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Political realignment
Political realignment
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A political realignment is a set of sharp changes in party-related ideology, issues, leaders, regional bases, demographic bases, and/or the structure of powers within a government. In the fields of political science and political history, this is often referred to as a critical election, critical realignment, or realigning election. These changes result in a restructuring of political focus and power that lasts for decades, usually replacing an older dominant coalition. Scholars frequently invoke the concept in American elections as this is where it is most common, though the experience also does occur in governments across the globe. It is generally accepted that the United States has had five distinct party systems, each featuring two major parties attracting a consistent political coalition and following a consistent party ideology, separated by four realignments. Two of the most apparent examples include the 1896 United States presidential election, when the issues of the American Civil War political system were replaced with those of the Populist and Progressive Era, and the 1932 United States presidential election, when the issues of the Populist and Progressive Eras were replaced by New Deal liberalism and modern conservatism. Realigning elections also contribute significantly to realigning (what are known in the field of comparative politics as) party systems—with 1828, for example, separating the First Party System and the Second Party System in the US.

Political realignments can be sudden (1–4 years) or can take place more gradually (5–20 years). Most often, as demonstrated in V. O. Key Jr.'s (1955) original hypothesis, a single "critical election" marks a sudden realignment.[1] However he also argued that a cyclical process of realignment exists, wherein political views within interests groups gradually begin to separate which he designated as secular realignment.[2] Political scientists and historians often disagree about which elections are realignments and what defines a realignment, and even whether realignments occur. The terms themselves are somewhat arbitrary, however, and usage among political scientists and historians does vary. In the US, Walter Dean Burnham argued for a 30–38 year "cycle" of realignments.[3] Many of the elections often included in the Burnham 38-year cycle are considered "realigning" for different reasons.

Other political scientists and quantitative elections analysts reject realignment theory altogether, arguing that there are no long-term patterns. Political scientist David R. Mayhew states, "Elections and their underlying causes are not usefully sortable into generation-long spans ... It is too slippery, too binary, too apocalyptic, and it has come to be too much of a dead end."[4] Sean Trende, senior elections analyst at RealClearPolitics, also argues against the realignment theory and the "emerging Democratic majority" thesis proposed by journalist John Judis and political scientist Ruy Teixeira. In his 2012 book The Lost Majority, Trende states, "Almost none of the theories propounded by realignment theorists has endured the test of time... It turns out that finding a 'realigning' election is a lot like finding an image of Jesus in a grilled-cheese sandwichif you stare long enough and hard enough, you will eventually find what you are looking for."[5] In August 2013, Trende observed that U.S. presidential election results from 1880 through 2012 form a 0.96 correlation with the expected sets of outcomes (i.e. events) in the binomial distribution of a fair coin flip experiment.[6] In May 2015, statistician and FiveThirtyEight editor-in-chief Nate Silver argued against a blue wall Electoral College advantage for the Democratic Party in the 2016 U.S. presidential election,[7] and in post-election analysis, Silver cited Trende in noting that "there are few if any permanent majorities" and both Silver and Trende argued that the "emerging Democratic majority" thesis led most news coverage and commentary preceding the election to overstate Hillary Clinton's chances of being elected.[list 1]

Realignment theory

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The central holding of realignment theory, first developed in the political scientist V. O. Key Jr.'s 1955 article, "A Theory of Critical Elections", is that American elections, parties and policymaking routinely shift in swift, dramatic sweeps as well as slow, gradual movements.

V. O. Key Jr., E. E. Schattschneider, James L. Sundquist, Walter Dean Burnham are generally credited with developing and refining the theory of realignment.[14] Though they differed on some of the details, earlier realignments scholars generally concluded that systematic patterns are identifiable in American national elections. Such that cycles occur on a regular schedule: once every 36-years or so. This period of roughly 30 years fits with the notion that these cycles are closely linked to generational change. However later scholars, such as Shafer and Reichley, argue that the patterns are longer, closer to 50 to 60 years in duration. Pointing to the Democratic dominance from 1800 to 1860, and Republican rule from 1860 to 1932 as examples, Reichley argues that the only true realigning elections occurred in these 60 year periods.[15] Given the much longer length of time since the last generally accepted realignment in 1932, more recent scholars have theorized that realignments don't in fact operate on any consistent time scale, but rather occur whenever the necessary political, social, and economic changes occur.[16]

Voter realignments

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A central component of realignment is the change in behavior of voting groups. Realignment within the context of voting relates to the switching of voter preferences from one party to another. This is in contrast to dealignment where a voter group abandons a party due to voter apathy or to become independent. In the US and Australia, as the ideologies of the parties define many of the aspects of voters' lives and the decisions that they make, a realignment by a voter tends to have a longer-lasting effect.[17][18]

In Britain, Canada, and other countries the phenomenon of political realignment is not as drastic. Due to the multi-party system, voters have a tendency to switch parties on a whim, perhaps only for one election, as there is far less loyalty towards one particular party.[19][20]

Cultural issues

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The major political parties in the United States have held the same name for over a century, yet there is no doubt that their values and intentions have changed. [21] While realignment is caused by various reasons, one of the largest factors is cultural issues. The culture of a population is altered over time as technology advances, needs change, and values evolve. With this shift, a population's views and desires will also change, thus resulting in parties realigning to be relevant to present topics.

In recent years, LGBTQ rights has become a growing factor in politics around the world. The increasing publicized presence of the LGBTQ community has created rifts and realignments in political parties. For example, in 2022, there were 315 bills introduced to various state legislatures across the United States that were found to be anti-LGBTQ. Of these 315 bills, 29 were signed into the state's law.[22]

While further discussing evolving social issues and its relation to party realignment, the growing issue of abortion has been found in relevancy to newly found party values. These values which differentiate between certain parties can be attributed to federal abortion policies, which have been altered, fought for, and lost, thus creating a mass social issue.[23] Since Roe v. Wade, abortion has largely become a major aspect of US politics. Furthermore, the 2022 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization case has sparked further issues in the US political scene, as it overturned the constitutional right of abortion that was granted from Roe v. Wade, in 1973.[24] The issue of abortion, state restrictions, and overturning of federal funding for procedures has created a political uproar in the US. For example, many state legislatures, members of Congress, and other politically powered members have created restrictions on insurance, funding, and the overall accessibility of having an abortion.[25] These actions have created the movement of activists to fight for the right of abortion. Furthermore, this battle has caused political parties to acknowledge the cause, determine their stance, and realign overall.

United States

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Political realignment in United States history

[edit]
  • 1800 presidential electionThomas Jefferson
    • This election completed the turnover of power in the First Party System from the Federalist Party, led by Alexander Hamilton, to Jefferson and his Democratic-Republican Party. The center of power shifted from New England to the South and Jeffersonian democracy became the dominant ideology.
    • Republicans gained 19.7% of House seats in 1800, 9.4% in 1802 and 9.7% in 1804, for a total gain of 38.8% in 3 elections.
    • As late as 1812, the Federalists came within one state of winning. A larger shift in electoral politics arguably came in the 1812–1816 period, as the Federalists became discredited after opposing the War of 1812.
  • 1828 presidential electionAndrew Jackson
  • 1860 presidential electionAbraham Lincoln
    • After the Whigs collapsed after 1852, party alignments were in turmoil, with several third parties, such as the Know Nothings and the Opposition Party. The system stabilized in 1858 and the presidential election marked the ascendence of the Republican Party. Abraham Lincoln beat out three other contenders — but even if they had somehow united he still had the majority of the electoral vote. The Republican party was pledged to the long-term ending of slavery, which was proximate cause of secession. Republicans rallied around nationalism in 1861 and fought the American Civil War to end secession. During the war the Republicans, under Lincoln's leadership, switched to a goal of short-term ending of slavery.[26] By 1864, the Republicans had a coalition built around followers of the "free labor" ideology, as well as soldiers and veterans of the Union Army. (Since then, the military establishment has favored the Republicans.)[citation needed]
      • The Republican Party went from 18.3% of the House in 1854, to 38.0% in 1856, 48.7% in 1858, and 59.0% in 1860, for a total gain of 40.7% in 4 elections.[27]
  • 1896 presidential electionWilliam McKinley
    • The status of this election is hotly disputed; some political scientists, such as Jerome Clubb, do not consider it a realigning election. Other political scientists and historians, such as Kleppner and Burnham consider this the ultimate realignment and emphasize that the rules of the game had changed, the leaders were new, voting alignments had changed, and a whole new set of issues came to dominance as the old Civil War-era issues faded away. Funding from office holders was replaced by outside fundraising from business in 1896 — a major shift in political history. Furthermore, McKinley's tactics in beating William Jennings Bryan (as developed by Mark Hanna) marked a sea change in the evolution of the modern campaign. McKinley raised a huge amount of money from business interests, outspending Bryan by 10 to 1. Bryan meanwhile invented the modern technique of campaigning heavily in closely contested states, the first candidate to do so.[28] Bryan's message of populism and class conflict marked a new direction for the Democrats. McKinley's victory in 1896 and repeat in 1900 was a triumph for pluralism, as all sectors and groups shared in the new prosperity brought about by his policy of rapid industrial growth.[29][30]
    • While Republicans lost House seats in 1896, this followed a massive two-election gain: from 25.9% in 1890 to 34.8% in 1892 and 71.1% in 1894, for a total 45.2% gain. Republicans lost 13.4% in 1896, but still held 57.7% of House seats.
    • In terms of correlations among counties, the election of 1896 is a realignment flop, but this is only a problem if realignment is considered to occur in single elections. Rather, if realignment is thought of as a generational or long-term political movement, then change will occur over several elections, even if there is one "critical" election defining the new alignment. So, as pointed out above, the 1896 realignment really began around 1892, and the 130 seat GOP gain in 1894, the all-record for a house election, meant there were almost no seats left to pick up in 1896. However, the presidential election in 1896 is usually considered the start of the new alignment since the national election allowed the nation to make a more conscious decision about the future of industrial policy by selecting McKinley over Bryan, making this the defining election in the realignment.[31] The election of 1876 passes the numbers test much better compared to 1896 alone, and Mayhew (2004) argues it resulted in far more drastic changes in United States politics: Reconstruction came to a sudden halt, African-Americans in the South would soon be completely disenfranchised, and politicians began to focus on new issues (such as tariffs and civil service reform).
  • 1932 presidential electionFranklin D. Roosevelt
    • Of all the realigning elections, this one musters the most agreement from political scientists and historians; it is the archetypal realigning election.[31] FDR's admirers such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. have argued that New Deal policies, developed in response to the crash of 1929 and the miseries of the Great Depression under Herbert Hoover, represented an entirely new phenomenon in American politics. More critical historians such as Carl Degler and David Kennedy see a great deal of continuity with Hoover's energetic but unsuccessful economic policies. In many ways, Roosevelt's legacy still defines the Democratic Party; he forged an enduring New Deal Coalition of big city machines, the White South, intellectuals, labor unions, Catholics, Jews, and Westerners. In 1936, African-Americans were added to the coalition (African-Americans had previously been denied the vote or voted Republican). For instance, Pittsburgh, which was a Republican stronghold from the Civil War up to this point, suddenly became a Democratic stronghold, and has elected a Democratic mayor to office in every election since this time.
    • The Democrats went from controlling 37.7% of House seats in 1928 to 49.6% in 1930 and 71.9% in 1932, for a total gain of 34.2% in two elections.
    • In the Senate, the Democrats went from controlling 40.6% of seats in 1928 to 49% in 1930 and 61.5% in 1932, for a total gain of 20.9% in two elections.

