Hubbry Logo
Continuity thesisContinuity thesisMain
Open search
Continuity thesis
Community hub
Continuity thesis
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Continuity thesis
Continuity thesis
from Wikipedia

In the history of ideas, the continuity thesis is the hypothesis that there was no radical discontinuity between the intellectual development of the Middle Ages and the developments in the Renaissance and early modern period. Thus the idea of an intellectual or scientific revolution following the Renaissance is, according to the continuity thesis, a myth. Some continuity theorists point to earlier intellectual revolutions occurring in the Middle Ages, usually referring to the European Renaissance of the 12th century[1] as a sign of continuity.

The Continuity Thesis has been seen by Paul Freedman and Gabrielle M. Spiegel as characteristic of Medieval Studies in North America in the twentieth century.[2] Despite the many points that have been brought up by proponents of the continuity thesis, however, a majority of scholars still support the traditional view of the Scientific Revolution occurring in the 16th and 17th centuries.[1][3][4][5]

Duhem

[edit]

The idea of a continuity, rather than contrast between medieval and modern thought, begins with Pierre Duhem, the French physicist and philosopher of science. It is set out in his ten-volume work on the history of science, Le système du monde: histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic. Unlike many former historians such as Voltaire and Condorcet, who did not consider the Middle Ages to be of much intellectual importance [citation needed], Duhem tried to show that the Roman Catholic Church had helped foster the development of Western science. His work was prompted by his research into the origins of statics in which he encountered the works of medieval mathematicians and philosophers such as Nicole Oresme and Roger Bacon. He consequently came to regard them as the founders of modern science since, in his view, they anticipated many of the discoveries of Galileo and later thinkers. Duhem concluded that "the mechanics and physics of which modern times are justifiably proud proceed, by an uninterrupted series of scarcely perceptible improvements, from doctrines professed in the heart of the medieval schools."[6]

Sarton

[edit]

Another notable supporter of the continuity thesis was George Sarton (1884–1956). In The History of Science and the New Humanism (1931), George Sarton put much stress on the historical continuity of science. Sarton further noted that the development of science stagnated during the Renaissance, due to Renaissance humanism putting more emphasis on form over fact, grammar over substance, and the adoration of ancient authorities over empirical investigation. As a result, he stated that science had to be introduced to Western culture twice: first in the 12th century during the Arabic–Latin translation movement, and again in the 17th century during what became known as the "Scientific Revolution". He said this was due to the first appearance of science being swept away by Renaissance humanism before science had to be re-introduced again in the 17th century.[7]

Sarton wrote in the Introduction to the History of Science:

It does not follow, as so many ignorant persons think, that the mediaeval activities were sterile. That would be just as foolish as to consider a pregnant woman sterile as long as the fruit of her womb was unborn. The Middle Ages were pregnant with many ideas which could not be delivered until much later. Modern science, we might say, was the fruition of mediaeval immaturity. Vesalius, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton were the happy inheritors who cashed in.[8]: 15 

We shall not be far wrong in saying that it was Occamism combined with Averroism which prepared the gradual dissolution of mediaeval continuity and the beginning of a new age.[8]: 91 

Franklin and Pasnau

[edit]

More recently the Australian mathematician and historian of science James Franklin has argued that the idea of a European Renaissance is a myth.[9] He characterizes the myth as the view that around the 15th century:

  • There was a sudden dawning of a new outlook on the world after 1000 years of darkness.
  • Ancient learning was rediscovered.
  • New ideas about intellectual inquiry and freedom replaced reliance on authority.
  • Scientific investigation replaced the sterile disputes of the schools.[9]: 60 

He claims that the Renaissance was in fact a period when thought declined significantly and brought to an end a period of advance in the Late Middle Ages and that the twelfth century was the "real, true, and unqualified renaissance". For example, the rediscovery of ancient knowledge, which the later Italian humanists claimed for themselves, was actually accomplished in the 12th century.[9]

