridlock with the opposition-controlled Kuomintang-dominated hampered swift implementation of structural reforms, such as and labor market . Critiques of the administration's handling centered on perceived policy inertia and exacerbating the downturn. Opponents, including KMT legislators, argued that Chen's initial "go slow, be patient" stance on China trade prolonged stagnation by deterring business confidence, with industrial output slumping in early . attributed post-2000 economic woes directly to Chen's pro-independence rhetoric, claiming it deterred and heightened cross-strait risks, though empirical data shows FDI inflows stabilized around $4-5 billion annually by . Analysts noted that while was the primary causal driver of the contraction—evident in synchronized declines across tech-exporting economies—domestic partisan battles delayed stimulus efficacy, contributing to a "stalemated" recovery compared to pre-2000 growth rates exceeding 6%. Supporters countered that inherited structural issues from prior KMT rule, including overcapacity in IT sectors, limited short-term options, with recovery metrics like industrial output gains validating adaptive measures. Overall, the term's performance reflected resilience in export-led fundamentals but underscored challenges from external shocks and internal divisions.

First term: Foreign relations and cross-strait tensions

Chen Shui-bian's foreign policy during his first term (2000–2004) emphasized strengthening ties with democratic allies, particularly the , while pursuing cautious engagement with the (PRC) amid persistent cross-strait frictions. Upon inauguration on May 20, 2000, Chen pledged the "four noes and one without"—no declaration of formal , no change to the Republic of China (ROC) regarding , no push for inclusion in the PRC , no promotion of independence ideology in education or law, and no on or constitutional revision unless the PRC attacked—aiming to reassure both domestic moderates and international partners of status quo maintenance. However, the PRC, viewing the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) historical pro-independence platform with suspicion, suspended semi-official cross-strait channels like the Exchange Foundation and Association for Relations Across the Straits dialogues shortly after Chen's election, citing his refusal to explicitly endorse the "" on "" with differing interpretations. Cross-strait tensions intensified due to mutual distrust and rhetorical escalations. In October 2000, Chen proposed resuming dialogue and cross-strait charter flights, but the PRC demanded prior acceptance of one-China principles, leading to stalled talks. Chen's February 2001 interview statement framing the as "one country on each side of the strait" drew sharp PRC rebuke, including threats of force and continued deployment of over 500 ballistic missiles targeted at , as detailed in Beijing's February 2000 . Despite 's indirect trade with the mainland reached $30.7 billion in 2001—political stalemate persisted, with the PRC conducting frequent military exercises and Chen rejecting preconditions for negotiation while advocating "peace and development" through goodwill gestures like resuming limited tourism. These dynamics reflected causal realities: Chen's ambiguity preserved DPP support but signaled gradual drift to , prompting defensive PRC posturing rather than aggression, though risks of miscalculation rose. Relations with the oscillated between strategic commitment and friction over perceived provocations. Early goodwill followed U.S. President George W. Bush's April 2001 approval of a $19 billion arms package, including Kidd-class destroyers and submarines, affirming Taiwan's defense needs under the . Chen's overseas transits, such as through New York and in October 2001, facilitated meetings with U.S. congressional figures, bolstering unofficial ties despite State Department restrictions on high-level visits. However, U.S. patience waned after Chen's independence-leaning rhetoric; Bush publicly rebuked him in December 2003 for a proposal, stating Taiwan must not change the status quo, amid concerns over diverting U.S. focus from and broader stability. Broader diplomatic efforts faced PRC counterpressure, exacerbating Taiwan's isolation. Chen pursued "active diplomacy," applying for UN membership under "Taiwan" in and 2002, but gained no traction, with the U.S. opposing name changes to avoid alienating . The PRC's economic incentives led to diplomatic defections, including Macedonia in January and in 2002, reducing Taiwan's formal allies from 28 in 2000 to 26 by 2004. Ties with warmed via shared security concerns, including Chen's transit meetings, but yielded no formal upgrades. Overall, Chen's approach yielded incremental U.S. security assurances but heightened cross-strait risks without breakthroughs, constrained by 's leverage and Washington's one-China policy adherence.

