Space Launch System
View on Wikipedia
SLS Block 1 with the Orion spacecraft launching from Pad 39B | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Function | Super heavy-lift launch vehicle | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Manufacturer | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Country of origin | United States | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Project cost | US$26.4 billion | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Cost per launch | US$2.5 billion | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Cost per year | US$2.6 billion (FY23) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Size | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Height | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Diameter | 8.4 m (27.6 ft)[2] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Mass | 2,610,000 kg (5,750,000 lb)[3] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Stages | 2½ | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Maximum thrust |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Capacity | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Payload to LEO | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Altitude | 200 km (120 mi)[4] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Orbital inclination | 28.5° | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Mass |
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Payload to TLI | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Mass | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Associated rockets | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Based on | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Comparable | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Launch history | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Status | Active | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Launch sites | Kennedy, LC-39B | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Total launches | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Success(es) | 1 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| First flight | 16 November 2022, 06:47:44 UTC[6] (1:47:44 am EST) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Carries passengers or cargo | Orion | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Space Launch System (SLS) is an American super heavy-lift expendable launch vehicle used by NASA. As the primary launch vehicle of the Artemis Moon landing program, SLS is designed to launch the crewed Orion spacecraft on a trans-lunar trajectory. The first SLS launch was the uncrewed Artemis I, which took place on 16 November 2022.
Development of SLS began in 2011 as a replacement for the retiring Space Shuttle as well as the canceled Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles. SLS was built using a combination of existing Shuttle technology, including solid rocket boosters and RS-25 engines, with newly-developed components, like the Core Stage. The project has faced significant challenges, including mismanagement, substantial budget overruns, and significant delays. The first Congressionally mandated launch in late 2016 was delayed by nearly six years.
All Space Launch System flights are to be launched from Launch Complex 39B at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida. The first three SLS flights are expected to use the Block 1 configuration, comprising a core stage, extended Space Shuttle boosters developed for Ares I and the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) upper stage. The improved Block 1B configuration, with the powerful and purpose-built Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), is planned to be introduced on the fourth flight; a further improved Block 2 configuration with new solid rocket boosters is planned for the ninth flight. After the launch of Artemis IV, NASA plans to transfer production and launch operations of SLS to Deep Space Transport LLC, a joint venture between Boeing and Northrop Grumman.
Description
[edit]The SLS is a Space Shuttle-derived launch vehicle. The rocket's first stage is powered by one central core stage and two outboard solid rocket boosters. All SLS Blocks share a common core stage design but differ in their upper stages and boosters.[18][19][20][21]
Core stage
[edit]
Together with the solid rocket boosters, the core stage is responsible for propelling the upper stage and payload out of the atmosphere to near orbital velocity. It contains the liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks for the ascent phase, the forward and aft solid rocket booster attach points, avionics, and the Main Propulsion System (MPS), an assembly of the four RS-25 engines,[18] associated plumbing and hydraulic gimbal actuators, and equipment for autogenous pressurization of the vehicle's tanks. The core stage provides approximately 25% of the vehicle's thrust at liftoff, the rest coming from the solid rocket boosters.[22][23]
The stage measures 213 ft (65 m) long by 28 ft (8.4 m) in diameter and is visually similar to the Space Shuttle external tank.[24][25] It is made mostly of 2219 aluminum alloy,[26] and contains numerous improvements to manufacturing processes, including friction stir welding for the barrel sections, and integrated milling for the stringers.[27][28] The first four flights will each use and expend four of the remaining sixteen RS-25D engines previously flown on Space Shuttle missions.[29][30][31] Aerojet Rocketdyne refits these engines with modernized engine controllers, higher throttle limits, as well as insulation for the high temperatures the engine section will experience due to their position adjacent to the solid rocket boosters.[32] Later flights will switch to an RS-25 variant optimized for expended use, the RS-25E, which will lower per-engine costs by over 30%.[33][34] The thrust of each RS-25D engine has been increased from 492,000 lbf (2,188 kN), as on the Space Shuttle, to 513,000 lbf (2,281 kN) on the sixteen modernized engines. The RS-25E will further increase per-engine thrust to 522,000 lbf (2,321 kN).[35][36] The first test firing of a RS-25E took place in June 2025 and was declared a success.[37]
Solid Rocket Boosters
[edit]Shuttle derived
[edit]Blocks 1 and 1B of the SLS will use two five-segment solid rocket boosters. They use casing segments that were flown on Shuttle missions as parts of the four-segment Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters. They possess an additional center segment, new avionics, and lighter insulation, but lack a parachute recovery system, as they will not be recovered after launch.[38] The propellants for the solid rocket boosters are aluminum powder, which is very reactive, and ammonium perchlorate, a powerful oxidizer. They are held together by a binder, polybutadiene acrylonitrile (PBAN). The mixture has the consistency of a rubber eraser and is packed into each segment.[39] The five-segment solid rocket boosters provide approximately 25% more total impulse than the Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters.[40][41]
BOLE
[edit]The stock of SLS Block 1 to 1B boosters is limited by the number of casings left over from the Shuttle program, which allows for eight flights of the SLS.[42] On 2 March 2019, the Booster Obsolescence and Life Extension program was announced, with the goal of developing new solid rocket boosters for SLS Block 2. These boosters will be built by Northrop Grumman Space Systems, and will be derived from the composite-casing solid rocket boosters then in development for the canceled OmegA launch vehicle, and are projected to increase Block 2's payload to 290,000 lb (130 t) to low Earth orbit (LEO) and at least 101,000 lb (46 t) to trans-lunar injection.[43][44][45] As of 2025,[update] the BOLE program is under development, with first firing of a prototype taking place in June of that year, which experienced a nozzle failure, exploding about two minutes into the burn.[46]
Upper stages
[edit]Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage
[edit]

The Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) is a temporary upper stage for Block 1 versions of SLS, built by United Launch Alliance, a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin. The ICPS is essentially an "off-the-shelf" Delta Cryogenic Second Stage, with minimal modifications for SLS integration. The ICPS is intended as a temporary solution and slated to be replaced on the Block 1B version of the SLS by the next-generation Exploration Upper Stage, under design by Boeing.
The ICPS used on the Artemis I mission was powered by a single RL10B-2 engine, while the ICPS for Artemis II and Artemis III will use the RL10C-2 variant.[47][48][49] Block 1 is intended to be capable of lifting 209,000 lb (95 t) to low Earth orbit (LEO) in this configuration, including the weight of the ICPS as part of the payload.[50] At the time of SLS core stage separation, Artemis I was traveling on an initial 1,806 by 30 km (1,122 by 19 mi) transatmospheric orbital trajectory. This trajectory ensured safe disposal of the core stage.[51] ICPS then performed orbital insertion and a subsequent trans-lunar injection burn to send Orion towards the Moon.[52] The ICPS will be human-rated for the crewed Artemis II and III flights.[53]
The SLS Block 1 has a conical frustum-shaped interstage called the Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter between the core stage and the ICPS. It consists of sixteen aluminum-lithium panels made of 2195 aluminum alloy. Teledyne Brown Engineering is its builder.[54] The first one cost $60 million, and the next two cost $85 million together.[55]
Exploration Upper Stage
[edit]The Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) is planned to first fly on Artemis IV. The EUS will complete the SLS ascent phase and then re-ignite to send its payload to destinations beyond LEO.[56] It is expected to be used by Block 1B and Block 2. The EUS shares the core stage diameter of 8.4 meters, and will be powered by four RL10C-3 engines.[57] It will eventually be upgraded to use four improved RL10C-X engines.[58] As of March 2022[update], Boeing is developing a new composite-based fuel tank for the EUS that would increase Block 1B's overall payload mass capacity to TLI by 40 percent.[59] The improved upper stage was originally named the Dual Use Upper Stage (DUUS, pronounced "duce"),[56] but was later renamed the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS).[60]
Block variants
[edit]| Flight # | Block | Boosters | Core engines | Upper stage | Liftoff thrust | Payload mass to... | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LEO | TLI | ||||||
| 1 | 1 | 5-segment Shuttle-derived boosters | RS-25D[29] | ICPS with RL10B-2[49] | 39 MN (8,800,000 lbf)[61] | 95,000 kg (209,000 lb)[50] | >27,000 kg (59,500 lb)[1] |
| 2, 3 | ICPS with RL10C-2[47] | ||||||
| 4 | 1B | EUS with RL10C-3 | 105,000 kg (231,000 lb)[62] | 42,000 kg (92,500 lb)[b][1] | |||
| 5, 6, 7, 8 | RS-25E[34] | ||||||
| 9+ | 2 | BOLE[42] | 53 MN (11,900,000 lbf)[50] | 130,000 kg (290,000 lb)[62] | >46,000 kg (101,400 lb)[b][1] | ||

Development
[edit]Funding
[edit]During the joint Senate-NASA presentation in September 2011, it was stated that the SLS program had a projected development cost of US$18 billion through 2017, with $10 billion for the SLS rocket, $6 billion for the Orion spacecraft, and $2 billion for upgrades to the launch pad and other facilities at Kennedy Space Center.[63][64] These costs and schedules were considered optimistic in an independent 2011 cost assessment report by Booz Allen Hamilton for NASA.[65] An internal 2011 NASA document estimated the cost of the program through 2025 to total at least $41 billion for four 209,000 lb (95 t) launches (1 uncrewed, 3 crewed),[66][67] with the 290,000 lb (130 t) version ready no earlier than 2030.[68] The Human Exploration Framework Team estimated unit costs for 'Block 0' at $1.6 billion and Block 1 at $1.86 billion in 2010.[69] However, since these estimates were made, the Block 0 SLS vehicle was dropped in late 2011, and the design was not completed.[18]
In September 2012, an SLS deputy project manager stated that $500 million is a reasonable target average cost per flight for the SLS program.[70] In 2013, the Space Review estimated the cost per launch at $5 billion, depending on the rate of launches.[71][72] NASA announced in 2013 that the European Space Agency will build the Orion service module.[73] In August 2014, as the SLS program passed its Key Decision Point C review and was deemed ready to enter full development, costs from February 2014 until its planned launch in September 2018 were estimated at $7.021 billion.[74] Ground systems modifications and construction would require an additional $1.8 billion over the same time.[75]
In October 2018, NASA's Inspector General reported that the Boeing core stage contract had made up 40% of the $11.9 billion spent on the SLS as of August 2018. By 2021, development of the core stage was expected to have cost $8.9 billion, twice the initially planned amount.[76] In December 2018, NASA estimated that yearly budgets for the SLS will range from $2.1 to $2.3 billion between 2019 and 2023.[77]
In March 2019, the Trump administration released its fiscal year 2020 budget request for NASA, which notably proposed dropped funding for the Block 1B and Block 2 variants of SLS. Congressional action ultimately included the funding in the passed budget.[78] One Gateway component that had been previously planned for the SLS Block 1B is expected to fly on the SpaceX Falcon Heavy rocket.[79][needs update]
On 1 May 2020, NASA awarded a contract extension to Aerojet Rocketdyne to manufacture 18 additional RS-25 engines with associated services for $1.79 billion, bringing the total RS-25 contract value to almost $3.5 billion.[80][34]
Budget
[edit]NASA has spent $29.0 billion on SLS development from 2011 through 2024, in nominal dollars. This is equivalent to $35.4 billion in 2025 dollars using the NASA New Start Inflation Indices.[81]
| Fiscal year | Funding | Source | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal (millions) |
Inflation adjusted (FY25 millions)[81] | ||
| 2011 | $1,536.1 | $ 2,168.6 | Actual[82] |
| 2012 | $1,497.5 | $ 2,091.8 | Actual[83] |
| 2013 | $1,414.9 | $ 1,947.2 | Actual[84] |
| 2014 | $1,600.0 | $ 2,159.5 | Actual[85] |
| 2015 | $1,678.6 | $ 2,220.9 | Actual[86] |
| 2016 | $1,971.9 | $ 2,577.8 | Actual[87] |
| 2017 | $2,127.1 | $ 2,722.7 | Actual[88] |
| 2018 | $2,150.0 | $ 2,683.9 | Actual[89] |
| 2019 | $2,144.0 | $ 2,625.8 | Actual[90] |
| 2020 | $2,528.1 | $ 3,029.1 | Actual[91] |
| 2021 | $2,555.0 | $ 2,949.7 | 2021 Operating Plan in 2023 budget[92] |
| 2022 | $2,600.0 | $ 2,839.4 | 2022 Operating Plan in 2024 budget[93] |
| 2023 | $2,566.8 | $ 2,692.9 | FY 2023 Op Plan in FY 2025 Budget Request[94] |
| 2024 | $2,600.0 | $ 2,660.0 | FY 2024 Op Plan in FY 2026 Budget Request[95] |
| Total | $28,970 | $35,369.2 | |
In 2025, the Enacted NASA Budget for Exploration, which includes SLS, is approximately the same again as 2024.
In January 2024 NASA announced plans for a first crewed flight of the Orion spacecraft on the SLS, the Artemis II mission, no earlier than March 2026.[96]
Included in the above SLS costs above are (1) the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), a $412 million contract[97] and (2) the costs of developing the Exploration Upper Stage (below).
Excluded from the SLS cost above are the costs to assemble, integrate, prepare and launch the SLS and its payloads, funded separately in the NASA Exploration Ground Systems, currently at about $600 million per year,[98][99] and anticipated to stay there through at least the first four launches of SLS.[100] Also excluded are payloads that launch on the SLS, such as the Orion crew capsule, the predecessor programs that contributed to the development of the SLS, such as the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle project, funded from 2008 to 2010 for a total of $70 million,[101] and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle, funded from 2006 to 2010 for a total of $4.8 billion[101][102] in development, including the 5-segment Solid Rocket Boosters used on the SLS.[103]
Despite calls from the Trump administration to terminate the SLS program after Artemis III, the 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act included $4.1 billion to fund SLS rockets for the Artemis IV and Artemis V missions, with mandated minimum spending of $1.025 billion per year from FY 2026 through 29.[104] However, as a compromise, lawmakers have suggested eliminating the EUS, and directed NASA to evaluate alternatives such as the Centaur V or the GS2 upper stage used on the New Glenn rocket.[105]
| Fiscal year | Funding for EUS development | |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal (millions) |
Inflation adjusted
(FY25 millions)[81] | |
| 2016 | $85.0[106] | $ 111.1 |
| 2017 | $300.0[107][88] | $ 384.0 |
| 2018 | $300.0[108][89] | $ 374.5 |
| 2019 | $150.0[109][110] | $ 183.7 |
| 2020 | $300.0[91] | $ 359.4 |
| 2021 | $400.0[111][note 1] | $ 461.8 |
| 2022 | $636.7[112] | $ 695.3 |
| 2023 | $648.3[94] | $ 680.2 |
| 2024 | $465.1[95] | $ 475.8 |
| Total | $3,285.1 | $3,725.9 |
Early plans
[edit]The SLS was created by an act of the U.S. Congress in the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, Public Law 111–267, in which NASA was directed to create a system for launching payloads and crew into space that would replace the capabilities lost with the retirement of the Space Shuttle.[113] The act set out certain goals, such as being able to lift 70–100 tons into low earth orbit with evolvability to 130 tons, a target date of 31 December 2016 for the system to be fully operational, and a directive to use "to the extent practicable" existing components, hardware, and workforce from the Space Shuttle and from Ares I.[113]: 12
On 14 September 2011, NASA announced their plan to meet these requirements: the design for the SLS, with the Orion spacecraft as payload.[114][115][116][117]
The SLS has considered several future development routes of potential launch configurations, with the planned evolution of the blocks of the rocket having been modified many times.[103] Many options, all of which just needed to meet the congressionally mandated payload minimums,[103] were considered, including a Block 0 variant with three main engines,[18] a variant with five main engines,[103] a Block 1A variant with upgraded boosters instead of the improved second stage,[18] and a Block 2 with five main engines plus the Earth Departure Stage, with up to three J-2X engines.[21]
In the initial announcement of the design of the SLS, NASA also announced an "Advanced Booster Competition", to select which boosters would be used on Block 2 of the SLS.[114][118][23][119] Several companies proposed boosters for this competition, all of which were indicated as viable:[120] Aerojet and Teledyne Brown proposed three booster engines each with dual combustion chambers,[121] Alliant Techsystems proposed a modified solid rocket booster with lighter casing, more energetic propellant, and four segments instead of five,[122] and Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne and Dynetics proposed a liquid-fueled booster named Pyrios.[123] However, this competition was planned for a development plan in which Block 1A would be followed by Block 2A, with upgraded boosters. NASA canceled Block 1A and the planned competition in April 2014, in favor of simply remaining with the Ares I's five-segment solid rocket boosters, themselves modified from the Space Shuttle's solid rocket boosters, until at least the late 2020s.[103][124] The overly powerful advanced booster would have resulted in unsuitably high acceleration, and would need modifications to Launch Complex 39B, its flame trench, and Mobile Launcher.[125][103]
On 31 July 2013, the SLS passed Preliminary Design Review. The review included not only the rocket and boosters but also ground support and logistical arrangements.[126]
On 7 August 2014, the SLS Block 1 passed a milestone known as Key Decision Point C and entered full-scale development, with an estimated launch date of November 2018.[74][127]
EUS options
[edit]In 2013, NASA and Boeing analyzed the performance of several Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) engine options. The analysis was based on a second-stage usable propellant load of 105 metric tons, and compared stages with four RL10 engines, two MARC-60 engines, or one J-2X engine.[128][129] In 2014, NASA also considered using the European Vinci instead of the RL10, which offered the same specific impulse but with 64% greater thrust, which would allow for the same performance at a lower cost.[130]
In 2018, Blue Origin submitted a proposal to replace the EUS with a cheaper alternative to be designed and fabricated by the company, but it was rejected by NASA in November 2019 on multiple grounds; these included lower performance compared to the existing EUS design, incompatibility of the proposal with the height of the door of the Vehicle Assembly Building being only 390 feet (120 m), and unacceptable acceleration of Orion components such as its solar panels due to the higher thrust of the engines being used for the fuel tank.[131][132]: 7–8
SRB tests
[edit]From 2009 to 2011, three full-duration static fire tests of five-segment solid rocket boosters were conducted under the Constellation Program, including tests at low and high core temperatures, to validate performance at extreme temperatures.[133][134][135] The 5-segment solid rocket booster would be carried over to SLS.[103] Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems has completed full-duration static fire tests of the five-segment solid rocket boosters. Qualification Motor 1 was tested on 10 March 2015.[136] Qualification Motor 2 was successfully tested on 28 June 2016.[137]
Proposed cancellation
[edit]On 7 February 2025, Boeing, the primary contractor for the SLS, informed its employees working on the rocket program that they may face layoffs when the company's contract expires in March. The announcement coincided with the anticipated release of the presidential budget, suggesting the Trump administration might propose canceling the SLS program.[138]
On 2 May 2025, the Trump administration released its fiscal year 2026 budget proposal for NASA, which calls for terminating the SLS and Orion spacecraft programs after Artemis III.[139][140] The budget proposal described the SLS as "grossly expensive", noting that it costs $4 billion per launch and has exceeded its budget by 140 percent. The budget allocates funding for a program to transition to "more cost-effective commercial systems", a move projected to save NASA $879 million.[141]
The 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act included funding for SLS rockets for the Artemis IV and Artemis V missions, but a clause directed NASA to evaluate alternatives to the EUS.[104][105]
Launch costs
[edit]NASA has been reluctant to provide an official per-flight cost estimate for the SLS.[142] However, independent agencies, such as the White House Office of Management and Budget and the NASA Office of Inspector General, have offered their own estimates.
