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Chinese space program
Chinese space program
from Wikipedia

From left to right, top to bottom:Long March 1 carrying Dong Fang Hong 1, Long March 5B launching, Yutu lunar rover, Chang'e 4 lander on the far side of the Moon, Zhurong rover on Mars, Shenzhou 14 crew heading to space, robotic arms on Tiangong Space Station, Chinese taikonaut performing spacewalk.

The space program of the People's Republic of China is about the activities in outer space conducted and directed by the government of China. The roots of the Chinese space program trace back to the 1950s, when, with the help of the newly allied Soviet Union, China began development of its first ballistic missile and rocket programs in response to the perceived American (and, later, Soviet) threats. Driven by the successes of Soviet Sputnik 1 and American Explorer 1 satellite launches in 1957 and 1958 respectively, China would launch its first satellite, Dong Fang Hong 1 in April 1970 aboard a Long March 1 rocket, making it the fifth nation to place a satellite in orbit.

China has one of the most active space programs in the world. With space launch capability provided by the Long March rocket family and four spaceports (Jiuquan, Taiyuan, Xichang, Wenchang) within its border, China conducts either the highest or the second highest number of orbital launches each year. It operates a satellite fleet consisting of a large number of communications, navigation, remote sensing and scientific research satellites.[1] The scope of its activities has expanded from low Earth orbit to the Moon and Mars.[2] China is one of the three countries, alongside the United States and Russia, with independent human spaceflight capability.

Currently, most of the space activities carried out by China are managed by the China National Space Administration (CNSA) and the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, which directs the astronaut corps and the Chinese Deep Space Network.[3][4] Major programs include China Manned Space Program, BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, Chinese Lunar Exploration Program, Gaofen Observation and Planetary Exploration of China. In recent years, China has conducted several missions, including Chang'e-4, Chang'e-5, Chang’e-6, Tianwen-1, Tianwen-2, and Tiangong space station.

History

[edit]

Early years (1950s to mid-1970s)

[edit]
Qian Xuesen, the forefather of Chinese space program
Qian Xuesen, the forefather of Chinese space program

The Chinese space program began in the form of missile research in the 1950s. After its birth in 1949, the newly founded People's Republic of China was in pursuit of missile technology to build up the nation's defense for the Cold War. In 1955, Qian Xuesen (钱学森), the world-class rocketry scientist, returned to China from the United States. In 1956, Qian submitted a proposal for the development of China's missile program, which was approved in just a few months. On October 8, China's first missile research institute, the Fifth Research Academy under the Ministry of National Defense, was established with less than 200 staff, most of which were recruited by Qian. The event was later recognized as the birth of China's space program.[5]

To fully utilize all available resources, China kick-started its missile development by manufacturing a licensed copy of two Soviet R-2 missiles, which were secretly shipped to China in December 1957 as part of the cooperative technology transfer program between the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese version of the missile was given the code name "1059" with the expectation of being launched in 1959. But the target date was soon postponed due to various difficulties arising from the sudden withdrawal of Soviet technical assistance due to the Sino-Soviet split.[6] Meanwhile, China started constructing its first missile test site in the Gobi desert of Inner Mongolia, which later became the famous Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (酒泉卫星发射中心), China's first spaceport.[citation needed]

After the launch of mankind's first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957, Mao Zedong decided during the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on May 17, 1958, to make China an equal of the superpowers (Chinese: "我们也要搞人造卫星"; lit. 'We too need satellites'), by adopting Project 581 with the objective of placing a satellite in orbit by 1959 to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the PRC's founding.[7] This goal was soon proven unrealistic, and it was decided to focus on the development of sounding rockets first.[citation needed]

Mao Zedong inspecting a T-7M rocket after its successful launch
Mao Zedong inspecting a T-7M rocket after its successful launch

The first achievement of the program was the launch of T-7M, a sounding rocket that eventually reached the height of 8 km on February 19, 1960. It was the first rocket developed by Chinese engineers.[8] The success was praised by Mao Zedong as a good beginning of an indigenous Chinese rocket development.[9] However, all Soviet technological assistance was abruptly withdrawn after the 1960 Sino-Soviet split, and Chinese scientists continued on the program with extremely limited resources and knowledge.[10] It was under these harsh conditions that China successfully launched the first "missile 1059", fueled by alcohol and liquid oxygen, on December 5, 1960, marking a successful imitation of Soviet missile. The missile 1059 was later renamed as Dongfeng-1 (DF-1, 东风一号).[6]

Dongfeng-2 missile
Dongfeng-2 missile

While the imitation of Soviet missile was still in progress, the Fifth Academy led by Qian had begun the development of Dongfeng-2 (DF-2), the first missile to be designed and built completely by the Chinese. After a failed attempt in March 1962, multiple improvements, and hundreds of engine firing tests, DF-2 achieved its first successful launch on its second attempt on Jun 29, 1964 in Jiuquan. It was considered as a major milestone in China's indigenous missile development history.[11]

In the next few years, Dongfeng-2 conducted seven more launches, all ended in success. On October 27, 1966, as part of the "Two Bombs, One Satellite" project, Dongfeng-2A, an improved version of DF-2, successfully launched and detonated a nuclear warhead at its target.[12] As China's missile industry matures, a new plan of developing carrier rockets and launching satellites was proposed and approved in 1965 with the name Project 581 changed to Project 651.[13] On January 30, 1970, China successfully tested the newly developed two-stage Dongfeng-4 (DF-4) missile, which demonstrated critical technologies like rocket staging, engine in-flight ignition, attitude control.[14] The DF-4 was used to develop the Long March 1 (LM-1 or CZ-1, 长征一号), with a newly designed spin-up orbital insertion solid-propellant rocket motor third stage added to the two existing Nitric acid/UDMH liquid propellant stages.[citation needed]

China's space program benefited from the Third Front campaign to develop basic industry and national defense industry in China's rugged interior in preparation for potential invasion by the Soviet Union or the United States.[15]: 4, 218–219  Almost all of China's new aerospace work units in the late 1960s and early 1970s were established as part of the Third Front and Third Front projects included expansion of Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center, building Xichang Satellite Launch Center, and building Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.[15]: 218–219 

Dong Fang Hong I - First Chinese satellite (1970)

On April 24, 1970, China successfully launched the 173 kg Dong Fang Hong I (东方红一号, meaning The East Is Red I) atop a Long March 1 (CZ-1, 长征一号) rocket from Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. It was the heaviest first satellite placed into orbit by a nation. The third stage of the Long March 1 was specially equipped with a 40 m2 solar reflector (观察球) deployed by the centrifugal force developed by the spin-up orbital insertion solid propellant stage.[16] China's second satellite was launched with the last Long March 1 on March 3, 1971. The 221 kg ShiJian-1 (SJ-1, 实践一号) was equipped with a magnetometer and cosmic-ray/x-ray detectors.[citation needed]

In addition to the satellite launch, China also made small progress in human spaceflight. The first successful launch and recovery of a T-7A(S1) sounding rocket carrying a biological experiment (it carried eight white mice) was on July 19, 1964, from Base 603 (六〇三基地).[17] As the space race between the two superpowers reached its climax with the conquest of the Moon, Mao and Zhou Enlai decided on July 14, 1967, that China should not be left behind, and started China's own crewed space program.[18] China's first spacecraft designed for human occupancy was named Shuguang-1 (曙光一号) in January 1968.[19] China's Space Medical Institute (航天医学工程研究所) was founded on April 1, 1968, and the Central Military Commission issued the order to start the selection of astronauts. The first crewed space program, known as Project 714, was officially adopted in April 1971 with the goal of sending two astronauts into space by 1973 aboard the Shuguang spacecraft. The first screening process for astronauts had already ended on March 15, 1971, with 19 astronauts chosen. But the program was soon canceled in the same year due to political turmoil, ending China's first human spaceflight attempt.[citation needed]

Early model of DF-5 ICBM.
Early model of DF-5 ICBM

While CZ-1 was being developed, the development of China's first long-range intercontinental ballistic missile, namely Dongfeng-5 (DF-5), has started since 1965. The first test flight of DF-5 was conducted in 1971. After that, its technology was adopted by two different models of Chinese medium-lift launch vehicles being developed. One of the two was Feng Bao 1 (FB-1, 风暴一号) developed by Shanghai's 2nd Bureau of Mechanic-Electrical Industry, the predecessor of Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight Technology (SAST). The other parallel medium-lift LV program, also based on the same DF-5 ICBM and known as Long March 2 (CZ-2, 长征二号), was started in Beijing by the First Research Academy of the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building, which later became China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT). Both FB-1 and CZ-2 were fueled by N2O4 and UDMH, the same propellant used by DF-5.[20]

On July 26, 1975, FB-1 made its first successful flight, placing the 1107-kilogram Changkong-1 (长空一号) satellite into orbit. It was the first time that China launched a payload heavier than 1 metric ton.[20] Four months later, on November 26, CZ-2 successfully launched the FSW-0 No.1 (返回式卫星零号) recoverable satellite into orbit. The satellite returned to earth and was successfully recovered three days later, making China the third country capable of recovering a satellite, after the Soviet Union and the United States.[21] FB-1 and CZ-2, which were developed by two different institutes, were later evolved into two different branches of the classic Long March rocket family: Long March 4 and Long March 2.[citation needed]

As part of the Third Front effort to relocate critical defense infrastructure to the relatively remote interior (away from the Soviet border), it was decided to construct a new space center in the mountainous region of Xichang in the Sichuan province, code-named Base 27. After expansion, the Northern Missile Test Site was upgraded as a test base in January 1976 to become the Northern Missile Test Base (华北导弹试验基地) known as Base 25.[citation needed]

New era (late 1970s to 1980s)

[edit]

After Mao died on September 9, 1976, his rival, Deng Xiaoping, denounced during the Cultural Revolution as reactionary and therefore forced to retire from all his offices, slowly re-emerged as China's new leader in 1978. At first, the new development was slowed. Then, several key projects deemed unnecessary were simply cancelled—the Fanji ABM system, the Xianfeng Anti-Missile Super Gun, the ICBM Early Warning Network 7010 Tracking Radar and the land-based high-power anti-missile laser program. Nevertheless, some development did proceed. The first Yuanwang-class space tracking ship was commissioned in 1979. The first full-range test of the DF-5 ICBM was conducted on May 18, 1980. The payload reached its target located 9300 km away in the South Pacific (7°0′S 117°33′E / 7.000°S 117.550°E / -7.000; 117.550 (DF-5 ICBM test impact)) [dubiousdiscuss] and retrieved five minutes later by helicopter.[22] In 1982, Long March 2C (CZ-2C, 长征二号丙), an upgraded version of Long March 2 based on DF-5 with 2500 kg low Earth orbit (LEO) payload capacity, completed its maiden flight. Long March 2C, along with many of its derived models, eventually became the backbone of Chinese space program in the following decades.[citation needed]

As China changing its direction from political activities to economy development since late 1970s, the demand for communications satellites surged. As a result, the Chinese communications satellite program, code name Project 331, was started on March 31, 1975. The first generation of China's own communication satellites was named Dong Fang Hong 2 (DFH-2, 东方红二号), whose development was led by the famous satellite expert Sun Jiadong.[23] Since communications satellites works in the geostationary orbit much higher than what the existing carrier rockets could reach, the launching of communications satellites became the next big challenge for the Chinese space program.[citation needed]

YF-73, the first cryogenic engine developed of China. Its development began in late 1970s.
YF-73, the first cryogenic engine of China. Its development began in late 1970s.
Xichang Satellite Launch Center
Xichang Satellite Launch Center

The task was assigned to Long March 3 (CZ-3, 长征三号), the most advanced Chinese launch vehicle in the 1980s. Long March 3 was a derivative of Long March 2C with an additional third stage, designed to send payloads to geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). When the development of Long March 3 began in the early 1970s, the engineers had to make a choice between the two options for the third stage engine: either the traditional engine fueled by the same hypergolic fuels used by the first two stages, or the advanced cryogenic engine fueled by liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen. Although the cryogenic engine plan was much more challenging than the other one, it was eventually chosen by Chief Designer Ren Xinmin (任新民), who had foreseen the great potential of its use for the Chinese space program in the coming future. The development of cryogenic engine with in-flight re-ignition capability began in 1976 and wasn't completed until 1983.[24] At the same time, Xichang Satellite Launch Center (西昌卫星发射中心) was chosen as the launch site of Long March 3 due to its low latitude, which provides better GTO launch capability.[citation needed]

On January 29, 1984, Long March 3 performed its maiden flight from Xichang, carrying the first experimental DFH-2 satellite. Unfortunately, because of the cryogenic third-stage engine failed to re-ignite during flight, the satellite was placed into a 400 km LEO instead of its intended GTO. Despite the rocket failure, the engineers managed to send the satellite into an elliptic orbit with an apoapsis of 6480 km using the satellite's own propulsion system. A series of tests were then conducted to verify the performance of the satellite.[23] Thanks to the hard work by the engineers, the cause of the cryogenic engine failure was located quickly, followed by improvements applied on the second rocket awaiting launch.[24]

On April 8, 1984, less than 70 days after the first failure, Long March 3 launched again from Xichang. It successfully inserted the second experimental DFH-2 satellite into target GTO on its second attempt. The satellite reached the final orbit location on April 16 and was handed over to the user on May 14, becoming China's first geostationary communications satellite.[25] The success made China the fifth country in the world with independent geostationary satellite development and launch capability.[24] Less than two years later, on February 1, 1986, the first practical DFH-2 communications satellite was launched into orbit atop a Long March 3 rocket, ending China's reliance on foreign communications satellite.[25]

During the 1980s, human spaceflights in the world became significantly more active than before as the American Space Shuttle and Soviet space stations were put in service respectively. It was in the same period that the previously canceled Chinese human spaceflight program was quietly revived again. In March 1986, Project 863 (863计划) was proposed by four scientists Wang Daheng, Wang Ganchang, Yang Jiachi, and Chen Fangyun. The goal of the project was to stimulate the development of advanced technologies, including human spaceflight. Followed by the approval of Project 863, the early study of Chinese human spaceflight program in the new era had begun.[26]

The rise and fall of commercial launches (1990s)

[edit]
Rendering of Long March 2E rocket
Rendering of Long March 2E rocket to launch Optus satellites
The launch of Long March 3B Rocket in 1997

After the initial success of Long March 3, further development of the Long March rocket series allowed China to announce a commercial launch program for international customers in 1985, which opened up a decade of commercial launches by Chinese launch vehicles in the 1990s.[27] The launch service was provided by China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) with support from CALT, SAST and China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC). The first contract was signed with AsiaSat in January 1989 to launch AsiaSat 1, a communications satellite manufactured by Hughes. It was previously a satellite owned by Westar but placed into a wrong orbit due to kick motor malfunction before being recovered in the STS-51-A mission in 1984.[citation needed]

On April 7, 1990, a Long March 3 rocket successfully launched AsiaSat 1 into target geosynchronous transfer orbit with high precision, fulfilling the contract. As its very first commercial launch ended in full success, the Chinese commercial launch program was introduced to the world with a good opening.[28]

Although Long March 3 completed its first commercial mission as expected, its 1,500 kg payload capability was not capable of placing the new generation of communication satellites, which were usually over 2,500 kg, into geostationary transfer orbit. To deal with the problem, China introduced Long March 2E (CZ-2E, 长征二号E), the first Chinese rocket with strap-on boosters that can place up to 3,000 kg payload into GTO. The development of Long March 2E began in November 1988 when CGWIC was awarded the contract of launching two Optus satellites by Hughes mostly due to its low price. At that time, neither the rocket nor the launch facility was anything more than concepts on paper. Yet the engineers of CALT eventually built all the hardware from scratch in a record-breaking period of 18 months, which impressed the American experts.[29] On September 16, 1990, Long March 2E, carrying an Optus mass simulator, conducted its test flight and reached intended orbit as designed. The success of the test flight was a huge inspiration for all parties involved and brought optimism about the coming launch of actual Optus satellites.[30]

However, an accident occurred during this highly anticipated launch on March 22, 1992, at Xichang Satellite Launch Center. After initial ignition, all engines shut down unexpectedly. The rocket was unable to lift off, resulting in a launch abort while being live-streamed to the world.[31] The post-launch investigation revealed that some minor aluminum scraps caused a shortage in the control circuit, triggering an emergency shutdown of all engines. Although the huge vibration brought by the short-lived ignition had led to a rotation of the whole rocket by 1.5 degree clockwise and partial displacement of the supporting blocks, the rocket filled with propellant was still standing on the launch pad when the dust settled. After a rescue mission that lasted for 39 hours, the payload, rocket, and launch facilities were all preserved intact, avoiding huge losses. Less than five months later, on August 14, a new Long March 2E rocket successfully lifted off from Xichang, sending the Optus satellite into orbit.[32]