Other possible political realignments

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Some debate exists today as to what elections could be considered realigning elections after 1932.[32] Although several candidates have been proposed, there is no widespread agreement:

  • 1874 elections
    • The 1874 elections saw a resurgence of the Democratic Party. Discontent with the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant and the economic depression known at the time as the Panic of 1873, and the slow return of disillusioned Liberal Republicans from their 1872 third party ticket, all energized the Democrats. The Democrats had not controlled either chamber of Congress since before the War. The realignment meant the Democrats generally controlled the House of Representatives from 1875 to their massive defeat in 1894. Republicans eked out very narrow wins in most of the presidential elections in that period. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, enacted in the lame-duck session of Congress following the 1874 elections, was the last major Reconstruction law, and it was chiefly of symbolic value. The new strength of the Democrats marked the end of Reconstruction legislation. With the end of Reconstruction, the 11 former states of the Confederacy became a dominant-party system known as the Solid South. The tariff and especially monetary policy emerged as the great ideological debates after 1874.[33][34]
  • 1964 and 1968 presidential electionsLyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon
    • The 1968 election is often cited due to the innovative campaign strategy of Nixon.[35] In running against Hubert Humphrey, he used what became known as the Southern strategy. He appealed to white voters in the South with a call for "states' rights", which they interpreted as meaning that the federal government would no longer demand the forced busing of school children as ordered by federal courts. Democrats protested that Nixon exploited racial fears in winning the support of white southerners and northern white ethnics.[36] Roosevelt's New Deal coalition had lasted over 30 years but after the urban riots and Vietnam crisis of the mid-1960s one by one the coalition partners peeled away until only a hollow core remained, setting the stage for a GOP revival. Nixon's downfall postponed the realignment which came about under Reagan, as even the term "liberalism" fell into disrepute.[citation needed]
    • Including this as a realignment preserves the roughly 30-year cyclical pattern: 1896 to 1932, 1932 to 1964, and 1964 to 1994.
    • For political scientists, 1964 was primarily an issue-based realignment. The classic study of the 1964 election, by Carmines and Stimson (1989), shows how the polarization of activists and elites on race-related issues sent clear signals to the general public about the historic change in each party's position on Civil Rights.[citation needed] Notably, while only 50% of African-Americans self-identified as Democrats in the 1960 National Election Study, 82% did in 1964, and the numbers are higher in the 21st century. The clearest indicator of the importance of this election was that Deep Southern states, such as Mississippi, voted Republican in 1964. In contrast, much of the traditional Republican strongholds of the Northeast and Upper Midwest voted Democratic. Vermont and Maine, which stood alone voting against FDR in 1936, voted for LBJ in 1964.
    • Many analysts do not consider 1968 a realigning election because control of Congress did not change; the Democrats would control the Senate until 1980 (and again from 1986 to 1994) and the House until 1994.[31] Also missing was a marked change in the partisan orientation of the electorate. Importantly, these two elections are consistent with the theory in that the old New Deal issues were replaced by Civil Rights issues as the major factor explaining why citizens identified with each party. Other scholars[37] contend that this is the beginning of a thirty-year dealignment, in which citizens generally moved towards political independence, which ended with the 1994 election.
  • 1980 presidential electionRonald Reagan
  • 1992 presidential electionBill Clinton
    • Clinton carried several states that had previously been Republican or swing states in both the Northeast and on the West Coast. Most notably, the largest state California switched from being a reliably Republican state to being consistently Democratic: it has been carried by Democratic candidates ever since. Other states that switched and have remained with the Democrats since include Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and Vermont. In contrast, despite the fact Clinton came from the South, he only carried four of the former Confederate states: Arkansas (his home state), Louisiana, Tennessee (his vice president's home state) and Georgia, confirming it as a Republican base of support.
    • Since 1992, the Democratic candidate has won the national popular vote in every presidential election except 2004 and 2024, suggesting some manner of national realignment away from the Republican domination of the 1970s and 1980s. This national tendency toward Democratic presidential candidates did not necessarily translate to Democratic victories in congressional elections. However Republicans remained competitive nationally, making historic gains in the 1994 and 2010 midterms, although the composition of the electorate in presidential versus midterm elections vary significantly.[45]
  • 1994 House of Representatives and Senate elections[46]
    • This election is now generally seen as a realigning election by political scientists.[46] Republicans won majorities in both the House and the Senate, taking control of both chambers for the first time since 1954. In addition, control of the House continued until 2007. Newt Gingrich, who promoted a "Contract with America", successfully nationalized the campaign by coordinating races around the country. The overwhelming nature of the Republicans' victory points to a realignment; the party gained 54 seats, while neither party would gain more than a handful of seats in any election until 2006.
    • The GOP gained seats in 43 of 46 state houses. These gains continued into the next decade, so that by 2002 the GOP held the majority of state legislative seats for the first time in fifty years.[46]
    • Notably, the period of party decline and mass dealignment appears to have ended in the 1990s. Strength of partisanship, as measured by the National Election Study, increased in the 1990s, as does the percentage of the mass public who perceive important differences between each party.[46]
    • This election also indicates the rise of religious issues as one of the most important cleavage in American politics.[citation needed] While Reagan's election hinted at the importance of the religious right, it was the formation of the Christian Coalition (the successor to the Moral Majority) in the early 1990s that gave Republicans organizational and financial muscle, particularly at the state level.[47] By 2004 the media portrayed the political nation as divided into "red" (Republican) and "blue" (Democratic) states, with reputed differences in cultural attitudes and politics between the two blocs.
    • The Republicans made historic inroads in the Solid South where they picked up total of 19 House seats. Going into the election, House Democrats outnumbered House Republicans. Afterwards, the Republicans outnumbered Democrats for the first time since Reconstruction.[48]
  • 2008 presidential electionBarack Obama
    • In the 2008 elections, the Democrats expanded their majorities in the Congress, and won the presidency decisively. This was due to the momentum carried over from the Democrats' 2006 successes, as well as the continued unpopularity of President George W. Bush, whose administration was now faced with a financial crisis and economic recession. Some people believe that 2008 is possibly a realigning election with a long-lasting impact, just as the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt was in 1932 and the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 were.[49][50] President Obama was reelected in the 2012 election as well, becoming only the third Democrat to win an absolute majority of the popular vote more than once[51] while losing only two entire states that he had won in 2008.[52]
    • On the other hand, the Republican Party experienced major gains two years later in 2010, retaking the House with a gain of 63 seats, the largest Republican gain in 72 years. Additionally, the Republican Party gained six seats in the Senate, slimming the Democratic majority. Despite Obama's reelection in 2012, the Republicans had another strong performance in the 2014 midterms; they not only increased their majority in the House and recaptured the Senate, but also made gains in the gubernatorial races and other statewide and local races, resulting in 31 Republican governorships and 68 state legislative houses under Republican control, thus increasing their influence to the largest Republican majority in the entire country in nearly a century.[53][54][55]
  • 2016 presidential electionDonald Trump

Canada

[edit]

The history of the critical realigning elections in Canada, both nationally and in the provinces, is covered by Argyle (2011).[57]

Federal

[edit]

According to recent scholarship, there have been four party systems in Canada at the federal level since Confederation, each with its own distinctive pattern of social support, patronage relationships, leadership styles, and electoral strategies.[58] Steve Patten identifies four party systems in Canada's political history[59]

  • The first party system emerged from pre-Confederation colonial politics, had its "heyday" from 1896 to 1911 and lasted until the Conscription Crisis of 1917, and was characterized by local patronage administered by the two largest parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives.
  • The second system emerged following the First World War, and had its heyday from 1935 to 1957, was characterized by regionalism and saw the emergence of several protest parties, such as the Progressives, the Social Credit Party, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.
  • The third system emerged in 1963 and had its heyday from 1968 to 1983 and began to unravel thereafter. The two largest parties were challenged by a strong third party, the New Democratic Party. Campaigns during this era became more national in scope due to electronic media, and involved a greater focus on leadership. The dominant policy of the era was Keynesian economics.
  • The fourth party system has involved the rise of the Reform Party, the Bloc Québécois, and the merger of the Canadian Alliance with the Progressive Conservatives. It saw most parties move to one-member-one-vote leadership contests, and a major reform to campaign finance laws in 2004. The fourth party system has been characterized by market-oriented policies that abandoned Keynesian policies, but maintained the welfare state.

Stephen Clarkson (2005) shows how the Liberal Party has dominated all the party systems, using different approaches. It began with a "clientelistic approach" under Laurier, which evolved into a "brokerage" system of the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s under Mackenzie King. The 1950s saw the emergence of a "pan-Canadian system", which lasted until the 1990s. The 1993 election — categorized by Clarkson as an electoral "earthquake" which "fragmented" the party system, saw the emergence of regional politics within a four party-system, whereby various groups championed regional issues and concerns. Clarkson concludes that the inherent bias built into the first-past-the-post system, has chiefly benefited the Liberals.[60]

  • 1896 election
    • 1896 saw a Liberal victory under Sir Wilfrid Laurier. From the 1867 election until 1896, the Conservative Party of John A. Macdonald had governed Canada, excepting a single term from 1873 to 1878. The Liberals had struggled to retake office, under Laurier and his predecessor, Edward Blake. 1896 was the first election held after the death of Macdonald in 1891, and the Conservatives had been in complete disarray in the ensuing years, with no fewer than four leaders. The Liberals would remain in office until 1911. Beyond that, political scientists often consider this election that made the Liberal Party the dominant force in Canadian politics, holding office for more than two thirds of the time between 1896 and 2006.[61]
  • 1993 election
    • 1993 saw not only the sweeping success of the Liberals under Jean Chrétien, but also the collapse of the Progressive Conservatives as their support base switched to regional parties in Quebec and the western provinces, resulting in a five party political system with the Liberals as the dominant party.[62] During his second term, the PCs' policies were unpopular, while the failure of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords frustrated Quebec and stirred up Western alienation. New regional parties which formed in protest: the Bloc Québécois in Quebec and the Reform Party in the west. Meanwhile, the New Democratic Party, the longtime third party in parliament, fell from 43 seats to nine, as their endorsement of the Charlottetown Accord and Quebec nationalism cost them support among organized labour and rural voters in the west, which switched their support to Reform. Meanwhile, the Progressive Conservatives were nearly wiped out, falling from 156 seats to only two—the worst defeat of a sitting government at the federal level.
    • The Liberals under Chrétien would win a further two consecutive majorities in 1997 and 2000, while never being seriously challenged as the largest party. The Progressive Conservatives never recovered, ultimately merging with the Reform Party's successor, the Canadian Alliance, to form the new Conservative Party of Canada in late 2003.
    • The Bloc Québécois would remain a major presence in federal politics, with the party winning either the most or second-most seats in the province in every election since (with the exception of 2011 and 2015).
  • 2004 election
    • While Paul Martin's Liberals retained enough seats to continue as the government, it saw the re-emergence of a united Conservative Party, resulting in a four party system. This was also the first of three elections where no party managed a majority of seats.