A White House Office of Management and Budget letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee in October 2019 estimated that SLS's total cost to the taxpayer was estimated at "over $2 billion" per launch.[143][note 2] When questioned by a journalist, a NASA spokesperson did not deny this per-flight cost estimate.[144]
The NASA Office of Inspector General has conducted several audits of the SLS program. A November 2021 report estimated that, at least for the first four launches of Artemis program, the per-launch production and operating costs would be $2.2 billion for SLS, plus $568 million for Exploration Ground Systems. Additionally, the payload would cost $1 billion for Orion and $300 million for the European Service Module.[100]: 23 An October 2023 report found that recurring production costs for SLS, excluding development and integration costs, are estimated to be at least $2.5 billion per launch.[145] In 2025, Sean Duffy, then the acting NASA administrator, said that, " Artemis I, Artemis II, and Artemis III are all $4 billion a launch".[105]
NASA has said that it is working with Boeing to bring down the cost of SLS launches and that a higher launch frequency could potentially lead to economies of scale, and would allow fixed costs to be spread out over more launches.[144] However, the NASA Office of Inspector General has called NASA's cost savings goals highly unrealistic and other potential government customers have made it clear they have no interest in using SLS.[145][146]
Operation
[edit]Construction
[edit]


As of 2020[update], three SLS versions are planned: Block 1, Block 1B, and Block 2. Each will use the same Core stage with its four main engines, but Block 1B will feature the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), and Block 2 will combine the EUS with upgraded boosters.[147][62][148]
The ICPS for Artemis 1 was delivered by ULA to NASA about July 2017[149] and was housed at Kennedy Space Center as of November 2018.[150]
Construction of core stage
[edit]In mid-November 2014, construction of the first core stage hardware began using a new friction stir welding system in the South Vertical Assembly Building at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility.[28][26][27] Between 2015 and 2017, NASA test fired RS-25 engines in preparation for use on SLS.[33]
The core stage for the first SLS, built at Michoud Assembly Facility by Boeing,[151] had all four engines attached in November 2019,[152] and it was declared finished by NASA in December 2019.[153]
The first core stage left Michoud Assembly Facility for comprehensive testing at Stennis Space Center in January 2020.[154] The static firing test program at Stennis Space Center, known as the Green Run, operated all the core stage systems simultaneously for the first time.[155][156] Test 7 (of 8), the wet dress rehearsal, was carried out in December 2020 and the fire (test 8) took place on 16 January 2021, but shut down earlier than expected,[157] about 67 seconds in total rather than the desired eight minutes. The reason for the early shutdown was later reported to be because of conservative test commit criteria on the thrust vector control system, specific only for ground testing and not for flight. If this scenario occurred during a flight, the rocket would have continued to fly normally. There was no sign of damage to the core stage or the engines, contrary to initial concerns.[158]
The second fire test was completed on 18 March 2021, with all four engines igniting, throttling down as expected to simulate in-flight conditions, and gimballing profiles. The core stage was shipped to Kennedy Space Center to be mated with the rest of the rocket for Artemis I. It left Stennis on 24 April and arrived at Kennedy on 27 April.[159] It was refurbished there in preparation for stacking.[160] On 12 June 2021, NASA announced the assembly of the first SLS rocket was completed at the Kennedy Space Center. The assembled SLS was used for the uncrewed Artemis I mission in 2022.[161]
The first SLS, for Artemis I, launched an Orion spacecraft into a lunar orbit on a test flight in fall 2022,[162] and NASA and Boeing are constructing the next three rockets for Artemis II, Artemis III, and Artemis IV.[163] Boeing stated in July 2021 that while the COVID-19 pandemic had affected their suppliers and schedules, such as delaying parts needed for hydraulics, they would still be able to provide the Artemis II SLS core stage per NASA's schedule, with months to spare.[163] The spray-on foam insulation process for Artemis II was automated for most sections of the core stage, saving 12 days in the schedule.[164][163] The Artemis II forward skirt, the foremost component of the core stage, was affixed on the liquid oxygen tank in late May 2021.[163] By 25 September 2023 the core stage was functionally complete, as all sections were assembled and the four RS-25 engines had been installed.[165] The complete core stage was set to ship to NASA in late fall 2023,[166][167] eight months later than was predicted originally.[168] The complete core stage was delivered in July 2024.[169] For Artemis III, assembly of elements of the thrust structure began at Michoud Assembly Facility in early 2021.[163] By August 2025, the thrust structure was completed and moved to storage in the Vehicle Assembly Building at Kennedy, to await the rest of the stage's arrival in mid-2026.[170] The liquid hydrogen tank for Artemis III was originally planned to be the Artemis I tank, but it was set aside as the welds were found to be faulty.[171]: 2 Repair techniques were developed, and the tank re-entered production and will be proof tested for strength, for use on Artemis III.[171]: 2
Construction of EUS for Block 1B
[edit]As of July 2021,[update] Boeing is also preparing to begin construction of the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), which is planned to be used on Artemis IV.[163]
Launches
[edit]Originally planned for late 2016, the uncrewed first flight of SLS slipped more than twenty-six times and almost six years.[note 3] As of earlier that month, the first launch was originally scheduled for 8:30 am EDT, 29 August 2022.[210] It was postponed to 2:17 pm EDT (18:17 UTC), 3 September 2022, after the launch director called a scrub due to a temperature sensor falsely indicating that an RS-25 engine's hydrogen bleed intake was too warm.[200][201] The 3 September attempt was then scrubbed due to a hydrogen leak in the tail service mast quick disconnect arm, which was fixed; the next launch option was at first a period in late[206][207] October and then a launch in mid-November, due to unfavorable weather during Hurricane Ian.[205][211][203] It launched on 16 November.[212][213]
NASA originally limited the amount of time the solid rocket boosters can remain stacked to "about a year" from the time two segments are joined.[214] The first and second segments of the Artemis I boosters were joined on 7 January 2021.[215] NASA could choose to extend the time limit based on an engineering review.[216] On 29 September 2021, Northrop Grumman indicated that the limit could be extended to eighteen months for Artemis I, based on an analysis of the data collected when the boosters were being stacked;[161] an analysis weeks before the actual launch date later extended that to December 2022 for the boosters of Artemis I, almost two years after stacking.[217]
In late 2015, the SLS program was stated to have a 70% confidence level for the first Orion flight that carries crew, the second SLS flight overall, to happen by 2023;[218][219][220] as of November 2021[update], NASA delayed Artemis II from 2023[221] to May 2024.[222] In March 2023, NASA announced they had delayed Artemis II to November 2024,[223] in January 2024 the mission was further delayed to September 2025,[224] and in December 2024 it was announced that the launch was pushed back to April 2026.[225]
| Flight No. | Date, time (UTC) | Configuration | Payload | Orbit | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | November 16, 2022, 06:47[226] | Block 1 | Artemis I (Orion and ESM) | TLI | Success |
| Uncrewed maiden flight of the SLS, first operational flight of the Orion capsule. Carrying cubesats for ten missions in the CubeSat Launch Initiative (CSLI), and three missions in the Cube Quest Challenge: ArgoMoon, BioSentinel, CuSP, EQUULEUS, LunaH-Map, Lunar IceCube, LunIR, NEA Scout, OMOTENASHI and Team Miles.[227][228] The payloads were sent on a trans-lunar injection trajectory.[229][230] | |||||
| 2 | NET February 5, 2026 | Block 1 Crew |
|
TLI | Planned |
| Crewed lunar flyby. | |||||
| 3 | Mid-2027[231] | Block 1 Crew |
|
Selenocentric | Planned |
| Crewed lunar rendezvous and landing.[232] | |||||
| 4 | September 2028[233] | Block 1B Crew[234] |
|
Selenocentric (NRHO) | Planned |
| Crewed mission to the Lunar Gateway. Delivery and integration of the International Habitation Module (I-HAB) to the Gateway, following by a crewed lunar landing.[235] | |||||
| 5 | March 2030[236] | Block 1B Crew[234] | Selenocentric (NRHO) | Planned | |
| Crewed mission to the Lunar Gateway, rendezvousing with the first Lunar Exploration Transportation Services (LETS) lander for a lunar landing. Delivery and integration of the ESPRIT module to the Gateway.[237] | |||||
Usage beyond Artemis
[edit]Efforts have been made to expand the Artemis missions to launching NASA's robotic space probes and observatories. However, SLS program officials have noted that between the launch cadence of Artemis missions and supply chain constraints, it is unlikely that rockets could be built to support science missions before the late 2020s or early 2030s.[238]
Another challenge is that the large solid-rocket boosters produce significant vibrations, which can damage sensitive scientific instruments. During wind-tunnel testing, torsional load values (a measurement of twisting and vibration) were nearly double initial estimates.[239] Although program officials later acknowledged the issue, they expressed confidence in their ability to mitigate it.[238]
As of October 2024,[update] NASA has studied using SLS for Neptune Odyssey,[240][241] Europa Lander,[242][243][244] Enceladus Orbilander, Persephone,[245] HabEx,[246] Origins Space Telescope,[247] LUVOIR,[248] Lynx,[249] and Interstellar probe.[250]
Initially, Congress mandated that NASA use the SLS to launch the Europa Clipper probe. However, concerns about the SLS's availability led NASA to seek congressional approval for competitive launch bids. SpaceX ultimately won the contract, saving the agency an estimated US$2 billion in direct launch costs over SLS, albeit at the cost of a longer flight.[239]
After the launch of Artemis IV, NASA plans to transfer production and launch operations of SLS to Deep Space Transport LLC, a joint venture between Boeing and Northrop Grumman.[251] The agency hopes the companies can find more buyers for flights on the rocket to bring costs per flight down to $1 billion.[146] However, finding a market for the large and costly rocket will be difficult. Reuters reported that the US Department of Defense, long considered a potential customer, stated in 2023 that it has no interest in the rocket as other launch vehicles already offer them the capability that they need at an affordable price.[146]
Criticism
[edit]The SLS has been criticized based on program cost, lack of commercial involvement, and non-competitiveness caused by legislation requiring the use of Space Shuttle components "where possible".[252]
Funding
[edit]
As the Space Shuttle program drew to a close in 2009, the Obama administration convened the Augustine Commission to assess NASA's future human spaceflight endeavors. The commission's findings were stark: NASA's proposed Ares V rocket, intended for lunar and Martian missions, was unsustainable and should be canceled. The administration further advocated for a public-private partnership, where private companies would develop and operate spacecraft, and NASA would purchase launch services on a fixed-cost basis.[254]
The recommendations faced fierce opposition from senators representing states with significant aerospace industries. In response, in 2011, Congress mandated the development of the SLS. The program was characterized by a complex web of political compromises, ensuring that various regions and interests benefited, maintaining jobs and contracts for existing space shuttle contractors.[255][256] Utah Senator Orrin Hatch ensured the new rocket used the Shuttle's solid boosters, which were manufactured in his state. Alabama Senator Richard Shelby insisted that the Marshall Space Flight Center design and test the rocket. Florida Senator Bill Nelson brought home billions of dollars to Kennedy Space Center to modernize its launch facilities.[257][258]
Almost immediately, Representative Tom McClintock called on the Government Accountability Office to investigate possible violations of the Competition in Contracting Act, arguing that the requirement that Shuttle components be used on SLS were non-competitive and assured contracts to existing suppliers.[259][260][261]
The Obama administration's 2014 budget called for canceling SLS and turning over space transportation to commercial companies. The White House sent Lori Garver, the NASA deputy administrator, along with astronaut Sally Ride and other experts to defend the proposal, saying the SLS program was too slow and wasteful. However, Senators Shelby and Nelson quickly moved to fight efforts to cut the program and were ultimately victorious.[262][254] After retirement from NASA, Garver would go on to recommend cancellation of the SLS.[263]
During the First Trump administration, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine suggested to a Senate committee that the agency was considering using the Falcon Heavy or Delta IV Heavy rocket to launch Orion instead of SLS. Afterward, the administrator was reportedly called into a meeting with Senator Shelby, who told Bridenstine he should resign for making the suggestion in a public meeting.[254]
In 2023, Cristina Chaplain, former assistant director of the GAO, expressed doubts about reducing the rocket's cost to a competitive threshold, "just given the history and how challenging it is to build."[146]
Management
[edit]In 2019, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted that NASA had assessed the performance of contractor Boeing positively, though the project had experienced cost growth and delay.[264][265] A March 2020 report by Office of Inspector General found NASA moved out $889 million of costs relating to SLS boosters, but did not update the SLS budget to match. This kept the budget overrun to 15% in FY 2019;[253]: 22 an overrun of 30% would have required NASA to request additional funding from the U.S. Congress[253]: 21–23 The Inspector General report found that were it not for this "masking" of cost, the overrun would have been 33% by FY 2019.[253]: iv, 23 The GAO stated "NASA's current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program".[266]: 19–20
Proposed alternatives
[edit]In 2009, the Augustine commission proposed a commercial 165,000 lb (75 t) launcher for lunar exploration.[267] In 2011–2012, the Space Access Society, Space Frontier Foundation, and The Planetary Society called for the cancellation of the project, arguing that the SLS would consume the funds for other projects from the NASA budget.[268][259][269] U.S. Representative Dana Rohrabacher and others[who?] proposed the development of an orbital propellant depot and the acceleration of the Commercial Crew Development program as an alternative to the SLS program.[268][270][271][272][273]
An unpublished NASA study[274][275] and another from the Georgia Institute of Technology found these approaches could have lower costs.[276][277] In 2012, United Launch Alliance also suggested using existing rockets with on-orbit assembly and propellant depots as needed.[278][279] In 2019, a former ULA employee alleged that Boeing viewed orbital refueling technology as a threat to the SLS and blocked investment in the technology.[280] In 2010, SpaceX's CEO Elon Musk claimed that his company could build a launch vehicle in the 310,000–330,000 lb (140–150 t) payload range for $2.5 billion, or $300 million (in 2010 dollars) per launch, not including a potential upper-stage upgrade.[281][282]
Former NASA Administrator Charlie Bolden, expressed that the SLS could be replaced in the future in an interview with Politico in September 2020. Bolden said that the "SLS will go away ... because at some point commercial entities are going to catch up." Bolden further stated, "They are really going to build a heavy-lift launch vehicle sort of like SLS that they will be able to fly for a much cheaper price than NASA can do SLS. That's just the way it works."[283]
See also
[edit]- Austere Human Missions to Mars
- Comparison of orbital launch systems
- Criticism of the Space Shuttle program
- DIRECT, proposals prior to SLS
- Shuttle-Derived Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle, a 2009 concept launch vehicle
- Ares V, a 2000s cargo vehicle design for the Constellation Program
- National Launch System, 1990s
- Saturn rocket family, 1960s
- Starship HLS, lunar variant of super heavy-lift vehicle Starship
- Studied Space Shuttle Variations and Derivatives
Notes
[edit]- ^ The FY2021 spending plan indicates that this is for "Block 1B (non-add) (including EUS)"
- ^ See the budget table for yearly inflation-adjusted figures.
- ^
Then-planned launch date history Date Planned launch date October 2010 31 December 2016[113][172][173][174] September 2011 2017[175][176][174] February 2012–August 2014 17 December 2017[174][177] December 2014 June–July 2018[178] 13 April 2017[inconsistent] November 2018[179] 28 April 2017 2019[180][174] November 2017 June 2020[181] December 2019 November 2020[182][183] 21 February 2020 18 April 2021[183] 28 February 2020 Mid- to late 2021[184] May 2020 22 November 2021[185][186] August 2021 December 2021[187][188] 22 October 2021 12 February 2022[189][190] 17 December 2021 March–April 2022[191] February 2022 May 2022[192] March 2022 June 2022[193] 26 April 2022 23 August 2022[194][195] 20 July 2022 8:33 am ET (12:33 UTC), 29 August 2022[196] 29 August 2022 12:48 pm ET (16:48 UTC), 2 September 2022[197][198][199] 30 August 2022 2:17 pm ET (18:17 UTC), 3 September 2022[200][201] 3 September 2022 19 September–4 October 2022[202] 8 September 2022 23 September–4 October 2022[203] 12 September 2022 27 September–4 October 2022[204] 24 September 2022 Late October 2022[205][206][207] 30 September 2022 12–27 November 2022[208] 13 October 2022 12:07 am ET (5:07 UTC), 14 November 2022[209] 8 November 2022 1:04 am ET (6:04 UTC), 16 November 2022[6]
References
[edit]
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b c d "SLS Lift Capabilities and Configurations" (PDF). NASA. 29 April 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 September 2020. Retrieved 20 January 2021.
- ^ NASA (27 October 2021). "Space Launch System Core Stage". nasa.gov. Archived from the original on 15 June 2020. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
- ^ "SLS October 2015 Fact Sheet" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 September 2014. Retrieved 19 November 2022.