2004 re-election campaign

Chen Shui-bian, the incumbent (DPP) president, sought re-election on March 20, 2004, facing a unified pan-Blue alliance ticket of (KMT) chairman and People First Party (PFP) chairman , who had split votes in the 2000 election. Chen's campaign emphasized a distinct identity, through referendums, and continuity of pro-independence-leaning policies, while critics accused him of provoking cross-strait tensions with . The Lien-Soong platform focused on economic stability, improved relations with , and portraying Chen's governance as divisive and ineffective amid legislative gridlock. On March 19, 2004, one day before the vote, Chen and were shot at while campaigning in in an incident that injured Chen with a graze to the abdomen and Lu with a wound to the knee. Investigations concluded it was an assassination attempt by a lone gunman using a handgun from a nearby building, with no evidence of staging found despite subsequent conspiracy theories from opponents claiming it was fabricated for sympathy votes. The election saw a turnout of 80.28 percent, with 13.25 million valid votes cast. Official results from Taiwan's showed Chen and Lu receiving 6,471,970 votes (50.11 percent), narrowly defeating and Soong's 6,442,452 votes (49.89 percent) by a margin of 29,518 votes. A concurrent consultative on strengthening Taiwan's defenses against Chinese missile threats and reviewing arms purchases failed due to insufficient turnout thresholds. Post-election, pan-Blue supporters protested in , alleging vote-buying, ballot tampering, and irregularities in over 100 precincts, while demanding a full recount and invalidation. Chen agreed to an expedited recount, which confirmed the results with minor adjustments not altering the outcome. Taiwan's rejected two opposition lawsuits contesting the election on grounds of fraud in November 2004, upholding Chen's victory. The congratulated Chen on his re-election, urging stability across the .

Second term: Escalating independence rhetoric

Following his re-election on , , Chen Shui-bian adopted a more assertive stance on Taiwan's distinct identity during his second term (–2008), emphasizing sovereignty through symbolic and institutional measures while framing them as preservations of the rather than formal declarations of . In his May 20, , inaugural address, Chen pledged constitutional reforms to streamline governance, including reducing legislative seats and enhancing via referendums, but explicitly avoided altering the constitutional framework on or territorial claims to assuage international concerns. These reforms, pursued amid legislative gridlock with the opposition-controlled (KMT), aimed to entrench Taiwan-centric governance, drawing criticism from as veiled moves. A pivotal escalation occurred on , 2006, when Chen announced the cessation of operations for the National Unification Council (NUC)—an advisory body established in 1990 under President —and the freezing of its National Unification Guidelines, which outlined a phased path toward unification with under democratic preconditions. Chen justified the move as reflecting outdated assumptions given China's 2005 , which threatened force against independence efforts, arguing that the NUC had not convened since 2001 and the action merely formalized inactivity without legal change. condemned it as a provocative step toward "Taiwan independence," prompting military threats, while the U.S. State Department urged restraint to avoid altering the cross-strait status quo. The decision symbolized Chen's shift from his 2000 inaugural "Four Noes" commitments (no independence declaration, no constitutional changes to territory, no on independence, no abolition of the NUC), which he had pledged to honor but increasingly viewed as incompatible with evolving realities. Chen's rhetoric intensified in 2007, particularly through pushes for membership under the name "," bypassing the Republic of China (ROC) designation to assert a separate identity. On October 10, 2007, in his speech, Chen challenged the interpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971), which expelled ROC representatives in favor of the (PRC), asserting it did not equate with the PRC or bar 's separate application. This preceded referendums held alongside the March 22, 2008, , where voters were asked whether should join the UN under "" or other innovative names; both failed validity due to turnout below 50%, garnering only 38.9% and 37.0% approval respectively amid KMT-led boycotts. U.S. officials, including the Bush administration, warned against the bids as destabilizing, fearing escalation with , while Chen portrayed them as democratic exercises in . These actions, coupled with Chen's public statements emphasizing Taiwan's sovereignty—such as his March 30, 2004, BBC interview affirming "Taiwan is an independent sovereign country" already—fueled perceptions of escalating independence advocacy, polarizing domestic politics and heightening cross-strait tensions without achieving formal separation. Critics, including U.S. analysts, noted the rhetoric strained Taiwan's international support by testing the U.S. "one China" policy red lines, yet Chen maintained they countered Beijing's unification pressure through enhanced national identity.