Alberta

[edit]

Alberta has had a tradition of one-party dominance, where a party forms government for an extended period before losing power. From 1905 to 2015, Alberta only changed governments (often called "dynasties") four times, with no party ever returning to government. The elections of 1921, 1935, 1971 and 2015 each marked the end of a particular dynasty and a realignment of the province's party system.[63]

The 2019 election has also been suggested as a realignment: although the New Democratic Party was defeated after only one term, they retained a strong base of seats and remained competitive in opinion polling and fundraising, pointing to a possible development of a competitive two-party system against the United Conservative Party.[64]

British Columbia

[edit]

Quebec

[edit]

A considerable number of Quebec general elections have been known characterized by high seat turnovers, with certain ones being considered realigning elections, notably:

Since the 1990s, provincial elections in Quebec show increasing voter realignment and volatility in party support.[65] The Quebec Liberal Party (unaffiliated with the federal Liberals since 1955) been a major party since Confederation, but they have faced different opposition parties.

Outside of North America

[edit]

Asia

[edit]
  • 1977 Indian general election - Janata Party victory, defeating the Indian National Congress
  • 2014 Indian general election - Bharatiya Janata Party victory, defeating the Indian National Congress
    • The Congress party suffered a major decline on both the national and state level, with the BJP occupying the dominant position Congress used to have since.[66] Congress was defeated by the BJP again in the 2019 and 2024 elections. Until 2019, Congress had never been out of power for two consecutive terms.[67]
  • 1977 Israeli legislative election
    • Likud defeated the Alignment, led by the Israel Labor Party, allowing Likud to lead a government for the first time ever. For the first 29 years of Israel's independence, politics had been dominated by the left-wing parties Labor and its predecessor, Mapai. The leadership of the right, especially Menachem Begin, were considered by the Left to be beyond the pale, and as Ben Gurion had said in the early years of the State, he would enter coalitions with any parties, except the communists and Begin. Prior to this election a hypothetical bloc of right-wing and religious parties would rarely ever approach the threshold of a majority government; however since 1977, a combination of these two blocs have made up the majority of Israel's electorate since then with exceptions of a few elections but no longer running far behind in comparison to pre-1977. Due to corruption in the Labor Party, many former Labor voters defected to the new Democratic Movement for Change, which won 15 seats and finished in third place, behind the Likud with 46 seats and Alignment (Labor plus Mapam) with 32 seats. The DMC collapsed within three years, allowing Labor to rebound at the next election. Labor and Likud dominated Israeli politics until 2003 when Labor went into sudden decline due to a backlash against the failed Oslo Accords and the outbreak of the Second Intifada.
  • 2000 Taiwanese presidential electionChen Shui-bian
    • Though more popular and consistently ranked higher in the polls, James Soong failed to gain the ruling Kuomintang's (KMT) nomination over incumbent Vice President Lien Chan. As a result, he announced his candidacy as an independent candidate, and was consequently expelled from the party. The split in the KMT vote resulted in a victory for Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party, even though he won only 39% of the popular vote. After the election, Soong founded the People First Party, which attracted members from the KMT and the pro-unification New Party, which was by that time beginning to fade. Angry from the defeat, the KMT expelled chairman Lee Teng-hui, who was president until 2000 and was widely suspected of causing the KMT split so that Chen would win. Lee then founded the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. The impact of these events changed the political landscape of Taiwan. Not only did the KMT lose the presidency for the first time in half a century, but its policies swung away from Lee's influence and it began intra-party reform. The two newly founded parties became far more viable than other minor parties in the past, and the multi-party nature of Taiwan's politics was confirmed by the legislative elections of 2001. The KMT would not return to power until 2008 under the leadership of Ma Ying-jeou.
  • 2002 Turkish general electionJustice and Development Party victory
  • 2006 Palestinian legislative election (Palestinian National Authority) — Hamas victory; Ismail Haniyeh Prime Minister
    • In January 2006 the militant Hamas organisation, classified as a terrorist group by the United States government and other groups, won a landslide victory over the ruling Fatah party which had been in power under the leadership of former PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. The Bush Administration, the Quartet, and Israel all threatened to cut off foreign aid to the Palestinian Authority if Hamas refused to abandon terrorist tactics and recognise the right of the State of Israel to exist. This concession, though discussed in Hamas circles, did not come about soon enough to prevent a serious breakdown in services under Hamas government, and Western (especially American) support of Fatah paramilitaries eventually led to the breakout of the Fatah–Hamas conflict (termed a "Palestinian Civil War" by some) in December 2006. The Hamas government was suspended by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, a member of Fatah, after some weeks of fighting, and installed a caretaker government under the leadership of Salam Fayyad.

Europe

[edit]

United Kingdom

[edit]
  • 1918 United Kingdom general election in IrelandSinn Féin victory
  • 1922 United Kingdom general electionLabour Party forms Loyal Opposition
    • For over 200 years, the Liberals and Conservatives (and their antecedents) had been the UK's two major parties; however, the 1922 general election saw Labour overtake the Liberals in the political landscape. Labour and the Conservatives have been the UK's two major parties since then, and government has alternated only between the two parties ever since.
  • 1979 United Kingdom general electionConservative victory; Margaret Thatcher Prime Minister
    • This election brought the Conservatives into government where they remained for eighteen uninterrupted years. Thatcher's policies of monetarism and privatisation represented a very different strand of Conservatism to that of previous governments and a bold shift from the post-war consensus that had existed since 1945. The shockwaves led to a new centrist party being formed by some disenchanted Labour MPs (the SDP) in 1981, and a long period in opposition for Labour, during which they abandoned many socialist policies (notably Clause IV which advocated common ownership) and were transformed into "New Labour" before they returned to government in a landslide victory at the 1997 general election under the leadership of Tony Blair. At a more base level, it led to a shift in voting patterns as the traditional class-based voting started to break down and many of the working classes (in particular skilled workers, homeowners and those in southern England) voted Conservative, whilst at the same time many public sector professionals shifted their support to Labour.
  • 2015 United Kingdom general election
    • The election saw Euroscepticism and Scottish Nationalism emerge as major forces in the UK political discourse, with the UK Independence Party and Scottish National Party finishing third in the popular vote and seat count respectively, and the Liberal Democrats, the country's traditional third-party, losing 49 of the 57 seats it had won at the previous general election. The SNP's victories, largely at the expense of the Scottish Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, established them as the dominant party in Scotland's electoral politics, a position they have since maintained. UKIP did not continue to enjoy electoral success (in part because they only won a single seat despite finishing third in the popular vote) and rapidly declined thereafter, but many of their policies were subsequently adopted by the Conservative Party, who formed a majority government for the first time since 1992.
  • 2019 United Kingdom general election – Conservative victory; Boris Johnson Prime Minister
    • The Conservative Party won a landslide victory over the Labour Party, winning many seats in the red wall, including seats that have never voted Conservative for over a century.[68] This was repeated again in 2021 local elections for mayoral and council elections, where the Conservatives made large gains in red wall areas but Labour (along with the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party) made gains in the south of England, with more educated voters.

Ireland

[edit]
  • 1932 Irish general electionFianna Fáil victory; Éamon de Valera President of the Executive Council
    • This election resulted in Fianna Fáil, led by Éamon de Valera, becoming the largest party in Dáil Éireann for the first time. Fianna Fáil remained in power for the next sixteen years and remained the largest party in the Dáil for the next 79 years, serving as the government more than 58 of those years.
  • 2011 Irish general election
    • Fianna Fáil, who had governed Ireland for most of the post-independence era, were heavily defeated at the election following anger over the Irish financial crisis. For the first time, Fine Gael overtook Fianna Fáil to win the most votes and seats, while Fianna Fáil fell from first place to third place, in terms of both votes and seats. Fine Gael and the second largest party in the Dáil, the Labour Party formed a coalition government.
  • 2020 Irish general election
    • This election resulted in the three largest parties each winning a share of the vote between 20% and 25%, along with the best result for Sinn Féin since 1923 (37 of the 160 seats) (before the formation of Fianna Fáil). Along with the two dominant parties Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil not having enough seats between them (38 and 35 respectively) to have a majority (at least 80 seats needed out of 160 seats), this election resulted in a break from a two-party dominant legislature, with something closer to a three party result.

Denmark

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Spain

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Italy

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Germany

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  • 1998 German federal election – first federal level red-green coalition victory
    • The election resulted in the first left of center majority in Germany on the federal level ever. The SPD came in first place for the first time since 1972 and the second time overall since the war. The election unseated Helmut Kohl after 16 years in office and having presided over German reunification and with five factions achieving more than the five percent electoral threshold of votes, it gave a first indication of the more fractious political landscape of the Berlin Republic. The FDP was removed from government after 29 consecutive years.

