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Maratha Empire
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The Maratha Empire,[a][12][13][14] also referred to as the Maratha Confederacy, was an early modern polity in the Indian subcontinent. It comprised the realms of the Peshwa and four major independent Maratha states[15][16] under the nominal leadership of the former.

Key Information

The Marathas were a Marathi-speaking peasantry group from the western Deccan Plateau (present-day Maharashtra) that rose to prominence under leadership of Shivaji (17th century), who revolted against the Bijapur Sultanate and the Mughal Empire for establishing "Hindavi Swarajya" (lit. 'self-rule of Hindus').[17][18] The religious attitude of Emperor Aurangzeb estranged non-Muslims, and the Maratha insurgency came at a great cost for his men and treasury.[19][20] The Maratha government also included warriors, administrators, and other nobles from other Marathi groups.[21] Shivaji's monarchy, referred to as the Maratha Kingdom,[22] expanded into a large realm in the 18th century under the leadership of Peshwa Bajirao I. Marathas from the time of Shahu I recognised the Mughal emperor as their nominal suzerain, similar to other contemporary Indian entities, though in practice, Mughal politics were largely controlled by the Marathas between 1737 and 1803.[b][23][24][c][26][27][d]

After Aurangzeb's death in 1707, Shivaji's grandson Shahu under the leadership of Peshwa Bajirao revived Maratha power and confided a great deal of authority to the Bhat family, who became hereditary peshwas (prime ministers). After he died in 1749, they became the effective rulers. The leading Maratha families – Scindia, Holkar, Bhonsle, and Gaekwad – extended their conquests in northern and central India and became more independent. The Marathas' rapid expansion was halted with the great defeat of Panipat in 1761, at the hands of the Durrani Empire. The death of young Peshwa Madhavrao I marked the end of Peshwa’s effective authority over other chiefs in the empire.[29][30][31] After he was defeated by the Holkar dynasty in 1802, the Peshwa Baji Rao II sought protection from the British East India Company, whose intervention destroyed the confederacy by 1818 after the Second and Third Anglo-Maratha Wars.

The structure of the Maratha state was that of a confederacy of four rulers under the leadership of the Peshwa at Poona (now Pune) in western India. These were the Scindia, the Gaekwad based in Baroda, the Holkar based in Indore and the Bhonsle based in Nagpur.[32][33] The stable borders of the confederacy after the Battle of Bhopal in 1737 extended from modern-day Maharashtra[34] in the south to Gwalior in the north, to Orissa in the east[35] or about a third of the subcontinent.[citation needed]

Nomenclature

[edit]

The Maratha Empire is also referred to as the Maratha Confederacy. Historian Barbara Ramusack notes, "neither term is fully accurate since one implies a substantial degree of centralisation and the other signifies some surrender of power to a central government and a longstanding core of political administrators".[36] Historian Stewart Gordon argues against using the term "confederacy" because it implies long-term, stable power-sharing, which did not characterize the Maratha state. Instead, power dynamics within the Maratha leadership frequently changed, sometimes as often as each decade.[37]

Some scholars prefer the term "Maratha Raj" or "Maratha rule," emphasizing the state's unique blend of centralized and decentralized authority.[38] This structure enabled both territorial expansion and regional autonomy.[39]

Colonial historians occasionally used terms such as the Hindu Confederacy or the Indian Confederacy when referring to the coalition of the Maratha chiefs.[40][41]

Although at present, the word Maratha refers to a traditionally Marathi peasantry group, in the past the word has been used to describe all Marathi people.[42][43]

History

[edit]

Shivaji and his descendants

[edit]
Early Maratha conquests, in Shivaji's and Shahji's time
A portrait of Shivaji I

Shivaji (1630–1680) was a Maratha aristocrat of the Bhonsle clan and was the founder of the Maratha state.[44] Shivaji led a resistance against the Sultanate of Bijapur in 1645 by winning the fort Torna, followed by many more forts, placing the area under his control and establishing Hindavi Swarajya (self-rule of Hindu people[18]). He created an independent Maratha state with Raigad as its capital[45] and successfully fought against the Mughals to defend his kingdom. He was crowned as Chhatrapati (sovereign) of the new Maratha Kingdom in 1674.[citation needed]

The Maratha dominion under him comprised about 4.1% of the subcontinent, but it was spread over large tracts. At the time of his death,[44] it was reinforced with about 300 forts, and defended by about 40,000 cavalries, and 50,000 soldiers, as well as naval establishments along the west coast. Over time, the kingdom would increase in size and heterogeneity;[46] by the time of his grandson's rule, and later under the Peshwas in the early 18th century, it became a vast realm.[47]

Shivaji had two sons: Sambhaji and Rajaram, who had different mothers and were half-brothers. In 1681, Sambhaji succeeded to the crown after his father's death and resumed his expansionist policies. Sambhaji had earlier defeated the Portuguese and Chikka Deva Raya of Mysore. To nullify the alliance between his rebel son, Akbar, and the Marathas,[48] Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb headed south in 1681. With his entire imperial court, administration and an army of about 500,000 troops, he proceeded to expand the Mughal empire, gaining territories such as the sultanates of Bijapur and Golconda. During the eight years that followed, Sambhaji led the Marathas successfully against the Mughals.[49][page needed]

In early 1689, Sambhaji called his commanders for a strategic meeting at Sangameshwar to consider an onslaught on the Mughal forces. In a meticulously planned operation, Ganoji and Aurangzeb's commander, Mukarrab Khan, attacked Sangameshwar when Sambhaji was accompanied by just a few men. Sambhaji was ambushed and captured by the Mughal troops on 1 February 1689. He and his advisor, Kavi Kalash, were taken to Bahadurgad by the imperial army, where they were executed by the Mughals on 21 March 1689.[50] Aurangzeb had charged Sambhaji with attacks by Maratha forces on Burhanpur.[51]

Upon Sambhaji's death, his half-brother Rajaram ascended the throne. The Mughal siege of Raigad continued, and he had to flee to Vishalgad and then to Gingee for safety. From there, the Marathas raided Mughal territory, and many forts were recaptured by Maratha commanders such as Santaji Ghorpade, Dhanaji Jadhav, Parshuram Pant Pratinidhi, Shankaraji Narayan Sacheev and Melgiri Pandit. In 1697, Rajaram offered a truce but this was rejected by Aurangzeb. Rajaram died in 1700 at Sinhagad. His widow, Tarabai, assumed control in the name of her son Shivaji II.[52]

A portrait of Sambhaji, son of Shivaji, and the second Maratha ruler.

After Aurangzeb died in 1707, Shahu, the son of Sambhaji (and grandson of Shivaji), was released by Bahadur Shah I, the new Mughal emperor. However, his mother was kept a hostage of the Mughals to ensure that Shahu adhered to the release conditions. Upon release, Shahu immediately claimed the Maratha throne and challenged his aunt Tarabai and her son. The spluttering Mughal-Maratha war became a three-cornered affair. This resulted in two rival seats of government being set up in 1707 at Satara and Kolhapur by Shahu and Tarabai respectively. Shahu appointed Balaji Vishwanath as his Peshwa.[53] The Peshwa was instrumental in securing Mughal recognition of Shahu as the rightful heir of Shivaji and the Chhatrapati of the Marathas.[53] Balaji also gained the release of Shahu's mother, Yesubai, from Mughal captivity in 1719.[54]

During Shahu's reign, Raghoji Bhonsle expanded the kingdom eastwards. Khanderao Dabhade and later his son, Triambakrao, expanded it Westwards into Gujarat.[55] Peshwa Bajirao and his three chiefs, Udaji Pawar, Malharrao Holkar, and Ranoji Scindia expanded it northwards.[56]

Peshwa era

[edit]
Shaniwar Wada palace fort in Pune, it was the seat of the Peshwa rulers of the Maratha Confederacy until 1818.
Peshwa Bajirao I and Malhar Rao Holkar c.18th century

