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Voluntary return
Voluntary return
Voluntary return
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In The Return from Egypt by James Tissot, Jesus, Mary, and Joseph voluntarily leave Egypt to go to Nazareth after King Herod's death.

Voluntary return or voluntary repatriation is the return of a migrant such as undocumented immigrants, rejected asylum seekers, refugees, unaccompanied minors, as well as second-generation immigrants[1] who, of their own free-will, make the decision to return to their country of origin or homeland when they are unable or unwilling to remain in their host country, for a variety of possible reasons, from conflicting cultural values to deteriorating conditions.

Overview

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The terms are used in slightly different contexts and can refer to:

  • The voluntary return of asylum seekers who no longer wish to wait for a decision on their asylum application or otherwise changed their mind and want to go back to their country of origin.
  • Destitute migrants, such as the homeless, who cannot afford the journey back home. Some homelessness charities provide funding for these journeys.
  • The "voluntary" return of rejected asylum seekers or irregular migrants to their countries of origin. Leaving voluntarily in such case may be fairly euphemistic, as the alternative is often immigration detention and eventual deportation.
  • The most preferred of the UNHCR's three durable solutions for refugees is return, because it is what most refugees seek.[2] Once the reasons for displacement or fleeing have been resolved and it is once again safe to live in the country of origin, refugees are free to return to their country of origin. Returnees remain a concern to the UNHCR and as such are under its legal protection. The UNHCR monitors returnee operations and provides support for the returnees even after their arrival and return to in their countries of origin.

Some voluntary return programs offer assisted voluntary return (AVR) and some voluntary return is spontaneous and independent without assistance.

Conventions on Voluntary return of refugees

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In Africa

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The concept of voluntary repatriation was first developed in the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. It was agreed that:

"The sending state, in collaboration with the receiving state, must make adequate arrangements for the safe return of refugees who request repatriation, while the country of origin must facilitate their resettlement and grant them the full rights and privileges of nationals of the country, and subject them to the same obligations."[3]

Controversies

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  • The UNHCR and the hosting countries usually encourage refugees to return voluntarily. The 1969 Refugee Convention stipulates that the countries of origin should facilitate repatriation, by using the media as well as Organisation of African Unity, in order to invite refugees to return . In turn, the host countries are expected to disseminate such information and ensure it is received.[3] However, reports of the improved stability and circumstances in the country of origin may be exaggerated, blurred or untrue and refugees may be encouraged to return before the dangers have fully removed.
  • As refugees are protected from deportation (or refoulement) by the 1951 Refugee Convention, some countries may pressure them to leave by gradually decreasing refugees' standard of living, as well as running propaganda campaigns to agitate the host population against them through fears of domination or loss of privilege. This is similar to self-deportation.
  • In some countries, the IOM's programmes of "voluntary assisted returns" have been criticized. The "voluntary" nature of these returns, put forward in the media coverage of IOM interventions is considered to be questionable in places such as Libya.[4] According to the UNHCR, "voluntariness is more than an issue of principle" . If refugee's rights are not recognized and enforced, if they are subject to pressures and restrictions such as confinement to isolated camps, they may choose to return, but this is not "an act of free will".[5]
  • Some countries offer financial support to refugees and rejected asylum seekers in order to facilitate the process of starting a new life in their country of origin. This could be considered as residency buyouts.

Support offered

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The UNHCR and the IOM offer assistance to refugees who want to return voluntarily and to other people in need of support for returning to their home countries. This includes administrative, logistical, financial and reintegration support. Many developed countries also provide assistance and voluntary return programs independent from the IOM and the UNHCR. Support includes arrangement and payment for returning travels. Support may also include financial support so that returnees can make sustainable investments and rebuild their lives again, and connecting people with networks and groups in the country of origin so that they will get support from local organizations.[citation needed]

Upon enrolling in assisted voluntary return programs (AVR), the applicant is forfeits their claim as a refugee or asylum-seeker. Many times this includes a five-year travel ban restricting the individual from returning to the host country,[6] similar to deportation. According to interviews with IOM workers and files on return migrants who took part in their program, it is not uncommon for return migrants to feel pressured into applying to AVR programs due to financial hardships, lack of employment, and fear of deportation.[7]

Government policies and incentives

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Europe

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 Belgium – Return and Emigration of Asylum Seekers Ex Belgium programme: This program is open to asylum seekers and third-country nationals who want to return to their country of origin or to voluntarily emigrate to a third world country. As this program is voluntary, one can retract their application if ever they change their mind. Applicants are offered travel support, including counselling prior to departure, assistance during their flight and travel cost. Applicants are also offered some monetary compensation to get them to their home from the airport. Financial support is also offered to aid in the reintegration process, partially funded by the European Return Fund.[8]

 Denmark – with a history of financially incentivising the voluntary return of immigrants,[9] Denmark raised the amount to 100,000 kroner per person (around €13,000 EUR or US$20,000[10]) in 2009.[11] Peter Skaarup, deputy leader of the Danish People's Party, explained the scheme was aimed at immigrants from outside the EU and non-Nordic nations, targeting "nationals from non-Western countries who are struggling to adapt to Danish society". The Danish government also allocated 20 million kroner for city councils, to "motivate foreigners to return home".[12]

 France – from 2005 around 3,000 immigrant families were paid to voluntarily leave France. By 2007, under newly elected President Nicolas Sarkozy, the French government started an enhanced scheme offering €6,000 per immigrant family to return to their country of origin. Brice Hortefeux, Immigration Minister, stated that France "must increase this measure to help voluntary return".[13] In 2016, in response to the European migrant crisis, the government had rapidly risen the offer from €350 to €2,500 per individual.[14] In 2017, Interior Minister Gerard Collomb reconfirmed the commitment to raise the monetary offer for immigrants to leave France.[citation needed]

 Germany – with 35,000 voluntary returns in 2015, Germany allocated an extra €150 million over three years for migrants willing to return to their homelands.[15] The policy saw an increase to 55,000 repatriations in the first year.[16] In February 2017, under the 'Starthilfe Plus' scheme, immigrants were offered up to €1,000 each, or €3,000 to families, to leave the country and withdraw applications for asylum or residency.[17] As of October 2017, 8,639 immigrants had returned home via the government program.[18][19] In December 2017, under the slogan "Your country. Your future. Now!",[20] the German government began offering grants for new kitchens and bathrooms, as well as one year's worth of paid rent, in the country of origin of an immigrant choosing to return home.[21]

 Ireland – in 2009, the Republic of Ireland government began offering repatriations grants to immigrants from nations outside the European Union to return home. The move was motivated by the Irish economic recession, with the EU-funded project attempting to "persuade foreign workers and asylum seekers to return to their country of origin".[22]

 Italy – in 2013, the Italian government offered African migrants, mainly from Ghana, Libya and Togo, up to €500 to leave the country and travel onwards to Germany, France or northern European nations. Detlef Scheele, Hamburgs social affairs minister, dealing with multiple arrivals from Italy, declared that the immigrants had "no legal right to stay" and would return to Italy or back to their home countries.[23][24]

 Norway – in 2016 the Norwegian government offered the first 500 asylum seekers to take a 10,000 kroner "bonus" to leave the country voluntarily, in addition to the 20,000 kroner already offered per person.[25] Sylvi Listhaug, Integration Minister of Norway, claimed the move might "entice" immigrants to "voluntarily travel back by giving them a bit more money on their way out".[26]

 Spain – in 2008, struggling from recession and with unemployment towards 30%, the Spanish government proposed a 'Voluntary Return Plan'. Mainly targeting immigrants from South America, the Spanish labour ministry identified around 100,000 individuals from 19 countries which would be eligible for the scheme.[27] In 2011, Anna Terrón, Secretary of State for Immigration, claimed the scheme "helps everyone if those who want to return to their country of origin are able to."[28]

 Sweden – in August 2007, the Swedish government began offering asylum seekers who were rejected permanent residency the equivalent of £3,500 per immigrant for a voluntary return to their country of origin.[29][30] This resulted in a record 4,542 immigrants taking part in the scheme, and returning home in the first 8 months of 2016.[31]

  Switzerland – the Swiss government, following in the footsteps of Denmark, began a policy of confiscating any property of illegal immigrants with a value over 1,000 Swiss francs. However, the 2016 policy included an incentive for migrants to return to their country of origin, with the SEM stating that "if someone leaves voluntarily within seven months this person can get the money back and take it with them."[32][33]

 United Kingdom – in 2006, asylum seekers and illegal immigrants were offered up to £3,000 per individual to leave the country. Job training, education as well as travel costs were included in the scheme, with an expected uptake of 3,000 people, costing the British taxpayer an estimated £6.2 million.[34] By 2010, the annual cost had risen to £16 million, with Immigration Minister Damian Green announcing a reduction from the 5-year delay on re-entry applications, to further incentivise quick voluntary repatriations.[citation needed]

