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Illegal immigration
Illegal immigration
from Wikipedia

Illegal immigration is the migration of people into a country in violation of that country's immigration laws, or the continuous residence in a country without the legal right to do so. Illegal immigration tends to be financially upward, with migrants moving from poorer to richer countries.[1] Illegal residence in another country creates the risk of detention, deportation, and other imposed sanctions.[2]

Asylum seekers who are denied asylum may face impediment to expulsion if the home country refuses to receive the person or if new asylum evidence emerges after the decision. In some cases, these people are considered illegal aliens. In others, they may receive a temporary residence permit, for example regarding the principle of non-refoulement in the International Refugee Convention. The European Court of Human Rights, referring to the European Convention on Human Rights, has shown in a number of indicative judgments that there are enforcement barriers to expulsion to certain countries, for example, due to the risk of torture.[3]

Terminology

[edit]

In Europe, the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) launched its international "Words Matter"[4] campaign in 2014 to promote the use of the terms undocumented or irregular migrants instead of illegal.[5][6][7][8] Depending on jurisdiction, culture, or context, alternatives to illegal aliens or illegal immigrants can include irregular migrants, undocumented immigrants, undocumented persons, and unauthorized immigrants.[9][10][11][12]

In some contexts the term illegal immigrants is shortened, often pejoratively,[13] to illegals.[14][15][16]

Irregular migration is a related term that is sometimes used, e.g. by the International Organization for Migration; however, because of the word migration, this term describes a somewhat wider concept, including illegal emigration.[10]

News media

[edit]

Some news associations have in their style guide discontinued or discouraged the term illegal immigrant, except in quotations. These organizations presently include the Associated Press (US),[17] Press Association (UK), European Journalism Observatory,[18] European Journalism Centre,[19] Association of European Journalists, Australian Press Council,[20] and Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (AU).[21] Most commonly they use the alternative term, undocumented immigrant. Related terms that describe actions are not similarly discouraged. For example, the Associated Press continues to use the term illegal immigration, whereby illegal describes the action rather than the person.[17]

On the other hand, The New York Times said described undocumented immigrant as a "term preferred by many immigrants and their advocates, but it has a flavor of euphemism and should be used with caution outside the quotation".[9] Newsweek questions the use of the phrase undocumented immigrants as a method of euphemistic framing, namely, "a psychological technique that can influence the perception of social phenomena".[22] Newsweek also suggests that persons who enter a country unlawfully cannot be entirely "undocumented", as they "just lack the certain specific documents for legal residency and employment", while "[m]any have driver's licences, debit cards, library cards, and school identifications which are useful documents in specific contexts but not nearly so much for immigration".[22] For example, in the US, youths brought into the country illegally are granted access to public K-12 education and benefits regardless of citizenship status;[23] therefore the youths are not entirely undocumented, since they are documented for educational purposes.

American government

[edit]

Title 8 of the US Code is the portion of United States law that contains legislation on citizenship, nationality, and immigration. Defining the legal term alien as "any person, not a citizen or national of the United States",[12] The terminology used in Title 8 includes illegal alien (33 times), unauthorized alien (21 times), undocumented alien (18 times), illegal immigrant (6 times), undocumented person (2 times), and others.[11] An analysis by PolitiFact, however, concluded that the term illegal alien "occurs scarcely, often undefined or part of an introductory title or limited to apply to certain individuals convicted of felonies".[24]

In the United States, while overstaying a visa is a civil violation handled by the immigration court, entering (including re-entering) the US without approval from an immigration officer is a crime; specifically a misdemeanor on the first offense. Illegal reentry after deportation is a felony offense. This is the distinction between the larger group referred to as unauthorized immigrants and the smaller subgroup referred to as criminal immigrants.[25][failed verification]

Democratic Senator and Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has spoken out against the term undocumented, stating that "Illegal immigration is wrong – plain and simple" and that proponents of the term were "not serious" about combatting illegal immigration.[26]

During president Joe Biden's term, government websites used the term "non-citizen" instead of "alien", although this was reverted in January 2025.[27]

Canadian government

[edit]
An asylum seeker that has illegally crossed from the United States to Canada is being detained.

In Canada, as in the US, illegal immigrant is a commonly used term. However, there is confusion and deep dissent among many about what the term means under the law and what circumstances, and what it implies socially.[28] Irregular is a term used by government authorities to refer to migrants who enter Canada outside of official border crossings ("points of entry"). Entrance into Canada outside of a POE is considered unlawful, but not a criminal offence, or a civil offence under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27.[29]

The Government of Canada[30] and the Immigration and Refugee Board use the term irregular to refer to these crossings.[31] The Liberal Party of Canada and the New Democratic Party typically use the term irregular, while the Conservative Party of Canada typically uses the term illegal.[32] The use of the term undocumented is increasingly prevalent among individual MPs and MLAs in Canada, and was also used in a NDP policy document[33] as well as by Ontario NDP leader Andrea Horwath in a 2018 platform document.[34] Conservative MP Dave Epp referred to "undocumented workers" in a 2020 interview with the CBC wherein he called for an end to the use of contract migrant labour by Canadian agriculture businesses, in part because many such workers are undocumented and therefore vulnerable to exploitation and unsafe working conditions.[35]

Reasons for illegal immigration

[edit]

Poverty

[edit]

Some examples do show that increases in poverty, especially when associated with immediate crises, can increase the likelihood of illegal migration. The 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, after the start of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), was associated with widespread poverty and a lower valuation for the peso relative to the dollar.[36] It also marked the start of a massive swell in Mexican immigration, in which net illegal migration to the U.S. increased every year from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s.

There are also examples where natural disasters and population growth can amplify poverty-driven migration flows.[37]

Gender violence

[edit]

Many leave their country fleeing gender-based violence, such as honor crime or forced marriage, especially from conflicts area.[38] Women in illegal situations are especially at risk of sexual exploitation or rape.

Family reunification

[edit]

Some illegal immigrants seek to live with relatives who already live in a country that they are not allowed to enter, such as a spouse or other family members.[39][40][41]

Having a family who has immigrated or being from a community with many immigrants is a much better predictor of one's choice to immigrate than poverty.[42] Family reunification visas may be applied for by legal residents or naturalized citizens to bring their family members into a destination state legally, but these visas may be limited in number and subject to yearly quotas. This may result in family members entering illegally to reunify. From studying Mexican migration patterns, Douglas Massey finds that the likelihood that a Mexican national will emigrate illegally to the US increases dramatically if they have one or more family members already residing in the United States, legally or illegally.[43]

Asylum

[edit]
Arrested refugees/immigrants in Fylakio detention centre, Evros, northern Greece

Unauthorised arrival into another country may be prompted by the need to escape civil war or repression in the country of origin. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights upheld by the United Nations guarantees the right of asylum,[44] and as such, asylum seekers are typically treated differently from undocumented immigrants. In practice, however, many asylum seekers are subjected to exceedingly long waiting periods, isolated and unsafe detention facilities, and a high probability of being denied. This has led some authors to suggest that the ideal of asylum has eroded in recent years in the Global North.[45][46]

According to the 1951 Refugee Convention refugees should be exempted from immigration laws and should expect protection from the country they entered.[47]

Deprivation of citizenship

[edit]

In a 2012 news story, the CSM reported, "The estimated 750,000 Rohingya, one of the most miserable and oppressed minorities in the world, are deeply resentful of their almost complete absence of civil rights in Myanmar. In 1982, the military junta stripped the Rohingya of their Myanmar citizenship, classing them as illegal immigrants and rendering them stateless."[48]

In some countries, people born on national territory (henceforth not "immigrants") do not automatically obtain the nationality of their birthplace, and may have no legal title of residency.[49]

Persecution

[edit]

With a pattern of persecution of Christians in Iran, Iranian converts to Christianity from Islam face the death penalty.[50][51] Peyman Malaz, chief operating officer of the PARS Equality Center, noted that "Those who arrive at the [Mexico–United States] border are often the most persecuted and desperate, such as Iranian Christians".[50] Matthew Soerens, U.S. Director of Church Mobilization for World Relief, noted that in 2024, "30,000 of the 100,000 refugees resettled in the U.S. were Christians fleeing persecution."[51]

If deported back to Iran, converts to Christianity from Islam face the death penalty given the pattern of persecution of Christians there.[50][51]

Education

[edit]

Families want to have better lives for their children and to succeed. The article "Learning to be Illegal" discusses the safety the children have in K-12 schooling. The children are guaranteed education in a safe environment.[23]

Effects of illegal immigration

[edit]

Aside from illegal immigration status, illegal immigration is related to other effects.[52]

Illegal employment

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Illegal employment of aliens[53] has been found to be enabled by low employer sanctions and rare law enforcement in particular for subcontractors and gig economy.[54][55] The search for employment is central to illegal international migration.[56]

Exploitation of labour

[edit]

Illegal employment makes it easier for corporations to take advantage of wage labour. If an employer does not maintain proper safety standards, refuses to pay, or creates overall precarious working conditions, looking for remedies or redress would also mean the risk of having to disclose illegal immigration status.[57] Employers sometimes pay less than the legal minimum wage or have unsafe working conditions, relying on the reluctance of illegal workers to report the violations to the authorities.[58] Another consequence on labor is the lack of regulations and fairness programs leading to an increased barrier to employment for women[59] or handicapped persons. Unfair and unjust, the exploitation of undocumented immigrants' labor can go unpunished.[60]

According to data from the U.S. Census Bureau, undocumented immigrants in the United States often work in dangerous industries such as agriculture and construction.[61] A recent study suggests that the complex web of consequences resulting from illegal immigrant status limits illegal workers' ability to stay safe at work.[62] In addition to physical danger at work, the choice to immigrate for work often entails work-induced lifestyle factors which impact the physical, mental and social health of immigrants and their families.[63]

Slavery

[edit]

Research at San Diego State University estimates that there are 2.4 million victims of human trafficking among illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States.[64] Some workers are smuggled into the United States and Canada by human traffickers.[65]

People have been kidnapped or tricked into slavery to work as laborers, after entering the country, for example in factories. Those trafficked in this manner often face additional barriers to escaping slavery, since their status as undocumented immigrants makes it difficult for them to gain access to help or services. For example, Burmese women trafficked into Thailand and forced to work in factories or as prostitutes may not speak the language and may be vulnerable to abuse by police due to their undocumented immigrant status.[66]

Sexual exploitation

[edit]

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, Western Europe is being confronted with a serious problem related to the sexual exploitation of undocumented immigrants (especially from Eastern Europe), for prostitution.[67]

In the United States, human trafficking victims often pass through the porous border with Mexico. To curb the spread of sex slavery and other predation on unauthorized immigrants, then California Attorney General Kamala Harris and Mexico Attorney General Marisela Morales Ibáñez signed an accord in 2012 to expand prosecutions of criminals typically members of transnational gangs who engage in the trafficking of human beings between the two countries.[68]

Economy and labor market

[edit]

Research on the economic effects of illegal immigration is scant, but existing studies suggest that the effects can be positive for the native population,[69][70] and for public coffers.[71][72] One 2015 study states that, "increasing deportation rates and tightening border control weakens low-skilled labor markets, increasing unemployment of native low-skilled workers. Legalization, instead, decreases the unemployment rate of low-skilled natives and increases income per native." This is because the presence of illegal immigrants reduces the labor costs of employers, providing them more opportunities to create more jobs.[73]

A 2013 study by the liberal think tank Center for American Progress found that granting citizenship to people who immigrated illegally would boost the U.S. economy: doing so would raise the incomes of illegal immigrants by a quarter (increasing U.S. GDP by approximately $1.4 trillion over a 10-years);[74] a 2016 study found that "legalization would increase the economic contribution of the unauthorized population by about 20%, to 3.6% of private-sector GDP";[75] and a 2019 working paper by the University of Cyprus found that "all types of immigrants generate a larger surplus to US firms than natives do".[76]

According to economist George Borjas, immigrants may have caused the decline of real wages of US workers without a high school degree by 9% between 1980 and 2000 due to increased competition.[77] Other economists, such as Gordon Hanson, criticized these findings.[78] Douglas Massey argues that developed countries need unskilled immigrant labor to fill undesirable jobs, which citizens do not seek regardless of wages.[43] Massey argues that this may refute claims that undocumented immigrants are "lowering wages" or stealing jobs from native-born workers and that it instead shows that undocumented immigrants "take jobs that no one else wants".[43]

A paper by Spanish economists found that, upon granting work permits to the undocumented immigrant population in Spain, the fiscal revenues increased by around €4,189 per newly legalized immigrant.[72] The paper found that the wages of the immigrants increased after receiving work permits. At the same time, some low-skilled natives had worse labor market outcomes and high-skilled natives had improved labor market outcomes.[72]

Since the decline of working-class blue-collar jobs in manufacturing and industry, younger native-born generations have acquired higher education. In the US, only 12% of the labor force has less than a high school education, but 70% of illegal workers from Mexico lack a high school degree.[78]

Support for this claim can be seen in a Pew Hispanic Center poll of over 3,000 undocumented immigrants from Mexico in the US, which found that 79% would voluntarily join a temporary worker program that allowed them to work legally for several years but then required them to leave.[42] From this, it is assumed that the willingness to take undesirable jobs is what gives undocumented immigrants their employment.[43] Evidence for this may be seen in the average wages of illegal day laborers in California, which was between $10 and $12 per hour according to a 2005 study, higher than many entry-level white-collar or service jobs.[79]

Research[which?] indicates that the advantage to firms employing undocumented immigrants increases as more firms in the industry do so, further increases with the breadth[clarification needed] of a firm's market, and also with the labor intensity of the firm's production process. However, the advantage decreases with the skill level of the firm's workers, meaning that illegal immigrants do not provide as much competitive advantage when a high-skilled workforce is required.[80]

Lack of access to services

[edit]

Illegal immigrants usually have no or very limited access to public health systems, proper housing, education and banks. For instance, the current international human rights framework stipulates in various documents that the right to health and access to healthcare is fundamental and independent of a person's legal status. However, on a domestic level, many States in Europe have established the right to health as a welfare right, making it subject to citizenship or other administrative requirements.[81] Whether it's due to the danger behind disclosing their status or because of the inherently unfair social infrastructures, these barriers are present in all types of services, from social security to health.