In June 1993, the China Aerospace Corporation was founded in Beijing. It was also granted the title of China National Space Administration (CNSA).[33] A improved version of Long March 3, namely Long March 3A (CZ-3A, 长征三号甲) with 2,600 kg payload capacity to GTO, was put into service in 1994. However, on February 15, 1996, during the first flight of the further improved Long March 3B (CZ-3B, 长征三号乙) rocket carrying Intelsat 708, the rocket veered off course immediately after clearing the launch platform, crashing 22 seconds later. The crash killed 6 people and injured 57, making it the most disastrous event in the history of Chinese space program.[34][35] Although the Long March 3 rocket successfully launched APStar 1A communication satellites on July 3, it came across a third stage re-ignition malfunction during the launch of ChinaSat 7 on August 18, resulting in another launch failure.[36][37]

The two launch failures within a few months dealt a severe blow to the reputation of the Long March rockets. As a consequence, the Chinese commercial launch service was facing canceled orders, refusal of insurance, or greatly increased insurance premium.[37] Under such a harsh circumstance, the Chinese space industry initiated full-scale quality improving activities. A closed-loop quality management system was established to fix quality issues in both the technical and administrative aspects.[35][38] The strict quality management system remarkably increased the success rate ever since. Within the next 15 years, from October 20, 1996, up until August 16, 2011, China had achieved 102 consecutive successful space launches.[39] On August 20, 1997, Long March 3B accomplished its first successful flight on its second attempt, placing the 3,770 kg Agila-2 communications satellite into orbit. It offered a GTO payload capacity as high as 5,000 kg capable of putting different kinds of heavy satellites available on the international market into orbit.[40] Ever since then, Long March 3B had become the backbone of China's mid to high Earth orbit launches and been granted the title of most powerful rocket by China for nearly 20 years. In 1998, the administrative branch of China Aerospace Corporation was split and then merged into the newly founded Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense while retaining the title of CNSA. The remaining part was split again into China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) in 1999.[33]

While the Long March rockets were trying to take back the commercial launch market it lost, the political suppression from the United States approached. In 1998, the United States accused Hughes and Loral of exporting technologies that inadvertently helped China's ballistic missile program while resolving issues that caused the Long March rocket launch failures. The accusation ultimately led to the release of Cox Report, which further accused China of stealing sensitive technologies. In the next year, the U.S. Congress passed the act that put commercial satellites into the list restricted by International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and prohibited launches of satellites containing U.S. made components onboard Chinese rockets.[41][42] The regulation abruptly killed the commercial cooperation between China and the United States. The two Iridum satellites launched by Long March 2C on June 12, 1999, became the last batch of American satellites launched by Chinese rocket.[43] Furthermore, due to the strict regulation applied and the U.S. dominance in space industry, the Long March rockets had been de facto excluded from the international commercial launch market, causing a stagnation of the Chinese commercial launch program in the next few years.[41]

Return capsule of Shenzhou 1
Return capsule of Shenzhou 1

Despite the turmoil of commercial launches, the Chinese space program still made a huge breakthrough near the end of the decade. At 6:30 (China Standard Time) on November 20, 1999, Shenzhou-1 (神舟一号), the first uncrewed Shenzhou spacecraft (神舟载人飞船) designed for human spaceflight, was successfully launched atop a Long March 2F (CZ-2F, 长征二号F) rocket from Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. The spacecraft was inserted into low earth orbit 10 minutes after lift off. After orbiting the Earth for 14 rounds, the spacecraft initiated the return procedure as planned and landed safely in Inner Mongolia at 03:41 on November 21, marking the full success of China's first Shenzhou test flight. Following the announcement of the success of the mission, the previously secretive Chinese human spaceflight program, namely the China Manned Space Program (CMS, 中国载人航天工程), was formally made public. CMS, which was formally approved on September 21, 1992, by the CCP Politburo Standing Committee as Project 921, has been the most ambitious space program of China since its birth.[44] Its goals can be described as "Three Steps": Crewed spacecraft launch and return; Space laboratory for short-term missions; Long-term modular space station.[45] Due to its complex nature, a series of advanced projects were introduced by the program, including Shenzhou spacecraft, Long March 2F rocket, human spaceflight launch site in Jiuquan, Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, and Astronaut Center of China in Beijing. In terms of astronauts, fourteen candidates were selected to form the People's Liberation Army Astronaut Corps and started accepting spaceflight training.[citation needed]

Breakthroughs by Shenzhou and Chang'e (2000s)

[edit]

Since the beginning of 21st century, China has been experiencing rapid economic growth, which led to higher investment into space programs and multiple major achievements in the following decades. In November 2000, the Chinese government released its first white paper entitled China's Space Activities, which described its goals in the next decade as:[46]

  • To build up an earth observation system for long-term stable operation.
  • To set up an independently operated satellite broadcasting and telecommunications system.
  • To establish an independent satellite navigation and positioning system.
  • To upgrade the overall level and capacity of China's launch vehicles.
  • To realize manned spaceflight and establish an initially complete R&D and testing system for manned space projects.
  • To establish a coordinated and complete national satellite remote-sensing application system.
  • To develop space science and explore outer space.
Coverage of BeiDou-1 service in early 2000s

The independent satellite navigation and positioning system mentioned by the white paper was Beidou (北斗卫星导航系统). The development of Beidou dates back to 1983 when academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Chen Fangyun designed a primitive satellite navigation systems consisting of two satellites in the geostationary orbit. Sun Jiadong, the famous satellite expert of China, later proposed a "three-step" strategy to develop China's own satellite navigation system, whose service coverage expands from China to Asia then the globe. The two satellites of the "first step", namely BeiDou-1, were launched in October and December 2000.[47] As an experimental system, Beidou-1 offered basic positioning, navigation and timing services to limited areas in and around China.[48] After a few years of experiment, China started the construction of BeiDou-2, a more advanced system to serve the Asia-Pacific region by launching the first two satellites in 2007 and 2009 respectively.[49]

The first Chinese astronaut Yang Liwei
Return capsule and space suit used by Yang Liwei in Shenzhou 5 mission
Return capsule and space suit used by Yang Liwei in Shenzhou 5 mission

Another major goal specified by the white paper was to realize crewed spaceflight. The China Manned Space Program continued its steady evolvement in the 21st century after its initial success. From January 2001 to January 2003, China conducted three uncrewed Shenzhou spacecraft test flights, validating all systems required by human spaceflight. Among these missions, the Shenzhou-4 launched on December 30, 2002, was the last uncrewed rehearsal of Shenzhou. It flew for 6 days and 18 hours and orbited around the Earth for 108 circles before returning on January 5, 2003.[50]

On October 15, 2003, the first Chinese astronaut Yang Liwei (杨利伟) was launched aboard Shenzhou-5 (神舟五号) spacecraft atop a Long March 2F rocket from Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. The spacecraft was inserted into orbit ten minutes after launch, making Yang the first Chinese in space. After a flight of more than 21 hours and 14 orbits around the Earth, the spacecraft returned and landed safely in Inner Mongolia in the next morning, followed by Yang's walking out of the return capsule by himself.[51] The complete success of Shenzhou 5 mission was widely celebrated in China and received worldwide endorsements from different people and parties, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.[52] The mission, officially recognized by China as the second milestone of its space program after the launch of Dongfanghong-1, marked China's standing as the third country capable of completing independent human spaceflight, ending the over 40-year long duopoly by the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States.[53]

First spacewalk by Chinese astronaut in 2008
First spacewalk by Chinese astronaut in 2008

The China Manned Space Program did not stop its footsteps after its historic first crewed spaceflight. In 2005, two Chinese astronauts, Fei Junlong (费俊龙) and Nie Haisheng (聂海胜), safely completed China's first "multi-person and multi-day" spaceflight mission aboard Shenzhou-6 (神舟六号) between October 12 and 17.[54] On 25 September 2008, Shenzhou-7 (神舟七号) was launched into space with three astronauts, Zhai Zhigang (翟志刚), Liu Boming (刘伯明) and Jing Haipeng (景海鹏). During the flight, Zhai and Liu conducted China's first spacewalk in orbit.[55]

Moon map imaged by Chang'e 1
Moon map imaged by Chang'e-1

Around the same time, China began preparation for extraterrestrial exploration, starting with the Moon. The early research of Moon exploration of China dates back to 1994 when its necessity and feasibility were studied and discussed among Chinese scientists.[56] As a result, the white paper of 2000 enlisted the Moon as the primary target of China's deep space exploration within the decade. In January 2004, the year after China's first human spaceflight mission, the Chinese Moon orbiting program was formally approved and was later transformed into Chinese Lunar Exploration Program (CLEP, 中国探月工程). Just like several other space programs of China, CLEP was divided into three phases, which were simplified as "Orbiting, Landing, Returning" (“绕、落、回”), all to be executed by robotic probes at the time of planning.[57]

On October 24, 2007, the first lunar orbiter Chang'e-1 (嫦娥一号) was successfully launched by a Long March 3A rocket, and was inserted into Moon orbit on November 7, becoming China's first artificial satellite of the Moon. It then performed a series of surveys and produced China's first lunar map. On March 1, 2009, Chang'e-1, which had been operating longer than its designed life span, performed a controlled hard landing on lunar surface, concluding the Chang'e-1 mission.[58] Being China's first deep space exploration mission, Chang'e-1 was recognized by China as the third milestone of the Chinese space program and the admission ticket to the world club of deep space explorations.[53]

In others areas, despite the harsh sanction imposed by the United States since 1999, China still made some progress in terms of commercial launches within the first decade of the 21st century. In April 2005, China successfully conducted its first commercial launch since 1999 by launching the APStar 6 communications satellite manufactured by French company Alcatel atop a Long March 3B rocket.[59] In May 2007, China launched NigComSat-1 satellite developed by China Academy of Space Technology. This was the first time China provided the full service from satellite manufacture to launch for international customers.[60][61]

Expansion and revolution (2010s)

[edit]
Images taken by Gaofen satellites
Images taken by Gaofen satellites

From 2000 to 2010, China had quadrupled its GDP and became the second largest economy in the world.[62] Due to the rapid development of economy activities across the nation, the demand for high-resolution Earth observation systems increased in a remarkable manner. To end the reliance on foreign high-resolution remote sensing data, China initiated the China High-resolution Earth Observation System program (高分辨率对地观测系统), most commonly known as Gaofen (高分), in May 2010. Its purpose is to establish an all-day, all-weather coverage Earth observation system for satisfying the requirements of social development as part of the Chinese space infrastructures.[63] The first Gaofen satellite, Gaofen 1, was launched into orbit on April 26, 2013, followed by more satellites being launched into different orbits in the next few years to cover different spectra. As of today, more than 30 Gaofen satellites are being operated by China as the completion of the space-based section of Gaofen was announced in late 2022.[64]

The Beidou Navigation Satellite System proceeded in extraordinary speed after the launch of first Beidou-2 satellite in 2007. As many as five Beidou-2 navigation satellites were launched in 2010 alone. In late 2012, the Beidou-2 navigation system consisting of 14 satellites was completed and started providing service to Asia-Pacific region.[49] The construction of more advanced Beidou-3 started since November 2017. Its buildup speed was even more astonishing than before as China launched 24 satellites into medium Earth orbit, 3 into inclined geosynchronous orbit, and 3 into geostationary orbit within just three years.[65] The final satellite of Beidou-3 was successfully launched by a Long March 3B rocket on June 23, 2020.[66] On July 31, 2020, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping made the announcement on the Beidou-3 completion ceremony,[67] declaring the commission of Beidou-3 system across the globe.[68][69] The completed Beidou-3 navigation system integrates navigation and communication function, and possesses multiple service capabilities, including positioning, navigation and timing, short message communication, international search and rescue, satellite-based augmentation, ground augmentation and precise point positioning.[48] It is now one of the four core system providers designated by the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems of the United Nations.[70]

Liu Yang became the first Chinese woman in space in 2012.
Liu Yang became the first Chinese woman in space in 2012.
Docking device used by Chinese spacecrafts
Docking device used by Chinese spacecraft

The China Manned Space Program continued to make breakthroughs in human spaceflight technologies in 2010s. In the early 2000s, the Chinese crewed space program continued to engage with Russia in technological exchanges regarding the development of a docking mechanism used for space stations.[71] Deputy Chief Designer, Huang Weifen, stated that near the end of 2009, the China Manned Space Agency began to train astronauts on how to dock spacecraft.[72] In order to practice space rendezvous and docking, China launched an 8,000 kg (18,000 lb) target vehicle, Tiangong-1 (天宫一号), in 2011,[73] followed by the uncrewed Shenzhou 8 (神舟八号). The two spacecraft performed China's first automatic rendezvous and docking on 3 November 2011, which verified the performance of docking procedures and mechanisms.[74] About 9 months later, in June 2012, Tiangong 1 completed the first manual rendezvous and docking with Shenzhou 9 (神舟九号), a crewed spacecraft carrying Jing Haipeng, Liu Wang (刘旺) and China's first female astronaut Liu Yang (刘洋).[75] The successes of Shenzhou 8 and 9 missions, especially the automatic and manual docking experiments, marked China's advancement in space rendezvous and docking. Tiangong 1 was later docked with crewed spacecraft Shenzhou 10 (神舟十号) carrying astronauts Nie Haisheng, Zhang Xiaoguang (张晓光) and Wang Yaping (王亚平), who conducted multiple scientific experiments, gave lectures to over 60 million students in China, and performed more docking tests before returning to the Earth safely after 15 days in space.[76] The completion of missions from Shenzhou 7 to 10 demonstrated China's mastery of all basic human spaceflight technologies, ending phase 1 of "Second Step".[77]

Rendering of Tianzhou-1 docked with Tiangong-2
Rendering of Tianzhou-1 cargo spacecraft docked with Tiangong-2 space laboratory

Although Tiangong 1 was considered as a space station prototype, its functionality was still remarkably weaker than decent space laboratories. Tiangong-2 (天宫二号), the first real space laboratory of China, was launched into orbit on September 15, 2016. It was visited by Shenzhou 11 crew a month later. Two astronauts, Jing Haipeng and Chen Dong (陈冬) entered Tiangong 2 and were stationed for about 30 days, breaking China's record for the longest human spaceflight mission while carrying out different types of human-attended experiments. In April 2017, China's first cargo spacecraft, Tianzhou-1 (天舟一号), docked with Tiangong 2 and completed multiple in-orbit propellant refueling tests.[78]

Yutu rover mockup
Yutu, the first Chinese lunar rover landed on an extraterrestrial body during the Chang'e-3 mission
Photo of 4179 Toutatis taken by Chang'e 2 probe during a flyby
Photo of 4179 Toutatis taken by Chang'e 2 during a flyby

In terms of deep space explorations, after completing the objective of "Orbiting" in 2007, the Chinese Lunar Exploration Program started preparing for the "Landing" phase. China's second lunar probe, Chang'e-2 (嫦娥二号), was launched on October 1, 2010. It used trans-lunar injection orbit to reach the Moon for the first time and imaged the Sinus Iridum region where future landing missions were expected to occur.[79] On December 2, 2013, a Long March 3B rocket launched Chang'e-3 (嫦娥三号), China's first lunar lander, to the Moon. On December 14, Chang'e 3 successfully landed on the Sinus Iridum region, making China the third country that made soft-landing on an extraterrestrial body. A day later, the Yutu rover (玉兔号月球车) was deployed to the lunar surface and started its survey, achieving the goal of "landing and roving" for the second phase of CLEP.[80]

In addition to lunar exploration, it is worth noting that China made its first attempt of interplanetary exploration during the same period. Yinghuo-1 (萤火一号), China's first Mars orbiter, was launched on board the Russian Fobos-Grunt spacecraft as an additional payload in November 2011. Yinghuo-1 was a mission in cooperation with Russian Space Agency. It was a relatively small project initiated by National Space Science Center of Chinese Academy of Sciences instead of a major space program managed by the state space agency. The Yinghuo-1 orbiter weighed about 100 kg and was carried by the Fobos-Grunt probe. It was expected to detach from the Fobos-Grunt probe and injected into Mars orbit after reaching Mars.[81] However, due to an error of the onboard computer, the Fobos-Grunt probe failed to start its main engine and was stranded in the low Earth orbit after launch. Two months later, Fobos-Grunt, along with the Yinghuo-1 orbiter, re-entered and eventually burned up in the Earth atmosphere, resulting in a mission failure.[82] Although the Yinghuo-1 mission did not achieve its original goal due to factors not controlled by China, it led to the dawn of the Chinese interplanetary explorations by gathering a group of talents dedicated to interplanetary research for the first time.[81] On December 13, 2012, the Chinese lunar probe Chang'e 2, which was in an extended mission after the conclusion of its primary tasks in lunar orbit, made a flyby of asteroid Toutatis with closest approach being 3.2 kilometers, making it China's first interplanetary probe.[83][84] In 2016, the first Chinese independent Mars mission was formally approved and listed as one of the major tasks in "White Paper on China's Space Activities in 2016". The mission, which was planned in an unprecedented manner, aimed to achieve Mars orbiting, landing and roving in one single attempt in 2020.[85]

Long March 5 carrier rocket at Wenchang Space Launch Site
Long March 5 carrier rocket at Wenchang Space Launch Site
YF-100 (middle) and YF-77 (right) are two of the engines powering the new generation of Long March rockets
YF-100 (middle) and YF-77 (right) are two of the engines powering the new generation of Long March rockets

While China was making remarkable progress in all areas above, the Long March rockets, the absolute foundation of Chinese space program, were also experiencing a crucial revolution. Ever since 1970s, the Long March rocket family had been using dinitrogen tetroxide and UDMH as propellant for liquid engines. Although this hypergolic propellant is simple, cheap and reliable, its disadvantages, including toxicity, environmental damages, and low specific impulse, hindered Chinese carrier rockets from being competitive against other space powers since the mid-1980s. To get rid of such unsatisfying situation, China commenced the study of new propellant selection since the introduction of Project 863 in 1986. After an early study that lasted for over a decade, the development of a 120-ton rocket engine burning LOX and kerosene in staged combustion cycle were formally approved in 2000.[86] Despite setbacks like engine explosions during initial firing tests, the development team still made breakthroughs in key technologies like superalloy production and engine ignition and completed its first long duration firing test in 2006.[87] The engine, which was named YF-100, was eventually certified in 2012, and the first engine for actual flight was ready in 2014.[88][89] On September 20, 2015, the Long March 6 (长征六号), a small rocket using one YF-100 engine on its first stage, successfully conducted its maiden flight.[90] On June 25, 2016, the medium-lift Long March 7 (长征七号), which was equipped with six YF-100 engines, completed its maiden flight in full success, increasing the maximum LEO payload capacity by Chinese rockets to 13.5 tons. The successes of Long March 6 and 7 signified the introduction of the "new generation of Long March rockets" powered by clean and more efficient engines.[91]

View of Wenchang Space Launch Site from nearby beach.
View of Wenchang Space Launch Site from nearby beach.

