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Battle of Chunuk Bair
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"Chunuk Bair" redirects here. For the 1992 film, see Chunuk Bair (film).

Battle of Chunuk Bair
Part of the Gallipoli campaign of World War I

Turkish POWs being escorted in Chunuk Bair
Date7–19 August 1915
Location
Chunuk Bair, Gallipoli, Ottoman Empire
Result Ottoman victory
Belligerents

British Empire

Ottoman Empire

Commanders and leaders
British Empire Alexander Godley Ottoman Empire Mustafa Kemal Pasha (WIA)[1]
German Empire Hans Kannengießer (WIA)
Strength
15,000 men 19th Division
9th Division
(20,000–30,000 men)
Casualties and losses
12,000–13,000[2] 9,200[2]

The Battle of Chunuk Bair (Turkish: Conk Bayırı Muharebesi) was a World War I battle fought between the Ottoman defenders and troops of the British Empire over control of the peak in August 1915. The capture of Chunuk Bair, (Turkish: Çanak Bayır Basin Slope, now Conk Bayırı), the secondary peak of the Sari Bair range, was one of the two objectives of the Battle of Sari Bair.

British units that reached the summit of Chunuk Bair early on 8 August 1915 to engage the Turks were the Wellington Battalion of the New Zealand and Australian Division, 7th (Service) Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment; and 8th (Service) Battalion, Welch Regiment, both of the 13th (Western) Division. The troops were reinforced in the afternoon by two squads of the Auckland Mounted Rifles Regiment, also part of the New Zealand and Australian Division. The first troops on the summit were severely depleted by Ottoman return fire and were relieved at 10:30 pm on 8 August by the Otago Battalion (NZ), and the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment, New Zealand and Australian Division. The New Zealand troops were relieved by 8:00 pm on 9 August by the 6th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment, and 5th Battalion, Wiltshire Regiment, who were massacred and driven off the summit in the early morning of 10 August, by an Ottoman counter-attack led by Mustafa Kemal.

The British August Offensive at Anzac Cove and Suvla was an attempt to try to break the stalemate that the Gallipoli Campaign had become. The capture of Chunuk Bair was the only success for the Allies of the campaign but it was fleeting as the position proved untenable. The Ottomans recaptured the peak for good a few days later.

Background

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Main article: Order of battle for the Gallipoli Campaign

August offensive

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Main articles: Battle of Sari Bair, Battle of Krithia Vineyard, Battle of Lone Pine, Battle of the Nek, Battle of Scimitar Hill, and Battle of Hill 60 (Gallipoli)

The failure of the Allies to capture Krithia or make any progress on the Cape Helles front, led General Ian Hamilton, commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) to pursue a new plan to secure the Sari Bair Range and capture the high ground of Hill 971 and Chunuk Bair. Both sides had been reinforced, with Hamilton's original five divisions increased to 15 divisions and the six original Ottoman divisions having grown to a force of 16 divisions.[3] The British planned to land two fresh infantry divisions from IX Corps (Lieutenant-General Frederick Stopford), at Suvla, 5 miles (8.0 km) north of Anzac, followed by an advance on Sari Bair from the north-west to Hill 971.[4]

Prelude

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Anzac plan of attack

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At Anzac an offensive would be made against the Sari Bair range by the New Zealand and Australian Division (Major-General Alexander Godley) on the northern flank advancing through rough and thinly defended terrain north of the Anzac perimeter. The division had been reinforced with most of the 13th (Western) Division (Lieutenant-General F. C. Shaw), the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and the Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, to about 20,000 front-line infantry. The attack would be conducted by a Right Assaulting Column up Rhododendron Spur to Chunuk Bair and the Left Assaulting Column would divide at Aghyl Dere and half would advance across Damakjelik Spur and Azma Dere to the Abdul Rahman Spur and then attack Hill 971, the other part of the force would move to the right up Damakjelik Spur to Hill Q. To prevent delays, a Right Covering Force was to take Destroyer Hill, Table top, Old No 3 Post and Bauchop's Hill and the Left Covering Force was to reach Walden Point, cross Aghyl Dere and take Damakjelik Bair.[5]

After the covering forces had captured their objectives by 10:30 p.m. the attacking columns would advance at 10:30 p.m. to reach the ridge an hour before dawn. Once Hill Q and Hill 971 had been captured, the Left Assaulting Column was to dig in and the Right Assaulting Column would consolidate Chunuk Bair and capture Battleship Hill, assisted by dawn attacks on the Nek and Baby 700 from the Nek from Russell's Top, by dismounted Australian light horse from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, in concert with an attack on the summit of Chunuk Bair by soldiers from the New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Colonel Francis Johnston), who would traverse Rhododendron Spur, the Apex and the Farm. Hill 971 would be attacked by Gurkhas of the 29th Indian Brigade and Australians of the 4th Infantry Brigade.[6]

Ottoman defences

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The Ottoman senior commanders did not expect an attack at Chunuk Bair as it felt that the rugged terrain was unsuitable for an attack. However, the commanding officer of the section, Mustafa Kemal, commander of the Ottoman 19th Division, anticipated an attack. He felt that the peak of Chunuk Bair was especially vulnerable. He was unable to convince his superiors to significantly strengthen the defences.[7]

Battle

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Rhododendron Spur

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Battle of Sari Bair, showing the British attack, 6–8 August 1915

The approach to the peak was made along Rhododendron Spur, which ran from the beach to the peak of Chunuk Bair. The Ottomans had outposts at specific points along the spur: at the Table Top, Destroyer Hill and nearest the beach at Old No. 3 Outpost. There was also an Ottoman outpost on Bauchop's Hill to the north. All these outposts had to be cleared by the covering force, the four understrength regiments of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, before the main assault column could proceed up the spur to the summit.[8]

The Auckland Mounted Rifles cleared Old No. 3 Outpost and the Wellington Mounted Rifles took Destroyer Hill and the Table Top. The Otago Mounted Rifles and Canterbury Mounted Rifles captured Bauchop's Hill, which was named after the Otago's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Bauchop, who was killed during the attack.[8][9] The fighting was heavy as the Ottomans had several machine guns in positions and the trenches were well protected. Ottoman wounded and prisoners were bayoneted after the fighting was over. [10] In all the New Zealanders lost about 100 men in clearing the outposts. [citation needed] While the attack efforts were successful, the plan was now running two hours behind schedule, making it difficult to reach the summit before first light.[11]