Incentivising dangerous migration routes

[edit]
Migrant family freighthopping in southern Mexico from Central America

Each year there are several hundred deaths along the Mexico–United States border[82] of immigrants crossing the border illegally. Death by exposure occurs in the deserts of Southwestern United States during the hot summer season.[83] In 2016 there were approximately 8,000 migrant deaths, with about 63% of deaths occurring within the Mediterranean.[84]

In some regions, people that are still en route to their destination country are also sometimes kidnapped, for example for ransom. In some instances, they are also tortured, raped, and killed if the requested ransom does not arrive. One case in point is the Eritrean migrants that are en route to Israel. A large number of them are captured in North Sinai (Egypt) and Eastern Sudan and held in the buildings in North Sinai.[85][86]

Methods

[edit]

Illegal border crossing

[edit]
Border patrol at sea by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
HMC Vigilant, one of several customs cutters of the UK Border Force, and capable of speeds up to 26 knots, departing Portsmouth Naval Base

Immigrants from countries that do not have automatic visa agreements, or who would not otherwise qualify for a visa, often cross the borders illegally in some areas such as the Mexico–United States border, the Mona Channel between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, the Strait of Gibraltar, Fuerteventura, and the Strait of Otranto. Because these methods are illegal, they are often dangerous. Would-be immigrants have been known to suffocate in shipping containers,[87] boxcars,[88] and trucks,[89] sink in shipwrecks caused by unseaworthy vessels, die of dehydration[90] or exposure during long walks without water. An official estimate puts the number of people who died in illegal crossings across the U.S.–Mexican border between 1998 and 2004 at 1,954 (see Migrant deaths along the Mexico–United States border).

Human smuggling is the practice of intermediaries aiding undocumented immigrants in crossing over international borders for financial gain, often in large groups. Human smuggling differs from but is sometimes associated with human trafficking. A human smuggler will facilitate illegal entry into a country for a fee, but on arrival at their destination, the smuggled person is usually free. Trafficking involves a process of using physical force, fraud, or deception to obtain and transport people.

Types of notorious human smugglers include Snakehead gangs present in mainland China (especially in Fujian) that smuggle laborers into Pacific Rim states (making Chinatowns frequent centers of illegal immigration) and "coyotes", who smuggle undocumented immigrants to the Southwestern United States and have been known to abuse or even kill their passengers.[91]

Overstaying visa

[edit]

Many undocumented immigrants are migrants who originally arrive in a country lawfully but overstay their authorized residence (overstaying a visa).[92][93] For example, most of the estimated 200,000 illegal immigrants in Canada (perhaps as high as 500,000) are refugee claimants whose refugee applications were rejected but who have not yet been expelled from the country.[94]

Another example is formed by children of foreigners born in countries observing jus soli ('right of territory'), such as was the case in France until 1994[95] and in Ireland until 2005.[96] In these countries, it was possible to obtain French or Irish nationality (respectively) solely by being born in France before 1994 or in Ireland before 2005[96] (respectively). At present, a French born child of foreign parents does not automatically obtain French nationality until residency duration conditions are met.[92] Since 1 January 2005, a child born in Ireland does not automatically acquire Irish nationality unless certain conditions are met.[96]

Sham marriages

[edit]

Some people enter into sham marriages, whereby marriage is contracted into for purely immigration advantage by a couple who are not in a genuine relationship. Common reasons for sham marriages are to gain immigration (i.e., immigration fraud),[97][98] residency, work, or citizenship rights for one or both of the spouses or other benefits.

In the United Kingdom, those who arrange, participate in, or officiate over a sham marriage may be charged with several offenses, including assisting unlawful immigration and conspiracy to facilitate a breach of immigration law.[99]

The United States has a penalty of a $250,000 fine and five-year prison sentence for such arrangements.[100] The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Justice Department say that they do not have accurate numbers on the rate of attempted marriage fraud.[101] In the 2009 fiscal year, 506 (0.2%) of the 241,154 petitions filed were denied for suspected fraud; 7% were denied on other grounds.[102]

By country or region

[edit]

Africa

[edit]

Angola

[edit]

In 2007 around 44,000 Congolese were forced to leave Angola.[103] Since 2004, more than 400,000 illegal immigrants, almost all from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have been expelled from Angola.[104][105]

South Africa

[edit]

No accurate estimates of the number of illegal migrants living in South Africa exist.[106] Estimates that have been published vary widely. A 1996 Human Sciences Research Council study estimated that there were between 2.5 million and 4.1 million illegal migrants in the country. In their 2008–09 annual report, the South African Police Service stated, "According to various estimates, the number of undocumented immigrants in South Africa may vary between three and six million people." Other estimates have put the figure as high as 10 million.[107] As of April 2015, Statistics South Africa's official estimate is between 500,000 and one million undocumented migrants.[108] A large number of Zimbabweans have fled to South Africa as a result of instability in Zimbabwe, with many living as illegal migrants in South Africa.[106][107][109] Sociologist Alice Bloch notes that migrants in South Africa have been the victims of xenophobia and violence, regardless of their immigration status.[109]

South to East Asia

[edit]

Bangladesh

[edit]

In 2018, there were 1.1 million illegal Rohingya Muslims in Bangladesh.[110]

There are about 1.2 million Indians living in Bangladesh illegally as of 2014.[111][112] By contrast, there are at least 20 million Bangladeshi illegal immigrants (20–40 times more) living in India,[113] making India the country with the largest number of illegal immigrants in the world.[114]

There is a significant number of Burmese illegal immigrants in Bangladesh. As of 2012, the Bangladesh government estimated about 500,000 illegal Burmese immigrants living across Bangladesh.[115]

Bhutan

[edit]

Immigration in Bhutan by Nepalese settlers (Lhotshampa) began slowly towards the end of the 19th century. The government passed the Bhutanese Citizenship Act 1985 to clarify and try to enforce the Bhutanese Citizenship Act 1958 to control the flood of illegal immigration. Those individuals who could not provide proof of residency prior to 1958 were adjudged to be undocumented immigrants. In 1991 and 1992, Bhutan expelled roughly 139,110 ethnic Nepalis, most of whom have been living in seven refugee camps in eastern Nepal ever since. The United States has offered to resettle 60,000 of the 107,000 Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese origin now living in U.N. refugee camps in Nepal. The Bhutanese government, even today, has not been able to sort out the problem of giving citizenship to those people who are married to Bhutanese, although they have been in the country for 40 years.[116]

India

[edit]
ABVP against Bangladeshi undocumented immigrants

It is estimated that several tens of millions of illegal immigrants live in India. Precise figures are not available, but the numbers run in tens of millions, at least 10 million are from Bangladesh, others being from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and others.[117] According to the Government of India, there are at least 20 million illegal immigrants from Bangladesh alone.[113] This makes India the country with the largest number of illegal immigrants in the world.[114] During the Bangladesh Liberation War, at least 10 million Bangladeshis crossed into India illegally to seek refuge from widespread rape and genocide.[118] According to Indian Home Ministry, at least 1.4 million Bangladeshi crossed over into India in the last decade alone.[118] Samir Guha Roy of the Indian Statistical Institute states that internal migration is sometimes falsely thought to be immigrants. An analysis of the numbers by Roy revealed that on average around 91,000 Bangladeshi nationals might have crossed over to India every year during the years 1981–1991, thus, close to a million in a decade alone. How many of them were identified and pushed back is not known. It is possible that some of these illegal immigrants returned on their own.[119]

According to a pro-Indian scholar, the trip to India from Bangladesh is one of the cheapest in the world, with a trip costing around Rs. 2000 (around $30 US), which includes the fee for the "Tour Operator". As Bangladeshis are culturally similar to the Bengali people in India, they are able to pass off as Indian citizens and settle down in any part of India to establish a future,[118] for a very small price. This false identity can be bolstered with false documentation available for as little as Rs. 200 ($3 US) can even make them part of the vote bank.[119]

India is constructing barriers on its eastern borders to combat the surge of migrants. The Indo-Bangladeshi barrier is 4,000 km (2,500 mi) long. Presently, India is constructing a fence along the border to restrict illegal traffic from Bangladesh.[120] This obstruction will virtually isolate Bangladesh from India. The barrier's plan is based on the designs of the Israeli West Bank barrier and will be 3.6 m (11.8 ft) high. The stated aim of the fence is to stop infiltration of terrorists, prevent smuggling, and end illegal immigration from Bangladesh.[121][122]

Malaysia

[edit]

There are an estimated 800,000 illegal immigrants in Malaysia.[123] In January 2009, Malaysia banned the hiring of foreign workers in factories, stores and restaurants to protect its citizens from mass unemployment amid the late 2000s recession.[124] An ethnic Indian Malaysian was recently sentenced to whipping and 10 months in prison for hiring six illegal immigrants at his restaurant. "I think that after this, Malaysian employers will be afraid to take in foreign workers (without work permits). They will think twice", said immigration department prosecutor Azlan Abdul Latiff. "This is the first case where an employer is being sentenced to caning", he said. Illegal immigrants also face caning before being deported.[125]

Pakistan

[edit]

As of 2005, 2.1% of the population of Pakistan had foreign origins, however the number of immigrants population in Pakistan recently grew sharply. Immigrants from South Asia make up a growing proportion of immigrants in Pakistan. The five largest immigrant groups in Pakistan are in turn Afghans,[126] Bangladeshis,[127] Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Iranians, Indians, Sri Lankan, Burmese,[128][129] and Britons,[130] including a sizeable number of those of Pakistani origin. Other significant expatriate communities in the country are Armenians, Australians, Turks, Chinese,[131] Americans,[132] Filipinos,[133] Bosnians,[134] and many others.