Second term: Governance amid gridlock

Chen Shui-bian's second term, beginning on May 20, 2004, was marked by intensified executive-legislative conflict following the December 11, 2004, legislative elections, in which the opposition pan-Blue alliance of the (KMT) and People First Party (PFP) secured a in the 225-seat . The KMT increased its seats to 89, while the PFP held 34, enabling the coalition to dominate proceedings and obstruct (DPP) initiatives. This led to policy gridlock, with the repeatedly blocking key reforms and budgets proposed by Chen's administration, including a special NT$480.7 billion arms procurement package for submarines, Patriot missiles, and P-3C aircraft from the , which failed to advance amid partisan disputes over funding and priorities. Opposition lawmakers also launched numerous investigative committees targeting executive officials, paralyzing governance and fueling accusations of political harassment. Public discontent peaked in 2006 with the "Million Voices Against Corruption, President Chen Must Go" movement, organized by former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh, which mobilized tens to hundreds of thousands of red-shirted protesters in during September and October rallies, demanding Chen's resignation over family-linked scandals and perceived governance failures amid legislative stalemate. The opposition initiated multiple petitions against Chen, including one rejected by the on June 27, 2006, further highlighting the . Economic challenges compounded the , as sluggish growth—averaging around 4% annually but with high and declines—drew blame from Chen's supporters toward legislative obstruction of stimulus measures, while critics attributed stagnation to policy uncertainty and pro-independence rhetoric deterring investment. Chen occasionally invoked emergency decrees to bypass blocks, such as halting the Fourth construction in 2006, but these maneuvers deepened partisan rifts without resolving underlying governance dysfunction.

Investigations and charges

Investigations into alleged corruption involving Chen Shui-bian began during his presidency, prompted by scandals such as the questionable use of official receipts by his wife, Wu Shu-chen, for a hotel stay in , which raised suspicions of fund misuse and influence peddling. Taiwanese prosecutors announced on November 3, , that they had gathered sufficient evidence to pursue corruption charges against Chen and Wu, including allegations of accepting bribes and diverting public funds through family associates for personal gain. Following Chen's departure from office on May 20, 2008, under the incoming administration of , prosecutors established a special to probe financial irregularities from his tenure, focusing on the misuse of a special presidential "state affairs fund" intended for and . The investigations centered on claims that Chen and Wu embezzled approximately NT$104 million (US$3.12 million) from this fund between 2002 and 2007, including transfers for fictitious expenses and personal enrichment, with funds allegedly laundered through relatives and overseas accounts. On November 12, 2008, Chen was arrested and detained on charges including embezzlement, bribery, , and money laundering, with prosecutors citing evidence such as records showing illicit transfers to family members and associates, including NT$200 million in bribes linked to land rezoning deals and construction projects like the Nangang Exhibition Hall. Chen maintained the proceedings constituted political persecution by KMT rivals seeking retribution for his pro-independence stance, while prosecutors pointed to documented financial trails, including Swiss inquiries into laundered proceeds exceeding $20 million funneled through his son and daughter-in-law. Formal indictments followed on December 12, 2008, encompassing six counts of graft, with additional probes into related of documents to conceal transactions.