The advance was initially made up the valleys, or deres, on either side of Rhododendron Spur and once past the Table Top, the New Zealanders climbed onto the ridge, leaving about 1,000 yards (910 m) to travel to the summit.[12]

The three battalions travelling along the north side of the spur were in position by 4:30 am, shortly before dawn. They advanced to a knoll dubbed "The Apex" which was only about 500 yards (460 m) from the summit where at the time there were only a handful of Ottoman infantry, about 20. [13] The Canterbury battalion on the south side of the spur was lost and delayed. Overall commander of the attack, Colonel Johnston, made the decision to wait for the last battalion to arrive before making the attack, disobeying original orders to not halt for any reason.[14]

The attack on Chunuk Bair was the main element in a wider offensive. At 4:30 am a supporting attack was planned at the Nek against Baby 700, intended to coincide with the New Zealanders attacking from Chunuk Bair down onto the rear of the Ottoman trenches on Battleship Hill. Despite the delay to the New Zealand attack, the Battle of the Nek went ahead nonetheless, with huge casualties.[13]

Chunuk Bair (Çanak Bayırı/Conk Bayırı)

[edit]
Assault on Chunuk Bair, 8 August

The opportunity for a swift victory at Chunuk Bair had been lost. With the failure of attack of the Nek and the realisation that Chunuk Bair was in danger of being overrun, the Ottomans reinforced the peak. At 7:30 am, the New Zealanders were just 500 yards (460 m) away from the summit, but Ottoman and German reinforcements started arriving in heavy numbers. The commander of the Ottoman 9th Division, German Lieutenant-Colonel Hans Kannengiesser, had reached the summit and was preparing its defence. Kemal, the Ottoman colonel who had warned of the possibility of an attack, arrived soon after Kannengiesser. He ordered several regiments to the area. By 10:00 am, the peaks had around 500 Ottoman reinforcements, whereas only hours ago, there had been just 20 sleeping soldiers.[15] However, these reinforcements were spotted by Australian artillery observers, who pinned down movements by the Ottomans, some of whom fled down from the summit to better cover.[16]

In daylight, after an exhausting climb and faced by stiffening opposition, the prospects for a New Zealand assault against the peak looked slim. Johnston requested to wait until nightfall. Nevertheless, General Godley ordered Johnston to attack.[17]

Two hundred yards beyond where the New Zealanders were positioned on the Apex was another knoll called "The Pinnacle" from which it was a straight climb to the summit. Off the side of the spur to the north was a small, sheltered plateau known as The Farm.[18]

Johnston told the Auckland battalion to attack and at 11:00 am, they did. About 100 made it as far as the Pinnacle, where they desperately tried to dig in. Around 300 fell as casualties between there and the Apex. Johnston told the Wellington battalion to continue the attack. The battalion's commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Malone refused, stating that he was not willing to order his men to carry out a hopeless attack. He said his battalion would take Chunuk Bair at night.[19]

In 2018 New Zealand military historian Ian McGibbon challenged the "myth" that Colonel Malone had refused a direct order to make a daytime attack, holding that Malone and Johnston both disagreed with Godley's order for the Auckland Battalion to attack in daylight, which dissention Johnston had reluctantly accepted. McGibbon said that the sole claim that Malone refused a direct order was made by NCO Charlie Clark in 1981. Malone had argued with a British officer, Major Arthur Temperley, who was Johnston's brigade major but junior to Malone.[20]

Two charges had been made before Godley finally called off the daytime attack. Hundreds of Anzacs lay dead and wounded before the peak.[21]

Godley spent the rest of the day of 7 August devising a plan for another attack. He sent up reinforcements including the British 13th (Western) Division; the 7th Battalion of The Gloucestershire Regiment and the pioneers of 8th Battalion, the Welch Regiment, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Bald. The Auckland and Canterbury Infantry Battalions were removed from the plan of attack. They were replaced by the Otago and Wellington Infantry Battalions, which would lead the new attack. A 45-minute naval bombardment would start at 3:30 the next morning.[22] Twelve machine guns would provide covering fire to the attacking forces.[23]

Following a naval bombardment of the peak and a delay, the Wellingtons, followed by the Gloucesters, reached Chunuk Bair virtually unopposed. The preceding barrage had driven most of the Ottoman defenders away as the ground was too hard and rocky for deep entrenchments.[24][25]

Chunuk Bair was hard to defend. It was only possible to scrape shallow trenches amongst the rocks, and the peak was exposed to fire from the main Ottoman line on Battleship Hill to the south and from Hill Q to the north. If the original plan for the offensive had worked, Hill Q would have been in Allied hands. Allanson's battalion of Gurkhas reached it briefly the following day but were in no position to offer relief to the troops on Chunuk Bair.

By 5:00 am, the Ottomans counter-attacked the Wellingtonians. The slope of the hill was so steep that the Ottomans could get within 22 yards (20 m) of the trenches without being seen. The New Zealanders fought desperately to hold off the Ottomans, firing their rifles and those of their fallen companions until the wood of the stock was too hot to touch. When the Ottomans got up to the trenches, the fighting continued with the bayonet. The Ottomans overran part of the New Zealand trench and took some prisoners. In full daylight, reinforcements were only reaching the summit at a trickle.

The fight raged all day until the trenches were clogged with the New Zealand dead. Around 5:00 pm, Malone was killed by a misdirected artillery shell, fired from either Anzac artillery or a British ship.

The Ottomans had reclaimed the east side of the summit and were reinforced by the arrival of the 8th Division from Helles. As the extent of the Allied offensive became apparent, General Otto Liman von Sanders, the commander of the Ottoman forces in the Dardanelles, appointed his most competent officer, Colonel Mustafa Kemal, the commander for the defence of Suvla and Sari Bair.

As darkness fell on the evening of 8 August, the fighting subsided and the Wellington Battalion was relieved. Out of the 760 men of the battalion who had reached the summit, 711 had become casualties. Whereas Malone had resisted sending his men on a suicidal charge when told to follow the Auckland Battalion on 7 August, a day later the outcome would be the same. The New Army battalions had also suffered greatly. There were 417 casualties amongst the Welch pioneers and 350 amongst the Gloucesters, including all the officers of the battalion. For the wounded, the suffering was only beginning. Some took three days to travel from the higher reaches of Rhododendron Spur to the beach, a little over a kilometre away.