- ^ "2018 draft factsheet of SLS capabilities" (PDF). NASA. 20 August 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 June 2019. Retrieved 24 August 2022.
- ^ "2024 update on SLS status". NASA. Retrieved 16 May 2025.
- ^ a b "NASA Prepares Rocket, Spacecraft Ahead of Tropical Storm Nicole, Re-targets Launch". NASA. 8 November 2022. Archived from the original on 8 November 2022. Retrieved 8 November 2022.
- ^ a b "Space Launch System Solid Rocket Booster". NASA. February 2021. Archived from the original on 3 July 2022. Retrieved 16 August 2022.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Redden, Jeremy J. (27 July 2015). "SLS Booster Development". NASA Technical Reports Server. Archived from the original on 23 August 2021. Retrieved 1 October 2020.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ @NASAGroundSys (2 October 2024). "The results are in… *drumroll* 🥁
Core stage weighs a total of 215,910 pounds! When full of propellant, core stage will weigh over 2 million pounds.
Using the Vehicle Assembly Building high bay crane and a secondary crane, Exploration Ground Systems teams lifted the @NASA_SLS core stage for @NASAArtemis II approximately 6 inches from its current mounts. Teams repeated the lift, weighing the core stage twice to ensure an exact weight reading was achieved" (Tweet). Retrieved 3 October 2024 – via Twitter. - ^ "SLS Core Stage Fact Sheet" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 20 February 2021. Retrieved 4 October 2021.
- ^ "RS-25 Engine". Archived from the original on 12 August 2021. Retrieved 12 June 2021.
- ^ "What is ICPS?". United Launch Alliance. 23 June 2021. Archived from the original on 23 June 2021. Retrieved 4 October 2021.
- ^ "Delta IV Launch Services User's Guide" (PDF). United Launch Alliance. Archived (PDF) from the original on 21 September 2018. Retrieved 13 April 2024.
- ^ a b c "Space Launch System". Spaceflight Insider. 9 September 2018. Archived from the original on 5 October 2021. Retrieved 4 October 2021.
- ^ "RL10 Engine". Archived from the original on 9 July 2021. Retrieved 5 July 2021.
- ^ "1 year down, a galaxy to go". Boeing. Archived from the original on 21 April 2024. Retrieved 13 April 2024.
- ^ "RL10 Engine". Aerojet Rocketdyne. Archived from the original on 7 November 2021. Retrieved 18 November 2021.
- ^ a b c d e Chris Bergin (4 October 2011). "SLS trades lean towards opening with four RS-25s on the core stage". NASASpaceflight.com. Archived from the original on 16 July 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ Chris Bergin (25 April 2011). "SLS planning focuses on dual phase approach opening with SD HLV". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 29 June 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ Bergin, Chris (16 June 2011). "Managers SLS announcement after SD HLV victory". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 29 January 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ a b Bergin, Chris (23 February 2012). "Acronyms to Ascent – SLS managers create development milestone roadmap". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 30 April 2012. Retrieved 9 April 2012.
- ^ Harbaugh, Jennifer (9 December 2019). "NASA, Public Marks Assembly of SLS Stage with Artemis Day". nasa.gov. NASA. Archived from the original on 6 February 2020. Retrieved 10 December 2019.
NASA and the Michoud team will shortly send the first fully assembled, 212-foot-tall core stage [...] 27.6-feet-in-diameter tanks and barrels.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b "space launch system" (PDF). nasa.gov. 2012. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 August 2012.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Stephen Clark (31 March 2011). "NASA to set exploration architecture this summer". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 15 May 2011. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
- ^ Chris Bergin (14 September 2011). "SLS finally announced by NASA – Forward path taking shape". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 2 September 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ a b Payne, Martin (18 February 2013). "SLS takes on new buckling standards, drops Super Light alloy". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 26 June 2023. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
- ^ a b Burkey, Martin (2 June 2016). "A (much) Closer Look at How We Build SLS – Rocketology: NASA's Space Launch System". NASA Blogs. Retrieved 26 June 2023.
- ^ a b "SLS Engine Section Barrel Hot off the Vertical Weld Center at Michoud". NASA. Archived from the original on 19 November 2014. Retrieved 16 November 2014.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b Evans, Ben (2 May 2020). "NASA Orders 18 More RS-25 Engines for SLS Moon Rocket, at $1.79 Billion". AmericaSpace. Archived from the original on 31 August 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (2 January 2015). "NASA ready to power up the RS-25 engines for SLS". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 15 May 2019. Retrieved 10 March 2015.
- ^ Boen, Brooke (2 March 2015). "RS-25: The Clark Kent of Engines for the Space Launch System". NASA. Archived from the original on 24 December 2020. Retrieved 29 March 2021.
- ^ Harbaugh, Jennifer (29 January 2020). "Space Launch System RS-25 Core Stage Engines". NASA. Archived from the original on 18 March 2021. Retrieved 29 August 2021.
- ^ a b Campbell, Lloyd (25 March 2017). "NASA conducts 13th test of Space Launch System RS-25 engine". SpaceflightInsider.com. Archived from the original on 26 April 2019. Retrieved 29 April 2017.
- ^ a b c "NASA Awards Aerojet Rocketdyne $1.79 Billion Contract Modification to Build Additional RS-25 Rocket Engines to Support Artemis Program | Aerojet Rocketdyne". www.rocket.com. Archived from the original on 23 March 2021. Retrieved 29 March 2021.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (31 December 2020). "NASA, Aerojet Rocketdyne plan busy RS-25 test schedule for 2021". NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 9 April 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ Ballard, Richard (2017). "Next-Generation RS-25 Engines for the NASA Space Launch System" (PDF). NASA Marshall Space Flight Center. p. 3. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 October 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ Dean, LaToya (23 June 2025). "NASA Tests New RS-25 Engine". NASA. Retrieved 28 June 2025.
- ^ "Four to Five: Engineer Details Changes Made to SLS Booster". Spaceflight Insider. 10 January 2016. Archived from the original on 25 July 2020. Retrieved 9 June 2020.
- ^ Perry, Beverly (21 April 2016). "We've Got (Rocket) Chemistry, Part 2". Rocketology: NASA’s Space Launch System. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Retrieved 30 September 2022.
- ^ Priskos, Alex (7 May 2012). "Five-segment Solid Rocket Motor Development Status" (PDF). ntrs.nasa.gov. NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 December 2018. Retrieved 11 March 2015.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "Space Launch System: How to launch NASA's new monster rocket". NASASpaceFlight.com. 20 February 2012. Archived from the original on 16 November 2019. Retrieved 9 April 2012.
- ^ a b Bergin, Chris (8 May 2018). "SLS requires Advanced Boosters by flight nine due to lack of Shuttle heritage components". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 1 June 2019. Retrieved 15 November 2019.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (12 July 2021). "NASA, Northrop Grumman designing new BOLE SRB for SLS Block 2 vehicle". NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 13 August 2021. Retrieved 13 August 2021.
- ^ Tobias, Mark E.; Griffin, David R.; McMillin, Joshua E.; Haws, Terry D.; Fuller, Micheal E. (2 March 2019). "Booster Obsolescence and Life Extension (BOLE) for Space Launch System (SLS)" (PDF). NASA Technical Reports Server. NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 November 2019. Retrieved 15 November 2019.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Tobias, Mark E.; Griffin, David R.; McMillin, Joshua E.; Haws, Terry D.; Fuller, Micheal E. (27 April 2020). "Booster Obsolescence and Life Extension (BOLE) for Space Launch System (SLS)" (PDF). NASA Technical Reports Server. NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 January 2021. Retrieved 12 August 2021.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (26 June 2025). "NASA tested a new SLS booster that may never fly, and the end of it blew off". Ars Technica. Retrieved 28 June 2025.
- ^ a b "NASA'S SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM BEGINS MOVING TO THE LAUNCH SITE" (PDF). NASA. 15 April 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 October 2021. Retrieved 12 October 2021.
- ^ Rosenberg, Zach. "Delta second stage chosen as SLS interim" Archived 27 July 2012 at the Wayback Machine. Flight International, 8 May 2012.
- ^ a b Henry, Kim (30 October 2014). "Getting to Know You, Rocket Edition: Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage". nasa.gov. Archived from the original on 6 August 2020. Retrieved 25 July 2020.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b c Harbaugh, Jennifer (9 July 2018). "The Great Escape: SLS Provides Power for Missions to the Moon". NASA. Archived from the original on 11 December 2019. Retrieved 4 September 2018.
- ^ Batcha, Amelia L.; Williams, Jacob; Dawn, Timothy F.; Gutkowski, Jeffrey P.; Widner, Maxon V.; Smallwood, Sarah L.; Killeen, Brian J.; Williams, Elizabeth C.; Harpold, Robert E. (27 July 2020). "Artemis I Trajectory Design and Optimization" (PDF). NASA Technical Reports Server. NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 September 2021. Retrieved 8 September 2021.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "Space Launch System Data Sheet". SpaceLaunchReport.com. 27 May 2014. Archived from the original on 21 October 2014. Retrieved 25 July 2014.
- ^ "Upper Stage RL10s arrive at Stennis for upcoming SLS launches February 2020". NASASpaceFlight.com. 3 February 2020. Archived from the original on 15 February 2020. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
- ^ "Teledyne to Build NASA's $60 Million Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter". Archived from the original on 1 April 2023. Retrieved 1 April 2023.
- ^ "Teledyne Brown Engineering Awarded $85 Million NASA Contract to Provide Key Stage of NASA's Space Launch System Vehicle Returning Astronauts to the Moon". www.teledyne.com. Archived from the original on 1 April 2023. Retrieved 31 May 2023.
- ^ a b "SLS prepares for PDR – Evolution eyes Dual-Use Upper Stage". NASASpaceFlight.com. June 2013. Archived from the original on 14 September 2013. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
- ^ "NASA confirms EUS for SLS Block 1B design and EM-2 flight". NASASpaceFlight.com. 6 June 2014. Archived from the original on 16 July 2014. Retrieved 24 July 2014.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (4 March 2021). "NASA, Boeing looking to begin SLS Exploration Upper Stage manufacturing in 2021". Nasaspaceflight. Archived from the original on 24 June 2021. Retrieved 23 June 2021.
- ^ Gebhardt, Chris (5 March 2022). "With all-composite cryogenic tank, Boeing eyes mass-reducing space, aviation applications". Archived from the original on 7 March 2022. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ Bergin, Chris (28 March 2014). "SLS positioning for ARRM and Europa missions". NASASpaceflight.com. Archived from the original on 3 December 2021. Retrieved 8 November 2014.
- ^ "Space Launch System Lift Capabilities" (PDF). NASA. 29 April 2020. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 September 2021. Retrieved 29 August 2024.
- ^ a b c "Space Launch System" (PDF). NASA Facts. NASA. 11 October 2017. FS-2017-09-92-MSFC. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 December 2018. Retrieved 4 September 2018.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Smith, Marcia (14 September 2011). "New NASA Crew Transportation System to Cost US$18 Billion Through 2017". Space Policy Online. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 15 September 2011.
- ^ Bill Nelson, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Charles F. Bolden (14 September 2011). Future of NASA Space Program. Washington, D.C.: Cspan.org. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 25 March 2015.
- ^ "Independent Cost Assessment of the Space Launch System, Multi-purpose Crew Vehicle and 21st Century Ground Systems Programs: Executive Summary of Final Report" (PDF). Booz Allen Hamilton. 19 August 2011. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2 March 2012. Retrieved 3 March 2012.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Paszior, Andy (7 September 2011). "White House Experiences Sticker Shock Over NASA's Plans". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 9 December 2017. Retrieved 22 February 2015.
- ^ "ESD Integration, Budget Availability Scenarios" (PDF). Space Policy Online. 19 August 2011. Archived (PDF) from the original on 9 December 2011. Retrieved 15 September 2011.
- ^ Smith, Marcia (9 September 2011). "The NASA Numbers Behind That WSJ Article". Space Policy Online. Archived from the original on 4 January 2013. Retrieved 15 September 2011.
- ^ "HEFT Phase I Closeout" (PDF). nasawatch.com. September 2010. p. 69. Archived (PDF) from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 25 March 2012.
- ^ "NASA's huge new rocket may cost US$500 million per launch". NBC News. 12 September 2012. Archived from the original on 12 August 2020. Retrieved 13 November 2019.
- ^ Roop, Lee (29 July 2013). "NASA defends Space Launch System against charge it 'is draining the lifeblood' of space program". al.com. Archived from the original on 18 February 2015. Retrieved 18 February 2015.
- ^ Strickland, John (15 July 2013). "Revisiting SLS/Orion launch costs". The Space Review. Archived from the original on 18 February 2015. Retrieved 18 February 2015.
- ^ "NASA Signs Agreement for a European-Provided Orion Service Module". NASA. 12 April 2015 [2013]. Archived from the original on 18 January 2013.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b Foust, Jeff (27 August 2014). "SLS Debut Likely To Slip to 2018". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
- ^ Davis, Jason. "NASA Budget Lists Timelines, Costs and Risks for First SLS Flight". The Planetary Society. Archived from the original on 12 March 2015. Retrieved 11 March 2015.
- ^ "NASA's Management of the Space Launch System Stages Contract" (PDF). oig.nasa.gov. NASA Office of Inspector General Office of Audits. 10 October 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 October 2018. Retrieved 14 October 2018.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA FY 2019 Budget Estimates" (PDF). nasa.gov. p. BUD-2. Archived (PDF) from the original on 24 December 2018. Retrieved 16 December 2018.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Smith, Rich (26 March 2019). "Is NASA Preparing to Cancel Its Space Launch System?". The Motley Fool. Archived from the original on 23 June 2019. Retrieved 15 May 2019.
- ^ "NASA FY 2019 Budget Overview" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 December 2019. Retrieved 24 June 2019. Quote: "Supports launch of the Power and Propulsion Element on a commercial launch vehicle as the first component of the LOP–Gateway, (page 14)
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA Commits to Future Artemis Missions with More SLS Rocket Engines" (Press release). NASA. 1 May 2020. Archived from the original on 1 May 2020. Retrieved 4 May 2020.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b c “NASA FY22 Inflation Tables – to be utilized in FY23 Archived 31 October 2022 at the Wayback Machine” (Excel). NASA. Retrieved 31 October 2022. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "FY 2013 Complete Budget Estimates" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 September 2021. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ "FY 2014 Complete Budget Estimates" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 September 2021. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ "FY 2013 Operating Plan" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 January 2021. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ "FY 2014 Operating Plan" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 June 2017. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ "FY 2015 Operating Plan Update (Aug. 2015)" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 17 February 2017. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ "FY 2016 Operating Plan (Sept. 4 update)" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 October 2021. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b "FY 2017 Operating Plan" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 October 2021. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ a b "FY 2018 Operating Plan" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 July 2021. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ “FY 2021 President's Budget Request Summary” (PDF). NASA. Retrieved 31 October 2022. Archived (PDF) from the original on 31 October 2022. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b "Updated FY 2020 Spending Plan" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ “FY 2023 President's Budget Request Summary” (PDF). NASA. Retrieved 6 June 2024. Archived Archived 6 June 2024 at the Wayback Machine (PDF) from the original on 6 June 2024. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[1]
- ^ “FY 2024 President's Budget Request Summary” (PDF). NASA. Retrieved 6 June 2024. Archived (PDF) Archived 6 June 2024 at the Wayback Machine from the original on 6 June 2024. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.[2]
- ^ a b "FY 2025 President's Budget Request Summary" (PDF). National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 August 2025. Retrieved 22 August 2025.
- ^ a b "FY 2026 President's Budget Request Summary" (PDF). National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 August 2025. Retrieved 22 August 2025.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (9 January 2024). "NASA delays Artemis 2 and 3 missions". SpaceNews. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
- ^ "Definitive Contract NNM12AA82C". govtribe.com. Archived from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 16 December 2018.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA FY2021 budget estimates" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 July 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA's Ground Systems Development and Operations Program Completes Preliminary Design Review". NASA. 27 March 2014. Archived from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
- ^ a b "NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS" (PDF). Office of Inspector General (United States). NASA. 15 November 2021. p. numbered page 23, PDF page 29. Archived (PDF) from the original on 15 November 2021. Retrieved 15 November 2021.
SLS/Orion Production and Operating Costs Will Average Over $4 Billion Per Launch [...] We project the cost to fly a single SLS/Orion system through at least Artemis IV to be $4.1 billion per launch at a cadence of approximately one mission per year. Building and launching one Orion capsule costs approximately $1 billion, with an additional $300 million for the Service Module supplied by the ESA [...] In addition, we estimate the single-use SLS will cost $2.2 billion to produce, including two rocket stages, two solid rocket boosters, four RS-25 engines, and two stage adapters. Ground systems located at Kennedy where the launches will take place—the Vehicle Assembly Building, Crawler-Transporter, Mobile Launcher 1, Launch Pad, and Launch Control Center—are estimated to cost $568 million per year due to the large support structure that must be maintained. The $4.1 billion total cost represents production of the rocket and the operations needed to launch the SLS/Orion system including materials, labor, facilities, and overhead, but does not include any money spent either on prior development of the system or for next-generation technologies such as the SLS's Exploration Upper Stage, Orion's docking system, or Mobile Launcher 2. [...] The cost per launch was calculated as follows: $1 billion for the Orion based on information provided by ESD officials and NASA OIG analysis; $300 million for the ESA's Service Module based on the value of a barter agreement between ESA and the United States in which ESA provides the service modules in exchange for offsetting its ISS responsibilities; $2.2 billion for the SLS based on program budget submissions and analysis of contracts; and $568 million for EGS costs related to the SLS/Orion launch as provided by ESD officials.
- ^ a b "Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Estimates" (PDF). NASA. p. v. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 August 2016. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "FY 2008 Budget Estimates" (PDF). NASA. p. ESMD-14. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 June 2016. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b c d e f g Bergin, Chris (20 February 2015). "Advanced Boosters progress towards a solid future for SLS". NasaSpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 23 February 2015. Retrieved 25 February 2015.
