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Alawi dynasty
View on Wikipedia| 'Alawi dynasty سلالة العلويين الفيلاليين | |
|---|---|
| Parent house | Hasanids |
| Country | Morocco |
| Founded | 1631 |
| Founder | Sharif bin Ali (died 1659) |
| Current head | Mohammed VI |
| Titles | Sultan (1631–1957) King (1957–present) |
| Style(s) | Amir al-Mu'minin |
| Royal family of Morocco |
|---|
|
The 'Alawi dynasty (Arabic: سلالة العلويين الفيلاليين, romanized: sulālat al-ʿalawiyyīn al-fīlāliyyīn) – also rendered in English as Alaouite, 'Alawid,[1][2] or Alawite[3] – is the current Moroccan royal family and reigning dynasty. They are an Arab Sharifian dynasty and claim descent from the Islamic prophet Muhammad through his grandson, Hasan ibn Ali.[4] Their ancestors originally migrated to the Tafilalt region, in present-day Morocco, from Yanbu on the coast of the Hejaz in the 12th or 13th century.[5][6][7]
The dynasty rose to power in the 17th century, beginning with Mawlay al-Sharif who was declared sultan of the Tafilalt in 1631. His son Al-Rashid, ruling from 1664 to 1672, was able to unite and pacify the country after a long period of regional divisions caused by the weakening of the Saadi Sultanate, establishing the Alawi Sultanate that succeeded it. His brother Isma'il presided over a period of strong central rule between 1672 and 1727, one of the longest reigns of any Moroccan sultan. After Isma'il's death, the country was plunged into disarray as his sons fought over his succession, but order was re-established under the long reign of Muhammad ibn Abdallah in the second half of the 18th century. The 19th century was marked by the growing influence of European powers.
The 'Alawis ruled as sovereign sultans up until 1912, when the French protectorate and Spanish protectorate were imposed on Morocco. They were retained as symbolic sultans under colonial rule. When the country regained its independence in 1956, Mohammed V, who had supported the nationalist cause, resumed the 'Alawi role as independent head of state. Shortly afterwards, in 1957, he adopted the title of "King" instead of "Sultan".[8] His successors, Hassan II and Mohammed VI (the current reigning monarch), have continued the dynasty's rule under the same title. Today, the Moroccan government is officially a constitutional monarchy,[9][10][11] but the king retains strong authoritarian power over the state and public affairs, despite some political reforms in recent decades.[12][11][13][14][15]
Name and etymology
[edit]The dynasty claims descent from Muhammad via Hasan, the son of Ali. The name 'Alawi (Arabic: علوي) stems either from the name of Ali (the father of Hasan),[16] from which the dynasty ultimately traces its descent, or from the name of the dynasty's early founder Ali al-Sharif of the Tafilalt.[17] Historians sometimes also refer to the dynasty as the "Filali Sharifs", in reference to their origin from the Tafilalt.[1][18][19][20]
The honorific title mawlay (also transliterated as mulay or moulay), meaning "my lord", was also commonly used in conjunction with the names of sultans.[21]
Origins
[edit]| Historical Arab states and dynasties |
|---|
The 'Alawis were a family of sharifian religious notables (or shurafa) who claimed descent from Muhammad via his grandson Hasan, the son of Ali and of Muhammad's daughter Fatimah.[1][17] Like the Sa'di dynasty before them, the 'Alawis originally came from the village of Yanbu al-Nakhil in the Hejaz region of Arabia.[6][5] According to the dynasty's official historians, the family migrated from the Hijaz to the Tafilalt during the 12th or 13th century at the request of the locals who hoped that the presence of a sharifian family would benefit the region. It is possible that the 'Alawis were merely one of many Arab families who moved westwards to Morocco during this period. The Tafilalt was an oasis region in the Ziz Valley in eastern Morocco and the site of Sijilmasa, historically an important terminus of the trans-Saharan trade routes.[1][17][2]
Little is known of 'Alawi history prior to the 17th century.[2] In the early 15th century they appear to have had a reputation as holy warriors, but did not yet have a political status. This was the example of one family member, Ali al-Sharif (not to be confused with the later 'Alawi by the same name below), who participated in battles against the Portuguese and Spanish in Ceuta and Tangier and who was also invited by the Nasrids of Granada to fight against Castile on the Iberian Peninsula.[3]: 228 By the 17th century, however, they had evidently become the main leaders of the Tafilalt.[2]
Their status as shurafa (descendants of Muhammad) was part of the reason for their success, as in this era many communities in Morocco increasingly saw sharifian status as the best claim to political legitimacy. The Saadian dynasty, which ruled Morocco in the 16th century and early 17th century prior to the rise of the 'Alawis, was also a sharifian dynasty and played an important role in establishing this model of political-religious legitimacy.[22][2][1][3]: 228
Political history
[edit]Rise to power
[edit]The family's rise to power took place in the context of early-to-mid-17th century Morocco, when the power of the Saadian sultans of Marrakesh was in serious decline and multiple regional factions fought for control of the country. Among the most powerful of these factions were the Dala'iyya (also spelled Dila'iyya or Dilaites), a federation of Amazigh (Berbers) in the Middle Atlas who increasingly dominated central Morocco at this time, reaching the peak of their power in the 1640s. Another, was 'Ali Abu Hassun al-Semlali (or Abu Hassun), who had become leader of the Sous valley since 1614.[3]: 222, 228 When Abu Hassun extended his control to the Tafilalt region in 1631, the Dala'iyya in turn sent forces to enforce their own influence in the area. The local inhabitants chose as their leader the 'Alawi family head, Muhammad al-Sharif – known as Mawlay Ali al-Sharif,[17] Mawlay al-Sharif, or Muhammad I[1] – recognizing him as Sultan.[3]: 222, 228 Mawlay al-Sharif led an attack against Abu Hassun's garrison at Tabu'samt in 1635 or 1636 (1045 AH) but failed to expel them. Abu Hassun forced him to go into exile to the Sous valley, but also treated him well; among other things, Abu Hassun gifted him a slave concubine who later gave birth to one of his sons, Mawlay Isma'il.[3]: 228 [22]: 224
While their father remained in exile, al-Sharif's sons took up the struggle. His son Sidi Mohammed (or Muhammad II[1]), became the leader after 1635 and successfully led another rebellion which expelled Abu Hassun's forces in 1640 or 1641 (1050 AH). With this success, he was proclaimed sultan in place of his father who relinquished the throne to him.[3]: 228–229 [22]: 224–225 The Dala'iyya invaded the region again in 1646 and following their victory at Al Qa'a forced him to acknowledge their control over all the territory west and south of Sijilmasa. Unable to oppose them, Sidi Mohammed instead decided to attempt expansion in other directions.[3]: 228–229 [22]: 224–225 [23]: 22
Mawlay Sharif died in 1659, and Sidi Mohammed was once again proclaimed sovereign. This provoked a succession clash between Sidi Mohammed and one of his younger half-brothers, Al-Rashid. Details of this conflict are lengthy, but ultimately Al-Rashid appears to have fled Sijilmasa in fear of his brother. He eventually managed to secure an alliance with the Banu Ma'qil Arab tribes who had previously supported his brother and also with the Ait Yaznasin (Beni Snassen), a Zenata Amazigh tribe. These groups recognized him as sultan in 1664,[24] while around the same time Sidi Mohammed made a new base for himself as far west as Azrou. The power of the Dala'iyya was in decline, and both brothers sought to take advantage of this, but both stood in each other's way. When Sidi Mohammed attacked Angad to force his rebellious brother's submission on August 2, 1664, he was instead unexpectedly killed and his armies defeated.[25][3]: 229 [22]: 225
Al-Rashid was left in control of the 'Alawi forces and in less than a decade he managed to extend 'Alawi control over almost all of Morocco, reuniting the country under a new sharifian dynasty.[20][3]: 229 After much campaigning in northern Morocco, Al-Rashid secured the surrender of Fez in June 1666.[3]: 230 [26]: 83 He made it his capital. He defeated the remnants of the Dala'iyya and destroyed their capital in the Middle Atlas in June 1668. In July, he captured Marrakesh.[3]: 230 His forces took the Sous valley and the Anti-Atlas in the south, forced Salé and its pirate republic to acknowledge his authority, while in the north he controlled most territory except for the European coastal enclaves. Al-Rashid had thus succeeded in reuniting the country under one rule. He subsequently died young in 1672.[22]: 225 [20]
Rule of the Alawi sultans
[edit]The reign of Mawlay Isma'il
[edit]Upon Al-Rashid's death, his younger half-brother Mawlay Isma'il became sultan. As sultan, Isma'il's 55-year reign was one of longest in Moroccan history.[1][22] He distinguished himself as a ruler who wished to establish a unified Moroccan state as the absolute authority in the land, independent of any particular group within Morocco – in contrast to previous dynasties which relied on certain tribes or regions as the base of their power.[3]: 230 He succeeded in part by creating a new army composed of Black slaves (the 'Abid al-Bukhari) from Sub-Saharan Africa (or descendants of previously imported slaves), many of them Muslims, whose loyalty was to him alone. Mawlay Isma'il himself was half Black, his mother having been a Black slave concubine of Mawlay Sharif.[27][3]: 231 This standing army also made effective use of modern artillery.[2]

He continuously led military campaigns against rebels, rivals, and European positions along the Moroccan coast. In practice, he still had to rely on various groups to control outlying areas, but he nonetheless succeeded in retaking many coastal cities occupied by England and Spain and managed to enforce direct order and heavy taxation throughout his territories. He put a definitive end to Ottoman attempts to gain influence in Morocco and established Morocco on more equal diplomatic footing with European powers in part by forcing them to ransom Christian captives at his court. These Christians were mostly captured by Moroccan pirate fleets which he heavily sponsored as a means of both revenue and warfare. While in captivity, prisoners were often forced into labour on his construction projects. All of these activities and policies gave him a reputation for ruthlessness and cruelty among European writers and a mixed reputation among Moroccan historians as well, though he is credited with unifying Morocco under strong (but brutal) leadership.[3]: 230–237 [22]: 225–230 [1] He also moved the capital from Fez to Meknes, where he built a vast imperial kasbah, a fortified palace-city whose construction continued throughout his reign.[28]
After Mawlay Isma'il
[edit]After Mawlay Isma'il's death, Morocco was plunged into one of its greatest periods of turmoil between 1727 and 1757, with Isma'il's sons fighting for control of the sultanate and never holding onto power for long.[1] Isma'il had left hundreds of sons who were theoretically eligible for the throne.[3] Conflict between his sons was compounded by rebellions against the heavily taxing and autocratic government which Isma'il had previously imposed.[2] Furthermore, the 'Abid of Isma'il's reign came to wield enormous power and were able to install or depose sultans according to their interests throughout this period, though they also had to compete with the guich tribes and some of the Amazigh (Berber) tribes.[20][3]