The maiden launch of Long March 7 was also the very first launch from Wenchang Space Launch Site (文昌航天发射场) located in Wenchang, Hainan Province. It marked the inauguration of Wenchang on the world stage of space activities. Compared with the old Jiuquan, Taiyuan, and Xichang, the Wenchang Space Launch Site, whose construction began in September 2009, is China's latest and most advanced spaceport. Rockets launched from Wenchang can send ten to fifteen percent more payloads in mass to orbit thanks to its low latitude.[92] Additionally, due to its geographic location, the drop zones of rocket debris produced by rocket launches are in the ocean, eliminating threats posed to people and facilities on the ground. Wenchang's coastal location also allows larger rockets to be delivered to launch site by sea, which is difficult, if not impossible, for inland launch sites due to the size limits of tunnels needed to be passed through during transportations.[93]

The biggest breakthrough within the decade, if not decades, were brought by Long March 5 (长征五号), the leading role of the new generation of Long March rockets and China's first heavy-lift launch vehicle. The early study of Long March 5 can be traced back to 1986, and the project was formally approved in mid-2000s. It applied 247 new technologies during its development while over 90% of its components were newly developed and applied for the first time.[94] Instead of using the classic 3.35-meter-diameter core stage and 2.25-meter-diameter side boosters, the 57-meter tall Long March 5 consists of one 5-meter-diameter core stage burning LH2/LOX and four 3.35-meter-diameter side boosters burning kerosene/LOX. With a launch mass as high as 869 metric tons and 10,573 kN lift-off thrust, the Long March 5, being China's most powerful rocket, is capable of lifting up to 25 tons of payload to LEO and 14 tons to GTO, making it more than 2.5 times as much as the previous record holder (Long March 3B) and nearly as equal as the most powerful rocket in the world at that time (Delta IV Heavy).[95][96] Due to its unprecedented capability, the Long March 5 was expected as the keystone for the Chinese space program in the early 21st century. However, after a successful maiden flight in late 2016, the second launch of the Long March 5 on July 2, 2017, suffered a failure, which was considered as the biggest setback for Chinese space program in nearly two decades.[97] Because of the failure, the Long March 5 was grounded indefinitely until the problem was located and resolved, and multiple planned major space missions were either postponed or facing the risk of being postponed in the next few years.[citation needed]

Queqiao relay satellite separating from the launch vehicle on its journey to the Moon
Queqiao relay satellite separating from the launch vehicle on its journey to the Moon
Chang'e-4 and Yutu-2 on the surface of the far side of the Moon
Chang'e-4 and Yutu-2 on the surface of the far side of the Moon

Despite the uncertain future of Long March 5, China managed to make history in space explorations with existing hardware in the next two years. Due to tidal locking, the Moon has been orbiting the Earth as the only natural satellite by facing it with the same side. Humans had never seen the far side of the Moon until the Space Age. Although humans have already got quite an amount of knowledge about the overall condition of the far side of the Moon in early 21st century with the help of numerous visits by lunar orbiters since the 1960s, no country had ever explored the area in close distance due to lack of communications on the far side. This missing piece was eventually filled by China's Chang'e-4 (嫦娥四号) mission in 2019. To solve the communications problem, China launched Queqiao (鹊桥号), a relay satellite orbiting around the Earth–Moon L2 Lagrangian point, in May 2018 to enable communications between the far side of the Moon and the Earth.[98] On December 8, 2018, the Chang'e 4, which was originally built as the backup of Chang'e 3, was launched by a Long March 3B rocket from Xichang and entered lunar orbit on December 12.[99][100] On January 3, 2019, Chang'e 4 successfully soft-landed at the Von Kármán (lunar crater) on the far side of the Moon, and returned the first close-up image of the lunar surface on the far side.[101] A rover named Yutu-2 (玉兔二号) was deployed onto the lunar surface a few hours later, leaving the first trial on the far side.[102] The accomplishment of a series of tasks by Chang'e-4 made China the first country to successfully achieved soft-landing and roving on the far side of the Moon. Because of its great success, the project team received IAF World Space Award of 2020.[103]

Aside from Chang'e 4, there were some other events worth noting during this period. In August 2016, China launched world's first quantum communications satellite Mozi (墨子号).[104] In June 2017, the first Chinese X-ray astronomy satellite named Huiyan (慧眼) was launched into space.[105] In August of the same year, the Astronaut Center of China organized a joint training in which sixteen Chinese and two ESA astronauts participated. It was the first time that foreign astronauts took part in astronaut training organized by China.[106][107] In 2018, China performed more orbital launches than any other countries on the planet for the first time in history.[108] On June 5, 2019, China conducted its first Sea Launch with Long March 11 (长征十一号) in the Yellow Sea.[109] On July 25, Chinese company i-Space became the first Chinese private company to successfully conduct an orbital launch with its Hyperbola-1 small solid rocket.[110]

As the 2010s came to an end, the Chinese space program was poised to conclude the decade with an inspiring event. On December 27, 2019, after a grounding and fixture that lasted for 908 days, the Long March 5 rocket conducted a highly anticipated return-to-flight mission from Wenchang. The mission ended in full success by placing Shijian-20, the heaviest satellite China had ever built, into the intended supersynchronous orbit.[111] The flawless return of Long March 5 swept away all the depressions brought by its last failure since 2017. With its great power, the Long March 5 cleared the paths to multiple world-class space projects, allowing China to make great strides toward its ambitions in the coming 2020s.[112][113][114]

2020-present

[edit]
Tiangong Space Station after its completion in November, 2022.
Tiangong Space Station after its completion in November, 2022.
Astronaut Fei Junlong performing spacewalk on Tiangong Space Station
Astronaut Fei Junlong performing spacewalk on Tiangong Space Station
First gathering of two Chinese astronaut crews on Tiangong Space Station on November 30, 2022.
First gathering of two Chinese astronaut crews on Tiangong Space Station on November 30, 2022

Being the product of latest technology and engineering by Chinese space industry in the early 21st century, the flight-proven Long March 5 unleashed the potential of Chinese space program to a great extent. Various projects previously restricted by the mass and size limits of the payloads were now offered a chance of realization. Ever since 2020, with the help of Long March 5, the Chinese space program has made tremendous progress in multiple areas by completing some of the most challenging missions ever conducted in history of space explorations, impressing the world like never before.[citation needed]

The "Third Step" of China Manned Space Program kicked off in 2020. Long March 5B, a variant of Long March 5, conducted its maiden flight successfully on May 5, 2020. Its high payload capacity and large payload fairing space enabled the delivery of Chinese space station modules to low Earth orbit.[115] On April 29, 2021, Tianhe core module (天和核心舱), the 22-tonne core module of the space station, was successfully launched into Low Earth orbit by a Long March 5B rocket,[116] marking the beginning of the construction of the China Space Station, also known as Tiangong (天宫空间站), followed by unprecedented high frequency of human spaceflight missions. A month later, China launched Tianzhou-2, the first cargo mission to the space station.[117] On June 17, Shenzhou-12, the first crewed mission to the Chinese Space Station consisting of Nie Haisheng, Liu Boming and Tang Hongbo, was launched from Jiuquan.[118] The crew docked with Tianhe and entered the core module about 9 hours after launch, becoming the first residents of the station. The crew lived and worked on the space station for three months, conducted two spacewalks, and returned to Earth safely on September 17, 2021.[119] breaking the record of longest Chinese human spaceflight mission (33 days) previously made by Shenzhou-11.[120] Roughly a month later, the Shenzhou-13 crewed was launched to the station. Astronauts Zhai Zhigang, Wang Yaping and Ye Guangfu completed the first long-duration spaceflight mission of China that lasted for over 180 days before returning to Earth safely on April 16, 2022.[121] Astronaut Wang Yaping became the first Chinese female to perform a spacewalk during the mission.[122]

Starting from May 2022, the China Manned Space Program had entered the space station assembly and construction phase. On June 5, 2022, Shenzhou-13 was launched and docked to Tianhe core module. The crew, including Chen Dong, Liu Yang and Cai Xuzhe, were expected to welcome the arrival of two space station modules during the six-month mission.[123] On July 24, the third Long March 5B rocket lifted off from Wenchang, carrying the 23.2 t Wentian laboratory module (问天实验舱), the largest and heaviest spacecraft ever built and launched by China, into orbit. The module docked with the space station less than 20 hours later, adding the second module and the first laboratory module to it.[124] On September 30, the new Wentian module was rotated from the forward docking port to starboard parking port.[125] On October 31, the Mengtian laboratory module (梦天实验舱), the third and final module of China Space Station, was launched by another Long March 5B rocket into orbit and docked with the space station in less than 13 hours later.[126] On November 3, the 'T-shape' China Space Station was completed after the successful transposition of the Mengtian module.[127] On November 29, Shenzhou-15 was launched and later docked with China Space Station. Astronauts Fei Junlong, Deng Qingming, and Zhang Lu were welcomed by the Shenzhou-14 crew on board the station, completing the first crew gathering and handover in space by Chinese astronauts and starting the era of continuous Chinese astronaut presence in space.[128][129]

Chang'e-5 lander and ascender assembly full-scale mockup display at China Science and Technology Museum
Chang'e-5 lander and ascender assembly full-scale mockup display at China Science and Technology Museum

The third phase of Chinese Lunar Exploration Program was also allowed to proceed in 2020. As preparation, China conducted Chang'e 5-T1 mission in 2014. By completing its main task on November 1, 2014, China demonstrated the capability of returning a spacecraft from the lunar orbit back to Earth safely, paving the way for the lunar sample return mission to be conducted in 2017.[130] However, the failure of the second Long March 5 mission disrupted the original plan. Despite the readiness of the spacecraft, the mission had to be postponed due to the unavailability of its launch vehicle, until the successful return-to-flight of Long March 5 in late 2019.[131] On November 24, 2020, the sample return mission, entitled Chang'e-5 (嫦娥五号), kicked off as the Long March 5 rocket launched the 8.2 t spacecraft stack into space.[132] The spacecraft entered lunar orbit on November 28, followed by a separation of the stack into two parts. The lander landed near Mons Rümker in Oceanus Procellarum on December 1 and started the sample collection process the next day.[133] Two days after the landing, on December 3, the ascent vehicle attached to the lander took off from lunar surface and entered lunar orbit, carrying the container with collected samples. This was the first time that China launched a spacecraft from an extraterrestrial body.[134][135] On December 6, the ascent vehicle successfully docked with the orbiter in lunar orbit and transferred the sample container to the return capsule, accomplishing the first robotic rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit in history.[136] On December 13, the orbiter, along with the return module, entered the orbit back to Earth after main engine burns.[137] The return capsule eventually landed intact in Inner Mongolia on December 17, sealing the perfect completion of the mission.[138]

A small portion of the lunar samples retrieved by Chang'e-5
A small portion of the lunar samples retrieved by Chang'e-5

On December 19, 2020, CNSA hosted the Chang'e-5 lunar sample handover ceremony in Beijing. By weighing the sample container taken out from the return capsule, CNSA announced that Chang'e-5 retrieved 1,731 grams of samples from the Moon.[139] Being the most complex mission completed by China at the time, the Chang'e-5 mission achieved multiple remarkable milestones, including China's first lunar sampling, first liftoff from an extraterrestrial body, first automated rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit (by any nation) and the first spacecraft carrying samples to re-enter Earth's atmosphere at high speed.[140] Its success also marked the completion of the goal of "Orbiting, Landing, Returning" planned by CLEP since 2004.[141]

Zhurong rover group selfie with the Tianwen-1 lander taken after the successful landing.
Zhurong rover group selfie with the Tianwen-1 lander taken after the successful landing.

Prior to the launch of Chang'e-5, which targeted the Moon 380,000 km away from the Earth, China's first Mars probe had departed, heading to the Mars 400 million kilometers away. Ever since the approval of the Mars mission in 2016, China had developed various technologies required, including deep space network, atmospheric entry, lander hovering and obstacle avoidance.[142][143] Long March 5, the only launch vehicle capable of delivering the spacecraft, was back to service after its critical return-to-flight in December 2019. As a result, all things were ready when the launch windows of July 2020 arrived. On April 24, 2020, CNSA officially announced the program of Planetary Exploration of China and named China's first independent Mars mission as Tianwen-1 (天问一号).[144] On July 23, 2020, Tianwen-1 was successfully launched atop a Long March 5 rocket into Trans-Mars injection orbit.[145] The spacecraft, consisting of an orbiter, a lander, and a rover, aimed to achieve the goals of orbiting, landing, and roving on Mars in one single mission on the nation's first attempt. Due to its highly complex and risky nature, the mission was widely described as "ambitious" by international observers.[146][147][148][149][150]

After a seven-month journey, on February 10, 2021, Tianwen-1 entered Mars orbit and became China's first operational Mars probe.[151] The payloads on the orbiter were subsequently activated and started surveying Mars in preparation for the landing. In the following few months, CNSA released a series of images captured by the orbiter.[152][153] On April 24, CNSA announced that the first Chinese Mars rover carried by Tianwen-1 probe had been named Zhurong, the god of fire in ancient Chinese mythology.[154]

On May 15, 2020, around 1 am (Beijing time), Tianwen-1 initiated its landing process by igniting its main engines and lowering its orbit, followed by the separation of landing module at 4 am. The orbiter then returned to the parking orbit while the lander moved toward Mars atmosphere. Three hours later, the landing experienced the most dangerous atmospheric entry process that lasted for nine minutes. At 7:18 am, the lander successfully landed on the preselected southern Utopia Planitia.[155] On May 25, the Zhurong rover drove onto the Martian surface from the lander.[156] On June 11, CNSA released the first batch of high-resolution images of landing sites captured by Zhurong rovers, marking the success of the Mars landing mission.[157] Being China's first independent Mars mission, Tianwen-1 completed the daunting process involving the orbiting, landing, and roving in highly sophisticated manner on one single attempt, making China the second nation to land and drive a Mars rover on the Martian surface after the United States. It drew the attention of the world as another example of China's rapidly expanding presence in outer space.[155] Because of its huge difficulty and inspiring success, the Tianwen-1 development team received IAF World Space Award of 2022. It was the second time that a Chinese team awarded with this honor after the Chang'e-4 mission in 2019.[103]

On 13 March, China attempted to launch two spacecrafts, DRO-A and DRO-B, into distant retrograde orbit around the Moon. As an independent project, the mission was managed by Chinese Academy of Sciences instead of Chinese Lunar Exploration Program. However, the mission failed to reach the strived for orbit due to an upper stage malfunction, remaining stranded in low Earth orbit.[158][159] Rescue attempts had been made as its orbit had been observed being significantly raised to a highly elliptical orbit since its launch, yet the following status remains unknown to the public.[160] They appear to have succeeded in reaching their desired orbit.[161][162]