  • Assisted Voluntary Return for Families and Children: This program is open to non-European people with children and lone migrant children. They are given a cash grant of £500 to relocate and £2,000 to reintegrate to their communities per person.[35] One can apply to this scheme before their asylum claim has been rejected.[6]
  • Assisted Voluntary Return of Irregular Migrants: This program provides help to illegal immigrants and immigrants who have overstayed to return to their country of origin. They are not offered monetary assistance.[35]
  • Facilitated Returns Scheme: This aids foreign national prisoners, once they have completed their sentence they are given £500 cash and a reintegration package of £3,000. If they leave before the end of their sentence they can receive  up to £2,000 more.[35]
  • Positive Futures Project: This project is offered to young unaccompanied adults. After applying to an assisted voluntary return program, they can receive training to develop skills and gain additional education to help them build a home and have a career in the country they are returning to.[36]
  • Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme: One can receive maximum £1,500 per person relocating to their home country. This program aids applicants with travel documents and booking flight.[35]

North America

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 Canada – the Canadian government opted to not renew their 'Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration' pilot program in early 2015, after an evaluation by the Canada Border Services Agency. The program sought to reduce the number of failed asylum appeals and incentivize voluntarily leaving the country, but did not achieve all its objectives.[37]

 United States – in 2018, the American government announced the end of temporary protected status (TPS) for 200,000 Salvadoran immigrants. The decision, implemented by President Donald Trump, gave an 18-month period for immigrants to find a legal route to staying in the U.S. or to return to their country of origin. The termination of TPS comes into effect on September 9, 2019, granting immigrants a grace period for voluntarily repatriation, before facing deportation beyond that date.[38]

Rest of world

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 Israel – the Israeli government withhold 20 percent of asylum seekers' wages, in an attempt to encourage individuals to leave the country, where they will have access to the funds upon return to their homeland. The scheme was launched from May 2016, and currently applies to asylum seekers from Sudan and Eritrea.[39]

 Japan – after the 2008 financial crisis, Japan initiated a policy of paying unemployed workers to leave the country, mainly targeting the Latin American Dekasegi population for voluntary return.[40] The incentivised scheme offered $3,000 (USD), plus $2,000 per dependent, and came with additional clauses that children of the returnee (second-generation immigrants) would not be able to later emigrate to Japan regardless of circumstance.[1]

UNHCR refugee return statistics

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Voluntary return movements of refugees between 2014 and 1998[41]
End-year 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Returned refugees 1,016,400 767,500 2,426,000 1,434,400 733,700 603,800 197,700 525,900 126,800
Voluntary return movements of refugees by country between 2014 and 2010
Returning from Returning to 2014 2013[42] 2012[43] 2011[44] 2010[45]
Total UNHCR assisted Total UNHCR assisted Total UNHCR assisted Total UNHCR assisted Total UNHCR assisted
Afghanistan India 210 160 120 70 110 50
Afghanistan Iran 4,510 4,510 8,250 8,250 15,040 15,040 18,850 18,850 8,490 8,490
Afghanistan Pakistan 12,990 12,260 31,220 30,390 83,420 80,000 52,100 49,160 109,380 109,380
Angola Botswana 430 430
Angola Congo 180 180 190 190
Angola DRC 12,480 12,480 15,570 15,570 1,540 1,540
Angola Namibia 2,810 2,810
Angola Zambia 1,620 1,620 1,160 1,160 1,090 980 2,370 2,370 400 400
Bosnia Germany 180 0
Bosnia Sweden 200 0
Burundi DRC 900 900 1,500 1,500 480 480 3,940 3,940 3,640 3,640
Burundi Kenya 290 290
Burundi Tanzania 510 510 35,200 35,200 340 340 1,010 1,010
Cameroon Nigeria 390 390
CAR Cameroon 350 350 2,500 2,500
CAR Chad 1,970 1,970 6,470 6,470
Chad Cameroon 380 380 1,710 1,710
Chad CAR 270 270
Congo Gabon 710 710
Côte d'Ivoire Benin 100 100 110 110
Côte d'Ivoire Guinea 390 390
Côte d'Ivoire Liberia 12,210 12,200 18,720 18,270 71,990 7,110 135,110 135,110
Côte d'Ivoire Mali 160 160
Côte d'Ivoire Togo 660 660 460 410
Croatia Bosnia 160 160 230 230 400 110
Croatia Serbia 120 120 410 410 200 200
DRC Burundi 290 290 260 260 490 490 1,100 1,100
DRC CAR 6,970 6,970 310 10 790 0 11,640 0
DRC Congo 10,070 10,070 62,870 62,870 46,390 46,390 760 20
DRC South Sudan 2,510 2,510
DRC Sudan 4,470 0 2,440 0
DRC Uganda 5,540 5,540 320 10 21,910 10 7,990 0 6,180 10
DRC Tanzania 100 100
DRC Zambia 130 130 9,270 9,270
Ethiopia South Sudan 440 440
Iraq Austria 360 360
Iraq Egypt 100 100
Iraq France 100 100
Iraq Germany 320 320
Iraq Greece 450 450
Iraq Indonesia 960 960
Iraq Iran 280 280
Iraq Italy 350 350
Iraq Jordan 750 750
Iraq Kazakhstan 2,310 2,310
Iraq Lebanon 110 110
Iraq Libya 240 240
Iraq New Zealand 370 370
Iraq Norway 250 250
Iraq Syria 1,960 1,960
Iraq Turkey 120 120
Iraq UAE 430 430
Iraq UK 740 740
Iraq various/unknown 60,880 48,190 82,270 40,460 67,090 67,090 28,820 25,180
Kenya Uganda 320 320
Liberia Côte d'Ivoire 17,590 17,590 1,170 1,170 920 920
Liberia Gambia 330 330
Liberia Ghana 4,710 4,710 470 470 180 180
Liberia Guinea 5,550 5,550 120 120
Liberia Nigeria 170 170
Liberia Sierra Leone 1,030 1,030
Libya Tunisia 1,050 0 148,950 0
Mali Algeria 2,370 2,370 920 0
Mali Burkina Faso 7,740 7,740 3,760 110
Mali Mauritania 4,550 4,550 3,900 2,050
Mali Niger 6,300 6,300 5,690 2,760
Mauritania Senegal 6,210 6,210 1,370 1,370 1,390 1,390
Myanmar Thailand 3,000 0
Pakistan Afghanistan 3,450 0
Rwanda DRC 5,650 5,650 7,200 7,200 10,780 10,780 8,350 8,350 10,810 10,810
Rwanda Uganda 410 410 380 380
Serbia Macedonia 250 210 160 150
Serbia Montenegro 130 130 120 120 200 200
Somalia Ethiopia 4,480 0
Somalia Ethiopia 490 490 28,830 0
Somalia Sudan 130 0
Somalia Yemen 1,990 0 2,620 30 110 110
South Sudan Israel 330 160
South Sudan Uganda 280 280 1,910 1,910 890 890
Sri Lanka India 500 400 910 710 1,450 1,260 2,310 1,670 5,040 5,040
Sudan Chad 13,110 13,110 16,940 16,940 17,660 17,660 30,890 14,670 4,000 0
Sudan Egypt 150 150 140 120 250 250
Sudan Ethiopia 270 270
Sudan Israel 100 100
Sudan Libya 17,820 17,820
Sudan Uganda 1,670 1,670 810 810 2,670 2,670
Syria Turkey 140,760 0 68,570 0
Togo Benin 100 100
Turkey Iraq 240 0
Zimbabwe South Africa 100 60