- ^ a b Mendenhall, Brooks (9 July 2025). ""One Big Beautiful Bill" sets stage for NASA's return to the Moon". Astronomy Magazine. Retrieved 12 September 2025.
- ^ a b c Berger, Eric (8 September 2025). "Congress and Trump may compromise on the SLS rocket by axing its costly upper stage". Ars Technica. Retrieved 12 September 2025.
- ^ “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016’" (PDF). p.63. Archived from the original 31 October 2022. Retrieved 31 October 2022. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA outlines plan for 2024 lunar landing". SpaceNews. 1 May 2019. Archived from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 15 May 2019.
- ^ Berger, Eric (20 May 2019). "NASA's full Artemis plan revealed: 37 launches and a lunar outpost". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 23 May 2019. Retrieved 20 May 2019.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (18 December 2019). "Amid competing priorities, Boeing redesigns NASA SLS Exploration Upper Stage". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 25 July 2020.
- ^ "FY 2019 Spend Plan" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 November 2020. Retrieved 3 October 2021.
- ^ “National Aeronautics and Space Administration FY 2021 Spending Plan” (PDF) June Update. NASA. Retrieved 3 January 2023. Archived from the original 3 January 2023. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ “National Aeronautics and Space Administration FY 2022 Spending Plan" (PDF). NASA. Retrieved 3 January 2023. Archived from the original on 3 January 2023. This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ a b c "Public Law 111–267 111th Congress, 42 USC 18322. SEC. 302 (c) (2) 42 USC 18323. SEC. 303 (a) (2)" (PDF). 11 October 2010. pp. 11–12. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 November 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
42 USC 18322. SEC. 302 SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM AS FOLLOW-ON LAUNCH VEHICLE TO THE SPACE SHUTTLE [...] (c) MINIMUM CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS (1) IN GENERAL – The Space Launch System developed pursuant to subsection (b) shall be designed to have, at a minimum, the following: (A) The initial capability of the core elements, without an upper stage, of lifting payloads weighing between 70 tons and 100 tons into low-Earth orbit in preparation for transit for missions beyond low Earth orbit [...] (2) FLEXIBILITY [...] (Deadline) Developmental work and testing of the core elements and the upper stage should proceed in parallel subject to appro-priations. Priority should be placed on the core elements with the goal for operational capability for the core elements not later than December 31, 2016 [...] 42 USC 18323. SEC. 303 MULTI-PURPOSE CREW VEHICLE (a) INITIATION OF DEVELOPMENT (1) IN GENERAL – The Administrator shall continue the development of a multi-purpose crew vehicle to be available as soon as practicable, and no later than for use with the Space Launch System [...] (2) GOAL FOR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY. It shall be the goal to achieve full operational capability for the transportation vehicle developed pursuant to this subsection by not later than December 31, 2016. For purposes of meeting such goal, the Administrator may undertake a test of the transportation vehicle at the ISS before that date.
- ^ a b "NASA Announces Design For New Deep Space Exploration System". NASA. 14 September 2011. Archived from the original on 21 September 2011. Retrieved 14 September 2011.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA Announces Key Decision For Next Deep Space Transportation System". NASA. 24 May 2011. Archived from the original on 15 September 2016. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "Press Conference on the Future of NASA Space Program". C-Span. 14 September 2011. Archived from the original on 8 February 2012. Retrieved 14 September 2011.
- ^ Chang, Kenneth (14 September 2011). "NASA Unveils New Rocket Design". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 21 February 2017. Retrieved 14 September 2011.
- ^ Cowing, Keith (14 September 2011). "NASA's New Space Launch System Announced – Destination TBD". SpaceRef. Archived from the original on 4 June 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ Morring, Frank (17 June 2011). "NASA Will Compete Space Launch System Boosters". Aviation Week. Archived from the original on 11 October 2011. Retrieved 20 June 2011.
- ^ "SLS Block II drives hydrocarbon engine research". thespacereview.com. 14 January 2013. Archived from the original on 2 September 2013. Retrieved 13 September 2013.
- ^ "NASA's Space Launch System: Partnering For Tomorrow" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 12 March 2013.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "The Dark Knights – ATK's Advanced Boosters for SLS revealed". NASASpaceFlight.com. 14 January 2013. Archived from the original on 12 September 2013. Retrieved 10 September 2013.
- ^ Hutchinson, Lee (15 April 2013). "New F-1B rocket engine upgrades Apollo-era design with 1.8M lbs of thrust". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 2 December 2017. Retrieved 15 April 2013.
- ^ "Second SLS Mission Might Not Carry Crew". SpaceNews. 21 May 2014. Archived from the original on 27 July 2014. Retrieved 25 July 2014.
- ^ "Wind Tunnel testing conducted on SLS configurations, including Block 1B". NASASpaceFlight.com. July 2012. Archived from the original on 24 October 2012. Retrieved 13 November 2012.
- ^ "NASA's Space Launch System Program PDR: Answers to the Acronym". NASA. 1 August 2013. Archived from the original on 4 August 2013. Retrieved 3 August 2013.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA Completes Key Review of World's Most Powerful Rocket in Support". NASA. 15 April 2015. Archived from the original on 27 May 2016. Retrieved 26 October 2015.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Gebhardt, Chris (13 November 2013). "SLS upper stage proposals reveal increasing payload-to-destination options". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 18 November 2013. Retrieved 18 November 2013.
- ^ Todd, David (3 June 2013). "SLS design may ditch J-2X upper stage engine for four RL-10 engines". Seradata. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016.
- ^ Todd, David (7 November 2014). "Next Steps for SLS: Europe's Vinci is a contender for Exploration Upper-Stage Engine". Seradata. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016.
- ^ Berger, Eric (5 November 2019). "NASA rejects Blue Origin's offer of a cheaper upper stage for the SLS rocket". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 19 December 2019. Retrieved 19 December 2019.
- ^ "Redacted_EUS.pdf". sam.gov. 31 October 2019. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 October 2021. Retrieved 6 October 2021.
- ^ "NASA and ATK Successfully Test Ares First Stage Motor". NASA. 10 September 2009. Archived from the original on 24 December 2018. Retrieved 30 January 2012.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA and ATK Successfully Test Five-Segment Solid Rocket Motor". NASA. 31 August 2010. Archived from the original on 19 December 2011. Retrieved 30 January 2012.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA Successfully Tests Five-Segment Solid Rocket Motor". NASA. 31 August 2010. Archived from the original on 24 September 2011. Retrieved 8 September 2011.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Bergin, Chris (10 March 2015). "QM-1 shakes Utah with two minutes of thunder". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 13 March 2015. Retrieved 10 March 2015.
- ^ "Orbital ATK Successfully Tests the World's Largest Solid Rocket Motor". Northrop Grumman. 28 June 2016. Archived from the original on 15 June 2021. Retrieved 11 October 2021.
- ^ Berger, Eric (7 February 2025). "Boeing has informed its employees that NASA may cancel SLS contracts". Ars Technica. Retrieved 7 February 2025.
- ^ Berger, Eric (2 May 2025). "White House budget seeks to end SLS, Orion, and Lunar Gateway programs". Ars Technica. Retrieved 2 May 2025.
- ^ Dooren, Jennifer M.; Stevens, Bethany (2 May 2025). "President Trump's FY26 Budget Revitalizes Human Space Exploration" (Press release). NASA. 25-035. Retrieved 2 May 2025.
- ^ "Fiscal Year 2026 Discretionary Budget Request" (PDF). United States Office of Management and Budget. 2 May 2025. p. 37. Retrieved 2 May 2025.
- ^ Berger, Eric (20 October 2017). "NASA chooses not to tell Congress how much deep space missions cost". arstechnica.com. Archived from the original on 17 December 2018. Retrieved 16 December 2018.
- ^ Vought, Russell T. "Letter to the Chair and Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee with respect to 10 of the FY 2020 annual appropriations bills" (PDF). White House. p. 7. Archived (PDF) from the original on 13 November 2019. Retrieved 13 November 2019.
estimated cost of over US$2 billion per launch for the SLS once development is complete
- ^ a b Berger, Eric (8 November 2019). "NASA does not deny the "over US$2 billion" cost of a single SLS launch". Ars Technica. Condé Nest. Archived from the original on 11 November 2019. Retrieved 13 November 2019.
The White House number appears to include both the "marginal" cost of building a single SLS rocket as well as the "fixed" costs of maintaining a standing army of thousands of employees and hundreds of suppliers across the country. Building a second SLS rocket each year would make the per-unit cost "significantly less"
- ^ a b "NASA’s Transition of the Space Launch System to a Commercial Services Contract Archived 25 July 2024 at the Wayback Machine" oig.nasa.gov. 12 October 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2024.
- ^ a b c d Roulette, Joey (8 June 2023). "Analysis: Boeing, Northrop face obstacles in commercializing flagship US rocket". Reuters. Retrieved 8 June 2023.
- ^ "The NASA Authorization Act of 2010". Featured Legislation. U.S. Senate. 15 July 2010. Archived from the original on 10 April 2011. Retrieved 26 May 2011.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Tate, Karl (16 September 2011). "Space Launch System: NASA's Giant Rocket Explained". Space.com. Archived from the original on 27 January 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ "SLS Upper Stage set to take up residence in the former home of ISS modules July 2017". 11 July 2017. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 15 February 2020.
- ^ Harbaugh, Jennifer (8 November 2018). "Meet the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage for SLS". NASA. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "NASA's Space Launch System Core Stage Passes Major Milestone, Ready to Start Construction". Space Travel. 27 December 2012. Archived from the original on 21 December 2019. Retrieved 27 December 2012.
- ^ "All Four Engines Are Attached to the SLS Core Stage for Artemis I Mission". NASA. 8 November 2019. Archived from the original on 12 November 2019. Retrieved 12 November 2019.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (15 December 2019). "NASA declares first SLS core stage complete". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 11 May 2022. Retrieved 7 October 2021.
- ^ Rincon, Paul (9 January 2020). "Nasa Moon rocket core leaves for testing". BBC News. Archived from the original on 9 January 2020. Retrieved 9 January 2020.
- ^ "Boeing, NASA getting ready for SLS Core Stage Green Run campaign ahead of Stennis arrival". NASASpaceFlight.com. 14 December 2019. Archived from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 9 January 2020.
- ^ "NASA Will Have 8 Minute Hold Down Test in 2020". Next Big Future. Archived from the original on 2 August 2019. Retrieved 2 August 2019.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (16 January 2021). "Green Run hotfire test ends early". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 17 January 2021.
- ^ Rincon, Paul (20 January 2021). "SLS: NASA finds cause of 'megarocket' test shutdown". BBC News. Archived from the original on 20 January 2021. Retrieved 20 January 2021.
- ^ Dunbar, Brian (29 April 2021). "Space Launch System Core Stage Arrives at the Kennedy Space Center". NASA. Archived from the original on 7 May 2021. Retrieved 1 June 2021.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (20 May 2021). "SLS Core Stage thermal protection system refurbishment in work at Kennedy for Artemis 1". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 26 May 2021. Retrieved 26 May 2021.
- ^ a b Sloss, Philip (29 September 2021). "EGS, Jacobs completing first round of Artemis 1 pre-launch integrated tests prior to Orion stacking". NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 29 September 2021. Retrieved 29 September 2021.
- ^ "Former NASA Official: Moon launch this month may be "embarrassing"". The Byte. 25 August 2022. Archived from the original on 16 September 2022. Retrieved 15 September 2022.
- ^ a b c d e f Sloss, Philip (19 July 2021). "Boeing working on multiple Cores, first EUS hardware for Artemis missions 2–4". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 12 August 2021. Retrieved 11 October 2021.
- ^ "Shields up! Spray foam evolving to protect NASA SLS". Boeing. 14 July 2021. Archived from the original on 15 August 2021. Retrieved 11 October 2021.
- ^ Mohon, Lee (25 September 2023). "All Engines Added to NASA's Artemis II Moon Rocket Core Stage – Artemis". NASA Blogs. Archived from the original on 25 September 2023. Retrieved 25 September 2023.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (29 September 2023). "Rocket Report: Iran launches satellite; Artemis II boosters get train ride". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 29 September 2023. Retrieved 2 October 2023.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (2 May 2023). "Artemis II Moon mission transitioning from planning to preparation". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 2 May 2023. Retrieved 6 June 2023.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (25 July 2022). "Boeing aiming to deliver second SLS Core Stage to NASA in March". NASASpaceFlight.com. Archived from the original on 31 August 2022. Retrieved 30 July 2022.
- ^ "Boeing delivers second stage of SLS rocket to NASA - AGN Boeing delivers second stage of SLS rocket to NASA". 17 July 2024.
- ^ NASA Communications team (18 August 2025). "NASA Begins Processing Artemis III Moon Rocket at Kennedy". NASA. Retrieved 18 August 2025.
- ^ a b "SLS Monthly Highlights February 2020" (PDF). NASA. February 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 October 2021. Retrieved 11 October 2021.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ "S.3729 – National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010". United States Congress. 11 October 2010. Archived from the original on 28 April 2021. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Davis, Jason (3 October 2016). "To Mars, with a monster rocket: How politicians and engineers created NASA's Space Launch System". The Planetary Society. Archived from the original on 25 September 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
- ^ a b c d Davis, Jason (17 May 2017). "The anatomy of a delay: Here's a timeline of twists and turns for NASA's SLS and Orion programs". The Planetary Society. Archived from the original on 7 August 2020. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ Harwood, William (14 September 2011). "NASA unveils new super rocket for manned flights beyond Earth orbit". CBS News. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
- ^ "NASA's Giant Rocket for Deep-Space Travel Passes Key Review". Space.com. 26 July 2012. Archived from the original on 13 May 2021. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ Bergin, Chris (29 February 2012). "Exploration Mission 1: SLS and Orion mission to the Moon outlined". NASASpaceFlight.com. NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 24 August 2022. Retrieved 2 September 2022.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (10 December 2014). "NASA Says SLS and Orion Will Slip to 2018 Despite Extra Funding". SpaceNews.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (13 April 2017). "NASA inspector general foresees additional SLS/Orion delays". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (28 April 2017). "NASA confirms first flight of Space Launch System will slip to 2019". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 26 December 2017. Retrieved 29 April 2017.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (20 November 2017). "NASA expects first Space Launch System flight to slip into 2020". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 9 August 2018. Retrieved 24 May 2018.
- ^ Patel, Neel (31 December 2019). "The seven most exciting space missions of 2020". MIT Technology Review. Archived from the original on 8 August 2020. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ a b Gebhardt, Chris (21 February 2020). "SLS debut slips to April 2021, KSC teams working through launch sims". NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 6 August 2020. Retrieved 21 February 2020.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (2 March 2020). "First SLS launch now expected in second half of 2021". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 9 September 2023. Retrieved 19 March 2022.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (1 May 2020). "Hopeful for launch next year, NASA aims to resume SLS operations within weeks". Archived from the original on 13 September 2020. Retrieved 3 May 2020.
- ^ "SMSR Integrated Master Schedule" (PDF). Office of Safety and Mission Assurance. NASA. 7 June 2021. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 June 2021. Retrieved 9 June 2021.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (31 August 2021). "NASA's hopes waning for SLS test flight this year". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 1 September 2021. Retrieved 1 September 2021.
- ^ Berger, Eric (31 August 2021). "NASA's big rocket misses another deadline, now won't fly until 2022". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 1 September 2021. Retrieved 1 September 2021.
- ^ Clark, Steven (22 October 2021). "NASA targets February launch for Artemis 1 moon mission". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 13 January 2022. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (21 October 2021). "Artemis 1 Orion joins SLS to complete vehicle stack". NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 30 December 2021. Retrieved 22 October 2021.
- ^ "Artemis I Integrated Testing Update". NASA. 17 December 2021. Archived from the original on 11 December 2022. Retrieved 18 December 2021.
- ^ Wall, Mike (24 February 2022). "NASA's Artemis 1 moon mission, 1st flight of new megarocket, won't launch until May". Space.com. Archived from the original on 18 March 2022. Retrieved 25 February 2022.
- ^ Barker, Nathan; Gebhardt, Chris (17 March 2022). "NASA moon rocket SLS rolls out to "rebuilt" LC-39B ahead of Artemis 1 rehearsal". NASASpaceFlight. Archived from the original on 17 March 2022. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (26 April 2022). "NASA's moon rocket rolls back to Vehicle Assembly Building for repairs". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 26 April 2022. Retrieved 26 April 2022.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (22 June 2022). "NASA not planning another Artemis 1 countdown dress rehearsal". Spaceflightnow. Archived from the original on 23 June 2022. Retrieved 24 June 2022.
- ^ "The SLS rocket finally has a believable launch date, and it's soon". Ars Technica. 20 July 2022. Archived from the original on 20 July 2022. Retrieved 20 July 2022.
- ^ Anthony Cuthbertson; Vishwam Sankaran; Johanna Chisholm; Jon Kelvey (29 August 2022). "Nasa scrambles to fix Moon rocket issues ahead of Artemis launch – live". The Independent. Archived from the original on 29 August 2022. Retrieved 29 August 2022.
- ^ Ashley Strickland (29 August 2022). "Today's Artemis I launch has been scrubbed after engine issue". CNN. Archived from the original on 29 August 2022. Retrieved 29 August 2022.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (29 August 2022). "First Artemis 1 launch attempt scrubbed". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 29 August 2022. Retrieved 29 August 2022.
- ^ a b Foust, Jeff (30 August 2022). "Next Artemis 1 launch attempt set for Sept. 3". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 3 September 2022. Retrieved 31 August 2022.
- ^ a b Strickland, Ashley (1 September 2022). "Artemis I launch team is ready for another 'try' on Saturday". CNN. Warner Bros Discovery. Archived from the original on 3 September 2022. Retrieved 2 September 2022.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (3 September 2022). "Second Artemis 1 launch attempt scrubbed". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 17 November 2022. Retrieved 4 September 2022.
- ^ a b Gebhardt, Chris (8 September 2022). "NASA discusses path to SLS repairs as launch uncertainty looms for September, October". NASASpaceflight. Archived from the original on 8 September 2022. Retrieved 8 September 2022.