On 20 March 2024 China launched its relay satellite, Queqiao-2, in the orbit of the Moon, along with two mini satellites Tiandu 1 and 2. Queqiao-2 will relay communications for the Chang'e 6 (far side of the Moon), Chang'e 7 and Chang'e 8 (Lunar south pole region) spacecrafts. Tiandu 1 and 2 will test technologies for a future lunar navigation and positioning constellation.[163] All the three probes entered lunar orbit successfully on 24 March 2024 (Tiandu-1 and 2 were attached to each other and separated in lunar orbit on 3 April 2024).[164][165]

China sent Chang'e 6 on 3 May 2024, which conducted the first lunar sample return from Apollo Basin on the far side of the Moon.[166] This is China's second lunar sample return mission, the first was achieved by Chang'e 5 from the lunar near side four years earlier.[167] It also carried the Chinese Jinchan rover to conduct infrared spectroscopy of lunar surface and imaged Chang'e 6 lander on lunar surface.[168] The lander-ascender-rover combination was separated with the orbiter and returner before landing on 1 June 2024 at 22:23 UTC. It landed on the Moon's surface on 1 June 2024.[169][170] The ascender was launched back to lunar orbit on 3 June 2024 at 23:38 UTC, carrying samples collected by the lander, and later completed another robotic rendezvous and docking in lunar orbit. The sample container was then transferred to the returner, which landed in Inner Mongolia on 25 June 2024, completing China's far side extraterrestrial sample return mission. After dropping off the return samples for Earth, the Chang'e 6 (CE-6) orbiter was successfully captured by the Sun-Earth L2 Lagrange point on 9 September 2024.[171]

Near future development

[edit]
Xuntian Space Telescope mockup
Xuntian Space Telescope mockup

According to a 2022 government white paper, China will conduct more human spaceflight, lunar and planetary exploration missions, including:[172]

In addition to these, China has also initiated the crewed lunar landing phase of its lunar exploration program, which aims to land Chinese astronauts on the Moon by 2030. A new crewed carrier rocket (Long March 10), new generation crew spacecraft, crewed lunar lander, lunar EVA spacesuit, lunar rover and other equipment are under development.[173][174]

CNSA's Tianwen-2 was launched in May 2025,[175] to explore the co-orbital near-Earth asteroid 469219 Kamoʻoalewa and the active asteroid 311P/PanSTARRS and collecting samples of the regolith of Kamo'oalewa.[176]

Chinese space program and the international community

[edit]

Belt and Road Initiative

[edit]

One of China's priorities in its Belt and Road Initiative is to improve satellite information pathways.[177]: 300 

Bilateral space cooperation

[edit]
CBERS-4 satellite of the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program
CBERS-4 satellite of the China–Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program

China is an attractive partner for space cooperation for other developing countries because it launches their satellites at a reduced cost and often provides financing in the form of policy loans.[177]: 301 

With respect to the African countries, the 2022-2024 action plan for the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation commits China to using space technology to enhance cooperation with African countries and to create centers for Africa-China cooperation on satellite remote sensing application.[177]: 300  African countries are increasingly cooperating with China on satellite launches and specialized training.[177]: 301  As of 2022, China has launched two satellites for Ethiopia, two for Nigeria, one for Algeria, one for Sudan, and one for Egypt.[177]: 301–302 

China and Namibia jointly operate the China Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Station which was established in 2001 in Swakopmund, Namibia.[177]: 304  This station tracks Chinese satellites and space missions.[177]: 304 

China and Brazil have successfully cooperated in the field of space.[178]: 202  Among the most successful space cooperation projects were the development and launch of earth monitoring satellites.[178]: 202  As of 2023, the two countries have jointly developed six China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellites.[178]: 202  These projects have helped both Brazil and China develop their access to satellite imagery and promoted remote sending research.[178]: 202  Brazil and China's cooperation is a unique example of South-South cooperation between two developing countries in the field of space.[178]: 202 

Dual-use technologies and outer space

[edit]

The PRC is a member of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and a signatory to all United Nations treaties and conventions on space, with the exception of the 1979 Moon Treaty.[179] The United States government has long been resistant to the use of PRC launch services by American industry due to concerns over alleged civilian technology transfer that could have dual-use military applications to countries such as North Korea, Iran or Syria. Thus, financial retaliatory measures have been taken on many occasions against several Chinese space companies.[180]

NASA's policy excluding Chinese state affiliates

[edit]

The Cox Report, released in 1999, alleged that following decades of intelligence operations against U.S. weapons laboratories conducted by the Ministry of State Security, China stole design information regarding advanced thermonuclear weapons. In 2011, Congress passed a law prohibiting NASA researchers from working with Chinese citizens affiliated with a Chinese state enterprise or entity without FBI certification or using NASA funds to host Chinese visitors.[181] In March 2013, the U.S. Congress passed legislation barring Chinese nationals from entering NASA facilities without a waiver from NASA.[182]

The history of the U.S. exclusion policy can be traced back to the Cox Report's allegations that the technical information that American companies provided China for its commercial satellite ended up improving Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile technology.[183] This was further aggravated in 2007 when China blew up a defunct meteorological satellite in low Earth orbit to test a ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile. The debris created by the explosion contributed to the space junk that litter Earth's orbit, exposing other nations' space assets to the risk of accidental collision.[183] The United States also fears the Chinese application of dual-use space technology for nefarious purposes.[184]

The Chinese response to the exclusion policy involved its own space policy of opening up its space station to the outside world, welcoming scientists coming from all countries.[184] American scientists have also boycotted NASA conferences due to its rejection of Chinese nationals in these events.[185] In September 2025, NASA prohibited Chinese nationals from working with its programs.[186]

Organization

[edit]

Initially, the space program of the PRC was organized under the People's Liberation Army, particularly the Second Artillery Corps (now the PLA Rocket Force, PLARF). In the 1990s, the PRC reorganized the space program as part of a general reorganization of the defense industry to make it resemble Western defense procurement.

The China National Space Administration, an agency within the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, is now responsible for launches. The Long March rocket is produced by the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, and satellites are produced by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation. The latter organizations are state-owned enterprises; however, it is the intent of the PRC government that they should not be actively state-managed and that they should behave as independent design bureaus.[citation needed]

Universities and institutes

[edit]

The space program also has close links with:

Space cities

[edit]

Suborbital launch sites

[edit]
  • Nanhui (南汇县老港镇东进村) First successful launch of a T-7M sounding rocket on February 19, 1960.[191]
  • Base 603 (安徽广德誓节渡中国科学院六〇三基地) Also known as Guangde Launch Site (广德发射场).[192] The first successful flight of a biological experimental sounding rocket transporting eight white mice was launched and recovered on July 19, 1964.[193]

Satellite launch centers

[edit]

The PRC has 6 satellite launch centers/sites:

Monitoring and control centers

[edit]

Domestic tracking stations

[edit]

Overseas tracking stations

[edit]

Plus shared space tracking facilities with France, Brazil, Sweden, and Australia.

Crewed landing sites

[edit]

Notable spaceflight programs

[edit]

Project 714

[edit]

As the Space Race between the two superpowers reached its climax with humans landing on the Moon, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided on July 14, 1967, that the PRC should not be left behind, and therefore initiated China's own crewed space program. The top-secret Project 714 aimed to put two people into space by 1973 with the Shuguang spacecraft. Nineteen PLAAF pilots were selected for this goal in March 1971. The Shuguang-1 spacecraft to be launched with the CZ-2A rocket was designed to carry a crew of two. The program was officially cancelled on May 13, 1972, for economic reasons, though the internal politics of the Cultural Revolution likely motivated the closure.[citation needed]

The short-lived second crewed program was based on the successful implementation of landing technology (third in the World after USSR and United States) by FSW satellites. It was announced a few times in 1978 with the open publishing of some details including photos, but then was abruptly canceled in 1980. It has been argued that the second crewed program was created solely for propaganda purposes, and was never intended to produce results.[200]

Project 863

[edit]

A new crewed space program was proposed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in March 1986, as Astronautics plan 863-2. This consisted of a crewed spacecraft (Project 863–204) used to ferry astronaut crews to a space station (Project 863–205). In September of that year, astronauts in training were presented by the Chinese media. The various proposed crewed spacecraft were mostly spaceplanes. Project 863 ultimately evolved into the 1992 Project 921.[citation needed]

China Manned Space Program (Project 921)

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Spacecraft

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Return capsule and parachute of Shenzhou spacecraft
Return capsule and parachute of Shenzhou spacecraft
Exhibition of China Manned Space Program at the National Museum of China in 2023
Exhibition of China Manned Space Program at the National Museum of China in 2023

In 1992, authorization and funding were given for the first phase of Project 921, which was a plan to launch a crewed spacecraft. The Shenzhou program had four uncrewed test flights and two crewed missions. The first one was Shenzhou 1 on November 20, 1999. On January 9, 2001 Shenzhou 2 launched carrying test animals. Shenzhou 3 and Shenzhou 4 were launched in 2002, carrying test dummies. Following these was the successful Shenzhou 5, China's first crewed mission in space on October 15, 2003, which carried Yang Liwei in orbit for 21 hours and made China the third nation to launch a human into orbit. Shenzhou 6 followed two years later ending the first phase of Project 921. Missions are launched on the Long March 2F rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. The China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) of the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission provides engineering and administrative support for the crewed Shenzhou missions.[201]

Space laboratory

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The second phase of the Project 921 started with Shenzhou 7, China's first spacewalk mission. Then, two crewed missions were planned to the first Chinese space laboratory. The PRC initially designed the Shenzhou spacecraft with docking technologies imported from Russia, therefore compatible with the International Space Station (ISS). On September 29, 2011, China launched Tiangong 1. This target module is intended to be the first step to testing the technology required for a planned space station.

On October 31, 2011, a Long March 2F rocket lifted the Shenzhou 8 uncrewed spacecraft which docked twice with the Tiangong 1 module. The Shenzhou 9 craft took off on 16 June 2012 with a crew of 3. It successfully docked with the Tiangong-1 laboratory on 18 June 2012, at 06:07 UTC, marking China's first crewed spacecraft docking.[202] Another crewed mission, Shenzhou 10, launched on 11 June 2013. The Tiangong 1 target module is then expected to be deorbited.[203]

A second space lab, Tiangong 2, launched on 15 September 2016, 22:04:09 (UTC+8).[204] The launch mass was 8,600 kg, with a length of 10.4m and a width of 3.35m, much like the Tiangong 1.[205] Shenzhou 11 launched and rendezvoused with Tiangong 2 in October 2016, with an unconfirmed further mission Shenzhou 12 in the future. The Tiangong 2 brings with it the POLAR gamma ray burst detector, a space-Earth quantum key distribution, and laser communications experiment to be used in conjunction with the Mozi 'Quantum Science Satellite', a liquid bridge thermocapillary convection experiment, and a space material experiment. Also included is a stereoscopic microwave altimeter, a space plant growth experiment, and a multi-angle wide-spectral imager and multi-spectral limb imaging spectrometer. Onboard TG-2 there will also be the world's first-ever in-space cold atomic fountain clock.[205]

Space station

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A larger basic permanent space station (基本型空间站) would be the third and last phase of Project 921. This will be a modular design with an eventual weight of around 60 tons, to be completed sometime before 2022. The first section, designated Tiangong 3, was scheduled for launch after Tiangong 2,[206] but ultimately not ordered after its goals were merged with Tiangong 2.[207]

This could also be the beginning of China's crewed international cooperation, the existence of which was officially disclosed for the first time after the launch of Shenzhou 7.[208]

The first module of Tiangong space station, Tianhe core module, was launched on 29 April 2021, from Wenchang Space Launch Site.[116] It was first visited by Shenzhou 12 crew on 17 June 2021. The Chinese space station is scheduled to be completed in 2022[209] and fully operational by 2023.

Lunar exploration

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Annotated image of the approximate landing site of the Chinese Chang'e-3 lander. It was launched at 17:30 UTC on 1 December 2013 and reached the Moon's surface on 14 December 2013. The lunar coordinates are: 44.12°N 19.51°W.
Chang'e 4 lander on the far side of the Moon
Chang'e 4 lander on the far side of the Moon

In January 2004, the PRC formally started the implementation phase of its uncrewed Moon exploration project. According to Sun Laiyan, administrator of the China National Space Administration, the project will involve three phases: orbiting the Moon; landing; and returning samples.[citation needed]

On December 14, 2005, it was reported "an effort to launch lunar orbiting satellites will be supplanted in 2007 by a program aimed at accomplishing an uncrewed lunar landing. A program to return uncrewed space vehicles from the Moon will begin in 2012 and last for five years, until the crewed program gets underway" in 2017, with a crewed Moon landing planned after that.[210]

The decision to develop a new Moon rocket in the 1962 Soviet UR-700M-class (Project Aelita) able to launch a 500-ton payload in LTO[dubiousdiscuss] and a more modest 50 tons LTO payload LV has been discussed in a 2006 conference by academician Zhang Guitian (张贵田), a liquid propellant rocket engine specialist, who developed the CZ-2 and CZ-4A rockets engines.[211][212][213]

On June 22, 2006, Long Lehao, deputy chief architect of the lunar probe project, laid out a schedule for China's lunar exploration. He set 2024 as the date of China's first moonwalk.[214]

In September 2010, it was announced that the country is planning to carry out explorations in deep space by sending a man to the Moon by 2025. China also hoped to bring a Moon rock sample back to Earth in 2017, and subsequently build an observatory on the Moon's surface. Ye Peijian, Commander in Chief of the Chang'e program and an academic at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, added that China has the "full capacity to accomplish Mars exploration by 2013."[215][216]

On December 14, 2013[217] China's Chang'e 3 became the first object to soft-land on the Moon since Luna 24 in 1976.[218]

On 20 May 2018, several months before the Chang'e 4 mission, the Queqiao was launched from Xichang Satellite Launch Center in China, on a Long March 4C rocket.[219] The spacecraft took 24 days to reach L2, using a gravity assist at the Moon to save propellant.[220] On 14 June 2018, Queqiao finished its final adjustment burn and entered the mission orbit, about 65,000 kilometres (40,000 mi) from the Moon. This is the first lunar relay satellite ever placed in this location.[220]

On January 3, 2019, Chang'e 4, the China National Space Administration's lunar rover, made the first-ever soft landing on the Moon's far side. The rover was able to transmit data back to Earth despite the lack of radio frequencies on the far side, via a dedicated satellite sent earlier to orbit the Moon. Landing and data transmission are considered landmark achievements for human space exploration.[221]

Yang Liwei declared at the 16th Human in Space Symposium of International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) in Beijing, on May 22, 2007, that building a lunar base was a crucial step to realize a flight to Mars and farther planets.[222]

According to practice, since the whole project is only at a very early preparatory research phase, no official crewed Moon program has been announced yet by the authorities. But its existence is nonetheless revealed by regular intentional leaks in the media.[223] A typical example is the Lunar Roving Vehicle (月球车) that was shown on a Chinese TV channel (东方卫视) during the 2008 May Day celebrations.

On 23 November 2020, China launched the new Moon mission Chang'e 5, which returned to Earth carrying lunar samples on 16 December 2020. Only two nations, the United States and the former Soviet Union have ever returned materials from the Moon, thus making China the third country to have ever achieved the feat.[224]

China sent Chang'e 6 on 3 May, which conducted the first lunar sample return from the far side of the Moon.[166] This is China's second lunar sample return mission, the first was achieved by Chang'e 5 from the lunar near side 4 years ago.[167]

Mission to Mars and beyond

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Tianwen-1 probe in Mars orbit.
Tianwen-1 probe in Mars orbit.
Zhurong rover and lander captured by HiRISE from NASA's MRO on June 6, 2021
Zhurong rover and lander on Martian surface. Image captured by HiRISE from NASA's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter on 6 June 2021

In 2006, the Chief Designer of the Shenzhou spacecraft stated in an interview that:

搞航天工程不是要达成升空之旅, 而是要让人可以正常在太空中工作, 为将来探索火星、土星等作好准备。 Space programs are not aimed at sending humans into space per se, but instead at enabling humans to work normally in space, and prepare for the future exploration of Mars, Saturn, and beyond.

