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K-25
K-25
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35°55′56″N 84°23′42″W / 35.93222°N 84.39500°W / 35.93222; -84.39500

The K-25 building of the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant aerial view, looking southeast. The mile-long building, in the shape of a "U", was completely demolished in 2013.

K-25 was the codename given by the Manhattan Project to the program to produce enriched uranium for atomic bombs using the gaseous diffusion method. Originally the codename for the product, over time it came to refer to the project, the production facility located at the Clinton Engineer Works in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, the main gaseous diffusion building, and ultimately the site. When it was built in 1944, the four-story K-25 gaseous diffusion plant was the world's largest building, comprising over 5,264,000 square feet (489,000 m2) of floor space and a volume of 97,500,000 cubic feet (2,760,000 m3).

Construction of the K-25 facility was undertaken by J. A. Jones Construction. At the height of construction, over 25,000 workers were employed on the site. Gaseous diffusion was but one of three enrichment technologies used by the Manhattan Project. Slightly enriched product from the S-50 thermal diffusion plant was fed into the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant. Its product in turn was fed into the Y-12 electromagnetic plant. The enriched uranium was used in the Little Boy atomic bomb used in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. In 1946, the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant became capable of producing highly enriched product.

After the war, four more gaseous diffusion plants named K-27, K-29, K-31 and K-33 were added to the site. The K-25 site was renamed the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 1955. Production of enriched uranium ended in 1964, and gaseous diffusion finally ceased on the site on 27 August 1985. The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant was renamed the Oak Ridge K-25 Site in 1989 and the East Tennessee Technology Park in 1996. Demolition of all five gaseous diffusion plants was completed in February 2017.

Background

[edit]

The discovery of the neutron by James Chadwick in 1932,[1] followed by that of nuclear fission in uranium by German chemists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann in 1938,[2] and its theoretical explanation (and naming) by Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch soon after,[3] opened up the possibility of a controlled nuclear chain reaction with uranium. At the Pupin Laboratories at Columbia University, Enrico Fermi and Leo Szilard began exploring how this might be achieved.[1] Fears that a German atomic bomb project would develop atomic weapons first, especially among scientists who were refugees from Nazi Germany and other fascist countries, were expressed in the Einstein-Szilard letter to the President of the United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt. This prompted Roosevelt to initiate preliminary research in late 1939.[4]

Niels Bohr and John Archibald Wheeler applied the liquid drop model of the atomic nucleus to explain the mechanism of nuclear fission.[5] As the experimental physicists studied fission, they uncovered puzzling results. George Placzek asked Bohr why uranium seemed to fission with both fast and slow neutrons. Walking to a meeting with Wheeler, Bohr had an insight that the fission at low energies was caused by the uranium-235 isotope, while at high energies it was mainly a reaction with the far more abundant uranium-238 isotope.[6] The former makes up just 0.714 percent of the uranium atoms in natural uranium, about one in every 140;[7] natural uranium is 99.28 percent uranium-238. There is also a tiny amount of uranium-234, which accounts for just 0.006 percent.[8]

At Columbia, John R. Dunning believed this was the case, but Fermi was not so sure. The only way to settle this was to obtain a sample of uranium-235 and test it.[1] He had Alfred O. C. Nier from the University of Minnesota prepare samples of uranium enriched in uranium-234, 235 and 238 using a mass spectrometer. These were ready in February 1940, and Dunning, Eugene T. Booth and Aristid von Grosse then carried out a series of experiments. They demonstrated that uranium-235 was indeed primarily responsible for fission with slow neutrons,[9] but they were unable to determine precise neutron capture cross sections because their samples were not sufficiently enriched.[10][11][12]

At the University of Birmingham in Britain, the Australian physicist Mark Oliphant assigned two refugee physicists—Otto Frisch and Rudolf Peierls—the task of investigating the feasibility of an atomic bomb, ironically because their status as enemy aliens precluded their working on secret projects like radar.[13] Their March 1940 Frisch–Peierls memorandum indicated that the critical mass of uranium-235 was within an order of magnitude of 10 kilograms (22 lb), which was small enough to be carried by a bomber aircraft of the day.[14]

Gaseous diffusion

[edit]
Gaseous diffusion uses semi-permeable membranes to separate enriched uranium.
Stages are connected together to form a cascade. A, B and C are pumps.

In April 1940, Jesse Beams, Ross Gunn, Fermi, Nier, Merle Tuve and Harold Urey had a meeting at the American Physical Society in Washington, D.C. At the time, the prospect of building an atomic bomb seemed dim, and even creating a chain reaction would likely require enriched uranium. They therefore recommended that research be conducted with the aim of developing the means to separate kilogram amounts of uranium-235.[15] At a lunch on 21 May 1940, George B. Kistiakowsky suggested the possibility of using gaseous diffusion.[16]

Gaseous diffusion is based on Graham's law, which states that the rate of effusion of a gas through a porous barrier is inversely proportional to the square root of the gas's molecular mass. In a container with a porous barrier containing a mixture of two gases, the lighter molecules will pass out of the container more rapidly than the heavier molecules. The gas leaving the container is slightly enriched in the lighter molecules, while the residual gas is slightly depleted.[17] A container wherein the enrichment process takes place through gaseous diffusion is called a diffuser.[18]

Gaseous diffusion had been used to separate isotopes before. Francis William Aston had used it to partially separate isotopes of neon in 1931, and Gustav Ludwig Hertz had improved on the method to almost completely separate neon by running it through a series of stages. In the United States, William D. Harkins had used it to separate chlorine. Kistiakowsky was familiar with the work of Charles G. Maier at the Bureau of Mines, who had also used the process to separate gases.[16]

Uranium hexafluoride (UF
6
) was the only known compound of uranium sufficiently volatile to be used in the gaseous diffusion process.[17] Before this could be done, the Special Alloyed Materials (SAM) Laboratories at Columbia University and the Kellex Corporation had to overcome formidable difficulties to develop a suitable barrier. Fluorine consists of only a single natural isotope 19
F
, so the 1 percent difference in molecular weights between 235
UF
6
and 238
UF
6
is solely the difference in weights of the uranium isotopes. For these reasons, UF
6
was the only choice as a feedstock for the gaseous diffusion process.[19] Uranium hexafluoride, a solid at room temperature, sublimes at 56.5 °C (133.7 °F) at 1 standard atmosphere (100 kPa).[20][21] Applying Graham's law to uranium hexafluoride:

where:

Rate1 is the rate of effusion of 235UF6.
Rate2 is the rate of effusion of 238UF6.
M1 is the molar mass of 235UF6 ≈ 235 + 6 × 19 = 349 g·mol−1
M2 is the molar mass of 238UF6 ≈ 238 + 6 × 19 = 352 g·mol−1

Uranium hexafluoride is a highly corrosive substance. It is an oxidant[22] and a Lewis acid which is able to bind to fluoride.[23] It reacts with water to form a solid compound and is very difficult to handle on an industrial scale.[19]

Organization

[edit]

Booth, Dunning and von Grosse investigated the gaseous diffusion process. In 1941, they were joined by Francis G. Slack from Vanderbilt University and Willard F. Libby from the University of California. In July 1941, an Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) contract was awarded to Columbia University to study gaseous diffusion.[9][24] With the help of the mathematician Karl P. Cohen, they built a twelve-stage pilot gaseous diffusion plant at the Pupin Laboratories.[25] Initial tests showed that the stages were not as efficient as the theory would suggest;[26] they would need about 4,600 stages to enrich to 90 percent uranium-235.[17]

The Woolworth Building in Manhattan housed the offices of the Kellex Corporation and the Manhattan District's New York Area

A secret contract was awarded to M. W. Kellogg for engineering studies in July 1941.[9][24] This included the design and construction of a ten-stage pilot gaseous diffusion plant. On 14 December 1942, the Manhattan District, the US Army component of the Manhattan Project (as the effort to develop an atomic bomb became known) contracted Kellogg to design, build and operate a full-scale production plant. Unusually, the contract did not require any guarantees from Kellogg that it could actually accomplish this task. Because the scope of the project was not well defined, Kellogg and the Manhattan District agreed to defer any financial details to a later, cost-plus contract, which was executed in April 1944. Kellogg was then paid $2.5 million.[25]