- ^ Kraft, Rachel (12 September 2022). "NASA Adjusts Dates for Artemis I Cryogenic Demonstration Test and Launch; Progress at Pad Continues". NASA. Archived from the original on 12 September 2022. Retrieved 16 September 2022.
- ^ a b Kraft, Rachel (24 September 2022). "Artemis I Managers Wave Off Sept. 27 Launch, Preparing for Rollback – Artemis". NASA Blogs. Archived from the original on 24 September 2022. Retrieved 24 September 2022.
- ^ a b "NASA to Roll Artemis I Rocket and Spacecraft Back to VAB Tonight – Artemis". blogs.nasa.gov. 26 September 2022. Archived from the original on 26 September 2022. Retrieved 26 September 2022.
- ^ a b Foust, Jeff (26 September 2022). "SLS to roll back to VAB as hurricane approaches Florida". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 16 January 2023. Retrieved 27 September 2022.
- ^ "Teams Confirm No Damage to Flight Hardware, Focus on November for Launch". NASA. 30 September 2022. Archived from the original on 6 October 2022. Retrieved 30 September 2022.
- ^ "NASA Sets Date for Next Launch Attempt for Artemis I Moon Mission". NASA. 12 October 2022. Archived from the original on 12 October 2022. Retrieved 13 October 2022.
- ^ "Weather remains 70% Favorable, Teams on Track to Begin Countdown Saturday – Artemis". 26 August 2022. Archived from the original on 27 August 2022. Retrieved 27 August 2022.
- ^ Kraft, Rachel (3 September 2022). "Artemis I Launch Attempt Scrubbed". NASA Blogs. Archived from the original on 28 December 2022. Retrieved 3 September 2022.
- ^ "SLS Artemis I Mission". RocketLaunch.org. 16 November 2022. Archived from the original on 1 September 2024. Retrieved 27 March 2024.
- ^ Roulette, Joey; Gorman, Steve (16 November 2022). "NASA's next-generation Artemis mission heads to moon on debut test flight". Reuters. Archived from the original on 16 November 2022. Retrieved 16 November 2022.
- ^ Sloss, Philip (4 December 2020). "New Artemis 1 schedule uncertainty as NASA EGS ready to continue SLS Booster stacking". nasaspaceflight. Archived from the original on 28 September 2021. Retrieved 28 September 2021.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (9 March 2021). "Stacking complete for SLS boosters". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 3 June 2021. Retrieved 28 September 2021.
- ^ Stephen, Clark (15 January 2021). "NASA proceeds with SLS booster stacking in Florida before core stage arrives". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 7 March 2021. Retrieved 28 September 2021.
- ^ "SLS returns to the pad for next Artemis launch attempt". 4 November 2022. Retrieved 16 November 2022.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (16 September 2015). "First Crewed Orion Mission May Slip to 2023". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 30 September 2021. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (16 September 2015). "Orion spacecraft may not fly with astronauts until 2023". Spaceflight Now. Archived from the original on 1 July 2016. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
- ^ Clark, Smith (1 May 2014). "Mikulski "Deeply Troubled" by NASA's Budget Request; SLS Won't Use 70 Percent JCL". spacepolicyonline.com. Archived from the original on 5 August 2016. Retrieved 23 June 2016.
- ^ "Report No. IG-20-018: NASA's Management of the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program" (PDF). Office of Inspector General (United States). NASA. 16 July 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 19 July 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2020.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (9 November 2021). "NASA delays human lunar landing to at least 2025". SpaceNews. Archived from the original on 1 September 2022. Retrieved 9 November 2021.
- ^ "NASA's Artemis 2 mission around Moon set for November 2024". Phys.org. 7 March 2023. Archived from the original on 7 March 2023. Retrieved 10 March 2023.
- ^ Tingley, Brett (9 January 2024). "Astronauts won't walk on the moon until 2026 after NASA delays next 2 Artemis missions". Space.com. Archived from the original on 11 January 2024. Retrieved 9 January 2024.
- ^ Donaldson, Abbey A. (5 December 2024). "NASA Shares Orion Heat Shield Findings, Updates Artemis Moon Missions". NASA. Retrieved 5 December 2024.
- ^ Roulette, Joey; Gorman, Steve (16 November 2022). "NASA's next-generation Artemis mission heads to moon on debut test flight". Reuters. Retrieved 16 November 2022.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (21 May 2019). "In 2020, NASA Will Send Living Things to Deep Space for First Time Since Apollo". Space.com. Archived from the original on 6 August 2019. Retrieved 6 August 2019.
BioSentinel is one of 13 cubesats flying aboard the Artemis I mission, which is currently targeted for mid-2020. [...] The other 12 cubesats flying aboard Artemis I are a diverse lot. For example, the Lunar Flashlight and Lunar IceCube missions will hunt for signs of water ice on the moon, and Near-Earth Asteroid Scout will use a solar sail to rendezvous with a space rock.
- ^ Northon, Karen (9 June 2017). "Three DIY CubeSats Score Rides on Exploration Mission-1". National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Archived from the original on 6 August 2019. Retrieved 6 August 2019.
NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) has awarded rides for three small spacecraft on the agency's newest rocket, and $20,000 each in prize money, to the winning teams of citizen solvers competing in the semi-final round of the agency's Cube Quest Challenge.
- ^ Crane, Aimee (11 June 2019). "Artemis 1 Flight Control Team Simulates Mission Scenarios". National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Archived from the original on 6 August 2019. Retrieved 6 August 2019.
...after the Space Launch System performs the Trans-Lunar Injection burn that sends the spacecraft out of Earth orbit and toward the Moon.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (22 July 2019). "First moon-bound Orion crew capsule declared complete, major tests remain". SpaceflightNow. Archived from the original on 6 August 2019. Retrieved 6 August 2019.
The Artemis 1 mission profile. Credit: NASA [...] The Artemis 1 mission sent the Orion spacecraft into a distant retrograde lunar orbit and back...
- ^ Donaldson, Abbey A. (5 December 2024). "NASA Shares Orion Heat Shield Findings, Updates Artemis Moon Missions". NASA. Retrieved 5 December 2024.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (9 November 2021). "NASA delays human lunar landing to at least 2025". SpaceNews. Retrieved 9 November 2021.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (13 March 2023). "NASA planning to spend up to $1 billion on space station deorbit module". SpaceNews. Retrieved 13 March 2023.
- ^ a b Lueders, Kathryn; Free, Jim (18 January 2022). NASA Advisory Council HEO Committee Public Meeting (PDF). NAC/HEO CMTE 2022. NASA. p. 16. Retrieved 20 January 2022.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (30 October 2022). "Lunar landing restored for Artemis 4 mission". SpaceNews. Retrieved 31 October 2022.
- ^ https://www.nasa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/nasa-fiscal-year-2025-budget-summary.pdf
- ^ Foust, Jeff (20 January 2022). "NASA foresees gap in lunar landings after Artemis 3". SpaceNews. Retrieved 20 January 2022.
- ^ a b Foust, Jeff (8 July 2021). "Supply chain, Artemis program limit SLS use for science missions". SpaceNews. Retrieved 27 November 2024.
- ^ a b Berger, Eric (23 July 2021). "SpaceX to launch the Europa Clipper mission for a bargain price". Ars Technica. Retrieved 28 November 2021.
- ^ Carter, Jamie (27 September 2021). "The $3.4 Billion Plan For NASA To Explore 'Pluto's Twin' And The Rings Of Neptune Then Execute A 'Death Dive'". Forbes. Archived from the original on 5 October 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ Rymer, Abigail M.; et al. (8 September 2021). "Neptune Odyssey: A Flagship Concept for the Exploration of the Neptune–Triton System". The Planetary Science Journal. 2 (5): 184. Bibcode:2021PSJ.....2..184R. doi:10.3847/PSJ/abf654. S2CID 237449259.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (31 March 2017). "Europa lander work continues despite budget uncertainty". SpaceNews. Retrieved 31 March 2017.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (17 February 2019). "Final fiscal year 2019 budget bill secures US$21.5 billion for NASA". SpaceNews.
- ^ Europa Lander Mission Concept Overview Archived 31 January 2021 at the Wayback Machine Grace Tan-Wang, Steve Sell, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, NASA, AbSciCon2019, Bellevue, Washington. 26 June 2019
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Clark, Stephen (14 July 2020). "Five years after New Horizons flyby, scientists assess next mission to Pluto". Spaceflightnow. Archived from the original on 6 October 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ "Habitable Exoplanet Observatory Final Report" (PDF). Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 25 August 2019. Archived (PDF) from the original on 11 December 2019. Retrieved 11 May 2020. Section 9-11 9.4.1 Basis of estimate, p. 281.
- ^ "Origins Space Telescope Mission Concept Study Report" (PDF). 11 October 2019. p. ES-11. Archived (PDF) from the original on 12 July 2020. Retrieved 14 May 2020.
The launch cost (US$500 million for the SLS launch vehicle, as advised by NASA Headquarters) is also included.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Siegel, Ethan (19 September 2017). "New Space Telescope, 40 Times The Power Of Hubble, To Unlock Astronomy's Future". Forbes. Archived from the original on 5 July 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ "Lynx X-Ray Observatory" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 April 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ Billings, Lee (12 November 2019). "Proposed Interstellar Mission Reaches for the Stars, One Generation at a Time". Scientific American. Archived from the original on 25 July 2021. Retrieved 13 October 2021.
- ^ Potter, Sean Sean (27 July 2022). "NASA Prepares for Space Launch System Rocket Services Contract". NASA. Archived from the original on 10 August 2022. Retrieved 10 August 2022.
- ^ Davenport, Christian (16 November 2022). "Relief and pride as NASA's huge SLS rocket finally flies". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 29 July 2023.
- ^ a b c d "NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF SPACE LAUNCH SYSTEM PROGRAM COSTS AND CONTRACTS" (PDF). NASA – Office of Inspector General – Office of Audits. 10 March 2020. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 August 2020. Retrieved 14 September 2020.
Based on our review of SLS Program cost reporting, we found that the Program exceeded its Agency Baseline Commitment (ABC) by at least 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, a figure that could reach 43 percent or higher if additional delays push the launch date for Artemis I beyond November 2020. This is due to cost increases tied to Artemis I and a December 2017 replan that removed almost $1 billion of costs from the ABC without lowering the baseline, thereby masking the impact of Artemis I's projected 19-month schedule delay from November 2018 to a June 2020 launch date. Since the replan, the SLS Program now projects the Artemis I launch will be delayed to at least spring 2021 or later. Further, we found NASA's ABC cost reporting only tracks Artemis I-related activities and not additional expenditures of almost $6 billion through FY 2020 that are not being reported or tracked through the official congressional cost commitment or the ABC. [...] as a result of delaying Artemis I up to 19 months to June 2020, NASA conducted a replan of the SLS Program in 2017 and removed $889 million in Booster and RS-25 Engine-related development costs because SLS Program officials determined those activities were not directly tied to Artemis I. [...] In our judgement, the removal of these costs should have reduced the SLS Program's ABC development costs from $7.02 billion to $6.13 billion. [...] SLS Program and HEOMD officials disagreed with our assessment and stated the SLS Program's change in cost estimates for the Booster and Engines element offices were not a removal of costs but rather a reallocation of those activities to appropriately account for them as non-Artemis I costs. [...] Federal law requires that any time Agency program managers have reasonable knowledge that development costs are likely to exceed the ABC by more than 30 percent, they must notify the NASA Administrator. Once the Administrator determines the SLS Program will exceed the development cost baseline by 30 percent or more, NASA is required to notify Congress and rebaseline program costs and schedule commitments. If the Administrator notifies Congress of the need to rebaseline, NASA is required to stop funding program activities within 18 months unless Congress provides approval and additional appropriations. In our judgement, using NASA's cost estimates from October 2019 and accounting for the removed costs from the replan, the SLS Program was required to rebaseline when the program exceeded its ABC by 33 percent at the end of FY 2019, an increase that could reach 43 percent or higher by the Artemis I launch date.
- ^ a b c Berger, Eric (9 February 2021). "So long Senator Shelby: Key architect of SLS rocket won't seek reelection". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 28 August 2024. Retrieved 28 August 2024.
- ^ Brown, David W. (17 March 2021). "NASA's Last Rocket". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Archived from the original on 18 December 2023. Retrieved 29 August 2024.
- ^ Davenport, Christian (16 November 2022). "Relief and pride as NASA's huge SLS rocket finally flies". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Archived from the original on 7 February 2023. Retrieved 29 August 2024.
- ^ Berger, Eric (9 September 2016). "How I learned to stop worrying and love the big $60B NASA rocket". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 26 July 2024. Retrieved 28 August 2024.
- ^ Berger, Eric (10 July 2024). "Congress apparently feels a need for "reaffirmation" of SLS rocket". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 27 August 2024. Retrieved 28 August 2024.
- ^ a b Ferris Valyn (15 September 2011). "Monster Rocket Will Eat America's Space Program". Space Frontier Foundation. Archived from the original on 6 October 2011. Retrieved 16 September 2011.
- ^ "Congressman, Space Frontier Foundation, And Tea Party In Space Call For NASA SLS Investigation". moonandback.com. 4 October 2011. Archived from the original on 3 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
- ^ "The Senate Launch System". Competitive Space Task Force. 4 October 2011. Archived from the original on 27 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
- ^ "Garver: NASA Should Cancel SLS and Mars 2020 Rover". Space News. January 2014. Archived from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 25 August 2015.
- ^ Foust, Jeff (3 January 2014). "Garver: NASA Should Cancel SLS and Mars 2020 Rover". SpaceNews.
- ^ "New Report Finds Nasa Awarded Boeing Large Fees Despite SLS Launch Slips". ArsTechnica. 19 June 2019. Archived from the original on 14 August 2019. Retrieved 1 August 2019.
- ^ "Space News: Contractors continue to win award fees despite SLS and Orion delays". Space News. 19 June 2019. Archived from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 1 August 2019.
- ^ "NASA HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION: Persistent Delays and Cost Growth Reinforce Concerns over Management of Programs" (PDF). GAO. Archived (PDF) from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 15 September 2020.
NASA's current approach for reporting cost growth misrepresents the cost performance of the program and thus undermines the usefulness of a baseline as an oversight tool. NASA's space flight program and project management requirements state that the agency baseline commitment for a program is the basis for the agency's commitment to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congress based on program requirements, cost, schedule, technical content, and an agreed-to joint cost and schedule confidence level. Removing effort that amounts to more than a tenth of a program's development cost baseline is a change in the commitment to OMB and the Congress and results in a baseline that does not reflect actual effort. [...] Further, the baseline is a key tool against which to measure the cost and schedule performance of a program. A program must be rebaselined and reauthorized by the Congress if the Administrator determines that development costs will increase by more than 30 percent. Accounting for shifted costs, our analysis indicates that NASA has reached 29.0 percent development cost growth for the SLS program. [...] In addition, as we previously reported in May 2014, NASA does not have a cost and schedule baseline for SLS beyond the first flight. As a result, NASA cannot monitor or track costs shifted beyond EM-1 against a baseline. We recommended that NASA establish cost and schedule baselines that address the life cycle of each SLS increment, as well as for any evolved Orion or ground systems capability. NASA partially concurred with the recommendation, but has not taken any action to date. [...] By not adjusting the SLS baseline to account for the reduced scope, NASA will continue to report costs against an inflated baseline, hence underreporting the extent of cost growth. NASA's Associate Administrator and Chief Financial Officer stated that they understood our rationale for removing these costs from the EM-1 baseline and agreed that not doing so could result in underreporting of cost growth. Further, the Associate Administrator told us that the agency will be relooking at the SLS program's schedule, baseline, and calculation of cost growth.
- ^ Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee; Augustine, Austin; Chyba, Kennel; Bejmuk, Crawley; Lyles, Chiao; Greason, Ride (October 2009). "Seeking A Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of A Great Nation" (PDF). NASA. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 February 2019. Retrieved 15 April 2010.
- ^ a b Henry Vanderbilt (15 September 2011). "Impossibly High NASA Development Costs Are Heart of the Matter". moonandback.com. Archived from the original on 31 March 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ "Statement before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology US House of Representatives Hearing: A Review of the NASA's Space Launch System" (PDF). The Planetary Society. 12 July 2011. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 March 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2012.
- ^ Rohrabacher, Dana (14 September 2011). "Nothing New or Innovative, Including It's [sic] Astronomical Price Tag". Archived from the original on 24 September 2011. Retrieved 14 September 2011.
This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
- ^ Messier, Doug (24 August 2011). "Rohrabacher calls for "emergency" funding for CCDev". Parabolic Arc. parabolicarc.com. Archived from the original on 26 November 2014. Retrieved 15 September 2011.
- ^ Jeff Foust (15 September 2011). "A monster rocket, or just a monster?". The Space Review. Archived from the original on 17 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
- ^ Jeff Foust (1 November 2011). "Can NASA develop a heavy-lift rocket?". The Space Review. Archived from the original on 15 October 2011. Retrieved 20 October 2011.
- ^ Mohney, Doug (21 October 2011). "Did NASA Hide In-space Fuel Depots To Get a Heavy Lift Rocket?". Satellite Spotlight. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016. Retrieved 10 November 2011.
- ^ "Propellant Depot Requirements Study" (PDF). HAT Technical Interchange Meeting. 21 July 2011. Archived (PDF) from the original on 1 October 2021. Retrieved 25 May 2012.
- ^ Cowing, Keith (12 October 2011). "Internal NASA Studies Show Cheaper and Faster Alternatives to the Space Launch System". SpaceRef. Archived from the original on 3 October 2021. Retrieved 10 November 2011.
- ^ "Near Term Space Exploration with Commercial Launch Vehicles Plus Propellant Depot" (PDF). Georgia Institute of Technology / National Institute of Aerospace. 2 September 2010. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 February 2016. Retrieved 7 March 2012.
- ^ "Affordable Exploration Architecture" (PDF). United Launch Alliance. 2009. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 October 2012.
- ^ Grant Bonin (6 June 2011). "Human spaceflight for less: the case for smaller launch vehicles, revisited". The Space Review. Archived from the original on 23 November 2012. Retrieved 20 September 2011.