Order and control was firmly re-established only under Abdallah's son, Sidi Mohammed ibn Abdallah (Mohammed III), who became Sultan in 1757 after a decade as viceroy in Marrakesh.[29] Sidi Mohammed ibn Abdallah maintained the peace in part through a relatively more decentralized regime and lighter taxes, relying instead on greater trade with Europe to make up the revenues.[2] In line with this policy, in 1764 he founded Essaouira, a new port city through which he funnelled European trade with Marrakesh.[17][30] The last Portuguese outpost on the Moroccan coast, Mazagan (al-Jadida today), was taken by Morocco in 1729, leaving only the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla as the remaining European outposts in North West Africa.[1][20] Muhammad also signed a Treaty of Friendship with the United States in 1787 after becoming the first head of state to recognize the new country.[31] He was interested in scholarly pursuits and also cultivated a productive relationship with the ulama, or Muslim religious scholars, who supported some of his initiatives and reforms.[3]: 241
Sidi Mohammed's opening of Morocco to international trade was not welcomed by some, however. After his death in 1790, his son and successor Mawlay Yazid ruled with more xenophobia and violence, punished Jewish communities, and launched an ill-fated attack against the Spanish city of Ceuta in 1792, in which he was mortally wounded.[17] After his death, he was succeeded by his brother Suleyman (or Mawlay Slimane), though the latter had to defeat two more brothers who contested the throne: Maslama in the north and Hisham in Marrakesh to the south.[17] Suleyman brought trade with Europe nearly to a halt.[22]: 260 Although less violent and bigoted than Yazid, was still portrayed by European sources as xenophobic.[17] After 1811, Suleyman also pushed a fundamentalist Wahhabist ideology at home and attempted to suppress local Sufi orders and brotherhoods, in spite of their popularity and despite his own membership in the Tijaniyya order.[22]: 260
European encroachment
[edit]Suleyman's successor, Abd al-Rahman (or Abderrahmane; ruled 1822–1859), tried to reinforce national unity by recruiting local elites of the country and orchestrating military campaigns designed to bolster his image as a defender of Islam against encroaching European powers. The French conquest of Algeria in 1830, however, destabilized the region and put the sultan in a very difficult position. Wide popular support for the Algerians against the French led Morocco to allow the flow of aid and arms to the resistance movement led by Emir Abd al-Qadir, while the Moroccan ulama delivered a fatwa for a supporting jihad in 1837. On the other hand, Abd al-Rahman was reluctant to provide the French with a clear reason to attack Morocco if he ever intervened. He managed to maintain the appearance of neutrality until 1844, when he was compelled to provide refuge to Abd al-Qadir in Morocco. The French, led by the marshall Bugeaud, pursued him and thoroughly routed the Moroccan army at the Battle of Isly, near Oujda, on August 14. At the same time, the French navy bombarded Tangiers on August 6 and bombarded Essaouira on August 16. In the aftermath, Morocco signed the Convention of Lalla Maghnia on March 18, 1845. The treaty made the superior power of France clear and forced the sultan to recognize French authority over Algeria. Abd al-Qadir turned rebel against the sultan and took refuge in the Rif region until his surrender to the French in 1848.[22]: 264–265 [17]

The next confrontation, the Hispano-Moroccan War, took place from 1859 to 1860, and the subsequent Treaty of Wad Ras led the Moroccan government to take a massive British loan larger than its national reserves to pay off its war debt to Spain.[32]
In the latter part of the 19th century Morocco's instability resulted in European countries intervening to protect investments and to demand economic concessions. Sultan Hassan I called for the Madrid Conference of 1880 in response to France and Spain's abuse of the protégé system, but the result was an increased European presence in Morocco—in the form of advisors, doctors, businessmen, adventurers, and even missionaries.[32]: 47
After Sultan Abdelaziz appointed his brother Abdelhafid as viceroy of Marrakesh, the latter sought to have him overthrown by fomenting distrust over Abdelaziz's European ties.[33] Abdelhafid was aided by Madani el-Glaoui, older brother of T'hami, one of the Caids of the Atlas. He was assisted in the training of his troops by Andrew Belton, a British officer and veteran of the Second Boer War.[34] For a brief period, Abdelaziz reigned from Rabat while Abdelhafid reigned in Marrakesh and Fez and a conflict known as the Hafidiya (1907–1908) ensued. In 1908 Abdelaziz was defeated in battle. In 1909, Abdelhafid became the recognized leader of Morocco.[33]

In 1911, rebellion broke out against the sultan. This led to the Agadir Crisis, also known as the Second Moroccan Crisis. These events led Abdelhafid to abdicate after signing the Treaty of Fes on 30 March 1912,[35] which made Morocco a French protectorate.[36] He signed his abdication only when on the quay in Rabat, with the ship that would take him to France already waiting. When news of the treaty finally leaked to the Moroccan populace, it was met with immediate and violent backlash in the Intifada of Fez.[37] His brother Youssef was proclaimed Sultan by the French administration several months later (13 August 1912).[38] At the same time a large part of northern Morocco was placed under Spanish control.
Colonial rule, Mohammed V, and independence
[edit]Under colonial rule the institution of the sultan was formally preserved as part of a French policy of indirect rule, or at least the appearance of indirect rule. Under the French Protectorate, the 'Alawi sultans still had some prerogatives such as the power to sign or veto dahirs (decrees). In the Spanish zone, a Khalifa ("deputy") was appointed who acted as a representative of the sultan. In practice, however, the sultan was a puppet of the new regime and many parts of the population saw the dynasty as collaborators with the French. The French colonial administration was headed by the French resident-general, the first of whom was Hubert Lyautey, who enacted many of the policies that set the tone for France's colonial regime in Morocco.[32][39]
Mawlay Youssef died unexpectedly in 1927 and his youngest son, Muhammad (Mohammed ben Youssef or Mohammed V), was acclaimed as the new sultan, at the age of 18. By the guidance of the French regime, he had spent most of his life growing up in relative isolation inside the royal palace in Meknes and Rabat. These restrictions on his interactions with the outside world continued in large part even after he ascended to the throne. However, over the course of his reign he became increasingly associated with the Moroccan nationalist movement, eventually becoming a strong symbol in the cause for independence. The nationalists, for their part, and in contrast with other anti-colonial movements like the Salafis, saw the sultan as a potentially useful tool in the struggle against French rule.[39]

Some of Mohammed V's initial interactions with nationalists came during the crisis caused by the so-called "Berber Dahir". Among other things at this time, the sultan received a delegation from Fez which presented a list of grievances about the new French policy, and had discussions with Allal al-Fassi where he apparently expressed that he had been misled by the French residency when signing it and vowed to cede no further rights of his country.[39]: 250 The sultan refrained from openly associating with the nationalist movement in the 1930s, but nonetheless resisted French attempts to shift the terms of the Protectorate during the interwar years. He reaffirmed Morocco's loyalty to France in 1939, at the beginning of the World War II. After the fall of France to the Germans and the advent of the Vichy regime, however, the sultan increasingly charted his own course, successfully pushing some reform initiatives related to education, even as the Vichy regime encouraged him to make several well-publicized trips abroad to bolster his legitimacy and that of the colonial system. In 1942 the Allies landed on the Moroccan Atlantic coast as part of their invasion of North Africa against Axis occupation. This momentous change also allowed the sultan more political manoeuvring room, and during the Anfa Conference in 1943, which Allied leaders attended, Mohammed V was left alone at one time with President Roosevelt, who expressed support for Moroccan independence after the war. The encounter was the sultan's first face-to-face interaction with another head of state without the mediating presence of the French officials. In the fall of the same year, the sultan encouraged the formation of the official Istiqlal ("Independence") Party and the drafting of the Manifesto of Independence that called for a constitutional monarchy with democratic institutions.[39]
These moves were strongly opposed by the French, but the sultan continued to steadily defy them. Another watershed event was the Tangier Speech of 1947, delivered in the Mendoubia Gardens of Tangier during the first visit of a Moroccan sultan to the city since Mawlay Hassan I in 1889.[39] The speech made a number of significant points including support for Arab nationalism, a generally anti-colonial ideology, and an expression of gratitude for American support of Moroccan aspirations while omitting the usual statements of support for the French Protectorate. In the following years the tensions increased, with French officials slowly acknowledging the need for Moroccan independence but stressing for slower reforms rather than rapid sovereignty. The French enlisted many powerful collaborators such Thami el-Glaoui to organize a campaign of public opposition to the sultan and demands for his abdication – also known as the "Qa'id Affair" – in the spring of 1953. The political confrontation came to a head in August of that year. On August 13 the royal palace in Rabat was surrounded and closed off by Protectorate military forces and police, and on August 16 Thami and allied Moroccan leaders formally declared Mohammed Ben 'Arafa, a little-known member of the 'Alawi family, as sultan. On August 20 the French resident-general, Auguste Guillaume, presented demands to the sultan for his abdication and his agreement to go into exile. The sultan refused to abdicate, and that afternoon he and his sons were escorted at gunpoint from the palace and onto a plane. He and his family were eventually exiled to Madagascar.[39]
The exile of the sultan did not alleviate French difficulties in Morocco, and an insurgency broke out which targeted both the regime and its collaborators with boycott campaigns as well as acts of violence. Several assassination attempts were made against the new puppet sultan, Mohammed Ben 'Arafa, and one of the boycott campaigns was aimed at the country's mosques due to prayers being said in the new sultan's name. Eventually, with the decolonialization process under way in Tunisia and the independence war in Algeria, the French agreed to negotiate Morocco's independence at a conference on August 23, 1955. By October 1 Mohammed Ben 'Arafa had abdicated and later that month even Thami el-Glaoui supported Mohammed V's return. The sultan landed at Rabat-Salé Airport at 11:42 am on November 16, greeted by cheering crowds.[39] The French-Moroccan Declaration of Independence was formally signed on March 2, 1956, and Tangier was reintegrated to Morocco later that year. In 1957 Mohammed V adopted the official title of "King", which has since been used by his successors, Hassan II and Mohammed VI.[32][39]
From 1957 to present day
[edit]
At independence, the Moroccan makhzen (royal government) remained underdeveloped and urgent reforms were needed to resolve problems arising from decades of colonial rule.[32]: 154 Political friction existed between the nationalist Istiqlal Party, which pushed for more democratic institutions, and the king, Mohammed V, who now hesitated on endorsing radical political changes. By the end of the decade in 1960, the Istiqlal Party was weakened by splinter factions and the growing number of political parties were unable to act together as an effective counterbalance to the king. A formal constitution also remained lacking. As a result, the monarch emerged as the main pillar of political stability in the state and there was a revival of absolutism under royal rule.[32]: 155–161 Mohammed V died in 1961 and was succeeded by his son, Hassan II.