The Farm

[edit]
British positions on 9 August

Godley remained at his headquarters near the beach, largely ignorant of the state of the fighting. His plan for 9 August was to take Hill Q. The main force for the assault was a brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Anthony Baldwin. Baldwin commanded the 38th Brigade of the 13th Division but the situation was so confused that the force he led towards Hill Q contained only one of his normal battalions, the 6th East Lancashires. He also had the 9th Worcestershires and 9th Warwicks from the 39th Brigade and the 5th Wiltshires from the 40th Brigade (who would later be redirected to reinforce Chunuk Bair). Plus he led two 10th (Irish) Division battalions; the 10th Hampshires and 6th Royal Irish Rifles from the 29th Brigade. Most of the 10th Division had landed at Suvla on 7 August.[26]

Battle of Sari Bair, showing the Turkish counter-attack, 9–10 August 1915

This force would climb to Hill Q from the Farm. At the same time, the New Zealanders on the right from Chunuk Bair and units of General Herbert Cox's Indian Brigade on the left would also attack the hill.[26] The plan failed when Baldwin's battalions became lost in the dark trying to find the Farm which they did not reach until after dawn, around 6:00 am. The only force to reach Hill Q was Allanson's battalion of Gurkhas. They suffered the same fate as Colonel Malone, shelled by their own artillery, and their stay on the hill was brief.[27]

With the offensive once again stalled, the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair had to endure another day of Ottoman harassment. As night fell the remaining New Zealanders moved back to the Apex and were replaced by two New Army battalions, the 6th Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment and some of the 5th Battalion of the Wiltshire Regiment from Baldwin's force.

On the morning of 10 August Mustafa Kemal led an overwhelming Ottoman counter-attack. If Chunuk Bair, the one Allied success of the August offensive, was recaptured, the battle was effectively over. His plan lacked subtlety but was brutally effective – overrun the defenders by sheer weight of numbers. Mustafa Kemal had stopped the advance of IX Corps at Suvla, with a counter-attack at dawn on 9 August and late in the day reconnoitred Chunuk Bair and planned an attack with six battalions.[28]

There were about 2,000 defenders on or below the summit of Chunuk Bair.[29] Baldwin's brigade at the Farm numbered a further 3,000. The Ottomans swept over the Lancashire battalion on the summit, few of whom survived (510 men were reported missing). The Wiltshires were unarmed and un-equipped and were scattered everywhere. On the right flank, the Ottomans captured the Pinnacle, driving the New Army troops before them. New Zealand machine gunners positioned at the Apex shot down the Ottomans as they tried to continue down the spur. The gunners could not discriminate friend from foe and killed many New Army troops who were amongst the charging Ottomans, as the Leinsters were rushed up to the Apex to reinforce. At the north side of Rhododendron Spur, the Ottomans descended from Chunuk Bair to the small plateau of the Farm and overran Baldwin's brigade, the Warwicks being almost annihilated, the 6th Royal Irish Rifles losing half its number and Baldwin being killed; the survivors retreating to Cheshire Ridge. The Turkish infantry were exhausted and fell back to the main ridge and the Farm plateau became part of no man's land.[30]

Aftermath

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Analysis

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The loss of Chunuk Bair marked the end of the Battle of Sari Bair. Fighting would continue elsewhere until August 29 but there would be no more attempts to capture the heights. The Apex formed the new front line on Rhododendron Spur. In 1919 burial teams found the Farm still covered in the bones of the men from Baldwin's brigade; their remains were interred in The Farm Commonwealth War Graves Commission Cemetery when it was constructed on the site after the Armistice.

Casualties

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Charles Bean, the Australian official historian, wrote that the Ottomans had 9,200 casualties in four days at Chunuk Bair and Hill 971, from 1,800–2,000 on the 19th Division sector around Baby 700 and the top of Monash Valley and 6,930 losses in the 16th Division, mainly at Lone Pine. The total of Ottoman casualties at Anzac was about 18,000 men and British casualties were 12,000–13,000 men.[2]

Commemoration

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A memorial arch, the Malone Memorial Gate, commemorating Lieutenant-Colonel Malone was constructed in Stratford, New Zealand in 1923 and a plaque unveiled in the New Zealand Parliament's Grand Hall in 2005.[31][32] A memorial to honour New Zealand soldiers who died in the campaign was unveiled on Chunuk Bair in May 1925.[33]

12 May 1925 – Unveiling of Chunuk Bair Memorial

Victoria Cross

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One Victoria Cross was awarded for actions at Chunuk Bair to Corporal Cyril Bassett, who repaired phone lines while under fire.[34]

[edit]

New Zealand writer Maurice Shadbolt produced a play Once on Chunuk Bair in 1982. A film version Chunuk Bair (Daybreak Pictures) was released in 1991. There is a detailed fictional description of the battle from the point of view of an Ottoman Turkish soldier in Birds Without Wings by Louis de Bernieres, author of Captain Corelli's Mandolin.

Once on Chunuk Bair was performed on the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Chunuk Bair in Christchurch, New Zealand. It was directed by Martin Howells. (see https://ww100.govt.nz/performance-of-'once-on-chunuk-bair'-christchurch Archived 8 April 2019 at the Wayback Machine)

Once on Chunuk Bair was performed on August 8th 2015, on the 100th anniversary of the battle, by the Mana Little Theatre in Plimmerton, Wellington to an audience composed largely of many Veterans. It was directed by Paulette McIndoe. The performance won (Wellington) Antoinette Awards for Best New Director (Paulette McIndoe), Best Drama, Best Set Design, Commendation for Best Supporting Actor (Craig Haywood as Sgt. Frank), Commendation for Best Ensemble, National Award: The David Brockett Award for Backstage Achievement Sue Miller for Costumes ( https://manalittletheatre.org.nz/awards/}} )

Composer Dwayne Bloomfield was in 2001 inspired by this battle to write the original work for brass band Behold the Narrows from the Hill describing the battle. This was the first of several brass band works he has composed commemorating the contributions of New Zealand and Australian forces to particular First World War battles.[35]

Musician PJ Harvey sings about the aftermath of this battle in the song "On Battleship Hill" from her 2011 album Let England Shake.

The Battle of Chunuk Bair was featured in the Gallipoli miniseries in 2015.