Philippines

[edit]

It was estimated by Teresita Ang-See, a prominent leader and activist of the Chinese Filipino community, that by 2007, as many as 100,000 illegal immigrants from mainland China are living in the Philippines, a tenth of the ethnic Chinese population. The latest influx has come in part because of Manila's move in 2005 to liberalise entry procedures for Chinese tourists and investors, a move that helped triple the number of Chinese visitors to 133,000 the prior year. Many of the new Chinese immigrants encounter hostility from many Filipinos, including Filipino-born Chinese, for being perceived as engaging in criminal activities and fraud,[135] to being of unruly behaviour.[136][137]

South Korea

[edit]

According to the Republic of Korea Immigration Service, as of 31 December 2014, there were 208,778 illegal immigrants, which is 11.6% of 1,797,618 total foreign nationals who resided in South Korea. Most illegal immigrants in South Korea are Asian. The top 10 home countries of those illegal immigrants all came from other Asian countries with China at number 1 followed by Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Mongolia, Indonesia, Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia.[138]

Other countries

[edit]

Americas

[edit]

Brazil

[edit]

Brazil has long been part of international migration routes. In 2009, the government estimated the number of illegal immigrants at about 200,000 people; a Catholic charity working with immigrants said there were 600,000 illegal immigrants (75,000 of whom were from Bolivia). That same year, the National Congress of Brazil approved an amnesty, opening a six-month window for all foreigners to seek legalization irrespective of their previous standing before the law. Brazil last legalized all immigrants in 1998; bilateral deals, one of which promoted the legalization of all reciprocal immigrants with Bolivia to date, signed in 2005, are also common.[143]

Illegal immigrants in Brazil enjoy the same legal privileges as native Brazilians regarding access to social services such as public education and the Brazilian public healthcare system.[143] A Federal Police operation investigated Chinese immigrants who traveled through six countries before arriving in São Paulo to work under substandard conditions in the textile industry.[144]

An October 2009 piece from O Globo, quoting a UNDP study, estimates the number of illegal immigrants at 0.7 million,[145] and points out to a recent wave of xenophobia among the general populace.[146]

Canada

[edit]

There is no credible information available on illegal immigration in Canada. Estimates range between 35,000 and 120,000 illegal immigrants in Canada.[147] James Bissett, a former head of the Canadian Immigration Service, has suggested that the lack of any credible refugee screening process, combined with a high likelihood of ignoring any deportation orders, has resulted in tens of thousands of outstanding warrants for the arrest of rejected refugee claimants, with little attempt at enforcement.[148] Refugee claimants in Canada do not have to attempt re-entry to learn the status of their claim. A 2008 report by the Auditor General Sheila Fraser stated that Canada has lost track of as many as 41,000 illegal immigrants.[149][150] This number was predicted to increase drastically with the expiration of temporary employer work permits issued in 2007 and 2008, which were not renewed in many cases because of the shortage of work due to the recession.[151]

Mexico

[edit]

In the first six months of 2005, more than 120,000 people from Central America were deported, as compared to 2002, when for the entire year, only 130,000 were deported.[152] People of Han Chinese origin pay about $5,500 to smugglers to be taken to Mexico from Hong Kong. It is estimated that 2.4% of rejections for work permits in Mexico correspond to Chinese citizens.[153] In a 2010 news story, USA Today reported, "... Mexico's Arizona-style law requires local police to check IDs. And Mexican police freely engage in racial profiling and routinely harass Central American migrants, say immigration activists."[154]

Many women from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Central and South America take jobs at table dance establishments in large cities. The National Institute of Migration (INM) in Mexico raids strip clubs and deport foreigners who work without proper documentation.[155] In 2004, the INM deported 188,000 people at a cost of US$10 million.[156]

In September 2007, Mexican President Calderón harshly criticized the United States government for the crackdown on illegal immigrants, saying it has led to the persecution of immigrant workers without visas. "I have said that Mexico does not stop at its border, that wherever there is a Mexican, there is Mexico", he said.[157] However, Mexico has also deported US citizens, deporting 2,000 cases in 2015 and 1,243 in 2014.[158]

Illegal immigration of Cubans through Cancún tripled from 2004 to 2006.[159] In October 2008, Mexico tightened its immigration rules and agreed to deport Cubans who use the country as an entry point to the US. It also criticized US policy that generally allows Cubans who reach US territory to stay. Cuban Foreign Minister said the Cuban-Mexican agreement would lead to "the immense majority of Cubans being repatriated".[160]

United States

[edit]
History of immigration enforcement actions, raw numbers as reported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security[161]
As a percent of US population, recent figures for enforcement actions are similar to those in several past decades.[162]
As a proportion of U.S. population, nationwide border encounters have varied substantially over the decades.[163]

Approximately 11 million illegal immigrants were estimated to be living in the United States in 2006.[164] The Pew Hispanic Center estimated that this peaked at 12 million in March 2007 and declined to 11 million again in March 2009.[165] The majority of the illegal immigrants are from Mexico.[166]

The issue of illegal immigration has long been controversial in the United States. In 2007, President George W. Bush called for Congress to endorse his guest worker proposal, stating that illegal immigrants took jobs that Americans would not take.[167]

The Pew Hispanic Center notes that while the number of legal immigrants arriving has not varied substantially since the 1980s, the number of illegal immigrants has increased dramatically and, since the mid-1990s, has surpassed the number of legal immigrants.[168] Penalties for employers of illegal immigrants, of $2,000–$10,000 and up to six months' imprisonment,[169] go largely unenforced.

Political groups such as Americans for Legal Immigration have formed to demand the enforcement of immigration laws and secure borders. ALIPAC has also called for "safe departure" border checkpoints, free of criminal checks.[170]

In a 2011 news story, the Los Angeles Times reported,

...illegal immigrants in 2010 were parents of 5.5 million children, 4.5 million of whom were born in the U.S. and are citizens. Because illegal immigrants are younger and more likely to be married, they represented a disproportionate share of births—8% of the babies born in the U.S. between March 2009 and March 2010 were to at least one illegal immigrant parent.[171]

Immigration from Mexico to the United States has slowed in recent years.[172] This has been attributed to the slowing of the U.S. economy, the buildup in security along the border and increased violence on the Mexican side of the Mexico–United States border.[173]

In 2016, the Library of Congress announced it would substitute "noncitizens" and "unauthorized immigration" for "illegal aliens" as a bibliographic retrieval term, saying the once common phrase had become offensive, and was not precise.[174] However, the change was suspended and the heading "illegal aliens" remains in use.[175]

In 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions instructed the US attorneys' offices not to use the term "undocumented immigrants", but to instead refer to people as "illegal aliens".[176]

Other countries

[edit]
  • Venezuela: an estimated 200,000 Colombians fled the Colombian conflict and sought safety in Venezuela. Most of them lacked identity documents, which hampered their access to services, as well as to the labor market. The Venezuelan government has no specific policies on refugees.[177][178] A much greater number of Venezuelans entered Colombia trying to escape from the political, economic and humanitarian crisis in the 21st century, especially during the last five to 10 years.[179][180]
  • Chile: Chile has recently become a new pole of attraction for illegal immigrants, mostly from neighboring Peru and Bolivia but also Ecuador, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Cuba, Venezuela and Haiti. According to the 2002 national census, Chile's foreign-born foreign population has increased by 75% since 1992.[181]
  • Dominican Republic: the Dominican Republic is a nation that shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. An estimated 1,000,000 Haitians live and work in the Dominican Republic, which has a total population of about ten million. The percentage of Haitians that have illegally immigrated to the Dominican Republic is not accurately known, and "many Dominicans have come to resent the influx of lower-paid workers from across the border and have sought to make their country less hospitable to noncitizens"[182] (see also Haitians in the Dominican Republic).

Eurasia and Oceania

[edit]

Australia

[edit]
Anarchist protest in Australia with banner reading "no one is illegal"

On 1 June 2013, the Migration Amendment (Reform of Employer Sanctions) Act 2013 commenced. This new law puts the onus on businesses to ensure that their employees maintain the necessary work entitlements in Australia. The new legislation also enables the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship to levy infringement notices against the business (AUD $15,300) and individual (AUD $3,060) employers on a strict liability basis—meaning that there is no requirement to prove fault, negligence or intention.[183][184]

Russia

[edit]

Russia experiences a constant flow of immigration. On average, 200,000 legal immigrants enter the country every year; about half are ethnic Russians from other republics of the former Soviet Union. There are an estimated 10–12 million foreigners working in the country without legal permission to be there.[185] There has been a significant influx of ethnic Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Tajiks, and Uzbeks into large Russian cities in recent years, which has been viewed very unfavorably by many citizens and contributed to nationalist sentiments.[186][187]

Many immigrant ethnic groups have much higher birth rates than native Russians, further shifting the balance. Some Chinese flee the overpopulation and birth control regulations of their home country and settle in the Far East and southern Siberia. Russia's main Pacific port and naval base of Vladivostok, once closed to foreigners, today is bristling with Chinese markets, restaurants and trade houses.[188]

Illegal border crossing is considered a crime, and captured illegal border crossers have been sentenced to prison terms. For example, Rossiyskaya Gazeta reported in October 2008 the case of a North Korean who was detained after illegally crossing the Amur River from China. Considered by Russian authorities an "economic migrant", he was sentenced to 6 months in prison and was to be deported to the country of his nationality after serving his sentence, although he may now risk an even heavier penalty there. That was just one of the 26 cases year-to-date of illegal entrants, of various nationalities, receiving criminal punishment in Amur Oblast.[189]

Turkey

[edit]

Turkey receives many economic migrants from nearby countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, but also from North Caucasus, Central Asia, West Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.[190] The Iraq War is thought to have increased the flow of illegal immigration into Turkey, and the global parties directly involved in the conflict have been accused of extending a less-helping hand than Turkey itself to resolve the precarious situation of immigrants stranded in the passage.[191]

Europe

[edit]
Eurostat: Non-EU citizens found to be illegally present in the EU-28 and EFTA, 2015

The Schengen Area is a multilateral agreement between 27 states in which they in most cases abolish the border control among themselves. These states include most of the EU countries, as well as the EEC countries Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. Any person who is physically inside any of the Schengen states will usually be able to travel to any other Schengen state without hindrance from the law enforcement, even if he or she has no legal right to enter another Schengen Area member state. A person who wishes to immigrate illegally to a Schengen Area member state may therefore find it more practical to enter it through another member state. According to a BBC report from 2012, over 80% of illegal immigrants entering the European Union pass through Greece.[192]

EU countries that are not members of the Schengen Agreement are still committed to allow lawful entry by citizens of EU countries;[193] they may however exercise border control at their discretion.

Migrants along the Balkan route crossing from Serbia into Hungary, 24 August 2015

Citizens within The EU is an economic and political partnership between 28 European countries that together cover much of the European continent.[194] A citizen of an EU member state has the right to seek employment within any other member state.[195] The Schengen Agreement does not regulate treatment of persons who enter the Schengen Area illegally. This is therefore left to the individual states, and other applicable international treaties and European case law. Illegal immigration to Schengen and to Europe in general was increasing sharply since approximately early 2014.[196]

France

[edit]

Children born to noncitizens in France are not immigrants themselves, but they are considered foreigners under French law, until they reach the age of 18, at which time they automatically become citizens.[197] French citizenship is based in the idea of political unity; therefore, French citizenship may be more accessible than other EU countries, such as Germany and the UK. However, many French citizens feel that those who gain French citizenship should conform to the cultural aspects of French life.[198]

There were between 890,000 and 1.2 million illegal immigrants in France.[199]

French law prohibits anyone from assisting or trying to assist "the entry of a foreigner in France" (except for a non-EU national, entering in metropolitan France illegally from the territory of a Schengen country),[200] which enabled them to harass activists helping refugees[201]

Hungary

[edit]
The Hungarian–Serbian border fence

In 2014, Hungary registered 43,000 asylum seekers and 80,000 up to July 2015.[202] In the summer of 2015, Hungary started building a 4m high fence along its 175 km border to neighbouring Serbia to keep out the tens of thousands illegal immigrants from the Middle East and migrants trying to reach the European Union.[203] The border was sealed on 15 September 2015 and the fence was the following day attacked by refugees and defended by riot police.[204]

With the Hungary-Serbia border closed, migrants then started heading to Croatia, but as Croatia led the migrants to the Hungary-Croatia border, Hungary then started the construction of a second fence along its border with Croatia on 18 September 2015.[202]

United Kingdom

[edit]

Many try to cross the English Channel from Calais to seek asylum or refugee status in the United Kingdom.[205] Truck drivers can be fined up to €2,500 if illegal immigrants are found on board.[199] The Home Office has its agents working alongside French police and immigration agents, to prevent unauthorized people from entering the zone. An area of Calais known as "Camp de la Lande" had a police raid in September 2009 to control illegal immigration.[205] The French also try to stop illegal immigrants from entering France from the southern part of the country.[206]

In 1986, an Iranian man was sent back to Paris, from London, as he was unable to present any ID to British immigration officers. He stayed at the airport for nearly twenty years and his story loosely inspired a film, The Terminal.[207]

As of 2009 there were between 550,000 and 950,000 illegal immigrants in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is a difficult country to reach as it is mostly located on one island and part of another, but traffickers in Calais, France, have tried to smuggle illegal immigrants into the UK. Many illegal immigrants come from Africa and Asia. As of 2008 there were also many from Eastern Europe and Latin America having overstayed their visas.[208][209]