For security reasons, the Army had Kellogg establish a wholly owned subsidiary, the Kellex Corporation, so the gaseous diffusion project could be kept separate from other company work.[25] "Kell" stood for "Kellogg" and "X" for secret.[27] Kellex operated as a self-contained and autonomous entity. Percival C. Keith, Kellogg's vice president of engineering,[27] was placed in charge of Kellex. He drew extensively on Kellogg to staff the new company but also had to recruit staff from outside. Eventually, Kellex would have over 3,700 employees.[25]

Dunning remained in charge at Columbia until 1 May 1943, when the Manhattan District took over the contract from OSRD. By this time Slack's group had nearly 50 members. His was the largest group, and it was working on the most challenging problem: the design of a suitable barrier through which the gas could diffuse. Another 30 scientists and technicians were working in five other groups. Henry A. Boorse was responsible for the pumps; Booth for the cascade test units. Libby handled chemistry, Nier analytical work and Hugh C. Paxton, engineering support.[28] The Army reorganized the research effort at Columbia, which became the Special Alloyed Materials (SAM) Laboratories. Urey was put in charge, Dunning becoming head of one of its divisions.[25] It would remain this way until 1 March 1945, when the SAM Laboratories were taken over by Union Carbide.[29]

The expansion of the SAM Laboratories led to a search for more space. The Nash Garage Building at 3280 Broadway was purchased by Columbia University. Originally an automobile dealership, it was just a few blocks from the campus. Major Benjamin K. Hough Jr. was the Manhattan District's Columbia Area engineer, and he moved his offices there too.[25][30] Kellex was in the Woolworth Building at 233 Broadway in Lower Manhattan. In January 1943, Lieutenant Colonel James C. Stowers was appointed New York Area Engineer, with responsibility for the entire K-25 Project. His small staff, initially of 20 military and civilian personnel but which gradually grew to over 70, was co-located in the Woolworth Building. The Manhattan District had its offices nearby at 270 Broadway until it moved to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in August 1943.[25][30]

Codename

[edit]

The codename "K-25" was a combination of the "K" from Kellex, and "25", a World War II-era code designation for uranium-235 (an isotope of element 92, mass number 235). The term was first used in Kellex internal reports for the end product, enriched uranium, in March 1943. By April 1943, the term "K-25 plant" was being used for the plant that created it. That month, the term "K-25 Project" was applied to the entire project to develop uranium enrichment using the gaseous diffusion process. When other "K-" buildings were added after the war, "K-25" became the name of the original, larger complex.[31][32]

Research and development

[edit]

Diffusers

[edit]
A gaseous diffusion cell, showing the diffuser

The highly corrosive nature of uranium hexafluoride presented several technological challenges. Pipes and fittings that it came into contact with had to be made of or clad with nickel. This was feasible for small objects but impractical for the large diffusers, the tank-like containers that had to hold the gas under pressure. Nickel was a vital war material, and although the Manhattan Project could use its overriding priority to acquire it, making the diffusers out of solid nickel would deplete the national supply. The director of the Manhattan Project, Brigadier General Leslie R. Groves Jr., gave the contract to build the diffusers to Chrysler. In turn Chrysler president K. T. Keller assigned Carl Heussner, an expert in electroplating, the task of developing a process for electroplating such a large object. Senior Chrysler executives called this "Project X-100".[33][34]

Electroplating used one-thousandth of the amount of nickel needed for a solid nickel diffuser. The SAM Laboratories had already attempted this and failed. Heussner experimented with a prototype in a building built within a building, and found that it could be done, so long as the series of pickling and scaling steps required were done without anything coming in contact with oxygen. Chrysler's entire factory at Lynch Road in Detroit was turned over to the manufacture of diffusers. The electroplating process required over 50,000 square feet (4,600 m2) of floor space, several thousand workers and a complicated air filtration system to ensure the nickel was not contaminated. By the war's end, Chrysler had built and shipped more than 3,500 diffusers.[33][34]

Pumps

[edit]

The gaseous diffusion process required suitable pumps that had to meet stringent requirements. Like the diffusers, the pumps had to resist corrosion from the uranium hexafluoride feed. Corrosion would not only damage the pumps, it would contaminate the feed. There could be no leakage of uranium hexafluoride (especially if it was already enriched) or of oil, which would react with the uranium hexafluoride. The pumps needed to operate at high rates and handle a gas 12 times as dense as air. To meet these requirements, the SAM Laboratories chose to use centrifugal pumps. The desired compression ratio of 2.3:1 to 3.2:1 was unusually high for this type of pump. For some purposes, a reciprocating pump would suffice,[35] and these were designed by Boorse at the SAM Laboratories, while Ingersoll Rand tackled the centrifugal pumps.[36]

In early 1943, Ingersoll Rand pulled out.[37] Keith approached the Clark Compressor Company and Worthington Pump and Machinery, but they turned it down, saying it could not be done.[38] So Keith and Groves met with executives at Allis-Chalmers, who agreed to build a new factory to produce the pumps, even though the pump design was still uncertain. The SAM Laboratories came up with a design, and Westinghouse built some prototypes that were successfully tested. Then Judson Swearingen at the Elliott Company came up with a revolutionary and promising design that was mechanically stable with seals that would contain the gas. This design was manufactured by Allis-Chalmers.[37]

Barriers

[edit]

Difficulties with the diffusers and pumps paled in significance beside those with the porous barrier. To work, the gaseous diffusion process required a barrier with microscopic holes, but not subject to plugging. It had to be porous but strong enough to handle the high pressures. And, like everything else, it had to resist corrosion from uranium hexafluoride. The latter criterion suggested a nickel barrier.[37] Foster C. Nix at the Bell Telephone Laboratories experimented with nickel powder, while Edward O. Norris at the C. O. Jelliff Manufacturing Corporation and Edward Adler at the City College of New York worked on a design with electroplated nickel.[36] Norris was an English interior decorator who had developed a very fine metal mesh for use with a spray gun.[39] The design appeared too brittle and fragile for the proposed use, particularly on the higher stages of enrichment, but there was hope that this could be overcome.[40]

Setting up a process pump

In 1943, Urey brought in Hugh S. Taylor from Princeton University to look at the problem of a usable barrier. Libby made progress on understanding the chemistry of uranium hexafluoride, leading to ideas on how to prevent corrosion and plugging. Chemical researchers at the SAM Laboratories studied fluorocarbons, which resisted corrosion and could be used as lubricants and coolants in the gaseous diffusion plant. Despite this progress, the K-25 Project was in serious trouble without a suitable barrier, and by August 1943 it was facing cancellation. On 13 August Groves informed the Military Policy Committee (the senior committee that steered the Manhattan Project) that gaseous diffusion enrichment in excess of fifty percent was probably infeasible, and the gaseous diffusion plant would be limited to producing product with a lower enrichment which could be fed into the calutrons of the Y-12 electromagnetic plant. Urey therefore began preparations to mass-produce the Norris-Adler barrier, despite its problems.[40]

Meanwhile, Union Carbide and Kellex had made researchers at the Bakelite Corporation, a subsidiary of Union Carbide, aware of Nix's unsuccessful efforts with powdered nickel barriers. To Frazier Groff and other researchers at Bakelite's laboratories in Bound Brook, New Jersey, it seemed that Nix was not taking advantage of the latest techniques, and they began their own development efforts. Both Bell and Bound Brook sent samples of their powdered nickel barriers to Taylor for evaluation, but he was unimpressed; neither had come up with a practical barrier. At Kellogg's laboratory in Jersey City, New Jersey, Clarence A. Johnson, who was aware of the steps taken by the SAM Laboratories to improve the Norris-Adler barrier, realized that they could also be taken with the Bakelite barrier. The result was a barrier better than either, although still short of what was required. At a meeting at Columbia with the Army in attendance on 20 October 1943, Keith proposed switching the development effort to the Johnson barrier. Urey balked at this, fearing this would destroy morale at the SAM Laboratories. The issue was put to Groves at a meeting on 3 November 1943, and he decided to pursue development of both the Johnson and the Norris-Adler barriers.[41]