— CAS Academician Qi Faren[225]

Sun Laiyan, administrator of the China National Space Administration, said on July 20, 2006, that China would start deep space exploration focusing on Mars over the next five years, during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) Program period.[226] In April 2020, the Planetary Exploration of China program was announced. The program aims to explore planets of the Solar System, starting with Mars, then expanded to include asteroids and comets, Jupiter and more in the future.[227]

The first mission of the program, Tianwen-1 Mars exploration mission, began on July 23, 2020. A spacecraft, which consisted of an orbiter, a lander, a rover, a remote and a deployable camera, was launched by a Long March 5 rocket from Wenchang.[145] The Tianwen-1 was inserted into Mars orbit in February 2021 after a seven-month journey, followed by a successful soft landing of the lander and Zhurong rover on May 14, 2021.[228]

Space-based solar power

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According to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST) presentation at the 2015 International Space Development Congress in Toronto, Canada, Chinese interest in space-based solar power began in the period 1990–1995. By 2013, there was a national goal, that "the state has decided that power coming from outside of the earth, such as solar power and development of other space energy resources, is to be China's future direction" and the following roadmap was identified: "In 2010, CAST will finish the concept design; in 2020, we will finish the industrial level testing of in-orbit construction and wireless transmissions. In 2025, we will complete the first 100kW SPS demonstration at LEO; and in 2035, the 100MW SPS will have an electric generating capacity. Finally in 2050, the first commercial level SPS system will be in operation at GEO."[229] The article went on to state that "Since SPS development will be a huge project, it will be considered the equivalent of an Apollo program for energy. In the last century, America's leading position in science and technology worldwide was inextricably linked with technological advances associated with the implementation of the Apollo program. Likewise, as China's current achievements in aerospace technology are built upon with its successive generations of satellite projects in space, China will use its capabilities in space science to assure sustainable development of energy from space."[229]

In 2015, the CAST team won the International SunSat Design Competition with their video of a Multi-Rotary Joint concept.[230] The design was presented in detail in a paper for the Online Journal of Space Communication.[231][232]

In 2016, Lt Gen. Zhang Yulin, deputy chief of the PLA armament development department of the Central Military Commission, suggested that China would next begin to exploit Earth-Moon space for industrial development. The goal would be the construction of space-based solar power satellites that would beam energy back to Earth.[233]

In June 2021, Chinese officials confirmed the continuation of plans for a geostationary solar power station by 2050. The updated schedule anticipates a small-scale electricity generation test in 2022, followed by a megawatt-level orbital power station by 2030. The gigawatt-level geostationary station will require over 10,000 tonnes of infrastructure, delivered using over 100 Long March 9 launches.[234]

List of launchers and projects

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Launch vehicles

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Active or under development

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  • Air-Launched SLV able to place a 50 kilogram plus payload to 500 km SSO[235]
  • Ceres-1 small-lift solid-fueled launch vehicle from private firm (relatively high launch cadence)
  • Gravity-1 medium-lift sea-launched solid fuel launch vehicle under development
  • Hyperbola-1 small-lift solid-fueled launch vehicle from private firm
  • Hyperbola-3 medium-lift liquid-fueled (methalox) launch vehicle with reusable first stage (VTVL) from private firm currently under development
  • Jielong 3 small to medium-lift solid fueled launch vehicle currently in service
  • Kaituozhe-1A (开拓者一号甲)
  • Kuaizhou quick-reaction small-lift solid fuel launch vehicle
  • Lijian-1 small to medium-lift solid fuel launch vehicle currently in service (by the commercial spin-off of the Chinese Academy of Sciences)
  • Lijian-2 medium-lift launch vehicle utilizing liquid fuel (kerolox) with reusable first stage under development
  • CZ-2E(A) Intended for launch of Chinese space station modules. Payload capacity up to 14 tons in LEO and 9000 (kN) liftoff thrust developed by 12 rocket engines, with enlarged fairing of 5.20 m in diameter and length of 12.39 m to accommodate large spacecraft[236]
  • CZ-2F/G Modified CZ-2F without escape tower, specially used for launching robotic missions such as Shenzhou cargo and space laboratory module with payload capacity up to 11.2 tons in LEO[237]
  • CZ-3B(A) More powerful Long March rockets using larger-size liquid propellant strap-on motors, with payload capacity up to 13 tons in LEO
  • CZ-3C Launch vehicle combining CZ-3B core with two boosters from CZ-2E
  • Long March 4C
  • CZ-5 heavy-lift hydrolox launch vehicle (with kerolox boosters)
  • CZ-5B variant of the CZ-5 for low Earth orbit payloads (up to 25 tonnes to LEO)
  • CZ-6 or Small Launch Vehicle; small-lift kerolox LV with short launch preparation period, low cost and high reliability, to meet the launch need of small satellites up to 500 kg to 700 km SSO, first flight for 2010; with Fan Ruixiang (范瑞祥) as Chief designer of the project[238][239][240]
  • CZ-7 medium-lift kerolox launch vehicle for launching resupply missions to the Tiangong space station
  • CZ-8 medium-lift launch vehicle mainly for launching payloads to SSO orbits
  • CZ-9 super heavy-lift launch vehicle with a LEO lift capability of 150 tonnes currently under development (planned to be fully reusable in time)
  • CZ-10 crew-rated super-heavy launch vehicle for crewed lunar missions under development
  • CZ-10A crew-rated medium-lift launch vehicle for launching the next-generation crewed spacecraft to LEOs with reusable first stage currently under development
  • CZ-11 small-lift solid fuel quick-response launch vehicle
  • Pallas-1 reusable (1st stage) medium-lift liquid fuel (kerolox) launch vehicle by private firm currently under development
  • Project 921-3 Reusable launch vehicle current project of the reusable shuttle system.
  • Tengyun another current project of two wing-staged reusable shuttle system
  • Reusable spaceplane reusable vertically launched spaceplane with wings that lands on a runway and currently in service (speculated to be similar to the US X-37B in form and function)
  • Tianlong 2 medium-lift kerolox launch vehicle from private firm (in service)
  • Tianlong 3 medium to heavy-lift kerolox launch vehicle with reusable first stage from private firm currently under development
  • Zhuque-2 medium-lift liquid fuel (methalox) launch vehicle by private firm currently in service (first methane fueled rocket in the world to reach space and to reach orbit with payload)
  • Zhuque-3 medium to heavy-lift methalox launch vehicle by private firm with reusable first stage currently under development

Cancelled/retired

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  • CZ-1D based on a CZ-1 but with a new N2O4/UDMH second stage.
  • Project 869 reusable shuttle system with Tianjiao-1 or Chang Cheng-1 (Great Wall-1) orbiters. Project of 1980s-1990s.

Satellites and science missions

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Space exploration

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Crewed LEO Program

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Chinese Lunar Exploration Program

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Deep Space Exploration Program

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China's first deep space probe, the Yinghuo-1 orbiter, was launched in November 2011 along with the joint Fobos-Grunt mission with Russia, but the rocket failed to leave Earth orbit and both probes underwent destructive re-entry on 15 January 2012.[252]

In 2018, Chinese researchers proposed a deep space exploration roadmap to explore Mars, an asteroid, Jupiter, and further targets, within the 2020–2030 timeframe.[253][254] Current and upcoming robotic missions include:

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Chinese space program constitutes a state-orchestrated initiative for space access, exploration, and utilization, coordinated by the with extensive military integration under the policy that blurs distinctions between civilian and defense technologies to advance national strategic capabilities. Originating from efforts in the 1950s, spearheaded by after his repatriation from the , the program realized its first independent orbital launch with the Dongfanghong 1 satellite on April 24, 1970, establishing as the fifth country to achieve this feat using domestic rocketry. Landmark accomplishments encompass the inaugural crewed flight of on October 15, 2003, piloted by for 21 hours in orbit; the operational completion of the in November 2022 following the docking of its Mengtian module; the pioneering soft landing on the Moon's far side by on January 3, 2019, in the South Pole-Aitken Basin; and robotic sample retrieval missions yielding 1,731 grams from via , returned December 17, 2020, and 1,935 grams from the far side via , returned June 25, 2024. These efforts underpin dual-use systems like the constellation for global navigation and positioning, rivaling foreign counterparts, while enabling military functions such as enhanced surveillance, secure communications, and counterspace measures demonstrated in the 2007 antisatellite test that generated significant orbital debris. The program's emphasis on indigenous innovation persists amid export controls on sensitive technologies, driving rapid advancements in launch vehicles, propulsion, and deep-space probes toward ambitions including Mars sample return and crewed lunar landings.

Historical Development

Origins and Early Efforts (1950s-1970s)

The Chinese space program originated in the 1950s as part of broader missile development efforts to bolster national defense following the founding of the in 1949. , a pioneering aerospace engineer who returned from the in 1955 after detention amid McCarthy-era suspicions, played a central role in establishing the program. He directed missile and research from 1956 until 1991, founding key institutions such as the Fifth Academy of the Ministry of Defense, which focused on rocketry. Initial progress relied heavily on Soviet assistance, including technical blueprints, missile samples, and expertise shared from the mid-1950s until the around 1960, which forced China to indigenize its technologies. Early efforts emphasized ballistic missiles like the Dongfeng series, derived from Soviet designs such as the R-2, with the DF-1 tested successfully in 1960. China's first occurred on July 19, 1964, when a biological carrying white mice was launched and recovered, marking an initial foray into experimentation. Development of the (CZ-1) began in the second half of 1965, adapting the Dong Feng 4 intermediate-range ballistic missile into a satellite carrier to achieve orbital capability. The program's most significant milestone came on April 24, 1970, with the launch of Dongfanghong-1, China's first artificial , weighing 173 kg and orbiting at an apogee of 2,286 km and perigee of 441 km with a 68.4° inclination from . The satellite broadcast the revolutionary song "The East is Red" and operated for about 20 days, demonstrating independent orbital insertion and making China the fifth nation to achieve this feat. These achievements unfolded amid the (1966-1976), a period of political upheaval that disrupted scientific endeavors nationwide, yet the space program persisted under military oversight, prioritizing strategic autonomy over ideological conformity. Despite purges and resource constraints, institutional protections allowed breakthroughs like Dongfanghong-1, underscoring the program's resilience in pursuing self-reliant rocketry amid external isolation.

Post-Mao Recovery and Institutionalization (1980s)

Following the Cultural Revolution's disruptions and Mao Zedong's death in 1976, China's space program recovered under Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic reforms, prioritizing economic utility over ideological prestige projects. The manned initiative was terminated in 1980 owing to insufficient funding, technological hurdles, and a reorientation toward satellite-based applications for , , and . This refocus aligned with broader national modernization, emphasizing reliable launch capabilities and dual-use technologies managed by defense-oriented ministries. Launches recommenced steadily with the Long March 2 series, including the deployment of scientific and recoverable satellites like Shi Jian 2 on November 26, 1980, and the first successful recovery of a Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) photoreconnaissance satellite in 1981. The decade's pivotal advancement came with the Long March 3, incorporating the domestically developed YF-73 cryogenic upper stage engine—whose research began in the late 1970s—to enable geostationary orbits. The Xichang Satellite Launch Center became operational in 1984, supporting these efforts; its debut Long March 3 flight on January 29 failed to orbit the DFH-2 prototype communications satellite, but a subsequent launch on April 8 successfully placed DFH-2 into geosynchronous orbit at 125°E, facilitating experimental TV broadcasting and marking China's entry into synchronous satellite operations. Institutionally, the program solidified under the Ministry of Aerospace Industry, which coordinated research institutes, launch vehicle academies, and satellite developers like the . This structure reduced political interference, fostering incremental improvements in reliability—evidenced by multiple FSW recoveries and additional DFH-2 deployments, such as in February 1986. By decade's end, on April 12, 1988, the ministry merged with the Ministry of Aviation Industry to form the Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics Industry, streamlining oversight amid growing emphasis on export potential for launch services. These changes professionalized operations, setting foundations for sustained growth despite persistent resource constraints relative to superpowers.

Commercialization Attempts and Setbacks (1990s)

In the early 1990s, China actively pursued commercialization of its space launch capabilities to generate revenue and gain international experience, marketing variants of the Long March rocket family for foreign satellite deployments into geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). The program marked a significant departure from purely domestic efforts, with China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) securing contracts for U.S.- and European-built payloads. The inaugural commercial launch occurred on April 7, 1990, when a Long March 3 rocket successfully orbited the AsiaSat 1 communications satellite from Xichang Satellite Launch Center, demonstrating China's entry into the global market. Subsequent efforts focused on the Long March 2E, a strap-on boosted variant designed specifically for heavier commercial GTO missions, with its first flight on January 8, 1992. Between 1992 and 1995, the 2E conducted six flights under commercial contracts, achieving only three full successes due to recurring technical issues, including separation failures and structural instabilities during strap-on booster jettison. A on , 1995, saw a 2E explode approximately 50 seconds after liftoff while carrying the Hughes APStar 2 , scattering debris over and killing at least six nearby villagers while injuring dozens more; the incident was attributed to aerodynamic overload from improper booster separation. This accident highlighted deficiencies in simulation and ground testing, eroding client confidence and prompting temporary halts in marketing efforts. The setbacks culminated in the February 15, 1996, debut of the Long March 3B, which failed during the Intelsat 708 mission due to a broken wire in the inertial measurement unit's power supply, causing loss of attitude control and a crash into a nearby village that reportedly killed between six and dozens of residents. This deadliest incident in Chinese space history grounded the entire Long March fleet for over a year, leading to contract cancellations by international insurers and operators wary of reliability risks. In response, China implemented rigorous reforms, including enhanced factory acceptance testing and full-duration ground simulations, but the failures exacerbated U.S. concerns over technology transfers during post-accident investigations involving American firms like Loral Space & Communications, which provided guidance improvements and faced subsequent export control scrutiny. These attempts yielded limited revenue—estimated at under $100 million annually by mid-decade—while exposing systemic challenges in and international integration, ultimately constraining China's to less than 5% of global commercial launches by 1999. Despite resuming successful flights in , such as the 3B's recovery mission, the 1990s setbacks reinforced perceptions of technical immaturity and contributed to tightened Western export restrictions, hindering further foreign partnerships.

Breakthroughs in Human Spaceflight and Lunar Missions (2000s)

The Shenzhou program achieved its primary breakthrough in with the launch of on October 15, 2003, from the aboard a Long March 2F rocket. The mission carried taikonaut , who orbited Earth 14 times over 21 hours and 23 minutes before a safe landing in . This flight established China as the third nation—after the and the —to independently send a human into space, demonstrating reliable reentry and recovery systems derived from Russian Soyuz designs but indigenously produced. Building on this success, Shenzhou 6 launched on October 12, 2005, with a of two taikonauts, and Nie Haisheng, who conducted a five-day mission focused on extended-duration and validation. The completed 76 orbits, testing operations in microgravity and the functionality of the orbital module for potential future docking experiments. Shenzhou 7, launched on September 25, 2008, advanced capabilities further by carrying three taikonauts—, Liu Boming, and —and executing China's first (EVA). Zhai Zhigang performed a 20-minute spacewalk, demonstrating the feasibility of suited operations outside the using the Feitian suit. In lunar exploration, the Chang'e-1 mission represented China's inaugural deep-space endeavor, launching on October 24, 2007, via a Long March 3A rocket from . The orbiter entered on November 5, 2007, and over its 16-month operational phase, it generated the first complete high-resolution three-dimensional map of the Moon's surface, along with data on its composition and topography from instruments including a and laser altimeter. The mission concluded with a controlled impact on the lunar surface on March 1, 2009, providing engineering data for subsequent probes while confirming China's proficiency in interplanetary navigation and autonomous operations. These achievements in the laid the groundwork for China's sustained presence in crewed spaceflight and systematic lunar studies, prioritizing self-reliance amid international technology restrictions.

Space Station Construction and Mission Intensification (2010s)

In September 2010, the Chinese government approved the manned project under the (CMSA), marking a strategic escalation in orbital infrastructure development to achieve independent long-duration human presence in space. This initiative built on prior Shenzhou missions by prioritizing rendezvous, docking, and life-support technologies essential for modular station assembly, with Tiangong-series laboratories serving as precursors to validate key systems before the core module's planned launch around 2020. The prototype space laboratory launched on September 29, 2011, aboard a Long March 2F rocket from , entering a 343-kilometer to test automated and manual docking procedures. Shenzhou 8, an unmanned mission, achieved China's first orbital docking with on November 2, 2011, after a 13-day free-flight phase, demonstrating proximity operations and separation maneuvers critical for future multi-module configurations. This was followed by Shenzhou 9, the first crewed docking on June 18, 2012, carrying astronauts , Liu Wang, and Liu Yang for a 13-day mission that included manual docking backups and microgravity experiments in and . Shenzhou 10 docked with on June 13, 2013, extending crewed operations to 15 days under commander Nie Haisheng, with taikonauts and Zhang Xiaoguang conducting over 40 scientific tasks, including a broadcast to Earth audiences on fluid physics and . These missions confirmed the reliability of the APAS-derived docking mechanism and environmental controls, accumulating data on and resource recycling that informed subsequent designs. continued unmanned operations post-Shenzhou 10 until communication loss in 2016, deorbiting uncontrolled in April 2018. Advancing the program, Tiangong-2 launched on September 15, 2016, featuring upgraded regenerative life support and a variable-thrust system for precise maintenance. Shenzhou 11 docked on October 18, 2016, with taikonauts and Chen Dong conducting China's longest crewed mission to date at 33 days, testing technology and extravehicular readiness while deploying a for . Tiangong-2's operations emphasized in-orbit refueling interfaces and integration prototypes, directly supporting the three-module Chinese Space Station (CSS) architecture announced in the mid-2010s, with design finalization by 2015. Parallel to station precursors, mission cadence intensified, with China executing 207 orbital launches from to 2019—exceeding the prior four decades combined—driven by CMSA priorities in validation and supporting satellite constellations like reconnaissance series. This surge, averaging over 20 launches annually by decade's end, reflected investments in variants for heavier payloads and reflected-orbit insertions, enabling sustained testing of crewed systems amid exclusion from the due to U.S. congressional restrictions under the . By 2019, these efforts positioned for CSS core module launch, underscoring a shift from sporadic achievements to systematic orbital infrastructure buildup.