Trials, conviction, and imprisonment

Following his departure from office on May 20, , Chen Shui-bian faced immediate scrutiny from Taiwan's prosecutors over allegations of during his presidency, including from state funds, , , and . He was detained on , , amid investigations into the misuse of a special presidential fund for and other slush funds totaling over NT$100 million (approximately US$3 million). Chen denied the charges, asserting they constituted political persecution by opponents, particularly the Kuomintang-led government. The primary trial commenced in the District Court, culminating in a verdict on , 2009, after 1,001 days of proceedings. Chen and his wife, Wu Shu-chen, were convicted on six counts, including of NT$104 million from state affairs and diplomatic funds, receiving bribes, document forgery, , and graft. The court imposed on both, along with a NT$200 million fine (US$6.13 million) on Chen and confiscation of ill-gotten gains, marking the first such conviction for a former Taiwanese president. Prosecutors had sought the death penalty for Chen on charges, citing the scale of funds diverted for personal use and political favors, such as land deals and construction contracts. Appeals followed, with the Taiwan High Court on June 11, 2010, upholding the convictions but reducing Chen's sentence to 20 years, citing procedural issues in some evidence handling while affirming core findings of . The Supreme Court further adjusted the term to 19 years in November 2010, focusing on convictions, though additional trials yielded an extra two-year sentence in August 2011 for related to forged documents and fund transfers. Chen began serving his consolidated sentence formally in December 2010 at Taipei Prison, where he was held under strict conditions, including isolation periods; he staged hunger strikes protesting the trials' fairness, drawing international attention to claims of judicial politicization. Subsequent rulings layered complexity, with a second-phase in October 2011 confirming an 18-year term for and laundering in related cases involving bids. Chen's imprisonment, spanning from 2008 detention to 2015 , totaled over six years served, during which he underwent medical evaluations for ailments like sleep disorders, amid ongoing appeals that did not overturn the foundational convictions. Critics of the verdicts, including pro-independence advocates, argued the cases exemplified selective prosecution against figures, while proponents emphasized forensic evidence of fund diversions as irrefutable proof of .

Family involvement and broader implications

Chen's wife, Wu Shu-chen, was convicted alongside him in September 2009 on multiple counts of , including , , and related to the misuse of diplomatic funds and state resources during his ; both received initial life sentences from the Taipei District Court. Wu's involvement centered on her role in directing illicit payments and falsifying documents, such as in the Dragon Boat Festival graft case involving over NT$100 million (approximately US$3 million) in diverted funds. Her sentence was later reduced to 20 years on appeal in June 2010, reflecting judicial findings of her active participation in schemes that exploited Chen's presidential influence. Other family members faced investigations and charges, though not all resulted in convictions. Chen's brother-in-law, Huang Jui-tsung, was sentenced to eight years in prison in December 2012 for and tied to land deals and fund diversions benefiting the . Chen's son, Chen Chih-chung, and daughter, Chen Hsing-wen, along with her husband, were probed in cases like the State Affairs Fund misuse but avoided in December 2015, as prosecutors found insufficient evidence of direct involvement. These probes revealed patterns of family access to presidential perks, including overseas property purchases funded by alleged bribes, such as a US$1.5 million forfeiture in 2016 linked to laundered proceeds. The scandals exposed systemic vulnerabilities in Taiwan's post-authoritarian governance, where familial influence intersected with executive power, eroding the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) image as a corruption-free alternative to the Kuomintang. Public outrage over family enrichment—amid economic stagnation and cross-strait policy gridlock—fueled the DPP's decisive loss in the 2008 presidential election, enabling Ma Ying-jeou's victory and a decade of KMT resurgence. Broader implications included heightened scrutiny of anti-corruption mechanisms, with the cases prompting legal reforms like stricter asset declarations for officials, yet also sparking debates on prosecutorial politicization under opposition-controlled institutions post-2008. The convictions reinforced perceptions of elite impunity across parties, contributing to voter cynicism and demands for judicial independence, as evidenced by subsequent ex-presidential indictments.

Post-presidency

Medical parole and health issues

Chen Shui-bian experienced a deterioration in health during his imprisonment for corruption convictions, which began after his 2008 sentencing to a 20-year term. By 2013, reports indicated he was afflicted with multiple conditions, including severe depression, brain atrophy, and neural degeneration that worsened despite prison medical interventions. These issues, compounded by earlier diagnoses such as potential Parkinson's disease symptoms, prompted repeated calls from supporters and some international figures for medical release, arguing that inadequate prison care exacerbated his frailty. On January 5, 2015, Taiwan's Agency of Corrections granted Chen a one-month medical following evaluations by medical experts, allowing his release from Prison after approximately six years of incarceration. The was justified by his neural degeneration and overall declining condition, with authorities stipulating home recuperation under monitoring and periodic reassessments. Initial extensions followed, including a three-month prolongation in February 2015, as his health required ongoing treatment outside the facility. Subsequent evaluations led to indefinite extensions of the , which has remained in effect without return to prison. Post-release, Chen underwent treatments that reportedly stabilized his conditions, enabling public activities such as hosting a weekly interview program and memoirs by 2024. Despite these improvements, discussions of a full persisted, with President declining to rule it out in May 2024 amid evaluations of judicial and medical factors, though no has been granted as of that date. Critics, including opponents from the , have questioned the 's extensions as politically influenced, citing Chen's resumed political commentary, while proponents emphasized humanitarian medical grounds.