Shahu appointed Balaji Vishwanath as Peshwa in 1713. Balaji Vishwanath's first major achievement was the conclusion of the Treaty of Lonavala in 1714 with Kanhoji Angre, the most powerful naval chief on the Western Coast who later accepted Shahu as Chhatrapati. In 1719, Marathas under Balaji marched to Delhi with Sayyid Hussain Ali, the Mughal governor of Deccan, and deposed the Mughal emperor, Farrukhsiyar.[57] The new teenage emperor, Rafi ud-Darajat and a puppet of the Sayyid brothers, granted Shahu rights to collecting Chauth and Sardeshmukhi from the six Mogul provinces of Deccan, and full possession of the territories controlled by Shivaji in 1680.[58][59] After Balaji Vishwanath's death in April 1720, his son, Baji Rao I, was appointed Peshwa by Shahu. Bajirao is credited with expanding the Maratha Kingdom tenfold from 3% to 30% of the modern Indian landscape during 1720–1740.[60] The Battle of Palkhed was a land battle that took place on 28 February 1728 at the village of Palkhed, near the city of Nashik, Maharashtra, India between Baji Rao I and Qamar-ud-din Khan, Asaf Jah I of Hyderabad. The Marathas defeated the Nizam. The battle is considered an example of the brilliant execution of military strategy.[57] In 1737, Marathas under Bajirao I raided the suburbs of Delhi in a blitzkrieg in the Battle of Delhi (1737).[61][62] The Nizam set out from the Deccan to rescue the Mughals from the invasion of the Marathas, but was defeated decisively in the Battle of Bhopal.[63][64] The Marathas extracted a large tribute from the Mughals and signed a treaty which ceded Malwa to the Marathas.[65] The Battle of Vasai was fought between the Marathas and the Portuguese rulers of Vasai, a village lying on the northern shore of Vasai creek, 50 km north of Mumbai. The Marathas were led by Chimaji Appa, brother of Baji Rao. The Maratha victory in this war was a major achievement of Baji Rao's time in office.[63]

Baji Rao's son, Balaji Bajirao (Nanasaheb), was appointed as the next Peshwa by Shahu despite the opposition of other chiefs. In 1740, the Maratha forces, under Raghoji Bhonsle, came down upon Arcot and defeated the Nawab of Arcot, Dost Ali, in the pass of Damalcherry. In the war that followed, Dost Ali, one of his sons Hasan Ali, and several other prominent people died. This initial success at once enhanced Maratha prestige in the south. From Damalcherry, the Marathas proceeded to Arcot, which surrendered to them without much resistance. Then, Raghuji invaded Trichinopoly in December 1740. Unable to resist, Chanda Sahib surrendered the fort to Raghuji on 14 March 1741. Chanda Saheb and his son were arrested and sent to Nagpur.[66] Rajputana also came under Maratha attacks during this time.[67] In June 1756 Luís Mascarenhas, Count of Alva (Conde de Alva), the Portuguese Viceroy was killed in action by the Maratha Army in Goa.

After the successful campaign of Karnataka and the Trichinopolly, Raghuji returned from Karnataka. He undertook six expeditions into Bengal from 1741 to 1748.[68][page needed] The resurgent Maratha Confederacy launched brutal raids against the prosperous Bengali state in the 18th century, which further added to the decline of the Nawabs of Bengal. During their invasions and occupation of Bihar[69] and western Bengal up to the Hooghly River[70] and during their occupation of western Bengal, the Marathas perpetrated atrocities against the local population.[70] The Maratha atrocities were recorded by both Bengali and European sources, which reported that the Marathas demanded payments, and tortured or killed anyone who couldn't pay.[70]

Raghuji was able to annex Odisha to his kingdom permanently as he successfully exploited the chaotic conditions prevailing in Bengal after the death of its governor Murshid Quli Khan in 1727. Constantly harassed by the Bhonsles, Odisha, Bengal and parts of Bihar were economically ruined. Alivardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal made peace with Raghuji in 1751 ceding Cuttack (Odisha) up to the river Subarnarekha, and agreeing to pay Rs. 1.2 million annually as the Chauth for Bengal and Bihar.[67]

The city of Delhi was sacked ten times by Marathas between 1737 and 1788. During this period, Maratha soldiers raped thousands of women including 350 Mughal queens and princesses.[71] In May 1754, Malhar Rao Holkar with his 20,000 Maratha soldiers raided the camp of Emperor Ahmad Shah at Sikandarabad, they proceeded to loot the camp and raped women in gangs including queens and princesses after emperor had fled.[71]

Balaji Bajirao encouraged agriculture, protected the villagers and brought about a marked improvement in the state of the territory. Raghunath Rao, brother of Nanasaheb, pushed into the wake of the Afghan withdrawal after Ahmed Shah Abdali's plunder of Delhi in 1756. Delhi was captured by the Maratha army under Raghunath Rao in August 1757, defeating the Afghan garrison in the Battle of Delhi. This laid the foundation for the Maratha conquest of North-west India. In Lahore, as in Delhi, the Marathas were now major players.[72] After the 1758 Battle of Attock, the Marathas captured Peshawar defeating the Afghan troops in the Battle of Peshawar on 8 May 1758.[35]

Just prior to the battle of Panipat in 1761, the Marathas looted "Diwan-i-Khas" or Hall of Private Audiences in the Red Fort of Delhi, which was the place where the Mughal emperors used to receive courtiers and state guests, in one of their expeditions to Delhi.

The Marathas who were hard pressed for money stripped the ceiling of Diwan-i-Khas of its silver and looted the shrines dedicated to Muslim maulanas.[73]

During the Maratha invasion of Rohilkhand in the 1750s

The Marathas defeated the Rohillas, forced them to seek shelter in hills and ransacked their country in such a manner that the Rohillas dreaded the Marathas and hated them ever afterwards.[73]

Peshwa Balaji Bajirao meets Chatrapati Shahu I by Shivram Chitari c. 1750

In 1760, the Marathas under Sadashivrao Bhau responded to the news of the Afghans' return to North India by sending a large army north. Bhau's force was bolstered by some Maratha forces under Holkar, Scindia, Gaekwad and Govind Pant Bundele with Suraj Mal. The combined army of over 50,000 regular troops re-captured the former Mughal capital, Delhi, from an Afghan garrison in August 1760.[74]

Delhi had been reduced to ashes many times due to previous invasions, and there was an acute shortage of supplies in the Maratha camp. Bhau ordered the sacking of the already depopulated city.[73][75] He is said to have planned to place his nephew and the Peshwa's son, Vishwasrao, on the Mughal throne. By 1760, with the defeat of the Nizam in the Deccan, Maratha power had reached its zenith with a territory of over 2,500,000 square kilometres (970,000 sq mi).[7]

Maratha Helmet
Signature Maratha helmet with curved back, front view
Maratha Armor
Signature Maratha helmet with curved back, side view
Maratha armour from Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia

Ahmad Shah Durrani called on the Rohillas and the Nawab of Oudh to assist him in driving out the Marathas from Delhi.[citation needed] Huge armies of Muslim forces and Marathas collided with each other on 14 January 1761 in the Third Battle of Panipat. The Maratha Army lost the battle, which halted their imperial expansion. The Jats and Rajputs did not support the Marathas. Historians have criticised the Maratha treatment of fellow Hindu groups. Kaushik Roy says, "The treatment by the Marathas of their co-religionist fellows – Jats and Rajputs was definitely unfair and ultimately had to pay its price in Panipat where Muslim forces had united in the name of religion."[72]

The Marathas had antagonised the Jats and Rajputs by taxing them heavily, punishing them after defeating the Mughals and interfering in their internal affairs.[citation needed] The Marathas were abandoned by Raja Suraj Mal of Bharatpur, who quit the Maratha alliance at Agra before the start of the great battle and withdrew their troops as Maratha general Sadashivrao Bhau did not heed the advice to leave soldiers' families (women and children) and pilgrims at Agra and not take them to the battlefield with the soldiers, rejected their co-operation. Their supply chains (earlier assured by Raja Suraj Mal) did not exist.[citation needed]

Peshwa Madhavrao I was the fourth Peshwa of the Maratha Confederacy. He worked as a unifying force in the Confederacy and moved to the south to subdue Mysore and the Nizam of Hyderabad to assert Maratha power. He sent generals such as Bhonsle, Scindia and Holkar to the north, where they re-established Maratha authority by the early 1770s.[citation needed] Madhav Rao I crossed the Krishna River in 1767 and defeated Hyder Ali in the battles of Sira and Madgiri. He also rescued the last queen of the Keladi Nayaka Kingdom, who had been kept in confinement by Hyder Ali in the fort of Madgiri.[76]