Franklin cites many examples of scientific advances in the medieval period that predate or anticipate later 'discoveries'. For example, the first advances in geometrical optics and mechanics were in the 12th century. The first steps in understanding motion, and continuous variation in general, occurred in the 14th century with the work of the scientists of the Merton School, at Oxford in the 1330s and 1340s. (Franklin notes that there is no phrase in ancient Greek or Latin equivalent to "kilometres per hour"). Nicole Oresme, who wrote on theology and money, devoted much of his effort to science and mathematics and invented graphs, was the first to perform calculations involving probability, and the first to compare the workings of the universe to a clock.[10][11] Franklin emphasises how much of later thought, not only in science, was built on a foundation of revived scholasticism, not Renaissance humanism.[12]

According to Franklin, little of importance occurs in any other branches of science in the two centuries between Oresme and Copernicus. Like other historians of this period, Franklin attributes the decline to the plague of 1348–1350 (the Black Death), which killed a third of the people in Europe. Johan Huizinga's examination of the period, The Waning of the Middle Ages,[13] suggests a tendency towards elaborate theory of signs, which Franklin compares with the degeneracy of modern Marxism. He cites the late Renaissance naturalist Aldrovandi, who considered his account of the snake incomplete until he had treated it in its anatomical, heraldic, allegorical, medicinal, anecdotal, historical and mythical aspects. He marks the 15th century as coinciding with the decline of literature. Chaucer died in 1400; the next writers that are widely read are Erasmus, More, Rabelais and Machiavelli, just after 1500. "It is hard to think of any writer in English between Chaucer and Spenser who is now read even by the most enthusiastic students. The gap is almost two hundred years." He points to the development of astrology and alchemy in the heyday of the Renaissance.[9]

Franklin concedes that in painting the Renaissance really excelled, but unfortunately, the artistic skill of the Renaissance concealed its incompetence in anything else. He cites Leonardo da Vinci, who was supposed to be good at everything, but who on examination, "had nothing of importance to say on most subjects". (A standard history of mathematics, according to Franklin (E. T. Bell's The Development of Mathematics, 1940), states, "Leonardo's published jottings on mathematics are trivial, even puerile, and show no mathematical talent whatever."[14]) The invention of printing he compares to television, which produced "a flood of drivel catering to the lowest common denominator of the paying public, plus a quantity of propaganda paid for by the sponsors".[9]

The philosopher and historian Robert Pasnau makes a similar claim that "modernity came in the late twelfth century, with Averroes' magisterial revival of Aristotle and its almost immediate embrace by the Latin West."[15]

Pasnau argues that in some branches of 17th-century philosophy, the insights of the scholastic era fall into neglect and disrepute. He disputes the modernist view of medieval thought as subservient to the views of Aristotle. By contrast, "scholastic philosophers agree among themselves no more than does any group of philosophers from any historical period."[15]: 561  Furthermore, the almost-unknown period between 1400 and 1600 was not barren but gave rise to vast quantities of material, much of which still survives. That complicates any generalizations about the supposedly novel developments in the 17th century. He claims that the concerns of scholasticism are largely continuous with the central themes of the modern era; that early modern philosophy, though different in tone and style, is a natural progression out of later medieval debates; and that a grasp of the scholastic background is essential to an understanding of the philosophy of Descartes, Locke and others.[15]

Graham and Saliba

[edit]

In 1973, A. C. Graham criticized the notion of "modern science" and argued, "The question may also be raised whether Ptolemy or even Copernicus and Kepler were in principle any nearer to modern science than the Chinese and the Maya, or indeed than the first astronomer, whoever he may have been, who allowed observations to outweigh numerological considerations of symmetry in his calculations of the month and the year".[citation needed] In 1999, George Saliba, in his review of Toby E. Huff's The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam, China and the West, also criticised the notion of "modern science" by arguing that one would need to define terms like "modern science" or "modernity".[16] After quoting Graham, Saliba notes that "the empirical emphasis placed by that very first astronomer on the value of his observations set the inescapable course to modern science. So where would the origins of modern science then lie?"[17]

Grant

[edit]

In The Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages, Edward Grant argues that the origins of modern science lie in the Middle Ages and was due to a combination of four factors:[1]

"Translations into Latin of Greek and Arabic scientific texts in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; the development of universities, which were uniquely Western and used the translations as the basis of a science curriculum; the adjustments of Christianity to secular learning and the transformation of Aristotle's natural philosophy."