Voluntary return of other migrants

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Voluntary return statistics

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Voluntary returns via IOM AVRR between 2014 and 2010[46]
Country/Territory departed from country/territory returned to country/territory
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Afghanistan 17 834 2,019 1,624 1,304
Albania 2 85 330 326 1,239
Algeria 118 176 140 41
Angola 108 69 69 76
Antigua and Barbuda 1 1
Argentina 2 3 123 140 77 89
Armenia 504 532 448 435
Australia 478 428 699 800 2 24 2
Austria 2,880 2,601 2,896 2,299 1 1 2 7
Azerbaijan 180 220 216 249
Bahamas 5 1
Bahrain 1
Bangladesh 126 1,208 2,000 1,334
Barbados 10 1
Belarus 88 281 269 188 159
Belgium 3,358 4,694 4,388 3,459 2 5 1 1
Belize 2 1 1
Benin 200 9 3 7 19 73 19
Bermuda 4
Bhutan 2 1
Bolivia 300 256 225 183
Bosnia and Herzegovina 164 221 500 935 1,511
Botswana 1 8 12 3
Brazil 1,903 1,802 1,418 881
Bulgaria 67 51 147 330 76 90 82 75
Burkina Faso 21 46 208 91
Burundi 103 133 34 29
Cambodia 8 3 15 30 64 30
Cameroon 5 2 111 90 159 345
Canada 862 2,024 1,244 13 67 27
Cape Verde 18 19 25 25
CAR 1 1
Chad 16 94 23 15
Chile 113 183 169 120
China 1 873 674 657 519
Colombia 207 346 320 293
Comoros 5 2 6
Congo 26 14 26 74
DRC 82 187 109 96
Costa Rica 93 2 12 9 1 7
Ivory Coast 154 81 215 316
Croatia 42 76 140 120
Cuba 13 9 15 20
Czech Republic 202 223 146 173 7 60 82 64
Denmark 64 66 219 110 8 19 2 3
Dominican Republic 1,209 1 71 81 39 34
Ecuador 2 752 780 356 276
Egypt 54 296 185 173 93 221 366 501
El Salvador 2 19 47 90 79
Equatorial Guinea 4 3 1 2
Eritrea 11 13 11 13
Estonia 8 29 17 23 8 11 6 9
Eswatini 3 2
Ethiopia 1,127 1,515 542 1,610
Fiji 16 10 11 16
Finland 304 327 342 318 1
France 6 3 8 6 11 10 8
Gabon 2 1
Gambia 56 221 300 76
Georgia 4 595 706 1,157 1,874
Germany 6,319 7,546 10,251 13,574 16 22 9 6
Ghana 17 10 226 324 355 222
Greece 760 7,290 9,325 7,357 3 8 7 15
Grenada 2 1
Guatemala 2 19 28 28 25
Guinea 102 13 12 161 142 244 270
Guinea-Bissau 15 55 68 33
Guyana 4 1 3 2
Haiti 1,211 67 5 1
Honduras 3 35 73 95 113
Hong Kong 37 11 4 4 6 9
Hungary 365 414 353 491 30 347 1,099 517
India 68 515 415 604 530
Indonesia 297 955 561 175 145 184 139
Iran 431 550 1,346 1,219
Iraq 2,667 2,472 1,930 1,280
Ireland 402 359 340 188 10 19 15 12
Israel 39 33 64 15
Italy 506 848 993 867 26 17 7 21
Jamaica 14 17 13 17
Japan 4 7 2 4 7 2
Jordan 2 5 51 66 68 99
Kazakhstan 58 207 182 147
Kenya 543 1 53 75 68 48
Kiribati 1
South Korea 2 41 16 45 57
Kosovo 1,569 1,334 1,542 1,546
Kuwait 1 2 2
Kyrgyzstan 80 119 123 81
Laos 1 4 1 2
Latvia 73 89 82 94 2 5 5 16
Lebanon 103 95 60 143
Liberia 19 15 34 18
Libya 172 847 218 27 50 80 82
Liechtenstein 5
Lithuania 47 65 43 66 12 11 4 15
Luxembourg 101 97 116 186
Macau 7
Macedonia 1,961 1,872 2,526 2,387
Madagascar 5 9 1 15
Malawi 38 3 15 12
Malaysia 36 23 11 44 42 20 21
Mali 21 8 7 55 32 173 126
Malta 29 39 55 72 1 3
Mauretania 1 8 18 35 14
Mauritius 23 23 77 37 58 31
Mexico 1,141 897 17 25 20 190 56 45
Moldova 38 73 10 248 199 213 149
Mongolia 1 4 632 527 458 541
Montenegro 26 127 83 174
Morocco 440 89 498 1,158 135 523 482 416
Mozambique 12 11 9 7
Myanmar 1 15 48 72 137
Namibia 2 2 34 17
Nepal 147 202 205 136
Nauru 50 17 46
Netherlands 3,473 2,905 2,489 2,269 11 10 8 5
New Zealand 2 3 3 2
Nicaragua 12 13 4 14 23 25 35
Niger 78 82 6 15 48 31 30
Nigeria 2 623 689 914 609
Norway 1,813 1,753 1,899 1,622 5 4 14
Oman 1
Pakistan 586 4,324 5,606 3,860
Palestinian territories 84 60 41 21
Panama 1 1 5 7 3 3
Papua New Guinea 5 3 177 278 31 2 2 13
Paraguay 4 74 60 49 75
Peru 2 3 149 149 183 207
Philippines 1 92 132 244 198
Poland 1,149 753 1,949 1,463 34 65 52 44
Portugal 594 753 692 412 2 3 15 16
Puerto Rico 1
Qatar 1
Réunion 1
Romania 131 312 197 113 198 168 140 776
Russia 12 117 10 2,561 2,607 5,048 4,538
Rwanda 32 40 35 21
Saint Kitts and Nevis 1
Saint Lucia 1 13 39 23
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 52 12
Samoa 1 4 1 1
São Tomé and Príncipe 16 23 14 7
Saudi Arabia 1 4 5
Senegal 1 1 124 201 328 283
Serbia 2,921 3,917 3,933 4,570
Seychelles 1 1 1
Sierra Leone 6 25 29 37 23
Singapore 3 4 1 11
Slovakia 95 54 50 57 51 141 181 188
Slovenia 11 11 20 16 11 10 1
Solomon Islands 1 1
Somalia 990 1 1,005 14 13
South Africa 197 247 48 36 20 38
South Sudan 15 120 74
Spain 823 785 758 889 14 12 9 21
Sri Lanka 1 205 847 409 374
Sudan 66 276 161 216
Suriname 32 46 56 58
Sweden 78 98 98 63 8 14 12 10
Switzerland 1,130 2,289 1,655 478 5 3
Syria 77 13
Taiwan 1 4
Tajikistan 74 45 49 77
Tanzania 912 589 58 47 50 35
Thailand 49 13 25 17 24 22
East Timor 1 1
Togo 183 2 5 21 26 74 31
Tonga 6 2 1
Trinidad and Tobago 4 8 5
Tunisia 9 251 99 278 451 609 139
Turkey 200 569 618 495 384 371 256 276
Turkmenistan 18 89 74 4
Turks and Caicos 3
Uganda 47 62 51 70
Ukraine 159 72 21 699 677 789 970
UAE 7 1 8 2
UK 874 2 53 41 59 50
United States 76 137 32 41
Uruguay 107 39 42 33
Uzbekistan 148 200 159 190
Vanuatu 1 5
Venezuela 34 34 45 34
Vietnam 1 371 215 251 179
Yemen 128 794 335 827 11 40 46 29
Zambia 34 20 8 4 4
Zimbabwe 90 35 5 12

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Voluntary return

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Voluntary return, also known as assisted voluntary return (AVR) or voluntary , denotes the process whereby migrants, asylum seekers, or refugees elect to depart a host country for their of origin, a transit country, or a third country, typically with logistical, financial, or reintegration support provided by governments or international bodies, distinguishing it from coercive measures. This mechanism operates on the premise of the returnee's , though empirical analyses reveal contextual pressures—such as pending removal orders, detention risks, or absence of —that can influence decisions, prompting debates over its authenticity despite formal consent requirements. Prominent in immigration policies across , , and select other regions, voluntary return programs aim to streamline migration by offering humane alternatives to enforced expulsion, often incorporating pre-departure counseling, travel arrangements, and post-return aid like vocational training or startup grants to foster sustainable reintegration. Organizations such as the (IOM) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) administer these initiatives globally, with the advancing a dedicated strategy since 2021 to enhance coordination and outcomes amid rising irregular migration flows. Key achievements include facilitating hundreds of thousands of returns annually—such as IOM's support for over 100,000 individuals in recent years—while reducing fiscal burdens on host states compared to detention and litigation; however, reintegration success varies, with peer-reviewed evaluations indicating that only a subset of returnees achieve long-term stability due to factors like economic instability or conflict in origin countries. Controversies persist regarding the voluntariness of these programs, as quantitative studies document cases where incentives mask underlying , particularly for vulnerable groups facing destitution or family separation, leading to higher uptake rates under duress than in purely autonomous scenarios. Moreover, while proponents highlight causal links to improved migrant dignity and policy efficiency, critics—drawing from field research in countries like and the —argue that such schemes sometimes prioritize host-country expulsion goals over genuine choice, with post-return monitoring revealing frequent re-migration attempts indicative of unmet needs. Despite these challenges, voluntary return remains a cornerstone of pragmatic migration , balancing enforcement imperatives with individual agency in an era of persistent global mobility pressures.