Public statements and political influence

Chen Shui-bian was released on medical on January 5, 2015, with conditions prohibiting participation in public political discussions or activities. Despite these restrictions, he has issued statements via , family channels, and occasional public appearances, often addressing Taiwan's democracy, sovereignty, and electoral dynamics. He maintains an active presence on the Threads platform under the handle @chenshuibian88, sharing political commentary, personal reflections, and engaging with followers, with approximately 58,000 followers as of late 2025. In February 2023, Chen commented on potential vice presidential pairings for the 2024 election, favoring Zheng Li-jun over to run with , citing Zheng's communication style as better suited for international engagement. At a February 2024 book launch for Chen Shui-bian Presidential Interviews, he urged incoming President and leader to read it, encouraging Ko not to underestimate himself. In April 2025, Chen spoke publicly after 17 years, stressing democratic principles and cautioning against reducing governance to single-leader dominance, based on his own experience as a president without a popular vote majority. His son, Chen Chi-chung, clarified the speech reaffirmed without targeting Lai. By June 2025, Chen endorsed legislative recall campaigns against members, shifting from prior reservations about political retribution cycles. Though sidelined by parole terms and corruption convictions, Chen maintains influence among pro-independence DPP factions through platforms like his "New Hero Story" page, where he comments on current events and sustains discourse on identity. His interventions often provoke partisan debate, underscoring persistent divisions in 's politics, yet his formal party role remains curtailed.

Political positions

Views on Taiwan's sovereignty and identity

Chen Shui-bian articulated a vision of Taiwan as an already and independent nation, emphasizing that formal was unnecessary because the status quo already constituted separation from the (PRC). In a 2007 BBC interview, he stated that "Taiwan does not have to declare independence because it is already independent," describing the situation as "one country on each side of the ." This formulation, first prominently voiced in August 2002 during a speech to communities, framed the as dividing two distinct entities: the Republic of China (ROC) on and the PRC on the mainland. He reiterated this in various contexts, arguing that Taiwan's resided with its 23 million people, independent of any one-China framework. Central to his views was the rejection of the PRC's territorial claims, coupled with advocacy for international recognition of Taiwan's distinct status. Chen supported legislative measures for referendums on issues, as expressed in August 2002 when he backed proposals for a public vote on formal separation from , defying PRC warnings. He endorsed resolutions within his (DPP) affirming that "Taiwan is a independent " not subject to the PRC, despite its constitutional name as the ROC. Throughout his presidency, he pushed for Taiwan's participation in the under the name "Taiwan," as announced in his January 1, 2007, New Year message, positioning this as a pragmatic step to affirm existing without immediate . These positions evolved from his 2000 inaugural pledge to maintain the status quo under the "Four Noes and One Without"—no declaration, no constitutional change to alter the national title, no inclusion of the mainland in the ROC territory, no promotion of , and no abolition of the National Unification Guidelines—yet he later intensified rhetoric to align with growing domestic sentiment for de jure . On Taiwan's , Chen promoted a distinctly Taiwanese , prioritizing , , and over shared Sinic heritage, a process often termed or Taiwanization. He argued that forging a new through education and public discourse was essential for and , distinguishing it from mere by emphasizing reclamation of indigenous and colonial-era narratives. Under his administration, this manifested in policies like curriculum reforms that elevated Taiwanese history—such as the 2004 emphasis on pre-1945 events—and reduced focus on texts, aiming to cultivate a generational shift away from identification with . Chen's insistence on a specific "Taiwanese " differentiated him from moderates, framing identity as a bulwark against PRC influence and a foundation for claims. Critics, including PRC officials and some domestic opponents, interpreted these efforts as veiled , but Chen maintained they reflected empirical realities of Taiwan's post-1949 democratic evolution and multicultural fabric.