Hatfield

[edit]

Gary Hatfield, in his "Was the Scientific Revolution Really a Revolution of Science?", argues that while the "Scientific Revolution" of the 17th century did have several individual "revolutions", he does not consider the period to be a "scientific" revolution. Some of his reasons include science still being tied to metaphysics at the time, experimental physics not being separated from natural philosophy until the end of the 18th century, and comparable individual "revolutions" in different sciences continued occurring before and after the 17th century, such as the optical revolution of Faraday and Maxwell.[18]

Bala

[edit]

Another contrary view has been recently proposed by Arun Bala in his dialogical history of the birth of modern science. Bala proposes that the changes involved in the Scientific Revolution — the mathematical realist turn, the mechanical philosophy, the atomism, the central role assigned to the Sun in Copernican heliocentrism — have to be seen as rooted in multicultural influences on Europe. He sees specific influences in Alhazen's physical optical theory, Chinese mechanical technologies leading to the perception of the world as a machine, the Hindu–Arabic numeral system, which carried implicitly a new mode of mathematical atomic thinking, and the heliocentrism rooted in ancient Egyptian religious ideas associated with Hermeticism. Bala argues that by ignoring such multicultural impacts we have been led to a Eurocentric conception of the Scientific Revolution.[19] Critics note that lacking documentary evidence of transmission of specific scientific ideas, Bala's model will remain "a working hypothesis, not a conclusion".[20]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The continuity thesis is a historiographical hypothesis in the history of science positing that there was no radical rupture or revolutionary break between medieval and early modern scientific thought; instead, modern science emerged as a gradual, continuous development from the intellectual achievements of medieval scholasticism, particularly the 14th-century Parisian school. Championed primarily by the French physicist and philosopher Pierre Duhem (1861–1916), the thesis challenges 19th-century narratives that portrayed the Middle Ages as a "dark age" of intellectual stagnation, followed by an abrupt Scientific Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries. Duhem's argument, articulated in major works such as Les Origines de la statique (1905–1906), Études sur Léonard de Vinci (1906–1913), and the unfinished Le Système du monde: Histoire des doctrines cosmologiques de Platon à Copernic (1913–1959), demonstrated through meticulous archival research that key concepts in modern physics and cosmology—such as impetus theory in dynamics and hypothetical reasoning in mechanics—originated with medieval thinkers like Jean Buridan, Nicole Oresme, and Albert of Saxony. For instance, Duhem traced the foundations of Galileo's mechanics to these 14th-century scholastics, asserting that "the science of Galileo" represented "the well-paved triumph of the science born at Paris during the fourteenth century over the doctrines of Aristotle and Averroes." This perspective not only rehabilitated the reputation of medieval science but also emphasized the role of Christian theology, particularly the 1277 Condemnation of Parisian Aristotelian doctrines, in liberating scientific inquiry from ancient Greek necessitarianism and enabling innovative thought experiments. The continuity thesis has profoundly influenced subsequent historiography, inspiring scholars such as Marshall Clagett, Ernest A. Moody, and A. C. Crombie to further explore medieval contributions, while contrasting sharply with the "conflict thesis" that depicted science and religion as inherently opposed forces.

Overview

Definition

The continuity thesis is a historiographical perspective in the that posits no abrupt break between medieval and modern science, instead emphasizing a process of gradual evolution across centuries. This view challenges the traditional narrative of a revolutionary rupture during the of the 16th and 17th centuries, arguing that modern scientific achievements represent an uninterrupted progression from earlier doctrines developed in medieval schools. Early proponents, such as , framed this as a "suite ininterrompue de perfectionnements à peine sensibles" (uninterrupted series of scarcely perceptible improvements) in mechanics and physics from the onward. Central to the thesis are shared methodologies between medieval and early modern thinkers, including empirical observation and mathematical reasoning applied to natural phenomena. For instance, medieval scholars employed quantitative analysis in and cosmology, laying groundwork for later developments. Institutional continuity further supports this perspective, as universities established in the 12th and 13th centuries—such as those in and —provided enduring frameworks for scientific inquiry, persisting into the without fundamental disruption. Intellectual lineages also illustrate this evolution, with medieval figures like Jean Buridan and advancing impetus theory and graphical methods that influenced early modern , including Galileo, who referenced "Doctores Parisienses" in his works. The thesis primarily applies to the development of Western from the through the 17th century, focusing on the transmission of ideas from 14th-century Parisian schools to figures like Copernicus and Galileo. It reframes the "" not as radical innovation but as the culmination of medieval foundations in , , and astronomy, thereby highlighting incremental advancements over dramatic shifts.