In early 1771, ten years after the collapse of Maratha authority over North India following the Third Battle of Panipat, Mahadaji Shinde recaptured Delhi and installed Shah Alam II as a puppet ruler on the Mughal throne[77] receiving in return the title of deputy Vakil-ul-Mutlak or vice-regent of the Empire and that of Vakil-ul-Mutlak being at his request conferred on the Peshwa. The Mughals also gave him the title of Amir-ul-Amara (head of the amirs).[78] After taking control of Delhi, the Marathas sent a large army in 1772 to punish Afghan Rohillas for their involvement in Panipat. Their army devastated Rohilkhand by looting and plundering as well as taking members of the royal family as captives.[77]

The Marathas invaded Rohilkhand to avenge the Rohillas' atrocities in the Panipat war. The Marathas under the leadership of Mahadaji Shinde entered the land of Sardar Najib-ud-Daula which was held by his son Zabita Khan after his death. Zabita Khan initially resisted the attack with Sayyid Khan and Saadat Khan behaving with gallantry, but was eventually defeated with the death of Saadat Khan by the Marathas and was forced to flee to the camp of Shuja-ud-Daula and his country was ravaged by Marathas.[79] Mahadaji Shinde captured the family of Zabita Khan, desecrated the grave of Najib ad-Dawlah and looted his fort.[80] With the fleeing of the Rohillas, the rest of the country was burnt, with the exception of the city of Amroha, which was defended by some thousands of Amrohi Sayyid tribes.[81] The Rohillas who could offer no resistance fled to the Terai whence the remaining Sardar Hafiz Rahmat Khan Barech sought assistance in an agreement formed with the Nawab of Oudh, Shuja-ud-Daula, by which the Rohillas agreed to pay four million rupees in return for military help against the Marathas. Hafiz Rehmat, abhorring unnecessary violence, unlike the outlook of his fellow Rohillas such as Ali Muhammad and Najib Khan, prided himself on his role as a political mediator and sought an alliance with Awadh to keep the Marathas out of Rohilkhand. He bound himself to pay on behalf of the Rohillas. However, after he refused to pay, Oudh attacked the Rohillas.[82]

Shah Alam II, the Mughal Emperor spent six years in the Allahabad fort and after the capture of Delhi in 1771 by the Marathas, left for his capital under their protection.[83] He was escorted to Delhi by Mahadaji Shinde and left Allahabad in May 1771. During their short stay, Marathas constructed two temples in Allahabad city, one of them being the famous Alopi Devi Mandir. After reaching Delhi in January 1772 and realising the Maratha intent of territorial encroachment, however, Shah Alam ordered his general Najaf Khan to drive them out. In retaliation, Tukoji Rao Holkar and Visaji Krushna Biniwale attacked Delhi and defeated Mughal forces in 1772. The Marathas were granted an imperial sanad for Kora and Allahabad. They turned their attention to Oudh to gain these two territories. Shuja was, however, unwilling to give them up and made appeals to the English and the Marathas did not fare well at the Battle of Ramghat.[84] The Maratha and British armies fought in Ram Ghat, but the sudden demise of the Peshwa and the civil war in Pune to choose the next Peshwa forced the Marathas to retreat.[85]

Madhavrao Peshwa's victory over the Nizam of Hyderabad and Hyder Ali of Mysore in southern India established Maratha dominance in the Deccan. On the other hand, Mahadaji's victory over Jats of Mathura, Rajputs of Rajasthan and Pashtun-Rohillas of Rohilkhand (Bareilly division and Moradabad division of present-day Uttar Pradesh) re-established the Marathas in northern India. With the Capture of Delhi in 1771 and the capture of Najibabad in 1772 and treaties with Mughal Emperor Shah Alam II as a restricted monarch to the throne under Maratha suzerainty, the resurrection of Maratha power in the North was complete.[86][87][88][77]

Madhav Rao died in 1772, at the age of 27. His death is considered to be a fatal blow to the Maratha Confederacy and from that time Maratha power started to move on a downward trajectory, less an empire than a confederacy.[citation needed]

Confederacy era

[edit]
Mahadaji Shinde restored the Maratha domination of northern India

In a bid to effectively manage the large empire, Madhavrao Peshwa gave semi-autonomy to the strongest of the aristocracy.[citation needed] After the death of Peshwa Madhavrao I, various chiefs and jagirdars became de facto rulers and regents for the infant Peshwa Madhavrao II.[citation needed] Under the leadership of Mahadaji Shinde, the ruler of the state of Gwalior in central India, the Marathas defeated the Jats, the Rohilla Afghans and took Delhi which remained under Maratha control for the next three decades.[86] His forces conquered modern day Haryana.[89] Shinde was instrumental in resurrecting Maratha power after the débâcle of the Third Battle of Panipat, and in this, he was assisted by Benoît de Boigne.[citation needed]

After the growth in power of feudal lords like the Malwa sardars, the landlords of Bundelkhand and the Rajput kingdoms of Rajasthan who refused to pay tribute to him, he sent his army to conquer states such as Bhopal, Datiya, Chanderi, Narwar, Salbai and Gohad. However, he launched an unsuccessful expedition against the Raja of Jaipur but withdrew after the inconclusive Battle of Lalsot in 1787.[90] The Battle of Gajendragad was fought between the Marathas under the command of Tukojirao Holkar (the adopted son of Malharrao Holkar) and Tipu Sultan from March 1786 to March 1787 in which Tipu Sultan was defeated by the Marathas. By the victory in this battle, the border of the Maratha territory was extended to the Tungabhadra river.[91] The strong fort of Gwalior was then in the hands of Chhatar Singh, the Jat ruler of Gohad. In 1783, Mahadaji besieged the fort of Gwalior and conquered it. He delegated the administration of Gwalior to Khanderao Hari Bhalerao. After celebrating the conquest of Gwalior, Mahadaji Shinde turned his attention to Delhi again.[92]

The Maratha-Sikh treaty in 1785 made the small Cis-Sutlej states an autonomous protectorate of the Scindia Dynasty of the Maratha Confederacy,[93] as Mahadaji Shinde was deputed the Naib Vakil-i-Mutlaq (Deputy Regent of the empire) of Mughal affairs in 1784.[94][95] Following the Second Anglo-Maratha War in 1806, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington drafted a treaty granting independence to the Sikh clans east of the Sutlej River in exchange for their allegiance to the British General Gerard Lake acting on his dispatch.[96][97] At the conclusion of the war, the frontier of British India was extended to the Yamuna.

Mahadaji Shinde had conquered Rania, Fatehabad and Sirsa from the governor of Hissar. Haryana then came under the Marathas. He divided Haryana into four territories: Delhi (Mughal emperor Shah Alam II, his family and areas surrounding Delhi), Panipat (Karnal, Sonepat, Kurukshetra and Ambala), Hisar (Hisar, Sirsa, Fatehabad, parts of Rohtak), Ahirwal (Gurugram, Rewari, Narnaul, Mahendragarh) and Mewat. Daulat Rao Scindia ceded Haryana on 30 December 1803 under the Treaty of Surji-Anjangaon to the British East India Company leading to the Company rule in India.