Lithuania

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Poland

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Estonia

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Hungary

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Greece

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France

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Czech Republic

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Slovakia

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2014 (Left) with Andrej Kiska winning 80% in the south; 2024 (Right) with Pellegrini winning the south

Latin America

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Oceania

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Australia

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  • 1910 Australian federal electionLabor victory; Andrew Fisher Prime Minister
  • 1922 Australian federal electionNationalist-Country coalition victory
    • This was the first time a conservative party formed the Coalition with the Country Party which represented graziers, farmers, and regional voters in the aftermath of the 1922 election. Despite some interruptions in Coalition agreements such as in 1931, 1939 and 1987, this coalition has existed until today, now between the Liberal Party (successor to the Nationalists) and National party (which was renamed from the Country party). The Liberal/National coalition alternates in power with their main opponents, the Australian Labor Party to form the federal government of Australia at every federal election.
  • 1949 Australian federal electionLiberal victory; Robert Menzies Prime Minister[76]
    • Previously, the United Australia Party (UAP) was seen as close to big business and the upper class, while their opponents, the Australian Labor Party appealed to trade unionists, and working and lower classes. By founding the Liberal Party to replace the UAP after its 1943 election defeat, Menzies began selling his party's appeal to middle-classes which he famously called "The Forgotten People" in the class conflict between the upper and lower social classes. Forming a coalition with the Country Party (now the National Party which represented rural graziers and farmers), this resulted in a coalition of liberals, conservatives and rural interests against the democratic socialists of the Australian Labor Party. Menzies kept free-traders and economic moderates; hard-line conservatives and social liberals united under one party, the Liberal party, by focusing on Labor's "socialism" and the international threat of communism amidst the Cold War.
    • During his 17 years in power from 1949 to 1966, the Menzies government presided over the longest period of economic prosperity in Australia's history, lasting from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. Continued economic growth, rising standards of living, and his widening of government support for education and universities led to the vast expansion of the Australian middle class and changed the Australian workforce from manual labour towards service, science and new technology industries; the ANZUS Treaty of 1951 and voting rights for Aboriginal Australians are legacies which still stand today.[77] Arguably, Labor was forced to modernise and adopt a more social democratic approach (away from democratic socialism and nationalisation of industry) to appeal to the expanded middle class, under Gough Whitlam.
  • 1972 Australian federal electionLabor victory; Gough Whitlam Prime Minister[78]
    • After twenty-three years of Liberal rule under Menzies, Harold Holt, John Gorton and William McMahon, the Labor Party took power in 1972, with the slogan, 'It's Time'. The significance of this election was broader than merely a change of partisan rule; elections would be no longer decided only on economic issues, but also, new issues such as the environment, Aboriginal affairs, abortion, multiculturalism, and a broader acceptance of state spending, resulted from the Whitlam government, which in many respects created a bipartisan consensus on major issues of social policy. Although the Whitlam government was relatively brief, its policy legacy—in creating new government policies for society and culture—lasted in many respects to the 1996 election, and even to the present day.

New Zealand

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  • 1890 New Zealand general electionLiberal victory; John Ballance Prime Minister
    • The coming to power of the Liberal Party is heralded as a major milestone in New Zealand history. It marked the beginning of proper party politics in New Zealand. While groupings of 'Liberal' and 'Conservative' politicians date back to the 1870s they were more akin to loose factions rather than properly organised parties. Massive economic and social reforms took place following 1890 with a progressive land tax partnered with leasehold sponsorship to stimulate agriculture which recovered the country from the Long Depression. Ballance's successor Richard Seddon carried on reforms concentrating largely on establishing welfare. Arguably the Liberal's most famous and important achievement was the enfranchisement of women, a major social upheaval which saw New Zealand become the first country in the world to allow women to vote.
  • 1935 New Zealand general electionLabour victory; Michael Joseph Savage Prime Minister
    • The 1935 election brought Labour to power for the first time. Huge economic change resulted from their entry into office at the height of the Great Depression which was to remain in place for half a century. A generous welfare system labeled as "social security" was instigated and the country's existing free market economy was completely abandoned in favour of a Keynesian based system with higher tariffs, guaranteed prices for producers and emphasis on local manufacturing to create jobs. The government was praised for their policies resulting in another landslide victory in 1938. The political landscape was also to change. The three-party era of the early 20th century ended with the United and Reform parties (who had formed a coalition between 1931 and 1935) completely merging a year later into the new National Party, who remain Labour's main rival to the present day, both occupying either government or opposition ever since.
  • 1984 New Zealand general electionLabour victory; David Lange Prime Minister
    • The election of the Labour Government under the leadership of David Lange and Roger Douglas, brought about radical economic reform, moving New Zealand from what had probably been one of the most protected, regulated and state-dominated system of any capitalist democracy to an extreme position at the open, competitive, free-market end of the spectrum. Social policies also took a dramatic change with New Zealand's largely socially conservative outlook being reshaped with more liberal outlooks in the Lange government's policy epitomised by policies such as the passing of anti-nuclear legislation and the legalisation of homosexuality. Foreign relations also changed dramatically with New Zealand abandoning their allegiances with the United States, largely over the issue of anti-nuclear policy, culminating in their exclusion from ANZUS by both the US and Australia. New Zealand Party won 12% of the vote in their first election, it was the first time since 1935 that any party other than Labour, the National and Social Credit Party won more than 10% of the vote.
  • 1996 New Zealand general electionNationalNew Zealand First coalition victory; Jim Bolger Prime Minister
    • The 1996 election was the first held under the new mixed-member proportional (MMP) voting system, introduced after two referendums in 1992 and 1993, and signalled the transition from the two-party era to a new multi-party era.

See also

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Notes and references

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Political realignment refers to a significant, long-term shift in the electoral coalitions that underpin , involving changes in voter affiliations, ideological orientations, and the social bases of support, often crystallized through critical elections that disrupt established party systems. These transformations typically arise from profound societal disruptions—such as economic crises, wars, or cultural conflicts—that realign voter priorities and party platforms, leading to new patterns of dominance in legislative and executive branches. In empirical analyses, realignments are distinguished from transient fluctuations by their durability, spanning multiple election cycles and reshaping policy outputs, though scholars debate whether they always follow a uniform cyclical pattern or can occur gradually through secular drifts in voter behavior. Historically, realignments have been most rigorously documented , where examples include the 1896 election aligning agrarian and industrial interests with the Republican Party amid economic depression, and the contest that forged the Democratic encompassing urban workers, minorities, and the in response to the . Another pivotal instance unfolded from the onward, as civil rights legislation and cultural upheavals prompted a partisan inversion in the , with white voters migrating from Democrats to Republicans, while African American support consolidated for Democrats—a shift substantiated by longitudinal voting data rather than mere anecdotal switches. Causally, such realignments stem from exogenous shocks amplifying latent cleavages, like class or identity divides, which parties exploit or mitigate through adaptive strategies, as evidenced in cross-national studies of affluent democracies where socio-economic modernization has eroded traditional class-based voting. The concept's analytical value lies in explaining systemic stability and change, yet it faces for overemphasizing U.S.-centric models and underaccounting for elite-driven manipulations or voter volatility in multiparty systems; nonetheless, empirical metrics like enduring swings in turnout and margins confirm its occurrence in events yielding pivots, such as expanded welfare states or deregulatory turns. In contemporary contexts, potential realignments are probed through data on and occupational gradients in partisanship, revealing how less-educated voters have trended toward parties emphasizing cultural particularism over universalist , challenging prior assumptions of inexorable leftward pulls from rising inequality. This framework underscores causal realism in : alignments endure until material and ideational pressures render them untenable, independent of institutional inertia or media narratives.

Theoretical Foundations

Definition and Historical Origins

Political realignment denotes a fundamental and enduring shift in the distribution of the electorate's partisan loyalties, party coalitions, and the underlying policy agendas that structure electoral competition, often crystallized through one or more critical elections that disrupt prior alignments and establish new ones lasting for a generation or more. This process involves not merely temporary swings in voter preferences but a reconfiguration of social groups' attachments to parties, driven by exogenous shocks such as economic crises, wars, or cultural upheavals that alter the salience of cleavages and prompt parties to adapt their platforms accordingly. Empirical identification relies on observable patterns like sharp, durable changes in vote shares across demographic or regional lines, as opposed to routine volatility. The theoretical foundations of realignment emerged in American political science during the mid-20th century, with V.O. Key Jr. providing the seminal formulation in his 1955 article "A of Critical Elections," published in The Journal of Politics. Key, analyzing historical U.S. voting data, posited that critical elections mark periods when voters' decisions forge persistent partisan divisions, leading to realignments that redefine party systems; he drew initial evidence from elections like , where industrial and agrarian interests polarized along new economic lines. This framework built on earlier observations by scholars such as Charles Merriam and Harold Gosnell in the , who noted cyclical patterns in voter behavior, but Key formalized the concept by emphasizing long-term electoral persistence over short-term fluctuations. Subsequent development in the and expanded the theory through works like E.E. Schattschneider's The Semisovereign People (1960), which highlighted how elites shape realignments by activating latent conflicts, and James Sundquist's Dynamics of the System (1973), which integrated economic and social determinants to explain sequential shifts in coalitions. These contributions, grounded in quantitative analyses of U.S. congressional and presidential returns from the 19th and 20th centuries, positioned realignment as a periodic mechanism for adapting party systems to societal changes, though later critiques questioned its universality beyond the American context. By the late , the paradigm had influenced interpretations of events like the era but faced empirical challenges in predicting post-1960s stability.

Core Elements: Critical Elections, Voter Coalitions, and Party Systems

Critical elections, as defined by political scientist V.O. Key Jr. in his analysis, constitute elections in which underlying voter loyalties experience a sharp and durable alteration, often triggered by profound social, economic, or ideological disruptions that mobilize new voter alignments and diminish previous ones. These contests typically feature heightened , decisive shifts in partisan margins across geographic or demographic lines, and a subsequent sequence of reinforcing elections that solidify the change, distinguishing them from routine electoral fluctuations. Key emphasized that such elections do not merely reflect temporary issue responses but establish long-term patterns of party dominance, as evidenced by historical cases where voter behavior persisted for decades post-election. Voter coalitions form the foundational building blocks of party support in realignment , comprising stable aggregations of socioeconomic, ethnic, regional, or ideological groups that align with one over others during periods of equilibrium. Realignments disrupt these coalitions through exogenous shocks—such as economic depressions or cultural upheavals—that realign group interests with alternative parties, leading to the erosion of prior majorities and the emergence of new dominant blocs. For instance, James L. Sundquist's examination of alignment dynamics highlights how coalitions evolve via issue-driven defections, where groups previously loyal to a party shift en masse due to perceived failures in addressing core grievances, resulting in measurable, multi-election persistence in voting patterns. Empirical identification of such shifts relies on longitudinal data showing statistically significant deviations in group-level partisanship, rather than aggregate vote totals alone. Party systems encapsulate the broader competitive structure arising from these realignments, defined as eras of relative stability in inter-party rivalry, issue salience, and coalition configurations, punctuated by critical elections that inaugurate new systems. Walter Dean Burnham extended Key's framework by positing cyclical patterns in American party systems, where each system endures until cumulative tensions culminate in realignment, as seen in durable Republican gains from 1896 onward following the 1896 election's economic realignment. Analyses of congressional and presidential data from 1868 to 2004 confirm that party systems exhibit measurable , with realignments marked by synchronized shifts in vote shares exceeding standard deviations of prior eras, often spanning 30-36 years. Sundquist further delineates how these systems adapt incrementally within coalitions until exogenous forces necessitate wholesale reconfiguration, underscoring the causal primacy of voter mobilization over elite-driven changes.