Groves summoned British help, in the form of Wallace Akers and fifteen members of the British gaseous diffusion project, who reviewed the progress made thus far.[42] Their verdict was that while the new barrier was potentially superior, Keith's undertaking to build a new facility to produce the new barrier in just four months, produce all the barriers required in another four and have the production facility up and running in just twelve "would be something of a miraculous achievement".[43] On 16 January 1944, Groves ruled in favor of the Johnson barrier. Johnson built a pilot plant for the new process at the Nash Building. Taylor analyzed the sample barriers produced and pronounced only 5 percent of them to be of acceptable quality. Edward Mack Jr. created his own pilot plant at Schermerhorn Hall at Columbia, and Groves obtained 80 short tons (73 t) of nickel from the International Nickel Company. With plenty of nickel to work with, by April 1944 both pilot plants were producing barriers of acceptable quality at a 45 percent rate.[44]

Construction

[edit]

The project site chosen was at the Clinton Engineer Works in Tennessee. The area was inspected by representatives of the Manhattan District, Kellex and Union Carbide on 18 January 1943. Consideration was also given to sites near the Shasta Dam in California and the Big Bend of the Columbia River in Washington state. The lower humidity of these areas made them more suitable for a gaseous diffusion plant, but the Clinton Engineer Works site was immediately available and otherwise suitable. Groves decided on the site in April 1943.[45]

Under the contract, Kellex had responsibility not just for the design and engineering of the K-25 plant, but for its construction as well. The prime construction contractor was J. A. Jones Construction from Charlotte, North Carolina. It had impressed Groves with its work on several major Army construction projects,[46] such as Camp Shelby, Mississippi.[47] There were more than sixty subcontractors.[48] Kellex engaged another construction company, Ford, Bacon & Davis, to build the fluorine and nitrogen facilities, and the conditioning plant.[48] Construction work was initially the responsibility of Lieutenant Colonel Warren George, the chief of the construction division of the Clinton Engineer Works. Major W. P. Cornelius became the construction officer responsible for K-25 works on 31 July 1943.[49] He was answerable to Stowers back in Manhattan.[48] He became chief of the construction division on 1 March 1946.[49] J. J. Allison was the resident engineer from Kellex, and Edwin L. Jones, the General Manager of J. A. Jones.[50]

Power plant

[edit]
K-25 power plant (the building with three smoke stacks) in 1945. The dark building behind it is the S-50 thermal diffusion plant.

Construction began before completion of the design for the gaseous diffusion process. Because of the large amount of electric power the K-25 plant was expected to consume, it was decided to provide it with its own electric power plant. While the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) believed it could supply the Clinton Engineer Works' needs, there was unease about relying on a single supplier when a power failure could cost the gaseous diffusion plant weeks of work, and the lines to TVA could be sabotaged. A local plant was more secure. The Kellex engineers were also attracted to the idea of being able to generate the variable frequency current required by the gaseous diffusion process without complicated transformers.[51]

A site was chosen for this on the western edge of the Clinton Engineer Works site where it could draw cold water from the Clinch River and discharge warm water into Poplar Creek without affecting the inflow. Groves approved this location on 3 May 1943.[52] Surveying began on the power plant site on 31 May, and J. A. Jones started construction work the following day. Because the bedrock was 35 to 40 feet (11 to 12 m) below the surface, the power plant was supported on 40 concrete-filled caissons.[53] Installation of the first boiler commenced in October 1943.[54] Construction work was complete by late September.[55] To prevent sabotage, the power plant was connected to the gaseous diffusion plant by an underground conduit. Despite this, there was one act of sabotage, in which a nail was driven through the electric cable. The culprit was never found but was considered more likely to be a disgruntled employee than an Axis spy.[46]

Electric power in the United States was generated at 60 hertz; the power house was able to generate variable frequencies between 45 and 60 hertz, and constant frequencies of 60 and 120 hertz. This capability was not ultimately required, and all but one of the K-25 systems ran on a constant 60 hertz, the exception using a constant 120 hertz.[54] The first coal-fired boiler was started on 7 April 1944, followed by the second on 14 July and the third on 2 November.[55] Each produced 750,000 pounds (340,000 kg) of steam per hour 1,325 pounds per square inch (9,140 kPa) and 935 °F (502 °C).[54] To obtain the fourteen turbine generators needed, Groves had to use the Manhattan Project's priority to overrule Julius Albert Krug, the director of the Office of War Utilities.[56] The turbine generators had a combined output of 238,000 kilowatts. The power plant could also receive power from TVA. It was decommissioned in the 1960s and demolished in 1995.[54]

Gaseous diffusion plant

[edit]

A site for the K-25 facility was chosen near the high school of the town of Wheat. As the dimensions of the K-25 facility became more apparent, it was decided to move it to a larger site near Poplar Creek, closer to the power plant. This site was approved on 24 June 1943.[52] Considerable work was required to prepare the site. Existing roads in the area were improved to take heavy traffic. A 5.1-mile (8.2 km) road was built to connect the site to US Route 70, and another, 5 miles (8.0 km) long, to connect with Tennessee State Route 61. A ferry over the Clinch River was upgraded and then replaced with a 360-foot (110 m) long bridge in December 1943. A 10.7-mile (17.2 km) railroad spur was run from Blair, Tennessee, to the K-25 site. Some 12.9 miles (20.8 km) of sidings were also provided. The first carload of freight traversed the line on 18 September 1943.[57]

K-25 under construction

It was initially intended that the construction workers should live off-site, but the poor condition of the roads and a shortage of accommodations in the area made commuting long and difficult, which in turn made it difficult to find and retain workers. Thus construction workers were housed in large hutment and trailer camps. The J. A. Jones camp for K-25 workers, known as Happy Valley,[58] held 15,000 people. This required 8 dormitories, 17 barracks, 1,590 hutments, 1,153 trailers and 100 Victory Houses.[59] A pumping station was built to supply drinking water from the Clinch River, along with a water treatment plant.[60] Amenities included a school, eight cafeterias, a bakery, theater, three recreation halls, a warehouse and a cold storage plant.[59] Ford, Bacon & Davis established a smaller camp for 2,100 people.[59] Responsibility for the camps was transferred to the Roane-Anderson Company on 25 January 1946, and the school was transferred to district control in March 1946.[61]

Work began on the 130-acre (53 ha) main facility area on 20 October 1943. Although the site was generally flat, some 3,500,000 cubic yards (2,700,000 m3) of soil and rock had to be excavated from areas up to 46 feet (14 m) high, and six major areas had to be filled, to a maximum depth of 23.5 feet (7.2 m). Normally buildings containing complicated heavy machinery would rest on concrete caissons down to the bedrock, but this would have required thousands of caissons. To save time, soil compaction and shallow footings were used instead. Layers were laid down and compacted with sheepsfoot rollers in the areas that had to be filled, and the footings were laid over compacted soil in the low-lying areas and the undisturbed soil in the areas that had been excavated. Activities overlapped, so concrete pouring began while grading was still going on.[62][63] Cranes started lifting the steel frames into place on 19 January 1944.[64]

K-25 under construction

Kellex's design for the main process building of K-25 called for a four-story U-shaped structure 0.5 miles (0.80 km) long containing 51 main process buildings and three purge cascade buildings.[64] These were divided into nine sections. Within these were cells of six stages. The cells could be operated independently or consecutively within a section. Similarly, the sections could be operated separately or as part of a single cascade.[65] When completed, there were 2,892 stages.[66] The basement housed the auxiliary equipment, such as the transformers, switch gears, and air conditioning systems. The ground floor contained the cells. The third level contained the piping. The fourth floor was the operating floor, which contained the control room and the hundreds of instrument panels. From here, the operators monitored the process.[67] The first section was ready for test runs on 17 April 1944, although the barriers were not yet ready to be installed.[63]

The main process building surpassed The Pentagon as the largest building in the world,[67] with a floor area of 5,264,000 square feet (489,000 m2), and an enclosed volume of 97,500,000 cubic feet (2,760,000 m3).[64] Construction required 200,000 cubic yards (150,000 m3) of concrete and 100 miles (160 km) of gas pipes.[68] Because uranium hexafluoride corrodes steel and steel piping had to be coated in nickel, smaller pipes were made of copper or monel.[67] The equipment operated under vacuum pressures, so plumbing had to be air tight. Special efforts were made to create as clean an environment as possible to areas where piping or fixtures were being installed. J. A. Jones established a special cleanliness unit on 18 April 1944. Buildings were completely sealed off, air was filtered, and all cleaning was with vacuum cleaners and mopping. Workers wore white lint-free gloves.[69] At the peak of construction activity in May 1945, 25,266 people were employed on the site.[70]

Other buildings

[edit]