Hassan was soon compelled to promulgate a constitution, which was approved by popular referendum in 1962. The constitution had been written by officials appointed by the king and in practice it cemented the monarchy's rule by granting it far-reaching executive powers.[32]: 163–164 Hassan II worked to improve relations with France and position Morocco as an ally of the West, but relations with neighboring Algeria deteriorated over border issues and resulted in the Sand War in 1963.[32]: 165–166 Tensions also rose internally during the 1960s and 1970s, with leftist opposition mounting against the conservative monarchy. This in turn was met with increased political repression and Hassan II largely relied on the army and police as instruments of power. The period from roughly 1975 to 1990 is known as the "Years of Lead", as state violence was regularly deployed against dissenters and political opponents were jailed or disappeared.[32]: 166–170 Two attempted coups d'état against the king failed in 1971 and 1972.[32]: 175–178
Upon the withdrawal of the Spanish from Spanish Sahara in 1975 and the declaration of independence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Hassan II used the opportunity to publicly galvanize nationalist sentiment by pressing Morocco's irredentist claims to the territory, over the objections of the local Sahrawi people and of the Algerian and Mauritanian governments. He organized the Green March, which saw around 350,000 Moroccans crossing the southern border to settle inside the territory, triggering a war with the Polisario, the armed front of the Sahrawi people.[32]: 180–184 A ceasefire was negotiated in 1989,[32]: 184 but the conflict remains unresolved today,[40][41] with most of the territory under de facto Moroccan control while the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic controls the easternmost zones.[32]: 180–184 [42] During the 1990s Hassan II changed course in domestic politics and publicly promoted an agenda of reform. A new constitutional reform, approved by referendum, was enacted in 1993. Another amendment to the constitution was passed in 1996 to create a bi-cameral legislature, with the lower house elected directly by voters and an upper house chosen indirectly by regional assemblies and professional organizations.[32]: 205
Hassan II died in 1999 and was succeeded by his son, Mohammed VI, the current reigning king. The new monarch's reign began with promises of further liberalization and reform; however, the extent of political reforms has been limited and popular engagement with electoral politics has been inconsistent.[32]: 221, 228–230 [43] Another constitutional reform was passed by a referendum in 2011 in response to protests inside the country, in the wider context of the Arab Spring.[44][32]: 234–236 Today, the 'Alawis remain the only monarchy in North Africa.[9] They officially rule in a parliamentary constitutional monarchy,[9][10][11] but authoritarian and absolutist characteristics are still noted by scholars and observers, with effective power largely remaining in the hands of the king,[12][10][14] a situation that has been compared to the pattern of Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.[14][45]
List of 'Alawi rulers
[edit]

Sultans of the Tafilalt and early expansion:
- Sharif ibn Ali (1631–1635)
- Muhammad ibn Sharif (1635–1664)
- Al-Rashid (1664–1668)
After capture of Marrakesh in 1668, Sultans of Morocco:[46]
- Al-Rashid (1668–1672)
- Mawlay Ismail Ibn Sharif (1672–1727)
- Abu'l Abbas Ahmad II (1727–1728) (first time)
- Abdalmalik (1728)
- Abu'l Abbas Ahmad II (1728–1729) (second time)
- Abdallah (1729–1734) (first time)
- Ali (1734–1736)
- Abdallah (1736) (second time)
- Mohammed II (1736–1738)
- Al-Mustadi (1738–1740) (first time)
- Abdallah (1740–1741) (third time)
- Zin al-Abidin (1741)
- Abdallah (1741–1742) (fourth time)
- Al-Mustadi (1742–1743) (second time)
- Abdallah (1743–1747) (fifth time)
- Al-Mustadi (1747–1748) (third time)
- Abdallah (1748–1757) (sixth time)
- Mohammed III (1757–1790)
- Yazid (1790–1792)
- Mulay Suleiman (1792–1822)
- Abd al-Rahman (1822–1859)
- Mohammed IV (1859–1873)
- Hassan I (1873–1894)
- Abdelaziz (1894–1908)
- Abd al-Hafid (1908–1912)
Under the French protectorate (1912–1956):
- Yusef (1912–1927)
- Sultan Mohammed V (1927–1961), changed title of ruler from Sultan to King in 1957. Deposed and exiled to Corsica and Madagascar (1953–1955).
- Mohammed Ben Aarafa, installed by France (1953–1955)
From Independence (1955 onwards):
- King Mohammed V (1955–1961)
- King Hassan II (1961–1999)
- King Mohammed VI (1999–present)
Timeline
[edit]
Family tree
[edit]| Hisham | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
ibn Hicham | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Aarafa | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Tahar | Ben Aarafa | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3° spouse Lalla Bahia | 2° spouse Lalla Abla bint Tahar | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lalla Fatima Zohra | Lalla Amina | 2° spouse Lalla Latifa Hammou | Lalla Malika | Lalla Nuzha | Lalla Aicha | Abdellah | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Lalla Meryem | Lalla Asma | spouse Lalla Salma | Lalla Hasna | Rachid | Hicham | Ismail | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Crown Prince Hassan | Lalla Khadija | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
See also
[edit]- History of Morocco
- Order of Ouissam Alaouite
- List of Sunni Muslim dynasties
- Hashemites, Jordan's ruling family that also claims descent from the Islamic prophet Muhammad
- Succession to the Moroccan throne
- List of rulers of Morocco
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Bosworth, Clifford Edmund (2004). "The 'Alawid or Filali Sharifs". The New Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Manual. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 9780748621378.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Wilfrid, J. Rollman (2009). "ʿAlawid Dynasty". In Esposito, John L. (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195305135.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Abun-Nasr, Jamil (1987). A history of the Maghrib in the Islamic period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521337674.
- ^ "العلويون/الفيلاليون في المغرب". www.hukam.net. Retrieved 2022-04-06.
- ^ a b Messier, Ronald A.; Miller, James A. (2015). The Last Civilized Place: Sijilmasa and Its Saharan Destiny. University of Texas Press. ISBN 978-0-292-76667-9.
- ^ a b Morrow, John Andrew (2020). Shi'ism in the Maghrib and al-Andalus, Volume One: History. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-5275-6284-4.
- ^ "ينـبع النـخـل .. لا نـبع ولا نـخل - أخبار السعودية | صحيفة عكاظ". 2019-11-04. Archived from the original on 2019-11-04. Retrieved 2022-04-06.
- ^ Jones, Barry (2017). Dictionary of World Biography: Fourth edition. ANU Press. p. 591. ISBN 978-1-76046-126-3.
- ^ a b c "Morocco | History, Map, Flag, Capital, People, & Facts | Britannica". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 2022-09-20.
- ^ a b c "Morocco; Government". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 12 September 2022. Retrieved September 21, 2022.
- ^ a b c Daadaoui, M. (2011). Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge: Maintaining Makhzen Power. Springer. p. 61. ISBN 978-0-230-12006-8.
The dominance of the monarchy in the sociopolitical arena is further institutionalized in the Moroccan constitution, which effectively diffuses makhzenite authority into three separate branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. While this separation of powers is informed by western style government, it does effectively place all powers under the iron grip of the monarch. Article 1 of the constitution promulgating a constitutional monarchy in Morocco is misleading, insofar as the king is not a figurehead acting as a symbol of unity for Moroccans. In fact the constitution, amended five times since the independence, has largely served to the traditional prerogatives of the monarchy.
- ^ a b Gilson Miller, Susan (2013). A History of Modern Morocco. Cambridge University Press. pp. 235–236. ISBN 9781139619110.
The most important innovations, however, were the limitations on the king's ability to intervene in day-to-day politics. While the king's role as "supreme arbiter" of political life remained unquestioned, the new [2011] constitution enhanced the legislative powers of the parliament and increased the independence of the judiciary, moving at least in spirit toward a separation of powers. What it did not do was to unequivocally limit the king's preponderant influence over public affairs, or move Morocco closer to becoming a parliamentary monarchy; in other words, it stopped short of remaking Muhammad VI into "a king who reigns but does not rule."
- ^ Sater, James N. (2016). Morocco: Challenges to tradition and modernity. Routledge. p. 104. ISBN 978-1-317-57398-2.
Recent reforms, including constitutional reform and the appointment of the PJD government in 2011, have only perpetuated the lack of meaningful political participation and supported authoritarianism. Ironically, reforms have multiplied the resources available to Morocco's monarchical institution to control the political sphere, creating the image of the Janus yet also an impasse.
- ^ a b c "Analysis | Why Jordan and Morocco are doubling down on royal rule". Washington Post. 16 May 2017. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2022-09-20.
- ^ "Morocco: Freedom in the World 2022 Country Report". Freedom House. 2022. Retrieved 2022-09-21.
- ^ Rézette, Robert (1975). The Western Sahara and the Frontiers of Morocco. Nouvelles Editions Latines. p. 47.
Moulay Rachid who really founded the dynasty in 1664, was born in Tafilalet of a family that had come from Arabia
- ^ a b c d e f g h i Bennison, Amira K. (2007). "ʿAlawī dynasty". In Fleet, Kate; Krämer, Gudrun; Matringe, Denis; Nawas, John; Rowson, Everett (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition. Brill. ISBN 9789004150171.
- ^ Hasan, Masudul (1998). History of Islam: Classical period, 1206-1900 C.E. Adam Publishers & Distributors. p. 422.
- ^ Fage, John; Tordoff, with William (2013). A History of Africa. Routledge. p. 182. ISBN 978-1-317-79727-2.
- ^ a b c d e Terrasse, Henri (2012). "ʿAlawīs". In Bearman, P.; Bianquis, Th.; Bosworth, C.E.; van Donzel, E.; Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill.
- ^ Campo, Juan Eduardo (2009). "Mawlā". In Esposito, John L. (ed.). The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195305135.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Rivet, Daniel (2012). Histoire du Maroc: de Moulay Idrîs à Mohammed VI. Fayard.
- ^ trans. from Arabic by Eugène Fumet, Ahmed ben Khâled Ennâsiri (1906). Kitâb Elistiqsâ li-Akhbâri doual Elmâgrib Elaqsâ [" Le livre de la recherche approfondie des événements des dynasties de l'extrême Magrib "], vol. IX : Chronique de la dynastie alaouie au Maroc (PDF) (in French). Ernest Leroux. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2021-10-04. Retrieved 2021-12-10.
- ^ O. Houdas, Abū al-Qāsim ibn Aḥmad al-Zayyānī (1886). Le Maroc de 1631 à 1812 / de Aboulqâsem ben Ahmed Ezziâni (in French). Paris, Ernest Leroux. p. 14.
- ^ trans. from Arabic by Eugène Fumet, Ahmed ben Khâled Ennâsiri (1906). Kitâb Elistiqsâ li-Akhbâri doual Elmâgrib Elaqsâ [" Le livre de la recherche approfondie des événements des dynasties de l'extrême Magrib "], vol. IX : Chronique de la dynastie alaouie au Maroc (PDF) (in French). Ernest Leroux. p. 41. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2021-10-04. Retrieved 2021-12-10.
- ^ Le Tourneau, Roger (1949). Fès avant le protectorat: étude économique et sociale d'une ville de l'occident musulman. Casablanca: Société Marocaine de Librairie et d'Édition.
- ^ El Hamel, Chouki (2013). Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam. Cambridge University Press.
- ^ Arnold, Felix (2017). Islamic Palace Architecture in the Western Mediterranean: A History. Oxford University Press. pp. 309–312.
- ^ Deverdun, Gaston (1959). Marrakech: Des origines à 1912. Rabat: Éditions Techniques Nord-Africaines.
- ^ Cenival, P. de; Troin, J.-F. (2012). "al- Suwayra". In Bearman, P.; Bianquis, Th.; Bosworth, C.E.; van Donzel, E.; Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.). Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Brill.
- ^ Roberts, Priscilla H.; Tull, James N. (June 1999). "Moroccan Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ibn Abdallah's Diplomatic Initiatives toward the United States, 1777–1786". Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society. 143 (2): 233–265. JSTOR 3181936.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Gilson Miller, Susan (2013). A History of Modern Morocco. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781139619110.
- ^ a b "Abd al-Hafid". Encyclopædia Britannica. Vol. I: A-Ak – Bayes (15th ed.). Chicago, IL: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 2010. pp. 14. ISBN 978-1-59339-837-8.
- ^ "An Empire of Peace" (PDF). The New York Times. November 4, 1908.
- ^ Harris, W. (2002). Morocco That Was. Eland. ISBN 0-907871-13-5.
- ^ Long, David E.; Bernard Reich (2002). The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. p. 393.
- ^ Mohammed Kenbib. "Fez Riots (1912)." Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World. Executive Editor Norman A. Stillman. Brill Online, 2014
- ^ "Journal Officiel" (PDF). 1 November 1912. Archived from the original (PDF) on 29 March 2024. Retrieved 22 October 2013.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Wyrtzen, Jonathan (2015). "The Sultan-cum-King and the Field's Symbolic Forces". Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity. Cornell University Press. pp. 248–272. ISBN 9781501704246.
- ^ "Why is the Western Sahara conflict heating up?". France 24. 2021-11-06. Retrieved 2022-09-21.
- ^ "Ukraine War Puts New Focus on Conflict in Western Sahara". United States Institute of Peace. Archived from the original on April 14, 2022. Retrieved 2022-09-21.
- ^ "Morocco's autonomy plan for the Western Sahara". France 24. 2022-04-07. Retrieved 2022-09-21.
- ^ Abouzzohour, Yasmina (2020-07-29). "Progress and missed opportunities: Morocco enters its third decade under King Mohammed VI". Brookings. Retrieved 2022-09-20.