Definition and Principles

Core Definition and Scope

Voluntary return refers to the process by which migrants, including undocumented individuals, rejected asylum seekers, or refugees, return to their , a transit , or a third of their choosing, based explicitly on their free and without or undue pressure. This form of return prioritizes the migrant's agency, distinguishing it from forced or , which relies on state compulsion, potential detention, or removal orders. In practice, voluntariness requires verifiable conditions such as access to objective information about origin- circumstances and absence of threats like imminent expulsion. The scope encompasses both independent returns, where individuals self-fund and arrange their departure, and assisted variants, particularly Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programs coordinated by entities like the International Organization for Migration (IOM). AVRR initiatives, operational in over 100 countries as of 2024, extend beyond travel logistics to include financial stipends (typically €500–€2,000 per person), medical screenings, and post-return reintegration support such as vocational training, business startup grants up to €10,000 for families, or community reconciliation efforts. These programs target irregular migrants and failed asylum applicants primarily, with UNHCR facilitating returns for refugees only when protection needs have ended and origin conditions ensure safety and dignity. In 2023, IOM assisted over 30,000 returns globally via AVRR, emphasizing sustainable outcomes over mere relocation. While promoted as a humane, cost-effective alternative to —reducing host-state expenses by up to 50% compared to deportations—voluntary return's scope is limited by eligibility criteria excluding those with ongoing claims or criminal records, and by variable uptake rates influenced by origin-country instability. Empirical data indicate higher long-term success when paired with tailored reintegration, though challenges persist in verifying true voluntariness amid incentives or detention alternatives.

Key Principles of Voluntariness

The principle of voluntariness in return migration requires that individuals make a free and informed decision to return to their without , inducement, or undue pressure from states, international organizations, or other actors. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), this cornerstone of international mandates that refugees and migrants must not face physical force, threats to their , or restrictions on basic assistance programs that could indirectly compel return. Similarly, the (IOM) emphasizes that voluntariness entails the migrant's agency to consent based on full awareness of alternatives, with the option to withdraw the decision at any stage prior to departure. Informed consent forms a critical component, necessitating the provision of neutral, accurate, and up-to-date information about conditions in the , including potential risks to safety, access to services, and reintegration prospects. UNHCR guidelines specify that such information must be disseminated without bias, often through independent counseling to ensure comprehension, particularly for vulnerable groups like unaccompanied minors or those with limited . IOM's framework further requires pre-departure assessments to verify understanding and absence of duress, underscoring that decisions influenced by or incomplete disclosure undermine true voluntariness. Absence of push factors is essential, meaning no deliberate reductions in host-country support—such as welfare cuts or residency permit revocations—timed to encourage returns. has highlighted that pre-conditions for genuine voluntariness include maintaining ongoing assistance programs and avoiding any linkage between return participation and continued aid eligibility. Returns must also occur in safety and dignity, with participants able to proceed at their own pace and without rushed timelines that could imply pressure. Non-discrimination and protect the process, ensuring that voluntary return programs do not disadvantage participants relative to those who remain, and that shared during counseling remains secure. IOM principles explicitly prohibit based on origin, gender, or other factors, while mandating confidentiality to foster trust in the decision-making environment. These elements collectively aim to distinguish voluntary return from forced measures, though empirical assessments often reveal challenges in verifying adherence amid complex migration dynamics.

Distinctions from Other Forms of Return

Voluntary return is defined by the migrant's uncoerced, informed decision to depart the host country and return to their or , often supported by programs offering travel assistance, reintegration aid, and counseling to ensure safety and dignity. In contrast, forced return—encompassing , removal, or expulsion—involves state-enforced departure pursuant to a legal order, where non-compliance may lead to detention, fines, or escorted transport, prioritizing over individual agency. A primary distinction lies in the absence of compulsion: voluntary return excludes threats, deadlines, or incentives that could undermine free choice, as emphasized in UNHCR guidelines requiring no "push factors" from host states and full freedom to remain or depart. Forced returns, however, stem from violations of entry or stay conditions, with authorities executing removal after due process, such as appeals exhaustion; for instance, in the UK, voluntary departures involve minimal enforcement, while deportations require active intervention. For refugees, voluntary repatriation further diverges from involuntary repatriation, which violates the principle under the 1951 Refugee Convention by exposing individuals to risks; UNHCR operations verify voluntariness through assessments like "go-and-see" visits and origin conditions checks, ensuring return is sustainable and rights-respecting. Involuntary returns lack such safeguards and are deemed unlawful when safety cannot be guaranteed. Assisted voluntary return programs, such as IOM's AVRR, provide logistical and financial support (e.g., over 1.4 million beneficiaries since inception, with 52,000 in 2023) but require explicit consent post-counseling, differentiating them from mandatory returns where self-departure is ordered without aid, potentially escalating to forced execution if ignored. Critics, including policy analyses, argue that contextual pressures like asylum denial or destitution can blur voluntariness in practice, though formal criteria demand absence of duress.

Historical Context

Pre-20th Century Examples

One of the earliest recorded instances of organized voluntary repatriation occurred in 538 BCE, when Persian king issued an edict permitting Jewish exiles in to return to Judah and rebuild the . Approximately 42,000 exiles, led by and the Jeshua, chose to return, though many others elected to remain in due to established lives there. This was facilitated by royal decree and Persian funding for reconstruction, marking a for state-enabled voluntary return of displaced populations without . In , voluntary returns of political exiles were common following amnesties or regime changes, as seen in after the overthrow of the in 403 BCE. Exiles, who had fled oligarchic rule, were recalled through democratic reconciliation policies, allowing thousands to reintegrate with restored property rights. Such returns emphasized voluntary participation, with individuals opting to reclaim citizenship amid guarantees against reprisals, contrasting forced exiles like where returns occurred after fixed terms. In the , the (ACS), founded in 1816, organized voluntary of free to in as a means to address racial tensions. Between 1820 and 1867, roughly 13,000-15,000 individuals participated, receiving transport and initial support, though motivations varied from seeking autonomy to escaping discrimination. The program was endorsed by figures like and some black leaders, but criticized by abolitionists like as insufficiently addressing slavery's root causes. Liberia's 1847 independence from ACS control formalized the settlement as a sovereign republic for returnees.

20th Century Developments and Post-WWII Emergence

The end of in 1945 left with an unprecedented displacement , with estimates of 11 to 12 million non-German displaced persons (DPs) in Allied-occupied zones, primarily Eastern Europeans fearing communist reprisals or persecution upon return. Initial Allied policies, codified in agreements like the and Conferences, mandated the of all nationals to their countries of origin, leading to the forced return of millions—often under duress, with reports of suicides and among those transported eastward by Soviet authorities. Western Allies, confronting humanitarian outcries and resistance from anti-communist DPs, began shifting away from compulsion as early as 1945, recognizing that coerced returns undermined moral and practical objectives. This transition crystallized in 1946 through actions, including a February resolution affirming voluntary repatriation for unwilling DPs and the 's October 3 resolution urging assistance for returns while enabling resettlement alternatives. The Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), operational from 1943 to 1947, facilitated the return of approximately 7 million individuals, increasingly on a voluntary basis after initial forced movements, through transport, documentation, and reintegration aid. Succeeding it, the (IRO, 1947–1952), established by UN Resolution 62(I) of December 1946, enshrined voluntariness in its constitution as the preferred solution, defining eligible refugees as those unwilling to return due to fears and resettling over 1 million while repatriating around 700,000 who chose to go home. These post-WWII mechanisms marked the formal emergence of voluntary return as an international norm, distinct from earlier 20th-century ad hoc responses to refugee flows—such as the League of Nations' focus on protection without repatriation emphasis during the interwar period. By prioritizing individual consent amid geopolitical tensions, the IRO and UN frameworks laid groundwork for later bodies like the UNHCR (established 1950), which incorporated repatriation facilitation into its statute, influencing durable solutions doctrine despite persistent challenges in verifying true voluntariness amid power imbalances. This era's policies repatriated the majority of DPs but left a "hard core" of about 250,000 resettled abroad, highlighting voluntary return's limits when home conditions precluded safe reintegration.

Evolution in the Late 20th and Early 21st Centuries

In the 1980s, the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) formalized voluntary repatriation as the preferred durable solution for situations, marking a shift from earlier emphases on local integration and resettlement amid protracted encampments and host country pressures. The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme examined the topic in detail in 1980, endorsing when conditions in countries of origin permitted safe and sustainable returns. This policy evolution reflected practical realities, including donor fatigue and the unsustainability of long-term hosting, with UNHCR developing guidelines on voluntariness, such as ensuring decisions were free from and informed by "go-and-see" visits. By the mid-1980s, UNHCR operations increasingly prioritized , as seen in efforts to return and African refugees following conflict resolutions. The witnessed a surge in large-scale voluntary repatriations, facilitated by the end of proxy conflicts and civil wars in regions like , , and the . UNHCR oversaw returns of millions, including over 1.2 million Mozambicans by 1996 and significant numbers from post-1991 Paris Accords, often linking aid to reintegration under "returnee aid and development" strategies introduced in 1994. In , assisted voluntary return (AVR) programs proliferated from the early , initially for refugees but expanding to irregular migrants amid rising asylum claims and policy shifts toward return over reception; countries like and the implemented schemes covering travel and modest reintegration grants, with participation growing as deportation alternatives. This period's emphasis on , however, drew scrutiny for potential dilutions of voluntariness, as host states' restrictive policies and camp conditions sometimes blurred lines with indirect compulsion. Entering the early 21st century, voluntary return integrated more deeply into global migration management, with the (IOM) expanding its Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programs, reaffirming their role in the late 1990s for transit contexts like the and scaling up post-2000 to include comprehensive reintegration support such as vocational training and micro-grants. By the mid-2000s, over 20 European states operated AVR initiatives, handling tens of thousands annually, driven by EU harmonization efforts and recognition that returns could mitigate irregular migration pressures without relying solely on . This evolution prioritized empirical assessments of home conditions over idealistic permanence, though evaluations highlighted variable sustainability, with reintegration success tied to economic pull factors rather than assistance alone.