Although by far the largest, the main process building (K-300) was but one of many that made up the facility. There was a conditioning building (K-1401), where piping and equipment were cleaned prior to installation. A feed purification building (K-101) was built to remove impurities from the uranium hexafluoride, but never operated as such because the suppliers provided feed pure enough to be fed into the gaseous diffusion process. The three-story surge and waste removal building (K-601) processed the "tail" stream of depleted uranium hexafluoride. The air conditioning building (K-1401) provided 76,500 cubic feet (2,170 m3) per minute of clean, dry air. K-1201 compressed the air. The nitrogen plant (K-1408) provided gas for use as a pump sealant and to protect equipment from moist air.[67][71][72]

The K-1001 administration building provided 2 acres (0.81 ha) of office space

The fluorine generating plant (K-1300) generated, bottled and stored fluorine.[71] It had not been in great demand before the war, and Kellex and the Manhattan District considered four different processes for large-scale production. A process developed by the Hooker Chemical Company was chosen. Owing to the hazardous nature of fluorine, it was decided that shipping it across the United States was inadvisable and it should be manufactured on site at the Clinton Engineer Works.[73] Two pump houses (K-801 and K-802) and two cooling towers (H-801 and H-802) provided 135,000,000 US gallons (510 ML) of cooling water per day for the motors and compressors.[67][71][72]

The administration building (K-1001) provided 2 acres (0.81 ha) of office space. A laboratory building (K-1401) contained facilities for testing and analyzing feed and product. Five drum warehouses (K-1025-A to -E) had 4,300 square feet (400 m2) of floor space to store drums of uranium hexafluoride. There were also warehouses for general stores (K-1035), spare parts (K-1036), and equipment (K-1037). A cafeteria (K-1002) provided meal facilities, including a segregated lunch room for African Americans. There were three changing houses (K-1008-A, B and C), a dispensary (K-1003), an instrument repair building (K-1024), and a fire station (K-1021).[67][71]

In mid-January 1945, Kellex proposed an extension to K-25 to allow product enrichment of up to 85 percent. Groves initially approved this but later canceled it in favor of a 540-stage side feed unit, which became known as K-27, which could process a slightly enriched product. This could then be fed into K-25 or the calutrons at Y-12. Kellex estimated that using the enriched feed from K-27 could lift the output from K-25 from 35 to 60 percent uranium-235.[63] Construction started at K-27 on 3 April 1945[74] and was completed in December 1945.[67] The five drum warehouses were moved by truck to make way for K-27. The construction work was expedited by making it "virtually a Chinese copy" of a section of K-25.[75] By 31 December 1946, when the Manhattan Project ended, 110,048,961 man-hours of construction work had been performed at the K-25 site.[50] The total cost, including that of K-27, was $479,589,999 (equivalent to $6.61 billion in 2024[76]).[77]

The water tower (K-1206-F) was a 382-foot (116 m) tall structure that held 400,000 US gallons (1,500,000 L) of water. It was built in 1958 by the Chicago Bridge and Iron Company and served as reservoir for the fire suppression system. Over 1.5 million pounds (680 tonnes) of steel was used in its construction. It operated until June 2013 and was demolished in August 2013.[78]

Operations

[edit]
The K-25 control room

The preliminary specification for the K-25 plant in March 1943 called for it to produce 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) per day of product that was 90 percent uranium-235.[79] As the practical difficulties were realized, this target was reduced to 36 percent. On the other hand, the cascade design meant construction did not need to be complete before the plant started operating.[80] In August 1943, Kellex submitted a schedule that called for a capability to produce material enriched to 5 percent uranium-235 by 1 June 1945; 15 percent by 1 July; and 36 percent by 23 August.[81] This schedule was revised in August 1944 to 0.9 percent by 1 January 1945; 5 percent by 10 June; 15 percent by 1 August; 23 percent by 13 September; and 36 percent as soon as possible after that.[82]

A meeting between the Manhattan District and Kellogg on 12 December 1942 recommended the K-25 plant be operated by Union Carbide. This would be through a wholly owned subsidiary, Carbon and Carbide Chemicals. A cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was signed on 18 January 1943, setting the fee at $75,000 per month. This was later increased to $96,000 per month to operate both K-25 and K-27.[83] Union Carbide did not wish to be the sole operator of the facility; Union Carbide suggested the conditioning plant be built and operated by Ford, Bacon & Davis. The Manhattan District found this acceptable, and a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract was negotiated with a fee of $216,000 for services up to the end of June 1945. The contract was terminated early on 1 May 1945, when Union Carbide took over the plant. Ford, Bacon & Davis was therefore paid $202,000.[84] The other exception was the fluorine plant. Hooker Chemical was asked to supervise its construction of the fluorine plant and initially to operate it for a fixed fee of $24,500. The plant was turned over to Union Carbide on 1 February 1945.[73]

A worker on a bicycle in the K-25 operating level

Part of the K-300 complex was taken over by Union Carbide in August 1944 and was run as a pilot plant, training operators and developing procedures, using nitrogen instead of uranium hexafluoride until October 1944, and then perfluoroheptane until April 1945.[83] The design of the gaseous diffusion plant allowed for it to be completed in sections and for the sections to be put into operation while work continued on the others. J. A. Jones completed the first 60 stages by the end of 1944. Before each stage was accepted, it underwent tests by J. A. Jones, Carbide and Carbon, and SAM Laboratories technicians to verify that the equipment was working and there were no leaks. Between four and six hundred people devoted eight months to this testing. Perfluoroheptane was used as a test fluid until February 1945, when it was decided to use uranium hexafluoride despite its corrosive nature.[85]

Manhattan District engineer Colonel Kenneth Nichols placed Major John J. Moran in charge of production at K-25. Production commenced in February 1945,[85] and the first product was shipped to the calutrons in March.[86] By April, the gaseous diffusion plant was producing 1.1 percent product.[87] It was then decided that instead of processing uranium hexafluoride feed from the Harshaw Chemical Company, the gaseous diffusion plant would take the product of the S-50 thermal diffusion plant, with an average enrichment of about 0.85 percent.[88] Product enrichment continued to improve as more stages came online and performed better than anticipated. By June product was being enriched to 7 percent; by September it was 23 percent.[87] The S-50 plant ceased operation on 9 September,[89] and Kellex transferred the last unit to Union Carbide on 11 September.[77] Highly enriched uranium was used in the Little Boy atomic bomb used in the bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August.[90]

Air compressors and water pumps in the K-1101 air conditioning building

With the end of the war in August 1945, the Manhattan Project's priority shifted from speed to economy and efficiency. The cascades were configurable, so they could produce a large amount of slightly enriched product by running them in parallel, or a small amount of highly enriched product through running them in series. By early 1946, with K-27 in operation, the facility was producing 3.6 kilograms (7.9 lb) per day, enriched to 30 percent. The next step was to increase the enrichment further to 60 percent. This was achieved on 20 July 1946. This presented a problem, because Y-12 was not equipped to handle feed that was so highly enriched, but the Los Alamos Laboratory required 95 percent. For a time, product was mixed with feed to reduce the enrichment to 30 percent. Taking the concentration up to 95 percent raised safety concerns, as there was the risk of a criticality accident.[91]

After some deliberation, with opinions sought and obtained from Percival Keith, Norris Bradbury, Darol Froman, Elmer E. Kirkpatrick, Kenneth Nichols and Edward Teller,[92] it was decided that this could be done safely if appropriate precautions were taken. On 28 November 1946, the K-25 plant began producing 94 percent product. At this point, they ran into a serious flaw in the gaseous diffusion concept: enrichment in uranium-235 also enriched the product in the unwanted and fairly useless uranium-234, making it difficult to raise the enrichment to 95 percent. On 6 December 1946, production was dropped back to a steady 2.56 kilograms (5.6 lb) per day enriched to 93.7 percent uranium-235, along with 1.9 percent uranium-234. This was regarded as a satisfactory product by the Los Alamos Laboratory, so on 26 December 1946 enrichment activity at Y-12 was curtailed. The Manhattan Project ended a few days later. Responsibility for the K-25 facility then passed to the newly established Atomic Energy Commission on 1 January 1947.[93] Workers at the plant were represented by the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union.[94]