In 1788, Mahadaji's armies defeated Ismail Beg, a Mughal noble who resisted the Marathas.[98] The Rohilla chief Ghulam Kadir, Ismail Beg's ally, took over Delhi, capital of the Mughal dynasty and deposed and blinded the king Shah Alam II, placing a puppet on the Delhi throne. Mahadaji intervened and killed him, taking possession of Delhi on 2 October restoring Shah Alam II to the throne and acting as his protector.[99] Jaipur and Jodhpur, the two most powerful Rajput states, were still out of direct Maratha domination, so Mahadaji sent his general Benoît de Boigne to crush the forces of Jaipur and Jodhpur at the Battle of Patan.[100] Another achievement of the Marathas was their victories over the Nizam of Hyderabad's armies.[101][102]The last of these took place at the Battle of Kharda in 1795 with all the major Maratha powers jointly fighting Nizam's forces.[103]

Maratha–Mysore Wars

[edit]
Further information: Maratha–Mysore Wars, Sringeri Sharada Peetham, and Anglo-Mysore Wars

The Marathas came into conflict with Tipu Sultan and his Kingdom of Mysore, leading to the Maratha–Mysore War in 1785. The war ended in 1787 with Tipu Sultan being defeated by the Marathas.[104] The Maratha-Mysore war ended in April 1787 following the finalizing of the treaty of Gajendragad, as per which the Tipu Sultan of Mysore was obligated to pay 4.8 million rupees as a war cost to the Marathas and an annual tribute of 1.2 million rupees, in addition to returning all the territory captured by Hyder Ali.[105][106] In 1791–92, large areas of the Maratha Confederacy suffered a massive population loss due to the Doji bara famine.[107]

In 1791, irregulars like lamaans, pindaris and purbias not Marathas raided and looted the temple of Sringeri Shankaracharya, killing and wounding many people, including Brahmins, plundering the monastery of all its valuable possessions, and desecrating the temple by displacing the image of goddess Sāradā.[citation needed] [108]

The Maratha Confederacy soon allied with the British East India Company (based in the Bengal Presidency) against Mysore in the Anglo-Mysore Wars. After the British had suffered a defeat against Mysore in the first two Anglo-Mysore Wars, the Maratha cavalry assisted the British in the last two Anglo-Mysore Wars from 1790 onwards, eventually helping the British conquer Mysore in the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War in 1799.[109] After the British conquest, however, the Marathas launched frequent raids in Mysore to plunder the region, which they justified as compensation for past losses to Tipu Sultan.[110]

British intervention

[edit]
Further information: Anglo-Maratha Wars (disambiguation) and Anglo-Mysore Wars
A mural depicting the British surrender during the First Anglo-Maratha War. The mural is a part of the Victory Memorial (Vijay Stambh) located at Vadgaon Maval, Pune.

In 1775, the British East India Company, from its base in Bombay, intervened in a succession struggle in Pune, on behalf of Raghunathrao (also called Raghobadada), who wanted to become Peshwa of the confederacy. The British also wanted to nip in the bud any potential anti-British, French-Maratha alliance.[111] Maratha forces under Tukojirao Holkar and Mahadaji Shinde defeated a British expeditionary force at the Battle of Wadgaon, but the heavy surrender terms, which included the return of annexed territory and a share of revenues, were disavowed by the British authorities at Bengal and fighting continued. What became known as the First Anglo-Maratha War ended in 1782 with a restoration of the pre-war status quo and the East India Company's abandonment of Raghunathrao's cause.[112]

Peshwa Madhavrao II in his court in 1790, concluding a treaty with the British

In 1799, Yashwantrao Holkar was crowned King of the Holkars and he captured Ujjain. He started campaigning towards the north to expand his dominion in that region. Yashwant Rao rebelled against the policies of Peshwa Baji Rao II. In May 1802, he marched towards Pune the seat of the Peshwa. This gave rise to the Battle of Poona in which the Peshwa was defeated. After the Battle of Poona, the flight of the Peshwa left the government of the Maratha state in the hands of Yashwantrao Holkar.[113] He appointed Amrutrao as the Peshwa and went to Indore on 13 March 1803. All except Gaekwad, chief of Baroda, who had already accepted British protection by a separate treaty on 26 July 1802, supported the new regime. He made a treaty with the British. Also, Yashwant Rao successfully resolved the disputes with Scindia and the Peshwa. He tried to unite the Maratha Confederacy but to no avail. In 1802, the British intervened in Baroda to support the heir to the throne against rival claimants and they signed a treaty with the new Maharaja recognising his independence from the Maratha Confederacy in return for his acknowledgement of British paramountcy. Before the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1805), the Peshwa Baji Rao II signed a similar treaty. The defeat in the Battle of Delhi, 1803 during the Second Anglo-Maratha War resulted in the loss of influence over Delhi for the Marathas.[114]

The Second Anglo-Maratha War represents the military high-water mark of the Marathas who posed the last serious opposition to the formation of the British Raj. The real contest for India was never a single decisive battle for the subcontinent, rather, it turned on a complex social and political struggle for the control of the South Asian military economy. The victory in 1803 hinged as much on finance, diplomacy, politics and intelligence as it did on battlefield manoeuvring and war itself.[110]

Battle of Assaye during the Second Anglo-Maratha War

Ultimately, the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1818) resulted in the loss of Maratha independence. It left the British in control of most of the Indian subcontinent. The Peshwa was exiled to Bithoor (Marat, near Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh) as a pensioner of the British. The Maratha heartland of Desh, including Pune, came under direct British rule, except the states of Kolhapur and Satara, which retained local Maratha rulers (descendants of Shivaji and Sambhaji II ruled over Kolhapur). The Maratha-ruled states of Gwalior, Indore, and Nagpur all lost territory and came under subordinate alliances with the British Raj as princely states that retained internal sovereignty under British paramountcy. Other small princely states of Maratha knights were retained under the British Raj as well.[citation needed]

Peshwa Baji Rao II signing the Treaty of Bassein with the British East India Company

The Third Anglo-Maratha War was fought by Maratha warlords separately instead of forming a common front and they surrendered one by one. Shinde and the Pashtun Amir Khan were subdued by the use of diplomacy and pressure, which resulted in the Treaty of Gwalior[115] on 5 November 1817.[citation needed] All other Maratha chiefs like Holkars, Bhonsles and the Peshwa gave up arms by 1818. British historian Percival Spear describes 1818 as a watershed year in the history of India, saying that by that year "the British dominion in India became the British dominion of India".[116][117]

The war left the British, under the auspices of the British East India Company, in control of virtually all of present-day India south of the Sutlej River. The famed Nassak Diamond was looted by the company as part of the spoils of the war.[118] The British acquired large chunks of territory from the Maratha Empire and in effect put an end to their most dynamic opposition.[119] The terms of surrender Major-general John Malcolm offered to the Peshwa were controversial amongst the British for being too liberal: The Peshwa was offered a luxurious life near Kanpur and given a pension of about 80,000 pounds.[citation needed]

Geography

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The Maratha Confederacy, at its peak, encompassed a large area of the Indian sub-continent. At its zenith, it expanded from Punjab in the north to Hyderabad in the south, Kutch in the west to Oudh in the east. It bordered Oudh and Rajputana in the north. Apart from capturing various regions, the Marathas maintained a large number of tributaries who were bound by agreements to pay a certain amount of regular tax, known as Chauth. The confederacy collected defeated the Sultanate of Mysore under Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, the Nawab of Oudh, the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawab of Bengal, Nawab of Sindh and the Nawab of Arcot as well as the Polygar kingdoms of South India. They extracted chauth from the rulers in Delhi, Oudh, Bengal, Bihar, Odisha and Rajputana.[120][121] They built up the large empire in India.[citation needed]

The Marathas were requested by Safdarjung, the Nawab of Oudh, in 1752 to help him defeat the Afghani Rohillas. The Maratha force set out from Pune and defeated the Afghan Rohillas in 1752, capturing the whole of Rohilkhand (Bareilly division and Moradabad division of present-day Uttar Pradesh).[73] In 1752, the Marathas entered into an agreement with the Mughal emperor, through his wazir, Safdarjung, and the Mughals gave the Marathas the chauth of Doab in addition to the Subahdari of Ajmer and Agra.[122] In 1758, Marathas started their north-west conquest and expanded their boundary till Afghanistan. They defeated the Afghan forces of Ahmed Shah Abdali. The Afghans numbered around 25,000–30,000 and were led by Timur Shah, the son of Ahmad Shah Durrani.[123]

During the confederacy era, Mahadaji Shinde resurrected the Maratha domination over much of Northern India which was lost after the Third Battle of Panipat. Delhi and much of Uttar Pradesh were under the suzerainty of the Scindhias of the Maratha Confederacy, but following the Second Anglo-Maratha War of 1803–1805, the Marathas lost these territories to the British East India Company.[78][95]

Territorial evolution

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Year Expanse Background
1680 Except for the Portuguese possessions of Goa, Chaul, Salsette, and Bassein, the Abyssinian pirate stronghold of Janjira, and the English settlement on Bombay Island, Sivaji had complete control over the entire Konkan region from Daman in the north to Karwar in the south at the time of his death in 1680. His eastern boundary extended through the districts of Nasik and Poona, encompassing the entire Satara region and most of Kolhapur. Additionally, he held territories in Bellary, Kopal, Sira, Bangalore, Kolar, Vellore, Arni, and Gingi, along with a share in his brother's principality of Tanjore.[124]
1700 Sambhaji, who succeeded Shivaji, was captured and subsequently executed by Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1689. However, by the beginning of the 18th century, the Marathas had managed to regain their power.[124]
1785 After Aurangzeb, Marathas conquered a significant portion of India, stretching from the Chenab River to the borders of Bengal.[125]