United Nations and UNHCR Guidelines

The framework for voluntary return emphasizes as a durable solution for and displaced persons, grounded in the right to return voluntarily when conditions allow, as reflected in resolutions such as A/RES/40/118 (1985), which calls for the promotion of voluntary in safety and dignity. This aligns with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of , particularly its cessation clauses (Article 1C), which permit the end of refugee status upon voluntary re-availment of national protection, provided the decision is uncoerced and informed. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18 (XXXI) of 1980 further specifies that voluntary requires the voluntary consent of each , free from duress, and should occur only after fundamental changes in the resolve the causes of . UNHCR's primary guidance is the Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: International Protection (1996), which mandates that repatriation promotion occurs solely when three conditions are met: resolution of the refugee problem's essential character, fundamental improvements in the home country's conditions enabling safe and dignified return, and refugees' expressed willingness to return voluntarily. The handbook stresses protection safeguards, including pre-return information campaigns, "go-and-see" visits to assess conditions firsthand, and post-return monitoring to verify physical security, legal safety from persecution, and access to basic rights without discrimination. UNHCR does not organize returns coercively but facilitates through partnerships, ensuring no involvement if voluntariness is compromised, as in cases of ongoing conflict or human rights abuses. In operations, UNHCR coordinates with states and NGOs to provide reintegration assistance, such as cash grants, vocational training, and community reconciliation programs, but only post-voluntary departure. The guidelines prohibit UNHCR endorsement of returns where monitoring access is denied, prioritizing under the 1951 Convention. Updated operational approaches, referenced in UNHCR's 2022 guidelines, reaffirm these protections while integrating gender-sensitive assessments and family unity considerations, though public details remain limited to internal policy. Critics, including analyses in the International Journal of , contend the 1996 handbook's focus on return as the "optimum solution" may undervalue local integration or resettlement alternatives in protracted situations, potentially incentivizing premature repatriations despite residual risks.

Regional Conventions and Protocols

In Africa, the 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in , adopted by the (now ), establishes voluntary repatriation as a cornerstone of refugee solutions. Article V explicitly requires that "the essentially voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no shall be repatriated against his will," while mandating cooperation between countries of origin and asylum, including facilitation by the OAU and UNHCR, to ensure safe and dignified returns. This provision builds on the 1951 Refugee Convention but adapts it to African contexts, such as mass influxes due to and conflicts, emphasizing individual consent and post-return resettlement support. In , the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, a non-binding yet regionally influential instrument adopted by over 20 governments in Central and , reinforces voluntary in its Conclusion III(f), stipulating that "any repatriation of refugees is voluntary, and is declared to be so on an individual basis, and is carried out with the cooperation of UNHCR." This reflects the region's historical focus on collective protection amid and generalized violence, prioritizing UNHCR verification of voluntariness to prevent coerced returns disguised as voluntary. European frameworks lack a standalone regional convention dedicated to voluntary return for refugees, relying instead on EU directives and national policies. The 2008 EU Return Directive (2008/115/EC) differentiates voluntary departure—offering irregular migrants a to leave without forced measures—from compulsory returns, often linked to assisted programs promoting reintegration in countries of origin. instruments, such as the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance (1953), reference repatriation sparingly and in humanitarian contexts but do not codify voluntariness for broader migrant or flows.

Obligations and Limitations on States

States parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention are obligated under the principle of to refrain from expelling or returning refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, , , membership of a particular , or political opinion, thereby limiting involuntary returns while permitting facilitation of genuinely voluntary when conditions permit. Host states must ensure that any adheres strictly to the refugee's freely expressed wish, without coercion, and only under conditions of absolute safety and dignity, as affirmed in UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 40 (XXXVI) of 1985. This includes providing accurate information on conditions in the and avoiding measures that pressure refugees into returning prematurely. Countries of origin bear responsibilities to facilitate safe and sustainable return by readmitting their nationals or former habitual residents, prohibiting penalization for prior flight or absence, and ensuring access to rights such as , restitution, and reintegration support upon return. UNHCR guidelines emphasize tripartite agreements between countries of origin, asylum, and UNHCR to coordinate these obligations, promoting joint monitoring of returnee safety and well-being post-repatriation. Origin states must also address root causes of displacement to make returns viable, though enforcement relies on diplomatic cooperation rather than binding sanctions. Limitations on states include the prohibition of any lacking , with host states required to verify voluntariness through individual assessments, particularly for vulnerable groups like women and children, to prevent disguised refoulement. imposes no absolute duty on host states to accept or promote voluntary returns if origin conditions remain unsafe, prioritizing protection over in such cases, as voluntary is one of three durable solutions alongside local integration and resettlement. States are further restricted from using cessation of refugee status to force returns without evidence of fundamental changes in circumstances, per Article 1C of the 1951 Convention. These frameworks underscore shared but differentiated responsibilities, with UNHCR playing a supervisory to uphold compliance.

Implementing Organizations and Programs

UNHCR's Role in Refugee Repatriation

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated under its 1950 Statute to seek permanent solutions for problems, including by promoting voluntary as a primary durable solution when conditions in the country of origin permit safe and sustainable returns. This role involves coordinating with governments, assessing the voluntariness of returns, and ensuring compliance with international protection standards, such as those outlined in the 1951 Convention, which emphasizes but allows only upon refugees' free and . UNHCR's involvement typically focuses on organized repatriations rather than spontaneous ones, though it promotes return through information campaigns, "go-and-see" visits to origin areas, and monitoring to verify that returns are free from coercion. UNHCR's 1996 Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation establishes core principles: returns must be voluntary in the sense of refugees' uncoerced decisions, safe upon arrival, and dignified, with attention to reintegration needs like access to documentation, land, and basic services in the home country. The agency does not organize every aspect of returns but facilitates them by negotiating tripartite agreements with countries of asylum and origin, providing logistical support such as transportation, and offering post-return assistance for up to 12 months, including cash grants and community-based reintegration projects. Updated operational guidelines from 2022 reinforce these elements, stressing individualized assessments to confirm voluntariness and prohibiting UNHCR facilitation where protection risks persist, such as ongoing conflict or . In practice, UNHCR has facilitated millions of returns since the , with annual figures varying by crisis; for instance, it supported over 33,000 repatriations in West and Central Africa in , primarily to Côte d'Ivoire and . Globally, while not all recorded returns (1.6 million refugees in 2023 and 2024) are directly facilitated by UNHCR—many occur spontaneously—the agency claims a core role in enabling informed decisions and mitigating risks, though critics argue that resource constraints and host country pressures have occasionally led to premature promotions of return over prolonged . UNHCR also monitors reintegration outcomes, reporting that sustainable returns depend on origin-state cooperation, with failures often linked to inadequate infrastructure or renewed instability, as seen in Afghan returns post-.

IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR)

The (IOM) has implemented Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes since 1979 to facilitate the return of migrants who voluntarily choose to depart host countries but require support due to financial, logistical, or other constraints. These initiatives target irregular migrants, rejected asylum seekers, stranded workers, and individuals facing destitution or failed integration, positioning AVRR as a rights-based alternative to involuntary within broader migration management efforts. By 2018, IOM's AVRR efforts had supported over 1.7 million returns globally. AVRR services span three phases: pre-departure assistance including counseling on return options, administrative , and medical screenings; transit support such as organized commercial flights or chartered with escorts for vulnerable cases; and post-return reintegration, which may involve cash stipends ranging from €500 to €2,000 depending on the programme, access to healthcare, psychological support, vocational , or small business startup to foster economic self-reliance. Reintegration is customized to local conditions, often partnering with origin-country governments or NGOs to address barriers like unemployment or , with follow-up monitoring for up to 12 months in some cases. In 2019, IOM formalized its approach with the Framework for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, articulating a vision of dignified, migrant-centered returns leading to sustainable outcomes for individuals and communities. The framework establishes seven guiding principles—such as ensuring genuine voluntariness through free from , non-discrimination, and —and six objectives: promoting , enabling safe and orderly transit, helping returnees overcome personal challenges, building community capacities, strengthening origin-country policies and services, and systematically addressing vulnerabilities like or health issues. Programmes emphasize migrant agency, with eligibility assessments confirming voluntary intent amid host-country pressures like asylum denial. Funded mainly by host governments, the , and other donors, AVRR operates in more than 100 countries, with significant activity in , , and regions like West and . In 2023, IOM assisted 56,045 migrants via AVRR, part of over 71,000 total returns and 126,000 reintegration cases, primarily from the to African origins. Returns rose 13 percent in to over 81,100, reflecting heightened irregular migration flows and emphases on voluntary departures. While IOM reports high satisfaction rates among participants—often exceeding 90 percent in evaluations—the programmes' effectiveness in achieving long-term reintegration remains variable, contingent on origin-country stability and individual circumstances.