Closure and demolition

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The K-25 complex in 2006

K-25 became a prototype for other gaseous diffusion facilities established in the early post-war years. The first of these was the 374,000-square-foot (34,700 m2) K-27 completed in September 1945. It was followed by the 15-acre (6.1 ha) K-29 in 1951, the 20-acre (8.1 ha) K-31 in 1951 and the 32-acre (13 ha) K-33 in 1954.[95] Gaseous diffusion facilities were built at Paducah, Kentucky, in 1952,[96] and Portsmouth, Ohio, in 1954.[97] The K-25 plant was renamed the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 1955.[98]

Today, uranium isotope separation is usually done by the more energy-efficient ultra centrifuge process,[99] developed in the Soviet Union after World War II by Soviet and captured German engineers working in detention.[100] The centrifuge process was the first isotope separation method considered for the Manhattan Project but was abandoned due to technical challenges early in the project. When German scientists and engineers were released from Soviet captivity in the mid-1950s, the West became aware of the ultra centrifuge design and began shifting uranium enrichment to this much more efficient process. As centrifuge technology advanced, it became possible to carry out uranium enrichment on a smaller scale without the vast resources that were necessary to build and operate 1940s and 1950s "K" and "Y" style separation plants, a development which had the effect of increasing nuclear proliferation concerns.[101]

Demolition of K-25 in progress in April 2012

Centrifuge cascades began operating at Oak Ridge in 1961. A gas centrifuge test facility (K-1210) opened in 1975, followed by a larger centrifuge plant demonstration facility (K-1220) in 1982. In response to an order from President Lyndon B. Johnson to cut production of enriched uranium by 25 percent, K-25 and K-27 ceased production in 1964, but in 1969 K-25 began producing uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent for use in nuclear reactors. Martin Marietta Energy replaced Union Carbide as the operator in 1984. Gaseous diffusion ceased on 27 August 1985. The Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant was renamed the Oak Ridge K-25 Site in 1989 and the East Tennessee Technology Park in 1996.[98] Production of enriched uranium using gaseous diffusion ceased in Portsmouth in 2001 and at Paducah in 2013.[102] Presently all commercial uranium enrichment in the United States is carried out using gas centrifuge technology.[103]

The United States Department of Energy contracted with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd in 1997 to decontaminate and decommission the facilities. Its subsidiary Reactor Sites Management Company Limited was acquired by EnergySolutions in June 2007. Initially K-29, K-31 and K-33 were to be retained for other uses, but it was subsequently decided to demolish them. Bechtel Jacobs, the environmental management contractor, assumed responsibility for the facility in July 2005. Demolition of K-29 began in January 2006 and was completed in August.[95] Demolition of K-33 began in January 2011 and was completed ahead of schedule in September.[104] It was followed by the demolition of K-31, which began in October 2014[105] and was completed in June 2015.[106]

Bechtel Jacobs was contracted to dismantle and demolish the K-25 facility in September 2008. The contract, valued at $1.48 billion, was made retrospective to October 2007[107] and ended in August 2011. Demolition work was then carried out by URS | CH2M Hill Oak Ridge.[108] Demolition was completed in March 2014 [109][110] Demolition of K-27, the last of the five gaseous diffusion facilities at Oak Ridge, began in February 2016.[111] US Senator Lamar Alexander and US Congressman Chuck Fleischmann joined 1,500 workers to watch the final wall come down on 30 August 2016. Its demolition was completed in February 2017.[112] Since 2020, the K-25 site is being redeveloped in part into a general aviation airport to service the city of Oak Ridge.[113] Several small private nuclear facilities are also planned on the site.[114][115][116]

Commemoration

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On 27 February 2020, the K-25 History Center, a 7,500-square foot museum opened at the site. The museum is a branch of the American Museum of Science and Energy and features hundreds of original artifacts and interactive exhibits related to the K-25 site.[117][118][119]

Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
K-25 was the codename for a massive facility at , constructed as part of the to enrich by separating the fissile from uranium-238. The plant, designed and built by the Kellex Corporation, utilized thousands of porous barrier stages in cascades to exploit the slight mass difference between the isotopes, enabling industrial-scale production of enriched gas. Spanning a mile in length with a U-shaped layout covering 44 acres under a single roof, it was the world's largest building when completed in 1944, surpassing even in floor area at over five million square feet. Construction began in 1943 amid intense secrecy, employing tens of thousands of workers and pioneering engineering feats like high-capacity to maintain process conditions. Although full operations commenced in early 1945—after the atomic bombings of and —K-25's development validated as a viable method, producing moderately enriched (up to about 90 percent in later stages) that fed electromagnetic separation at Y-12 and supported postwar nuclear weapons and reactor fuel programs until its shutdown in 1964. Its legacy includes advancing technology but also long-term environmental challenges from and chemical contaminants, culminating in decades of and efforts completed in 2014.

Historical Context

Origins in the Manhattan Project

The K-25 program emerged from early Manhattan Project research into uranium isotope separation methods, driven by the need to produce weapons-grade uranium-235 for atomic bombs. Gaseous diffusion investigations began around 1940 at Columbia University under sponsorship from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, with Nobel laureate Harold Urey playing a pivotal role in advancing the concept of separating uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas through porous barriers based on differing molecular velocities of U-235 and U-238 isotopes. By July 1, 1941, the Office of Scientific Research and Development awarded Columbia a contract to study gaseous diffusion at the SAM Laboratories, led by John R. Dunning. The method gained traction following the British MAUD Committee's 1941 report endorsing gaseous diffusion's feasibility and the U.S. Lewis Committee's 1942 prioritization of it over alternatives like electromagnetic separation, prompting parallel development paths to hedge uncertainties. On January 19, 1942, President approved atomic weapon production, encompassing uranium separation efforts, and on December 28, 1942, he authorized a full-scale plant despite unresolved technical challenges, such as developing an effective diffusion barrier. director General endorsed K-25's construction in late 1942, assigning it the codename for the initiative at , as part of a diversified strategy integrating it with the Y-12 electromagnetic plant. By May 1, 1943, Columbia's studies were fully absorbed into the under Urey's direction, accelerating engineering for industrial-scale application. The K-25 site was selected on April 13, 1943, about 11 miles southwest of the to leverage existing infrastructure while maintaining secrecy. Initially envisioned to achieve high-enrichment levels independently, late summer 1943 assessments adjusted its role to generate approximately 50% feed for Y-12's final stages, optimizing timelines amid barrier development delays and emphasizing redundancy across enrichment technologies.

Site Selection and Initial Secrecy Measures

In spring 1942, the S-1 Board, headed by Murphree, initiated the process for facilities intended for or centrifuge-based uranium enrichment as part of the Project's uranium program. Key criteria included access to a large, reliable supply of from the (TVA), an adequate and silt-free water source from the (ensured by the upstream ), flat terrain divided by hills for compartmentalization, proximity within 20 miles of Knoxville for labor and logistics, railroad access, inexpensive land, and minimal population displacement to facilitate rapid acquisition and construction. A survey group led by Zola G. Deutsch evaluated potential locations, emphasizing these factors to support the energy-intensive process later designated K-25. By June 1942, the , chaired by , recommended acquiring a site in eastern meeting these specifications. On September 13-14, 1942, the committee finalized plans to acquire the land and construct an initial electromagnetic separation plant capable of 100 grams per day of , with the broader site to accommodate multiple enrichment methods including . Following James C. Marshall's replacement by General on September 17, Groves approved the Oak Ridge site—spanning approximately 55,000 to 59,000 acres along the , 20 miles west of Knoxville—on September 19, 1942, displacing around 1,000 families at a cost of $3.5 million. The location's rural isolation, natural barriers of ridges and valleys for compartmentalization, inland position reducing to attack, and cheap land averaging $48 per acre made it preferable over denser or coastal alternatives. Land acquisition proceeded under in fall 1942, with residents evicted without disclosure of the project's purpose to maintain operational secrecy. The site, initially codenamed "Site X" and later designated the in spring 1943, featured restricted access enforced by guarded gates, military police patrols, and extensive fencing to prevent unauthorized entry or observation. Production facilities, including the future K-25 plant, were sited in valleys for natural concealment and containment of potential hazards. Workers and residents were required to sign oaths of secrecy prohibiting discussion of activities, with the city's existence omitted from public maps and mail routed through Knoxville post offices without specific addresses; violations risked severe penalties under wartime laws. These measures ensured that even as construction ramped up—beginning for K-25 in fall 1943—the site's role in enrichment remained unknown to most personnel until the atomic bombings of and in August 1945.