- ^ "Morocco approves King Mohammed's constitutional reforms". BBC News. 2011-07-02. Retrieved 2022-09-20.
- ^ Yom, Sean (2017). "Jordan and Morocco: The Palace Gambit". Journal of Democracy. 28 (2): 132–146. doi:10.1353/jod.2017.0030. ISSN 1086-3214. S2CID 151865682.
- ^ Miller, Susan Gilson (2013-04-15). A History of Modern Morocco. Cambridge University Press. p. 243. ISBN 978-0-521-81070-8.
Further reading
[edit]- Waterbury, John. Commander of the Faithful
External links
[edit]Alawi dynasty
View on GrokipediaEtymology and Sharifian Legitimacy
Name Origins and Religious Claims
The Alawi dynasty, also rendered as Alaouite or ʿAlawī, derives its name from the Arabic term ʿAlawī, denoting descendants of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, through whom the family's Sharifian lineage is traced.[11] This nomenclature reflects the broader categorization of Arab Sharifian families in Morocco who claim prophetic descent via Ali and Muhammad's daughter Fatima.[12] The specific dynastic branch emerged from the Tafilalt region, with Moulay Ali Cherif (d. circa 1650s), an early ancestor venerated for his piety and resistance to Portuguese forces in the 16th century, serving as a foundational figure whose name and lineage anchor the ruling house.[12][11] Religiously, the Alawis assert descent from Muhammad through Hasan ibn Ali, positioning themselves within the Filali line of Sharifs who migrated from Yanbu in Arabia to Morocco's Sijilmasa region around the early 13th century.[12][11] This Sharifian heritage, documented in family genealogies and reinforced by titles such as Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), underpins their claim to inherent baraka (spiritual blessing) essential for legitimate rule over Moroccan Muslims, distinguishing them from non-Sharifian predecessors and successors like the Saadians.[11][13] Such claims, while self-attributed and maintained through religious certification processes, have historically been pivotal in garnering support from local shurafa families and ulama, enabling the dynasty's consolidation of power amid 17th-century fragmentation.[12][13]Symbolic Role in Moroccan Identity
The Alawi dynasty's symbolic centrality in Moroccan identity derives from its sharifian lineage, claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad via Hasan ibn Ali, which establishes the monarchy as the divinely ordained guardian of Islamic orthodoxy in Morocco. This genealogical claim, emphasized since the dynasty's rise in the 17th century, underpins the enduring belief that only a sharif—descendant of the Prophet—possesses legitimate authority to rule, providing ideological stability that has outlasted periods of weak governance by fostering broad societal deference to the throne.[14][15] As Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), Alawi rulers hold a religious mandate that transcends political power, positioning the king as the spiritual leader of Morocco's Muslim population and a unifying force across Arab, Berber, and tribal divides. This title, invoked in official discourse and constitutional provisions, reinforces the monarchy's role in moderating religious practice and countering extremist ideologies, with King Mohammed VI leveraging it to promote a model of tolerant Maliki Sunni Islam as integral to national character.[16][17] The dynasty's symbols, including the red banner associated with Alaouite rule since the 17th century, evoke resilience and continuity, appearing in national emblems to signify strength against historical invasions and colonial pressures.[18] This symbolic framework has enabled the Alawis to maintain legitimacy through modernization efforts, such as invoking Andalusian heritage to link royal authority with Morocco's cultural pluralism, thereby embedding the dynasty in collective memory as the embodiment of sovereignty and faith. Even amid 20th-century reforms, the king's dual secular-religious persona—affirmed in the 2011 constitution—serves as a bulwark against fragmentation, with public rituals and lineage displays underscoring the throne's role in preserving Moroccan exceptionalism within the Islamic world.[10][19]Origins and Rise to Power
Genealogical Descent from the Prophet
The Alawi dynasty traces its origins to Sharifian lineage, claiming direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali ibn Abi Talib, specifically via their elder son Hasan ibn Ali, establishing the Hasanid branch of Alids.[12][20] This descent underpins the dynasty's religious authority as sharif (noble descendants of the Prophet), a status that granted them legitimacy as protectors of Sunni orthodoxy and commanders of the faithful in Morocco.[13] Central to the Moroccan Alawi branch is al-Hassan ad-Dakhil (Hassan the Penetrator), a mid-13th-century descendant of Hasan ibn Ali who migrated from Yanbu in the Hejaz to the Tafilalt oasis around 1250 at the invitation of local tribes seeking a figure of baraka (spiritual blessing) amid political instability.[21] Al-Hassan ad-Dakhil's arrival marked the establishment of the Filali Sharifs in the region, with his progeny maintaining religious and scholarly roles for centuries.[12] His grandson, Moulay Sharif ibn Ali (c. 1589–1659), founded the ruling line by becoming emir of Tafilalt in 1631, leveraging the family's sacred genealogy to rally support against regional rivals.[21][20] The complete genealogy spans approximately 35 generations from the Prophet to modern rulers, preserved in family records and corroborated by Moroccan historical scholarship, though pre-modern chains rely on oral and manuscript traditions rather than continuous documentation.[12] This lineage distinguishes the Alawis from other North African dynasties and has been invoked to affirm their role in resisting non-Muslim incursions, as seen in the reigns of sultans like Mawlay Rashid (r. 1664–1672).[13] While the claim's antiquity poses verification challenges inherent to medieval Islamic genealogies, it remains unchallenged in primary Moroccan sources and forms the basis of the dynasty's enduring symbolic authority.[20]Establishment in Tafilalt and Early Conflicts
The Alawi family, tracing its lineage to the Prophet Muhammad via Hasan al-Dakhil, had established itself in the Tafilalt oasis of southeastern Morocco by the 12th or 13th century, initially as religious scholars and local leaders among the Berber and Arab populations there.[14][22] Following the death of Saadi sultan Ahmad al-Mansur in 1603 and the ensuing period of national fragmentation known as the fitna or interregnum, characterized by rival warlords, tribal confederacies, and diluted central authority, Muhammad ibn Sharif (also known as Mawlay al-Sharif or Muhammad I) capitalized on local support in Tafilalt to proclaim himself emir in 1631.[23][24] This declaration, backed by his Sharifian religious prestige and alliances with regional tribes, initiated Alawi political dominance in the oasis, though initially confined to Tafilalt and the nearby ruins of Sijilmasa.[6] Muhammad I's rule, lasting until his death in 1635, focused on consolidating authority amid challenges from nomadic Arab groups like the Banu Ma'qil and local Berber factions resistant to centralized sharifian oversight.[25] His successor, Muhammad II ibn Sharif (Sidi Muhammad, r. 1635–1664), expanded Alawi influence beyond Tafilalt proper, incorporating the Draa River valley, Oujda, and eastern Saharan fringes through military campaigns and tribal pacts, thereby establishing a nascent territorial base numbering several thousand square kilometers.[26][24] However, this expansion provoked early conflicts, including clashes with entrenched garrisons tied to fading Saadian interests and independent Berber tribes such as the Ait Atta, who contested control over oases and caravan routes vital for date production and trans-Saharan trade.[25] Internal family rivalries also emerged, as Muhammad II navigated succession disputes among his brothers and sons, foreshadowing the violent fraternal strife that would culminate in al-Rashid's rise.[26] These formative struggles underscored the Alawis' reliance on religious legitimacy to mobilize support against secular rivals, yet their limited resources—primarily tribal levies and oasis revenues—constrained broader advances until the 1660s, when al-Rashid leveraged military successes to challenge northern powers like the Dila'iyya confederacy.[14][6] By 1664, Muhammad II's assassination by his son al-Rashid amid a palace intrigue highlighted the precariousness of early Alawi governance, rooted in Tafilalt's isolation but sustained by its strategic position as a gateway to the Sahara.[24]Mawlay Rashid's Unification Efforts
Mawlay al-Rashīd succeeded his brother Muḥammad ibn Sharīf as leader of the Alawī forces in Tafilalt in 1664, inheriting a fragmented power base in southeastern Morocco amid the collapse of Saʿdī authority and regional anarchy.[27] Drawing on sharifian lineage claims and tribal alliances, he assembled an army of Arab and Amazigh mercenaries to expand northward, first securing Taza as a provisional base before advancing on Fez.[27] This campaign exploited the weakening of the Dīlāʾī Sufi brotherhood, which had dominated northern Morocco through religious influence and maraboutic networks, allowing al-Rashīd to position himself as a restorer of centralized sharifian rule.[27] In June 1666, al-Rashīd captured Fez after overcoming Dīlāʾī resistance, receiving the bayʿa (oath of allegiance) from local ulama and inhabitants, which formalized his proclamation as sultan and marked the establishment of the Alawī dynasty.[27] He then systematically dismantled remaining Dīlāʾī strongholds, plundering and razing their key monastery at al-Ribāṭ al-Fath to eliminate threats from religious fraternities that had fueled division.[27] Funding these operations partly through piracy and the seizure of assets, including the assassination of a wealthy Jewish merchant, al-Rashīd consolidated control over the north by subjugating coastal areas and warring tribes, thereby bridging the rift between eastern oases and Atlantic regions.[27] Turning southwest in 1668–1669, al-Rashīd marched on Marrakesh, overthrowing the last Saʿdī claimants and local potentates to seize the southern imperial city, followed by conquests in the Sūs valley and Anti-Atlas Mountains.[27] These victories integrated Berber highlands and trade routes, ruthlessly crushing maraboutic opposition to forge nominal unity across Morocco's diverse ethnic and tribal landscape.[27] By his death in 1672 from an accidental fall in Marrakesh, al-Rashīd had reunified the realm under Alawī suzerainty for the first time since the early 17th century, laying the groundwork for his brother Ismaʿīl's more enduring centralization, though tribal revolts persisted.[27]Peak of Centralized Rule
Mawlay Isma'il's Reign and Military Reforms
Mawlay Isma'il ibn Sharif ruled as sultan from 1672 to 1727, a 55-year period that represented the zenith of Alawi authority through aggressive centralization and military innovation. Ascending after his brother Mawlay al-Rashid's death, he confronted a landscape of tribal fragmentation and European coastal enclaves, leveraging a novel standing army to impose order and expand influence.[12] [28] Central to his reforms was the creation of the 'Abid al-Bukhari, or Black Guard, a professional force of enslaved Black Africans modeled partly on Ottoman Janissaries but adapted for Moroccan needs. Recruitment drew from forced enslavement of free Haratin (Black Moroccans), purchases via trans-Saharan trade at rates like 10 mithqals per slave, raids into southern regions, and conscription drives announced by criers, including children trained from age 10 over six years.[29] By the early 18th century, the army numbered around 150,000 soldiers, supplemented by families and support personnel totaling up to 221,320 as recorded in 1705 chronicles like Jany al-Azhar.[12] [29] Bound by oaths invoking the Sahih al-Bukhari, these troops owed allegiance exclusively to the sultan, bypassing tribal loyalties that had undermined prior rulers, and performed diverse functions including rebellion suppression, tax collection, border patrols, and labor on fortifications.[29] This military structure enabled decisive campaigns against external threats, such as compelling the English withdrawal from Tangier, expelling Portuguese garrisons from Mamora, Mahdiya, and Arzila, and ousting Spanish forces from Larache.[12] Inland, victories like the 1708 capture of Laghouat from Ottoman-aligned groups demonstrated the army's efficacy, though assaults on Tlemcen and Ceuta proved unsuccessful.[28] Complementing the Black Guard were tribal guich auxiliaries and corsair squadrons operating from Salé and Rabat, which raided European shipping to acquire weapons, slaves, and ransom revenues, thereby sustaining military logistics without heavy reliance on domestic taxation.[28] By substituting hereditary tribal militias with a deracinated slave corps, Isma'il eroded the power of regional notables and Sufi networks, redirecting resources toward a palace-dominated state apparatus centered in Meknes.[29] European observers noted improved road security by 1721, reflecting enhanced internal control, yet the system's racial basis—equating Black identity with enslavement—perpetuated social divisions that outlasted his rule.[29]Administrative and Diplomatic Achievements