Critiques of independence strategy

Chen Shui-bian's push for Taiwanese through measures like constitutional reform proposals, a defensive initiative, and the 2007 UN membership bid under the name "" drew sharp rebukes for heightening cross-Strait tensions without tangible gains in . Critics, including U.S. officials, argued these actions unnecessarily provoked , risking military escalation; for instance, President publicly stated in December that Chen's plans destabilized the , reflecting Washington's preference for strategic over provocative . Similarly, the noted that such steps were unwelcome in both and Washington, as they undermined efforts to maintain peace across the . Domestically, (KMT) leaders and pan-Blue allies lambasted the strategy as divisive, accusing Chen of policies—such as curriculum changes emphasizing Taiwanese history over —that eroded shared and polarized along ethnic lines. These efforts, they contended, exacerbated legislative gridlock and electoral losses for the (DPP), as evidenced by the KMT's gains in the 2004 legislative elections, which limited Chen's agenda amid accusations of fostering "" at the expense of pragmatic governance. analysts further critiqued the approach as counterproductive, asserting it failed to leverage Taiwan's economic and democratic strengths in the global system while inviting Beijing's isolation tactics, such as diplomatic poaching and economic coercion. Economically, opponents highlighted how Chen's reluctance to expand cross-Strait engagement—despite surging volumes reaching record highs—contributed to industrial hollowing and , as capital and talent flowed to the mainland unchecked by restrictive policies. While trade persisted amid tensions, critics from think tanks like pointed to the 2007 UN referendum as a "cynical political move" that distracted from diversification needs and amplified Beijing's retaliatory measures, including aviation restrictions and tourism bans, ultimately stunting Taiwan's competitiveness without advancing sovereignty. The Quarterly analysis underscored that conflating assertive with true independence overlooked less confrontational paths to autonomy, leaving more vulnerable post-Chen as fears of formal separation subsided but unresolved frictions lingered.

Legacy

Achievements in democratization and local governance

Chen Shui-bian's election as in December 1994 represented a in local , as he became the first leader of the city chosen through direct popular vote following its designation as a special . During his term from 1994 to 1998, he initiated reforms aimed at improving administrative efficiency and transparency, accelerated construction of the Taipei Rapid Transit system to enhance urban mobility, and promoted international city-to-city to bolster Taipei's global profile. These efforts contributed to measurable improvements in public safety, with Taipei's crime rate declining amid a national uptick, and elevated the city's livability rankings by Asiaweek to 10th in in 1997, 5th in 1998, and 2nd most livable Asian city in 1999. His 2000 presidential victory further advanced Taiwan's democratization by achieving the first peaceful transfer of power from the long-ruling to the , ending over five decades of one-party dominance and affirming the robustness of Taiwan's multi-party . This transition, managed without institutional disruption from or administrative holdovers, underscored the maturation of democratic norms in Taiwan since martial law's end in 1987. As president from 2000 to 2008, Chen pursued institutional reforms to deepen democratic participation and refine governance structures, including signing the Referendum Act on December 31, 2003, which empowered citizens to initiate and vote on referendums, and pardoning 19 prisoners of in 2000 to address historical injustices from the authoritarian era. He also chaired government reform committees emphasizing simplification and pragmatism in local administrations, launched initiatives to eradicate "black gold" politics—corrupt ties between and elections—and appointed figures known for integrity to key justice roles, though legislative opposition limited some proposals like a dedicated agency. These steps, alongside efforts such as drafts for indigenous autonomy, aimed to distribute power more equitably beyond central authority.