Historical Context

The prevailing historiographical narratives of the 19th and early 20th centuries, heavily influenced by Enlightenment thinkers like , depicted the medieval period as an era of intellectual darkness marked by superstition, barbarism, and stagnation in scientific inquiry. , in works such as his Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations (1756), portrayed the as a regressive interlude between the and the rational rebirth of the , where progress in knowledge was stifled by religious dogma and ignorance. This perspective framed the of the 16th and 17th centuries as a radical rupture, inaugurating modern science as a triumphant emergence from medieval obscurity. Building on Enlightenment views, 19th-century positivists such as Auguste Comte further entrenched this discontinuity by conceptualizing human intellectual development through his "law of three stages," in which the medieval era fell squarely within the "theological stage." In this framework, medieval thought was dominated by supernatural explanations and anthropomorphic deities, lacking the empirical rigor that would only arrive in the "positive" or scientific stage associated with modernity. Comte's evolutionary model, outlined in Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842), thus reinforced the notion of medieval science as primitive and discontinuous with later advancements. These interpretations aligned with the "Whig history" approach, which retrospectively celebrated the Scientific Revolution as inexorable progress toward contemporary scientific ideals, often at the expense of nuanced appreciation for pre-modern contributions. By the early , a historiographical shift began to challenge these dominant narratives, spurred by increased access to medieval archives and the critical reevaluation of long-neglected texts, which uncovered evidence of advanced and proto-scientific methods in the . This reevaluation positioned the continuity thesis as a deliberate antidote to Whig biases, emphasizing gradual evolution over abrupt breaks in the . initiated much of this transformation through his extensive research into medieval mechanics and cosmology, demonstrating precursors to modern theories in 14th-century works. The emergence of the continuity thesis resonated within broader debates in , especially in , where it became a defining characteristic of 20th-century scholarship. Historians Paul Freedman and Gabrielle M. Spiegel have observed that this approach reflected a prevailing tendency to integrate medieval intellectual life into narratives of Western continuity, countering earlier Eurocentric dismissals of the period's significance.

Origins and Early Development

Pierre Duhem's Contributions

(1861–1916) was a French and philosopher of who, after facing academic disputes that limited his career to provincial universities such as , , and , increasingly turned to the as a scholarly pursuit. Born in to a devout Catholic family, Duhem's intellectual trajectory shifted notably around 1903 when his research uncovered overlooked medieval scientific texts, prompting him to challenge prevailing narratives of scientific discontinuity. Duhem's foundational contributions to the continuity thesis are evident in his major historical works, particularly the multi-volume Le Système du Monde (published between 1913 and 1959, with ten volumes in total, though incomplete at his death) and Études sur Léonard de Vinci (1906–1913). In Le Système du Monde, Duhem meticulously traced cosmological and mechanical doctrines from through the to the , arguing that medieval thinkers provided essential precursors to modern mechanics. Similarly, Études sur Léonard de Vinci examined figures like and Galileo, demonstrating how medieval impetus theory influenced their developments in dynamics. Central to Duhem's arguments was the claim that medieval scholastics anticipated key inertial concepts in ; for instance, he highlighted Jean Buridan's —describing a projectile's sustained motion through an internalized motive force—as a direct precursor to Galileo's of . Duhem explicitly rejected the Protestant-influenced historiographical bias that depicted the Catholic as a period of intellectual stagnation and anti-scientific repression, instead portraying it as a vibrant era of scientific advancement. Duhem's methodological approach emphasized the Catholic intellectual tradition's pivotal role in preserving, translating, and extending Greek scientific heritage, particularly through scholastic and curricula that fostered rigorous of natural phenomena. This perspective laid groundwork for later historians to explore medieval contributions to .