A 2012 study carried out by the University of Oxford's Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) has estimated that there were 120,000 illegal migrant children in the UK, of whom 65,000 were born in the UK to parents without legal status. According to the study these children are at risk of destitution, exploitation and social exclusion because of contradictory and frequently changing rules and regulations which jeopardize their access to healthcare, education, protection by the police and other public services.[210]

The Home Office estimated that 4,000 to 10,000 applications a year to stay in the UK are made on the basis of a sham marriage.[211] Many undocumented immigrants or asylum seekers have tried to enter the UK from France, by hiding inside trucks or trains.[212]

On 11 August 2020, the Government of the United Kingdom and France worked together on a single channel to finalize a new plan for blocking illegal migrant route. Many of the migrants who aimed to emigrate to the United Kingdom came from Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria and countries in Africa, fleeing poverty, persecution or war.[213]

Other countries

[edit]
  • Bulgaria: in 2013, 11,000 persons attempted to enter Bulgaria via its border with Turkey.[214] Their aim is not believed by Bulgarian border officials to remain in Bulgaria, but to go to other European countries.[214] In November 2013, Bulgaria started building a razor wire fence on its Turkey border, which was completed in 2015.[214]
  • Germany: the number of irregular immigrants caught in Germany was 42,478 in 2018 and 40,610 in 2019 according to the Federal Police.[215] The numbers rose sharply with the Russian invasion of Ukraine from 57,637 entries in 2021 to 91,986 in 2022.[216]
  • Italy: in November 2023, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and her Albanian counterpart Edi Rama signed an agreement to relocate migrants to Albania, a deal criticized by human rights organizations. Italy plans to construct two detention centres in Albania which would initially house 3,000 individuals upon opening in late 2024, but could process up to 36,000 people annually once fully operational. Meloni has previously threatened immediate deportation of migrants, which is not allowed within the EU, and Albania's position outside the EU is viewed as significant in light of this. In response the European Commission requested further details on the arrangement for scrutiny.[217]
  • Norway: the number of illegal immigrants in Norway was estimated to roughly 20 thousand in 2009,[218] and to between 18 and 56 thousand in 2017.[219] Estimates by organizations working with illegal migrants are much lower, between 5 thousand and 10 thousand in 2011.[220]
  • Switzerland: it is estimated that at least 100,000 individuals reside in Switzerland without being registered with the authorities and thus are considered illegal immigrants by the state. Many are also workers, employed as nannies, labourers on farms or construction sites, as well as waiters or kitchen or other ancillary staff in the restaurant and hotel industry.[221]

Middle East

[edit]

Iran

[edit]

Since late April 2007, the Iranian government has forcibly deported back Afghans living and working in Iran to Afghanistan at a rate between 250,000 and 300,000 per year. The forceful evictions of the refugees, who lived in Iran and Pakistan for nearly three decades, are part of the two countries' larger plans to repatriate all Afghan refugees within a few years. Iran said that it would send 1,000,000 by March 2008, and Pakistan announced that all 2,400,000 Afghan refugees, most living in camps, must return home by 2009. Aimal Khan, a political analyst at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad said it would be "disastrous" for Afghanistan.[222][223][224]

Iran plans to remove two million undocumented Afghan migrants by March 2025, with authorities reporting a rise in arrests and voluntary returns. The government is under pressure to manage immigration enforcement while addressing the needs of its undocumented population.[225] Later reports claimed that Iran's mass evacuation of Afghans from Iran aims to expel 4 million refugees all together.[226]

Israel

[edit]
Demonstration against the expulsion of undocumented immigrants and their families from Israel, Tel Aviv, 2009

Tens of thousands of migrants, mostly from Sudan and Eritrea, had crossed the Israeli border between 2009 and 2012.[227] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said that, "This phenomenon is very grave and threatens the social fabric of society, our national security and our national identity."[228] In May 2012, Israel introduced a law which would allow illegal immigrants to be detained for up to three years, a measure that the Interior Ministry intended to stem the flow of Africans entering Israel across the desert border with Egypt.[227] As a result, completing a barrier along the border with Egypt, illegal immigration from Africa decreased by over 99%.[229]

Israel faces substantial (estimated at 40,000 in 2009)[230] illegal immigration of Arab workers from the Palestinian Authority territories, a migration that includes both workers seeking employment, and homosexuals escaping the social opprobrium of Arab society.[231][232][233][230][234]

Thousands of foreign workers who entered the country on temporary visas have overstayed and live illegally in Israel.[235] There is a debate within Israel as to whether the Israel-born children of foreign workers should be allowed to remain in the country.[236]

Libya

[edit]

Before the Libyan civil war, Libya was home to a large population of illegal immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, numbering as much as 2,000,000.[237] The mass expulsion plan to summarily deport all illegally residing foreigners was announced by then-current Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi in January 2008, "No resident without a legal visa will be excluded."[238][239]

Saudi Arabia

[edit]

In 2004, Saudi Arabia began construction of a Saudi–Yemen barrier between its territory and Yemen to prevent the unauthorized movement of people and goods into and out of the Kingdom. Anthony H. Cordesman labeled it a "separation barrier".[240] In February 2004, The Guardian reported that Yemeni opposition newspapers likened the barrier to the Israeli West Bank barrier,[241] while The Independent wrote, "Saudi Arabia, one of the most vocal critics in the Arab world of Israel's 'security fence' in the West Bank, is quietly emulating the Israeli example by erecting a barrier along its porous border with Yemen."[242] Saudi officials rejected the comparison saying it was built to prevent infiltration and smuggling.[241]

Syria

[edit]

Since the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, there are more refugees from Iraq. The United Nations estimates that nearly 2,200,000 Iraqis have fled the country since 2003,[243] with nearly 100,000 fleeing to Syria and Jordan each month.[244][245] Most ventured to Jordan and Syria, creating demographic shifts that have worried both governments. Refugees are mired in poverty as they are generally barred from working in their host countries.[246][247]

Syrian authorities worried that the new influx of refugees would limit the country's resources. Sources such as oil, heat, water and electricity were said to be becoming scarcer as demand were rising.[248] On 1 October 2007, news agencies reported that Syria reimposed restrictions on Iraqi refugees, as stated by a spokesperson for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Under Syria's new rules, only Iraqi merchants, businessmen and university professors with visas acquired from Syrian embassies may enter Syria.[249][250][251]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Illegal immigration is the unauthorized entry of foreign nationals into a sovereign country or their continued residence therein after violating the terms of legal admission, such as by overstaying visas or evading border controls. This phenomenon spans continents, driven primarily by stark economic disparities between origin and destination countries, where prospective migrants seek higher wages and opportunities unavailable domestically, compounded by push factors like , political , and demographic pressures in sending nations. In major receiving nations like the United States, the unauthorized population reached an estimated record 14 million in 2023, predominantly from Latin America, though recent policy shifts have prompted declines through enhanced enforcement and voluntary departures. Economic analyses reveal mixed effects, with unauthorized workers filling low-skill labor gaps but exerting downward pressure on wages for native low-skilled laborers and imposing net fiscal costs via public services exceeding tax contributions, particularly at state and local levels. Security concerns persist, as unvetted entrants facilitate risks including elevated incarceration rates for certain offenses among unauthorized cohorts compared to natives in some jurisdictions, alongside associations with transnational crime networks. Debates center on enforcement efficacy—ranging from border barriers and deportations to interior attrition—versus regularization proposals, which critics argue incentivize further violations by signaling lax consequences, while empirical data underscores that restricted legal pathways correlate with sustained illegal flows. Despite institutional tendencies in academia and media to minimize adverse outcomes, rigorous studies affirm that illegal immigration challenges national sovereignty, resource allocation, and social cohesion by bypassing merit-based selection inherent to legal systems.

Core Definitions and Terminology

Illegal immigration refers to the entry into or residence within a sovereign nation by foreign nationals in violation of that nation's laws, encompassing both unauthorized crossings and the failure to depart after legal authorization expires. This includes actions such as evading inspection at ports of entry or overstaying visas, which constitute breaches of statutory requirements for admission and stay. , for instance, improper entry is codified as a under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, applying to aliens who enter at non-designated times or places or elude examination. Core terminology distinguishes precise legal statuses from descriptive euphemisms. An "illegal immigrant" or "unauthorized alien" denotes a non-citizen lacking lawful permission to enter or remain, a status enforced through national statutes rather than international conventions. This contrasts with "undocumented immigrant," a term sometimes used to highlight absence of papers but which critics argue softens the illegality of the presence by implying mere administrative oversight rather than deliberate violation. Visa overstays, comprising a significant portion of unauthorized populations—estimated at 40-50% in the U.S.—involve nonimmigrants who remain beyond their admitted period, triggering accrual of unlawful presence but typically treated as a civil infraction rather than a criminal entry offense. Other terms include "irregular migration," often employed in multilateral contexts to describe non-standard entries without emphasizing criminality, though it aligns with unauthorized flows breaching host-country rules. Unlawful presence accrues daily after overstay or unlawful entry, leading to bars on reentry (e.g., three or ten years under U.S. law) and distinguishing it from or pending applications that may suspend penalties. These definitions prioritize legal authorization over humanitarian framing, as national sovereignty dictates entry controls absent binding global mandates. Illegal immigration fundamentally differs from legal migration in that it entails crossing borders or remaining in a without from the receiving state's authorities, often through clandestine means, visa overstays, or evasion of inspection procedures. In contrast, legal migration requires compliance with predefined criteria, such as obtaining visas for work, study, , or investment, which involve vetting for eligibility, , risks, and economic contributions, typically administered via quotas or caps to manage inflows. This structured process ensures migrants contribute to host societies under regulated terms, whereas unauthorized entrants bypass these safeguards, imposing unvetted costs on public services and labor markets without reciprocal obligations. Asylum claims introduce a distinct legal pathway under international instruments like the 1951 Refugee Convention, allowing individuals to seek protection from persecution based on race, , , political opinion, or membership, regardless of entry method. However, asylum seekers who enter irregularly—such as without visas or inspection—commit an initial unlawful act under national immigration laws, though many jurisdictions, including the , permit claims to proceed with temporary protections against during . This creates a practical overlap: while genuine qualify for status upon proving a well-founded , the system's permissiveness enables economic migrants to exploit asylum filings as a regularization mechanism, delaying removal and granting work authorization in some cases. Empirical evidence underscores this distinction's fragility, with global and national approval rates revealing that most claims fail to meet thresholds, indicating widespread misuse for non-refugee motives like economic opportunity. In the United States, asylum grant rates hovered around 14% for all decisions in fiscal year 2023, with only 54,350 principal applicants approved amid hundreds of thousands of filings, many from low-risk nationalities. Similarly, data for 2024 showed recognition rates below 20% for over half of applicant nationalities in early trends, reflecting patterns where safe-country origin or lack of individualized evidence leads to denials. These low outcomes, coupled with surges in claims from stable economies rather than war zones, support analyses that asylum processes have become loopholes for irregular economic inflows, straining resources without fulfilling humanitarian intent. International law recognizes the sovereign right of states to control their borders and determine conditions for entry, residence, and expulsion of non-nationals, with no binding obligation to admit migrants absent specific status. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), in Article 13, guarantees the right to leave any country and return to one's own but imposes no reciprocal right to enter foreign territory, leaving such decisions to national discretion. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), ratified by 173 states as of 2023, similarly protects within a state and the right to emigrate but explicitly subjects entry into other states to that state's laws under Article 12(3). These instruments underscore that unauthorized entry—crossing borders without valid permission or overstaying legal authorization—constitutes a violation of the receiving state's , not an internationally protected act. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol establish protections against refoulement for individuals fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, social group, or political opinion, but these apply narrowly to recognized refugees and do not legitimize irregular entry by economic migrants or others lacking such status. As of 2023, 146 states are parties to the Convention, yet it permits states to designate points of entry and penalize illegal crossings outside asylum procedures, provided claims are processed fairly. The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990), ratified by 59 states including and the but notably not by major destination countries like the or most EU members, addresses treatment of documented migrants but grants no right to irregular migration and defers to state on admissions. Non-binding frameworks, such as the 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration endorsed by 152 UN members, reaffirm state prerogative over migration policy while encouraging cooperation on irregular flows, without creating enforceable entry rights. Nationally, illegal immigration is codified as a criminal or administrative offense in virtually all countries, with penalties escalating based on , involvement, or risks. In the United States, Title 8 U.S. Code § 1325, enacted in 1952 and amended subsequently, criminalizes "improper entry by alien"—entering at non-designated points or eluding inspection—as a punishable by up to 6 months imprisonment and fines for first offenses, rising to status with up to 2 years for reentries after . Over 400,000 such prosecutions occurred between 2008 and 2018, primarily along the southern border. In the , the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC), implemented by all 27 member states by 2012, mandates identification, voluntary departure periods, and removal for third-country nationals staying illegally, with member-specific penalties like Germany's (§ 95), which fines up to €5,000 or imprisons for , or France's (Article R. 622-1), imposing up to 1 year imprisonment and €3,750 fines. data show 596,000 non-EU citizens ordered to leave the EU in 2022 for irregular status, though enforcement varies due to practical challenges. These frameworks prioritize border integrity while balancing humanitarian obligations, though critics note inconsistent application amid high irregular flows, as states retain unilateral authority under .