Footnotes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Battle of Chunuk Bair

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The Battle of Chunuk Bair was a pivotal and bloody engagement during the of , fought from 6 to 10 August 1915 on the northern Gallipoli Peninsula in the , where Allied forces—led primarily by troops of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade—attempted to seize and hold the strategic heights of Chunuk Bair from Ottoman defenders commanded by Mustafa Kemal in order to break the campaign's deadlock and facilitate advances toward . As part of the broader August Offensive, the battle aimed to outflank entrenched Ottoman positions along the Sari Bair range, with Chunuk Bair's summit offering a commanding view over the Strait and potential naval support for Allied ships. The advance began on the night of 6–7 August, as units, including the and Battalions supported by British and Indian troops, navigated treacherous terrain through gullies like Chailak Dere and Sazli Beit Dere, though delays and disorientation slowed progress. By dawn on 8 August, the Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone—numbering around 760 men—unexpectedly captured the summit with minimal initial opposition, establishing defensive positions amid exposed ridges. However, the position proved untenable without swift reinforcements, as Ottoman artillery and machine-gun fire from surrounding heights inflicted devastating casualties; by evening, only about 70 soldiers remained unwounded or lightly injured, and himself was killed by an Allied shell. On 9 August, British battalions attempted to relieve the exhausted but faltered under relentless Ottoman counterattacks, while Kemal, recognizing the threat, urgently repositioned his 19th Division to launch a coordinated . The climactic Turkish offensive on 10 August overwhelmed the Allied defenders, recapturing Chunuk Bair and forcing the survivors to withdraw to lower positions like The Apex, marking a significant Ottoman victory that solidified their control over the northern ridges. The battle resulted in heavy losses for the Allies, with the Wellington Battalion alone suffering approximately 690 casualties out of its engaged strength, contributing to the overall failure of the August Offensive and underscoring the campaign's grueling stalemate that ultimately led to the Allied evacuation in January 1916. Despite the defeat, the ' tenacious defense earned lasting recognition, symbolizing national resilience and the heavy toll of the Gallipoli theater, where Chunuk Bair remains a site of commemoration for the ANZAC legacy.

Background

Gallipoli Campaign Context

The Gallipoli Campaign originated as an Allied strategy during World War I to weaken the Ottoman Empire by forcing the Dardanelles Strait, thereby securing a sea route to supply Russia and potentially knocking the Ottomans out of the war through the capture of Constantinople. Conceived primarily by First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, the plan gained approval from the British War Council in early 1915, envisioning an initial naval operation to neutralize Ottoman fortifications along the strait. The broader objective was to alleviate pressure on the Eastern Front and open new fronts against the Central Powers, reflecting the Allies' search for alternatives to the entrenched Western Front. The naval phase commenced with Allied bombardment of the outer forts in February 1915, but the decisive attempt on 18 failed disastrously when Ottoman mines sank three battleships and damaged several others, compelling a shift to amphibious operations. Under the command of General Sir Ian Hamilton, the —comprising British, Australian, New Zealand, French, and Indian troops—launched landings on 25 April 1915 at in the south and to the north. These assaults aimed to secure beachheads for a swift advance inland but encountered immediate setbacks from rugged terrain, including steep ravines and cliffs, which funneled troops into vulnerable positions. Ottoman forces, bolstered by German military expertise, mounted fierce resistance that prevented any breakthrough, leading to a trench-bound stalemate by early May 1915 akin to the deadlock in and . Overall Ottoman command rested with German General , appointed to lead the Fifth Army defending the Gallipoli Peninsula, who reorganized defenses to emphasize and rapid reinforcements. Local Ottoman commanders, such as Esat Pasha of the III Corps, effectively coordinated responses, exploiting the Allies' supply difficulties and the peninsula's harsh conditions to maintain control over the high ground. This impasse prompted Allied planners to devise renewed offensives, including the August 1915 , to outflank entrenched positions and seize dominating ridges.

August Offensive

In mid-1915, the had reached a stalemate following the Allied landings in April, prompting General Sir Ian Hamilton, commander of the , to devise a comprehensive offensive to seize the strategic high ground. The plan, known as the August Offensive, aimed to break through Ottoman lines by coordinating simultaneous operations: a major north of by the British IX Corps to outflank Ottoman positions, and a breakout from the Anzac sector toward the Sari Bair range, a ridge of heights including Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Hill 971. Chunuk Bair was particularly vital, as its summit provided commanding views over the Strait, potentially enabling Allied artillery to control naval passage and support further advances toward . To distract Ottoman reserves and mask the main thrusts, Hamilton incorporated diversionary actions timed for 6 August 1915. At the southern end of the Anzac perimeter, Australian troops launched a fierce assault on Lone Pine, a fortified position on the 400 Plateau, intended to draw enemy reinforcements away from the Sari Bair sector and simulate a broader Anzac push. Concurrently, the Suvla Bay landing commenced under Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stopford's IX Corps, involving two British divisions and Australian engineers, with the objective of securing the beaches by nightfall on 6 August and advancing inland to capture the Anafarta Spur and Tekke Tepe heights by the following day, thereby linking with Anzac forces. These diversions were supported by a subsidiary attack at Krithia Vineyard in the Helles sector to further pin down Ottoman troops. The Anzac sector's advance relied on the Anzac Corps under Lieutenant General Sir , with Major General Sir Alexander Godley's New Zealand and Australian Division spearheading the assault on Sari Bair using three columns navigating treacherous ravines and spurs. However, coordination proved challenging due to the complex terrain, poor visibility at night, and communication breakdowns; for instance, the left assault column of British and Indian troops became disoriented and lost direction, while the right column, comprising the Infantry Brigade and an Indian mountain battery, failed to rendezvous effectively on Rhododendron Spur as planned. These issues stemmed from the ambitious scope of the operation, which required precise timing across fragmented units, exacerbating delays in the overall synchronization between Birdwood's corps-level oversight and Godley's divisional execution. Ottoman commanders, led by Liman von Sanders, responded swiftly to the diversions, redeploying reserves to counter the perceived threats. The Lone Pine attack initially succeeded in pulling Ottoman attention southward, prompting reinforcements to that sector, but intelligence allowed for rapid shifts northward; by dawn on 7 August, additional troops were bolstering defenses on Chunuk Bair and the Sari Bair range. Similarly, the Suvla landing triggered immediate Ottoman maneuvers, with reserves moved to the Tekke Tepe area to block the British advance, leveraging the element of forewarning from Allied preparations. These redeployments underscored the Ottomans' defensive flexibility on familiar ground.