George Sarton's Influence

George Sarton (1884–1956), a Belgian-American historian of science, is widely recognized as the founder of the modern discipline of history of science. Born in Ghent, Belgium, he immigrated to the United States in 1915 amid World War I and became a pivotal figure in establishing the field through his scholarly and organizational efforts. Sarton's most influential work, Introduction to the History of Science (1927–1948), comprises three volumes in five parts that meticulously chronicle scientific progress from antiquity to the end of the 14th century, with particular emphasis on medieval contributions to the scientific method, such as advancements in optics, mathematics, and empirical observation. In this comprehensive synthesis, he documented how medieval scholars preserved and expanded ancient knowledge, laying foundational elements for later developments. Complementing this, his 1931 book The History of Science and the New Humanism explicitly stressed the unbroken historical continuity of science, rejecting notions of abrupt ruptures and portraying scientific inquiry as a gradual evolution driven by human curiosity and collaboration across eras. Sarton advocated a "humanistic" history of science that intertwined technical advancements with cultural and philosophical contexts, arguing that understanding science's past humanizes its present applications. He integrated medieval figures like (c. 1219–1292) into this narrative as proto-empiricists, highlighting Bacon's insistence on experimentation, direct observation, and mathematical verification—such as his applications of Euclid's in studies of mirrors—as bridges between scholastic deduction and modern inductive methods. Sarton's institutional legacy further entrenched the continuity thesis in academic discourse; he founded the journal Isis in 1913 as a platform for interdisciplinary historical research and launched Osiris in 1936 for in-depth monographic studies. In 1924, he established the History of Science Society to sustain Isis and foster global collaboration among historians, scientists, and philosophers. He also championed the integration of history of science into university curricula, influencing Harvard University's creation of the first Ph.D. program in the field in 1936 and promoting its role in broadening scientific education beyond technical training. These efforts helped institutionalize the study of the history of science with an emphasis on continuity as a core tenet of historiographical study.

Medieval and Renaissance Foundations

Edward Grant's Work

Edward Grant (1926–2020) was an American historian of medieval science who served as Distinguished Professor Emeritus in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at , where he taught from 1959 until his retirement. Specializing in the of during the , Grant's scholarship emphasized the foundational role of medieval thought in the emergence of modern science. Grant's key contributions to the continuity thesis appear in his seminal works of Modern Science in the Middle Ages: Their Religious, Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts (1996) and A of : From the Ancient World to the Nineteenth Century (2007). In the former, he systematically traces how medieval intellectual traditions provided the conceptual and methodological groundwork for scientific advancements in the seventeenth century. The latter offers a broader historical survey, underscoring the evolution of natural philosophy across eras while highlighting medieval innovations as pivotal links. Central to Grant's arguments is the development of systematic natural philosophy within medieval universities, which integrated empirical observation and mathematical reasoning into the study of nature. He contends that these institutions, emerging in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, created structured curricula based on Aristotelian texts that encouraged rigorous analysis and debate, evolving Aristotle's qualitative physics toward more quantitative approaches. For instance, Grant illustrates continuity in core concepts such as the void and motion, showing how fourteenth-century thinkers like advanced discussions of impetus and spatial extension, which prefigured René Descartes's mechanistic views on matter and locomotion in the seventeenth century. This progression demonstrates a gradual refinement rather than a rupture in scientific thought. Grant places particular emphasis on the institutional role of universities in nurturing scientific inquiry, arguing that they provided for despite the era's theological framework. By separating domains of faith and reason—allowing philosophers to explore natural causes without direct divine intervention—medieval academia countered perceptions of as purely theological or stagnant, instead fostering an environment conducive to empirical and logical exploration. His analysis aligns briefly with Pierre Duhem's earlier recognition of medieval impetus theory as a precursor to modern dynamics.