Contemporary Milestones and Acceleration (2020-present)

The period from 2020 onward marked a significant acceleration in China's space activities, characterized by the completion of the Tiangong space station, successful sample-return missions to the Moon, and the first independent Mars landing. This phase saw an increase in launch frequency and mission complexity, with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) conducting multiple high-profile interplanetary probes and sustaining continuous human presence in orbit. In December 2020, the Chang'e-5 mission achieved China's first lunar sample return, retrieving approximately 1,731 grams of regolith and rocks from the region after a 23-day mission launched on November 23. This marked the first such success since the Soviet in 1976 and provided fresh basaltic samples estimated to be 1.2 billion years younger than those from Apollo missions. The Tianwen-1 mission, launched on July 23, 2020, via a Long March 5 rocket, accomplished orbiting, landing, and roving on Mars in a single expedition. The orbiter entered Mars orbit on February 10, 2021, followed by the successful touchdown of the Zhurong rover and lander in Utopia Planitia on May 14, 2021, making China the second nation after the United States to operate a rover on the Martian surface independently. The rover traveled over 1.2 kilometers during its operational phase before entering hibernation in May 2022 due to dust accumulation on its solar panels. Construction of the progressed rapidly after the launch of the on April 29, 2021, aboard a 5B. The Shenzhou-12 crew docked on June 17, 2021, initiating the first long-duration stay of three astronauts for 90 days. Subsequent modules included the Wentian laboratory on July 24, 2022, and Mengtian on October 31, 2022, completing the station's T-shaped configuration by November 2022. Over this period, seven Shenzhou crewed missions (Shenzhou 12 through 18) and multiple Tianzhou cargo resupplies maintained occupancy, with cumulative crew time exceeding 1,000 days by 2024 and achievements such as the first in-orbit fuel transfer and extravehicular activities using domestic spacesuits. In 2024, the Chang'e-6 mission, launched on May 3 via a , became the first to retrieve samples from the Moon's far side, landing in the South Pole-Aitken basin on June 2 and returning 1,935.3 grams of material to Earth on June 25. Supported by the Queqiao-2 relay satellite launched in March 2024, the mission demonstrated autonomous sampling technologies for shadowed regions. This built on Chang'e-4's 2019 far-side landing and advanced China's lunar exploration roadmap. By 2025, the program continued its momentum with the asteroid exploration mission launched on May 29, targeting samples from the near-Earth 469219 and a flyby of 2016 HO3, representing China's inaugural deep-space sample return beyond the . Launch cadence intensified, with CNSA planning over 100 orbital missions annually and expansions in testing, positioning the program as a peer to established spacefaring entities.

Organizational Framework

Primary Agencies and Leadership

The , established on April 22, 1993, by splitting the former Ministry of Aerospace Industry, serves as the principal civilian agency coordinating China's national space activities, including policy formulation, international cooperation, and oversight of major programs such as lunar and planetary exploration. Headquartered in Beijing's Haidian District, CNSA operates under the State Council and emphasizes civil applications while interfacing with global partners, though its projects often integrate with initiatives driven by the . As of January 2025, Shan Zhongde assumed the role of administrator following the transition from Zhang Kejian, who had led since May 2018 and oversaw milestones like the Chang'e-6 lunar sample return in 2024. Complementing CNSA, the (CASC), a founded in July 1999, functions as the primary contractor for hardware development, manufacturing launch vehicles like the series, satellites, and crewed through its academies and subsidiaries, such as the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology. CASC, which employs over 170,000 personnel across more than 300 subsidiaries, bridges research, production, and commercialization, with significant ties to the (PLA) Rocket Force for launch operations. Current leadership includes Chairman Chen Mingbo, appointed in March 2024, and President , focusing on advancing reusable rocket technologies and expanding commercial satellite services amid national goals for self-reliance in space. In parallel, China's commercial aerospace sector has seen rapid growth, with private enterprises conducting market-oriented operations such as financing via venture capital and private equity and pursuing commercial orders; however, these companies are not fully marketized, remaining deeply embedded in the national system through government regulation, required military qualifications, state capital involvement in some cases, prioritization of national security, and operation under strong state guidance, distinguishing them from independent firms like SpaceX. Private firms advance reusable rockets, satellite internet constellations, and upstream supply chains for materials and components, forming an ecosystem driven by national policies that promote private investment and innovation while aligning with state-led military-civil fusion efforts. The (CMSA), created in April 2018 to streamline human spaceflight efforts previously managed under broader structures, directs the Shenzhou missions, operations, and future lunar landing preparations, reporting to high-level CCP mechanisms. CMSA coordinates taikonaut selection, training, and mission execution, achieving operational status with the core modules by 2022. Overall program coordination occurs through CCP-led Leading Small Groups (LSGs), such as the Manned Space Engineering LSG and Lunar Exploration Program LSG, which integrate civilian agencies with PLA elements under the Central Military Commission (CMC) to align space endeavors with strategic priorities like technological autonomy and , often obscuring lines between civil and military applications due to systemic opacity in disclosures.

Infrastructure and Launch Sites

The Chinese space program's infrastructure encompasses four primary satellite launch centers—, , , and —each tailored to specific orbital requirements and rocket types within the family. These sites, managed under the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) and supported by the (CNSA), form the backbone of launch operations, enabling missions from (LEO) to geostationary transfer orbits (GTO) and deep space probes. Complementary ground infrastructure includes tracking, , and command (TT&C) networks, with fixed stations augmented by Yuan Wang tracking ships for oceanic coverage. Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (JSLC), established in 1958 in Province at approximately 100°E, 41°N, and 1,000 meters elevation, serves as China's oldest and primary site for LEO missions, including recoverable satellites and high-inclination orbits. It hosted the nation's first satellite launch, , in 1970, and its South Launch Site (SLS-2) has been the dedicated pad for all Shenzhou crewed missions, such as the recent rollout for Shenzhou-21 in October 2025. Infrastructure features include a dedicated railway link to the Lanzhou-Urumqi line for rocket transport and the nearby Dingxin Airport with a 4,100-meter , facilitating logistics in the remote environment. Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center (TSLC), founded in March 1966 and operational since 1968 in Province at 1,400–1,900 meters elevation, specializes in sun-synchronous and polar orbits for and meteorological satellites. Its northern trajectory allows overland launches, minimizing debris risks over populated areas, and it supports solid-propellant rockets like 4C and 6. The site's elevated terrain aids payload performance, with advanced testing and tracking facilities integrated into the broader TT&C system. Xichang Satellite Launch Center (XSLC), constructed starting in 1970 and completed in 1983 in Sichuan Province at 102°E, 28.2°N, is optimized for GTO and heavy-lift missions, leveraging its southern latitude for efficient eastward launches over the Pacific. It primarily deploys geostationary communication, broadcast, and weather satellites using Long March 3 series rockets, with infrastructure including a 3,600-meter runway at Xichang Airport and connections via the Sichuan-Yunnan Highway and Chengdu-Kunming railway. The center marked a milestone with over 100 launches by 2024 and continues active operations, as evidenced by a satellite deployment on October 26, 2025. Wenchang Satellite Launch Site, located in Province and operational since its first launch in June 2016, benefits from equatorial positioning (19°N) to maximize payload capacity for heavy-lift vehicles like , supporting lunar probes such as Chang'e-5 and future deep-space missions. Unlike inland sites, it utilizes seaport access for oversized components, reducing transport constraints, and includes dedicated pads for medium-lift rockets alongside emerging commercial facilities to foster involvement. This modern infrastructure positions as a hub for large-scale endeavors, including space station assembly logistics.

Research and Academic Contributions

The Chinese space program's research and academic contributions are primarily coordinated through institutions like the (CAS) and the (CAST), which oversee strategic programs and publish findings in peer-reviewed journals. Since 2011, CAS has implemented the Strategic Priority Research Program on Space Science, funding missions that have produced data on solar-terrestrial physics, dark matter detection, and quantum experiments, leading to numerous publications in international outlets. CAST researchers have contributed over 3,800 publications, focusing on , , and simulations, enhancing global understanding of and materials under microgravity. Lunar exploration missions have yielded significant scientific insights, including the first detailed mapping of the Moon's via Chang'e-1, which provided high-resolution imagery for geological analysis. Chang'e-5 samples, returned in 2020, revealed molecular water (H2O) in lunar soil for the first time, challenging prior assumptions about volatile retention and informing models of planetary formation. Chang'e-4's 2019 landing in the South Pole-Aitken basin delivered data on subsurface structures and radiation environment, contributing to studies of lunar evolution and resource potential. These findings, analyzed by CAS teams, have been disseminated through journals like Chinese Journal of Space Science, established in 1981 to report theoretical and applied advancements. The , operational since 2022, supports multidisciplinary experiments in life sciences, , and fluid physics, with over 1,000 on-orbit tests conducted by 2024. Discoveries include the identification of Niallia tiangongensis, a novel bacterium resilient to space conditions, advancing knowledge of microbial adaptation in extreme environments. medicine research from manned missions has produced studies on in microgravity, including loss countermeasures, published in specialized reviews. These efforts, while often led by state-affiliated bodies, have integrated empirical data from missions into broader space science, though international collaboration remains limited due to policy restrictions.

Technological Foundations

Launch Vehicles: Evolution and Current Fleet

The Long March (Chang Zheng) series constitutes the primary launch vehicles of China's space program, with roots in Dongfeng ballistic missile technology from the 1950s and 1960s. The first orbital-capable rocket, Long March 1 (CZ-1), a 30-meter-tall vehicle derived from the Dongfeng-3 missile, launched the Dongfanghong-1 satellite into low Earth orbit on April 24, 1970, marking China's entry into spaceflight. This single-stage liquid-fueled launcher was retired after two flights in 1971 due to limited payload capacity and reliability concerns. Early evolution emphasized variants adapted for diverse orbits and heavier payloads. The Long March 2A debuted on November 5, 1974, capable of delivering 2,000 kg to (LEO), evolving into the taller (first flight 1982, 3,850 kg to LEO) and (1992, noted for high reliability with 59 successful launches by 2022). Specialized models included the Long March 2E for geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO) missions (1990–1995, 3,500 kg to GTO) and Long March 2F for (2003 debut, 8,400 kg to LEO, used in Shenzhou missions). The Long March 3 series, optimized for geostationary launches, featured the 3B variant's first success in 1996, upgraded to 5,500 kg to LEO. These first-generation vehicles relied on hypergolic propellants and missile-derived stages, achieving over 400 missions but facing occasional failures, such as structural issues in early Long March 7A tests in 2020. Transition to second-generation launchers in the introduced non-missile-derived designs with advanced kerosene-liquid oxygen (YF-100) and cryogenic (YF-77) engines for greater efficiency and payload. The heavy-lift , 57 meters tall with a 25-tonne core stage, conducted its maiden flight on November 3, 2016, from , delivering up to 14,000 kg to GTO despite an early anomaly in a subsequent 2017 launch. The debuted with YF-100 engines for sun-synchronous orbits (1,080 kg capacity), while , also YF-100 powered, supports logistics with 13,500 kg to LEO. , a 50-meter medium-lift vehicle, first flew in December 2020, targeting 4,500 kg to sun-synchronous , with reusability modifications planned around 2025. As of October 2025, the active fleet encompasses 16 Long March variants, including , 2F, , 4 series for polar orbits, 5/5B for heavy lifts, 6/6A, 7/7A, 8, and solid-fueled for rapid-response small satellite launches. The series has exceeded 600 flights overall, with launches from , , , and sites, reflecting sustained improvements in reliability and versatility despite intermittent setbacks like the 2020 and 7A failures. Future enhancements focus on reusability and super-heavy variants like for 140,000–150,000 kg to LEO.

Spacecraft and Satellite Developments

The Shenzhou spacecraft series represents China's primary development in crewed orbital vehicles, initiated in the 1990s under the China Manned Space Program with design influences from the Russian Soyuz but incorporating indigenous enhancements for autonomy and modularity. Each Shenzhou vehicle comprises three modules: an orbital module for experiments and extended stays, a reentry module for crew return, and a service module for propulsion and power, enabling docking with space stations and supporting missions of up to six months. Uncrewed test flights began with Shenzhou-1 in 1999, demonstrating reentry and recovery capabilities, followed by the first crewed flight, Shenzhou-5, on October 15, 2003, which carried astronaut Yang Liwei for 21 hours in orbit. By 2025, the series had evolved to support routine crew rotations to the Tiangong space station, with Shenzhou-21 preparations underway for launch from Jiuquan, marking the 10th crewed mission to the station since 2021 and incorporating upgrades for longer-duration operations. Early unmanned spacecraft developments laid the groundwork, including the Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) series of recoverable satellites launched from 1975 onward, which tested reentry technologies and film-based reconnaissance with over 20 successful recoveries by the 1990s, achieving a domestic capability independent of foreign assistance. These efforts paralleled initial satellite deployments, starting with Dongfanghong-1 on April 24, 1970—the first domestically produced and launched satellite—which orbited at 441 km altitude, broadcasted revolutionary music, and validated basic orbital mechanics for subsequent systems. By the 1980s and 1990s, China advanced geostationary communications satellites under the Dongfanghong-3 series, featuring indigenous transponders for domestic broadcasting and data relay, with launches achieving over 90% success rates in orbital insertions by 2001. Satellite constellations have since proliferated for strategic applications, with the Navigation Satellite System evolving from regional coverage in 2012 to global positioning, navigation, and timing services by June 2020 through deployment of 55 satellites (including 30 , 5 geostationary, and 20 inclined geosynchronous), offering accuracy comparable to GPS with independent regional augmentation. The series, part of the High-resolution Earth Observation System, delivers sub-meter optical and radar imaging for civil and mapping; Gaofen-2, launched in 2014, achieved 0.8-meter panchromatic resolution, while subsequent models like Gaofen-11 incorporate for all-weather surveillance. -oriented satellites, numbering over 40 by 2023, focus on intelligence, surveillance, and , with Yaogan-41 (launched December 2023) introducing geosynchronous optical capabilities for persistent monitoring of maritime and ground targets, testing hyperspectral and secure data links. These programs reflect iterative advancements in sensor , radiation-hardened , and constellation resilience, driven by dual-use imperatives amid expanding launch cadences exceeding 60 annually by the mid-2020s.
Satellite SeriesPrimary PurposeKey Milestone
Dongfanghong and communicationsDongfanghong-1 launch ()
FSW (recoverable)Reentry testing and reconnaissanceFirst recovery success (1975)
BeidouGlobal navigationFull constellation operational (2020)
GaofenHigh-resolution Sub-meter imaging (Gaofen-2, 2014)
YaoganISR and Geosynchronous optical debut (Yaogan-41, 2023)

Propulsion and Reusability Advances

China's propulsion advancements have transitioned from hypergolic fuels in early rockets to high-performance kerosene-liquid oxygen (kerolox) and cryogenic hydrogen-oxygen engines, enabling heavier payloads and greater efficiency. The YF-100 kerolox engine, operational since 2016, delivers 122 metric tons of thrust at with a of 300 seconds, rising to 335 seconds in , and powers first stages of 6 and 7 variants. Similarly, the YF-77 cryogenic engine, developed in the 2000s with testing starting in 2005, provides high-thrust for boosters using and oxygen, marking China's first such application in heavy-lift vehicles. Recent developments emphasize advanced cycle engines and alternative propellants for future super-heavy launchers. The YF-130, a twin-chamber kerolox with 480 metric tons total , is slated for boosters and first stage, supporting reusable configurations. In November 2023, progress was reported on full-flow staged-combustion-cycle methane-liquid oxygen engines akin to Raptor, intended to power the reusable super heavy-lift rocket. By March 2025, China tested a 100 kW high-thrust , targeting extended deep-space applications. Reusability initiatives, driven by both state and commercial entities, aim to reduce costs through recoverable stages, with state plans focusing on adaptations and commercial efforts achieving milestones. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) unveiled a fully reusable design in April 2023, featuring recoverable first stages powered by methane engines, with debut flights targeted for 2025-2026. Commercial firms have advanced vertical landing technologies; LandSpace's , the first methalox rocket to in July 2023, conducted static-fire tests for reusability in October 2025. Space Pioneer's Tianlong-3, under development since 2022, demonstrated vertical takeoff and landing tests in September 2025, capable of 17-18 metric tons to , positioning it as a competitor. These efforts reflect a strategic push, with U.S. intelligence noting China's potential to master reusable launches soon, enhancing launch cadence and strategic capabilities.