Mawlay Isma'il (r. 1672–1727) centralized Moroccan administration by shifting governance toward a palace-oriented structure in Meknes, his newly established capital, which minimized bureaucratic overhead and enhanced direct royal oversight over provincial affairs. This approach reduced dependence on the traditional Makhzan civil service, enabling more efficient collection of taxes and suppression of tribal autonomy through loyal enforcers like the Abid al-Bukhari, a slave-soldier corps numbering up to 150,000 by the early 18th century, tasked with maintaining order and quelling rebellions across disparate regions.[29][30] Infrastructure projects, including vast palaces, mosques, and ramparts enclosing over 25 square kilometers in Meknes, not only fortified the administrative hub but also symbolized imperial authority, with construction involving forced labor from captives and locals to project stability amid internal fragmentation.[31] Diplomatic efforts under Isma'il focused on balancing European encroachments with pragmatic alliances, including the dispatch of ambassadors such as Ahmad Qardanash to England between 1706 and 1708 to negotiate trade and resolve piracy disputes, fostering intermittent peace amid corsair activities from Moroccan ports.[32] A key achievement was the 1721 Anglo-Moroccan treaty signed in Fez on January 23, which secured British recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over territories including what is now Western Sahara, in exchange for concessions on captive ransoms and commerce.[33] Isma'il also engaged France under Louis XIV through exchanges aimed at redeeming European slaves held in Moroccan galleys—estimated at over 5,000 by 1700—while asserting independence from Ottoman suzerainty via direct correspondence, such as a letter to Sultan Ahmed III emphasizing Morocco's autonomous sharifian rule. These initiatives, often leveraging Sharifian lineage for legitimacy, temporarily stabilized borders and facilitated revenue from ransoms totaling millions of dollars in equivalent value, though underlying hostilities persisted.[34][35]Decline and Internal Strife
Succession Crises After Isma'il
Upon Mawlay Isma'il's death on 22 March 1727, after a 55-year reign that had centralized authority through military and administrative means, Morocco descended into acute instability due to the absence of a designated successor among his hundreds of sons. This vacuum triggered protracted fratricidal conflicts, with rival princes leveraging tribal alliances, the remnants of the 'Abid al-Bukhari black guard, and regional power bases to seize and defend the throne, leading to a half-century of intermittent civil war, assassinations, and eroded central control from 1727 to roughly 1777.[12][36] The immediate succession saw brief tenures by Isma'il's sons, beginning with Mawlay Ahmad, who claimed the sultanate but faced rapid insurrections, followed by Mawlay Abdelmalik. Power then shifted to Mawlay Abdallah ibn Isma'il (born 1694), who was proclaimed sultan for the first time on 5 March 1729 amid ongoing chaos. Abdallah endured five dethronements by brothers including Ahmad and Abdelmalik, as well as other kin like Mawlay Ali and Mawlay Zin al-Abidin, who briefly held power during interludes. His fragmented reigns encompassed 1729–1734, February to May 1736, 1740–1741, 1743–1747, and 1748 until his death on 10 November 1757 at Dar Edbagh palace; these episodes involved military confrontations, forced exiles, and opportunistic coups exploiting weakened loyalties in key cities like Meknes and Fez.[37][12] At least seven of Isma'il's sons rotated through the sultanate during this era, fostering provincial fragmentation where local warlords and tribes asserted autonomy, compounded by the disruptive role of the black guard units that Isma'il had militarized but which now fueled anarchy.[12] Waves of rebellion persisted, undermining fiscal systems and diplomatic standing, until Muhammad III (Muhammad ibn Abdallah), Isma'il's grandson and Abdallah's son, consolidated power in 1757 following his father's demise. As governor of Marrakesh prior to ascension, Muhammad III secured ulama endorsement and methodically reasserted authority by disbanding the black guard—whose resentful remnants had resisted dispersal—and prioritizing administrative renewal over dynastic vendettas.[1][37] His 35-year rule (1757–1792) quelled acute crises through pragmatic governance, including trade treaties with Europe and infrastructure like the port of Essaouira in 1765, thereby restoring a semblance of monarchical stability absent since Isma'il's era.[1]19th-Century Fragmentation and Tribal Rebellions
Following the succession crises in the 18th century, the Alawi dynasty's central authority further eroded in the 19th century, confining effective makhzen control to urban centers and surrounding plains known as the bled al-makhzen, while much of the interior remained bled al-siba—territories of dissidence where tribes maintained de facto autonomy and frequently rebelled against royal tax demands or interventions.[38][39] This fragmentation stemmed from the dynasty's inability to sustain a reliable military force after the dissolution of Mawlay Isma'il's ʿAbid al-Bukhari slave army, forcing sultans to rely on irregular tribal levies prone to disloyalty and local power plays. Sultan Abd al-Rahman (r. 1822–1859) confronted persistent tribal challenges amid external threats, including revolts exacerbated by Morocco's defeat at the Battle of Isly in 1844 against French forces, which undermined the sultan's prestige and emboldened dissident groups across the Atlas Mountains and northern regions.[40] His reign saw repeated suppressions of uprisings by notables and tribes, reflecting the causal link between military setbacks and internal instability, as weakened enforcement of royal authority invited opportunistic rebellions over taxation and land disputes. Under Muhammad IV (r. 1859–1873), efforts at modernization, such as limited administrative reforms and trade treaties, faced resistance from conservative tribal leaders wary of encroaching centralization, perpetuating cycles of localized revolts in semi-autonomous areas.[41] Sultan Hassan I (r. 1873–1894) mounted the most vigorous response to fragmentation, conducting extensive mahalla military expeditions to assert sovereignty, collect tribute, and pacify tribes—campaigns to the eastern regions in 1876, the Souss Valley in 1882 and 1886, and the suppression of the Darqawa uprising near Figuig in 1887.[42] These peripatetic operations, involving thousands of troops, temporarily extended royal reach but underscored the underlying fragility, as constant mobilization drained resources and failed to forge lasting loyalty, with tribes reverting to autonomy upon the mahalla's departure. Hassan's death in 1894 during one such expedition near Tadla highlighted the personal risks and systemic exhaustion of these efforts.[43] By the late 19th century, this pattern of rebellion and reconquest had entrenched tribal semi-independence, contributing to the dynasty's vulnerability to European encroachment, as the makhzen prioritized core territories over comprehensive unification.[44]External Pressures and Colonial Encroachment
Ottoman and European Rivalries
The Alawi dynasty maintained Morocco's independence from Ottoman overlordship, despite the empire's control over adjacent Algeria and Tunisia, through military vigilance and diplomatic maneuvering. Under Sultan Mawlay Isma'il (r. 1672–1727), eastern border fortifications were reinforced to deter incursions from Ottoman-backed Algerian forces, which had sporadically challenged Moroccan authority in disputed frontier zones like the Rif Mountains.[45] Skirmishes continued into the 18th century, as Algerian beys exploited internal Moroccan instability to assert claims over oases and tribes, but Alawi rulers repelled direct subjugation by leveraging sharifian legitimacy and alliances with nomadic groups.[46] By the late 18th century, mutual recognition of escalating European threats prompted a de facto truce between Morocco and the Ottomans, shifting focus from rivalry to shared concerns over infidel encroachment.[47] European powers, including Spain, Portugal, Britain, and France, pursued competing interests in Morocco for trade routes, coastal enclaves, and resources, compelling Alawi sultans to balance concessions with resistance. Early treaties, such as those negotiated by Sultan Muhammad III ben Abd Allah (r. 1757–1790) with Britain in 1760 and Spain in 1767, granted extraterritorial privileges to European merchants in exchange for naval protection and arms, exploiting intra-European rivalries to preserve autonomy.[48] These agreements emphasized maritime peace but often excluded land borders, allowing Morocco to contest Spanish holdings like Ceuta and Melilla while fostering economic ties that offset Ottoman pressures.[49] In the 19th century, intensified competition—exemplified by Britain's 1856 Anglo-Moroccan treaty and France's post-1830 Algerian expansion—eroded Moroccan leverage, as capitulatory regimes expanded foreign legal immunities and debt-financed loans deepened dependency.[50] Spain's 1860 Tetouan War occupation of northern territories further highlighted these dynamics, forcing indemnities that strained Alawi finances amid tribal unrest.[51]Pre-Protectorate Reforms and Resistance
Sultan Hassan I (r. 1873–1894) initiated key military reforms to counter European encroachment, establishing the Bab El-Makina arms factory in Fez in 1884 as a center for modern weaponry production.[52] He imported European machinery and trained local soldiers in contemporary techniques, aiming to build a professional standing army capable of defending Moroccan sovereignty amid growing threats from France and Spain.[53] Concurrently, Hassan I launched military expeditions into southern and eastern regions during the 1880s and 1890s to enforce tax collection and tribal loyalty, reasserting central authority over peripheral areas weakened by prior fragmentation.[54] These efforts, however, faced resistance from conservative ulema and tribal leaders wary of foreign influences, limiting their scope and effectiveness despite religious endorsements for modernization.[53] Upon succeeding Hassan I, Sultan Abd al-Aziz (r. 1894–1908) pursued administrative reforms influenced by European models, particularly in taxation, to stabilize finances strained by indemnities from defeats like the 1844 Battle of Isly.[55] He engaged European advisors to overhaul revenue systems, but these changes provoked widespread discontent among rural populations and elites, who viewed them as disruptive to traditional structures and overly concessionary to creditors.[55] Heavy loans from France, including mortgaging customs revenues, exacerbated economic dependency, fueling revolts that framed the reforms as a betrayal of Islamic governance and national independence.[54] Tribal uprisings and urban protests in 1907, centered in Marrakesh, highlighted this resistance, portraying Abd al-Aziz's policies as enabling foreign domination rather than fortifying the state.[56] Abd al-Hafid, brother of Abd al-Aziz, capitalized on this unrest to seize power in 1908 through a rebellion backed by conservative forces and tribes opposing European-oriented changes.[56] His reign initially embodied resistance, promising to expel foreign influences and restore traditional authority, yet inherited fiscal crises compelled further borrowing and concessions, including after French occupations of Casablanca in 1907 and Oujda.[54] Internal divisions and military defeats, culminating in the French capture of Fez in 1911, undermined these efforts, leading to Abd al-Hafid's abdication in 1912 amid pressures that ended effective Alawi independence.[56] The period's reforms, while rooted in pragmatic responses to external threats, often intensified domestic opposition, illustrating the tension between modernization imperatives and entrenched socio-religious structures.[55]Colonial Era and Nationalist Revival
French and Spanish Protectorates
The French Protectorate in Morocco was formally established on March 30, 1912, through the Treaty of Fez, signed by Alawi Sultan Abd al-Hafid under military pressure from French forces amid internal unrest and European rivalries.[57][58] This agreement placed effective administrative, military, and economic control in French hands while nominally preserving the sultan's religious authority as amir al-mu'minin and the Alawi dynasty's role as figurehead sovereign.[59] Abd al-Hafid abdicated shortly thereafter on August 12, 1912, due to the treaty's humiliating terms and domestic opposition, paving the way for his cousin Moulay Yusef ben Hassan to ascend as sultan.[60] A Franco-Spanish convention on November 27, 1912, divided Morocco into zones of influence, with France administering the larger central and southern territories—encompassing about 522,000 square kilometers—and Spain controlling the northern Rif region (approximately 20,000 square kilometers) and smaller southern enclaves like Ifni and Tarfaya.[61][62] Tangier became an international zone in 1923 under joint administration. Under French Resident-General Hubert Lyautey (1912–1925), policy emphasized indirect rule: preserving traditional Islamic institutions, the sultan's court (makhzen), and urban morphology while pursuing pacification campaigns against tribal resistance, infrastructure development (e.g., railroads, ports like Casablanca), and European settlement in blancs villes segregated from indigenous medinas.[59][61] Lyautey's approach subordinated the sultanate politically but leveraged Alawi religious legitimacy to legitimize colonial governance, including forced conscription into groupes mobiles units for suppression of revolts.[63] In the Spanish zones, administration was more direct and militarized, facing fierce Berber resistance culminating in the Rif War (1921–1926), where Abd el-Krim's guerrilla forces inflicted heavy defeats on Spanish troops, including the catastrophic Battle of Annual on July 22, 1921, resulting in over 10,000 Spanish casualties.[64][65] Abd el-Krim proclaimed the Republic of the Rif in 1921, employing modern tactics and captured weaponry, but Spanish retaliation—joined by French forces from 1925—deployed over 400,000 troops, aerial bombings, and chemical weapons, forcing his surrender on May 27, 1926.[64] Sultan Moulay Yusef (r. 1912–1927) cooperated with both protectorates, traveling extensively to assert symbolic authority and approve reforms, though his role remained ceremonial under resident oversight; he died on November 17, 1927, succeeded by his son Mohammed V.[60] The protectorates exploited Morocco's resources through mining concessions, agricultural exports, and infrastructure favoring metropolitan interests, while fostering economic disparities and land alienation that fueled latent nationalist sentiments.[66] Alawi sultans retained nominal oversight of religious and customary law (sharif), but French and Spanish authorities controlled fiscal policy, justice in European matters, and military affairs, effectively reducing the dynasty to a stabilizing veneer over colonial rule until post-World War II pressures.[59][61]Mohammed V's Leadership and Exile