Contributions of Graham and Saliba

Mark Graham, an American author and novelist with a background in medieval history, and (born 1939), a Lebanese-American historian and professor emeritus of Arabic and Islamic science at , have significantly advanced the continuity thesis by illuminating the pivotal role of Islamic scholarship in bridging ancient knowledge to European scientific developments. Their works emphasize the intermediary function of Islamic intellectuals in astronomy, , and during the 9th to 12th centuries, positioning these contributions as essential to the unbroken evolution of scientific thought. In his 2006 book How Islam Created the Modern World: The Untold Story of Islam's Influence on World Civilization, Graham details the medieval translation movement centered in Baghdad's (Bayt al-Hikmah), where Islamic scholars preserved, translated, and expanded Greek texts from antiquity, laying foundational groundwork for later European innovations. Complementing this, Saliba's influential 2007 monograph Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance critiques traditional historiographies that isolate the as a uniquely European phenomenon, instead demonstrating how Islamic scientific traditions directly informed European progress through sustained intellectual exchanges. Saliba draws on astronomical manuscripts to show ongoing advancements in Islamic up to the , which were assimilated into European curricula via translations in Toledo and . Central to their arguments is the transmission of Greek knowledge through Islamic intermediaries, exemplified by the influence of Ibn al-Haytham's (Alhazen) Book of Optics (early 11th century), which introduced experimental approaches to light and vision that shaped Johannes Kepler's later theories on planetary motion and optics in the 17th century. Graham and Saliba further trace continuity in experimental methods, from systematic observations and mathematical modeling in Baghdad's observatories to their adoption in Padua's universities, where figures like Galileo built upon these precedents without radical breaks. By highlighting these links, they challenge Eurocentric narratives that portray the Scientific Revolution as an abrupt Western emergence, arguing instead that Islamic science provided the critical continuity and innovation essential to modernity. Their unique emphasis on 9th- to 12th-century Islamic contributions underscores these as the vital conduit between Hellenistic antiquity and European , fostering a more inclusive understanding of scientific history that recognizes dependencies. This perspective extends Edward Grant's analysis of university-based developments in Latin by integrating the exchanges that originated in the Islamic world.

Modern Interpretations

Franklin and Pasnau

James Franklin (born 1953) is an Australian philosopher and mathematician, and Robert Pasnau (born 1967) is an American philosopher. Franklin is a retired professor of mathematics and philosophy at the , where his research encompassed the , the history of probability, and the . Pasnau serves as a professor of philosophy at the , specializing in medieval and , with a focus on metaphysics, , and the . Both scholars contribute to the continuity thesis through their examinations of epistemological and methodological developments, emphasizing persistent logical structures from the into the without positing radical breaks. Franklin defends continuity in the philosophy of science by highlighting the analytical rigor of late scholastic thinkers from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, arguing that their conceptual analysis prefigured modern scientific methods. In his analysis, these scholastics advanced fields like , political theory, and through precise thought experiments and probabilistic evaluations, countering narratives of intellectual stagnation. For instance, Franklin traces the evolution of probabilistic reasoning in medieval and , showing how concepts of and —developed in works like those of canon lawyers—laid groundwork for empirical , bridging scholastic traditions to post-Cartesian inquiry. This approach underscores a methodological continuity, where logical tools for handling persisted across periods. Pasnau similarly argues for epistemological continuity, particularly in how medieval and early modern philosophers addressed , regress problems, and the nature of . Drawing on Thomas Aquinas's treatments of in justification—where requires foundational certainties to avoid vicious cycles—Pasnau demonstrates parallels in Descartes's , rejecting the idea of a methodological rupture. In his broader historical survey, Pasnau illustrates a gradual shift in epistemic ideals, from the high demands of medieval scientia to probabilistic acceptance in early modern thought, with shared concerns over regress and soul-related cognition linking Aquinas to Locke. Their aligned perspectives emphasize that logical frameworks for , such as probabilistic responses to skeptical challenges, evolved incrementally from medieval foundations.