Historical Context

Origins and Early Regulations

The concept of illegal arose in the late as modern nation-states implemented the first comprehensive border controls to regulate entry based on national sovereignty, shifting from largely unrestricted movement to enforced distinctions between authorized and unauthorized migrants. Prior to this era, population flows across territories were governed by local customs, vagrancy laws, or practical barriers rather than centralized statutes, with no systematic federal prohibitions on entry in places like the early . In the U.S., the federal government encouraged until concerns over labor competition, , and prompted initial restrictions. The marked the ' first restrictive federal immigration law, prohibiting the importation of Chinese women for prostitution and extending bans to convicts and other "undesirables," thereby criminalizing the facilitation of such entries and laying groundwork for deportation of prohibited persons. This was rapidly followed by the of 1882, which barred virtually all Chinese laborers—a racially targeted measure driven by economic and anti-Asian sentiment—while also excluding paupers, those with contagious diseases, and others deemed likely to become public charges, and authorizing federal officials to inspect and exclude arrivals at s. These laws introduced rudimentary enforcement mechanisms, including port inspections and the ability to return excluded individuals at the expense of shipping companies, though interior enforcement remained limited without dedicated border agencies. Similar developments occurred in , where the United Kingdom's Aliens Act of 1905 established the first modern immigration controls by empowering officials to deny entry to "undesirable" aliens—primarily targeting impoverished Jewish refugees from fleeing pogroms—and allowing for their if deemed a burden on the state or involved in crime. The Act required registration of aliens and reflected anxieties over urban poverty and foreign influences, though exemptions were made for genuine refugees, marking an early tension between exclusion and humanitarian considerations. Globally, these pioneering regulations emphasized qualitative exclusions based on , , and , setting precedents for quota systems and formalized penalties for that would evolve in the , while enforcement relied heavily on port-based inspections rather than land border patrols.

Post-World War II Expansion

After , economic reconstruction in and created acute labor shortages, drawing migrants from poorer regions and former colonies, often through temporary guest worker schemes that blurred lines between legal and unauthorized entry. In the United States, the continuation of the (initiated in 1942 and expanded post-1945) legally admitted over 4.6 million Mexican workers by 1964 to fill agricultural needs, yet it coincided with a surge in illegal border crossings as employers sought cheaper, unregulated labor and enforcement lagged. A 1946 Immigration and Naturalization Service report documented a "massive increase" in illegal entries, prompting heightened border patrols but failing to stem the flow, with estimates of several hundred thousand undocumented Mexicans residing in the country by the early 1950s. This expansion was driven by postwar prosperity and weak interior enforcement, as numerical quotas from the 1920s National Origins Act capped legal immigration at around 150,000 annually, diverting pressure toward clandestine routes. In response to growing public concern over unauthorized workers competing for jobs, the U.S. launched in June 1954, a coordinated effort by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that apprehended and repatriated over 1.1 million individuals, primarily from the Southwest, though official figures were later revised downward amid claims of exaggeration for political effect. Despite such crackdowns, illegal immigration persisted and expanded through the 1960s and 1970s, fueled by the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act's preferences, which prioritized non-quota visas but inadvertently encouraged chain migration and overstays. By the 1980 Census, estimates placed the undocumented population at 2 to 4 million, predominantly from , marking a shift from episodic to structural unauthorized presence. In , postwar recovery similarly spurred labor recruitment, with countries like importing over 14 million guest workers () from , , and between 1955 and 1973, often under bilateral agreements that tolerated informal entries during boom years. Colonial ties enabled unrestricted movement from to France and the to the until mid-1960s restrictions, after which illegal overstays and clandestine sea crossings grew; for instance, the UK's 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act aimed to curb inflows but resulted in increased document fraud and unauthorized entries from the . The halted formal recruitment across , stranding millions in irregular status and prompting that bypassed controls, with unauthorized migration rising amid economic disparities and limited deportation capacity. By the late 1970s, irregular entries from the Mediterranean and were documented in growing numbers, though comprehensive estimates remained elusive due to porous internal borders pre-Schengen. This period laid the groundwork for later surges, as initial tolerance for economic utility evolved into entrenched unauthorized communities resistant to expulsion.

Contemporary Global Surge (1980s–Present)

Beginning in the 1980s, illegal immigration experienced a pronounced global upsurge, propelled by the dissolution of barriers, economic liberalization fostering labor demand in advanced economies, and escalating instability in source countries across , , and . This period saw transitions from primarily regional movements to transcontinental flows, with unauthorized entries often evading detection and contributing to growing resident undocumented populations. Official metrics, such as border apprehensions and asylum claims exploited as entry mechanisms, underscore the scale, though they capture only detected attempts, underestimating successful crossings. In the Americas, the recorded a sharp rise in southwest border apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol, from around 630,000 total nationwide in fiscal year 1980—predominantly at the southern border—to an average exceeding 1.3 million annually in the , culminating in 1.7 million in fiscal year 2000. The resident unauthorized population expanded accordingly, from an estimated 2.1 million in 1980 to 8.5 million by 2000, driven by Mexican economic migrants and later Central American flights from violence. Parallel surges occurred southward, with irregular movements through intensifying post-2010, including African and Asian nationals traversing routes like the en route to . Europe faced analogous pressures, with irregular Mediterranean and land crossings accelerating after the 1990s and the 2011 Arab Spring, but reaching unprecedented levels in 2015 when detected over 1.8 million illegal border crossings, including more than 1 million sea arrivals primarily from , , and . This influx, often blending economic migrants with conflict refugees, prompted emergency border measures like Hungary's fence along the Serbian frontier, yet undocumented presence persisted, with estimating hundreds of thousands annually found illegally present by the mid-2010s. Elsewhere, African intra- and extra-continental irregular migration diversified since the late 1980s, fueling routes to and the Gulf states, while saw rises in unauthorized entries to via —peaking at over 20,000 arrivals in 2013—and overstays in East Asian economies. These trends reflect systemic challenges amid demographic imbalances, with global unauthorized flows continuing into the 2020s, as evidenced by renewed U.S. encounters surpassing 2 million annually in fiscal years 2022 and 2023.

Drivers of Illegal Immigration

Economic Pull Factors and Incentives

Significant wage differentials between low-income origin countries and high-income destinations serve as a primary economic pull for illegal immigration, enabling migrants to achieve earnings multiples higher than at home despite risks of apprehension and exploitation. For example, undocumented workers from and often secure low-skilled jobs in the paying 5 to 10 times the prevailing wages in their countries of origin, with US construction or agricultural roles offering $15–20 per hour compared to $2–4 daily equivalents in rural as of 2023 data from labor surveys. This disparity persists because destination economies feature higher productivity and capital intensity, amplifying returns to even unskilled labor under first-principles economic logic where determines pay. Demand for undocumented labor in sectors shunning native workers further incentivizes , as employers in , , and face chronic shortages of low-skilled natives unwilling to accept prevailing conditions. In the , unauthorized immigrants comprised about 4.6% of the labor force in 2022, totaling 8.3 million workers concentrated in these industries, where they fill roles amid tight labor markets that correlate with surges in illegal crossings—evident in post-2020 border encounters rising alongside vacancy rates exceeding 7 million. In , similar dynamics prevail, with countries identifying 42 occupations in shortage as of 2024, drawing irregular migrants for temporary, low-wage work despite formal restrictions, as native participation lags due to higher reservation wages and better alternatives. Remittances amplify the incentive, as migrants remit substantial portions of earnings to origin-country families, sustaining migration networks and reducing return rates even amid . Globally, remittances reached $831 billion in , with a significant share from undocumented flows—such as 79% of illegal migrants sending funds home, averaging $170 monthly per family in surveyed communities, which bolsters household incomes and encourages chain migration by alleviating pressures. This causal loop persists because remittances represent untaxed, portable gains, often exceeding formal aid and funding further illegal ventures, though studies note mixed wage impacts on natives without negating the pull for senders. Access to public benefits, while legally restricted for undocumented adults, indirectly incentivizes stays through eligible US-born children and mixed-status households, creating fiscal magnets despite net costs. Estimates indicate 59% of illegal immigrant-headed households in the US used at least one major welfare program in recent analyses, with total consumption averaging higher per capita than for natives when including entitlements like for offspring, though direct adult eligibility remains minimal under 1996 reforms. Peer-reviewed assessments highlight this as a secondary pull, as benefits reduce effective deportation risks by embedding families, outweighing limited upfront access and contributing to fiscal drains estimated in billions annually. Counterclaims of lower overall use by immigrants overlook household dynamics and long-term entitlements, per data from Census-linked studies showing noncitizens consuming 54% more in some benefit categories.

Policy Laxity and Enforcement Failures

Policies characterized by minimal detention and rapid release of unauthorized entrants have incentivized increased attempts at illegal border crossings . Under the "catch and release" approach, over 75 percent of illegal aliens encountered by Border Patrol between fiscal years 2021 and 2023 were released into the interior pending hearings, contributing to more than 3 million such releases during that period. This practice, which prioritizes alternatives to detention over mandatory holding, has been criticized for signaling low risk of removal, thereby encouraging further migration flows amid limited interior capacity. Visa overstays represent another enforcement shortfall, accounting for nearly 40 percent of new undocumented arrivals annually, with estimates of 510,000 to 850,000 individuals failing to depart after temporary admissions each year from 2016 onward. The Department of Security's entry-exit tracking system has identified overstay rates of 1 to 2 percent among nonimmigrant visitors, yet deportation rates for these cases remain low due to resource constraints and prioritization of criminal removals over civil violations. Such lax interior enforcement exacerbates the undocumented population, as many overstays transition to long-term unauthorized residence without facing consequences. Sanctuary jurisdictions, which limit cooperation with federal immigration authorities, further undermine enforcement by shielding removable aliens, including those with criminal records—estimated at nearly 650,000 nationwide as of early 2025—from detention requests. These policies, adopted by numerous cities and states, reduce local-federal information sharing on illegal presence, effectively creating safe havens that signal reduced deportation risks and attract additional unauthorized migration. In the , enforcement failures post-2015 have similarly driven sustained inflows, with approximately 6.8 million asylum-seekers arriving since that year amid repeated policy breakdowns in and returns. Member states' inability to implement effective mechanisms and reliance on non-binding relocation quotas have resulted in low return rates for rejected claimants, fostering perceptions of as a low-enforcement destination. Ongoing border management lapses, including inadequate screening and secondary movements across internal frontiers, have eroded and perpetuated irregular entries, as evidenced by persistent high encounter volumes through 2025.

Demographic Pressures and Sending-Country Instability

Rapid growth in developing regions, particularly and parts of and the , generates demographic pressures that exceed local job creation capacities, fostering youth bulges—a disproportionate share of the aged 15-24—and high rates that propel . In , where the fertility rate averaged 4.5 children per woman in 2023, the working-age is projected to add up to 15 million new entrants annually by 2030, demanding equivalent job growth amid structural economic constraints. rates in the region often surpass 20%, reaching 25% or higher in North African countries and select sub-Saharan states like and , correlating with increased irregular migration as young people seek opportunities abroad when domestic markets fail to absorb them. This dynamic aligns with first-principles causal mechanisms: surplus labor in low-productivity economies incentivizes risk-taking via unauthorized routes when legal migration quotas are restrictive. Sending-country instability amplifies these pressures through acute , , and , displacing populations and overwhelming formal asylum systems, thereby channeling flows into illegal channels. Venezuela's economic implosion since 2013, marked by a 75% GDP contraction and exceeding 1 million percent in 2018, has driven over 7 million emigrants by 2024, with Venezuelans comprising the largest nationality for U.S.-Mexico border encounters in September 2023—surpassing prior peaks and often involving irregular crossings due to limited visa options. In , the initiated in 2011 displaced 11 million people, including 6.6 million internally, spurring over 1 million asylum claims in Europe by 2015, predominantly via irregular Mediterranean routes amid collapsed state structures. Central America's Northern Triangle (, , ) exemplifies gang-driven violence, with and Barrio 18 controlling territories and homicide rates historically exceeding 50 per 100,000 in pre-2019 crackdowns, positioning , forced , and murders as primary push factors for unauthorized U.S. migration beyond alone. These cases illustrate how instability erodes and economic viability, causally intensifying illegal outflows when receiving countries' gaps permit circumvention of legal barriers.