Criticisms of polarization and economic stagnation

Critics of Chen Shui-bian's presidency contend that his aggressive promotion of Taiwanese identity and sovereignty reforms significantly deepened between the pro-independence (DPP) and its pan-Green allies, on one hand, and the Kuomintang-led pan-Blue camp favoring closer cross-strait ties or the , on the other. Policies such as proposals to excise references to the Chinese mainland, alongside referendums in 2004 and 2008 seeking membership under the name "," were viewed by opponents as deliberate provocations that prioritized over pragmatic governance, exacerbating ethnic tensions between native Taiwanese and mainland-descended populations. This divide manifested in relentless partisan battles, including street protests and media wars, which opposition figures like described as socially divisive and irresponsible. The resulting legislative , stemming from the DPP's lack of a parliamentary throughout Chen's two terms, stalled critical reforms and budgets, further entrenching divisions and undermining institutional trust. For instance, pan-Blue lawmakers repeatedly blocked initiatives and fiscal measures, while Chen's appeals to his pro-independence base—such as periodic rhetoric challenging the "" framework—infuriated and strained domestic consensus, prioritizing short-term mobilization over cross-party cooperation. Analysts note that this polarization was not inevitable but amplified by Chen's strategy of framing as a zero-sum contest, contrasting with earlier catch-all party dynamics. Economically, Taiwan under Chen experienced relative stagnation compared to the high-growth and , with annual GDP growth averaging around 3%—including contractions of -1.7% in amid the global dot-com bust and -1.8% in during the —while unemployment surged from 2.7% in 2000 to a peak of 5.2% in 2002 and hovered near 4% thereafter. Critics from business sectors and the opposition attributed this underperformance to political instability and policy paralysis, arguing that cross-strait tensions and identity-driven rhetoric deterred investment and to , with the losing over half its value by . Initial restrictions on China-bound investments, intended to mitigate over-reliance but criticized as protectionist, compounded structural challenges like manufacturing exodus and failure to enact timely stimulus amid legislative deadlock. These intertwined issues, per assessments, reflected a shift from economic prioritization to identity mobilization, fostering a environment where partisan strife overshadowed responses to inherited post-Asian crisis woes and global headwinds, ultimately eroding public confidence in Chen's administration by 2008.

Long-term impact on cross-strait relations and U.S.-Taiwan ties

Chen Shui-bian's advocacy for Taiwanese and policies such as the proposed 2004 defensive referendum provoked Beijing, culminating in China's passage of the on March 14, 2005, which authorized the use of "non-peaceful means" to thwart formal . This measure, enacted amid fears of Chen's incremental steps toward , entrenched a legal framework for potential military action, hardening the People's Republic of China's (PRC) stance and influencing its policy for decades by establishing as a . Despite escalating rhetoric and military posturing from both sides—no cross-strait trade or direct flights expanded significantly under Chen—public sentiment in favored preserving the , with surveys showing support for immediate dropping from around 20% pre-2000 to lower levels by 2004. Following Chen's departure in 2008, the Kuomintang's pursued pragmatic engagement, yielding direct charter flights by December 2008, expanded tourism, and the signed June 29, 2010, which boosted to over $200 billion annually by mid-decade. This contrasted sharply with Chen-era stagnation, underscoring how his confrontational tactics achieved neither nor economic leverage against the PRC, instead associating the (DPP) with heightened risks and domestic polarization over identity issues. Long-term, Chen's legacy reinforced Beijing's wariness of DPP governance, as seen in renewed tensions post-2016 under , while fostering a resilient Taiwanese consensus against unification, though without altering the island's international status. Chen's unpredictable independence initiatives strained U.S.-Taiwan relations, prompting Washington to publicly criticize moves like the 2003 referendum proposal, with President stating on December 9, 2003, that the U.S. opposed actions altering the status quo. This reflected diminished trust, as Chen often bypassed prior consultation with American officials, leading the Bush administration to question his long-term intentions and prioritize cross-strait stability. Nonetheless, the U.S. upheld commitments under the 1979 , approving arms sales exceeding $11 billion from 2000 to 2008, including submarine upgrades and Patriot missiles, which sustained Taiwan's defensive capabilities amid PRC threats. In the broader context, Chen's highlighted the perils of unilateral provocation, reinforcing U.S. strategic —supporting Taiwan's and without endorsing —which has endured as a deterrent framework, even as evolving U.S.-PRC rivalry has amplified arms transfers and unofficial ties post-2008. His era demonstrated that such invites PRC countermeasures without commensurate American backing for status quo alterations, shaping subsequent DPP caution and bolstering Taiwan's role in U.S. strategy focused on countering Beijing's assertiveness.

References

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