Gary Hatfield

Gary Hatfield (born 1955) is an American philosopher of science and the retired Adam Seybert Professor in Moral and Intellectual at the , where he taught from 1987 after positions at Harvard and . His research focuses on the history and of , , and mind, with seminal contributions including the book The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz (1990), which examines the interplay of empirical and transcendental approaches to , and numerous essays on Descartes' , such as those exploring his mechanistic views of the mind in works like Descartes and the Meditations (2003). In advancing the continuity thesis, Hatfield argues that medieval theories of vision provided foundational elements for early modern empirical , particularly through the intromission model developed by and transmitted via Roger Bacon's (1267), which emphasized the geometric projection of light forms into the eye as a basis for spatial . This framework, he contends, evolved without radical rupture into seventeenth-century theories by Descartes and Malebranche, where visual sensations were analyzed as natural signs requiring inferential processes to yield perceptual judgments about external objects, thus bridging scholastic to the empirical of Locke. Hatfield further highlights continuity in the mind-body problem, tracing its persistence from scholastic debates on the soul's union with the body—rooted in Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions—to Locke's empiricist treatment in (1689), where mental operations arise from sensory experience without positing a substantive dualism that severs psychological from . In his chapter "Remaking the Science of Mind: Psychology as a " (1995), he demonstrates how eighteenth-century retained this thread by classifying mental powers under natural laws, avoiding the sharp discontinuities posited by some histories of the . Hatfield's unique emphasis lies in psychological continuity, wherein medieval intromission theories prefigure modern by positing unconscious inferential mechanisms in —such as Bacon's "species" as intermediaries—that anticipate contemporary models of visual processing in computational theories of mind. This perspective aligns briefly with Franklin and Pasnau's arguments for epistemological continuity in medieval contributions to modern logic and .

Arun Bala

Arun Bala is an Indian-Canadian historian of science and philosopher, holding a Ph.D. in philosophy from the , with prior degrees in physics from the . He has taught at the and served as a senior research fellow at the Asia Research Institute there, while also holding visiting positions, including at the . Bala's scholarship extends the continuity thesis by emphasizing the role of non-Western scientific traditions in the emergence of modern science, challenging Eurocentric narratives through a focus on intercultural dialogues. In his seminal work, The Dialogue of Civilizations in the Birth of (2006), Bala argues that arose not as a uniquely European achievement but through hybrid interactions involving Asian, , and ancient Egyptian ideas transmitted to during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. He highlights specific contributions, such as Indian mathematical concepts—like infinite series and negative numbers—influencing Islamic , which in turn shaped European developments in and symbolic mathematics during the . Similarly, Bala points to Chinese cosmological and observational practices, including precise astronomical measurements, as informing European heliocentric models via Jesuit exchanges. These examples underscore his rejection of a pure Western origin for , positing instead a continuity where non-Western traditions provided essential conceptual and technical foundations. Bala further develops this globalized perspective in Asia, Europe, and the Emergence of Modern Science: Knowledge Crossing Boundaries (2012), an edited volume that examines cross-cultural knowledge flows as key to scientific innovation. Here, he addresses Eurocentrism by illustrating hybrid developments, such as the integration of Indian and Chinese empirical methods with European experimentation in optics and mechanics, fostering the methodological pluralism of early modern science. This approach complements George Saliba's emphasis on Islamic transmissions by broadening the scope to include East Asian influences in a multifaceted continuity. Bala's framework thus reframes the continuity thesis as a worldwide process, highlighting mutual exchanges that overcame cultural boundaries to propel scientific progress.