Mohammed V ascended to the Moroccan throne on 14 November 1927, succeeding his father Yusef amid the French Protectorate established in 1912, during which the sultan's authority was significantly curtailed by French Resident-General Hubert Lyautey and successors. Initially cooperative with French administration, Mohammed V's stance evolved toward subtle support for Moroccan autonomy, particularly after World War II when he engaged with nationalist leaders and received encouragement from U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1943 for pursuing independence.[67] By the late 1940s, he endorsed the Istiqlal Party's formation in 1944 and its Independence Manifesto, positioning himself as a symbolic figurehead for growing anti-colonial sentiment while navigating pressures from French authorities and pro-French Berber pasha Thami El Glaoui.[68] Tensions escalated in the early 1950s as Mohammed V refused to disavow nationalist activities, leading French officials to view him as an impediment to their control; on 20 August 1953, amid Glaoui's orchestrated campaign backed by French forces, the sultan was deposed, forced to abdicate under duress, and exiled first to Corsica and then to Madagascar with his family.[69] [70] The installation of the compliant Mohammed Ben Aarafa as puppet sultan failed to quell unrest, instead igniting widespread protests, armed resistance, and the "Revolution of the King and the People," which amplified calls for Mohammed V's return and unified disparate nationalist factions against colonial rule.[71] [72] Exiled for over two years, Mohammed V maintained influence through clandestine communications with nationalists, and mounting violence—including bombings and uprisings in cities like Casablanca—pressured France to negotiate; on 16 November 1955, he returned triumphantly to Rabat, abrogating Ben Aarafa's rule and paving the way for the Lausanne Declaration on 2 March 1956, which granted Morocco independence from the French Protectorate.[69] [72] His exile transformed him from a constrained monarch into a national icon of resistance, bolstering the monarchy's legitimacy in the independence struggle and ensuring its central role in post-colonial Morocco, though it also highlighted internal divisions exacerbated by Glaoui's feudal alliances with colonial powers.[73]Independence Struggle and Monarchical Restoration
The Moroccan nationalist movement gained momentum after World War II, with the founding of the Istiqlal Party in 1944, which issued a Manifesto of Independence on January 11, 1944, demanding full sovereignty from French and Spanish protectorates.[74] Sultan Mohammed V increasingly aligned with nationalists, publicly calling for independence in his Tangier Speech on April 9, 1947, following the Casablanca massacre of 1947.[73] In response to growing unrest, French authorities deposed Mohammed V on August 20, 1953, exiling him first to Corsica and then to Madagascar, while installing his cousin Mohammed Ben Arafa as a puppet sultan.[75] The deposition sparked the Revolution of the King and the People, characterized by widespread riots, assassinations, and armed resistance by nationalist groups, including terrorism tactics employed by Istiqlal-affiliated factions, which intensified pressure on French rule amid concurrent Algerian rebellion.[76] French strategy shifted due to these pressures and international dynamics, leading to negotiations; Mohammed V returned triumphantly to Rabat on November 16, 1955, greeted by massive crowds and signaling the collapse of Ben Arafa's regime.[77] [69] Following his return, Mohammed V negotiated the Franco-Moroccan Joint Declaration, signed on March 2, 1956, which dissolved the 1912 Treaty of Fez and ended the French protectorate, restoring full Moroccan sovereignty under the Alawi sultanate.[67] Spain followed suit, relinquishing its northern protectorate zone on April 7, 1956, and southern territories shortly thereafter, unifying the kingdom.[78] Mohammed V assumed the title of king on August 14, 1957, formalizing the constitutional monarchy and consolidating Alawi authority post-independence, with his son Moulay Hassan (later Hassan II) positioned as heir and military commander.[69] This restoration emphasized the dynasty's role as a unifying symbol against colonial division, though it faced immediate challenges from internal power struggles between royalists and Istiqlal leaders.[79]Post-Independence Consolidation
Hassan II's Reign: Security and Development
Hassan II ascended the throne on March 3, 1961, following the death of his father, Mohammed V, and immediately faced challenges to monarchical authority, including leftist insurgencies and military unrest. To consolidate power, he expanded the internal security apparatus, establishing multiple layers of intelligence and paramilitary forces loyal to the palace, such as the Cabinet's security units and the Gendarmerie, which reported directly to him rather than civilian oversight.[80][81] This structure enabled rapid suppression of dissent but fostered a culture of surveillance and coercion, prioritizing regime stability over broader civil liberties. The regime encountered direct threats through two major coup attempts: the Skhirat coup on July 10, 1971, where cadets and officers stormed the palace during a celebration, killing dozens before loyal forces prevailed; and the subsequent airborne assault on August 16, 1972, targeting Hassan II's aircraft and residence, which resulted in heavy casualties but failed to dislodge him.[82] In response, Hassan II purged disloyal elements from the military, "arabized" officer corps to reduce foreign influence, and intensified reliance on personalist networks of khudama' (loyal servants), embedding security within the makhzen's centralized authority.[81] The period known as the Years of Lead (roughly 1960s–1990s) exemplified these security priorities, characterized by widespread repression of political opponents, including Marxists, Islamists, and Sahrawi separatists, through enforced disappearances, secret detentions, and systematic torture in facilities like the Ain Chok prison.[83] Estimates suggest thousands were affected, with Amnesty International documenting routine use of methods like beatings and electric shocks to extract confessions, often without due process.[83] This approach maintained internal order amid regional instabilities, such as the Western Sahara conflict starting in 1975, but at the cost of human rights, as corroborated by later admissions in Morocco's Equity and Reconciliation Commission.[84] On development, Hassan II pursued pragmatic economic policies emphasizing export-oriented growth, particularly in phosphates—Morocco's dominant resource, accounting for over 20% of global reserves and fueling revenues through the Office Chérifien des Phosphates. He initiated major infrastructure projects, including hydraulic works like the Mohammed V Dam completed in the 1970s, which expanded irrigation and mitigated drought impacts on agriculture, a sector employing much of the population.[85] Stabilization plans in the late 1970s and 1980s, supported by IMF adjustments, curbed inflation and attracted foreign investment, fostering industrial zones and tourism development in coastal areas. Annual GDP growth averaged around 4% in the 1980s, reflecting recovery from earlier droughts and oil shocks, though per capita gains were modest due to population growth and inequality.[86] By the 1990s, Hassan II liberalized the economy further, privatizing state firms and promoting agro-industry, which helped integrate Morocco into global markets while sustaining monarchical legitimacy through visible modernization. Toward his reign's end, security eased with prisoner releases in 1991–1994, signaling a shift toward controlled pluralism without undermining core stability.[87][84]Transition to Mohammed VI in 1999
King Hassan II died on July 23, 1999, in Rabat at the age of 70 from a heart attack resulting from complications of pneumonia.[88][89] His eldest son, Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed, who was 35 years old, immediately announced the death on state television and assumed the throne as King Mohammed VI, in accordance with Morocco's hereditary constitutional monarchy established under the 1996 constitutional reforms.[90] The succession proceeded without incident, underscoring the institutional stability of the Alaouite dynasty after Hassan II's 38-year reign marked by political turbulence and economic challenges.[91] Mohammed VI's accession was met with national mourning for his father alongside public anticipation for potential reforms under the younger monarch.[92] On July 25, 1999, Hassan II's funeral in Rabat drew over two million mourners and more than 40 world leaders, including U.S. President Bill Clinton, French President Jacques Chirac, and Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah, highlighting Hassan II's international stature as a mediator in Arab-Israeli affairs and ally to the West.[93][94] The ceremony at the Moulay Hassan Mosque emphasized the king's religious legitimacy as Commander of the Faithful, with traditional rites reinforcing dynastic continuity.[95] In his inaugural address on July 30, 1999—celebrated as Throne Day—Muhammad VI pledged fidelity to his father's legacy while invoking Morocco's Arab and Islamic identity and expressing hopes for Middle East peace.[96] The transition facilitated early gestures toward liberalization, such as permitting the return of exiled dissidents later in 1999, though substantive changes emerged gradually amid expectations of addressing human rights concerns from Hassan II's era.[97] No significant institutional disruptions occurred, as the Makhzen apparatus and military remained loyal, ensuring a peaceful handover within the framework of absolute monarchy tempered by parliamentary elements.[98]Contemporary Reign Under Mohammed VI
Political and Constitutional Reforms
Upon ascending the throne in July 1999, Mohammed VI established the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) in 2004 to investigate human rights abuses committed between 1956 and 1999, marking the first official acknowledgment of state-sponsored repression under his father, Hassan II; the commission received over 9,000 petitions and recommended reparations for victims, though it was criticized for lacking prosecutorial powers against perpetrators.[91][99] A significant early reform was the overhaul of the Moudawana, Morocco's family code, promulgated in 2004 following a royal commission appointed by Mohammed VI; it raised the minimum marriage age to 18 (with judicial exceptions), required spousal consent and court approval for polygamy, granted women the right to initiate divorce (khul' and talaq equivalents), and emphasized mutual consent in custody arrangements, aiming to align Islamic principles with gender equity while reducing patriarchal imbalances in prior Sharia-derived laws.[100][101] The reform was driven top-down by the king, who in a 2003 speech advocated for women's dignity as a religious and national imperative, though implementation faced resistance from conservative judges and uneven enforcement, with polygamy cases dropping but not eliminated—reporting 1,062 permissions granted between 2004 and 2016.[102][103] The most prominent constitutional changes occurred in 2011 amid protests inspired by the Arab Spring, particularly the February 20 Movement demanding democratic accountability; on March 9, 2011, Mohammed VI delivered a speech outlining reforms, leading to an advisory commission that drafted a new constitution emphasizing human rights, separation of powers, and Amazigh (Berber) as an official language alongside Arabic.[104][99] Voters approved the revised constitution in a July 1, 2011 referendum with 98.49% support on a 73% turnout, transferring some executive powers to the prime minister—now required to be from the largest parliamentary party—and enhancing parliament's legislative role, judicial independence via a Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and the creation of a National Human Rights Council.[104][105] However, the king retained core authorities as head of state, including command of the military, religious leadership (Amir al-Mu'minin), dissolution of parliament, declaration of states of emergency, and veto over key appointments, preserving an executive monarchy rather than a full parliamentary system.[99][106] Post-2011 implementation included November 2011 legislative elections won by the Justice and Development Party (PJD), elevating Islamist Abdelilah Benkirane as prime minister, followed by subsequent governments under the same framework, with efforts to devolve power through 2015 regionalization laws establishing elected regional councils for local governance.[91] Analysts from the Carnegie Endowment noted that while the reforms diffused immediate unrest and formalized multipartism—banning single-party rule—they fell short of curbing the monarchy's dominance, as the king's influence over security, foreign policy, and religious affairs limited prime ministerial autonomy, with Benkirane's 2013 dismissal illustrating retained royal prerogatives.[107][108] In recent years, Mohammed VI has pursued incremental adjustments, including 2023 proposals to enhance parliamentary oversight of government budgets and reinforce anti-corruption bodies, alongside 2025 ministerial council drafts to diversify political participation and align governance with societal changes; however, observers like Le Monde have described these as part of "unfinished reforms," citing persistent centralization and slow judicial progress amid demands for fuller accountability.[109][110][111] These measures reflect a pattern of royally orchestrated change to maintain stability, with empirical indicators like Morocco's ranking improvement in the World Bank's governance indicators (from 4.5 in 2010 to 5.2 in 2022 on voice and accountability) tempered by critiques of substantive democratic deficits.[91]Economic Modernization and Social Policies