Core Mission Programs

Manned Spaceflight Initiatives

China's manned spaceflight initiatives, conducted under the (CMSP), originated in 1992 with the approval of Project 921 by the Chinese government, aiming to develop independent capabilities drawing from . The program progressed through uncrewed test flights starting with Shenzhou 1 in November 1999, which verified orbital insertion, reentry, and recovery systems. These tests culminated in the first crewed mission, , launched on October 15, 2003, from the aboard a Long March 2F rocket, carrying for a 21-hour single-orbit flight, marking as the third country after the and to achieve independent . Subsequent Shenzhou missions advanced rendezvous, docking, and extravehicular activity (EVA) capabilities. Shenzhou 6 in October 2005 carried two taikonauts for a five-day mission, testing manual control and life support. Shenzhou 7, launched in September 2008, achieved China's first spacewalk when taikonaut Zhai Zhigang exited the orbital module for approximately 13 minutes to test EVA suits and tools, supported by Liu Boming on a tethered assist. Docking milestones included uncrewed Shenzhou 8's automated rendezvous with Tiangong 1 in November 2011, followed by manned missions Shenzhou 9 in June 2012 and Shenzhou 10 in June 2013, which conducted 12-day stays aboard the prototype lab module for systems verification and scientific experiments. The program's focus shifted to sustained orbital presence with the . The core module Tianhe launched on April 29, 2021, followed by Shenzhou 12 in June 2021, delivering the first crew—Nie Haisheng, Liu Bomin, and Tang Hongbo—for a three-month shakedown mission involving technology tests and payload operations. Assembly continued with Wentian and Mengtian modules in 2022, enabling full operations by late that year. Rotating crews via through 20 have maintained continuous human presence since December 2021, with missions averaging six months and supporting over 100 experiments in microgravity, including protein crystallization and fluid physics. EVA operations have expanded station , with crews multiple spacewalks for solar repairs, installations, and deployments. in November 2022 marked the first in-orbit crew handover, while later missions like Shenzhou 19 (October 2024 to April 2025) set a national record with a nine-hour EVA on December 18, 2024, by taikonauts Cai Xuzhe and Song Lingdong to install payload adapters. By Shenzhou 20's launch on April 24, 2025, had completed 15 crewed Shenzhou flights and over 20 EVAs, demonstrating reliable crew transport and station maintenance without international partnerships. Future initiatives include extending mission durations, selecting civilian taikonauts, and preparing for lunar missions, with plans for a manned lunar landing by 2030 using next-generation . These efforts underscore the program's emphasis on , leveraging domestically developed launch vehicles, capsules, and life-support systems derived from iterative testing.

Lunar and Cislunar Exploration

The , named after the moon goddess in , systematically advanced from orbital reconnaissance to surface operations and sample returns, positioning as the third country to achieve a soft lunar landing. Initiated under the (CNSA), the program relies on Queqiao relay satellites in Earth-Moon L2 halo orbits to enable communications with the lunar , where direct Earth signals are blocked. Queqiao-1, launched on May 20, 2018, supported -4's far-side operations, while Queqiao-2, deployed on March 20, 2024, facilitates subsequent missions including south polar explorations. Chang'e-1, launched October 24, 2007, via 3A from , entered on November 5 and conducted stereoscopic imaging, , and microwave sounding until its controlled crash on March 1, 2009, yielding a comprehensive lunar atlas. Chang'e-2 followed on October 1, 2010, with enhanced resolution imaging from a 100 km orbit, later extending to Earth-Moon L2 and asteroid flybys, demonstrating propulsion reliability for maneuvers. These orbiters provided foundational data on lunar and composition, informing landing site selections. Transitioning to surface missions, Chang'e-3 launched December 1, 2013, on a Long March 3B and soft-landed December 14 in Sinus Iridum, deploying the Yutu rover, which traversed 114 meters while conducting panoramic imaging, soil analysis, and ground-penetrating radar surveys up to 30 meters depth before mobility failure in 2014, though the lander operated until 2024. Chang'e-4 achieved the first far-side landing on January 3, 2019, in Von Kármán crater, with Yutu-2 rover exploring basaltic terrain, discovering unusual mantle-derived materials and operating beyond its planned three-month lifespan. Sample return marked the program's third phase: Chang'e-5, launched November 24, 2020, collected 1,731 grams of regolith from via drilling and scooping, returning December 16 after docking in for transfer, revealing younger volcanic activity than previously sampled sites. Chang'e-6 extended this to , launching May 3, 2024, landing in Apollo Basin on June 2, retrieving subsurface samples using a scoop and drill, and returning June 25 with 1,935 grams, including water-bearing minerals and ejecta from impacts, analyzed to probe lunar formation asymmetries.
MissionLaunch VehicleLanding/Return DateSample Mass (g)Primary Site
Chang'e-5Dec 16, 20201,731
Chang'e-6Jun 25, 20241,935Apollo Basin ()
Future efforts target resource prospecting and infrastructure: Chang'e-7, slated for 2026, will deploy a lander and rover at the to survey water ice and volatiles, supporting in-situ utilization. Chang'e-8, planned for 2028, aims to test 3D-printing with for habitats, precursor to the (ILRS). Co-led with , ILRS envisions a polar outpost by 2035, initially robotic with , expanding to human presence before 2030 for sustained operations amid competing U.S. initiatives.

Interplanetary and Deep Space Probes

China's initial attempt at an interplanetary probe, Yinghuo-1, aimed to orbit Mars and study its and but failed due to the malfunction of its Russian host , Phobos-Grunt, leading to uncontrolled reentry over the in January 2012. The mission marked 's first successful interplanetary endeavor, launching on July 23, 2020, aboard a rocket and arriving at Mars on February 10, 2021, after a seven-month journey. The mission integrated an orbiter, lander, and named , which achieved a soft landing in on May 14, 2021, making the second nation to operate a on the Martian surface. The orbiter has conducted and relayed data, while traveled approximately 1.921 kilometers before entering hibernation in May 2022 due to Martian winter conditions and dust accumulation on its solar panels. Building on this success, launched on May 28, 2025, targeting the near-Earth 469219 Kamoʻoalewa for sample collection via a touch-and-go maneuver, with plans to return samples to by November 2027. After asteroid operations, the will proceed to comet 311P/ for remote observation, expected to arrive around January 2035. As of October 2025, the mission has reached the halfway point to its primary target. Future interplanetary efforts include Tianwen-3, a slated for launch around 2028, aiming to collect and return Martian regolith and rocks. For deep space, Tianwen-4 is planned for launch circa 2029 to explore Jupiter's system, including orbital insertion around Callisto to investigate and geology. These missions reflect China's strategy to incrementally expand beyond near-Earth and lunar domains, leveraging heavy-lift launchers and autonomous navigation technologies developed through prior programs.

Emerging Technologies and Experiments

China's efforts in reusable launch vehicles represent a key emerging technology, aiming to reduce costs and increase launch cadence for ambitious missions. In August 2025, the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) successfully conducted the first static fire test of the , a two-stage partially reusable with a 5-meter first stage designed for vertical recovery, supporting crewed lunar landings targeted for 2030. Concurrently, private firm Landspace Technology completed full-system hot-fire tests for its Zhuque-3 methane-liquid oxygen reusable in October 2025, with a maiden orbital flight anticipated as early as November 2025; the vehicle features a reusable first stage capable of payload capacities up to 20 tons to . These developments draw from vertical takeoff and landing experiments initiated in the early 2020s, prioritizing rapid iteration over fully expendable architectures previously dominant in China's series. Advancements in space-based quantum communication continue to build on the 2016 Micius satellite, which demonstrated over 1,200 kilometers. In 2025, plans to deploy two to three additional quantum satellites into to test enhanced entanglement distribution and secure intercontinental links, addressing atmospheric interference limitations of ground-based systems. These experiments aim to enable global-scale quantum networks resistant to eavesdropping, with ground station integrations already achieving record distances in prior tests. Space-based solar power (SBSP) prototypes mark another frontier, with Chinese researchers proposing a 1-kilometer-wide orbital to beam microwave to , potentially generating gigawatts continuously—exceeding terrestrial solar efficiency by over tenfold due to uninterrupted sunlight exposure. A test satellite capable of 10 kilowatts is slated for 2028 launch, following ground-based validations. This initiative, likened in scale to the , integrates lightweight and phased-array antennas developed through iterative suborbital tests. Scientific experiments underscore experimental payloads, including the space telescope launched in mid-2025 to operate alongside the Tiangong station for ultraviolet surveys and detection, enabling regular servicing unavailable to Hubble-like observatories. The Einstein Probe, deployed in 2024, has advanced time-domain by detecting over 300 gamma-ray bursts via novel lobster-eye , with ongoing data analysis revealing unprecedented transient events. Jointly, the Solar wind Magnetosphere Ionosphere Link Explorer (SMILE) mission with the , scheduled for 2025 launch, will probe solar-terrestrial interactions using soft X-ray imaging and particle measurements to model impacts. On Tiangong, microgravity life science experiments have yielded insights into protein and cellular responses, with simulated studies informing human deep-space resilience. These efforts prioritize empirical validation through in-orbit hardware, contrasting with simulation-heavy approaches in some Western programs.

International Dimensions

Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

China's space cooperation emphasizes partnerships with developing nations, , and select European entities, while facing restrictions from the and its allies on technology transfers due to concerns. As of 2023, China had established 135 space cooperation agreements with 46 countries and 6 international organizations, facilitating satellite launches with a 96% success rate for vehicles. These efforts align with broader initiatives like the , targeting enhanced collaboration with nations and other non-Western partners in 2025. Bilateral engagements include longstanding ties with Russia, particularly on lunar projects; in 2021, both nations agreed to develop the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), with plans for a joint nuclear power plant on the Moon's surface by 2026 to support base operations. This partnership has deepened amid Western restrictions, encompassing satellite navigation and deep space exploration, though it reflects Russia's pivot eastward following reduced European cooperation. With France, the Sino-French Space Variable Objects Monitor (SVOM) satellite, launched in 2024 after nearly two decades of joint development, exemplifies payload and scientific instrument collaboration. In Africa and Latin America, China has launched satellites for countries like Nigeria and Venezuela, providing training and ground infrastructure as part of capacity-building efforts. Between 2022 and 2025, China signed 26 new bilateral agreements, including with Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and additional BRI participants. European cooperation remains limited by U.S. influence, including the 2011 prohibiting collaboration with , which indirectly constrains the (ESA) due to shared technologies. Instances include ESA's contributions to 's Mars mission payloads in 2020 and selected international instruments for the 2028 Chang'e-8 lunar mission, involving 10 projects from various partners. However, ESA declined to send astronauts to 's Tiangong station in 2023, citing political and security hurdles, and Chinese officials have accused the U.S. of interfering in potential EU ties. Multilaterally, leads the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), established in 2005 with founding members including , , , , and , focusing on , , and joint exploration initiatives like ILRS studies. The ILRS, co-led with , seeks up to 50 participating countries and had 17 members by 2025, emphasizing open lunar research at the as an alternative to NASA's . These frameworks prioritize non-aligned nations, enabling to expand influence in space governance amid geopolitical divides.

Commercial Space Exports and Partnerships

The China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC), a subsidiary of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), serves as the primary entity for commercial space exports and international launch services, offering solutions that bundle manufacturing, launches via rockets, ground stations, and operational training. These activities target primarily developing nations, with deals often financed through export credits or barter arrangements to facilitate entry into markets lacking established space infrastructure. By April 2025, CGWIC had executed 101 commercial launches, successfully orbiting 74 international satellites alongside 261 domestic ones, demonstrating a steady expansion in foreign capacity despite U.S. and allied controls limiting Western participation. Overall, since 1990, has conducted 77 launches for foreign customers—73 of which succeeded—and directly exported 17 satellites, with activity accelerating post-2010 amid the Belt and Road Initiative's emphasis on space infrastructure. Exported platforms, such as the DFH-4 series communications satellites, have been procured by entities in countries including , , , , , and , often as complete systems to support and needs. Notable examples include the 2007 launch and delivery of NigComSat-1, Nigeria's first geostationary , fully designed and built by the under a $300 million contract that encompassed launch, insurance, and five years of operations. Similar turnkey exports occurred with Venezuela's (launched 2008) and Pakistan's (2011), both DFH-4 variants enabling regional broadcasting and connectivity. In 2015, CGWIC supplied and launched Laos' first , followed by a 2018 agreement for two Nigerian valued at approximately $700 million, highlighting reliance on bundled services for nations new to operations. These exports have totaled over $5 billion in contracts since the early 2000s, per industry estimates, though exact figures remain opaque due to state-controlled . Partnerships extend beyond hardware sales to include joint networks and data-sharing frameworks, with over 80 space-related projects abroad under the Belt and Road framework as of 2025, encompassing satellite manufacturing collaborations and tracking facilities in , , and . For instance, China has established bilateral agreements with African nations for constellations aiding disaster monitoring and agriculture, such as shared access to remote-sensing data via co-built stations. Emerging commercial ties involve private foreign firms, including a 2019 deal with Argentina's for 90 Earth-observation smallsats launched on dedicated flights, signaling diversification into rideshare services for non-state actors. However, these engagements are predominantly state-orchestrated, with limited technology transfers due to protocols, and have faced scrutiny for potential dual-use applications in surveillance.

Geopolitical Restrictions and Responses

The primary geopolitical restrictions on China's space program originate from U.S. legislation and export controls aimed at safeguarding and preventing technology transfers to entities affiliated with the (PLA). The , incorporated into the 2011 , bars the () from expending funds on bilateral cooperation with or Chinese-owned companies unless the FBI certifies no risks and provides explicit approval; this has effectively excluded from U.S.-led initiatives like the () since its enactment on April 1, 2011. Complementing the , U.S. export control frameworks such as the (ITAR) and (EAR) impose stringent licensing requirements on space-related technologies, software, and components destined for , citing risks of diversion to military end-uses. The U.S. Department of Commerce's has designated numerous Chinese aerospace firms, including subsidiaries of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), for activities supporting PLA modernization; for example, seven entities were added in August 2022 for procuring U.S.-origin items to advance hypersonic and space capabilities, subjecting them to a presumption of license denial. By September 2025, the encompassed over 3,000 entries, with a disproportionate focus on Chinese firms in dual-use sectors like electronics and propulsion. These U.S. measures have influenced international partners, particularly ISS collaborators such as the (ESA), (JAXA), and , which adhere to aligned restrictions on technology sharing with to maintain interoperability with American systems. In September 2025, escalated barriers by prohibiting Chinese nationals—even those holding valid U.S. visas—from accessing its facilities or contributing to programs, a policy framed as protecting sensitive data amid concerns over and risks. China's responses emphasize indigenous innovation and diversified partnerships to mitigate dependency. Facing ISS exclusion codified by the , China operationalized its core module in April 2021, achieving independent manned orbital presence with capacity for international crews from non-Western partners like and by 2023. U.S. restrictions have catalyzed a national push for under directives from President , evidenced by accelerated development of domestic engines like the YF-100 and full satellite constellation completion in June 2020, reducing reliance on foreign navigation systems. To counter isolation, has pursued asymmetric diplomacy, forging agreements for lunar exploration with (announced in 2021 for a joint by 2036) and satellite data-sharing pacts with over 20 developing nations via the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. These efforts include training foreign astronauts for Tiangong missions and exporting commercial launch services through entities like , bypassing Western controls while expanding influence in the Global South. Empirical outcomes suggest restrictions have not curtailed progress; China's launch cadence reached 67 orbital missions in 2023, surpassing pre-restriction projections, as domestic R&D investments surged to counter perceived containment.

Strategic and Military Aspects

Dual-Use Applications in National Security

China's space program operates under the Chinese Communist Party's military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy, which mandates the integration of civilian and military technological development to advance national security objectives, rendering space assets inherently dual-use. This approach leverages commercial and scientific satellite systems for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as precision targeting, with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) benefiting from data generated by nominally civilian platforms. MCF emphasizes fusing dual-use technologies across sectors, including space, to enhance PLA capabilities without distinct separations between civil and defense applications. The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System exemplifies dual-use applications, providing global positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services that support both civilian infrastructure and military operations. Operational since achieving full global coverage on June 23, 2020, with 55 satellites, has been integrated into PLA systems for precision-guided munitions and command communications since at least 2014, enabling accurate strikes independent of foreign systems like GPS. Its regional service, covering since 2012, initially prioritized military users, with features like anti-jamming enhancing battlefield resilience. Remote sensing satellites, including the series under the civilian High-Resolution System (CHEOS) and the military-oriented program, provide high-resolution imagery for tasks such as maritime surveillance and targeting support. satellites, with over 30 operational units as of 2024—including and launches in July and October—offer resolutions down to sub-meter levels via (SAR) and electro-optical sensors, inherently supporting dual-use defense applications despite civilian designations. satellites, numbering over 40 series by 2025, focus on military reconnaissance, including electro-optical, SAR, and electronic intelligence gathering to track naval vessels and air defenses, directly aiding PLA Strategic Support Force operations. These systems contribute to a networked ISR architecture, with enabling real-time military decision-making. Launch vehicles like the family, derived from ballistic missile technologies such as the Dongfeng series, further underscore dual-use , allowing rapid deployment of security-related payloads. By 2024, maintained over 500 dual-use satellites, bolstering integrated air, sea, and for scenarios like Taiwan contingencies. This fusion has accelerated PLA informatization, though reliance on shared civilian introduces potential vulnerabilities in contested environments.