- ^ Berger, Eric (1 August 2019). "The SLS rocket may have curbed development of on-orbit refueling for a decade". Ars Technica. Archived from the original on 5 August 2019. Retrieved 5 August 2019.
- ^ Strickland, John K. Jr. "The SpaceX Falcon Heavy Booster: Why Is It Important?". National Space Society. Archived from the original on 8 July 2015. Retrieved 4 January 2012.
- ^ "NASA Studies Scaled-Up Falcon, Merlin". Aviation Week. 2 December 2010. Archived from the original on 27 July 2012.
- ^ "Bolden talks expectations for Biden's space policy". Politico. 2020. Archived from the original on 11 September 2020. Retrieved 11 September 2020.
External links
[edit]- Space Launch System and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle page on NASA.gov Archived 27 April 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- "Preliminary Report on Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle and Space Launch System" (PDF), NASA
- SLS Future Frontiers video
- Video animations of mission to asteroid, the Moon, and Mars, beyondearth.com
- "NASA Continues Journey to Mars Planning", spacepolicyonline.com
Space Launch System
View on GrokipediaOverview and Purpose
Design Objectives and Capabilities
The Space Launch System (SLS) was developed to provide NASA with a heavy-lift launch capability exceeding that of prior U.S. rockets, enabling crewed missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond as part of the Artemis program and future deep space exploration. Primary design objectives emphasize safety through human-rating standards, affordability via reuse of Space Shuttle-derived components such as RS-25 engines and solid rocket boosters, and sustainability through modular evolvability to accommodate evolving mission requirements.[13] [14] The architecture prioritizes high thrust at liftoff—8.8 million pounds in Block 1—to escape Earth's gravity efficiently, while maximizing payload volume and departure energy to reduce overall mission complexity and risk compared to multi-launch architectures.[5] [15] SLS Block 1, the initial configuration, delivers 95 metric tons (209,000 pounds) to low Earth orbit (LEO) at 200 km altitude and 28.5° inclination, and 27 metric tons (59,500 pounds) to trans-lunar injection (TLI), sufficient for launching the Orion spacecraft with crew and service module for lunar missions.[13] [16] This variant employs a core stage with four RS-25 liquid hydrogen/oxygen engines, twin five-segment solid rocket boosters, and an Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage upper stage, achieving a height of 98 meters (322 feet) and supporting payloads up to 8 meters in diameter.[17] The Block 1B upgrade replaces the interim upper stage with the more powerful Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), boosting LEO capacity to 105 metric tons and TLI payload to 38-40 metric tons when configured for cargo, allowing co-manifested delivery of Orion and large elements like habitats or landers.[13] [3] Block 2 further evolves the system with advanced solid rocket boosters, increasing TLI capability beyond 46 metric tons and enabling sustained Mars exploration architectures.[16] These progressive capabilities ensure SLS can handle diverse payloads, from uncrewed science missions to crewed deep space voyages, while maintaining compatibility with the Orion spacecraft for human-rating.[18]Comparison to Predecessor Systems
The Space Launch System (SLS) draws extensively from Space Shuttle hardware, incorporating four RS-25 liquid hydrogen/oxygen engines repurposed from the Shuttle's three-engine main propulsion system, along with five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs) that extend the Shuttle's four-segment design by adding a fifth propellant segment for increased thrust. The SLS core stage tankage structure is adapted from the Shuttle's external tank, the largest single component ever built for spaceflight, enabling rapid development by leveraging proven manufacturing processes at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility. This heritage allowed SLS to achieve initial operational capability faster than designing from scratch, though it inherits some inefficiencies like the non-reusability of Shuttle-era components optimized for partial recovery.[5][19][20] Compared to the Space Shuttle, which delivered approximately 24 metric tons to low Earth orbit (LEO) in its payload bay excluding the orbiter itself, SLS Block 1 vastly exceeds this with a capacity of 95 metric tons to LEO in cargo configuration. The Shuttle's integrated orbiter design limited payload volume and mass due to reusability constraints, human-rated safety margins, and the need to return the vehicle intact, whereas SLS is expendable, focusing on maximum lift for deep-space missions like Artemis. SLS liftoff thrust reaches 8.8 million pounds-force (lbf), surpassing the Shuttle's approximately 7.8 million lbf, primarily from the enhanced SRBs.[16][21] Relative to the Saturn V, the Apollo-era heavy-lift vehicle that achieved 140 metric tons to LEO, SLS Block 1 offers lower LEO capacity despite generating 15% more liftoff thrust (8.8 million lbf versus Saturn V's 7.6 million lbf). Saturn V's superior efficiency stemmed from its larger upper stages and optimized staging for translunar injection, whereas SLS prioritizes payload fairing volume (over 5,000 cubic meters in Block 1) and versatility for crewed or cargo variants over raw LEO mass. SLS stands shorter at 98 meters tall compared to Saturn V's 110 meters, reflecting modern design emphases on structural margins and integration with the Orion spacecraft rather than solely maximizing expendable performance.[13][22]| Parameter | SLS Block 1 | Space Shuttle (STS) | Saturn V |
|---|---|---|---|
| Height (m) | 98 | 56 (stack) | 110 |
| Liftoff Thrust (million lbf) | 8.8 | ~7.8 | 7.6 |
| Payload to LEO (metric tons) | 95 | 24 | 140 |
| Reusability | Expendable | Partial (orbiter, SRBs) | Expendable |
| Primary Engines | 4 RS-25 (core) | 3 SSME (orbiter) | 5 F-1 (S-IC) |
Historical Development
Origins in Post-Shuttle Era
Following the final Space Shuttle mission, STS-135, which launched on July 8, 2011, and landed on July 21, 2011, NASA faced a significant gap in its heavy-lift launch capabilities for human spaceflight beyond low Earth orbit.[25] The Shuttle program's retirement, driven by high operational costs exceeding $1.5 billion per launch in its later years, safety concerns after incidents like the Challenger and Columbia disasters, and the need for more sustainable architectures, left the agency without a domestic means to send large payloads or crews to destinations like the Moon or Mars.[26] This post-Shuttle era necessitated a successor system to fulfill NASA's exploration mandates under the Vision for Space Exploration, originally outlined in 2004 but requiring adaptation after program shifts.[27] The origins of the Space Launch System (SLS) trace directly to the cancellation of the Constellation program on February 1, 2010, by the Obama administration, which eliminated the Ares I crew launch vehicle and Ares V heavy-lift concept due to projected costs ballooning to over $100 billion and schedule delays pushing lunar return beyond 2020.[27] Constellation, initiated in 2005, aimed to replace Shuttle capabilities but faced criticism for inefficient inline staging and new engine development risks; its termination shifted focus toward commercial crew for low Earth orbit while preserving heavy-lift options for deep space. Congress, seeking to retain Shuttle-derived infrastructure and workforce expertise at centers like Marshall Space Flight Center and Michoud Assembly Facility, intervened to mandate a new vehicle leveraging existing hardware such as RS-25 engines and five-segment solid rocket boosters.[27] The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010, signed into law on October 11, 2010 (Public Law 111-267), formally directed NASA to develop the SLS as an "evolutionary upgrade" to the Shuttle, requiring an initial capability of at least 130 metric tons to low Earth orbit using Shuttle and Ares program elements where practical to reduce costs and risks. This bipartisan legislation balanced administration proposals for flexible path exploration with congressional priorities for sustained human spaceflight hardware, explicitly prohibiting sole reliance on commercial systems for heavy-lift needs.[27] NASA formally announced the SLS configuration on September 14, 2011, selecting a core stage with four RS-25 engines and twin solid boosters, emphasizing reuse of proven components to enable rapid development despite debates over innovation versus heritage reliability.[28] This approach prioritized industrial base preservation in states like Alabama, Louisiana, and Florida, though it later drew scrutiny for limiting cost efficiencies compared to clean-sheet designs.[27]Key Milestones and Technical Challenges
The Space Launch System (SLS) program originated from congressional directives in 2011, following the cancellation of the Ares I and V rockets under the Constellation program, mandating NASA to develop a Shuttle-derived heavy-lift vehicle using existing hardware to minimize costs and leverage expertise.[17] Key early milestones included the award of the prime contract for vehicle integration to Boeing in 2011 and subsequent core stage development contract in 2014 valued at $2.8 billion for the initial flight article. Qualification testing of the five-segment solid rocket boosters, derived from Space Shuttle boosters, advanced with successful static fire tests of development motors in 2016 and qualification motors in 2017 at Orbital ATK facilities. The core stage's Green Run campaign, a critical integrated hot-fire test simulating launch conditions, encountered anomalies in cryogenic systems and structural elements but concluded successfully in March 2021 after multiyear delays.[1] The program's inaugural flight, Artemis I, lifted off uncrewed on November 16, 2022, from Kennedy Space Center, achieving all primary objectives including Orion's lunar orbit insertion and reentry, thus validating the Block 1 configuration's 8.8 million pounds of thrust and payload capacity to cislunar space. Post-launch, production of the second core stage progressed, with completion of RS-25 engine certifications in April 2024 and shipment to Kennedy Space Center for Artemis II integration. Stacking operations for the Artemis II SLS began in January 2025, with the full vehicle assembly targeting readiness for a crewed orbital mission no earlier than April 2026, pending resolution of propulsion stage and ground system verifications.[29] Technical challenges have centered on core stage manufacturing, where automated friction stir welding at Michoud Assembly Facility suffered repeated failures due to material inconsistencies and equipment malfunctions, extending production timelines by years and necessitating manual rework.[8] Integration of RS-25 engines, adapted from Shuttle inventory with new production units, faced delays in controller avionics and software validation, compounded by testing infrastructure upgrades at Stennis Space Center that slipped from 2019 targets. Solid rocket booster segmentation and nozzle joint processes revealed unforeseen thermal and structural stresses during qualification, requiring design iterations. Program management issues, including fragmented oversight across NASA centers and reliance on cost-reimbursable contracts, have exacerbated these, as contractors like Boeing incurred performance shortfalls without strong cost-control incentives.[30] Government audits document substantial cost overruns and schedule erosions; the SLS Block 1 first flight slipped from a 2017 baseline to 2022, accumulating over 37 months of delay across human exploration elements by 2021 assessments.[31] Total development costs for the initial configurations have surpassed $20 billion, far exceeding early estimates, with life-cycle projections for limited launches deemed unsustainable by the Government Accountability Office due to per-unit expenses approaching $4 billion.[32][33] Supply chain disruptions, skilled workforce attrition post-Shuttle retirement, and evolving requirements for upper stage enhancements have perpetuated risks, though the Artemis I success affirmed the architecture's robustness for high-thrust, cryogenic deep-space propulsion despite these hurdles.[34]Political and Funding Dynamics
The development of the Space Launch System (SLS) was driven by congressional mandates following the 2011 NASA Authorization Act, which directed NASA to create a heavy-lift launch vehicle using Space Shuttle-derived components to maintain post-Shuttle capabilities and sustain thousands of jobs across multiple states, including Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Utah.[27] This initiative emerged amid the cancellation of the Ares I and Ares V programs under the Obama administration, with lawmakers, led by figures like Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), prioritizing government-controlled launch infrastructure over fully commercial alternatives recommended by the 2009 Augustine Committee, resulting in SLS as a politically insulated program dispersed across 44 states to build bipartisan support.[35] NASA officials have acknowledged that funding for SLS is allocated to generate employment nationwide, framing it as a deliberate strategy to distribute economic benefits rather than optimize for efficiency.[36] Funding for SLS has totaled over $11.8 billion in development costs through the Artemis I launch on November 16, 2022, with congressional appropriations consistently overriding executive branch attempts to redirect resources toward commercial systems.[37] The NASA Office of Inspector General projected in 2023 that a single SLS Block 1 rocket under the Exploration Production and Operations Contract (EPOC) would cost $2.5 billion, potentially rising higher without sustained cost-reduction measures, while Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports from 2023 highlighted NASA's lack of comprehensive life-cycle cost tracking post-Artemis I, limiting congressional oversight of the program's affordability.[33][38] By 2020, cumulative SLS expenditures had reached approximately $22.8 billion if Artemis II slipped to 2023, underscoring persistent overruns tied to fixed-price contracts with legacy Shuttle suppliers rather than competitive bidding.[8] Political dynamics have sustained SLS despite criticisms of its high marginal costs—estimated at $4.1 billion per launch for the first four missions—compared to emerging commercial heavy-lift options, as Congress has mandated its exclusive use for Artemis crewed missions to protect an estimated 28,000 jobs in Republican-leaning districts.[39] In fiscal year 2026 budget proposals released in May 2025, the White House sought to phase out SLS and Orion in favor of commercial alternatives, but subsequent congressional actions, including a July 2025 bill adding $9.9 billion to NASA's budget, reaffirmed SLS funding to ensure program continuity amid debates over its role versus private-sector innovations.[40][41] This pattern reflects causal trade-offs where job preservation and industrial base maintenance have outweighed efficiency gains from commercialization, as evidenced by GAO analyses of contracting metrics showing limited incentives for cost control.[42]Technical Architecture
Core Stage Specifications
The SLS core stage forms the central structural backbone and main propulsion unit for the Block 1 configuration of the Space Launch System, housing four RS-25 engines that burn liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LOX) propellants.[43] Constructed primarily from Aluminum 2219 alloy with orange spray-on foam insulation, the stage comprises a forward liquid oxygen tank, an intertank section, a larger liquid hydrogen tank, and an aft engine section.[44] It measures 212 feet (64.6 meters) in length and 27.6 feet (8.4 meters) in diameter, making it the tallest stage ever built by NASA.[43] The empty weight is approximately 188,000 pounds (85,275 kilograms).[44] Propellant storage capacities include 196,000 gallons (741,941 liters) of LOX weighing 1.86 million pounds and 537,000 gallons (2 million liters) of LH2 weighing 317,000 pounds, loaded into separate tanks forward and aft of the intertank.[44] The four RS-25 engines, derived from the Space Shuttle Main Engine but adapted for expendable use, operate at up to 111% of their rated power level for later flights, delivering a combined vacuum thrust exceeding 2 million pounds-force (8.9 meganewtons).[45] At sea level, each engine produces approximately 416,300 pounds-force (1.85 meganewtons), for a core stage total of about 1.67 million pounds-force (7.44 meganewtons), contributing roughly 25% of the full SLS liftoff thrust when augmented by solid rocket boosters.[45]| Specification | Value |
|---|---|
| Length | 212 ft (64.6 m)[44] |
| Diameter | 27.6 ft (8.4 m)[44] |
| Empty Mass | 188,000 lb (85,275 kg)[44] |
| LOX Capacity | 196,000 gal (1.86 million lb)[44] |
| LH2 Capacity | 537,000 gal (317,000 lb)[44] |
| Engines | 4 × RS-25[43] |
| Engine Thrust (vacuum, each) | 512,300 lbf (2.28 MN)[45] |
| Burn Time | ~500 seconds[44] |
Solid Rocket Boosters
The Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) for the Space Launch System (SLS) are two five-segment solid-propellant motors that supply the primary thrust during launch, accounting for approximately 75% of the vehicle's total liftoff thrust. Each booster stands 177 feet (54 meters) tall and has a diameter of 12 feet (3.7 meters), with a loaded mass of 1.6 million pounds (726 metric tons). They burn polybutadiene acrylonitrile (PBAN) propellant at a rate of roughly six tons per second, generating 3.6 million pounds (16,000 kilonewtons) of thrust per booster for a nominal duration of 126 seconds.[47][48][49] Evolved from the four-segment boosters flown on the Space Shuttle program, the SLS SRBs incorporate an additional forward segment to enhance performance, yielding about 20% greater average thrust and 24% higher total impulse than their predecessors. This design leverages mature Shuttle-derived hardware for reliability while addressing the SLS's higher payload demands, though it prioritizes expendability over recovery—unlike Shuttle SRBs, which were retrieved from the ocean for refurbishment. Manufacturing is handled by Northrop Grumman at facilities in Utah and Louisiana, utilizing both repurposed Shuttle-era casing segments and new components for the Block 1 configuration. Qualification motors underwent full-duration hot-fire tests in March 2015 (QM-1) and June 2016 (QM-2) at Northrop Grumman's Promontory, Utah site, validating the integrated five-segment assembly under simulated launch conditions.[50][49][51] During ascent, the SRBs ignite simultaneously with the core stage's RS-25 engines, propelling the SLS from Kennedy Space Center's Launch Complex 39B. They separate at around 146 seconds into flight via pyrotechnic ordnance, following depletion of their propellant, and subsequently re-enter the atmosphere to splash down in the Atlantic Ocean approximately 1,400 miles (2,250 kilometers) downrange, where they disintegrate and are not recovered due to the added complexity and cost of the five-segment geometry. The boosters' nozzles, constructed from phenolic composites, provide vector control through hydraulic actuators for initial vehicle stability. For the Artemis I mission on November 16, 2022, the flight boosters (FSB-1 and FSB-2) performed nominally, delivering the expected thrust profile without anomalies. Future SLS flights will continue using this configuration for Block 1 and Block 1B variants, with no planned upgrades to advanced boosters until potential Block 2 development.[52][53][52]Upper Stage Configurations
The Space Launch System's initial Block 1 configuration employs the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), a modified version of the Delta Cryogenic Second Stage developed by United Launch Alliance.[54] The ICPS utilizes a single RL-10B-2 engine producing approximately 24,750 lbf (110 kN) of thrust, fueled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen stored in tanks with a total propellant capacity of about 28 metric tons.[55] This stage provides the necessary velocity increment to insert the Orion spacecraft into a translunar trajectory following separation from the core stage and boosters, as demonstrated during the Artemis I mission on November 16, 2022.[55] Integration of the ICPS for Artemis II occurred in May 2025 at NASA's Kennedy Space Center, marking progress toward the crewed lunar orbit mission targeted for no earlier than September 2026.[56] For enhanced performance in the Block 1B variant, NASA plans to replace the ICPS with the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), designed to support heavier payloads such as the Gateway logistics module or surface landers.[57] The EUS features four RL-10C-3 engines arranged in a cross pattern, delivering a combined thrust of around 99,000 lbf (440 kN), and larger propellant tanks holding approximately 105 metric tons of cryogenic propellants.[57] This configuration increases the payload mass to lunar orbit by roughly a factor of two compared to Block 1, enabling more ambitious Artemis missions starting with Artemis IV around 2028.[58] Development of the EUS, led by Boeing, advanced with the completion of a thrust structure component for testing in July 2025, though the program faces scrutiny over costs exceeding $2.8 billion and potential alternatives amid budget constraints.[59][60] Earlier proposals for a Block 2 upper stage envisioned even greater capability with up to five RL-10 engines and advanced avionics, but this configuration was deferred indefinitely due to shifting priorities and fiscal pressures following the 2017 NASA budget review.[61] The EUS design incorporates heritage elements from prior cryogenic stages while addressing SLS-specific requirements for restart capability and extended burn times up to 1,000 seconds.[57] Both stages interface with the Orion spacecraft via the Universal Stage Adapter, ensuring compatibility across configurations.[62]Variants and Evolution