Prelude

Allied Forces and Plan of Attack

The advance toward Chunuk Bair in the Anzac sector during the August Offensive was primarily conducted by the and Australian Division, commanded by Major-General . This division included the Mounted Rifles Brigade, comprising the Auckland, , , and Mounted Rifles regiments, which were tasked with initial assaults on key spurs like Bauchop's Hill and No. 2 Outpost to clear the path for the main infantry push. Supporting these efforts were elements of the Infantry Brigade, consisting of the , , , and Infantry Battalions, with the latter playing a pivotal role in the final assault on the hill. The (Maori) Contingent provided additional support in the advance through Sazli Beit Dere. Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone led the Battalion, emphasizing disciplined fire and defensive positioning in his command approach. Australian units, such as detachments from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, provided flanking support but were not central to the Chunuk Bair operation. The tactical plan, devised by Godley, centered on a coordinated night march to exploit the element of surprise and navigate the labyrinthine gullies of the Sari Bair range. Commencing after dusk on 6 August 1915, the advance divided into two main columns: the left column, led by the Mounted Rifles Brigade, proceeded through the Chailak Dere gully, while the right column, including the Infantry Brigade, followed the Sazli Beit Dere route. These paths were chosen to avoid detection and reach the foothills of the Sari Bair ridges—such as Rhododendron Spur—by dawn on 7 August, from where coordinated assaults would target Chunuk Bair and adjacent heights like Hill Q. The plan anticipated linking with the simultaneous to the north, forming a continuous Allied line across the peninsula. Logistical preparations were constrained by the unforgiving , which featured steep, scrub-covered slopes and narrow ravines that restricted movement to single file in places. Artillery support was minimal, relying on from naval guns offshore and a handful of mountain batteries positioned at , as field guns could not be manhandled up the heights effectively. Communication challenges arose from the absence of reliable lines, forcing dependence on runners and visual signals amid dust and poor visibility, which often delayed orders and coordination. and resupply was equally problematic, with troops carrying limited rations and facing in the summer heat, underscoring the plan's reliance on speed to minimize exposure. The primary objective was to capture Chunuk Bair, the dominant height on the Sari Bair range at approximately 240 meters elevation, to secure observation posts overlooking both Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay. This position would enable enfilade fire on Ottoman supply routes along the coast and facilitate the convergence of Allied forces from Suvla, potentially collapsing the central Gallipoli defenses and allowing a breakout from the entrenched stalemate.

Ottoman Defenses and Intelligence

The Ottoman defenses in the Sari Bair area during the August 1915 offensive were coordinated by the III Corps under Major General Esat Pasha, which included the 19th Division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Kemal. This corps had been tasked with securing the Anzac sector since the initial landings, with Kemal's division initially held in reserve near Bigalı before being redeployed to bolster positions along the Sari Bair and Chunuk Bair ridges after early detection of Allied preparations. Esat Pasha adjusted divisional boundaries to grant Kemal operational autonomy in the northern sector, reflecting the fluid command structure amid the peninsula's ongoing stalemate. Defensive fortifications were relatively sparse due to the rugged, steep terrain of the Sari Bair range, which limited large-scale construction and favored mobile outposts over fixed lines. Ottoman forces maintained light pickets on forward ridges such as Rhododendron Spur (known as Şahinsırtı), while the bulk of reserves concentrated in the Aghyl Dere valley for rapid response. These positions, supported by artillery from nearby Scrubby Knoll, emphasized observation and quick reinforcement rather than extensive entrenchments, allowing Ottoman troops to contest Allied advances through the narrow gullies and spurs. Ottoman intelligence efforts proved crucial in anticipating the Allied assault, with Mustafa Kemal's patrols playing a pivotal role in early detection. identified unusual Anzac movements signaling the onset of the main advance despite diversionary actions elsewhere. These observations enabled Kemal to alert higher command and initiate immediate countermeasures, drawing on his prior terrain knowledge from operations. This foresight facilitated rapid reinforcements, as Kemal repositioned elements of the 19th Division—including the 57th, 72nd, and 77th Regiments—from reserves to the threatened ridges, outpacing Allied progress through the dense scrub and ravines. Command dynamics highlighted Kemal's initiative, as he often acted independently, committing units without awaiting full approval from amid hesitations in the higher echelons over the scale of the threat. For instance, Kemal assumed unified control of the Anafartalar Group on 9 August, overriding delays proposed by subordinates to launch timely counter-maneuvers.

Battle

Initial Assaults: Rhododendron Spur

The initial assaults on Rhododendron Spur formed a critical preliminary phase of the broader Anzac plan to seize the high ground overlooking the Sari Bair range during the August Offensive at Gallipoli. On the evening of 6 August 1915, units, including elements of the Maori Contingent and the Auckland Mounted Rifles, commenced a challenging night march from No. 2 Outpost. The advance proceeded through steep and tangled gullies such as Sazli Beit Dere and Chailak Dere, where the rugged, uncharted terrain and heavy equipment loads caused significant disorientation in the pitch darkness. Ottoman outpost resistance added to the difficulties, with scattered enemy patrols and sentries complicating the silent infiltration. Around dawn on 7 August, the Maori Contingent and Auckland Mounted Rifles executed targeted strikes to secure forward positions on Rhododendron Spur. They overran Old No. 3 Outpost, surprising approximately 40 Ottoman troops in a swift action that minimized Allied casualties, before pushing on to capture the key outposts of Table Top and Chestnut Spur. These assaults relied on close-quarters combat, with s employed in fierce hand-to-hand fighting to clear entrenched positions; the Maori troops notably used a traditional chant to demoralize and dislodge defenders without extensive bayonet use in some instances. Ottoman reinforcements began arriving by first light, intensifying the skirmishes with rifle and machine-gun fire from higher ground. The troops faced severe environmental and logistical hardships during these opening engagements, including morning fog that obscured visibility, scorching heat that exacerbated exhaustion, and acute shortages of amid the arid . Ottoman artillery shelling further disrupted movements, littering the advance routes with casualties and forcing units to seek cover in hastily dug positions. By mid-morning, the had consolidated their gains on the captured spurs, establishing a tenuous foothold from which the summit of Chunuk Bair became visible for the first time on the northern skyline, offering a glimpse of the objective ahead.