Under King Mohammed VI, Morocco pursued economic modernization through structural reforms emphasizing diversification, infrastructure investment, and export-oriented growth. Ascending the throne in 1999, the monarch oversaw the liberalization of key sectors, including privatization of state enterprises and negotiation of free trade agreements, such as the 2004 U.S.-Morocco FTA, which boosted foreign direct investment and integrated Morocco into global supply chains.[112] Gross domestic product expanded from approximately $37 billion in 2000 to over $130 billion by 2023, with average annual growth of around 3-4% in the post-2008 period, driven by agriculture, phosphates, tourism, and manufacturing.[113] Phosphate production, managed by the state-owned OCP Group, saw a $13 billion green investment program launched in 2022 to enhance fertilizer output and sustainability, positioning Morocco as a global leader in the sector with exports exceeding $10 billion annually.[114] Renewable energy initiatives, including the Noor Ouarzazate solar complex operational since 2016, advanced targets for 52% renewable capacity by 2030, reducing energy import dependence from 90% to under 10% while attracting international partnerships.[115] The 2017 New Development Model, prompted by the king's critique of stagnant growth, prioritized private sector-led industrialization, digitalization, and regional development hubs like Tangier Med port, which handled over 9 million TEUs in 2023 and facilitated automotive exports.[116] Tourism revenues surged from $2.5 billion in 2000 to $9.6 billion in 2019 pre-pandemic, supported by infrastructure projects and Vision 2020 strategies.[117] Despite these advances, challenges persisted, including youth unemployment averaging 30-35% and vulnerability to droughts affecting agricultural GDP contributions of up to 15%.[91] Social policies emphasized human development and inclusion, with the 2005 National Initiative for Human Development (INDH) allocating over 40 billion dirhams ($4 billion) to community-driven projects targeting poverty in rural and urban fringes.[118] This initiative expanded access to electricity from 18% in rural areas in 1999 to near-universal coverage by 2019 and potable water from 40% to 95%, contributing to a poverty rate decline from 15% in 2001 to under 5% nationally by 2021, though rural rates remained higher at 10-12%.[119] The 2003 Moudawana family code reforms raised the marriage age to 18, granted women divorce rights, and promoted gender equity, influencing subsequent policies like mandatory schooling to age 15 in 2007.[112] A 2018 social protection overhaul, endorsed by the king, universalized family allowances and pensions, covering 22 million beneficiaries by 2024 and financed by a 2.5% solidarity tax on high earners, amid World Bank support for digital delivery systems.[120] Health expenditures rose to 6% of GDP, improving life expectancy from 68 years in 1999 to 77 by 2023, while education enrollment reached 99% at primary levels but faced quality critiques with PISA scores lagging regional peers.[116] In 2025, the king reiterated calls for accelerated rural job creation and public service enhancements to address persistent inequalities.[121]Foreign Policy and Regional Influence
Under King Mohammed VI, Morocco's foreign policy has pursued a pragmatic doctrine emphasizing territorial sovereignty, economic diversification, and southward expansion into Africa, while balancing ties with Western powers and selective engagement in the Arab world. This approach, articulated in royal speeches and diplomatic initiatives since 1999, prioritizes autonomy in decision-making and has shifted from reactive postures to proactive strategies, including high-level leader visits to over 30 African nations.[122][123] The policy has secured Morocco's role as a regional stabilizer, evidenced by its mediation in Sahel conflicts and investments exceeding $10 billion in African infrastructure projects like ports and highways.[124][125] Central to Morocco's regional influence is its steadfast defense of sovereignty over Western Sahara, disputed since Spain's withdrawal in 1975. Mohammed VI has made the territory a "strategic priority," advancing an autonomy plan under Moroccan sovereignty proposed in 2007, which has garnered increasing international endorsements. The United States recognized Morocco's claims in December 2020 as part of the Abraham Accords and reaffirmed this support on April 8, 2025, by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, citing Morocco's alignment on counterterrorism and regional stability.[126][127][128] France followed in July 2024, shifting from ambiguity to explicit backing of the autonomy initiative, while Belgium endorsed it in October 2025 amid migration cooperation deals.[129][130][131] These gains, numbering over 20 recognitions by 2025, have isolated Polisario Front separatists and strained ties with Algeria, which supports the group and maintains closed borders since 1994, exacerbating Maghreb divisions.[132][127] Morocco has amplified its African influence through royal-led diplomacy, rejoining the African Union in 2017 after a 32-year absence and institutionalizing South-South cooperation via institutions like the Mohammed VI Polytechnic University and investments in 40 sub-Saharan countries. Annual tours since 2017 have fostered over 1,000 bilateral agreements in trade, energy, and security, positioning Morocco as a bridge between Africa and Europe.[124][133] This offensive has countered Algerian sway in the Sahel, with Morocco mediating truces in Mali and Libya, though it faces challenges from jihadist threats and coups in the Alliance of Sahel States.[134][132] Relations with Western partners underscore Morocco's pivot toward security and economic alliances. With the United States, ties include major non-NATO ally status since 2004, joint military exercises, and $1 billion in annual trade, bolstered by the 2020 accords linking normalization with Israel to U.S. Sahara recognition.[135][136] European Union engagement, formalized in a 2000 Association Agreement, drives 60% of Morocco's trade and €1 billion in aid, though disputes over Western Sahara fisheries and agriculture deals persist due to European Court rulings deeming them inapplicable to the territory.[137][138] France remains pivotal, with €5 billion in annual investments, while Gulf ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE provide $10 billion in phosphate and infrastructure funding since 2015, maintaining Morocco's neutrality in intra-Gulf rivalries.[139][140] Overall, this multifaceted strategy has elevated Morocco's global standing, though vulnerabilities like migration pressures and Algerian proxy conflicts test its resilience.[141]Governance Structures and Institutions
The Makhzen and Centralized Authority
The Makhzen, referring to the centralized governing apparatus of Morocco centered on the sultanate, emerged as a core mechanism for the Alawi dynasty to consolidate authority from the late 17th century onward, encompassing military forces, treasury management, and administrative officials loyal to the monarch.[38] This patrimonial structure enabled the sultans to exert control over the bilad al-makhzen—territories directly administered by royal agents for taxation and justice—distinguishing it from the bilad al-siba, regions of tribal autonomy beyond effective central reach.[142] Under Moulay Ismail (r. 1672–1727), the Makhzen achieved unprecedented centralization through the formation of a standing army exceeding 150,000 troops, including the Abid al-Bukhari (Black Guard), an elite corps of black slave-soldiers recruited via forced levies and imported from sub-Saharan Africa, which suppressed rebellions, enforced tax collection, and subdued nomadic tribes across Morocco.[142][38] This military foundation, decoupled from tribal affiliations, allowed Ismail to dismantle rival power bases and extend royal dominion from the Tafilalt oasis to the Atlantic coast, unifying a fragmented polity after the Saadian era's instability.[142] Subsequent sultans built on this by integrating religious legitimacy, with the sultan as Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), to legitimize Makhzen decrees over customary tribal law. For instance, Sidi Muhammad (r. 1757–1790) reformed administrative practices, enhancing the roles of pashas and caids as royal intermediaries to manage provincial governance and revenue, thereby reinforcing the treasury's role in funding expeditions (mahalla) against dissident groups.[38] In the 19th century, amid European encroachments, Hassan I (r. 1873–1894) pursued military modernization, incorporating European weaponry and training while deploying Makhzen forces to reassert control over peripheral tribes, though fiscal constraints limited full centralization.[142] The Makhzen's endurance under the Alawis stems from its adaptive clientelist networks, where loyalty to the sultan—enforced through patronage, coercion, and shared spoils—supersedes institutional autonomy, allowing the dynasty to navigate colonial interruptions and post-1956 independence challenges.[38] This system perpetuated centralized decision-making, with the palace arbitrating elite factions and directing policy, as evidenced by the integration of modern security services and economic levers under later rulers to maintain monarchical preeminence over parliamentary bodies.[142] Despite periodic weakenings, such as after Ismail's death when tribal revolts fragmented control, the Makhzen's emphasis on personal allegiance to the sovereign has sustained Alawi rule, distinguishing it from more decentralized North African counterparts.[38]Religious Legitimacy and Sharifian Institutions
The Alawi dynasty's religious legitimacy derives from its claimed patrilineal descent from the Prophet Muhammad via al-Hasan ibn Ali, his grandson, which classifies its members as sharifs entitled to spiritual preeminence in Sunni Islam. Originating in the Tafilalt oasis, where the family cultivated a reputation for piety and scholarship, this genealogy was instrumental in rallying support during the dynasty's 17th-century rise, enabling rulers like al-Rashid (r. 1666–1672) to unify Morocco under a sharifian banner after the fragmentation following the Saadian era.[11][14] Historical genealogical records, preserved by the dynasty and corroborated by contemporary scholars, trace this lineage to Idrisid roots, though skeptics question the precision of pre-17th-century links due to reliance on oral and hagiographic traditions rather than exhaustive documentary evidence.[143] This sharifian heritage underpins the monarch's title of Amir al-Mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful), enshrined in Morocco's 2011 constitution as granting supreme authority over religious interpretation, enforcement of Maliki jurisprudence, and protection of Islam against heterodoxy. Alawi sultans, starting with Muhammad III (r. 1757–1790), invoked this role to position the throne as defender of Sunni orthodoxy amid Berber revolts and Ottoman influences, a strategy that stabilized rule by transcending tribal asabiyya (group solidarity) through transcendent prophetic kinship. In practice, the title empowers the king to lead Friday prayers, convene religious councils, and direct doctrinal policy, as seen in Mohammed VI's 2019 initiatives to export moderate Moroccan Islam via training imams abroad.[13][144][145] Sharifian institutions operationalize this legitimacy through centralized bodies subordinating religious life to royal oversight, including the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (established 1957, restructured post-independence), which administers over 50,000 mosques, waqf properties valued at billions of dirhams, and Quranic education to propagate state-approved rituals and curricula. Appointments to key positions, such as regional muftis, require ministerial vetting aligned with monarchical priorities, ensuring fidelity to Maliki fiqh over Salafi or Wahhabi variants. Complementing this is the Supreme Council of Ulema, reformed in 1981 and expanded in 2004 under royal decree, which functions as the apex fatwa-issuing authority but operates contingent on the king's approval—as evidenced by Mohammed VI's 2025 endorsements of rulings on zakat distribution and the Prophet's mawlid celebrations—thus fusing ulama scholarship with dynastic control to preempt autonomous clerical challenges.[146][147][145] This institutional framework has enduringly buttressed Alawi stability, as sharifian prestige historically insulated the dynasty from Khaldunian cycles of decline by eliciting voluntary deference from tribes and urban elites.[14]Controversies and Criticisms