National and NGO Contributions

Several national governments maintain dedicated programs for voluntary returns, typically targeting irregular migrants, rejected asylum seekers, and failed beneficiaries of protection, with incentives including cash payments, travel reimbursements, and limited reintegration aid to promote self-funded departures over enforced removals. These initiatives aim to reduce administrative burdens and detention costs while aligning with international norms on , though uptake varies based on origin-country conditions and economic disincentives. In , the "StarthilfePlus" scheme, overseen by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, supplies financial grants alongside in-kind support such as temporary housing and medical aid upon arrival in countries of origin, covering returns to over 40 destinations as of 2023; the program processed thousands of cases annually, with €1,500–€3,000 per adult depending on family status and . Similarly, the United Kingdom's legacy Voluntary Returns Service, active until 2020, facilitated over 20,000 departures since inception through partnerships, offering up to £3,000 in cash and onward travel support, though post-Brexit shifts emphasized border enforcement. The supports voluntary returns via U.S. Customs and Border Protection's CBP Home mobile application, launched on July 3, 2025, which incentivizes undocumented individuals with stipends, itinerary planning, and exit processing to avoid formal proceedings; this builds on prior State Department funding for 1,250 assisted returns from August to December 2021, primarily from . In , the Assisted Voluntary Returns Pilot Program, initiated November 24, 2020, by , aids those with enforceable removal orders through counseling and logistics, recording several hundred participants by 2022 to encourage compliance amid bilateral agreements like the Safe Third Country pact. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) augment national efforts by providing culturally sensitive counseling, community-based reintegration projects, and monitoring to ensure voluntariness, often filling gaps in capacity for pre-departure information and post-return follow-up; however, reliance on NGOs can introduce variability in outcomes due to funding dependencies and ideological alignments, with some critiques noting overemphasis on facilitation without rigorous voluntariness verification. In , NGOs like Refugee Action in the UK have directly operated assisted voluntary return services since April 2011, handling case management for thousands via the Choices program, including vulnerability assessments and linkage to origin-country partners for sustainable livelihoods training. Other entities, such as local groups in host countries like , evaluate return feasibility for Syrian refugees through on-site needs assessments, highlighting risks from instability and advocating for enhanced safeguards beyond financial aid. NGO involvement extends to specialized reintegration, where organizations coordinate micro-grants, vocational skills programs, and support in countries of origin; for instance, initiatives by groups like the Jesuit Refugee Service have supported returns from to , emphasizing empirical tracking of rates post-return, which often lag below 50% within the first year due to structural barriers rather than individual failings. These contributions, while cost-effective for states—averaging €2,000–€5,000 per case versus higher expenses—face scrutiny for potentially conflating with choice in high-pressure asylum systems, as evidenced by lower uptake in programs lacking robust independent oversight.

Government Policies and Incentives

European Approaches

The European Union's return policy prioritizes voluntary departure over forced returns for irregularly staying third-country nationals, as established in Directive 2008/115/EC, which sets minimum standards for procedures and protections while encouraging Member States to facilitate voluntary returns through counseling and assistance. This approach aims to enhance effectiveness and dignity, with voluntary returns comprising a significant portion of total departures, though overall return rates remain low at around 20-30% of issued decisions due to challenges like lack of travel documents and non-cooperation from origin countries. In April 2021, the launched the Strategy on Voluntary Return and Reintegration to systematize assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) efforts, focusing on five principles: early information provision, streamlined procedures, tailored reintegration support, cooperation with origin and transit states, and evidence-based monitoring. The strategy promotes standardized reintegration packages, including cash grants (typically €1,000-€5,000 per returnee), in-kind aid like tools or housing, and longer-term measures such as vocational training or business startups, funded partly through the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Implementation involves partnerships with the (IOM), which has assisted over 100,000 returns annually in recent years via AVRR programs tailored to funding, and , which coordinates joint return flights and administers the EU Reintegration Programme (EURP) for small-scale projects supporting up to 500 returnees per initiative. Member States adapt these frameworks nationally, often integrating AVRR into border and asylum procedures; for instance, and the emphasize pre-return counseling in detention centers to boost uptake, while and leverage bilateral readmission agreements to facilitate reintegration in high-return countries like those in the Western Balkans and . Incentives include waived fines for voluntary leavers and expedited eligibility post-return, though critics from organizations like argue that tying returns to detention contexts can undermine true voluntariness. A March 2025 proposal for a Common European System for Returns builds on this by mandating mutual recognition of return decisions across states, introducing "voluntary return windows" with enhanced incentives like immediate travel cost coverage, and requiring origin country cooperation under threat of visa sanctions, aiming to raise voluntary return rates amid rising irregular arrivals. Empirical evaluations, such as those from the European Migration Network, indicate AVRR participants experience higher short-term satisfaction but variable long-term reintegration success, dependent on origin-country stability and program scale.

North American Strategies

In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented strategies emphasizing financial incentives and technological facilitation to promote voluntary self-deportation among undocumented migrants and rejected asylum seekers. In May 2025, DHS announced a program offering travel assistance and a one-time stipend to eligible individuals opting for voluntary return via the CBP Home mobile app, aiming to reduce enforcement costs associated with forced removals. This initiative, supported by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under Project Homecoming launched in July 2025, allows users to register for self-deportation, track compliance, and receive assistance for departure, with over 5,000 participants reported by mid-2025. The Trump administration reallocated approximately $250 million from Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) funds to cover flight costs and a $1,000 exit bonus, positioning self-deportation as a cost-effective alternative to detention and proceedings. Collaboration with the (IOM) facilitates assisted returns, providing reintegration support upon arrival in home countries, though uptake remains limited compared to overall irregular migration flows. Canada's approach to voluntary return prioritizes administrative processes for failed claimants and inadmissible foreign nationals, often integrated with removal enforcement by the (CBSA). The Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Pilot Program, introduced to address post- claim or removal scenarios, offers logistical aid and limited reintegration counseling through partnerships with IOM, targeting individuals who concede inadmissibility to avoid formal orders. Unlike U.S. stipend-based incentives, Canadian policies focus on expedited processing and avoidance of exclusion periods; for instance, those subject to orders may pursue voluntary departure to preserve future admissibility, though an to Return to Canada (ARC) is required for re-entry within specified bans. Empirical data indicate lower volumes of assisted returns relative to the U.S., with emphasis on case-by-case assessments rather than broad campaigns, reflecting a framework that balances humanitarian considerations with border security. Both nations leverage IOM's AVR framework for operational support, but U.S. strategies incorporate aggressive financial and digital incentives to deter prolonged stays, while Canada's remain more procedurally oriented, with less public emphasis on monetary rewards. These policies align with broader North American goals of managing irregular migration pressures, particularly from , though critics note potential in practice due to alternatives.

Policies in Other Regions

Australia operates the Return and Reintegration Assistance Program (RRAP), administered through partnerships with the (IOM), to facilitate voluntary departure for non-citizens lacking legal grounds to remain, including rejected asylum seekers and visa overstayers. Eligible participants receive support such as travel arrangements, reintegration grants up to AUD 10,000 for business startups or vocational training in their home countries, and counseling, with over 1,000 individuals assisted annually in recent years. The program emphasizes self-funded returns where possible but provides financial aid to avoid destitution, aligning with Australia's broader that prioritizes removal of unauthorized migrants while offering incentives to encourage compliance over forced . In , the Assisted Voluntary Return Department under the Population and Immigration Authority offers incentives for African migrants classified as "infiltrators"—primarily from and —to depart, including a one-time grant of USD 3,500, flight tickets, and assistance with travel documents for those agreeing to leave rather than face or forced expulsion. Implemented since 2013 amid efforts to reduce an estimated 60,000 unauthorized entries from by 2012, the policy has facilitated over 20,000 departures by 2018, though critics, including organizations, argue that ultimatums like for non-compliance undermine true voluntariness, with many departures occurring under duress. The approach reflects 's security-focused stance on irregular migration, prioritizing and population composition over expansive asylum protections, with no formal status granted to most Eritrean or Sudanese arrivals despite claims. Japan maintains stringent immigration controls with limited dedicated voluntary return programs for asylum seekers, instead emphasizing deportation following repeated refugee claim rejections under the revised Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act of 2023, which permits expulsion after a second unsuccessful application unless exceptional circumstances apply. The government contributes financially to international efforts, such as UNHCR-supported reintegration projects since 2005, providing vocational and to returnees, but domestically prioritizes prevention of overstays through visa scrutiny and employer penalties rather than incentives for voluntary exit. With asylum approval rates below 1% annually—granting status to just 202 individuals in 2022—Japan's framework treats most claimants as economic migrants, facilitating returns via administrative processes without substantial reintegration support, reflecting a policy of minimal intake to preserve social homogeneity. In the region beyond and , voluntary return initiatives are often IOM-coordinated under frameworks like the Bali Process, assisting irregular migrants—such as those from —with travel and small reintegration packages, though national policies vary widely; for instance, Gulf Cooperation Council states enforce contract-end returns for labor migrants without formal voluntariness incentives, treating as a standard outcome upon job termination. These approaches prioritize and deterrence, with empirical data showing higher voluntary uptake where financial or detention-avoidance incentives exist, but limited long-term tracking of outcomes due to host-country disinterest in origin reintegration.