Criticisms and Debates

Ideological Critiques

Critics have accused the continuity thesis, particularly as articulated by , of being driven by ideological motivations rooted in Catholic nationalism and , which intrude upon objective historical analysis. In their 2011 analysis, Bernard R. Goldstein and Giora Hon argue that Duhem's emphasis on gradual evolution in scientific thought served to rehabilitate the medieval Catholic intellectual tradition, portraying it as a harmonious precursor to modern rather than a period of stagnation or conflict. They contend that this narrative downplays significant tensions between and the Church, such as the trial of Galileo in 1633, which Duhem largely ignored to avoid highlighting institutional opposition to . Alexandre Koyré offered an early and influential counterpoint by stressing conceptual revolutions in the history of science, which inherently challenge the continuity thesis's minimization of breaks. Through Maurice Clavelin's examination, Koyré's work underscores discontinuities, such as the shift from medieval qualitative physics to the mathematical frameworks of the seventeenth century, arguing that Duhem's gradualism overlooks these profound paradigmatic changes. This critique positions the continuity thesis as ideologically selective, favoring evolutionary harmony over evidence of rupture to align with apologetic goals. Broader ideological concerns extend to the risk of , where proponents project modern scientific standards onto medieval thought, thereby distorting historical alterity. Paul Freedman and Gabrielle M. Spiegel identify this as a hallmark of twentieth-century North American , where the continuity thesis reinforced a progressive narrative that assimilated the into a teleological story of Western development, often at the expense of recognizing period-specific worldviews. Such approaches, they argue, stem from cultural and ideological commitments to continuity, blurring the line between historical inquiry and contemporary self-justification. Historical examples of this bias appear in critiques of George Sarton's influential historiography, which promoted a humanistic vision of science's development that privileged unbroken progress over genuine epistemological shifts. Sarton's framework, emphasizing the integration of science into broader human endeavors, has been faulted for underplaying discontinuities, such as the methodological breaks during the Scientific Revolution, in favor of a cohesive narrative that aligns with liberal humanistic ideals. This selective emphasis, critics note, reflects an ideological preference for continuity that echoes Duhem's apologetic undertones while adapting them to a secular, progressive context.

Responses to Discontinuity Thesis

Proponents of the continuity thesis have offered robust rebuttals to the discontinuity narrative, emphasizing institutional and intellectual developments in the medieval period that directly informed modern science. Edward Grant, in his analysis of medieval natural philosophy, argues against the "dark ages" myth by highlighting the pivotal role of universities such as Paris and Oxford, which institutionalized rigorous inquiry into logic, natural philosophy, and theology, creating a stable framework for scientific thought that persisted into the early modern era. These institutions, supported by the Church, fostered methodologies like hypothetical reasoning and empirical observation, which Grant contends laid essential groundwork for the Scientific Revolution, countering claims of a complete intellectual rupture. Specific arguments draw on from historical texts to demonstrate incremental progress across eras, particularly in mechanics. For instance, medieval scholars like Jean Buridan and developed impetus theory, which explained through sustained internal force, bridging Aristotelian kinematics and later Newtonian principles without abrupt breaks. This continuity is evident in how Oresme's graphical representations of velocity and acceleration prefigured Descartes' and Galileo's work, showing a gradual evolution rather than revolutionary invention. Such textual analyses refute the discontinuity thesis as an oversimplification, often rooted in 19th-century ideologies that portrayed medieval Europe as stagnant to exalt Enlightenment progress, as seen in John William Draper's portrayal of religious suppression stifling science. In response to persistent ideological critiques portraying as perpetually at war with medieval traditions, continuity advocates integrate global and philosophical perspectives to address . Arun Bala extends the by tracing modern science's to interactions among European, Chinese, Indian, and Islamic civilizations, arguing that 17th-century breakthroughs built on cross-cultural exchanges rather than isolated Western genius. Similarly, Gary Hatfield reevaluates the , questioning its "revolutionary" label by showing how 17th-century innovations in and evolved from scholastic foundations, challenging narratives of total shifts. Post-2000 archival studies have bolstered these defenses, uncovering manuscripts that reveal sustained transmission of knowledge, such as Arabic-to-Latin translations influencing Copernican astronomy, thus undermining outdated Eurocentric discontinuity models. The continuity thesis continues to evolve in contemporary to counter enduring "" tropes in popular histories of . Recent works, such as Dieks' 2023 examination of , leverage historical continuity to argue that successive theories exhibit emergent links—e.g., from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics—without radical breaks, supporting realism's claim of progressive truth approximation. This approach reframes debates, positioning continuity not as mere preservation but as a dynamic process that integrates global contributions and philosophical rigor to dismantle simplified origin myths.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.