The involvement of the Bombay Government in advocating Raghoba's claim to the Peshwaship of the Maratha Confederacy resulted in the First Anglo-Maratha War, ultimately concluding with the signing of the Treaty of Salbai (1782).[126]

1798 In 1795, the Marathas overwhelmed the Nizam of Hyderabad at Kharda. The Maratha frontier was expanded all the way to the Tungabhadra River.[127]
1805 The Treaty of Bassein (1802) resulted in a conflict with the Marathas. As per the treaty, the Peshwa, Baji Rao II, was reinstated in Poona as a mere figurehead under the control of the British East India Company. In exchange, he agreed to allow the British to station a subsidiary force in his territory and accepted British arbitration in any disputes with other regional powers. This agreement made a war with the Marathas unavoidable. In the ensuing Second Anglo-Maratha War, the Treaty of Deogaon saw Berar surrender the province of Cuttack, including Balasore, which connected Bengal with Madras. Additionally, the Treaty of Surji Arjangaon led to Scindia relinquishing the Upper Doab, his forts and territories northeast of the Rajput States, the districts of Broach and Ahmadnagar, as well as his possessions south of the Ajanta hills. Asirgarh, Burhanpur, and certain districts in the Tapti Valley were returned to Scindia. The Peshwa received the fort and district of Ahmadnagar, while the Nizam acquired the district south of the Ajanta hills. Furthermore, the western part of Berar, lying west of the Wardha River and south of the fortress of Gawilgarh, was also granted to the Nizam.[128]
1836 During the final and Third Anglo-Maratha war (1817–19), the British achieved widespread success in their military endeavours. They successfully removed the Peshwa from power, confiscated his territories, and compelled him to reside in Bithur near Cawnpore. The Raja of Satara was permitted to retain a small portion of his ancestral domains until it eventually came under British control during the time of Dalhousie. The independence of Scindia, Holkar, and Berar was completely dismantled, leading to significant territorial reductions for these states. Holkar was compelled to relinquish Ajmer, which held strategic importance in Rajputana. The pirate leaders of the Konkan were coerced into surrendering their coastal holdings. Treaties were established with significant Rajput States such as Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Mewar, as well as with smaller Rajput States like Banswara, Dungarpur, Partabgarh, Jaisalmer, and Kotah. Additionally, British protection was extended to Bhopal, the States of Bundelkhand, Malwa, and Kathiawar.[129]
1856 The British territory expanded by incorporating the following States under Dalhousie's rule, following the doctrine of lapse: Satara (1848), Jaitpur (1849) situated northeast of Jhansi, Sambalpur (1849), Jhansi (1853), and Nagpur (1854).[130]

Government and military

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Administration

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Pratapgad fort, one of the earliest forts built by Shivaji.
Maratha darbar or court.
Gold coins minted during Shivaji's era, 17th century.

The Ashtapradhan (The Council of Eight) was a council of eight ministers that administered the Maratha Kingdom. This system was formed by Shivaji.[131] Ministerial designations were drawn from the Sanskrit language and comprised:

With the notable exception of the priestly Panditrao and the judicial Nyayadisha, the other pradhans held full-time military commands and their deputies performed their civil duties in their stead. In the later era of the Maratha Confederacy, these deputies and their staff constituted the core of the Peshwa's bureaucracy.[citation needed]

The Peshwa was the titular equivalent of a modern Prime Minister. Shivaji created the Peshwa designation in order to more effectively delegate administrative duties during the growth of the Maratha Kingdom. Prior to 1749, the Peshwas held office for 8–9 years and controlled the Maratha Army. They later became the de facto hereditary administrators of the Maratha Empire from 1749 till its end in 1818.[citation needed]

Under the administration of the Peshwas and with the support of several key generals and diplomats (listed below), the Maratha Empire reached its zenith, ruling most of the Indian subcontinent. It was also under the Peshwas that the Maratha Empire came to its end through its formal annexation into the British Empire by the British East India Company in 1818.[citation needed]


Shivaji was an able administrator who established a government that included modern concepts such as cabinet, foreign policy and internal intelligence.[133] He established an effective civil and military administration. He believed that there was a close bond between the state and the citizens. He is remembered as a just and welfare-minded king. Cosme da Guarda says of him that:[101]

Such was the good treatment Shivaji accorded to people and such was the honesty with which he observed the capitulations that none looked upon him without a feeling of love and confidence. By his people he was exceedingly loved. Both in matters of reward and punishment he was so impartial that while he lived he made no exception for any person; no merit was left unrewarded, no offence went unpunished; and this he did with so much care and attention that he specially charged his governors to inform him in writing of the conduct of his soldiers, mentioning in particular those who had distinguished themselves, and he would at once order their promotion, either in rank or in pay, according to their merit. He was naturally loved by all men of valor and good conduct.

The Marathas carried out many sea raids, such as plundering Mughal Naval ships and European trading vessels. European traders described these attacks as piracy, but the Marathas viewed them as legitimate targets because they were trading with, and thus financially supporting, their Mughal and Bijapur enemies. After the representatives of various European powers signed agreements with Shivaji or his successors, the threat of plundering or raids against Europeans began to reduce.

Military

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Main articles: Maratha Navy and Maratha Army

The Maratha Army under Shivaji was a national army consisting of personnel drawn mainly from his empire which corresponds to present-day Maharashtra. It was a homogeneous body commanded by a regular cadre of officers, who had to obey one supreme commander. With the rise of the Peshwas, however, this national army had to make room for a feudal force provided by different Maratha sardars.[134] This new Maratha Army was not homogeneous, but employed soldiers of different backgrounds, both locals and foreign mercenaries, including large numbers of Arabs, Sikhs, Rajputs, Sindhis, Rohillas, Abyssinians, Pashtuns, and Europeans. The army of Nana Fadnavis, for example, included 5,000 Arabs.[135] The army of Baji Rao II included the Pinto brothers Jose Antonio and Francisco from the famous Goan noble family who had escaped Goa after trying to overthrow the government in the Conspiracy of the Pintos.[136][137]

A painted scroll depicting different types of ships of the Maratha Navy including some captured English ships.

Some historians have credited the Maratha Navy for laying the foundation of the Indian Navy and bringing significant changes in naval warfare. A series of sea forts and battleships were built in the 17th century during the reign of Shivaji. It has been noted that vessels built in the dockyards of Konkan were mostly indigenous and constructed without foreign aid.[138] Further, in the 18th century, during the reign of Admiral Kanhoji Angre, a host of dockyard facilities were built along the entire western coastline of present-day Maharashtra. The Marathas fortified the entire coastline with sea fortresses with navigational facilities.[139] Nearly all the hill forts, which dot the landscape of present-day western Maharashtra were built by the Marathas. The renovation of Gingee Fort in Tamil Nadu, has been particularly applauded, according to the contemporary European accounts, the defence fortifications matched the European ones.[140]

The Marathas prioritized technical advancement over establishing a modern command structure, resulting in a trade-off. While they excelled as craftsmen and technicians, successfully replicating the latest foreign military technology, their ability to govern as nation-builders was hindered because they struggled to effectively manage the intricate workings of command and failed to address the shortcomings in their general staff system. The fragmented Maratha state was unable to unite due to political divisions, undoing the progress made through technology.[141][142]

Afghan accounts

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Maratha Gurab ships attacking a British East India Company ship

The Maratha Army, especially its infantry, was praised by almost all the enemies of the Maratha Empire, ranging from the Duke of Wellington to Ahmad Shah Abdali.[citation needed] After the Third Battle of Panipat, Abdali was relieved as the Maratha Army in the initial stages were almost in the position of destroying the Afghan armies and their Indian Allies, the Nawab of Oudh and Rohillas. The grand wazir of the Durrani Empire, Sardar Shah Wali Khan was shocked when Maratha commander-in-chief Sadashivrao Bhau launched a fierce assault on the centre of the Durrani Army, over 10,000 Durrani soldiers were killed alongside Haji Atai Khan, one of the chief commander of the Durrani Army and nephew of wazir Shah Wali Khan. Such was the fierce assault of the Maratha infantry in hand-to-hand combat that Afghan armies started to flee and the wazir in desperation and rage shouted, "Comrades whither do you fly, our country is far off".[143] Post battle, Ahmad Shah Abdali, in a letter to one Indian ruler claimed that Afghans were able to defeat the Marathas only because of the blessings of the almighty and that any other army would have been destroyed by the Maratha army on that particular day even though the Maratha Army was numerically inferior to the Durrani Army and its Indian allies.[144]