Methods of Unauthorized Entry

Clandestine Border Crossings

Clandestine crossings refer to unauthorized entries into a by evading official inspection points, typically involving land, sea, or less commonly air routes without detection. Common methods include walking across remote desert or mountainous terrain, concealing individuals in vehicles such as trucks with hidden compartments, or using small boats for maritime crossings. In some cases, migrants employ tunnels, railways, or stow away in commercial transport like lorries or aircraft cargo holds. These tactics are facilitated by networks that charge fees ranging from thousands to tens of thousands of dollars per person, exposing migrants to risks including , , , or from traffickers. At the United States-Mexico border, clandestine crossings predominantly occur along the 2,000-mile southwestern land frontier, where U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recorded over 370,000 encounters in December 2023 alone, reflecting peak monthly attempts before subsequent declines. 2025 saw encounters drop sharply to around 238,000 in the initial months under enhanced enforcement, including Mexican interdictions, representing the lowest levels in over 50 years. However, these figures capture only detected attempts; estimates of "gotaways"—undetected successful crossings—numbered in the hundreds of thousands annually prior to 2025 reductions, with CBP reporting total control and a 93% drop in daily encounters by April 2025. Tunnels and vehicle breaches have been recurrent, with over 200 smuggling tunnels discovered since 1990, though physical barriers and patrols mitigate some volumes. In the , irregular crossings via clandestine means target external borders, with detecting 112,375 such entries in the first eight months of 2025, a 21% decrease from 2024 amid bolstered frontier measures. Primary routes include perilous voyages from in overcrowded vessels, leading to thousands of drownings annually, and overland treks through the Western Balkans or Evros River region between and . Smugglers often use inflatable dinghies or hidden truck compartments for Channel crossings to the , while barriers like Hungary's fence along the Serbian border have reduced land flows by channeling attempts to monitored points. Detection data from underscores that undetected entries persist, particularly in vast maritime zones, contributing to ongoing enforcement challenges despite a 38% overall decline in 2024 compared to 2023.

Visa Overstays and Document Fraud

Visa overstays occur when nonimmigrant visitors remain in a country beyond the authorized period of stay specified in their visa or admission stamp. In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that between 650,000 and 850,000 individuals overstay their visas annually, representing 1% to 2% of nonimmigrant admissions. For fiscal year 2022, DHS reported approximately 850,000 suspected overstays, exceeding the number of illegal border crossers for the seventh consecutive year as of earlier data trends. These overstays contribute significantly to the unauthorized population, accounting for over 40% of undocumented immigrants in the U.S., with many entering legally via tourist (B1/B2), student (F), or exchange (J) visas before failing to depart. Overstay rates vary by visa category and nationality; for instance, in fiscal year 2023, the suspected in-country overstay rate for B1/B2 visas was lower than prior years but remained elevated for certain countries, with over 500,000 total overstays recorded. Globally, similar patterns emerge, such as in , where estimates suggest nearly one million individuals reside on expired temporary visas, highlighting enforcement challenges in tracking departures without comprehensive exit systems. Lax monitoring of exits and limited interior enforcement enable overstayers to blend into communities, often transitioning to unauthorized or benefit claims, thereby amplifying illegal immigration beyond visible border encounters. Document fraud facilitates unauthorized entry and prolonged stays by circumventing visa requirements through falsified identities or credentials. Common methods include altering genuine documents (e.g., changing expiration dates or photos), producing passports and visas, or using stolen identities to obtain work authorization. U.S. and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigates such , which often links to human networks that supply fake travel documents for illicit border crossings or visa applications. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) enforces penalties for deceitful practices, including permanent inadmissibility for those using false information to gain immigration benefits, as emphasized in 2025 guidance targeting fraudulent asylum claims or adjustments of status. Fraudulent documents enable overstays to evade detection during routine checks, such as employment verification, and contribute to , where unauthorized individuals assume legal personas to access jobs or services. Government agencies rely on forensic analysis and biometric databases to detect alterations, but the volume of applications—coupled with resource constraints—allows persistent exploitation, underscoring vulnerabilities in visa adjudication processes. One prominent legal loophole exploited in unauthorized migration involves the asylum screening process, particularly the credible interview in the United States. Under U.S. , individuals apprehended at the who express of return may receive a credible fear screening instead of expedited removal; a positive determination—historically occurring in about 89% of cases in 2018—allows them to enter full removal proceedings where they are often released into the interior pending hearings that can take years due to backlog. This "catch and release" practice, whereby migrants are processed and paroled pending adjudication, has enabled millions to remain in the despite low ultimate asylum grant rates, with only around 12% of those receiving positive credible fear findings from 2016 to 2018 securing asylum after full review. Critics, including former administration officials, argue this system incentivizes fraudulent claims as a means to gain entry and work authorization, transforming asylum from a targeted protection into a broad migration pathway. Humanitarian parole authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act, intended for urgent case-by-case humanitarian or public benefit reasons, has also been leveraged on a mass scale, creating another exploitable gap. During the Biden administration, programs like those for nationals of , , , and (CHNV) d over 400,000 individuals via advance travel authorization, contributing to an estimated 1.5 million total grants that bypassed standard visa processes and strained resources. Such expansions, decried as abuse by Department of officials in 2025 directives, allowed entry without rigorous vetting, with subsequent revocations highlighting fraud risks and the program's deviation from statutory limits. Internationally, similar vulnerabilities appear in bilateral agreements, as seen in Canada's Safe Third Country Agreement with the . A loophole permitting asylum claims at unofficial land crossings like enabled tens of thousands—peaking at 18,836 in alone in 2022—to irregularly enter from the U.S. and file claims, circumventing requirements to seek protection in the first safe country encountered. This route was closed in March 2023 through amendments expanding the agreement's scope, reducing irregular crossings but underscoring how interpretive gaps in international pacts can facilitate secondary migration flows. Additional domestic loopholes include protections for unaccompanied minors under the Flores settlement, which limits detention and mandates release to sponsors, often family members already in the U.S. illegally, effectively chaining further entries through family reunification claims. Programs like Temporary Protected Status (TPS) have been extended repeatedly, shielding hundreds of thousands from removal despite origins as temporary measures, while the Special Immigrant Juvenile status has been abused by criminals including gang members and offenders to gain benefits. These mechanisms, though designed for specific vulnerabilities, collectively lower enforcement credibility, encouraging unauthorized attempts by signaling high probabilities of prolonged presence over deportation.

Scale and Measurement

Global Estimates and Data Challenges

Estimating the global population of illegal immigrants—often termed irregular or undocumented migrants—is fraught with methodological limitations, as these individuals deliberately avoid official records to evade enforcement. No direct, comprehensive worldwide count exists, relying instead on indirect approaches such as residual estimation (subtracting documented migrants from total foreign-born populations) or extrapolations from apprehension data, both of which carry wide margins of error due to incomplete baseline information and underreporting. The most cited global figure originates from the (IOM), estimating at least 50 million irregular migrants worldwide in 2010, derived from regional surveys and detection trends but acknowledged as a floor rather than precise total. Subsequent IOM reports, including the 2024 World Migration Report, provide no updated aggregate, focusing instead on total international migrants at 281 million in 2020—a near doubling since 1990—without disaggregating the irregular share, which complicates assessments amid rising flows. This gap persists despite increased detections, such as over 1.5 million irregular entries in the U.S. alone in 2021, highlighting how global totals likely exceed prior benchmarks yet evade quantification. Principal data challenges stem from the inherent of and residence: migrants undercount themselves in censuses and surveys fearing , leading to systematic underestimation, while undetected overstays (a major pathway) escape apprehension-based proxies. Inconsistent definitions across jurisdictions—encompassing clandestine crossings, expired visas, or rejected asylum claims—hinder cross-national aggregation, as do errors in tracking legal admissions and outflows. Institutional factors exacerbate unreliability; international bodies like the UN and IOM prioritize broad mobility metrics over enforcement-sensitive irregular flows, potentially influenced by policy advocacy that downplays scale, whereas national data from agencies like or DHS reveal only detected cases, such as non-EU citizens found illegally present in the EU (e.g., peaking in the mid-2010s). These obstacles result in estimates varying by orders of magnitude, with regional proxies (e.g., 14 million unauthorized in the U.S. as of 2023 per Pew Research) suggesting a global figure in the tens of millions but underscoring the absence of verifiable aggregates amid ongoing surges. Rigorous verification demands triangulating multiple sources, yet varies, with academic and multilateral reports often critiqued for underemphasizing enforcement data due to prevailing institutional orientations.

Regional and National Statistics

In the , the unauthorized immigrant population reached an estimated 14 million in 2023, representing 27% of all immigrants and 4% of the total U.S. population, according to Pew Research Center's analysis of Census Bureau data. This figure marked a 33% increase from 10.5 million in 2021, largely attributable to surges in border encounters from and other regions. California hosts approximately 21% of the U.S. unauthorized immigrant population, with 2.9 million individuals out of a national total of 13.7 million as of mid-2023, according to the Migration Policy Institute. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Homeland Security Statistics estimated a lower 11 million unauthorized residents as of January 2022, based on administrative records and surveys adjusted for undercounting. The similarly projected 11.3 million as of mid-2022, noting diversification in origins beyond traditional Latin American sources. In the , authorities detected 918,925 third-country nationals illegally present in 2024, a 27.4% decline from 2023, per enforcement data. reported the highest detections at over 200,000, followed by and . Stock estimates for irregular migrants across 12 EU and EFTA countries ranged from 2.6 to 3.2 million between 2016 and 2023, comprising less than 1% of those nations' populations, according to a MIrreM project analysis incorporating survey and regularization data. Irregular entries at external borders totaled 112,000 in the first eight months of 2025, down 21% year-over-year, reflecting tightened controls. The recorded 43,630 detected irregular arrivals in 2024, an 19% increase from 2023, with 84% via small boat crossings across the . data indicate these arrivals primarily originated from , , and , though overall unauthorized resident estimates remain uncertain following a retracted figure; prior analyses suggested 800,000 to 1.2 million. Canada's irregular migration involves fewer incidents, with Immigration and Refugee Board detention reviews for irregular border crossers totaling 28 in early 2024, mostly at the U.S. border. Government assessments place the undocumented population at up to 500,000 as of 2023, amid policy shifts to curb asylum claims. Australia maintains low unauthorized inflows, with boat arrivals negligible post-2013 policy reforms; estimates of overstayers and visa violators hovered around 100,000 in 2021, or 0.37% of the population. Department of Home Affairs detention statistics reported 159 unlawful air or boat arrivals in facilities as of March 2024.
Country/RegionEstimated Unauthorized PopulationYearSource
14 million2023Pew Research
EU (select countries)2.6–3.2 million2016–2023MIrreM
United Kingdom~800,000–1.2 million (prior est.)RecentMigration Observatory
CanadaUp to 500,0002023Government est.
~100,0002021Reports
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) tracked apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol primarily at the southwest land border during the 2010s, with totals declining from 447,731 in fiscal year (FY) 2010 to a low of 303,970 in FY 2017 before rising to 851,508 in FY 2019. These figures reflect detections between ports of entry, excluding encounters at ports handled by the Office of Field Operations. Beginning in FY 2020, CBP shifted to reporting "encounters," encompassing Border Patrol Title 8 apprehensions, Office of Field Operations Title 8 inadmissibles at ports, and Title 42 expulsions implemented amid the from March 2020 to May 2023. Southwest land border encounters totaled 458,088 in FY 2020, a decrease attributed to travel restrictions and expulsions. Encounters then escalated sharply from FY 2021, reaching 1,659,206 southwest land border encounters that year, followed by approximately 2.4 million in FY 2022 and 2.5 million in FY 2023—record highs driven by surges from non-traditional source countries beyond and . Nationwide encounters from FY 2021 through mid-FY 2024 exceeded 10 million, highlighting sustained pressure. In FY 2024, encounters remained elevated at over 2 million southwest, but executive actions in June 2024 restricting asylum access contributed to declines later in the year. FY 2025 marked a reversal, with Border Patrol apprehensions at the southwest border totaling 238,000—the lowest annual figure since FY 1970—following intensified and policy shifts under the incoming administration, including cessation of catch-and-release practices. Monthly encounters in mid-2025 fell below 30,000 nationwide, 93% below prior peaks.
Fiscal YearSouthwest Border Encounters/Apprehensions (approx.)
2010447,731 (apprehensions)
2017303,970 (apprehensions)
2019851,508 (apprehensions)
2020458,088 (encounters)
20211,659,206 (encounters)
2022~2,400,000 (encounters)
2023~2,500,000 (encounters)
2025238,000 (apprehensions)
These trends underscore the responsiveness of migration flows to policies, economic incentives, and global push factors, with apprehensions serving as a proxy for attempted illegal entries despite varying detection rates estimated at 35-78% in recent years.