Technical Principles

Gaseous Diffusion Process

The gaseous diffusion process separates uranium isotopes by exploiting the difference in diffusion rates of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) molecules containing 235U and 238U through semi-permeable porous barriers. Natural uranium, primarily 238U with 0.7% 235U, is converted to UF6 gas, which sublimes at 56.5°C under atmospheric pressure, allowing it to be handled as a vapor in the plant's diffusion units. Lighter 235UF6 molecules, with a molecular mass of 349 u, diffuse approximately 0.43% faster than 238UF6 (352 u) due to higher average thermal velocities, following Graham's law where the rate ratio equals the square root of the inverse mass ratio. In operation, compressed UF6 gas enters a diffuser cell at higher pressure on one side of a barrier, partially diffusing to the lower-pressure side where the permeate is slightly enriched in U, while the retentate on the high-pressure side is depleted. This single-stage enrichment is minimal (α ≈ 1.0043), necessitating a cascade of thousands of identical stages arranged in parallel and serial configurations to achieve progressively higher U concentrations, with systems maintaining pressure differentials across barriers and exchangers managing the exothermic compression. Feed gas from or prior enrichment stages enters at intermediate points, with product withdrawn at high enrichment and tails discarded or recycled. At K-25, the process was scaled industrially within a vast U-shaped building housing over 4,000 , operational by late , producing enriched to 23% 235U by August 1945 after initial runs reached 7% in . The technology required precise control of gas flow, (typically 10-15 psi differentials), and temperature to minimize back-diffusion and ensure efficiency, with the overall separation factor derived from the product of individual factors compounded across the cascade.

Uranium Isotope Separation Challenges

The minute mass difference between (235 atomic mass units) and (238 atomic mass units), comprising only 0.72% of , inherently limited the efficiency of methods, necessitating processes capable of exploiting subtle physical differences in molecular behavior. In , uranium was converted to (UF6), a volatile compound with molecular weights of 349 for 235UF6 and 352 for 238UF6; the ideal single-stage separation factor, governed by of diffusion, was thus approximately 1.0043, calculated as √(352/349). This minuscule increment per stage demanded a vast cascade of sequential diffusion units—over 4,000 in total for K-25 to achieve high enrichment levels from feed material—amplifying risks of inefficiencies, leaks, and system failures across the interconnected process. The most critical engineering obstacle was developing porous barrier membranes that permitted selective diffusion of the lighter 235UF6 molecules while withstanding operational pressures and the corrosive nature of UF6 gas, which reacts aggressively with moisture to produce (HF) and uranyl fluoride. Barriers required uniform pores sized in the range—small enough to leverage the isotopes' differing effusion rates but large enough for adequate gas throughput—yet robust to prevent rupture under the repeated compression-expansion cycles in each stage. Early prototypes, tested in pilot plants like the 12-stage unit at Columbia University's Pupin Physics Laboratory, failed due to insufficient permeability, mechanical fragility, or chemical degradation, delaying full-scale viability until proprietary techniques yielded acceptable nickel-based materials by mid-1944. Operational demands further compounded these issues: each stage required high-capacity compressors to maintain pressure gradients, with the entire K-25 cascade necessitating specialized nickel-plated piping to mitigate UF6-induced and vast electrical power for pumping and cooling, contributing to peak consumption of 200 million kWh monthly by 1945—equivalent to powering 20,000 homes. The unproven scalability of the process, untested beyond laboratory models at wartime inception, risked total failure if barriers clogged or cascades unbalanced, underscoring the Manhattan Project's high-stakes gamble on over alternatives like electromagnetic separation. Despite these hurdles, iterative refinements enabled K-25 startup in 1945, though initial output was limited to low enrichment levels pending barrier optimizations.

Research and Development

Barrier Material Innovations

The development of suitable barrier materials represented the most significant technical hurdle in realizing the for enrichment at K-25, as the barriers required billions of submicrometer pores—approximately 1/10,000th of a millimeter in —to enable the slight differential diffusion rate between and hexafluoride molecules while withstanding corrosive conditions, high pressure differentials up to 1 psi per stage, and mechanical stresses without clogging or leaking. Early research at Columbia University's SAM Laboratories under John Dunning explored various materials, but none proved scalable until nickel emerged as the frontrunner due to its corrosion resistance to byproducts and ability to form uniform porous structures via . Kellex Corporation, responsible for K-25's engineering design, innovated the primary barrier configuration under Clarence Johnson's leadership, employing a sintered powder process where fine particles—sourced from the International Nickel Company in —were packed into tubular forms, compressed, and heated to fuse into a thin, porous with controlled pore sizes optimized for a separation factor of about 1.0043 per . This approach overcame earlier failures with materials like silver and alumina, which lacked durability or producibility, and was selected over competing designs such as the Norris-Adler etched-metal barrier in 1944 after pilot testing demonstrated acceptable quality yields of around 45% in scaled production. and Houdaille-Hershey Corporation contributed to fabrication refinements, including hermetic sealing and anti-clogging treatments, enabling of over 3,000 barriers per across K-25's 2,892- cascade by early 1945. These innovations addressed a critical "barrier crisis" in mid-1944, when initial prototypes suffered from inconsistencies in pore uniformity and vulnerability to oxyfluoride precipitation from trace moisture, necessitating rigorous quality control and iterative parameter adjustments to achieve the required mechanical integrity under operational pressures exceeding 10 psi cumulatively. The resulting barriers facilitated K-25's startup in , producing feed material enriched to 0.86% U-235 for further processing, though full weapons-grade output was limited by the process's inherent inefficiency requiring thousands of cascaded stages. Postwar, these techniques informed subsequent plants like K-31 and K-33 at Oak Ridge, with barrier durability extending operational life into the era until corrosion and obsolescence prompted decommissioning in the 1980s.

Equipment and Process Engineering

The K-25 plant utilized a multistage cascade process for uranium isotope separation, with approximately 4,400 individual stages arranged in parallel and series configurations to incrementally enrich uranium-235 from natural uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) feed material. Each stage operated on the principle of differential diffusion rates through porous barriers, exploiting the slight mass difference between ²³⁵UF₆ and ²³⁸UF₆ molecules, yielding a separation factor of about 1.0043 per stage. The process required precise pressure differentials, typically 10-20 inches of water across barriers, maintained across the entire cascade to achieve product enrichment levels up to 23% U-235 initially, with tails depletion to below 0.3%. Core equipment in each stage included axial-flow compressors, heat exchangers, and converters. Compressors, manufactured by , featured rotor-stator blade assemblies with leak-proof seals designed to handle corrosive UF₆ without lubricants, preventing contamination and ensuring vacuum-tight operation; over 7,000 such units were installed. Heat exchangers, supplied by firms like and Whitlock Manufacturing, cooled the compressed gas to optimize diffusion conditions by removing heat of compression, using water or circuits integrated into the process loop. Converters consisted of corrosion-resistant nickel-plated tanks housing bundles of barrier tubes, where UF₆ gas was introduced at higher pressure on one side, allowing the enriched fraction to permeate through microscopic pores (on the order of 10 nanometers) to the lower-pressure side for transfer to the next stage. Engineering challenges centered on scaling the to industrial levels while managing , , and material integrity under high vacuum and chemical aggression. Piping systems employed over 3 million feet of alloy for UF₆ transport, with automated controls minimizing human intervention in the sealed cells to reduce risks. Depleted stream recycling and feed introduction points were engineered for efficiency, with the cascade design allowing modular startup of sections as barriers proved viable, ultimately enabling full operation by early 1945 despite initial delays in barrier fabrication. The system's redundancy and automation represented pioneering for nuclear applications, handling gas flows equivalent to thousands of cubic feet per minute across the facility.