Methods for Identifying Realignments

Political realignments are typically identified through empirical analysis of electoral data, focusing on sharp deviations in voting patterns that demonstrate durability across multiple elections. V.O. Key Jr. defined critical elections as those producing a profound and lasting realignment of voter coalitions, often involving heightened electoral participation and shifts in the salience of issues dividing parties. Such elections are detected by disaggregating returns at subnational levels, such as counties or precincts, to reveal geographic concentrations of change correlated with demographic factors like , , or . For instance, the 1928 U.S. presidential election showed Democratic vote gains of over 10 percentage points in towns with high proportions of foreign-born and Catholic residents compared to , a pattern that endured into and beyond, signaling a realignment along ethno-religious lines. Analysts employ time-series comparisons of party vote shares, often visualized in graphs, to confirm persistence; deviations must exceed historical volatility and align with broader coalition reforms rather than temporary fluctuations. Quantitative approaches complement historical methods by modeling voter behavior with multinomial or regressions applied to survey data, estimating probabilities of choice based on positions in multi-dimensional spaces (e.g., economic and social axes). of datasets like the American National Election Studies from 1952 onward identifies evolving cleavages, such as the transition from class-based to cultural voting, by extracting latent dimensions from respondent issue attitudes and retrospective votes. David Mayhew critiques reliance on critical elections alone, advocating verification through sustained electoral metrics like uniform shifts in presidential and congressional majorities, alongside macropolicy punctuations (e.g., landmark legislation clusters) that reflect new voter mandates. Durability is tested by assessing whether initial surges yield multi-election dominance in government branches; for example, post-1932 Democratic control of the and for over two decades supported realignment claims, whereas transient 1964 shifts did not. Longitudinal party identification trends from panel surveys provide additional evidence, revealing cohort-specific switches (e.g., from Democratic to Republican allegiance between 1952 and 1980). These methods prioritize observable data over theoretical cycles, though scholars note challenges in distinguishing realignments from dealignment or , as academic interpretations may overemphasize narrative fits at the expense of null results in non-U.S. contexts.

Critiques and Alternative Explanations

Empirical Limitations and Failed Predictions

One key empirical limitation of political realignment theory lies in its reliance on impressionistic evidence and subjective interpretations of electoral data rather than rigorous, quantifiable metrics, making it challenging to objectively identify "critical elections" or shifts in voter coalitions. Scholars such as V.O. Key initially applied the framework retrospectively to elections like and , but subsequent analyses, including those by David R. Mayhew, demonstrate that patterns in presidential vote returns do not consistently exhibit the hypothesized deviations from uniform partisan swings predicted during realigning eras. For instance, Mayhew's examination of U.S. presidential elections from to found no statistical evidence supporting cyclical disruptions every 28 to 36 years, with vote margins showing more continuity than abrupt, system-defining breaks. The theory's predictive power has also faltered, as anticipated realignments failed to materialize in line with proposed timelines. Proponents like James L. Sundquist and Walter Dean Burnham expected a major shift in the 1960s or 1970s following the 1932 alignment, yet no enduring Republican dominance emerged despite high turnout and policy debates in elections such as and ; Burnham's designation of –1972 as a realignment relied on non-electoral indicators like primary disruptions rather than sustained vote realignments, which data contradicted. By the , Burnham forecasted a systemic in the U.S. due to declining voter participation and the absence of new critical elections, predicting institutional breakdown, but the two-party structure endured without collapse, underscoring the theory's inability to forecast structural persistence. Furthermore, realignment claims often prove unfalsifiable because criteria for validation—such as durable changes or punctuations—are adjusted post hoc to fit outcomes, evading empirical disconfirmation. Mayhew identifies 11 core propositions distilled from the literature, including links between realignments and macropolicy shifts or inter-election volatility, but empirical tests reveal no systematic correlations; for example, enactments like the programs or Reagan-era tax cuts occurred without corresponding electoral realignments in vote patterns. This retrospective flexibility has led critics to argue that the genre prioritizes narrative coherence over prospective hypothesis-testing, as evidenced by repeated failures to pinpoint unfolding critical elections, such as overstated expectations for a conservative lock-in after 1980 that dissolved amid subsequent Democratic congressional majorities.

Non-Cyclical Models: Incrementalism and Party Adaptation

Non-cyclical models of political change emphasize gradual, continuous shifts in voter coalitions and party systems, contrasting with theories positing periodic ruptures via critical elections. These approaches highlight incremental voter realignments and adaptive responses by parties to socioeconomic transformations, without reliance on dramatic, generational upheavals. Scholars argue that such models better account for empirical patterns where partisan support erodes or builds steadily across multiple elections, driven by persistent factors like demographic mobility, economic cycles, and policy feedback loops. Secular realignment represents a key non-cyclical mechanism, wherein voter attachments to parties evolve slowly through repeated, small-scale defections rather than abrupt conversions in a single contest. V.O. Key Jr. formalized this concept in 1959, observing that American electoral data from the early revealed gradual partisan sorting, such as Southern Democrats defecting incrementally amid economic modernization and civil rights pressures, accumulating into broader coalitions over decades. Unlike critical realignments, which demand exogenous shocks and immediate mandate effects, secular processes operate endogenously via voters' responses to ongoing conditions, yielding durable but unspectacular changes in party bases. Party adaptation complements by enabling incumbents to recalibrate without . Parties achieve this through modest platform tweaks, turnover, and targeted , aligning with shifting voter medians on issues like or . David Mayhew's 2002 analysis of U.S. history demonstrates that major enactments—such as the 1960s civil rights laws or 1980s —occurred amid adaptive maneuvers in divided governments, not confined to realignment eras, underscoring parties' capacity for endogenous evolution. Empirical studies of vote shares confirm this, with annual fluctuations averaging 2-5% in presidential contests from 1896 to 2000, compounding into 20-30% swings over 20-30 years absent any "critical" inflection. These models critique cyclical theories for retrospective pattern-fitting and predictive failures, such as anticipated but unrealized realignments in 1968 or 2008, where changes proved more diffuse. Instead, prioritizes causal realism in voter decision-making, where habits and information costs favor marginal adjustments over wholesale shifts, fostering stability despite underlying volatility. Mayhew notes that U.S. policymaking —averaging 10-15 laws per decade—persists across purported alignment phases, evidencing adaptation's over rupture.

Overemphasis on Narrative Over Data

David R. Mayhew has characterized the scholarship on electoral realignments as an "American genre," implying a reliance on interpretive narratives akin to historical rather than a robust empirical framework capable of withstanding systematic testing. In this view, realignment theorists often designate specific elections as "critical" retrospectively, based on observed long-term shifts in voter coalitions or policy directions, which introduces selectivity and lacks prospective criteria for identification. This approach allows for flexible accommodations of data that do not fit preconceived cycles, such as irregular intervals between purported realignments—typically claimed to occur every 28 to 36 years—but evidenced by gaps like the 36 years from 1896 to 1932 or shorter spans that defy uniformity. Empirical scrutiny of the theory's core propositions underscores this narrative tilt. Mayhew distilled the literature into 11 testable claims, including assertions of sharp electoral disruptions leading to durable transformations, and applied quantitative measures like presidential vote margins, turnout surges, and congressional party unity scores across U.S. elections from to 1996. These analyses revealed minimal support: for example, neither the , , , nor elections consistently demonstrated the exaggerated volatility or subsequent policy lock-ins predicted by the model, with many "realigning" periods showing continuity rather than rupture in voter behavior. Similarly, the mid-20th-century Southern shift from Democratic to Republican dominance, often framed as a realignment tied to civil upheavals, occurred gradually over decades—from the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt through the 1994 Republican congressional gains—without a singular critical precipitating abrupt change. Such discrepancies highlight how narrative construction can overshadow data-driven falsification, as theorists emphasize dramatic electoral moments while downplaying incremental adaptations or counterexamples like stable turnout patterns and persistent . This has led to critiques that the theory's appeal lies in its explanatory elegance for past events, yet it falters in predictive accuracy, with alleged realignments in eras like the 1960s-1970s failing to produce the enduring realignments foreseen. Consequently, alternative models favoring continuous partisan or issue-specific voter sorting gain traction for better aligning with observable electoral dynamics.

United States

19th-Century Realignments

The collapse of the by the early 1820s, following the dominance of Democratic-Republicans after the Federalists' decline, set the stage for the 1828 presidential election, widely regarded as the first major realignment of the . Andrew Jackson's victory over incumbent , with 56% of the popular vote and 178 electoral votes to Adams's 83, reflected a surge in voter participation from approximately 27% in 1824 to 57% in 1828, fueled by the elimination of property requirements for white male in most states. This shift coalesced a coalition of small farmers, urban laborers, and frontiersmen against the elite National Republicans, emphasizing , opposition to the national bank, and westward expansion, thereby inaugurating the Second Party System and modern mass-party organization. The mid-1850s disintegration of the Whig Party over slavery and nativism paved the way for the Third Party System, crystallized in the 1860 election of . The Republican Party, founded in 1854 by anti-slavery activists from Whig, Free Soil, and Democratic ranks, nominated Lincoln, who secured 39.8% of the popular vote (1.86 million) but 180 electoral votes, concentrated in the North, amid a fragmented field including three other major candidates. This outcome, representing just 40% of the vote due to Southern Democratic splits and Constitutional Union opposition, triggered Southern secession and the Civil War, realigning parties along sectional lines: Republicans dominated the industrialized North and Midwest with business, abolitionist, and immigrant support, while Democrats retained the agrarian South. Post-war amendments and Reconstruction entrenched Republican control in national politics until the late . The 1896 election between and is often identified as a reinforcing realignment, solidifying Republican hegemony through the . McKinley, advocating the gold standard and protective tariffs, won 51% of the popular vote (7.1 million) and 271 electoral votes, defeating Bryan's bimetallism-fueled Democratic-Populist fusion that garnered 47% (6.5 million) but only 176 electoral votes, largely from the South and West. Amid the Panic of 1893's depression, this contest shifted voter coalitions: urban industrial workers, business interests, and the Northeast aligned durably with Republicans, marginalizing agrarian populism and marking the decline of third-party influences like the Populists, who peaked at 8.5% of the vote. The realignment endured, with Republicans controlling the for 16 of the next 20 years.