Global Statistics on Refugee Returns

In 2024, 1.6 million refugees returned voluntarily to their countries of origin from 78 countries of asylum, representing the highest annual total in over two decades and a 54 percent increase from the previous year. This figure encompasses both spontaneous and assisted returns, with UNHCR facilitating a portion through programs emphasizing safety and dignity, though the majority occurred independently amid shifting conditions in host countries and origins. Of these returns, 92 percent were concentrated in four countries: Syria (512,700), South Sudan (404,700), Afghanistan (364,400, including 126,800 assisted from Pakistan), and Ukraine (209,100). In 2023, approximately 1.04 million refugees repatriated voluntarily, continuing a pattern of modest annual figures relative to the global refugee stock of over 40 million. Cumulative returns over the prior decade highlight persistent challenges in major crises: 1.7 million to South Sudan, 1.1 million to Syria, and 962,700 to Afghanistan. These numbers reflect UNHCR's tracking of returns deemed voluntary based on refugee declarations and program criteria, though empirical assessments of long-term voluntariness remain limited by data gaps on post-return sustainability.
YearTotal Voluntary Refugee ReturnsKey Destinations (Share)
2023~1.04 millionVaried; precursor to 2024 spikes in ,
20241.6 million (32%), (25%), (23%), (13%)
Despite recent upticks driven by events like the fall of the Assad regime in , voluntary returns constitute less than 4 percent of the 42.7 million refugees worldwide at the end of 2024, underscoring repatriation's limited role as a durable solution amid ongoing conflicts. UNHCR data, derived from government reports and field monitoring, provide the primary global benchmark but may undercount spontaneous movements in inaccessible regions.

Migrant and Non-Refugee Return Figures

In 2023, the (IOM) facilitated the assisted voluntary return of over 71,000 non-refugee migrants worldwide through its Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and related programs, targeting irregular migrants, rejected asylum seekers, and other vulnerable individuals ineligible for status. Of these, 56,045 received AVRR support, while 15,906 benefited from Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) assistance, often for those in distress without protection needs. Returns were concentrated from host regions like the (MENA), with primary origins in West and , where 65% of AVRR cases involved intraregional movements. Approximately 31% of AVRR returns were intraregional overall, reflecting patterns of short-distance for economic or irregular migrants. By 2024, IOM-assisted returns rose to over 81,100, a 13% increase from 2023 and the highest annual total recorded, driven by heightened demand amid irregular migration pressures in and elsewhere. In the (EEA), 21,407 migrants were assisted in 2023, representing 30% of IOM's global AVRR caseload and underscoring Europe's prominence as a transit and destination hub for non-refugee returns. EU-wide data indicate that voluntary returns comprised 53.7% of all effective returns to third countries, outpacing forced removals at 46.3%, though absolute numbers remain modest relative to the 515,000 return decisions issued across member states in 2022. These figures exclude unassisted self-deportations and focus on organized programs, which IOM has scaled to over 1.5 million cumulative returns since , emphasizing cost-effective alternatives to detention for non-refugees lacking legal stay. Reintegration support accompanied many cases, reaching 126,000 beneficiaries in 2023 for services like vocational training and grants, though long-term varies by origin country stability. National variations persist; for instance, the recorded around 8,200 enforced returns in 2024 alongside voluntary departures, but detailed voluntary breakdowns highlight slower growth in assisted options compared to . Voluntary repatriation of refugees remained limited throughout the , with UNHCR recording approximately 532,000 returns in 2011, a relatively low figure amid protracted conflicts in and that deterred large-scale returns. By 2020, returns totaled 251,000 refugees, reflecting a 21% decline from prior years due to border closures and ongoing instability in origin countries. Numbers rebounded post-pandemic, reaching over 1.6 million refugee returns in 2023, driven by specific crises such as the repatriation of 57,000 from under UNHCR programs amid heightened pressures in host states. In the first half of 2024 alone, 433,600 refugees returned, indicating a continued upward trajectory influenced by improved logistical access and policy incentives. IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programs mirrored this pattern, assisting over 34,000 migrants in 2010, escalating to more than 69,000 by 2022, and showing a 4% increase in beneficiaries in 2023, primarily from where economic hardships and stricter enforcement encouraged uptake. In , voluntary returns constituted 76% of total removals in 2024, the highest volume since 2017 at 34,000, reflecting broader shifts toward readmission agreements and incentives following the 2015 migration crisis. quarterly data for 2025 showed 28,355 returns in Q2, up 12.7% year-over-year, though overall effectiveness remained low with only about 24% of return orders executed. Key influences included host-country policies emphasizing voluntary options over forced removals for cost and humane reasons, as seen in EU reforms like the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which prioritized returns through bilateral deals and reintegration aid. Economic pressures in destination states, such as post-COVID job market saturation in Europe, combined with origin-country factors like partial security improvements (e.g., in parts of Syria or Afghanistan), prompted more spontaneous and assisted returns, though community stigma and limited reintegration support often undermined sustainability. Deteriorating asylum prospects and policy determinants, including age, family ties, and origin conditions, blurred lines between truly voluntary and coerced decisions, with studies noting overlaps in drivers for both assisted returns and deportations. Projections for 2025 suggest stabilized inflows but volatile returns, potentially boosted by stricter enforcement in regions like the EU amid global uncertainties such as conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.

Effectiveness and Outcomes

Measures of Success and Reintegration

Measures of success for voluntary return programs are assessed using a multi-dimensional framework that evaluates economic, social, and reintegration, with defined as the returnee's ability to achieve self-sufficiency without ongoing external support. Economic indicators include post-return rates, levels, and rates of business startups or vocational skill application, often tracked via follow-up surveys conducted 6 to 12 months after arrival. Social metrics focus on access to , , healthcare, and , while psychosocial measures assess emotional , community acceptance, and absence of secondary migration due to unmet needs. Empirical studies indicate that voluntary returns yield more sustainable outcomes than forced repatriations across these dimensions. A 2021 International Organization for Migration (IOM) analysis of over 1,200 returnees from , , , , , and found voluntary participants demonstrated greater economic self-sufficiency and social stability, with fewer barriers to basic services compared to forced returnees. However, success varies by context; gender-disaggregated data from the same study revealed female voluntary returnees encountered heightened challenges in employment access and healthcare, often linked to prior migration experiences. Long-term viability hinges on origin-country factors like and , as short-term assistance—such as cash grants of €1,500–5,000, tools, or training provided by programs like IOM's Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR)—frequently proves insufficient without local support. Reintegration efforts emphasize pre-departure counseling, immediate post-return aid, and community-level interventions to mitigate risks of failure, such as stigmatization or gaps. An peer review of eight European countries highlighted the need for coordinated "whole-of-government" strategies involving development actors to address these gaps, noting that isolated financial aid alone yields mixed results in unstable environments. Despite these measures, comprehensive long-term evaluations remain scarce, with many programs relying on self-reported data that may overstate durability due to toward motivated voluntary participants.

Economic and Social Impacts

Voluntary return programs can yield economic benefits for countries of origin by facilitating the transfer of skills, capital, and entrepreneurial activities from returnees, potentially enhancing local development. Studies indicate that return migrants often experience a premium compared to non-migrants upon reintegration, contributing to improved and labor market outcomes in origin countries. In , returnees who acquired multiple skills abroad, such as management or technical expertise, were nearly 50% likely to start businesses—4.5 times the rate of those without such transfers—fostering for others and local economic activity. Return migrants are approximately three times more likely to employ non-migrants than non-returnees, amplifying these effects through job creation. For host countries, voluntary returns offer cost savings relative to forced deportations or prolonged detention. Assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programs are administratively less burdensome and cheaper, avoiding expenses associated with escorts, detention, and legal proceedings. In the United States, voluntary self-deportation options, including stipends, are projected to reduce costs by around 70%, even accounting for assistance provided. However, these savings depend on program uptake and reduced re-migration rates, which remain variable due to limited long-term tracking. Social impacts of voluntary returns frequently include psychosocial challenges for returnees, such as stigma, shame, and anxiety stemming from perceived migration failure, which hinder reintegration. burdens and expectations exacerbate these issues, often leading to frustration and strains, particularly among women and children. Despite this, programs incorporating counseling and engagement can mitigate stigma and support , yielding better social outcomes than forced returns, where returnees face heightened isolation and poorer labor prospects. Success in social reintegration, measured by tools like the IOM Reintegration Score across economic, social, and dimensions, varies but improves with tailored, post-return assistance rather than pre-departure incentives alone.