Capture and Defense of Chunuk Bair

The assault on Chunuk Bair began on the night of 7 August 1915, as the Infantry Brigade, following initial advances along Rhododendron Spur, pushed toward the summit. Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone, commanding the Battalion of approximately 760 men, insisted on delaying the final advance until after dark to avoid devastating Ottoman fire, a decision that allowed his forces to move stealthily up the slopes despite navigational challenges and fatigue from the preceding day's exertions. By around 4 a.m. on 8 August, the troops reached the crest, finding it unexpectedly unoccupied by Ottoman defenders who had withdrawn under earlier Allied pressure, enabling a swift seizure of the position with minimal initial resistance. As dawn broke, Ottoman forces quickly reacted, opening fire from higher ground on Battleship Hill and Hill , exposing the to intense rifle, machine-gun, and artillery barrages across the barren, coverless summit. Malone tactically positioned his men in shallow trenches split between the forward and reverse slopes, utilizing the latter's natural protection from enfilading fire to repel probing attacks, while directing rapid volleys and defenses that conserved ammunition by having wounded soldiers assist in reloading. This reverse-slope strategy proved crucial in holding the line amid the exhaustion of troops who had marched and fought without rest, water, or substantial food for over 24 hours under relentless summer heat and dust. Ottoman counterattacks intensified throughout 8 August, with reinforcements from the 19th Division, including the 10th Regiment, assaulting the summit with massed rifle fire and charges aimed at dislodging the defenders. The , supported by limited naval gunfire from Allied ships, repelled these assaults through determined close-quarters fighting, though the lack of deep cover left them vulnerable to shrapnel and fire sweeping the exposed ridge. By late afternoon, was killed by an Allied artillery shell while coordinating from the reverse slope, exacerbating command strains as his battalion clung to the position amid mounting disarray from wounds and fatigue. During the night of 8 August, the depleted Wellington Battalion was relieved by the Otago Infantry Battalion and Wellington Mounted Rifles. The relieving faced heavy Ottoman attacks throughout 9 August, holding the position under intense fire but suffering further casualties from exhaustion, lack of supplies, and enfilading fire from adjacent heights. That night, they were in turn relieved by the British 6th Battalion (Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) and 5th Battalion (), but the handover occurred in darkness and confusion, with poor communication and unfamiliarity with the terrain leading to disorganized positioning and gaps in the defensive line. The British troops faced immediate pressure from continued Ottoman probes, compounded by the same environmental hardships of exposure to artillery and absence of prepared trenches. On 10 August, Kemal launched a renewed major counteroffensive at dawn, personally leading reserves in a coordinated assault featuring massed preparation followed by charges over the crest, exploiting the Allies' weakened and fatigued state after days without effective resupply or reinforcement. The defenders, now primarily British with scattered elements, endured the onslaught under withering fire, their positions further hampered by the rocky, shelterless terrain that offered no respite from the sun or shrapnel, ultimately unable to prevent the Ottoman forces from regaining control of the summit.

Attacks on The Farm and Hill Q

As part of the broader August Offensive, Allied forces launched supporting assaults on 8 August 1915 aimed at capturing Hill Q and The Farm to flank and reinforce the main effort at Chunuk Bair. The British 13th Division, newly landed at Suvla Bay, was tasked with advancing inland to seize these objectives and link up with Anzac troops, but progress was severely hampered by difficult terrain, including deep gullies and scrub-covered slopes, and intense Ottoman machine-gun fire from entrenched positions. Indian units from H. V. Cox's 29th Indian Brigade, including elements of the 14th and 6th Rifles, pushed northward from the Anzac sector toward Hill Q, but navigational disorientation in the darkness and rugged landscape delayed their advance, allowing Ottoman defenders to consolidate. On 9 August, renewed efforts focused on Hill Q, a key ridge immediately north of Chunuk Bair essential for securing the summit. A column led by Major Cecil J. L. Allanson of the 1/6th Rifles, augmented by stragglers from units, climbed the slopes and briefly captured the crest around midday, overlooking the vital Chunuk Bair position. However, without immediate reinforcements due to poor communication and exhaustion among supporting British battalions, the Gurkhas faced heavy Ottoman counterfire and were compelled to withdraw by evening after suffering significant casualties from both enemy action and mistaken friendly artillery shelling from HMS Bacchante. Concurrently, at The Farm—a small plateau along Abdul Rahman Bair serving as a en route to Chunuk Bair—the 38th of the 13th Division, comprising the 6th East Lancashire, 5th Wiltshire, 10th Hampshire, and 6th Royal Irish Rifles battalions under Brigadier General A. H. Baldwin, probed forward but stalled under enfilading machine-gun fire from Ottoman positions on nearby ridges. troops from the Mounted Rifles also conducted limited and skirmishes at The Farm, but these were repelled amid chaotic terrain and lack of artillery support. Coordination breakdowns exacerbated these failures, as the Suvla Bay landings by the British IX Corps on 6-7 August devolved into disarray due to command indecision under Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Stopford, preventing timely advances that could have enveloped Ottoman lines from the north. Ottoman reinforcements, directed by Colonel Mustafa Kemal who arrived late on 9 August to bolster defenses around Chunuk Bair and adjacent spurs, effectively sealed off The Farm and Hill Q; Kemal's 19th Division poured troops into the sector, using the natural barriers of the Sari Bair range to repel probes and launch local counterattacks. By 10 August, Ottoman forces under Kemal's overall influence had secured these flanks, launching a major dawn assault from Hill Q and Chunuk Bair that overwhelmed isolated Allied positions and isolated the exhausted defenders on the main summit. The inability to capture The Farm and Hill Q left Chunuk Bair vulnerable, contributing to its loss and the collapse of the offensive's northern thrust.

Aftermath

Immediate Consequences

On the morning of 10 August 1915, Ottoman forces under the command of Mustafa Kemal launched a powerful on Chunuk Bair, overwhelming the exhausted British defenders who had relieved the troops the previous day. Kemal's 57th Regiment, supported by reinforcements, exploited the Allies' fatigue and ammunition shortages, driving them from the summit in fierce hand-to-hand fighting and recapturing the key position by midday. This assault, characterized by bayonet charges due to the close proximity of trenches, marked the tactical collapse of the Allied hold on the ridge. In the ensuing chaos, Allied units conducted a hasty retreat, evacuating hundreds of wounded soldiers down treacherous slopes under heavy fire while consolidating at lower defensive lines like The Apex and Rhododendron Spur. The failure to maintain control of Chunuk Bair prevented the planned linkage between the Suvla Bay landings and the Anzac sector, isolating the new beachhead and exposing flanks to Ottoman artillery. Eyewitness reports from survivors depicted scenes of disarray, with men scrambling amid exploding shells and collapsing trenches; the earlier death of commander Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone on 8 August—killed by friendly artillery fire while directing defenses—had already weakened leadership cohesion during the initial defense. The recapture of Chunuk Bair halted the August Offensive's momentum, forcing Allied commanders to abandon further advances and entrench amid deteriorating conditions, including water shortages and disease. High command faced immediate recriminations: Lieutenant-General Frederick Stopford was relieved of his IX Corps command on 15 August for his indecisive orders at , which contributed to the operational disconnect, while Major-General drew sharp criticism from Australian and troops for the Anzac Corps' poorly coordinated assaults on the Sari Bair range. This tactical reversal entrenched a renewed stalemate, with both sides reverting to defensive postures along the Gallipoli front.