20th-Century Shifts: New Deal to Reagan Era

The presidential election, conducted amid the , marked a pivotal realignment that elevated the Democratic Party to dominance through Franklin D. Roosevelt's over , securing 472 electoral votes to Hoover's 59 and 57.4% of the popular vote to 39.7%. This shift reflected voter repudiation of Republican economic policies, with Democrats gaining control of both chambers of —capturing a majority of 59 seats and expanding their majority to 313 seats—enabling the implementation of programs that prioritized federal intervention in relief, recovery, and reform. The resulting encompassed urban laborers, ethnic immigrants, (who began defecting en masse from the Republican Party due to relief efforts despite historical GOP ties to ), farmers, intellectuals, and white Southern conservatives, forging a durable electoral majority that propelled Democrats to seven presidential wins from to and sustained congressional control through much of and . This coalition endured post-World War II, underpinned by economic prosperity and Democratic advantages in party identification—peaking at roughly 55-60% Democratic identifiers versus 25-30% Republican in the 1930s and 1940s, per survey trends—yet fissures emerged in the 1960s over civil rights legislation. The , signed by President , provoked backlash among Southern whites, with only 1 of 21 Southern Democratic senators voting in favor, accelerating the defection of conservative Democrats opposed to federal enforcement against segregation and Jim Crow practices that their party had long tolerated in the South. Johnson's prediction of losing the South "for a generation" materialized gradually, as evidenced by Barry Goldwater's 1964 capture of five states despite his national defeat, signaling ideological sorting where racial conservatism aligned Southern voters with emerging Republican emphasis on and limited federal overreach. This realignment intensified under Richard Nixon's appeals to "" voters alienated by urban unrest and welfare expansion, with Southern white support for GOP presidential candidates rising from about 30% in 1960 to majorities by the 1970s. By the late 1970s, and cultural divides further eroded the order, culminating in Ronald Reagan's 1980 victory, where he amassed 489 electoral votes and 50.7% of the popular vote against Jimmy Carter's 41%. Reagan's coalition incorporated evangelicals, fiscal conservatives, and "Reagan Democrats"—predominantly white working-class voters, including union households (46% for Reagan versus 45% for Carter, a reversal from prior Democratic lock)—who prioritized anti-inflation policies, , and traditional values over class-based economic appeals. Among white voters, Reagan secured 59%, bolstering GOP gains in the Sun Belt and Midwest, while party identification trends showed Democratic edges narrowing to near parity by 1980 (around 46% Democratic, 24% Republican, 30% independent), reflecting a broader transition from to ideological alignment on race, , and social issues. This era's shifts thus dismantled the framework, establishing Republican inroads among former Democratic bastions through voter realignment driven by policy divergences rather than mere electoral tactics.

Post-Cold War and 21st-Century Developments

The completion of the Southern realignment, initiated by the Republican Party's appeal to white conservative voters following the , solidified in the 1990s as the region transitioned from Democratic dominance to Republican control in presidential, congressional, and state-level elections. By the mid-1990s, Republican candidates consistently won a majority of Southern congressional seats, with the party's viability prompting conservative Democrats to switch affiliations, polarizing primaries and accelerating ideological sorting. This shift reflected broader voter realignment driven by cultural and racial aligning more closely with Republican platforms, evidenced by increased Republican identification among white Southerners from the 1990s onward. The 1994 midterm elections marked a pivotal congressional realignment, with Republicans gaining 54 House seats and 8 Senate seats to secure majorities in both chambers for the first time since the , propelled by Newt Gingrich's "" emphasizing , , and . This "" disrupted the post-New Deal Democratic congressional hegemony, signaling voter dissatisfaction with Clinton-era policies and foreshadowing partisan sorting where ideology increasingly predicted party loyalty. Into the early , these changes contributed to heightened polarization, with parties realigning along educational and urban-rural lines amid globalization's economic dislocations affecting regions. In the , a pronounced educational realignment emerged, with non-college-educated white voters shifting toward the Republican Party; by 2023, 63% identified as or leaned Republican, up substantially since the when such voters were more evenly divided. This cleavage intensified as the Democratic Party pivoted from predistribution policies (e.g., labor protections and trade barriers) toward redistribution via taxes and transfers, preferences favored by college-educated voters but alienating less-educated ones who prioritized —a dynamic explaining about 50% of the shift when accounting for voter perceptions of party economic competence. Empirical surveys from 1942–2020 show the education-partisan gradient reversing post-1970s, with each additional year of education predicting a 3% higher Democratic identification likelihood by 2000. Donald Trump's 2016 victory accelerated this working-class realignment, assembling a coalition of non-college voters that defied polling expectations and marked durable gains for Republicans among this group, comprising about 60% of the electorate. Trump improved Republican performance among white working-class voters in states, while beginning inroads with nonwhite working-class demographics, such as in Texas's Rio Grande Valley and in , trends that persisted into 2020 where he narrowed gaps despite losing the popular vote. By the 2022 midterms, Republicans achieved their highest modern support among and voters, underscoring education over income as the primary divide, with working-class voters increasingly viewing the GOP as addressing cultural and economic grievances overlooked by Democrats.

2024 Election as Potential Realignment

In the held on November 5, 2024, Republican candidate defeated Democratic candidate , securing 312 electoral votes to Harris's 226 and winning the popular vote with approximately 49.9% to her 48.3%. This outcome marked Trump's return to the presidency and represented a continuation of Republican gains in key battleground states, including flips or widened margins in all seven swing states: , Georgia, , , , , and . was estimated at around 65% of eligible voters, similar to recent cycles, with Trump maintaining strong support among non-college-educated white voters while expanding his . Demographic analyses revealed notable shifts in voter coalitions, potentially signaling elements of realignment. Trump narrowed the Democratic advantage among voters to a mere 3-point deficit (from over 30 points in ), achieved near parity with Harris in some exit polls, and saw increased support from voters, particularly men, rising to around 20-25% from 12% in . Young voters under 30 shifted rightward, with Trump gaining ground among Gen Z compared to prior elections, driven by economic concerns and dissatisfaction with Democratic messaging. Working-class voters, defined by non-college , continued their migration toward Republicans, with Trump winning this group by wide margins across racial lines, underscoring a class-based reconfiguration over traditional racial alignments. At the county level, over 89% of U.S. counties shifted toward Trump relative to , including gains in urban and suburban areas previously trending Democratic, such as parts of and Miami-Dade. These patterns have prompted debate among political scientists about whether 2024 constitutes a realigning , akin to the New Deal era or Reagan's 1980 victory, where durable voter s formed around new issues like and . Proponents of realignment highlight the persistence of working-class defection from Democrats since 2016, attributing it to cultural and economic grievances rather than transient factors, with Trump's diverse —including higher support from union households and low-propensity voters—suggesting a potential solidification of Republican dominance among non-elite groups. However, skeptics argue the was "ordinary" in scope, lacking the transformative margins or issue realignments of historical precedents, with Trump's popular vote win being narrow and Democratic losses partly attributable to low for Harris rather than structural voter changes. True realignment requires confirmation in subsequent elections, as single-cycle shifts may reflect candidate-specific dynamics or economic conditions like , which favored Trump but could reverse. Analyses from centrist institutions like Brookings emphasize incremental adaptation over dramatic rupture, cautioning against overinterpreting 2024 amid ongoing polarization.

International Examples

Europe

In Europe, political realignment since the has featured the decline of centrist dominance and the ascent of parties prioritizing , controls, and skepticism toward supranational integration, driven by voter discontent with , cultural changes, and perceived elite detachment. Traditional social democratic and Christian democratic parties have hemorrhaged support, particularly among working-class electorates, as cultural divides supplant class-based alignments. This process varies regionally: exhibits multiparty fragmentation with populist gains challenging coalitions, while shows episodes of ruling-party consolidation amid post-communist institutional legacies. Empirical trends indicate populist parties' combined vote share in national elections rose from under 10% in the early to over 20% by , reflecting causal links between globalization's dislocations and demands for .

Western Europe: Populism and Fragmentation

's party systems have fragmented as voters defect from mainstream parties toward , eroding the post-1945 consensus on . In the 2024 elections, nationalist and populist groups secured approximately 25% of seats, up from prior cycles, with notable advances in ( at 31.4%), ( at 15.9%), and (Freedom Party at 27.5%). These gains prompted policy shifts, such as stricter migration stances in national governments; Italy's formed a in October 2022 with 26% of the vote, enacting naval blockades on migrant routes. In the , ' won 23% in 2023, supporting a minority cabinet focused on border closures. This realignment correlates with socioeconomic patterns: less-educated, rural voters increasingly back , while urban professionals align with greens or liberals, as evidenced by Chapel Hill Expert Surveys tracking ideological polarization since 2000. Fragmentation has destabilized governments; France's July 2024 after National Rally's European success yielded a , with no bloc securing a despite the party's 33% first-round share. Mainstream parties' adaptations, like Germany's CDU pledging asylum curbs, reflect competitive pressures but have not reversed dealignment, with established groups losing 10-15% vote shares in key states from 2019 to 2024.

Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Consolidations

's realignments have centered on dominant parties consolidating power through appeals to historical grievances, economic redistribution, and resistance to Western liberal norms, building on post-1989 transitions' incomplete institutionalization. In , under secured constitutional supermajorities in 2010 (52.7% vote), 2014, 2018, and 2022 (54%), enabling media control and electoral law changes that entrenched rural support bases. This dominance reflects a realignment toward "illiberal ," with policies like family subsidies boosting turnout among traditionalist voters, though opposition fragmentation limited challenges. Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) governed from 2015 (37.6% vote) to 2023, implementing judicial reforms and welfare expansions that polarized electorates along urban-rural lines, securing 43.6% in 2019 but falling to 35.4% in 2023 amid inflation and disputes, enabling a pro-EU coalition's ascent. In Slovakia, Robert Fico's Smer-SD reclaimed power in the September 2023 parliamentary election (22.9%), allying with nationalists to halt aid and amend broadcasting laws, signaling a shift from the 2020 pro-Western coalition. Fico's ally won the 2024 presidential runoff with 55%, consolidating executive alignment. These consolidations stem from post-communist legacies, where weaker civil societies enabled party capture of institutions, contrasting Western fragmentation; empirical data show ruling parties maintaining 40-50% cores via and identity mobilization, though vulnerabilities to economic shocks persist.