Block 1 Configuration
The Block 1 configuration of the Space Launch System (SLS) serves as the initial operational variant, optimized for NASA's early Artemis missions to deliver payloads beyond low Earth orbit, including translunar injection (TLI) trajectories. It integrates a core stage powered by four RS-25 liquid oxygen/hydrogen engines, two five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs), and the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) for upper-stage propulsion. This setup provides a liftoff thrust of 8.8 million pounds-force (39 meganewtons), exceeding that of the Saturn V by 15 percent, while leveraging heritage components from the Space Shuttle program for reliability.[13][63] The core stage, manufactured by Boeing, measures approximately 212 feet in length and 27.6 feet in diameter, with a fueled mass exceeding 2.8 million pounds, primarily from its liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks. Its four RS-25 engines, each producing 512,000 pounds-force of thrust at sea level, are throttled and gimbal-controlled for ascent steering, drawing on Shuttle-derived turbopump and nozzle technology. The stage's structure incorporates aluminum-lithium alloy barrels and a common skirt, enabling it to separate post-SRB burnout around two minutes after launch.[13][64] The twin SRBs, developed by Northrop Grumman from Shuttle four-segment designs, each extend 177 feet long and 12 feet in diameter, generating 3.6 million pounds-force of thrust apiece through a mix of ammonium perchlorate composite propellant burned over 126 seconds. These boosters provide the majority of initial ascent impulse, with enhanced nozzles and insulation for improved performance over Shuttle heritage. Following burnout, they separate via pyrotechnic systems, falling into the Atlantic Ocean for recovery and analysis if designated.[19][13] The ICPS, a modified Delta Cryogenic Second Stage variant built by United Launch Alliance, stands 45 feet tall and 16.7 feet in diameter, propelled by a single Aerojet Rocketdyne RL10B-2 engine delivering 24,750 pounds-force of vacuum thrust using liquid hydrogen and oxygen. It performs a single burn lasting several minutes to achieve TLI, after which it is jettisoned; for Block 1, no restart capability is included, limiting it to single-impulse missions. The stage interfaces with the payload via the Orion stage adapter, accommodating secondary payloads in some configurations.[55][65] Overall, the Block 1 stack reaches 322 feet in height when fully assembled with payload fairing, capable of injecting 95 metric tons to low Earth orbit or 27 metric tons to TLI in expendable mode, as demonstrated by the successful Artemis I launch on November 16, 2022. This capacity supports crewed or cargo variants but lacks the expanded upper stage volume of later blocks, prioritizing proven hardware over scalability.[16][66][13]Block 1B and Exploration Upper Stage
The Block 1B configuration upgrades the Space Launch System by replacing the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage with the more capable Exploration Upper Stage and incorporating a universal stage adapter to accommodate larger payloads, while retaining the core stage and solid rocket boosters from the Block 1 variant.[67] This modification substantially boosts performance for deep-space missions, increasing payload mass to trans-lunar injection from 27 metric tons in Block 1 to 38 metric tons when launching Orion with crew, or up to 42 metric tons for cargo configurations.[13][68] The enhanced capacity supports deployment of heavier elements like the Gateway lunar space station's Power and Propulsion Element and habitation modules.[67] The Exploration Upper Stage employs four Aerojet Rocketdyne RL10C-3 engines fueled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen, delivering approximately 97,000 pounds of thrust during translunar injection—nearly four times that of the single RL10B-2 engine on the ICPS.[57][13][69] These engines provide high specific impulse for efficient in-space propulsion, enabling precise trajectory adjustments and extended operational margins for Artemis program objectives.[57] The stage's design prioritizes reliability through heritage components, with the RL10 series having accumulated over 500,000 seconds of hot-fire testing across prior programs.[57] Development of Block 1B and the EUS, contracted to Boeing, began in earnest after NASA's 2017 award, aiming for integration into the Artemis IV mission.[70] By January 2024, the program advanced to the qualification phase for EUS components, with full operational readiness targeted for late 2028.[70] However, progress has been hampered by technical challenges, including reliance on inexperienced technicians and supply chain issues, contributing to schedule slips from initial 2025 goals.[9] As of July 2025, Boeing completed fabrication of the first EUS aft structure for ground testing, marking a key hardware milestone amid ongoing qualification efforts.[58] NASA's fiscal year 2026 budget proposals, as drafted in July 2025, sustain EUS funding at levels supporting Artemis IV while directing a six-month study of lower-cost upper stage alternatives, reflecting congressional scrutiny over escalating expenses projected to exceed $5.7 billion for Block 1B development through first flight.[9][60] These costs stem partly from custom engineering for the EUS's increased propellant load and structural reinforcements, though proponents argue the stage's performance justifies investment for enabling co-manifested crew and cargo launches.[9][67]Block 2 Proposals and Limitations
The SLS Block 2 configuration was proposed as the program's ultimate evolution, incorporating the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) powered by four RL10C-3 engines and a 10-meter diameter payload fairing to enable larger scientific and cargo missions.[57][17] This variant aimed to deliver up to 46 metric tons to trans-lunar injection and approximately 130 metric tons to low Earth orbit, with liftoff thrust increased to 9.5 million pounds-force compared to Block 1's 8.8 million pounds-force, primarily through potential integration of advanced solid rocket boosters.[13][71] Intended as a workhorse for assembling infrastructure for human Mars missions, Block 2 was envisioned to support deep space propulsion modules and large habitats by the 2030s.[63] Development proposals for Block 2 emphasized scalability from heritage Shuttle and Ares components, including reuse of RS-25 engines and evolved boosters for cost efficiency, though full-scale prototyping remained conceptual as of 2022.[17] NASA outlined Block 2 in early program architecture to meet congressional mandates for heavy-lift capability beyond initial lunar returns, with payload volumes expanded to accommodate missions like asteroid redirection or Mars cargo prepositioning.[72] However, no dedicated funding line was established post-Artemis I, limiting efforts to studies rather than hardware fabrication.[5] Key limitations of Block 2 stem from escalating program costs and fiscal constraints, with the overall SLS exceeding $23 billion in development expenditures by 2024 without advancing beyond Block 1 production.[71] Technical challenges include the complexity of qualifying an EUS variant for higher performance under cryogenic constraints and integration risks with larger fairings, potentially adding years to timelines already plagued by delays in core stage manufacturing.[57] Policy shifts prioritizing commercial launch providers, such as SpaceX's Starship for Artemis heavy-lift needs, have deprioritized Block 2, as reusable alternatives offer projected costs under $100 million per launch versus SLS's $2 billion-plus per flight.[73] Broader critiques highlight structural inefficiencies, including congressional earmarks favoring jobs in specific districts over performance metrics, which inflate costs without corresponding capability gains; for instance, Block 2's marginal thrust increase does not compete with emerging systems capable of 100+ tons to orbit reusably.[74] As of late 2024, discussions within NASA and the incoming administration considered terminating SLS post-Artemis III, effectively sidelining Block 2 due to unsustainable budgeting amid flat agency appropriations.[75] These factors, compounded by reliance on single-use architecture in an era of rapid private-sector innovation, render Block 2's realization improbable without major policy reversals.[73]Manufacturing and Operations
Assembly Processes
The core stage of the Space Launch System (SLS) is assembled at NASA's Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans, Louisiana, under contract by Boeing, which employs advanced friction stir welding to join the large-diameter liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen tanks from aluminum-lithium alloy segments.[43][76] Following tank fabrication, technicians install the four RS-25 engines in the aft skirt, route extensive cabling for avionics and propulsion systems, apply thermal protection, and conduct structural and leak tests to verify integrity before final closeout.[77][78] For the Artemis II mission, the core stage's liquid hydrogen tank barrel was lifted into position for welding in early 2021, with full assembly completing vertical integration by mid-2024 prior to shipment.[79] Completed core stages, measuring approximately 65 meters in length and weighing over 1,000 metric tons when fueled, are transported horizontally via the specialized Pegasus barge from MAF through inland waterways, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway to Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida, a journey spanning about 800 kilometers and taking up to three weeks.[80] At KSC, the core stage is offloaded at the Turn Basin Complex and moved into the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) using self-propelled modular transporters.[79] In the VAB's high bays, the core stage is hoisted vertically using the 142-meter-tall crane system and mated to the mobile launcher (ML) platform, which serves as both assembly fixture and launch pad transport.[81] The twin five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs), manufactured by Northrop Grumman with segments produced at facilities in Promontory, Utah, and shipped by rail to KSC, are then stacked adjacent to the core stage; each booster's segments are assembled into a full stack before being lifted by crawler-transporter-derived cranes and attached via forward and aft attachments to the core stage's diameter transition structure.[81] For Artemis II, SRB stacking began in late 2024, with all ten segments integrated by early 2025.[81] The Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) for Block 1 configurations, built by United Launch Alliance and incorporating a RL10 engine, is delivered separately to KSC and lifted atop the core stage via the VAB's main cranes after installation of the core-to-upper stage adapter.[17] Final vehicle integration includes electrical, hydraulic, and data interface checks, followed by rollout of the fully stacked SLS on the ML to Launch Complex 39B for propellant loading and launch operations.[17] This sequential stacking process leverages heritage from the Space Shuttle program but incorporates digital simulations and automated tooling to mitigate risks in handling the SLS's unprecedented scale.[82]Ground Infrastructure Requirements
The ground infrastructure for the Space Launch System (SLS) is centered at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida, encompassing facilities and equipment adapted from legacy systems to support the rocket's assembly, integration, testing, and launch operations. Key requirements include modifications to enable handling of the SLS's scale, with a total vehicle mass exceeding 5.75 million pounds for Block 1 configurations, necessitating robust structural support, umbilical connections for propellants and power, and enhanced safety features.[17] These systems fall under NASA's Exploration Ground Systems program, which oversees upgrades for processing SLS alongside the Orion spacecraft.[83] In the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), High Bay 3 was modified with 10 levels of retractable work platforms (20 halves total) installed in Towers E and F to provide access for stacking SLS components, including solid rocket boosters, core stage, upper stage, and Orion integration.[84] Each platform measures approximately 38 feet long by 62 feet wide and weighs 300,000 to 325,000 pounds, mounted on rail beams with roller systems for extension and retraction during operations like umbilical connections and mating at specific heights—ranging from Platform K at 86 feet for core stage-to-booster attachments to Platform A at 346 feet for Orion Launch Abort System access.[84] These platforms enable integrated vehicle testing and checkout prior to rollout. The Mobile Launcher 1 (ML1), a 400-foot-tall steel structure weighing 11.5 million pounds, serves as the primary ground support platform for Block 1 SLS assembly in the VAB, transport to the pad, and launch operations at Launch Complex 39B (LC-39B).[85] It features a two-story base (165 feet long, 135 feet wide, 25 feet high) elevated 22 feet off the ground, a 40-foot-square tower with floors every 20 feet, eight vehicle support posts for liftoff stabilization, and umbilicals delivering power, communications, coolant, fuel, and pneumatics.[85] Additional elements include a crew access arm for personnel and astronaut ingress and an emergency egress system with slide baskets. A taller Mobile Launcher 2 is under construction for Block 1B and beyond, incorporating larger modules to accommodate extended upper stages.[86] Crawler-Transporters (CTs), upgraded from Space Shuttle-era designs, transport the ML1 with stacked SLS from the VAB to LC-39B over a 4-mile crawlerway.[87] Crawler-Transporter 2 (CT-2) was modified to "Super Crawler" status by 2016, with enhancements including new 40-inch-diameter bearings, upgraded electronics, hydraulic systems, fuel tanks, and increased lift capacity to handle SLS dynamic loads during rollout tests.[88] These modifications ensure stability for the heavier SLS stack compared to prior vehicles.[87] At LC-39B, infrastructure requirements focus on a "clean pad" design with upgraded subsystems for propellant loading, countdown simulations, and launch support, including replacement of Apollo- and Shuttle-era equipment.[89] Post-Artemis I (November 2022), the flame trench and deflector were enhanced with new plates weighing up to 5,500 pounds each to manage exhaust plume forces from the SLS's four RS-25 engines and boosters.[90] A water-based sound suppression system, validated via 5% scale model tests, deluges the pad during wet dress rehearsals to mitigate acoustic and thermal loads.[17] Ground support equipment provides cryogenic propellant delivery, high-pressure gases, electrical power, and environmental controls, enabling full vehicle fueling and integrated countdowns.[17]Launch Manifest and Scheduling
The Space Launch System (SLS) launch manifest centers on NASA's Artemis program, with missions designed to enable crewed lunar return and infrastructure development for sustained exploration. Artemis I, the uncrewed demonstration flight using the Block 1 configuration, launched successfully on November 16, 2022, from Kennedy Space Center's Pad 39B, validating the rocket's core stage, solid rocket boosters, and interim cryogenic propulsion stage (ICPS) during a 25-day mission.[91] Subsequent launches prioritize crewed operations, though schedules have slipped due to technical integrations, such as Orion spacecraft heat shield anomalies and propulsion valve issues, compounded by dependencies on commercial partners like SpaceX for human landing systems.[92][93] Artemis II, the first crewed SLS flight, is scheduled no earlier than February 5, 2026, with launch windows extending through April 2026, carrying four astronauts on a 10-day lunar flyby to test Orion's life support and reentry systems in deep space.[92] The SLS core stage and boosters for this mission were shipped to Kennedy Space Center by mid-2024, with full vehicle stacking completed in October 2025, ahead of Orion integration.[29] This delay from initial 2025 targets reflects rigorous anomaly resolutions, including non-destructive testing of the heat shield following Artemis I data, ensuring crew safety without compromising empirical validation of heritage Shuttle-derived components.[94] Artemis III, targeting the program's first crewed lunar landing, is planned no earlier than mid-2027 using another Block 1 SLS to loft Orion and dock with a human landing system in lunar orbit.[95] Schedule slippage from prior 2026 goals arises from ongoing Starship development delays at SpaceX, including unproven in-orbit refueling and suborbital testing shortfalls, prompting NASA to reopen the lander contract for competitive bids in October 2025 to mitigate risks.[96][97] Beyond Artemis III, the manifest envisions SLS Block 1B variants for heavier payloads starting with Artemis IV around 2028 or later, including Lunar Gateway station assembly and potential cargo variants, though exact cadences remain fluid amid production constraints. NASA has procured components for up to 11 SLS vehicles to support a sustained rate of one launch every 1-2 years, limited by serial manufacturing at Michoud Assembly Facility and cost-plus contracting inefficiencies rather than inherent technical ceilings.[1] No non-Artemis SLS missions are firmly scheduled, as the rocket's 95-130 metric ton low-Earth orbit capacity targets deep-space heavy lift unavailable from commercial alternatives.[1] Delays across the program underscore causal factors like supply chain dependencies and sequential testing protocols, prioritizing empirical reliability over accelerated timelines.[98]Performance Record
Artemis I Flight and Outcomes
The Artemis I mission marked the inaugural flight of the Space Launch System (SLS) Block 1 configuration, launching on November 16, 2022, at 1:47 a.m. EST from Launch Complex 39B at NASA's Kennedy Space Center in Florida.[91] The SLS rocket, comprising two solid rocket boosters derived from the Space Shuttle program and a core stage powered by four RS-25 liquid engines, generated a total liftoff thrust of approximately 8.8 million pounds, propelling the uncrewed Orion spacecraft and Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) toward a trans-lunar injection trajectory.[99] The twin boosters ignited simultaneously, achieving burnout within 0.4 seconds of each other at roughly two minutes after liftoff, with peak thrusts aligned to within 0.1 seconds and total booster thrust within 0.25% of predictions.[99] Following booster separation, the core stage's RS-25 engines, each delivering 512,000 pounds of thrust in vacuum conditions, continued ascent until main engine cutoff (MECO) at approximately eight minutes, 28 seconds post-launch, when the vehicle reached a velocity exceeding 16,000 mph and experienced maximum dynamic pressure acceleration of 3.25 g.[99] The core stage then separated from the ICPS and Orion stack, which was inserted into a low-Earth parking orbit at a velocity of 25,579.86 feet per second—deviating from nominal by just 0.026%.[99] The ICPS performed its trans-lunar injection burn for about 18 minutes, accelerating the Orion spacecraft to over 22,000 mph before separation, enabling the 25-day, 1.4 million-mile mission profile that included a lunar flyby and distant retrograde orbit.[91] No in-flight anomalies affected SLS hardware performance, though pre-launch scrubs due to hydrogen leaks and hardware issues were resolved through procedural adjustments.[99] Post-mission analysis confirmed the SLS met or exceeded all performance expectations, with flight data from over 3,000 sensors validating structural integrity, aerodynamic loads, and propulsion efficiency to within tenths of a percent of pre-flight models.[100][99] The successful demonstration of ascent, staging, and payload delivery de-risked the SLS architecture, providing empirical evidence of its reliability for subsequent crewed Artemis missions while highlighting the robustness of heritage components like the RS-25 engines and boosters.[101] Orion splashed down on December 11, 2022, after 25 days, 10 hours, and 53 minutes, with re-entry at 24,581 mph, affirming the integrated SLS-Orion system's capability for deep-space operations despite unrelated spacecraft-specific issues like unexpected heat shield charring.[91] This flight established baseline performance metrics, enabling refinements for Block 1B and future variants without necessitating major redesigns.[102]Reliability Factors from Heritage Technology