Strategic Analysis

The Battle of Chunuk Bair represented a critical juncture in the , where Allied strategic ambitions unraveled due to systemic failures in coordination and leadership. The August Offensive aimed to link the Suvla Bay landings with Anzac forces to seize high ground like Chunuk Bair, but poor synchronization between the two sectors prevented any decisive breakthrough. Sir Frederick Stopford's hesitant command at , where he ordered troops to entrench rather than advance aggressively, squandered initial gains and isolated Anzac efforts. Similarly, Alexander Godley's direction of the Anzac push toward Chunuk Bair suffered from inadequate preparation, with troops exhausting themselves in rugged terrain without timely reinforcement. General Sir Ian Hamilton, as overall commander, exacerbated these issues through indecisive oversight, failing to impose urgency on subordinates or integrate operations effectively. Inadequate artillery and naval support further compounded the debacle; limited heavy guns could not suppress Ottoman positions, and naval gunfire was curtailed by threats, leaving ground forces exposed. Ottoman successes at Chunuk Bair stemmed from proactive leadership and swift reinforcements, transforming a potential vulnerability into a defensive triumph. Kemal's initiative proved pivotal; without awaiting higher orders, he repositioned reserves to counter the Anzac assault, rallying troops with a famous exhortation to hold positions at all costs, even unto death. This rapid response, coupled with reinforcements from adjacent sectors, enabled Ottoman forces to recapture Chunuk Bair by August 10, 1915, halting the Allied advance. The battle served as a , bolstering Ottoman morale and reinforcing their resolve across the peninsula, as defenders viewed the repulse as divine validation of their against the invaders. Recent historiographical analyses since 2015 have debated the relative weight of versus command errors in the battle's outcome, while Ottoman perspectives emphasize inherent defensive strengths. Scholars highlight how the steep, labyrinthine ridges of Chunuk Bair amplified Allied coordination woes, turning a bold plan into a logistical nightmare, though they argue that resolute command could have mitigated these challenges. From the Ottoman viewpoint, the battle underscored the resilience of local defenses, rooted in intimate and cultural fortitude, rather than mere Allied blunders. These interpretations portray Chunuk Bair not just as a tactical loss for the Allies but as a showcase of Ottoman adaptability under pressure. In the long term, the failure at Chunuk Bair accelerated the Allies' decision to evacuate Gallipoli in December 1915, as the offensive's collapse eroded confidence in the campaign's viability and strained resources. The battle also elevated Kemal's reputation, marking him as a national hero whose leadership foreshadowed his role in founding modern .

Casualties and Losses

The Battle of Chunuk Bair resulted in heavy casualties for the Allied forces, totaling approximately 12,000–13,000 killed and wounded across the engagement from 7 to 10 August 1915. troops bore a disproportionate share, suffering around 2,800 casualties, with the Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiment alone recording 117 losses (38 killed and 79 wounded) during their 24-hour defense of the on 8 August. British units, particularly the 38th Brigade, incurred heavy casualties, including severe losses during counterattacks at The Farm and Hill Q on 9–10 August. Australian and Indian contingents, including elements of the 6th Battalion and 6th Gurkha Rifles, sustained roughly 2,000 casualties combined, with the Gurkhas reporting 204 losses in three days of fighting near the summit. The heaviest toll occurred on 7–8 August, when and British assaults on the led to over 4,000 Allied casualties in a single day, exacerbated by enfilading fire and friendly naval bombardment. Ottoman forces, primarily from the 19th Division under Mustafa Kemal, estimated 9,200 casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) over four days of fighting at Chunuk Bair and adjacent Hill 971, according to Australian official historian C.E.W. . These losses stemmed largely from repeated assaults to recapture the ridge, with incomplete Ottoman records likely underreporting the true figure due to chaotic logistics and high desertion rates in the summer heat. In comparison, the concurrent Allied diversion at Lone Pine cost about 2,000 casualties but inflicted heavier proportional Ottoman losses in trench fighting, highlighting the defensive advantages on Chunuk Bair's exposed slopes. Several environmental and logistical factors contributed to the high mortality rates among Allied troops, beyond direct combat. Prolonged exposure on the barren ridge without adequate cover led to severe sunburn, , and , as soldiers endured temperatures exceeding 35°C (95°F) with limited supplies—many carried only one canteen per man during the ascent. Poor evacuation routes across steep, shell-torn delayed medical aid, resulting in many wounded succumbing to blood loss or ; for instance, the Wellington Battalion's 690 casualties on 8 August included numerous deaths from unattended injuries after friendly shellfire struck their positions. These conditions amplified the battle's toll, with non-combat causes accounting for up to 20% of fatalities, straining the overall Gallipoli manpower by depleting experienced ANZAC units. The Allied medical response relied heavily on field ambulances, such as the No. 1 Field Ambulance stationed in Chailak Dere gully, which triaged and evacuated hundreds under fire but was overwhelmed by the volume—over 1,700 casualties processed in the first 48 hours alone. Stretcher-bearers faced immense risks navigating the rugged gullies, often taking hours to reach the beach for ship transfer, which contributed to higher mortality from shock and . This logistical burden reduced the effective fighting strength of the ANZAC by nearly 30% during the August Offensive, forcing reliance on undertrained reinforcements and underscoring the campaign's unsustainable human cost.