Western Europe: Populism and Fragmentation

In , the rise of parties has accelerated political fragmentation since the early , eroding the dominance of centrist establishments and complicating formations. Right-wing populist parties, emphasizing controls, national sovereignty, and criticism of integration, have captured increasing vote shares amid public discontent with economic stagnation and cultural changes. For instance, their combined vote share in national elections grew notably in countries like , , and the by 2022-2023, reflecting a voter shift away from traditional parties that previously alternated power. Italy exemplifies this realignment, where Giorgia Meloni's secured 26% of the vote in the September 2022 general election, forming a government coalition that has maintained stability through 2025 despite internal challenges. The party's success stemmed from its platform prioritizing border security and family policies, drawing support from working-class voters disillusioned with prior centrist administrations. Poll ratings for hovered around 26-28% into late 2025, underscoring sustained appeal without significant reversal. Similar patterns emerged in the , where ' (PVV) won 37 of 150 seats (approximately 23.5% of the vote) in the November 2023 parliamentary election, propelled by anti-immigration sentiment following years of high asylum inflows. joined a right-wing in July 2024, influencing stricter migration policies, though the government collapsed in June 2025 over unresolved immigration disputes, triggering snap elections amid ongoing fragmentation. In , the achieved 20.5% in the September 2022 election, becoming the second-largest party and enabling a center-right via external support under the . This positioned the party to enforce tougher and law-and-order measures, marking a departure from Sweden's historically permissive policies; by 2025, its influence persisted despite public debates over democratic norms, with polls indicating continued growth in blue-collar districts. France's 2024 legislative elections highlighted fragmentation's extremes: Marine Le Pen's led the first round on June 30 with 33.15% of the vote, but and alliances resulted in a , with the left-wing New Popular Front gaining 188 seats, centrists around 160, and securing about 143—leaving no majority and forcing unstable governance. Germany's February 2025 federal election further illustrated the trend, with the (AfD) attaining 20.8% nationwide—its historic high as second place—dominating eastern states and expanding westward on platforms opposing mass migration and green energy mandates, while the won but struggled to form coalitions excluding AfD. This outcome fragmented the , with AfD holding 152 seats and complicating policy consensus on economic recovery and EU relations. These developments have led to more multipolar parliaments, with increasing in several nations due to splintering center blocs and populist breakthroughs, often resulting in minority governments or prolonged negotiations. Mainstream parties' attempts to adopt populist rhetoric on have yielded limited vote recovery, perpetuating a cycle of imitation without halting the underlying voter realignment toward sovereignty-focused alternatives.

Eastern Europe: Post-Communist Consolidations

Following the collapse of communist regimes in 1989–1991, Central and Eastern European countries experienced rapid electoral realignments as voters rejected one-party systems in favor of multi-party democracies, with initial victories for anti-communist coalitions emphasizing market reforms and national independence. In Poland, Solidarity's overwhelming win in the semi-free June 1989 elections led to Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government, marking the first non-communist leadership in the Soviet bloc. Similar patterns emerged in Czechoslovakia's Velvet Revolution and Hungary's negotiated transition, where center-right or dissident groups secured power by 1990, consolidating opposition to Soviet-era structures amid economic liberalization shocks. Economic hardships from and — including rates exceeding 15% in by 1992 and in some states—prompted a mid-1990s realignment toward reformed successor parties of the communists, which promised stability and welfare continuity. 's Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), rooted in the former Polish United Workers' Party, won 20.4% in the 1993 parliamentary elections, forming a . Hungary's (MSZP) similarly triumphed with 32.9% in 1994, capitalizing on voter fatigue with reformist pain. These shifts reflected a pragmatic voter pivot from ideological to socioeconomic security, though the parties moderated toward pro-market policies to pursue accession. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, renewed realignments favored center-right parties focused on Euro-Atlantic integration, as economic stabilization and / enlargement (2004 for eight states) realigned electorates around geopolitical priorities over past affiliations. In Poland, (AWS) secured 33.8% in 1997, enabling negotiations. Hungary's , evolving from liberal roots to conservative nationalism under , governed from 1998–2002, emphasizing and sovereignty. This era saw party system stabilization, with declining fragmentation as voters coalesced into pro- and anti-integration blocs, though ex-communist lefts began eroding due to scandals and historical baggage. The 2010s marked a consolidation of national-conservative dominance, as cultural and identity issues—intensified by the 2015 migrant crisis and perceived EU overreach—drove voters away from liberal and residual social democratic parties toward parties prioritizing border security, family policies, and economic nationalism. Hungary's Fidesz achieved a supermajority in 2010 with 52.7% of votes, enacting constitutional reforms and media controls sustained through 2022 elections (54% share). Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) won 37.6% in 2015, governing until 2023 with policies like judicial reforms and child benefits, drawing rural and working-class support disillusioned by post-2004 liberalization. Slovakia's Direction–Social Democracy (Smer-SD) under Robert Fico maintained power intermittently since 2006, peaking at 34.8% in 2012, blending left economics with anti-immigration stances. Across the region, traditional left vote shares plummeted—e.g., MSZP from 43% in 2002 to under 10% by 2018—as working-class electorates realigned to these conservative formations, reflecting causal links between globalization strains and sovereignty preferences over supranational progressivism.

Asia: Emerging Party System Changes

In , the (BJP) has reshaped the national since its 2014 victory, establishing a dominant position that analysts describe as India's , succeeding the Congress-led dominance of prior eras. The BJP's 2019 general election win secured 303 seats in the , reflecting a realignment toward Hindu nationalist appeals and welfare policies that consolidated support among lower castes and rural voters previously aligned with regional parties. However, the 2024 elections marked a partial reversal, with the BJP winning 240 seats and relying on partners for a slim , signaling coalition dependencies amid opposition gains by the INDIA bloc, though the BJP retained its central role without collapsing the system. Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed almost continuously since 1955, faced significant erosion in the due to scandals and , culminating in the October 2024 lower house election where the LDP-Komeito lost its majority, securing only 215 seats against opposition gains. This prompted Shigeru Ishiba's resignation in October 2025 after further upper house losses in July 2025, where the fell short of a majority, fostering instability and boosting opposition parties like the amid voter disillusionment with LDP corruption. The shift highlights a potential fragmentation of Japan's one-party dominance, with emerging conservative factions challenging LDP internals, as seen in the selection of as party leader in 2025 to counter far-right surges. In , partisan alternation intensified with the June 2025 presidential election, where Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung won decisively following the and removal of conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol in April 2025 over imposition, marking a rapid swing from conservative to progressive control. Lee's victory, securing over 50% of the vote, reflected voter backlash against Yoon's administration amid economic pressures and scandals, reinforcing 's pattern of sharp ideological realignments since , with the Democratic Party gaining ground among younger and urban demographics. This change underscores ongoing polarization, as progressive recalibrations toward challenge entrenched conservative alliances with the . The has witnessed dynastic realignments fracturing the 2022 Marcos-Duterte alliance, with Sara Duterte's resignation from Marcos Jr.'s cabinet in June 2024 amid policy disputes escalating into personal feuds, influencing the May 2025 midterm elections where dynastic rivalries dominated. The split, rooted in divergences like stances, has polarized elite networks, boosting Duterte-aligned candidates in regions while Marcos consolidated urban and establishment support, signaling a volatile prone to personalistic shifts over ideological consistency. These developments in South and illustrate broader trends of populist incumbents facing voter penalties for graft and economic failures, prompting hybrid systems where traditional parties adapt or yield to coalitions and dynasties.

Latin America: Leftist Cycles and Backlashes

's political landscape has featured recurrent cycles of leftist ascendance, often termed the "," followed by electoral backlashes driven by economic deterioration and governance failures. The initial wave began in the late 1990s amid high commodity prices, enabling resource-dependent economies to fund expansive social programs and nationalizations. Hugo Chávez's election in in 1998 marked the onset, with subsequent victories for left-leaning leaders in (Luiz Inácio in 2002), ( in 2003), ( in 2005), and ( in 2006). These governments pursued statist policies, including wealth redistribution and anti-market reforms, initially buoyed by oil and mineral booms that lifted GDP growth rates above 4% regionally from 2003 to 2008. The cycle's downturn accelerated after the 2014 commodity price collapse, exposing structural vulnerabilities such as overreliance on exports, fiscal deficits exceeding 5% of GDP in several nations, and currency controls that fueled black markets. In , under Chávez and successor , GDP contracted by over 75% from 2013 to 2021, peaked at 1.7 million percent in 2018, and rates surged to 96% by 2021, prompting mass emigration of 7.7 million people. Brazil's administration under faced impeachment in 2016 amid a that shrank GDP by 3.8% in 2015 and 3.6% in 2016, compounded by corruption scandals like , which implicated billions in bribes across state firms. under saw annual inflation average 25% from 2007 to 2015, with public debt ballooning to 53% of GDP by 2015, eroding investor confidence. Backlashes manifested in rightward electoral shifts from the mid-2010s, reflecting voter prioritization of economic stability over ideological appeals. Jair Bolsonaro's 2018 victory in , securing 55% of the vote, capitalized on anti-corruption sentiment and economic frustration, marking a realignment toward conservative . In , Javier Milei's 2023 presidential win with 56% of the runoff vote rejected Peronist continuity after hit 211% in 2023, ushering in and measures that reduced monthly from 25% in December 2023 to under 5% by mid-2024. Bolivia's was ousted in 2019 amid fraud allegations and protests, leading to interim conservative rule before a leftist return in 2020, while and saw similar anti-incumbent waves, with conservative Lenín Moreno succeeding Correa in 2017 and right-leaning Pedro Pablo briefly in 2016. These reversals correlated with poverty increases—up 10-20 percentage points in affected countries—and declining approval ratings for incumbents below 30%. Subsequent attempts at a "second Pink Tide" since 2018, including Lula's 2022 return in (50.9% vote share) and Andrés Manuel López Obrador's 2018 win in , have proven fragmented and less dominant, constrained by institutional checks and voter wariness of past failures. Economic data underscores causal links: leftist cycles often coincided with rising inequality post-boom (Gini coefficients worsening in from 0.39 in 1998 to 0.45 by 2013) and sustainability issues, fostering realignments toward market-oriented reforms despite media narratives attributing declines primarily to external factors like U.S. sanctions, which postdated Venezuela's core collapse. This pattern highlights how empirical economic performance, rather than ideological entrenchment, drives voter shifts in resource-volatile polities.

Oceania: Incremental Voter Reorientations

In , incremental voter reorientations have eroded the longstanding , with a gradual increase in support for independents and minor parties signaling a shift towards issue-based voting over partisan . From 8% of the primary vote in federal elections in 1980, the share allocated to non-major parties rose steadily to 32% by 2022, paralleling similar trends in state elections such as (from 5% in 1981 to 28% in 2023). This dealignment intensified in the 2022 federal election, where 33% of voters backed minor parties or independents—the highest in nearly a century—while consistent party fell to a record low of 37%, down from 72% in 1967. Demographic patterns underscore this reorientation, particularly among educated urban voters and specific cohorts. Over 35 years of election data, women have increasingly supported left-of-centre parties, with Coalition backing dropping to 32% in 2022—the lowest recorded—attributable to factors like higher education levels and emphasis on issues such as and . Younger voters exhibit parallel leftward trends, with and Gen Z providing only 24-25% support to the Coalition in 2022, though young men show slightly higher conservative leanings than young women. The "teal" independents, who secured multiple seats in traditionally Liberal-leaning affluent electorates in 2022 by prioritizing policy and anti-corruption measures, represent a targeted reorientation within moderate conservative bases; these candidates, ideologically positioned just left of center, have since voted cohesively in at rates rivaling major parties. In , voter reorientations under the mixed-member proportional system have proceeded incrementally through fluctuations in coalition preferences, often tied to economic performance rather than enduring ideological blocs. The 2023 general election marked a conservative pivot, with the National Party securing 48 seats amid Labour's party vote collapsing to 26.91%—nearly half its 2020 share—primarily due to backlash against , housing costs, and perceived policy overreach following . Māori electorates remained bastions of left-leaning support, with the most progressive areas concentrated there, while broader turnout held steady across age groups, indicating no sharp generational rupture but a pragmatic recalibration towards fiscal restraint.