Key Personnel and Organizational Structure

The research and development phase of the K-25 gaseous diffusion process was coordinated through collaborative efforts involving academic institutions, such as , and industrial contractors selected by the leadership. Key scientific leadership included John Dunning, a who directed early experimental work on gaseous diffusion for uranium isotope separation at Columbia, contributing to the foundational proof-of-concept demonstrations that validated the method's feasibility. Industrial oversight was provided by the Kellex Corporation, a special-purpose of the M.W. Kellogg Company formed specifically for the project to handle engineering design, barrier innovation, and process scaling; Manson Benedict served as a chief technical leader at Kellex, guiding the development of diffusion cascades and barrier materials essential to achieving viable enrichment rates. In parallel, & Carbon Corporation, chosen by director General for its expertise in handling corrosive gases and large-scale chemical processes, assumed management of barrier production and integration starting in April 1944, with Dr. George T. Felbeck holding primary responsibility for advancing the powdered barriers from laboratory prototypes to industrial deployment. The organizational structure emphasized a division of labor between , engineering, and operations: academic and laboratory teams focused on theoretical and small-scale validation, while Kellex managed the transition to pilot plants and full-scale design specifications, including the configuration of over 5,000 staged units. Union Carbide's role extended to operational R&D, integrating process controls and safety protocols for handling, under a hierarchical framework reporting to the District's Clinton Engineer Works administration. This contractor-led model, overseen by military authorities, enabled rapid iteration despite challenges like barrier permeability and , culminating in the first successful cascade operations by mid-1945. Later figures, such as Clark E. Center, who rose to general superintendent during the transition to production, exemplified the blend of technical and managerial expertise required.

Construction Phase

Project Scale and Timeline

Construction of the K-25 plant commenced in under the direction of the Kellex Corporation as part of the Manhattan Project's enrichment efforts at . The project achieved completion in early 1945, spanning less than two years—a remarkably accelerated timeline driven by wartime imperatives and innovative engineering practices. This rapid pace enabled the facility to transition swiftly to operational status, contributing to the production of for atomic weapons. The scale of K-25 was immense, making it the largest building under a single roof in the world upon completion, surpassing even in . The U-shaped structure extended half a mile in length and 1,000 feet in width, encompassing a 44-acre footprint designed to house thousands of diffusion stages for . Total construction costs reached approximately $500 million, reflecting the project's status as one of the Project's most expensive components and underscoring the resource mobilization required. Workforce demands were equally staggering, with the facility ultimately requiring 12,000 workers for operations, while phases involved peak of comparable magnitude to erect the complex infrastructure amid wartime labor shortages. The endeavor's logistical coordination, including the fabrication and installation of specialized barrier materials and piping networks, exemplified the era's industrial mobilization, though it strained supply chains and engineering limits.

Supporting Infrastructure and Power Systems

The K-25 plant demanded unprecedented electrical power for its thousands of vacuum pumps and compressors, which drove the gas through diffusion barriers. To meet this need, an on-site power house was constructed, capable of generating and regulating , with initial reliance on coal-fired boilers for generation. This facility also interfaced with the (TVA) grid to handle peak loads and provide redundancy, as TVA's hydroelectric capacity in the region was expanded specifically to support sites. By the late , TVA supplied a substantial portion of the site's , reflecting the plant's operational scale after wartime completion. Steam generation formed a critical auxiliary system, powering turbines, heating processes, and supporting initial enrichment stages. The original power house boilers were supplemented by Plant F-06, a dedicated steam facility erected as K-25 ramped up operations in 1945, addressing the surge in demand from the main diffusion building and adjacent processes like the S-50 thermal diffusion pilot plant. These systems ensured continuous operation amid the facility's 44-acre process structure, where steam lines distributed heat across control areas and equipment bays. Water infrastructure underpinned cooling and process needs, with extensive pumping and distribution networks drawing from the and on-site reservoirs. Multiple water towers, including the prominent K-1206-F structure, elevated storage to maintain pressure for cooling towers that dissipated heat from compressors and condensers. Circulation volumes reached hundreds of millions of gallons daily through these towers, preventing thermal overload in the energy-intensive diffusion stages. Additional utilities encompassed , drainage, and lines integrated into the site's sprawling layout to sustain 24-hour production.

Engineering and Logistical Feats

The construction of K-25 exemplified engineering audacity and logistical coordination on an immense scale, erecting what became the world's largest building under a single roof in less than two years during wartime exigencies. Initiated in June 1943 under the prime contractor J.A. Jones Construction Company, with by the Kellex Corporation, the project transformed a secluded site in , into a U-shaped, four-story complex spanning half a mile by 1,000 feet and exceeding in floor area. By March 1945, the main process building, covering 44 acres, stood substantially complete, enabling initial operations despite the unproven nature of the technology. Logistically, the endeavor mobilized a peak workforce of 19,680 construction personnel by April 1944, many accommodated in makeshift camps like Happy Valley amid the site's isolation and secrecy protocols. Material procurement faced acute wartime scarcities, yet the project amassed sufficient steel framing, concrete, and piping—requiring innovative supply chains—to support over 3,000 stages across multiple levels. The total outlay reached approximately $512 million, underscoring the Project's prioritization of speed over conventional deliberation. Engineering challenges were surmounted through adaptive techniques, including specialized to bear the weight of the mile-long roof and ensure vibration-free environments critical for the precision apparatus. Construction advanced parallel to unresolved elements, such as barrier fabrication, a gamble that paid off by delivering the facility's core ahead of full . This rapid prototyping at industrial scale highlighted causal linkages between accelerated decision-making and breakthrough achievements under duress.

Operational History

Startup and Early Production

The K-25 gaseous diffusion plant commenced initial operations in January 1945, with the activation of its first diffusion stage. This marked the start of uranium isotope separation using (UF6) gas forced through porous barriers, exploiting the slight mass difference between U-235 and U-238 to achieve incremental enrichment. The process began on a small scale, with early runs limited to initial cells producing low levels of enrichment, typically below 1% U-235, as the full cascade of thousands of stages required sequential commissioning to avoid systemic failures. By late January 1945, K-25 completed its first enrichment run and shipped product to the adjacent Y-12 facility for further processing via electromagnetic separation. Startup challenges included maintaining barrier integrity against corrosion from byproducts, controlling gas leaks in the vacuum systems, and stabilizing pressure differentials across stages, which delayed full cascade integration. Engineers incrementally added stages through spring 1945, reaching operational status for lines by March, when the plant began supplying pre-enriched UF6 feed to Y-12 to augment weapons-grade output. Initial production rates were modest, prioritizing process reliability over volume, with the facility employing around 11,000 workers by summer 1945 to manage operations and maintenance. The plant achieved full operational capacity by August 1945, enabling higher-throughput enrichment to intermediate levels (up to approximately 20-30% U-235 in later wartime cascades) for downstream refinement. Early output supported the expanding U.S. fissile material stockpile but did not contribute directly to the uranium components of the atomic bombs deployed against Japan in July and August 1945, as those relied on Y-12's direct separation from natural uranium. Post-startup refinements focused on optimizing barrier permeability and compressor efficiency to minimize energy losses, with the automated control systems allowing remote monitoring but requiring frequent manual interventions for anomalies. These efforts established gaseous diffusion as a scalable method, though initial yields were constrained by unproven engineering at industrial scale.

Wartime Contributions to Enrichment

The K-25 plant initiated its first successful uranium enrichment run in January 1945, producing partially hexafluoride (UF6) that was shipped to the adjacent Y-12 facility for final electromagnetic separation to weapons-grade levels. This marked the onset of operational contributions from the massive installation, which featured over 4,000 stages designed to exploit the slight mass difference between and isotopes via repeated diffusion through porous barriers. Initial output was limited due to ongoing commissioning of stages and barrier reliability issues, but by spring 1945, the plant began supplying intermediate product—enriched to approximately 10-20% U-235—to augment Y-12's capacity, which had been strained by operations since 1943. K-25's wartime role complemented the electromagnetic and thermal diffusion processes at Oak Ridge, collectively enabling the production of the approximately 64 kilograms of 80%+ enriched U-235 required for the bomb detonated over on August 6, 1945. While Y-12 calutrons performed the bulk of final enrichment, K-25 provided a portion of the pre-enriched feed material, reducing bottlenecks and demonstrating the scalability of as a parallel pathway. Operational challenges, including leaks in early barriers and the need for iterative improvements, constrained output to low separative work units (SWU) per month initially—far below the plant's designed 5 million SWU annual capacity—but the facility's activation in 1945 nonetheless advanced the Project's goal of rapid under wartime secrecy. By the war's end in September 1945, K-25 had enriched several tons of UF6 to intermediate levels, contributing to the stockpiling of material for potential additional weapons and validating the process for postwar scaling. The plant's brief wartime production underscored the engineering triumph of deploying an unproven industrial-scale method, with over 12,000 workers operating continuous 24-hour shifts amid high-pressure demands from the Army Corps of Engineers. This effort, though not decisive for Little Boy's timeline, established as the dominant U.S. enrichment technology moving forward.