Impacts on Receiving Societies

Net Fiscal and Welfare Burdens

Illegal immigrants in the United States impose a net fiscal burden on s, as their limited tax contributions fail to offset the costs of public services utilized by themselves and their households, particularly through U.S.-born children eligible for welfare programs. In 2023, the estimated this net cost at $150.7 billion annually across federal, state, and local levels, equating to $1,156 per U.S. after accounting for taxes paid by undocumented households. This figure derives from expenditures on ($78 billion), medical care ($42 billion including and emergency services), ($26 billion), and welfare ($18 billion), surpassing the approximately $96 billion in federal, state, and local taxes contributed by undocumented immigrants in 2022, primarily through sales, property, and payroll taxes. Lifetime analyses reinforce the imbalance, with low-skilled undocumented immigrants generating net costs due to low earnings and high dependency ratios. The Manhattan Institute's 2025 update projects a $80,000 net fiscal deficit over 30 years for a typical new undocumented immigrant, rising to $225,000 for existing ones, factoring in benefits received minus taxes paid, including downstream effects on descendants. Undocumented households exhibit elevated welfare usage rates—59.4% participate in at least one program like SNAP ($5.8 billion annually for eligible children), TANF ($1.43 billion), and ($16.2 billion added under recent policies)—despite restrictions on direct eligibility, as citizen offspring access full entitlements. These patterns stem from lower average levels (over 50% lack high school diplomas) and informal , limiting revenue while amplifying demands on public goods like K-12 schooling, which absorbs roughly half of state-local immigration-related spending surges as noted in assessments of 2021–2023 inflows. In , data on undocumented migrants' net fiscal impacts remain fragmented due to varying enforcement and underreporting, but available evidence points to analogous burdens from low-skilled non-EU inflows. Non-EU immigrants, including irregular entrants, often yield negative lifetime fiscal contributions in welfare-heavy systems like those in and , where education and healthcare costs for families exceed tax inflows, with estimates suggesting annual EU-wide strains in tens of billions of euros when accounting for asylum processing and integration failures. analyses similarly highlight net drains from irregular migration, with per-person support costs exceeding £100,000 over extended stays absent , underscoring how restricted work rights and benefit access still generate indirect fiscal pressures via emergency services and unaccompanied minors. These dynamics reflect causal realities: undocumented status correlates with and family sizes that leverage public resources without proportional fiscal reciprocity, a pattern less evident in high-skilled legal migration.

Labor Market Displacement and Wage Suppression

Undocumented immigrants, numbering approximately 11 million as of 2022, disproportionately enter low-skilled labor markets such as , , and food services, where they comprise 15-20% of workers in these sectors. This influx expands the labor supply in occupations requiring minimal formal , exerting downward pressure on wages and increasing for native-born workers with similar skills, including high school dropouts and less-educated minorities. Economic models grounded in supply-demand dynamics predict that such reduces equilibrium wages for substitutable labor, with confirming modest but persistent effects, particularly for the bottom quartile of the native wage distribution. Harvard economist George Borjas, analyzing national data from 1980 to 2000, found that a 10% increase in the immigrant share of the labor force depresses for native high dropouts by 5.2%, equivalent to an annual loss of about $1,000 per worker in 2023 dollars, with cumulative effects amplifying over decades. This wage elasticity arises because undocumented workers often accept lower pay due to limited and fear of , undercutting prevailing rates; for instance, in the industry, where undocumented labor rose from 12% in 2007 to 16% by 2017, median hourly for low-skilled natives stagnated despite overall economic growth. Similar patterns emerged in the 1980 , where a sudden 7% increase in Miami's labor force from Cuban entrants led to a 10-30% wage drop for native high dropouts, persisting for years. Displacement manifests as reduced employment rates and labor force participation among competing natives, rather than outright job loss, as firms hire cheaper immigrant labor. Borjas's analysis attributes 25% of the employment decline and 20-60% of wage losses for low-skilled African American males between 1980 and 2000 to , with unauthorized entrants contributing disproportionately due to their concentration in manual trades. In high-immigration states like and , native-born Hispanics and Blacks—groups often in overlapping skill sets—experienced employment-to-population ratios 2-4 percentage points lower than in low-immigration states, adjusted for demographics, during the surge of over 1 million annual unauthorized entries. Post-2020 border encounters exceeding 2 million annually have intensified these pressures, correlating with stagnant in service occupations despite low native , as firms expand hiring of unauthorized workers amid enforcement gaps. While some studies, such as those from the National Academies of Sciences, report smaller aggregate effects (0-2% wage reduction for all natives), they acknowledge stronger impacts on prior immigrants and low-skilled subgroups, with methodological critiques noting underestimation from spatial adjustments that ignore responses. Borjas counters that national-level analyses better capture general equilibrium effects, avoiding attenuation from localized data. Simulations of mass deportations indicate potential 3-5% gains for remaining low-skilled authorized workers, underscoring the causal link between unauthorized supply and suppression. These dynamics extend beyond the U.S., as evidenced in where unauthorized inflows into low-skill sectors post-2015 depressed s for native youth by 1-3% in affected regions.

Crime, Public Safety, and National Security Risks

Illegal immigrants have been associated with elevated risks in specific categories of violent and crimes, despite aggregate studies often reporting lower overall incarceration rates compared to native-born populations. enforcement data reveal substantial criminal involvement: In fiscal year 2024, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement () arrested 113,431 noncitizens, with 81,312 (71.7%) having prior criminal convictions or pending charges, including thousands for , sexual offenses, and . In , state records show over 443,000 bookings of criminal noncitizens into local jails from 2011 to 2024, resulting in more than 316,000 convictions across offenses like murder, , and drug trafficking. Peer-reviewed analyses, such as those using conviction data, indicate illegal immigrant conviction rates at 2.2 per 100,000 from 2013–2022, lower than the native rate of 3.0 per 100,000, yet absolute numbers contribute meaningfully to public safety burdens, particularly in border regions. Public safety concerns extend to gang infiltration and drug-related violence facilitated by porous borders. Transnational gangs like , predominantly composed of Salvadoran nationals who entered illegally, have been linked to numerous homicides and rackets; the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted approximately 749 members since 2016 for violent crimes. Similarly, Venezuelan gang members, many arriving via illegal crossings, have been arrested for and assaults in multiple U.S. cities. While most fentanyl seizures occur at ports of entry (over 90% from FY2018–2024), illegal crossings enable cartels to divert border resources, indirectly boosting smuggling success rates for synthetic opioids, which caused over 70,000 U.S. overdose deaths in 2024. In , non-EU migrants are overrepresented in crime statistics; for instance, German federal data for 2023 showed non-Germans (13% of population) accounting for 41% of suspects in violent crimes, with asylum seekers disproportionately involved in sexual offenses, though socioeconomic factors like youth and male demographics partially explain disparities. National security risks arise from undetected entrants among high-volume illegal flows, including individuals on terrorist watchlists. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encountered 283 watchlisted individuals at the U.S.- border alone through July 2024, down from prior years but underscoring vetting gaps at southwest borders where encounters exceeded 2.4 million in FY2024. Historical cases, such as the 2024 arrest of nationals with ties who crossed illegally, highlight potential for jihadist infiltration, as porous borders bypass rigorous visa screenings. The Department of Homeland Security's 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment warns of evolving terrorist threats exploiting migration routes, with small boat crossings and overland treks evading biometric checks, thereby elevating risks of or attacks compared to legal pathways. These incidents, while rare relative to total crossings, amplify vulnerabilities in an era of heightened global .

Cultural Assimilation Challenges and Social Cohesion

Illegal immigrants often experience heightened barriers to compared to legal entrants, as their undocumented status fosters marginalization, limits access to formal and , and encourages reliance on ethnic networks that perpetuate cultural isolation. This dynamic contrasts with historical patterns of assimilation among legal immigrants, where structured pathways like processes incentivize adoption of host-country norms, , and civic participation. Empirical analyses indicate that undocumented status correlates with slower intergenerational transmission of host-language skills and higher rates of endogamous marriages within origin groups, sustaining parallel cultural practices that diverge from prevailing societal values. The formation of ethnic enclaves, prevalent among unassimilated illegal immigrant communities, exacerbates these challenges by creating self-sustaining micro-societies with limited interaction with the broader population, as observed in urban areas of and the . In , rapid inflows of undocumented migrants from culturally distant regions have led to "parallel societies" in neighborhoods like those in , , or parts of suburbs, where host-country laws on and are routinely undermined by imported norms such as clan-based dispute resolution or informal patrols, eroding mutual trust and communal bonds. U.S. studies similarly document how undocumented enclaves in cities like hinder second-generation economic integration and cultural convergence, with enclave residence linked to poorer job quality and reduced inter-ethnic cooperation. Broader empirical evidence underscores the strain on social cohesion, as rapid demographic shifts from illegal immigration amplify ethnic diversity's negative effects on generalized trust, a core pillar of cohesive societies. Harvard sociologist Robert Putnam's research, drawing from U.S. community surveys, reveals that higher ethnic heterogeneity—often intensified by undocumented inflows—prompts "hunkering down," with residents withdrawing from , volunteering, and neighborly interactions across groups, a pattern persisting even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. A of 90 studies confirms this "constrict claim," finding statistically significant reductions in social trust amid rising diversity from non-Western , with effects more pronounced in contexts of weak and cultural policy failures that discourage assimilation. In receiving societies, these dynamics manifest as heightened intergroup tensions, policy polarization, and diminished , as unassimilated cohorts resist shared values like and rule-of-law adherence.

Policy Responses

Border Fortification and Technological Measures


Physical fortifications, such as fences and walls, have been deployed by various nations to deter illegal border crossings. In Hungary, a border fence along the Serbian frontier, completed in 2015 amid a surge exceeding 350,000 migrants transiting the country that year, resulted in an almost 100 percent reduction in illegal entries compared to peak levels. Hungarian authorities attributed this decline to the barrier combined with policy enforcement, with apprehensions dropping from over 400,000 in 2015 to fewer than 3,000 by 2018 in the affected sectors. Similarly, in the United States, segments of the border wall along the Mexico frontier have correlated with localized decreases in apprehensions; for instance, completion of barriers in high-traffic zones led to a 79 percent drop in detections in one sector by 2020. U.S. Customs and Border Protection data indicate that wall installations in Arizona sectors reduced illegal crossings by over 90 percent in the subsequent years. These structures often incorporate anti-climb features, vehicle barriers, and reinforced steel bollards, spanning hundreds of miles where terrain permits, though smugglers have occasionally breached them via tunneling or cutting tools.
Technological measures complement physical barriers by enhancing detection and response capabilities. In the U.S., the Border Patrol employs autonomous surveillance towers equipped with thermal cameras, , and long-range sensors, providing real-time monitoring over expansive areas; Big Bend Sector deployed such solar-powered units in 2024 to cover remote deserts. Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and integrated fixed towers feed data into command centers, enabling rapid agent deployment; CBP's 2024-2028 strategy emphasizes AI-driven analytics to process sensor inputs for threat identification. In the , utilizes from the Copernicus program, drones, and emerging digital twins for predictive border surveillance, aiming to boost and intercept irregular crossings before they occur. These systems have improved interception rates in maritime and domains, though effectiveness varies with and migrant tactics, such as nighttime crossings or remote routes. Combined approaches demonstrate measurable impacts on illegal flows. Hungary's fenced , augmented by patrols and thermal imaging, sustained low crossing numbers into the 2020s, with 2021 attempts at 122,000 but most repelled. U.S. "smart " initiatives, blending barriers with sensors, have disrupted networks by channeling traffic to monitored points, reducing "got-aways" in fortified areas. Globally, over 70 walls exist as of 2022, often yielding short-term reductions in unauthorized entries by increasing costs and risks for migrants, though long-term efficacy depends on maintenance, interior enforcement, and upstream migration pressures. Challenges include high construction costs—U.S. segments exceeded $20 million per mile—and adaptation by traffickers, necessitating ongoing investment in layered defenses.