Underlying Drivers

Economic and Class-Based Factors

and have eroded traditional working-class support for left-wing parties in Western democracies, redirecting it toward populist and conservative alternatives perceived as addressing economic grievances. Since the , job losses—totaling over 5 million in the alone from 2000 to 2010 due to trade with and —have disproportionately affected non-college-educated workers, fostering resentment against free-trade policies and elite-driven . This shift is evident in the , where Trump's 2016 and 2024 victories drew strong support from white non-college voters (62% in 2024), who cited job and stagnation as key concerns, while college graduates increasingly backed Democrats (55% for Harris in 2024). In , similar patterns emerged, with radical right parties gaining among low-skilled workers hit by import competition from low-wage countries; for instance, imports of labor-intensive goods correlated with a 1-2 rise in right-wing populist vote shares in affected regions during the . Economic insecurity, rather than absolute , drives this: European Social Survey data from 2002-2018 show working-class voters facing job instability were 10-15% more likely to support radical parties, left or right, as incumbents failed to mitigate globalization's "losers." Income inequality exacerbates these divides; Gini coefficients rising above 0.35 in countries like and the since 2000 have boosted populist support by 5-7 points, as marginalized groups reject mainstream parties tied to neoliberal policies. Education has become a stronger class proxy than income in predicting alignments, with non-graduates favoring and controls amid stagnant (e.g., US median male earnings flat since 1973 adjusted for ). This realignment reflects supply-side party adaptations—populists offering —over demand-side voter ideology alone, as seen in the US gradient widening from 10 points in 2000 to 25 points by 2020. Yet, causal links remain debated, with some analyses attributing shifts more to cultural mediation of economic shocks than pure .

Cultural and Identity Shifts

In recent political realignments across Western democracies, cultural and identity divides have emerged as pivotal drivers, with voters increasingly sorting into coalitions based on attitudes toward , , traditional social norms, and progressive identity frameworks. Non-college-educated voters, who often prioritize —such as stricter immigration controls and resistance to rapid social changes—have shifted toward right-wing or populist parties, while college-educated cohorts, more aligned with cosmopolitan and expansive , have gravitated leftward. This education-based cultural gradient has intensified since the , correlating with electoral outcomes where cultural salience overrides economic factors for many working-class demographics. Empirical voting data underscores this pattern: in the United States, the 2024 presidential election saw secure approximately 55% of non-college-educated white voters, alongside gains among Hispanic (45%) and Black (13%) non-college voters, reflecting a cultural backlash against perceived elite-driven on issues like border security and gender norms. In , surveys indicate that attitudes structure , with voters deeming the issue salient being 20-30% more likely to defect to conservative or national-populist parties, as observed in France's 2022 legislative elections and Italy's 2022 general election where cultural bolstered right-wing majorities. This realignment transcends , as less-educated voters in both regions exhibit stronger opposition to and support for ethno-national identity preservation, per longitudinal panel studies. The erosion of traditional progressive dominance on identity issues further fuels these shifts; post-2020 U.S. polling revealed a 10-15% decline in support for strict identity-based discourse among independents and working-class minorities, enabling cross-coalition appeals emphasizing shared civic identity over group-based grievances. In , generational data from 2019-2024 elections show younger, urban-educated voters polarizing left on (e.g., 60% favoring expansive LGBTQ+ policies), while older and rural cohorts consolidate rightward on and heritage preservation, fragmenting centrist parties. These dynamics, rooted in causal tensions between globalized identity fluidity and localized cultural anchors, have rendered cultural positions more predictive of partisanship than class alone since the mid-2010s.

Institutional and Media Influences

Electoral institutions significantly shape the pace and form of political realignments by determining how voter preferences translate into parliamentary representation. (PR) systems, common in , lower entry barriers for niche or extremist parties, enabling the fragmentation of traditional voter blocs and the rise of populist challengers that realign coalitions around anti-establishment sentiments. For instance, in countries like , , and , PR has allowed radical right parties to capture 10-30% of votes in national elections since 2010, drawing support from former center-right and working-class voters disillusioned with and EU integration policies. In majoritarian systems such as the ' first-past-the-post or the United Kingdom's, promotes two-party dominance, compressing realignments into existing parties rather than spawning new ones; the Republican Party's shift toward working-class and non-college-educated voters from 2016 onward exemplifies this consolidation despite institutional rigidity. Bureaucratic institutions exert influence through policy implementation and resistance to electoral mandates, often amplifying misalignments between voter-driven realignments and administrative priorities. In the U.S., federal bureaucrats donate to Democratic candidates at rates exceeding 90% in some agencies, creating ideological friction that undermines conservative reforms and fuels perceptions of an unaccountable "," which in turn bolsters support for realigning parties promising bureaucratic overhaul. Similar dynamics appear in , where supranational EU bureaucracies prioritize integrationist policies, provoking national-level backlashes that realign voters toward sovereigntist parties, as evidenced by gains in and post-2010. This causal pathway—where entrenched administrative preferences clash with popular shifts—highlights how bureaucracies can delay or distort realignments unless countered by strong executive controls. Media outlets influence realignments by framing issues and selectively amplifying narratives, with confirming a left-liberal skew in Western that correlates with undercoverage of topics like migration costs or , alienating segments of the electorate and accelerating defections to alternative platforms. A cross-national survey of over 1,000 journalists in 17 countries found their self-identified ideologies skew left of national electorates by 10-20 percentage points on average, predicting coverage biases that favor progressive framing. In the U.S., this has manifested in partisan distrust, with Republican trust in falling below 20% by 2020, driving realignments via echo chambers on that prioritize identity-based mobilization over traditional gatekept discourse. The countervailing rise of conservative media, such as , demonstrably shifted voter coalitions rightward, boosting Republican presidential vote shares by 0.4-0.7% in exposed markets between 1996 and 2000 through targeted issue emphasis. 's algorithmic amplification further entrenches these divides, enabling rapid coalition formation around overlooked grievances but exacerbating polarization that sustains realignments.

Implications for Democracy and Policy

Durability and Reversibility of Shifts

The durability of political realignments hinges on their alignment with enduring cleavages, such as economic grievances or cultural divides, which can institutionalize voter coalitions over multiple election cycles. Empirical studies of U.S. history reveal that critical realignments, like the Democratic dominance following the 1932 election, persisted for 30 to 40 years through consistent control of government institutions and reinforcement via policy feedback loops, before succumbing to dealignment amid changing demographics and issues. In contrast, less entrenched shifts, such as those tied to transient economic shocks, often prove ephemeral without structural changes in party systems. Recent evidence from the underscores partial durability in the post-2016 realignment, where Republican gains among non-college-educated workers, Hispanics, and other traditionally Democratic-leaning groups held firm through the 2024 election, with achieving a popular vote plurality and expanded margins in states. This shift, driven by class-based resentments over and , resisted full reversal despite intense partisan mobilization, though its long-term stability awaits confirmation in subsequent cycles, potentially through 2028. In , populist realignments show similar variance: in Central and Eastern states like and , parties emphasizing national sovereignty have consolidated power since the , leveraging institutional reforms to embed voter loyalty amid persistent post-communist economic disparities. Reversibility of these coalitions often correlates with exogenous shocks or governance outcomes, as voters exhibit responsiveness to policy delivery and economic performance rather than ideological rigidity. In multiparty democracies, coalition formations can prompt short-term voter recalibrations, with support eroding for underperforming governments, as seen in Western Europe's fluctuating populist surges tied to economic uncertainty post-2008, where gains in countries like and have endured in some cases but receded elsewhere amid recovery or scandals. Institutional factors, including electoral rules and media landscapes, further mediate reversibility; proportional systems facilitate fragmentation and potential snapbacks, while majoritarian ones may lock in major-party realignments longer. Overall, while cultural-identity driven shifts appear more resistant to reversal than purely economic ones, no realignment proves immutable, as generational replacement and adaptive elite strategies continually reshape s.

Effects on Governance and Polarization

This heightened ideological sorting during realignments amplifies affective and policy polarization, as voters increasingly view opposing parties not merely as rivals but as existential threats, reducing willingness for bipartisan compromise. , DW-NOMINATE analysis of roll-call votes reveals congressional polarization has accelerated since the 1970s realignment, with the partisan gap expanding from approximately 0.8 units in the early postwar era to over 1.6 by the , driven by regional and demographic shifts that sorted liberals into Democrats and conservatives into Republicans. Such polarization manifests in governance challenges, notably through procedural obstruction and , which have curtailed legislative output; for example, the number of public laws enacted per has trended downward since the peak of 713 in the 100th (1987-1988), reaching a low of 153 in the 118th (2023-2024), the fewest since tracking began post-World II. exacerbates this, as veto players exploit tools like the to block initiatives, leading to repeated fiscal crises such as the 2011 debt ceiling standoff and 2023 brinkmanship, which delay appropriations and undermine administrative continuity. Yet realignments can enhance governance efficacy in unified periods by enabling decisive policy pivots aligned with new majorities, producing higher-stakes reforms despite overall slowdowns; empirical studies of U.S. states and show polarized environments yield fewer routine laws but more ambitious ones, like the 2017 under Republican control or the 2010 under Democrats, reflecting realignment-mandated breaks from prior equilibria. In multiparty European systems, populist-driven realignments—such as the 2010s surge in radical-right support—have fragmented assemblies, prolonging coalition negotiations and shortening government durations; , for instance, experienced four national governments between 2018 and 2022 amid and League influences, fostering policy inconsistency on migration and budgets while polarizing debates over integration. Broader implications include elevated risks to institutional norms, as polarization from realignments incentivizes executive overreach or judicial reliance to bypass legislatures, potentially eroding and balances; cross-national data link high polarization to weaker economic and democratic , though some models suggest it sharpens voter signals for quality by minimizing ambiguity in elite choices. In contexts like post-communist or Latin American cycles, these dynamics amplify volatility, where realignments resolve stale coalitions but entrench zero-sum conflicts, hindering long-term policy durability.

References

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