European accounts

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Maratha arms

Similarly, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, after defeating the Marathas, noted that the Marathas, though poorly led by their generals, had regular infantry and artillery that matched the level of that of the Europeans and warned other British officers from underestimating the Marathas on the battlefield. He cautioned one British general: "You must never allow Maratha infantry to attack head on or in close hand-to-hand combat as in that your army will cover itself with utter disgrace".[145][citation needed]

He summarised Maratha tactics as follows: the Mahrattas employ two methods in their operations. They primarily rely on their cavalry to disrupt the enemy's supplies, causing distress in their camp and forcing them to retreat. Once the retreat begins, the Mahrattas unleash their infantry and formidable artillery to relentlessly pursue the enemy. By depriving the opponent of provisions, they compel them to hasten their march, while remaining confident in their own safety from counterattacks. They trail the enemy with their cavalry during marches, and when the enemy halts, they encircle and assault them using their infantry and cannons, making escape nearly impossible. Under no circumstances should you allow the enemy to engage you with their infantry. The Mahrattas possess such powerful artillery that it would be impossible to maintain your camp against it. If you receive word of their approach when they are close and ready to attack, it would be advisable to secure your baggage in any way possible and initiate an attack against them. It is crucial to prevent them from launching an attack on your camp at all costs.[146]

Even when Wellesley became the Prime Minister of Britain, he held the Maratha infantry in utmost respect, claiming it to be one of the best in the world. However, at the same time, he noted the poor leadership of Maratha Generals, who were often responsible for their defeats.[145][citation needed]

Wellesley Charles Metcalfe, one of the ablest of the British Officials in India and later acting Governor-General, wrote in 1806:

India contains no more than two great powers, British and Mahratta, and every other state acknowledges the influence of one or the other. Every inch that we recede will be occupied by them.[147][148]

Norman Gash says that the Maratha infantry was equal to that of British infantry.[142] After the Third Anglo-Maratha war in 1818, Britain listed the Marathas as one of the martial races to serve in the British Indian Army. The 19th-century diplomat Sir Justin Sheil commented about the British East India Company copying the French Indian Army in raising an army of Indians:

It is to the military genius of the French that we are indebted for the formation of the Indian army. Our warlike neighbours were the first to introduce into India the system of drilling native troops and converting them into a regularly disciplined force. Their example was copied by us, and the result is what we now behold. The French carried to Persia the same military and administrative faculties, and established the origin of the present Persian regular army, as it is styled. When Napoleon the Great resolved to take Iran under his auspices, he dispatched several officers of superior intelligence to that country with the mission of General Gardanne in 1808. Those gentlemen commenced their operations in the provinces of Azerbaijan and Kermanshah, and it is said with considerable success.

— Sir Justin Sheil (1803–1871).[149]

Rulers, administrators and generals

[edit]

Chhatrapati

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Satara:

Kolhapur:

  • Tarabai (1675–1761) (wife of Rajaram) in the name of her son Shivaji II
  • Shivaji II (1700–1714)
  • Sambhaji II (1714–1760) – came to power by deposing his half-brother Shivaji II
  • Shivaji III (1760–1812) (adopted from the family of Khanwilkar)

Peshwas

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Peshwas from the Bhat family

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From Balaji Vishwanath onwards, the actual power gradually shifted to the Bhat family of Peshwas based in Poona.

Federal houses of Maratha Confederacy

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Maratha Empire

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from Grokipedia
The Maratha Empire was a Hindu empire founded in 1674 by Shivaji Bhonsle through his coronation as Chhatrapati at Raigad Fort, marking the establishment of an independent Maratha state in the Deccan region that emphasized self-rule (swarajya) against Mughal overlordship. Under Shivaji and his successors, the empire pioneered guerrilla warfare tactics, a formidable navy for coastal defense whose innovations laid the foundation for modern Indian naval traditions, and fortified hill strongholds—recognized by UNESCO as the "Maratha Military Landscapes of India" World Heritage Site (inscribed 2025, comprising 12 forts: 11 in Maharashtra and 1 in Tamil Nadu)—to resist Mughal expansion, gradually eroding imperial authority in southern India and laying the groundwork for broader territorial control. By the mid-18th century, following the rise of powerful Peshwas like Baji Rao I and Madhavrao I, who resurrected Maratha power after the Third Battle of Panipat, the Marathas had transformed into a loose confederacy that dominated much of the Indian subcontinent, with peak extent from Attock in the northwest to Odisha in the east, extracting tribute (chauth) from regions extending from the Deccan to the Gangetic plains and even briefly influencing areas near Delhi. This expansion contributed significantly to the fragmentation of Mughal power after Aurangzeb's death in 1707, as Maratha raids and alliances disrupted centralized control. However, internal divisions among Maratha sardars, reliance on cavalry over disciplined infantry, and overextension weakened cohesion, culminating in Maratha victories in the First Anglo-Maratha War but ultimate defeats in the later conflicts of the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1775–1818), which ended Maratha sovereignty and facilitated British paramountcy over India.

Origins and Nomenclature

Etymology and Self-Designation

The term "Maratha" derives from the Sanskrit compound Mahārāṣṭra, literally meaning "great country" or "great kingdom," composed of mahā- ("great") and rāṣṭra ("country" or "kingdom"). This etymology reflects its origins in denoting the inhabitants of the Maharashtra plateau in western India, evolving through Prakrit forms like "Marhatta" to refer to a broader geographical and cultural region encompassing the Deccan. By the 17th century, "Maratha" had come to specifically designate a martial class of peasant-soldiers and landholders, often organized into 96 clans (kuḷīs), who served in Deccan sultanate armies before coalescing under leaders like Shivaji Bhosale. The polity founded by Shivaji in the mid-17th century was self-designated as Hindavī Svārājya, or "Hindu self-rule," emphasizing sovereignty independent of Mughal and sultanate domination rather than ethnic exclusivity. Shivaji articulated this concept in early correspondence, such as letters from the 1640s, framing it as a realm governed by Hindu dharma and merit-based administration, with Raigad as its initial capital following his 1674 coronation as Chhatrapati ("lord of the umbrella," denoting imperial authority). Later Maratha rulers and chroniclers, in sources like bakhars (Marathi historical narratives), continued to invoke Svarājya for the expanding confederacy, though European observers and Persian records often rendered it as the "Maratha state" based on the dominant clan's identity. The retrospective label "Maratha Empire" emerged in 19th-century historiography to describe the confederated structure under Peshwas and sardars, distinct from the earlier centralized Svarājya.