Legacy

Commemorations and Memorials

The Chunuk Bair (New Zealand) Memorial, located on the summit of Chunuk Bair in the Gallipoli Peninsula, is a tall stone pylon designed by New Zealand architect S. Hurst Seager and unveiled on 12 May 1925 by General Sir . It commemorates over 850 soldiers who died during the and related operations in the sector, many of whom have no known grave, including Lieutenant-Colonel William George Malone, commander of the Wellington Battalion who was on the hill. The inscription reads: "In honour of the soldiers of the 8th August 1915 'From the uttermost ends of the earth'." A dedicated Malone Memorial, in the form of an arch and gates at the entrance to King Edward Park in , honors 's leadership in capturing Chunuk Bair on 8 August 1915; it was constructed in 1923 and serves as the site for annual local remembrance services. On the Turkish side, the Conkbayırı Atatürk Victory Monument, erected in 1993 by the , features a large statue of and commemorates his command of the Ottoman counterattack that recaptured Chunuk Bair on 10 August 1915. Adjacent to the Memorial is the Chunuk Bair Mehmet Memorial, consisting of five stone monoliths noting approximately 9,200 Turkish and 12,000 Allied casualties from the battle. Annual Turkish ceremonies at Conkbayırı honor the 10 August events, emphasizing Atatürk's role in the defense. Other Allied commemorations include the Hill 60 Cemetery at the northern end of the former Anzac sector, which contains 788 graves of servicemen—primarily British, Australian, and —from the August 1915 offensives, with 712 unidentified burials managed by the . These sites integrate into broader observances on 25 April, where New Zealanders hold services at Chunuk Bair to remember the Gallipoli campaign's sacrifices. In 2025, marking the 110th anniversary of the battle, commemorations included services at the Chunuk Bair Memorial on 25 April, attended by and Australian defence personnel, and a wreath-laying ceremony at the Malone Memorial in Stratford on 8 August. Post-2015 developments during New Zealand's centenary program (WW100) featured joint New Zealand-Turkish commemorations, such as the 2015 event at Chunuk Bair attended by over 400 people, including New Zealand's and Turkish officials, highlighting themes of and shared history.

Awards and Honors

The only awarded in connection with the Battle of Chunuk Bair was given to Corporal Cyril Royston Bassett of the Divisional Signal Company for his actions on 7 August 1915. Bassett, along with two other signallers, laid and repeatedly repaired a vital telephone line from No. 2 Outpost to the newly established No. 3 Outpost on Chunuk Bair under intense rifle, machine-gun, and shell fire, enabling critical communication that helped maintain the position during the fierce fighting. His citation praised his "most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty," marking him as the first New Zealander to receive the VC in the First World War and the only one for the . Other Allied decorations recognized individual and unit bravery during the battle. New Zealand soldiers received several Distinguished Conduct Medals (DCMs), including to Frederick William Watson of the Auckland Infantry Battalion for conspicuous gallantry on 7 August while advancing on Chunuk Bair, where he displayed exceptional courage under fire. William Ricketts of the Wellington Mounted Rifles was awarded a DCM for his leadership and gallantry in the assault on Chunuk Bair. British units, such as the 6th Battalion and 6th Rifles, which reinforced and defended the crest after the , earned multiple Mentions in Despatches for their tenacious stand against Ottoman counterattacks from 9 to 10 August. Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone, commander of the Wellington Battalion who led the nighttime capture of Chunuk Bair on 8 August, received two posthumous Mentions in Despatches for his , though campaigns for a posthumous VC—citing his tactical skill in seizing and initially holding the vital height—emerged decades later but were deemed ineligible due to time constraints. On the Ottoman side, Mustafa Kemal, commander of the 19th Division, received recognition for his decisive role in repelling the Allied assault, including promotion to the rank of following his successful counterattacks that recaptured Chunuk Bair on 10 August 1915. Soldiers of the 19th Division were awarded the Harp Madalyası (War Medal, commonly known as the ), instituted by Sultan on 1 March 1915 for gallantry in combat, with widespread distribution to participants in the defensive stands at Chunuk Bair and surrounding ridges. Debates persist over the under-recognition of contributions to the battle in Allied awards, particularly compared to British and Australian honors, with critics arguing that the intense fighting and high casualties at Chunuk Bair—where bore the brunt of and defense—warranted more Victoria Crosses beyond , including for Malone's pivotal leadership. This perceived disparity has fueled ongoing discussions in New Zealand historical circles about the overshadowing of Kiwi valor in broader ANZAC narratives. The Battle of Chunuk Bair has been depicted in various literary works that capture survivor testimonies and national narratives. Maurice Shadbolt's 1988 book Voices of Gallipoli compiles oral histories from veterans, including detailed accounts of the Wellington Battalion's experiences at Chunuk Bair, highlighting the intense fighting and sense of abandonment by British command. In , the battle—known as Conk Bayırı Muharebesi—is frequently portrayed through the lens of Ottoman resilience and Kemal's leadership, emphasizing his role in the that secured , as explored in historical narratives like those in Gallipoli: The Turkish Story, which draws on Turkish survivor perspectives to underscore themes of heroism and defense. In film and television, the battle receives indirect but significant attention within broader Gallipoli depictions, often from an ANZAC viewpoint. Peter Weir's 1981 film Gallipoli focuses primarily on the April landing and the Battle of the Nek diversionary attack, which supported the August offensive toward Chunuk Bair, portraying the futility and tragedy of the campaign through young Australian and soldiers' eyes, though it prioritizes emotional impact over precise tactical details of the hill fighting. A more direct portrayal appears in the 1992 drama Chunuk Bair, adapted from Shadbolt's work, which dramatizes the Wellington Regiment's capture and defense of the ridge, critiquing British strategic failures while emphasizing Kiwi courage and the human cost, based on historical records for authenticity. Documentaries like the 2014 Australian series The War That Changed Us touch on the August offensives, including Chunuk Bair's role in shaping , through personal stories that blend historical footage with veteran reflections to convey the battle's lasting psychological impact. Theater provides a poignant stage for the battle's drama, particularly in New Zealand productions. Maurice Shadbolt's 1982 play Once on Chunuk Bair centers on the Wellington Battalion's desperate two-day hold on the summit, using dialogue drawn from soldier accounts to question imperial loyalties and the ANZAC myth of heroic sacrifice, staging the chaos of exposure to Ottoman fire and failed reinforcements as a national tragedy. The play, first performed at Auckland's , has been revived multiple times, influencing perceptions of the event as a for identity. Post-2015 media continues to explore the battle, often analyzing its place in . Video games such as Battlefield 1's 2017 Turning Tides DLC recreate aspects of the , including ridge assaults evocative of Chunuk Bair, allowing players to experience the terrain and multi-national combat from both Allied and Ottoman sides, though prioritizing gameplay over strict historical fidelity. Turkish cinema, like the 2012 film Çanakkale 1915, depicts the Ottoman defense and Kemal's pivotal counteroffensive at Conk Bayırı as a triumphant stand, framing the battle as a foundational moment of national rebirth with high production values and soldier-focused narratives. Scholarly analyses, such as those in theater critiques of Shadbolt's works, examine how Chunuk Bair representations contribute to ANZAC legend myth-making, portraying the hill's loss as a of futile bravery rather than strategic oversight, while Turkish views celebrate it as unyielding heroism.

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