Factors Influencing Long-Term Viability

The long-term viability of voluntary returns, defined as sustained economic self-sufficiency, , and avoidance of for at least several years post-return, hinges on a interplay of origin- conditions, support mechanisms, and individual circumstances. Empirical analyses indicate that while initial returns may succeed due to immediate incentives, durability often falters without addressing root drivers of migration, with overall reintegration rates averaging around 37% across economic, social, and dimensions in multi-country studies of assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programs. Security improvements in the origin serve as the strongest predictor, enabling approximately one-third of refugees to return within a decade of , though returns taper sharply after 4-5 years absent ongoing stability. Economic opportunities profoundly impact sustainability, as weak job markets and high —such as the 30% rate observed in post-conflict —frequently precipitate secondary migration or dependency. Reintegration packages, including cash grants (e.g., €1,000 per adult in ) and business startup aid (up to €10,000 in ), accelerate initial returns but prove insufficient alone, with economic reintegration succeeding in only 56% of cases on average, often undermined by debt from migration costs averaging up to $12,000. Effective programs incorporate skills and , yet program-level coordination, such as 's use of reintegration scouts and pre-departure counseling influencing 31-33% of decisions, is essential to counter non-linear reintegration trajectories marked by "up" and "down" phases. Social and factors, including community acceptance and family ties, further determine outcomes, with stigma and tensions between returnees and stay-at-home populations eroding viability, as seen in where ethnic divisions limited Serb returns despite property restitution efforts. Individual vulnerabilities exacerbate risks: women encounter heightened barriers to employment, training, and healthcare, while forced returns (versus truly voluntary ones) correlate with higher intent due to diminished agency and poorer initial conditions. Holistic support addressing these—via counseling and diaspora-mediated trust-building—yields better results than economic aid in isolation, though origin-country governance weaknesses, such as inadequate service access, persistently challenge durability across contexts like and , where overall reintegration rates dip below 23%.

Criticisms and Alternative Perspectives

Challenges to True Voluntariness

True voluntariness in return programs requires that decisions be made free from , with full , viable alternatives, and no undue , as outlined in UNHCR guidelines emphasizing without threats to safety or liberty. However, critics argue that for many irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers, the context of impending forced removal undermines this, as "voluntary" returns often serve as a mechanism to facilitate departures that would otherwise require greater enforcement resources. A primary challenge arises from the binary choice presented: accept assisted return with modest reintegration aid or face detention and forcible , which can include prolonged administrative holding or physical removal. In the , assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programs, implemented by organizations like the IOM, see high participation rates among those issued return orders, with data from 2014-2020 indicating that over 80% of AVRR users in some member states were irregular migrants or failed claimants lacking legal stay options, suggesting decisions driven by avoidance of harsher alternatives rather than preference. This dynamic has been documented in empirical studies, where interviewees reported signing return agreements under duress from destitution or border authorities' warnings of imminent expulsion. Specific cases highlight direct or indirect . In Libya's detention facilities, migrants—often held in overcrowded, abusive conditions—have been compelled to to "voluntary" returns via IOM flights, with UN reports citing instances where refusal led to extended detention or denied access to asylum processes, rendering uninformed and pressured as of 2022. Similarly, in , Syrian rejected asylum seekers faced accusations of into EU-funded voluntary programs in 2025, where officials allegedly withheld information on appeals and emphasized risks, leading rights groups to question compliance with principles. In Kenya's camps, Somali refugees were subjected to government campaigns from 2016 onward promoting repatriation amid aid cuts and camp closures, with studies finding that while framed as voluntary, economic pressures and threats of encampment enforcement blurred lines into effective . Further complicating voluntariness is inadequate counseling and power imbalances. Return counseling sessions, mandated in programs like the EU's, are often brief and conducted by state or IOM staff who may prioritize efficiency over exhaustive alternatives exploration, with a 2018 OHCHR review noting that vulnerable migrants, including trauma survivors, frequently lack independent or , leading to consents not fully reflective of autonomous choice. Quantitative analyses of return decisions, such as those from IOM evaluations, reveal that psychological distress and amplify perceived pressure, particularly among those with pending appeals unknowingly waived. Despite these issues, proponents of AVRR maintain that such programs reduce overt force compared to unassisted deportations, though underscores the need for stricter safeguards to ensure decisions align with international standards on .

Reintegration Failures and Systemic Issues

Reintegration efforts for voluntarily returning migrants frequently falter due to persistent economic hardships and skills mismatches in origin countries, resulting in high rates of and among returnees. An peer review across eight European countries and partners highlighted that returnees often encounter barriers such as stigma from communities perceiving them as failures, in aid distribution, and inadequate alignment between acquired skills and local labor markets, leading to unsustainable outcomes where initial business ventures or plans collapse shortly after return. For instance, in , where sustainability is measured by a three-year post-return stay, programs show uneven success, with many participants requiring plan revisions due to unrealistic pre-departure assessments, exacerbating financial strain. Systemic issues compound these failures, including fragmented coordination between host and origin countries, limited due to and constraints, and the absence of standardized metrics for long-term viability, which hinder effective . Reports indicate thin empirical data on reintegration durability, with short monitoring periods (often 12 months) masking later breakdowns, and external factors like ongoing insecurity or in origin areas driving re-migration despite assistance. In cases like , over 6 million refugees returned between 2001 and 2011 with international aid, yet systemic weaknesses—such as corrupt institutions, weak infrastructure in reception areas, and lack of support—led to widespread marginalization, economic isolation, and secondary displacement, particularly among facing stigma and resource shortages. These patterns underscore how voluntary programs, while preferable to forced returns, often fail to address root causes like origin-country instability, resulting in returnees resorting to irregular re-emigration when support dissipates. Psychosocial challenges further undermine reintegration, with returnees experiencing shame, , and identity conflicts that strain family ties and social networks, often without tailored interventions. Studies note that even voluntary returnees, who generally fare better than forced ones economically, confront burdens from migration costs and limited pre-departure counseling, perpetuating cycles of . Broader critiques point to programs' overreliance on individual-level aid without compelling origin governments to invest in structural reforms, creating disparities where returnees compete with locals for scarce resources and face heightened risks of violations during transit.

Achievements and Comparative Benefits Over Alternatives

Voluntary return programs have facilitated the of significant numbers of migrants and refugees, with the (IOM) assisting over 71,000 individuals in safe and dignified returns in 2023 alone, alongside providing reintegration services to more than 126,000 beneficiaries. These efforts represent a 4% increase in assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) beneficiaries from 50,001 in 2022, demonstrating scalability amid rising demand driven by restrictive policies in host countries. Such programs, often including financial stipends, vocational training, and medical support upon arrival, have enabled returnees to achieve measurable reintegration milestones, such as within six months for a notable portion in targeted initiatives like the EU-IOM Joint Initiative. Compared to forced , voluntary returns yield superior economic and outcomes for returnees, with studies indicating that voluntary participants exhibit greater self-sufficiency, social stability, and lower rates of re-migration due to reduced trauma and active involvement in the process. For instance, a comparative analysis of returns to found voluntary returnees reporting fewer issues and higher income stability than those subjected to forced removal, attributing this to pre-departure counseling and tailored reintegration plans that foster agency and . Host countries also benefit from cost efficiencies, as voluntary programs eliminate expenses related to prolonged detention, legal appeals, and enforcement operations—estimated to be up to several times higher per individual in forced cases—while promoting compliance and reducing irregular re-entry attempts. Relative to alternatives like indefinite asylum or , voluntary return alleviates fiscal pressures on host welfare systems by repatriating individuals to environments where cultural and familial ties can accelerate , often leading to sustained remittances that bolster origin-country economies without ongoing subsidies. EU data from shows voluntary returns comprising 18% of operations, with trends toward expansion under strategies emphasizing humane efficiency over protracted hosting, which can strain public resources and integration capacities in high-inflow nations. These benefits are evidenced by lower in irregular migration post-return, as voluntary processes incorporate deterrence through informed rather than , aligning with causal incentives for long-term viability over reactive measures.

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  143. https://balkaninsight.com/2025/10/09/consent-is-key-bulgaria-accused-of-coercion-over-syrians-voluntary-deportations/
  144. https://repository.essex.ac.uk/32274/1/JRS-Accepted-full.pdf
  145. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/Return/InformalSummary.pdf
  146. https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/migrants/iom-submission-1103.htm
  147. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC2442043/
  148. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/233150241600400305
  149. https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/sites/default/files/papers/Majidi_ReturntoAfghanistan_CostsofWar_Dec102024.pdf
  150. https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=12461&lang=en
  151. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0120
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