Foundational Myths and Early Identity

The early Maratha identity coalesced among rural, semi-autonomous warrior-peasants in the Deccan highlands of present-day Maharashtra, where families held hereditary roles as deshmukhs (village headmen) or patils (land overseers) under the fragmented authority of the Bahmani Sultanate and its successors, including the Adil Shahi dynasty of Bijapur. These groups, often drawn from agrarian Kunbi stock and organized into clans, served as local cavalry and revenue collectors, blending agricultural labor with military service amid the chronic instability of 16th-century Deccan politics. Prior to political unification, "Maratha" primarily signified Marathi-speaking Hindus of the plateau, without a cohesive supra-clan identity, though by the early 17th century, it increasingly denoted a martial stratum distinct from Brahmin priests or urban merchants. Shivaji Bhonsle's rise from 1640 onward forged this disparate identity into a proto-national consciousness centered on swarajya (self-rule), drawing on regional resentment against Muslim sultanates and Mughal incursions, yet his Bhonsle forebears exemplified the era's fluidity: great-grandfather Babaji Bhosale as a minor Pune village headman around 1550, grandfather Maloji elevating the family through Bijapur service by 1600, and father Shahji as a jagirdar (land-grant holder) commanding 1,000–3,000 horsemen. This upward mobility from local chieftaincy to imperial challengers reflected causal dynamics of patronage, warfare, and terrain advantage in the Sahyadri hills, rather than ancient nobility, with clan genealogies often retroactively embellished to claim Rajput or solar dynasty ties. A pivotal foundational myth emerged during Shivaji's coronation at Raigad on June 6, 1674, when Varanasi scholar Gaga Bhatta validated his Kshatriya eligibility by presenting a constructed genealogy tracing the Bhonsles to the 14th-century Sisodiya Rajputs of Mewar, portraying Shivaji as heir to the Suryavanshi (solar) line essential for Vedic kingship rites. This narrative, necessitated by orthodox Brahmin objections to Marathas' perceived Shudra status, integrated 70 purported generations linking Deccan upstarts to ancient Rajasthan warriors, enabling the raja-abhisheka (anointing) and framing the empire as a restored Hindu order against Islamic dominance. Historians assess this pedigree as fabricated for legitimacy, aligning with empirical records of the Bhonsles' recent rural origins and the pragmatic realpolitik of 17th-century Indian polities, where such myths bridged varna hierarchies to consolidate power. The myth endured, unifying 96 clans under a shared Kshatriya mantle and inspiring later confederacy expansions.

Historical Development

Ahilyabai Holkar served as a female ruler of the Malwa region (Indore) within the Maratha Confederacy from 1767 to 1795. She commissioned or restored hundreds of temples across the Indian subcontinent, including the Kashi Vishwanath Temple and Somnath Temple, with projects extending from Srinagar in the north to Rameshwaram in the south.

Foundation and Consolidation under Shivaji (1627–1680)

Shivaji Bhosale was born on 19 February 1630 at Shivneri Fort near Pune to Shahaji Bhosle, a Maratha general serving the Bijapur Sultanate, and Jijabai, who instilled in him ideals of self-rule. Under the guardianship of Dadoji Kondadev, he received training in warfare and governance, fostering ambitions for Maratha independence amid Deccan sultanate and Mughal dominance. His military career began in 1646 at age 16 with the capture of Torna Fort from Bijapur, followed by conquests of Raigad, Kondana, and Pratapgad, utilizing guerrilla tactics (ganimi kava) leveraging hilly terrain and swift cavalry raids. On 10 November 1659, at Pratapgarh, Shivaji ambushed and killed Bijapur commander Afzal Khan in close combat, annihilating his 10,000-strong force and securing southwestern Deccan territories. Raids into Mughal-held areas from 1657 escalated tensions, prompting retaliatory campaigns. In 1665, pressured by Mughal general Jai Singh I, Shivaji signed the Treaty of Purandar, surrendering 23 forts and agreeing to Mughal service. Detained in Agra by Aurangzeb, he escaped on 17 August 1666 concealed in sweetmeat baskets, resuming expansion upon return to the Deccan. The Battle of Salher in 1672 marked the first major open-field defeat of Mughal forces by Marathas, with 40,000 troops under Prataprao Gujar routing a larger enemy army. Shivaji then turned south, conquering lands in present-day Karnataka and establishing a naval presence to counter Portuguese and Siddi threats. On 6 June 1674, Shivaji was crowned Chhatrapati at Raigad Fort in a Vedic ceremony, proclaiming the sovereign Hindavi Swarajya independent of Islamic rule. For governance, he instituted the Ashtapradhan council of eight ministers—Peshwa for prime duties, Amatya for finance, Sachiva for records, and others for military, foreign affairs, justice, and religion—all salaried and serving without hereditary jagirs. Revenue reforms included direct assessment of crop yields, taxing at about two-fifths while providing cultivator aid like seeds and loans; chauth (one-quarter tribute) was extracted from adjacent realms for "protection" against raids. Military organization emphasized mobile cavalry under a Senapati, supported by infantry and artillery, with forts numbering 240–280 by 1680 serving as administrative and defensive hubs. Shivaji died on 3 April 1680 from illness, leaving a consolidated core territory in the western Deccan as the Maratha Empire's foundation.

Succession Crises and Mughal Resistance (1680–1707)

Following Shivaji's death on April 3, 1680, a brief succession crisis erupted as his widow Soyarabai, mother of the younger son Rajaram, challenged the claim of Shivaji's elder son Sambhaji, leading to factional intrigue at the court in Raigad. Sambhaji, born in 1657, decisively suppressed the plot by executing Soyarabai and her allies, securing his coronation as Chhatrapati on June 20, 1680, and thereby stabilizing Maratha leadership amid internal threats. During his nine-year reign, Sambhaji maintained aggressive resistance against Mughal incursions, launching raids that plundered key Mughal centers like Burhanpur in 1685 and into Mughal territories in Gujarat and Bengal, while also confronting Portuguese forces in Goa and Konkan, expanding Maratha naval influence. Aurangzeb intensified Deccan campaigns from 1681, deploying over 500,000 troops to subdue the Marathas, capturing key forts such as Ramsej in 1682 and Nashik, but Sambhaji's adoption of guerrilla tactics—emphasizing mobility, scorched-earth retreats, and hit-and-run assaults—prevented decisive Mughal victory despite numerical superiority. On February 1, 1689, Sambhaji was betrayed and captured near Sangameshwar by Mughal commander Muqarrab Khan, aided by defector Ganoji Shirke; subjected to 40 days of torture including mutilation and demands for conversion to Islam, which he refused, Sambhaji was executed on March 11, 1689, at Tulapur on the Bhima River, where he was beheaded, dismembered, and his remains paraded. Rajaram, crowned Chhatrapati in October 1689 at Raigad, faced immediate Mughal pressure as forces under Zulfiqar Khan seized the capital in June 1689, prompting his flight south with a small retinue; he reached Jinji (Gingee) fort in Tamil Nadu by November 1689, establishing a temporary base beyond immediate Mughal reach. The ensuing Siege of Jinji, launched in September 1690 by Zulfiqar Khan with 40,000 troops, lasted until January 1698, marked by fierce Maratha defenses under commanders like Rupaji Bhosale and repeated Mughal assaults that failed to breach the triple-walled fortress despite heavy artillery. Rajaram escaped Jinji in late 1697 amid intensifying pressure, returning to the Deccan via Parinda and Satara by early 1698, where he reorganized forces, granting jagirs to loyal sardars like Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav to sustain guerrilla operations that harassed Mughal supply lines and recaptured forts such as Panhala. Rajaram's death from illness on March 3, 1700, at Satara elevated his wife Tarabai as regent for their infant son Shivaji II, born in 1696; under her command, Maratha forces mounted relentless counteroffensives, with commanders like Parashuram Pant and Nemaji Shinde inflicting defeats on Mughal armies at battles such as Khed (1705), reclaiming swarajya territories while Aurangzeb's overstretched campaigns—costing an estimated 100,000-200,000 Mughal lives over the period and bankrupting treasuries—yielded control of forts but no submission. Tarabai's strategic acumen, including rejection of Aurangzeb's 1706 truce offers demanding vassalage, preserved Maratha sovereignty through asymmetric warfare, as Mughal advances fragmented into garrisons vulnerable to raids; Aurangzeb's death on March 3, 1707, at Ahmednagar camp effectively halted the offensive, leaving the empire exhausted and Maratha resilience intact despite territorial losses.