Historical Brutality and Use of Slave Armies
The most notorious instance of brutality in the Alawi dynasty's history occurred during the reign of Sultan Moulay Ismail (r. 1672–1727), who established a large standing army composed primarily of enslaved Black Africans known as the Abid al-Bukhari, or Black Guard.[148][1] This force was created to consolidate central authority amid tribal fragmentation and to counter the influence of local warlords following the decline of the Saadi dynasty. Ismail reorganized and expanded the guard significantly around 1699, drawing recruits through trans-Saharan slave trade routes, enslavement of free Black Moroccans (Haratin), and captures from military campaigns in regions like Tafilalt and Sudan.[149][150] The army's loyalty was ensured by severing recruits' ties to Moroccan tribes, training them from a young age, and positioning them as a professional corps unbound by local allegiances, which allowed Ismail to wield them as an instrument of unchecked power.[148] The Abid al-Bukhari's size grew to become one of the largest slave armies in Islamic history, with contemporary accounts claiming up to 150,000 members including soldiers and their families, though modern estimates suggest a core fighting force of 15,000 to 25,000 elite troops supplemented by auxiliaries.[151] These soldiers were armed with muskets and sabers, housed in dedicated barracks in Meknes—the capital Ismail developed—and deployed to enforce tax collection, suppress rebellions, and conduct raids. Recruitment involved brutal methods, such as forced conscription from Black communities in Morocco and imports via Saharan caravans, often involving high mortality rates from the harsh journey.[148] Ismail's reliance on this force reflected a strategic calculus: slaves imported from afar lacked kinship networks that could foster disloyalty, enabling their use in terrorizing Arab and Berber tribes that resisted central rule.[1] Moulay Ismail employed the Black Guard to perpetrate widespread atrocities, including mass executions and punitive campaigns that decimated opposing factions. In consolidating power, he unleashed the army on cities like Fez and Meknes to quell dissent, reportedly ordering the slaughter of thousands of residents who failed to support him, as part of purges that eliminated potential rivals including members of his own family.[152] The guard's role extended to constructing monumental projects in Meknes using forced labor from slaves, European captives, and locals, where thousands perished under grueling conditions; estimates suggest over 30,000 workers died building the city's walls and palaces between 1679 and 1727.[149] Tribal revolts, such as those by the Berber Zenata confederations, were crushed with extreme violence, involving village burnings, enslavements, and public impalements to instill fear and deter future uprisings. Ismail's personal cruelty, documented in European diplomatic reports, included routine floggings, mutilations, and the execution of envoys, with the slave army serving as enforcers of his absolutist regime.[152] Following Ismail's death in 1727, the Abid al-Bukhari continued under subsequent Alawi sultans but gradually declined due to internal revolts and fiscal strains, though remnants were used into the 19th century for suppressing unrest. The dynasty's early dependence on slave soldiers highlighted a pattern of relying on imported military elites to bypass tribal power structures, a tactic rooted in causal dynamics of loyalty and control rather than ethnic prejudice alone, yet it entrenched a legacy of coercive governance. Later rulers, such as Moulay Abd al-Rahman (r. 1822–1859), maintained smaller contingents of Black Guard units, but the scale and brutality peaked under Ismail, shaping perceptions of Alawi rule as one sustained by force over consensus.[148][151]Modern Allegations of Authoritarianism and Corruption
Human Rights Watch documented systematic violations of fair trial standards in 12 court cases against Moroccan dissidents between 2015 and 2022, including the use of secret evidence, coerced confessions, and denial of access to legal counsel, as part of a broader strategy to suppress dissent under King Mohammed VI.[153] Freedom House reports that, despite constitutional reforms in 2011, the king retains dominance through formal powers—such as appointing the prime minister, dissolving parliament, and vetoing legislation—and informal influence over state institutions, judiciary, and media, contributing to Morocco's classification as "Partly Free" with political rights scored at 25/40 and civil liberties at 38/60 in 2023 assessments.[154] The 2016-2017 Hirak al-Rif protest movement in northern Morocco, sparked by the death of fishmonger Mouhcine Fikri in a garbage truck, demanded economic development, anti-corruption measures, and political freedoms; authorities responded with mass arrests, deploying thousands of security forces to Al Hoceima and sentencing movement leaders, including Nasser Zefzafi, to 20-year prison terms on charges of threatening state security.[155] Amnesty International highlighted ongoing intimidation of Hirak activists, such as the 2018 harassment and conviction of protester Nawal Benaissa on fabricated charges, as evidence of persistent repression against peaceful dissent.[156] Allegations of corruption within the royal family and entourage intensified following 2010 WikiLeaks disclosures, which revealed U.S. diplomatic cables accusing Moroccan royals of using state institutions to solicit bribes in the real estate sector and describing corruption as "prevalent at all levels of society."[157] The Pandora Papers in 2021 exposed Princess Lalla Meryem, sister of King Mohammed VI, utilizing offshore shell companies for property dealings in France and elsewhere, raising questions about opaque financial practices among royal members.[158] Critics, including protesters in the 2011 February 20 Movement, targeted royal advisor Fouad Ali El Himma for alleged undue influence and cronyism, linking him to stalled reforms and economic favoritism.[111] Morocco's score of 37 out of 100 on Transparency International's 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking 99th out of 180 countries, reflects perceptions of entrenched public-sector graft, including judicial interference and elite impunity, despite anti-corruption laws enacted since 2011.[159] The monarchy's extensive economic holdings, managed through entities like Al Mada (formerly SNI), which control stakes in banking, mining, and fisheries comprising up to 10% of GDP, have fueled claims of conflicts of interest, as royal investments benefit from state contracts and regulatory advantages without transparent oversight.[157] In 2019, King Mohammed VI issued pardons to over 100 Hirak prisoners, framed as reconciliation gestures, but human rights groups argue such measures fail to address underlying systemic abuses.[160]Debates on Monarchical Power vs. Democratic Aspirations
The Alawi monarchy in Morocco has long embodied a fusion of religious, traditional, and executive authority, with King Mohammed VI retaining ultimate decision-making power despite constitutional provisions for parliamentary governance. The 2011 constitution, enacted via referendum on July 1, 2011, with official approval rates exceeding 98%, ostensibly devolved some powers to the elected prime minister, including cabinet formation from the largest parliamentary party and greater legislative initiative.[161][99] However, the king preserved command over the military, foreign policy, religious affairs as Amir al-Mu'minin, and the ability to dissolve parliament or appoint key officials, fueling debates over whether these changes represent substantive democratization or mere procedural adjustments to sustain dynastic control.[162][163] Critics, including opposition figures from the February 20 Movement that sparked the 2011 protests amid the Arab Spring, argue that the reforms entrenched rather than diluted monarchical dominance, as the palace continues to orchestrate political outcomes through informal networks like the makhzen. For instance, the Justice and Development Party (PJD), an Islamist group, secured pluralities in 2011 and 2016 elections but saw its influence curtailed, with the king appointing technocratic prime ministers and sidelining party agendas on key issues like economic liberalization.[164][165] This dynamic has led to characterizations of Morocco as a "hybrid regime" in global assessments, with the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2023 Democracy Index scoring it 4.98 out of 10—placing it 93rd worldwide and below the flawed democracy threshold—due to limited electoral pluralism and executive overreach.[166][167] Pro-monarchy perspectives emphasize the dynasty's role in averting revolutionary upheaval, crediting Alawi adaptability—evident in preemptive reforms under Mohammed VI since 1999—for fostering stability in a volatile region, where full democratic transitions have often yielded instability elsewhere.[91] Yet, recurrent protests, such as the 2016-2017 Hirak Rif movement and youth-led demonstrations in 2025 decrying unemployment and inequality, underscore persistent aspirations for a ceremonial monarchy that "reigns but does not rule," with demands for parliamentary oversight of budgets and security forces.[168][169] In October 2025, Mohammed VI acknowledged social grievances in a parliamentary address, urging reforms without ceding core prerogatives, highlighting the ongoing tension between incremental liberalization and calls for structural power redistribution.[168] These debates reflect a causal interplay where monarchical resilience, rooted in Sharifian legitimacy and coercive capacity, coexists with democratic facades that channel but do not fully satisfy public demands for accountability.[170]Rulers and Succession
Chronological List of Sultans and Kings
The Alaouite dynasty, ruling Morocco since the mid-17th century, produced a series of sultans who consolidated power after regional fragmentation, transitioning to kings following independence in 1956.[23][12] Early reigns involved civil strife and contested successions, particularly after the death of Sultan Ismail in 1727, leading to intermittent rule by multiple brothers until stabilization under Mohammed III in 1757.[23]| Ruler | Reign | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Moulay Al-Rashid | 1664–1672 | Founder; unified Morocco by capturing Fez (1666) and Marrakesh (1669); killed in accident.[23] |
| Ismail Ibn Sharif | 1672–1727 | Consolidated power after 1684; built extensive military including black slave guards; long reign marked by centralization efforts.[23][12] |
| Abu'l Abbas Ahmad II | 1727–1728; 1728–1729 | Son of Ismail; brief reigns interrupted by revolts; deposed multiple times.[23] |
| Abdallah bin Ismail as-Samin | 1729–1735; 1736; 1740–1745; 1745–1757 | Brother of Ismail; ruled in fragmented periods amid family conflicts.[23] |
| Mohammed III ben Abdallah | 1757–1790 | Stabilized dynasty; recognized U.S. independence (1777); expanded trade.[23] |
| Yazid | 1790–1792 | Son of Mohammed III; killed in civil war with claimants.[23] |
| Slimane (Sulaiman) | 1792–1822 | Focused on religious legitimacy; avoided expansionist wars.[23] |
| Abderrahmane (Abd al-Rahman) | 1822–1859 | Faced European pressures; defeated by France at Isly (1844); signed treaties.[23][12] |
| Mohammed IV | 1859–1873 | Continued defensive diplomacy amid Ottoman and European influences.[23] |
| Hassan I | 1873–1894 | Modernized army and administration; toured provinces to assert control.[23][12] |
| Abdelaziz (Abd al-Aziz) | 1894–1908 | Early reforms; deposed due to financial scandals and European interventions (Algeciras Act 1906).[23][12] |
| Abdelhafid (Abd al-Hafid) | 1908–1912 | Overthrew brother; abdicated after Fez uprising and Treaty of Fez establishing French protectorate.[23][12] |
| Yusef (Yusuf) | 1912–1927 | Ruled under French protectorate; suppressed revolts including Rif War.[23][12] |
| Mohammed V | 1927–1953; 1955–1961 | Exiled by French (1953–1955); led independence movement; became first King in 1957.[23][12] |
| Mohammed Ben Aarafa | 1953–1955 | Installed by French during Mohammed V's exile; abdicated amid nationalist unrest.[23][12] |
| Hassan II | 1961–1999 | Survived assassination attempts and coups; oversaw 1962 constitution; annexed Western Sahara (1975).[23][12] |
| Mohammed VI | 1999–present | Current King; initiated reforms including equity commission (2004); as of 2025, continues reign.[23][12] |