Interior Enforcement, Deportations, and Removals

Interior enforcement refers to the detection, , detention, and removal of illegal immigrants within a country's , separate from apprehensions. Agencies like the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) prioritize individuals posing public safety or threats, though resource limitations often restrict operations to criminal noncitizens. Globally, interior actions face challenges including limited funding, legal appeals, and non-cooperative origin countries, resulting in low removal rates relative to undocumented populations. In the United States, conducted 113,431 administrative arrests in (FY) 2024, with approximately 33,242 (29.3%) occurring in the interior rather than at borders or jails. These efforts contributed to 271,000 total deportations that year, the highest since FY , though most removals stemmed from border encounters rather than interior enforcement. From FY 2020 to 2024, interior deportations averaged 43,000 annually, reflecting a focus on convicted criminals amid broader policy shifts that deprioritized non-criminal violators. Following the 2024 election, the Trump administration escalated interior operations, achieving nearly 200,000 deportations by August 2025 and surpassing 350,000 for the year, with plans targeting up to 600,000 annually through expanded raids and military support. In the , interior enforcement yields low effective returns despite substantial orders. data show approximately 400,000 annual return decisions issued to third-country nationals, but execution rates hovered below 20% in 2020-2021 and around 25% in early 2022, with Q2 2025 recording 116,495 orders against 28,355 returns (about 24%). Countries like and lead in returns, often relying on voluntary programs (53.7% of Q2 2025 cases), but systemic issues such as absent readmission agreements and absconding undermine efficacy. The United Kingdom's recorded 31,500 total returns (enforced and voluntary) in the year ending September 2024, a 19% increase from prior periods, with enforced returns comprising about 24% (around 8,200 in 2024). From July 2024 to January 2025, 18,987 returns occurred, including actions against illegal workers and failed asylum seekers, bolstered by higher civil penalties for employers (£45,000 per worker for first breaches). Despite these measures, overall enforcement remains constrained by appeals and diplomatic hurdles, with foreign national criminal removals rising 14% to 5,179 in the first year of the Labour government. Trends indicate that while border-focused policies dominate, interior correlates with political will and resources; lax prioritization in some administrations allows undocumented populations to grow, exacerbating fiscal and burdens. In practice, only a fraction of estimated illegal immigrants—11.7 million in the U.S. as of 2023—are removed annually, highlighting enforcement gaps despite legal mandates.

Legislative Reforms and International Agreements

In the United States, the authorized the construction of approximately 700 miles of physical barriers, including double-layer fencing and vehicle barriers, along the southern border to deter illegal crossings, with implementation beginning in high-traffic areas like and Yuma sectors. Subsequent evaluations indicated that areas with newly deployed fencing experienced an 87% reduction in illegal entries from fiscal year 2019 to 2020. More recent legislative efforts, such as the Border Act of 2024 (S.4361), sought to grant emergency authority for summary removals within 100 miles of the southwest border when daily encounters exceeded 5,000, alongside $20 billion in funding for personnel, technology, and asylum processing capacity, but the bill failed procedural votes in the amid partisan opposition. Internationally, the - Statement of March 18, 2016, established a framework where agreed to accept the return of all irregular migrants crossing from its territory to Greek islands not qualifying for international protection, in exchange for €6 billion in funding for refugee support in , accelerated visa for Turkish citizens, and a one-for-one resettlement mechanism for Syrian refugees from to states. This agreement correlated with a sharp decline in irregular Mediterranean crossings, from over 850,000 arrivals in 2015 to under 400,000 in 2016, though long-term compliance has varied due to geopolitical tensions. The United States-Mexico Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), initiated in January 2019, required non-Mexican asylum seekers to await U.S. immigration hearings while remaining in , aiming to curb meritless claims and illegal entries; during its initial implementation, southwest apprehensions dropped by over 60% in the following months before legal challenges and policy suspensions. A September 2025 joint U.S.- security cooperation statement further committed both nations to high-level implementation groups for countering illegal , enhancing inspections, and dismantling cross-border tunnels, building on prior bilateral efforts to reduce unauthorized migration flows. In the , the Pact on Migration and Asylum, entering into force on June 11, 2024, introduced mandatory border screening procedures for irregular entrants, including biometric identification via the Eurodac database and expedited asylum assessments within seven days for those unlikely to qualify for protection or posing risks, with strengthened return mechanisms and protocols to manage surges. These reforms emphasize shared responsibility among member states, including solidarity contributions like relocation or financial support for frontline countries, while prioritizing rapid returns for ineligible migrants to third countries where feasible.

Controversies and Empirical Debates

Claims of Economic Benefits vs. Verifiable Costs

Proponents of illegal immigration often claim it yields net economic benefits, such as filling labor shortages in low-wage sectors, contributing to GDP growth through increased consumption and , and generating tax revenues that offset costs. For instance, undocumented immigrant households are estimated to have paid $96.7 billion in federal, state, and local taxes in 2022, including and taxes, while holding $299 billion in spending power in 2023 that supports demand in . Some analyses, drawing from models of labor market dynamics, argue that undocumented workers expand economic output by taking jobs natives avoid, with one 2020 study asserting positive fiscal effects from their in and despite restrictions on benefits access. However, these claims frequently aggregate legal and illegal immigrants or emphasize short-term consumption while understating long-term fiscal transfers, particularly when accounting for U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants who qualify for full benefits. Empirical assessments of net fiscal impacts reveal substantial costs exceeding revenues for illegal immigrants. A 2024 analysis estimates the lifetime net fiscal burden of a newly arrived illegal immigrant at approximately $130,000 in terms, factoring in higher use of , healthcare, and welfare services relative to taxes paid, with total annual costs to U.S. taxpayers exceeding $150 billion when including dependent children. Illegal immigrant-headed households exhibit welfare usage rates of 59%, accessing programs like , food assistance, and school lunches at rates comparable to or exceeding those of U.S.-born households, despite legal barriers to direct federal benefits; this usage totals $42 billion annually in transferred benefits. projections indicate that the post-2021 immigration surge, including millions of illegal entries, will increase federal deficits by $0.9 trillion over the next decade due to elevated spending on services outpacing revenue contributions, with recent arrivals remitting 15% of earnings abroad rather than recirculating funds domestically. Additional verifiable costs include remittances outflows, which drained over $200 billion from the U.S. economy in alone, primarily from low-wage illegal workers sending funds to home countries, thereby reducing local multiplier effects and taxable consumption. Labor market studies further document wage suppression for low-skilled native workers, with illegal immigration correlating to 4-7% reductions in earnings for high school dropouts, as undocumented labor competes directly in sectors like and without equivalent gains. These dynamics underscore a pattern where claimed benefits—often promoted by organizations with incentives to highlight positives—fail to materialize as net gains when scrutinized against comprehensive data on intergenerational costs and opportunity burdens on public budgets.

Humanitarian Narratives vs. Rule-of-Law Imperatives

Humanitarian narratives frame illegal immigration primarily as a , portraying unauthorized border crossers as vulnerable asylum seekers fleeing , violence, or poverty, thereby invoking obligations under international agreements like the 1951 Refugee Convention. Advocates, including non-governmental organizations and certain media outlets, emphasize stories of individual hardship to argue against strict enforcement, often labeling deportations as inhumane and promoting policies that prioritize or over legal vetting. However, empirical data reveals that a significant portion of claimants do not meet the narrow legal definition of refugees—persecution based on race, , , political opinion, or — with many applications driven by economic motivations rather than qualifying fears. In the United States, credible fear screenings at the border, a initial hurdle for asylum eligibility, result in high pass rates—often exceeding 70% in recent years—but subsequent immigration court decisions grant asylum in only about 35-40% of cases as of October 2024, indicating widespread abuse or unsubstantiated claims among irregular entrants. Similarly, during Europe's 2015-2016 migrant crisis, asylum systems were overwhelmed by applications from nationalities with low approval rates, such as those from economic migration hotspots in sub-Saharan Africa, exposing systemic exploitation where safe third country passage was bypassed in favor of irregular routes. These patterns suggest that humanitarian appeals frequently conflate economic migrants with genuine refugees, incentivizing illegal entries by signaling lax consequences and straining judicial resources, with backlogs exceeding 3 million cases in U.S. courts by mid-2025. Rule-of-law imperatives counter that sovereign nations must enforce immigration statutes to maintain border integrity, fiscal sustainability, and public trust in governance, as unchecked inflows erode the social contract by imposing uncompensated costs on citizens. Strict enforcement, as demonstrated by Australia's offshore processing model since 2013, has deterred boat arrivals by over 90%, preserving humanitarian capacity for vetted cases while upholding legal processes. In contrast, permissive policies correlate with sustained high encounters—U.S. border officials recorded over 11 million unauthorized attempts from October 2019 to June 2024—undermining deterrence and encouraging repeat violations. Critics of humanitarian dominance, including analyses from policy institutes, argue that systemic biases in academia and mainstream media amplify unverified sob stories while downplaying rejection data and enforcement successes, fostering a narrative that prioritizes global mobility over national self-determination. This tension manifests in policy debates where rule-of-law advocates stress causal links: lax asylum vetting not only fails genuine refugees by clogging systems but also amplifies secondary migration, referrals among detainees, and welfare dependencies, as evidenced by European returns data showing persistent illegal presence post-denial. Empirical studies affirm that balanced enforcement—combining rapid screenings with deportations—restores order without forsaking core protections, as seen in post-2023 U.S.- cooperation reducing encounters by 53%. Ultimately, prioritizing legal channels over narrative-driven amnesties aligns with verifiable needs, mitigating the dilution of protections for those truly persecuted.

Political Exploitation and Media Distortions

In the United States, illegal immigration has been politically exploited through the mechanism of census apportionment, where non-citizen residents, including undocumented individuals, are counted for allocating congressional seats and Electoral College votes, conferring disproportionate representation to areas with high immigrant populations that align with Democratic voting patterns. A October 2024 report by the Center for Immigration Studies calculated that post-2020 census immigration shifts granted Democrats an additional four House seats and electoral votes equivalent to those of certain states, without immigrants needing to vote or naturalize. This dynamic creates incentives for lax enforcement in sanctuary jurisdictions, as local officials prioritize electoral gains from demographic changes over federal law compliance. Republican politicians, in turn, have capitalized on the issue by amplifying border security failures to rally voters concerned with national sovereignty, contributing to a 1990-2016 county-level analysis showing immigration correlated with a 2-3 percentage point decline in Republican vote shares amid heightened enforcement rhetoric. European examples mirror this partisan instrumentalization, with left-leaning governments in countries like and tolerating elevated illegal entries to sustain pro-immigration voter coalitions, only facing backlash when public costs manifest, as during the 2015-2016 migrant surge that boosted far-right parties' electoral gains. Lax policies persist due to fears of alienating ethnic minority blocs, despite of integration failures, such as Sweden's rising gang violence linked to unvetted entrants. Media distortions compound these incentives by framing illegal immigration predominantly through humanitarian lenses, often omitting or minimizing verifiable costs like fiscal strain and security threats. Mainstream outlets, influenced by institutional left-leaning biases, underreport incidents tying crimes to immigration status; for example, a 2005 Government Accountability Office analysis found criminal non-citizens responsible for over 25% of federal prison inmates at an annual cost exceeding $1.6 billion, yet such data receives scant ongoing coverage amid narratives emphasizing "asylum seekers" over enforcement imperatives. In the UK, coverage disproportionately spotlights illegal crossings—despite legal migration outnumbering it 14:1—fostering public misconceptions that warp policy debates toward restrictionist reactions rather than balanced reform. Partisan word choice further skews perceptions, with left-leaning media favoring "undocumented migrant" over "illegal immigrant," reducing emphasis on legal violations, as documented in analyses of ICE operation reporting. This selective emphasis promotes policy stalemate, as media prioritizes episodic crises over systemic data on net costs, such as U.S. states bearing billions in uncompensated services for undocumented populations.

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