The Space Launch System (SLS) derives significant reliability from its use of heritage components adapted from the Space Shuttle program, including the RS-25 engines and five-segment solid rocket boosters (SRBs), which benefit from decades of flight data, ground testing, and iterative improvements that minimize developmental risks compared to fully new designs.[103] These elements enable reliability predictions grounded in empirical historical performance, with failure rates informed by prior operational environments rather than solely analytical models.[104] For instance, heritage data applicability studies highlight how modifications to existing hardware, while introducing some changes to failure modes, preserve core maturity that reduces overall system uncertainty.[103] The RS-25 engines, evolved from the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), exemplify this advantage, having accumulated over 500 hot-fire tests and flights across 135 Shuttle missions with no catastrophic in-flight failures after early-program refinements.[105] Their staged-combustion cycle and turbopump designs, proven under reusable flight stresses, provide a reliability baseline exceeding that of many contemporary engines, as evidenced by successful full-duration firings at 111% thrust for SLS—higher than the Shuttle's 104.5% operational rating.[106] Upgrades for SLS, such as enhanced controllers and additive-manufactured parts, build on this foundation without altering fundamental reliability drivers, allowing NASA to allocate system-level loss-of-mission probabilities using validated heritage metrics.[104] SLS's five-segment SRBs further leverage Shuttle SRB heritage, extending the four-segment design that, after the 1986 Challenger redesign addressing O-ring vulnerabilities, achieved flawless performance in 110 subsequent missions, contributing over 75% of liftoff thrust with consistent burn predictability.[107] The added fifth segment increases total impulse by approximately 25% while retaining propellant formulations and case materials tested across thousands of static fires, enabling flight-ground performance correlations validated during Artemis I on November 16, 2022, where boosters met all ascent criteria without anomalies.[108] This evolutionary approach contrasts with clean-sheet boosters by inheriting segmented-case reliability, which facilitates anomaly isolation and reduces integration risks in the SLS core stage.[103] Overall, these heritage factors supported Artemis I's uncrewed success, with the vehicle attaining orbital insertion and demonstrating booster separation and engine cutoff precision aligned with Shuttle-era tolerances, underscoring how empirical data from prior programs informs SLS's probabilistic risk assessments for crewed variants.[109] However, adaptations like non-reusability and thrust scaling necessitate ongoing qualification testing to confirm that modified failure rates do not erode baseline reliabilities.[103]Quantitative Metrics of Success
The Space Launch System (SLS) has completed one flight, Artemis I, on November 16, 2022, achieving a 100% success rate in terms of primary mission objectives, including delivery of the Orion spacecraft and associated payloads to a high-Earth orbit trajectory for subsequent trans-lunar injection via the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS).[100][13] All major systems, including the core stage powered by four RS-25 engines and two five-segment solid rocket boosters, performed nominally during ascent, with no mission-critical anomalies reported.[110] Post-flight analysis confirmed structural integrity and propulsion performance aligned with pre-launch predictions, enabling data collection for subsequent missions.[100] In the Block 1 configuration used for Artemis I, SLS demonstrated a liftoff thrust of 8.8 million pounds-force (39 MN), surpassing the Saturn V's 7.6 million pounds-force by 15%, establishing it as the most powerful rocket to successfully launch to date.[13][111] The vehicle successfully lofted approximately 27 metric tons (59,500 pounds) to the lunar vicinity, meeting or exceeding the specified payload capacity for crewed configurations in early Artemis flights.[67] This performance validated the SLS Block 1's capability for 95 metric tons to low Earth orbit under expendable operations, though the Artemis I profile prioritized deep-space insertion over maximum LEO mass.[46] Heritage components contribute to projected reliability metrics. The RS-25 engines, adapted from the Space Shuttle Main Engine program, achieved a 99.95% success rate across 135 flights, with over 1 million seconds of hot-fire testing accumulated prior to SLS integration.[112] Ground tests for SLS-specific configurations, including full-duration firings at up to 113% throttle, showed zero failures in certified engines, supporting an inferred in-flight reliability exceeding 99%.[113] The solid rocket boosters, evolved from four-segment Shuttle designs, underwent extensive qualification testing with success rates near 100% in static fires, though their expendable nature precludes reuse-based metrics.[110]| Metric | Value | Notes/Source |
|---|---|---|
| Flights Completed | 1 (Artemis I, Nov. 16, 2022) | 100% success; all objectives met[100] |
| Liftoff Thrust | 8.8 million lbf (39 MN) | Block 1 configuration[13] |
| Payload to Lunar Vicinity | >27 metric tons | Artemis I achieved[67] |
| RS-25 Engine Reliability | ~99.95% (heritage) | 135 Shuttle flights[112] |
Economic and Cost Analysis
Total Program Expenditures
The Space Launch System (SLS) program, authorized under the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 and formally initiated in 2011, has accrued total expenditures of $23.8 billion from fiscal year (FY) 2012 through projected FY 2025, constituting 26 percent of the broader Artemis campaign's estimated $93 billion outlay over the same period.[33] This sum covers design, development, testing, and production of the Block 1 core vehicle—including five RS-25 engines, core stage, solid rocket boosters derived from Space Shuttle heritage, and interim cryogenic propulsion stage—as well as integration for initial launches like Artemis I in November 2022.[109] Expenditures reflect NASA's cost-plus-incentive-fee contracting model, which prioritizes fixed development milestones over serial production efficiencies, leading to sustained annual funding requests exceeding $2 billion per fiscal year post-Artemis I.[114] NASA has not produced a full life-cycle cost estimate encompassing long-term production and sustainment beyond the first few vehicles, a deficiency highlighted in multiple Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessments, as the agency classifies SLS as exploratory development rather than an operational production program.[114] GAO reports indicate that the $11.8 billion in development costs through Artemis I—comprising $2.7 billion in formulation and $9.1 billion in production, integration, and test phases—exclude pre-2012 heritage investments and ongoing vehicle builds for Artemis II through IV, which add billions more.[38] Senior NASA officials have internally acknowledged the program's unaffordability at prevailing cost levels, prompting roadmaps for cost reduction via commercial partnerships, though implementation remains pending as of 2023.[38] Projections for upgrades, such as the Block 1B configuration with an Exploration Upper Stage for greater payload capacity starting with Artemis IV, add nearly $5 billion, including engine production and stage development, further elevating total outlays without a baselined production cost model.[9] FY 2024 budget requests included $11.2 billion for SLS through FY 2028, signaling continued escalation absent structural reforms to transition from bespoke assembly to streamlined manufacturing.[38] These figures underscore systemic challenges in cost accounting for congressionally mandated programs reliant on legacy contractors, where empirical overruns—exceeding initial estimates by over 30 percent in some phases—stem from technical complexities and limited competition rather than exogenous factors.[30]Marginal Launch Costs
NASA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) estimates that the production cost for a single SLS Block 1B vehicle is at least $2.5 billion, excluding systems engineering and integration (SE&I) costs, encompassing core stages, upper stages, boosters, engines, and adapters.[33] This represents the marginal cost for additional launches under the Exploration Production and Operations Contract (EPOC), with projections indicating costs exceeding $2 billion per rocket for the first 10 vehicles despite NASA's target to reduce them by 50 percent to $1.25 billion.[33] For Block 1 configurations used in early Artemis missions, similar analyses have pegged per-launch production expenses over $2 billion, excluding Orion spacecraft and ground systems.[115] These elevated marginal costs stem from SLS's low flight cadence—typically one per year—and expendable design, which preclude reusability benefits and limit economies of scale in manufacturing.[33] Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts for major components, such as the core stage produced by Boeing, have contributed to overruns, with the first two stages alone escalating from $4.2 billion to $5.4 billion by late 2019.[8] The OIG has criticized NASA's cost estimating practices for lacking transparency, complicating accurate assessment of true incremental expenses beyond initial development.[114] Independent government reviews, including from the White House Office of Management and Budget, have corroborated the over-$2 billion threshold for SLS launches post-development, a figure NASA has not disputed.[116] In contrast to commercial launchers achieving sub-$100 million marginal costs through high-volume production and partial reusability, SLS's structure sustains high per-unit expenses, raising questions about long-term affordability for sustained lunar operations.[117]Inefficiencies in Cost-Plus Model
The cost-plus contracting model, predominant in the Space Launch System (SLS) program's major development phases, reimburses contractors for allowable costs incurred plus a fixed or incentive-based fee, thereby insulating contractors from financial risk associated with overruns. This structure, applied to key SLS elements such as Boeing's core stage and solid rocket boosters, as well as Aerojet Rocketdyne's RS-25 engines, reduces incentives for contractors to minimize expenses or innovate efficiently, as higher costs directly translate to greater reimbursements without proportional penalties.[109][35] NASA's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has noted that this approach for SLS boosters and engines was employed to a greater extent than warranted, contributing to propulsion costs exceeding $5 billion for engines alone by 2023, far surpassing initial projections due to persistent overruns unmitigated by competitive pricing pressures.[118][109] Empirical evidence from SLS contracts demonstrates how cost-plus arrangements exacerbate inefficiencies through scope creep and inadequate cost estimation. For example, Boeing's SLS core stage contract, valued at $2.8 billion initially in 2014 under a cost-plus-incentive-fee structure, ballooned to over $5 billion by 2020 due to design changes and production delays, with NASA bearing the full incremental costs.[8] Similarly, RS-25 engine production costs rose from an estimated $145 million per engine in shuttle-era baselines to approximately $200 million each under new cost-plus contracts, perpetuating high labor-intensive manufacturing without mandates for process modernization.[119] The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has highlighted that such contracts in human spaceflight programs, including SLS, lack transparency in long-term affordability, enabling unchecked expenditure growth estimated at $4.1 billion for the first four Block 1 launches through Artemis IV.[38] Critics, including NASA leadership, attribute systemic inefficiencies to cost-plus dominance, with Administrator Bill Nelson labeling them a "plague" on the agency in 2022 testimony, arguing they stifle the cost discipline seen in fixed-price commercial partnerships.[120] Despite efforts to transition SLS production to fixed-price "services" contracts post-Artemis IV—aiming for 50% cost reductions per OIG recommendations—auditors assess these goals as unrealistic, projecting marginal savings at best due to entrenched supplier dependencies and low production volumes that fail to amortize fixed costs effectively.[33][121] This persistence of cost-plus elements underscores a causal link between contract type and SLS's elevated marginal launch costs, estimated at $2 billion to $4 billion per flight, contrasting sharply with commercial alternatives unburdened by similar incentives misalignments.[122]Criticisms and Debates
Technical and Capability Shortfalls
The Space Launch System's Block 1 configuration, which relies on the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage derived from the Delta IV upper stage, delivers a payload capacity of approximately 27 metric tons to translunar injection, constraining mission designs for heavy lunar landers, habitats, or aggregated cargo that exceed this threshold and necessitate multi-launch architectures.[9] This limitation stems from the stage's modest propellant load and specific impulse, which fall short of enabling the single-launch capabilities originally envisioned for more ambitious Artemis elements, such as direct insertion of large surface systems without orbital refueling.[9] Efforts to address this through the Block 1B upgrade, incorporating the Exploration Upper Stage for a 40 percent payload increase to roughly 38 metric tons for crewed missions or 42 metric tons in cargo variants, have been hampered by technical maturation delays since development began in 2014.[9][109] NASA's Office of Inspector General identified persistent quality control deficiencies in Boeing's core stage production, including weld imperfections and material defects requiring extensive rework, which have escalated costs by hundreds of millions and postponed readiness for Artemis IV beyond fiscal year 2028.[9] Manufacturing challenges, such as early core stage welding tool misalignments that risked structural integrity, were mitigated but at the expense of schedule compression, leaving minimal margin for unforeseen anomalies in subsequent vehicles.[34] The heritage Shuttle-derived RS-25 engines and solid rocket boosters, while proven in Artemis I's November 16, 2022, launch, impose fixed-thrust profiles without deep throttling options, potentially exacerbating ascent dynamics under off-nominal conditions or payload variations, as evidenced by vibration and acoustic load analyses during ground testing.[34] These factors, compounded by shifting requirements amid funding reallocations to commercial partners, have curtailed the system's evolutionary scalability, rendering it less adaptable to emerging deep-space demands than initially projected.[9]Pork-Barrel Politics and Job Preservation
The Space Launch System (SLS) program has been structured to allocate contracts across a wide array of U.S. states and congressional districts, ensuring broad political support through job creation and economic benefits in key regions. This geographic dispersion, involving suppliers and manufacturing in all 50 states for Artemis-related efforts including SLS, exemplifies pork-barrel politics by tying federal funding to localized employment gains rather than centralized efficiency.[123] Major components are produced in politically influential areas: the core stage at Boeing's Michoud Assembly Facility in Louisiana, RS-25 engines tested and refurbished at NASA's Stennis Space Center in Mississippi and Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, solid rocket boosters by Northrop Grumman in Utah, and final integration at Kennedy Space Center in Florida.[124] This approach secured initial authorization in the 2010 NASA Authorization Act and sustained funding despite escalating costs, as lawmakers from affected districts advocate for continuation to protect constituent interests.[125] The program sustains approximately 28,000 direct and indirect jobs nationwide, with an estimated annual economic impact of $5.5 billion, primarily preserving employment in legacy NASA centers post-Space Shuttle retirement in 2011.[126][127] In Alabama, for instance, Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), who chaired the Senate Appropriations Committee until 2023, championed SLS to maintain thousands of high-skill positions at Marshall, where the program is managed, viewing it as essential for retaining aerospace expertise amid competition from commercial providers.[128] Congressional delegations from Mississippi, Louisiana, and Utah have similarly prioritized SLS funding in appropriations bills, with unwavering bipartisan backing attributed to the program's reach into nearly every state, even if contributions vary from major fabrication to minor supplier roles.[125] Critics contend that this job-preservation focus, rooted in repurposing Shuttle-era infrastructure and workforce, inflates development and operational costs through fragmented supply chains, limited competition, and cost-plus contracting that incentivizes overruns.[35] The distributed model necessitates extensive transportation logistics—such as barge shipments from Louisiana to Florida—and duplicates efforts across sites, contributing to SLS's total program cost exceeding $23 billion by 2023 without proportional innovation gains.[38] NASA's Office of Inspector General has highlighted unrealistic cost-reduction targets under proposed reforms, estimating sustained high marginal launch expenses of $2-4 billion per flight due to fixed workforce and facility commitments.[33] Proponents, including NASA administrators, defend the approach as safeguarding national capabilities and a skilled labor pool irreplaceable by private sector scaling, though analyses from groups like the Center for Growth and Opportunity argue it prioritizes political allocation over technological advancement or fiscal prudence.[129][35]Superiority of Commercial Alternatives
Commercial launch providers, notably SpaceX, have developed vehicles that surpass the SLS in cost per kilogram to orbit, reusability, and operational tempo. The Falcon Heavy achieves a payload of 63.8 metric tons to low Earth orbit (LEO) at an estimated cost of $97 million per launch in its reusable configuration, yielding a cost-effectiveness of approximately $1,500 per kilogram.[130] In contrast, the SLS Block 1 delivers 95 metric tons to LEO but incurs $4.1 billion per launch for the initial Artemis missions, equating to over $43,000 per kilogram.[131] This disparity stems from Falcon Heavy's partial reusability—recovering side boosters and the central core in some missions—enabling amortized hardware costs across multiple flights, a capability absent in the expendable SLS design.[114]| Vehicle | LEO Payload (metric tons) | Estimated Launch Cost | Cost per kg to LEO |
|---|---|---|---|
| SLS Block 1 | 95 | $4.1 billion | ~$43,000 |
| Falcon Heavy (reusable) | 63.8 | $97 million | ~$1,500 |
| Starship (fully reusable, target) | 100–150 | $10–90 million | <$100–900 |
Future Trajectory
Upcoming Artemis Missions
Artemis II, the first crewed flight of the Space Launch System (SLS) in its Block 1 configuration, will launch four astronauts aboard the Orion spacecraft for a lunar flyby mission lasting approximately 10 days.[92] The mission, commanded by Reid Wiseman with pilot Warren Hoburg and mission specialists Victor Glover and Jeremy Hansen, verifies Orion's systems for deep space operations following the uncrewed Artemis I test in 2022.[92] Originally targeted for September 2025, the launch has been delayed to no earlier than February 2026 due to investigations into Orion's heat shield charring from Artemis I and subsequent hardware integrations.[29] NASA completed stacking the SLS core stage elements and is preparing to integrate Orion in the coming months at Kennedy Space Center.[29] Artemis III aims to achieve the program's first crewed lunar landing since Apollo 17, using SLS Block 1 to propel Orion toward lunar orbit where astronauts will transfer to a Human Landing System (HLS) developed by SpaceX for surface operations near the lunar south pole.[95] The mission targets a launch no earlier than mid-2027, delayed from prior 2026 estimates to accommodate HLS development milestones and Gateway station preparations.[95] SLS will deliver over 27 metric tons to low Earth orbit before trans-lunar injection, enabling the crew to rendezvous with the HLS variant of Starship.[67] Buildup of the SLS rocket for this flight has begun at Kennedy Space Center, including core stage processing.[134] Subsequent missions, starting with Artemis IV, transition to the SLS Block 1B configuration featuring the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS) for enhanced payload capacity exceeding 40 metric tons to lunar orbit.[67] Artemis IV, planned for no earlier than September 2028, will deliver the Power and Propulsion Element and initial habitation modules for the Lunar Gateway station using the cargo variant.[135] Artemis V will employ Block 1B crew configuration for another south pole landing, supporting sustained lunar presence.[2]| Mission | Planned Launch | SLS Configuration | Key Objectives |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artemis II | NET February 2026 | Block 1 | Crewed lunar flyby, Orion deep space verification[92] |
| Artemis III | NET mid-2027 | Block 1 | First crewed lunar landing with HLS[95] |
| Artemis IV | NET September 2028 | Block 1B Cargo | Gateway station elements delivery[135] |
| Artemis V | TBD (late 2020s) | Block 1B Crew | Second crewed landing, sustained exploration[2] |