Postwar Expansion and Utilization

Following the conclusion of , the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant at Oak Ridge expanded rapidly to support increased enrichment demands amid the onset of the . The adjacent K-27 building, whose construction had begun on April 3, 1945, achieved full operational status by February 7, 1946, integrating directly with K-25 to boost overall separative capacity through a linked cascade system. Additional process buildings—K-29 operational on January 24, 1951; K-31 on December 9, 1951; and K-33 on November 4, 1954—further interconnected with the original facility, creating a multi-unit complex capable of higher-volume production of . In 1955, the expanded site was redesignated the Oak Ridge Plant (ORGDP), reflecting its role as the primary enrichment hub. The postwar ORGDP primarily utilized its gaseous diffusion process to produce highly (HEU) for nuclear weapons stockpiles and naval propulsion reactors, attaining weapons-grade levels exceeding 90% U-235 as early as December 2, 1946. This output supported U.S. strategic deterrence and the development of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers during the arms buildup. By the late 1960s, the facility adapted to civilian needs, initiating a "toll enrichment" program in 1969 to supply low- (3-5% U-235) for commercial power reactors under contract. On-site support facilities, including a barrier production plant and feed operations starting in December 1947, ensured sustained material supply for these activities. Production scaled back in response to policy shifts; on , 1964, K-25 and K-27 units shut down pursuant to President Lyndon B. Johnson's executive order reducing national output by 25%, though select K-25 cascades continued limited purge operations. Enrichment activities persisted in the remaining K-29, K-31, and K-33 buildings until the final equipment at Oak Ridge ceased operation on August 27, 1985, at 3:31 p.m., marking the end of the site's primary utilization phase.

Decommissioning and Cleanup

Shutdown Decisions

The shutdown of the K-25 gaseous diffusion complex proceeded in stages, reflecting shifts in U.S. uranium enrichment priorities from military to civilian applications and subsequent operational efficiencies. In 1964, highly enriched uranium (HEU) production ceased at the original K-25 and adjacent K-27 buildings, as demand for weapons-grade material declined post-World War II and resources were redirected to low-enriched uranium (LEU) output in newer facilities on the site—K-29, K-31, and K-33—which continued operations for commercial nuclear fuel. This partial closure marked the transition of the Oak Ridge site from its Manhattan Project-era role to supporting the growing civilian nuclear power sector, with K-25's legacy infrastructure deemed sufficient for initial postwar HEU phase-out but less optimal for sustained LEU scalability compared to expanded units. By the early 1980s, the U.S. Department of Energy evaluated the viability of its three —Oak Ridge, Paducah, and —amid excess national enrichment capacity, rising costs, and the aging at Oak Ridge, which consumed significantly more per separative work unit (SWU) than its counterparts due to original limitations and decades of wear. On August 27, 1985, at 3:31 p.m., the final cascades at the site were shut down, ending all enrichment activities at Oak Ridge after 40 years of operation. The DOE formally terminated enrichment operations in 1987, citing reduced requirements for driven by nuclear non-proliferation policies and stable civilian demand, which no longer justified maintaining the oldest and most power-intensive facility. This decision consolidated production at the more modern Paducah and , avoiding redundant capacity while preserving overall U.S. . Post-shutdown, the site entered standby mode, with residual inventories managed and facilities prepared for , underscoring the DOE's prioritization of fiscal responsibility over indefinite operation of legacy assets. No single document details a controversial or politically driven rationale; instead, internal assessments emphasized empirical metrics like energy efficiency and total cost per SWU, aligning with broader federal efforts to streamline nuclear infrastructure in an era of budgetary constraints.

Demolition Efforts

Demolition of the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant began in December 2008 with the west wing, undertaken by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC under a U.S. Department of Energy contract valued at $2.25 billion for accelerated cleanup. This phase addressed the 884,000-square-foot structure built during the , completing in January 2010 after 13 months of work. Subsequent efforts targeted the main K-25 process building, which had deteriorated significantly due to age and environmental exposure, posing safety risks including potential collapse. Contractors URS | CH2M Oak Ridge LLC continued demolition, fully razing the structure by March 2014 as part of broader site remediation at the Technology Park. The project extended to associated facilities, including the K-27 building, the last of five major structures, with demolition starting in February 2016 and concluding in August 2016. Overall, crews demolished over 500 contaminated buildings across the former site by October 2020, marking the first full cleanup of a enrichment complex. Challenges included managing radiological hazards and ensuring no risk of inadvertent criticality during , addressed through rigorous safety protocols established in 2015. The U.S. Department of Energy confirmed completion of the K-25 building demolition in a 2014 announcement, emphasizing the scale of removing uranium enrichment infrastructure without major incidents.

Site Remediation Processes

The site remediation at the former K-25 facility, now part of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), focused primarily on addressing and groundwater contamination from decades of enrichment operations involving and other chemicals. Following the demolition of structures, the U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM), in partnership with contractor UCOR, conducted extensive excavation to remove radiologically contaminated material, targeting areas beneath building footprints and slabs. This process involved methodical excavation, with depths reaching up to 38 feet in contaminated zones to ensure complete removal, followed by scanning of excavated using detection equipment to verify compliance with remediation standards before off-site disposal at licensed facilities. One of the largest efforts, completed in July , removed over 100,000 cubic yards of —equivalent to approximately 8,500 loads—from the main K-25 footprint, contributing to the clearance of more than one million tons of contaminated material across the site. Excavated areas were then backfilled with clean material to restore the site for potential reuse. All major remediation projects at ETTP concluded in summer , marking the completion of fieldwork for this phase and enabling land transfer for . Attention has shifted to , particularly for volatile organic compounds like trichloroethene (TCE) beneath the former K-25 main plant area. The selected method, enhanced in-situ , injects microbial amendments into the subsurface to stimulate natural degradation of contaminants, a applied due to its effectiveness in treating chlorinated solvents without extensive excavation. Records of Decision for ETTP remedies were signed in 2024, aligning with broader site closure goals under DOE oversight. These processes have adhered to federal and state regulatory requirements, including those under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), to mitigate risks from legacy uranium and chemical releases.

Legacy and Impacts

Environmental and Health Assessments

Environmental assessments at the former K-25 site, now part of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), have identified uranium as the primary contaminant in soil and groundwater resulting from decades of gaseous diffusion operations. Soil remediation efforts included excavation and removal of contaminated material beneath the K-25 building footprint, with a major project completed in July 2020, marking significant progress toward site stabilization. By 2025, demolition and soil cleanup across the gaseous diffusion complex were finalized, representing the first full remediation of such a facility, though groundwater treatment remains ongoing due to persistent uranium plumes. Groundwater monitoring and remediation at ETTP involve treating uranium-contaminated flows, such as from legacy ponds, using media to remove radionuclides before discharge into surface waters like Bear Creek. The site is designated under the program, with federal oversight ensuring compliance, though challenges persist in fully containing subsurface migration of contaminants. Assessments indicate no widespread off-site environmental migration beyond monitored boundaries, with remediation strategies focused on containment and natural attenuation where feasible. Health assessments primarily concern occupational exposures among K-25 workers, with studies revealing internal intake through inhalation and potential from process materials. A pooled of uranium enrichment workers, including those from K-25, estimated organ doses from uranium and found overall mortality rates lower than the general population, attributable to the healthy worker survivor effect. Specific elevations included standardized mortality ratios (SMRs) for (SMR=110), brain cancer (SMR=114), and lymphoreticulosarcoma (SMR=122) among K-25 production workers, though causality remains linked to multifaceted exposures rather than isolated uranium effects. Epidemiological reviews by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) support compensation claims under programs like the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act (EEOICPA) for conditions such as sensitivity and certain cancers among plant workers. impacts appear minimal, with no documented elevated risks in surrounding communities per available DOE and EPA evaluations, reflecting effective containment of effluents during operations and subsequent cleanup. Long-term monitoring continues to verify low-dose exposures do not exceed regulatory thresholds for nearby populations.

Strategic and Technological Achievements

The K-25 plant represented a technological breakthrough in uranium isotope separation through the process, which exploited the slight mass difference between and isotopes in (UF₆) gas. The method relied on repeated stages across porous barriers, achieving a separation factor of approximately 1.0043 per , calculated as the of the inverse mass ratio M238/M235=352/349\sqrt{M_{238}/M_{235}} = \sqrt{352/349}
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