Anti-Satellite and Defensive Capabilities

China conducted its first publicly acknowledged destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) test on January 11, 2007, launching a direct-ascent ASAT from the that destroyed the defunct Fengyun-1C polar-orbiting at an altitude of approximately 865 kilometers, generating over 3,000 trackable debris fragments and an estimated 35,000 pieces larger than 1 centimeter. The test, executed by the (PLA), demonstrated kinetic kill vehicle technology derived from systems, marking as the third nation after the and to perform such an action. This event produced the largest debris field in history at the time, posing collision risks to operational satellites including the , and prompted international condemnation for exacerbating hazards without prior notification. Subsequent developments have expanded China's counterspace arsenal beyond kinetic direct-ascent systems. The PLA has tested co-orbital capable of rendezvous and proximity operations, such as the series, which exhibit maneuvering capabilities suggestive of inspection, grappling, or disruption potential against adversary . Ground-based directed-energy weapons, including lasers, have been deployed to dazzle, damage, or destroy satellite optical sensors, with assessments indicating reversible effects currently but potential for permanent kill capabilities by the mid- to late-2020s. Electronic warfare systems for jamming satellite communications and navigation signals are integrated into PLA operations, while non-kinetic options like cyber intrusions target ground segments. The U.S. assesses that the PLA aims to develop ASAT weapons reaching at 36,000 kilometers, supported by launches like the 2013 solid-fuel missile test. Defensive capabilities emphasize space situational awareness (SSA) and asset protection to counter similar threats. The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), reorganized in 2024 into information support and forces, maintains a network of sensors for tracking orbital objects, enabling early warning of potential ASAT attacks or collisions. Maneuverable satellites with propulsion for evasion, along with hardened designs resistant to radiation and jamming, form part of resilience measures, though vulnerabilities persist in low-Earth orbit constellations. Integration with ground-based missile defenses, such as the HQ-19 system targeting intermediate-range ballistic missiles in exo-atmospheric phases, provides dual-use protection for sites and indirectly supports orbital defenses. These efforts align with PLA doctrine prioritizing denial of adversary advantages in potential conflicts, particularly over the or .

Integration with Broader Defense Strategy

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has historically overseen China's space program, with the Aerospace Force—established in April 2024 following the reorganization of the Strategic Support Force—responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including satellite launches, operations, and support for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). This integration aligns space capabilities with the PLA's doctrine of informatized warfare, where space-based assets enable integrated joint operations, long-range precision strikes, and denial of adversary space access. Under the Chinese Communist Party's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, formalized as a national policy in 2015 and elevated to a core component of the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025), civilian space advancements—such as commercial satellite constellations and reusable launch vehicles—are systematically directed toward military applications to accelerate PLA modernization. MCF mandates the integration of civil technologies into military systems, including dual-use ground stations and sensors that enhance PLA missile targeting and battlefield awareness, while PLA oversight ensures reciprocal technology transfers from military research to civil entities like the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). This fusion has enabled the PLA to field over 600 operational satellites by 2024, many with military utility, supporting anti-access/area denial strategies in potential conflicts over Taiwan or the South China Sea. Space integration extends to broader defense domains through the PLA's emphasis on "integrated strategic deterrence," where orbital assets underpin cyber, electronic warfare, and kinetic operations; for instance, the navigation system provides positioning, navigation, and timing critical for PLA and accuracy. Dual-use technologies, such as those tested in civil missions, are adapted for counterspace roles, including maneuvering for evasion or interference, reflecting a doctrinal shift toward as a warfighting domain rather than mere support. This holistic approach prioritizes resilience against U.S. dominance, with investments in redundant constellations and ground infrastructure to sustain operations amid conflict.

Controversies and Criticisms

Allegations of Intellectual Property Theft and Espionage

The government has accused the Chinese state of conducting extensive cyber espionage and economic campaigns targeting and space technologies to bolster its space program, with the and Department of Justice documenting over 200 instances of such activities since 2000. These allegations, supported by indictments and convictions, involve state-linked actors from China's Ministry of State Security, including hacking groups like APT10, aiming to acquire proprietary data on rockets, satellites, and systems that China has integrated into its series and other dual-use developments. Intelligence assessments from the Five Eyes alliance describe this as the "most sustained, scaled, and sophisticated theft of and expertise in human history," with sectors particularly affected due to their overlap with military rocketry. A prominent case involved Dongfan "Greg" Chung, a former engineer convicted in 2010 of economic espionage for stealing trade secrets on the , C-17 military transport, and rocket, which he transmitted to via associates; Chung, who held PRC citizenship, received a 24-year sentence after showed the aided Chinese aerospace entities. In 2005 and 2006, Chinese hackers infiltrated networks managed by and , exfiltrating on the program, including design and operational details relevant to reusable launch technologies. Similarly, in 2011, hackers disrupted and U.S. Geological Survey satellites, extracting sensitive orbital and imaging that could enhance 's capabilities. Cyber operations have persisted, with the 2018 indictment of Zhu Hua and Zhang Shilong of APT10 for a decade-long campaign hacking U.S. firms, 's , and related entities to steal on controls, systems, and , affecting at least a dozen countries. More recently, in 2024, Song Wu, an engineer at Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC)—a key PRC state-owned entity overseeing the space program—was indicted for a multi-year spear-phishing scheme from 2017 to 2021 targeting , the U.S. , and universities to obtain restricted software and for dual-use and technologies. U.S. intelligence has also warned of ongoing recruitment attempts against private firms like and , where Chinese operatives seek insider access to reusable and deployment innovations, though specific thefts remain under investigation. In response, implemented a in 2025 barring Chinese nationals, even with valid U.S. visas, from its facilities and networks, citing documented risks of exfiltration exemplified by cases like the July 2025 guilty plea of a U.S.-based for stealing trade secrets on launch and detection systems—technologies foundational to launches—for PRC benefit. These actions reflect broader U.S. efforts, including the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, to counter perceived state-directed theft that accelerates China's catch-up in reliability and constellations without equivalent indigenous R&D costs. China has denied orchestrating such , attributing advancements to domestic innovation, though U.S. indictments and forensic evidence of state ties undermine these claims.

Safety, Environmental, and Transparency Failures

The Chinese space program has experienced several high-profile safety failures, particularly during early development phases. On February 15, 1996, the inaugural launch of the rocket from , carrying the satellite, failed 22 seconds after liftoff due to a malfunction in the , causing the nozzles to swivel erratically and the vehicle to veer horizontally before crashing approximately 1.7 kilometers downrange into a nearby mountainside and village area. Official Chinese reports stated 6 fatalities and 57 injuries, though unofficial estimates suggested higher numbers, potentially in the dozens, amid disputes over evacuation efficacy and local impacts. A prior incident on January 1995 involved a explosion shortly after launch from the same site, scattering debris without reported casualties but highlighting persistent guidance issues. More recently, the second launch on July 2, 2017, failed due to a turbo-pump malfunction, destroying the and prompting a two-year grounding. Private sector efforts have also faltered, as seen in the July 1, 2024, accidental ignition of Space Pioneer's Tianlong-3 during a ground test, leading to an uncontrolled trajectory, crash, and explosion in a remote mountainous region with no confirmed casualties. Environmental consequences of these operations include localized from launch exhaust and debris fallout, exacerbated by inland launch sites like situated near villages and ecosystems. The 1996 Long March 3B crash dispersed toxic fumes across the area, carried by wind, and created craters amid forested terrain. Recurrent uncontrolled reentries of 5B core stages—each weighing about 20 metric tons—have posed global risks: the 2020 debut flight scattered debris over villages in Côte d'Ivoire, while subsequent events in 2021 and 2022 saw remnants predictably fall over oceans or uninhabited zones by chance, avoiding major incidents but violating international norms for deorbit planning. These reentries stem from the rocket's design, which intentionally leaves the core stage in without propulsion for controlled disposal, contributing to atmospheric from burn-up particulates like alumina and . An August 7, 2024, 6A launch further generated over 300 orbital debris fragments from post-separation breakup, increasing collision hazards. Transparency deficits persist, rooted in state oversight and , leading to delayed or minimized disclosures. Following the 1996 failure, initial reporting omitted casualty details for weeks, with Xinhua's March announcement citing low figures amid eyewitness claims of inadequate warnings and no public memorials, fostering distrust in official accounts. 5B reentries drew international rebuke, including from Administrator in May 2021, who stated China was "failing to meet responsible standards" for , as provided scant pre-event predictions or mitigation data. While has publicly acknowledged some failures and causes—such as in CNSA white papers—the program's opacity, including censored domestic media and restricted failure analyses, contrasts with more open Western practices, potentially hindering global safety coordination.

Authoritarian Control and Innovation Constraints

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) centralized oversight of the space program, channeled through the (CNSA) and the People's Liberation Army's Strategic Support Force (SSF), enforces a hierarchical that prioritizes political alignment and state-directed goals over flexible, bottom-up . This structure allocates substantial (R&D) budgets—estimated at tens of billions of yuan annually—but routes decisions through multiple layers of party approval, often resulting in delays and conservative engineering choices to avoid failures that could invite political repercussions. For example, the SSF's management of space operations integrates civilian and military efforts under policies, yet this fusion mandates ideological conformity, deterring experimentation that deviates from approved national rejuvenation objectives. Historical upheavals underscore how authoritarian interventions disrupt sustained progress; the space program's early phases were severely hampered by the (1966-1976), during which political purges and anti-intellectual campaigns sidelined key scientists, stalling advancements in missile-derived launch vehicles until the post-Mao reforms of the late 1970s. In the modern context, Xi Jinping's intensification of CCP leadership since 2012 has amplified these dynamics, with reforms embedding party committees within R&D institutions to enforce "," potentially fostering an environment where fear of criticism suppresses bold hypotheses and iterative testing essential for fields like reusable rocketry. Analysts note that this micromanagement erodes the risk-tolerant culture needed for high-stakes innovation, as evidenced by persistent challenges in cryogenic engine reliability despite decades of investment, such as the Long March 5's development delays tied to iterative failures under state oversight. Political loyalty further constrains talent utilization, as promotions and increasingly hinge on demonstrated fidelity to CCP directives rather than solely on technical prowess. The elevation of engineers like those from the military-industrial sector to the 20th Party Congress highlights this trend, rewarding technocrats who embody alongside expertise, which critics argue subordinates meritocratic advancement to ideological vetting. This emphasis on loyalty manifests in mandatory ideological training for scientists and restrictions on open discourse, limiting the cross-pollination of ideas that drives breakthroughs in peer-reviewed, internationalized environments. Reports from observers of China's , , and (STI) ecosystem describe a resultant clash: while "whole-of-nation" mobilization accelerates targeted projects, it clashes with the autonomy required for serendipitous discoveries, as party reclamation of control professionalizes R&D under political imperatives rather than insulating it from them. These constraints persist despite China's space launch records, such as 68 orbital attempts in , because the system incentivizes scale and replication—often via state-subsidized —over disruptive , with two commercial failures that year underscoring vulnerabilities in unproven technologies under compressed timelines. External factors like controls exacerbate internal rigidities by curtailing access to global best practices, compelling reliance on domestic where flows are censored to align with party narratives. Ultimately, this authoritarian framework enables catch-up in established domains but poses long-term hurdles for pioneering frontiers like or AI-driven mission planning, where unfettered inquiry historically yields asymmetric gains.

Future Trajectory

Near-Term Missions and Technological Goals (2025-2030)

China's near-term space objectives from 2025 to 2030 emphasize completing the operational phase of the , advancing lunar exploration toward crewed landings, and initiating sample-return missions to asteroids and Mars, supported by new heavy-lift launchers and relay infrastructure. The plans intensive launches in 2025, including deep-space probes, to build capabilities for sustained human presence on the and resource prospecting at the . These efforts align with a broader strategy to achieve technological in , landing systems, and in-situ resource utilization, amid ongoing development of the rocket for lunar transit. Additionally, China has unveiled plans to develop space tourism capabilities and launch orbiting artificial intelligence data centers within five years. In lunar exploration, CNSA targets Chang'e-7 for launch around 2026 to survey the , deploying an orbiter, lander, rover, and mini-flying probe for resource mapping and environmental analysis, paving the way for future habitats. This follows the successful Chang'e-6 far-side sample return in 2024 and leverages the Queqiao-2 relay satellite, launched in March 2024, which enables communications for south pole missions by orbiting in a . Chang'e-8, slated for approximately 2028, will demonstrate technologies for lunar resource extraction and of structural elements, forming a foundational module for the in collaboration with . Crewed lunar landing remains a cornerstone goal, with integrated tests of the lander and ascent vehicle confirming progress toward a mission before 2030, including static-fire trials of the 10's YF-130 engine cluster achieving 990-ton thrust in August 2025. Deep-space missions include , launched on May 28, 2025, via from , targeting sample collection from near-Earth asteroid in 2026 before a flyby of 311P/PanSTARRS around 2029 to study volatiles. Tianwen-3, planned for circa 2030, aims to retrieve Martian samples, building on prior orbital and rover data to analyze habitability indicators. These probes incorporate advanced sampling arms and propulsion for extended operations, reflecting goals to characterize solar system bodies for resource potential. Technological priorities encompass the Long March 10's maturation, a 92.5-meter super-heavy launcher with 5-meter core diameter, undergoing subsystem tests for a in late 2026 or early 2027 to loft lunar stack elements exceeding 70 tons to . Development focuses on cryogenic YF-75 and YF-100K engines for efficiency, with parallel efforts in reusable first stages via commercial variants to reduce costs, though full reusability remains developmental. Manned will prioritize Tiangong utilization for long-duration stays, microgravity experiments, and lunar mission rehearsals, targeting routine crew rotations and extravehicular activities to sustain expertise. Challenges include scaling production for high-cadence launches and verifying deep-space autonomy amid geopolitical isolation from Western partnerships.

Long-Term Ambitions and Potential Challenges

China's long-term space ambitions center on establishing a sustained human presence beyond , including the construction of the (ILRS) in collaboration with and other partners, with a basic facility targeted for completion by 2035 at the Moon's . The ILRS project follows a phased approach: through 2025, construction from 2026 to 2035, and operational utilization starting in 2036, incorporating for energy needs and expanding to a network linking the , , and far side by 2050. This initiative supports resource utilization, scientific research, and potential habitat development, aligning with broader goals of manned lunar landings before 2030. Extending ambitions to Mars, China plans a crewed mission by 2033, preceded by the Tianwen-3 sample return mission launching around 2028 via two Long March 5 rockets, with samples arriving on Earth by 2031. Further objectives include a Mars research station around 2038 focused on in-situ resource utilization and long-term habitation studies, alongside orbital crewed missions by 2050. Deep space exploration encompasses asteroid missions like Tianwen-2 in 2025 and a Jupiter probe via Tianwen-4, contributing to a 2024-2050 space science program prioritizing 17 areas such as planetary habitability and extraterrestrial life detection. These efforts aim for a major technological breakthrough by 2040, including space-based resource extraction and potential colonization architectures. Potential challenges include technological hurdles in propulsion and for extended manned interplanetary travel, as current heavy-lift capabilities like the series require scaling for reliable Mars transit windows and shielding. Economic pressures from domestic issues such as weak consumption, instability, and employment strains could constrain funding, despite integration into the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030). International restrictions, including U.S. sanctions under the prohibiting cooperation, limit technology transfers and force reliance on indigenous development, potentially slowing progress in areas like advanced semiconductors for guidance systems. Authoritarian oversight and through entities like the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation may hinder bottom-up innovation, as evidenced by historical delays in cryogenic engine maturation, though recent launch success rates exceed 95%. Geopolitical tensions risk escalating space into a contested domain, complicating partnerships for the ILRS beyond . Achieving long-term commercial sustainability presents further obstacles, with heavy reliance on government orders, military-civil fusion projects, and national constellations for revenue, alongside limited diversification into independent markets. Reusable rocket technology encounters low recovery success rates and high costs, as illustrated by private firms like LandSpace, which experienced failures in recent tests despite plans for mid-2026 achievements. Geopolitical restrictions curtail international commercial launch market share, while satellite internet applications primarily serve domestic needs and Belt and Road Initiative countries, absent large-scale paying users for profitable operations.

References

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