Peshwa Era and Internal Centralization (1713–1761)

The Peshwa era commenced on 16 November 1713, when Chhatrapati Shahu appointed Balaji Vishwanath as Peshwa, elevating the office to the effective executive authority in the Maratha state. Balaji, a former revenue official, stabilized internal affairs by negotiating the 1719 Mughal-Maratha treaty, securing chauth (one-quarter revenue) and sardeshmukhi (additional 10%) collection rights over the six Deccan provinces, while freeing Shahu's mother from Mughal captivity. To prevent civil war amid rival claims to the throne, he instituted a new polity recognizing key Maratha sardars (chiefs) as hereditary jagirdars with semi-autonomous territorial control, bound by military service obligations to the Chhatrapati and Peshwa. This arrangement centralized executive decision-making under the Peshwa while distributing land grants to secure loyalty from feudal elites. Balaji Vishwanath's death on 12 April 1720 led to the hereditary succession of his son, Baji Rao I, appointed Peshwa at age 20, marking the Bhat Deshastha Brahmin family's dominance. Baji Rao relocated the administrative capital from Satara to Pune in 1728, fortifying it as the hub of central governance and closer to northern expansion routes. He commissioned the construction of Shaniwar Wada fort-palace in 1732, which served as the central residence and administrative hub for successive Peshwas until the British annexation in 1818. Internally, he challenged the fragmented jagirdari system—where territories were jointly held by multiple claimants—pushing for exclusive grants to streamline revenue flows and military mobilization, though full implementation persisted only during his lifetime (1720–1740). The Peshwa's cavalry forces, numbering around 100,000 horsemen by the 1730s, were reorganized under direct command, emphasizing mobility over static garrisons to enforce central directives. Baji Rao I's son, Balaji Baji Rao (Nanasaheb), succeeded as Peshwa in 1740 at age 19 and assumed de facto rulership following Shahu's death in 1749, with the Chhatrapati's role becoming ceremonial. He established the Huzur Daftar as Pune's central secretariat, coordinating revenue collection, military logistics, and judicial appeals through specialized daftars for fixed and itinerant accounts. Provincial prants were supervised by kamavisdars appointed by the Peshwa, who assessed land revenue based on crop yields, irrigation, and soil quality, transitioning from sharecropping to fixed cash demands while offering tagoi loans to cultivators. Military reforms under the Peshwas included establishing a Konkan navy by Balaji Vishwanath, with bases at Khanderi and Vijayadurg, to protect coastal revenues and counter Portuguese threats. However, centralization faced limits as sardar families like the Holkars and Scindias amassed autonomous jagirs through conquests, fostering a confederate structure where Peshwa oversight relied on personal alliances rather than bureaucratic hierarchy. By 1761, internal frictions among these chiefs, compounded by fiscal strains from expansive campaigns, strained the Peshwa's coordinating role, setting the stage for confederacy-wide vulnerabilities.

Confederacy Expansion and Panipat Defeat (1761–1775)

The Third Battle of Panipat took place on January 14, 1761, pitting Maratha forces under Sadashivrao Bhau against the Afghan Durrani Empire led by Ahmad Shah Abdali, allied with Rohilla Afghans and other northern powers. The conflict arose from Maratha incursions into Punjab and efforts to supplant Mughal authority in the north, prompting Abdali's invasion to counter this expansion. Maratha armies numbered around 60,000 combatants, while Afghan-led forces totaled approximately 80,000, resulting in a catastrophic defeat for the Marathas with tens of thousands killed, including commanders Sadashivrao Bhau and Vishwasrao, the Peshwa's heir. The loss halted immediate northern ambitions and caused a leadership crisis, as Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao succumbed to grief-related illness in June 1761. In the aftermath, young Madhavrao I, aged 16, assumed the Peshwa role amid rivalry with his uncle Raghunathrao, focusing on internal stabilization and military revival. By March 7, 1763, Madhavrao decisively routed Nizam-ul-Mulk's forces at Rakshasbhuvan near Aurangabad, securing Deccan territories and extracting tribute that bolstered Maratha finances. This victory marked the onset of recovery, shifting emphasis to confederate sardars who wielded semi-independent commands, expanding influence through decentralized operations rather than centralized thrusts. Madhavrao's campaigns extended southward into the Carnatic from 1762 onward, targeting Hyder Ali's emerging power in Mysore and reinforcing Maratha claims over southern polities previously contested with the Nizam. These expeditions yielded territorial gains and revenue rights, with Maratha armies under sardars like the Holkars and Scindias consolidating control amid ongoing skirmishes. Northern reassertion followed, as surviving confederate leaders repelled residual Afghan threats and subdued local rivals; by 1770, Maratha forces defeated the Jats of Bharatpur and Rohilla chief Najib Khan, paving the way for reoccupation of Delhi in 1771 under Mahadaji Scindia's command. The Panipat defeat accelerated the Maratha shift to a loose confederacy, empowering regional houses—the Scindias in Malwa and Gwalior, Holkars in Indore, Gaekwads in Gujarat, and Bhonsles in Nagpur—to pursue autonomous expansions while nominally acknowledging Peshwa suzerainty. This structure enabled resilience, as sardar-led armies reclaimed lost ground without overreliance on Pune's central authority. Madhavrao's death from tuberculosis in 1772 at age 27 temporarily disrupted momentum, ushering in succession disputes by 1773–1775, yet the confederacy's territorial footprint had expanded anew in the Deccan and north, averting collapse.

Wars with Mysore, Nizam, and British Intervention (1775–1818)

The period following the Third Battle of Panipat saw the Maratha Confederacy engage in renewed conflicts with regional powers while facing escalating British East India Company involvement, driven by internal succession disputes. After Peshwa Madhavrao I's death in 1772, a power struggle ensued between his uncle Raghunathrao and the regency council supporting the infant Madhavrao II under Nana Fadnavis. Raghunathrao, seeking to claim the Peshwa title, signed the Treaty of Surat on 6 March 1775 with the Bombay Presidency, ceding territories including Salsette and Bassein in exchange for British military support comprising 2,400 infantry, 600 Europeans, and artillery. This intervention sparked the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775–1782), marked by Maratha victories such as the Battle of Adas in May 1775 and the decisive rout at Wadgaon on 13 January 1779, where British forces under Captain Thomas Goddard surrendered after encirclement by Maratha cavalry under Haripant Phadke and Tukoji Holkar. The conflict concluded inconclusively with the Treaty of Salbai on 17 May 1782, restoring pre-war boundaries and establishing mutual non-aggression, as British Governor-General Warren Hastings prioritized peace amid distractions from Mysore and French threats. Parallel to British entanglements, the Marathas pursued aggressive campaigns against Mysore following Hyder Ali's death on 7 December 1782. Tipu Sultan, succeeding his father, faced a Maratha invasion led by Tukoji Holkar in 1785, who captured key forts like Nargund and Badami, extracting tribute and territory. Tipu counterattacked in late 1786, defeating Maratha forces at the Battle of Bahadurpura and besieging their camps, but sustained pressure forced a settlement via the Treaty of Gajendragad on 14 April 1787, under which Mysore ceded one-half of the disputed territories, paid 48 lakh rupees in indemnity, and promised future tribute. These operations temporarily bolstered Maratha finances but highlighted the Confederacy's reliance on mobile cavalry against Mysore's rocket-armed infantry and fortifications. Conflicts with the Nizam of Hyderabad persisted over chauth (tribute) arrears, escalating to the Battle of Kharda on 11 March 1795. A combined Maratha army of approximately 50,000 under Daulat Rao Scindia and Tukoji Holkar overwhelmed the Nizam's 80,000-strong force, including French-trained battalions, through superior maneuverability and artillery fire, routing them and besieging the Nizam at Kharda fort for 17 days. The Nizam capitulated, paying a 3 crore rupee indemnity and ceding territories like Aurangabad district, affirming Maratha dominance in the Deccan. However, internal rivalries intensified after Nana Fadnavis's death in 1800, weakening cohesion as Peshwa Baji Rao II struggled against ambitious sardars like Yashwantrao Holkar and Daulat Rao Scindia. British influence deepened with the Treaty of Bassein on 31 December 1802, where Baji Rao II, defeated by Holkar at Poona, accepted a subsidiary alliance providing 6,000 British troops in exchange for territorial cessions and recognition of Peshwa authority. This provoked the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1805), as Scindia and Bhonsle (the Raja of Berar) mobilized against perceived British overreach, fielding over 100,000 troops including Pindari auxiliaries. British forces under Arthur Wellesley achieved stunning victories, notably at Assaye on 23 September 1803, where 4,500 British-Indian troops routed 20,000 Marathas despite heavy losses (398 British casualties), and at Laswari on 1 November 1803 against Scindia's army. The war ended with the Treaty of Deogaon (1803) subsuming Berar to British protection and the Treaty of Surji-Anjangaon (1803) forcing Scindia's disarmament and territorial losses; Holkar submitted via the Treaty of Rajghat (1805). The Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1818) sealed the Confederacy's dissolution, triggered by Peshwa Baji Rao II's resentment of subsidiary constraints and Pindari raids serving as pretext for Governor-General Lord Hastings's offensive. British preemptive strikes captured Poona after battles at Kirkee (5 November 1817) and Koregaon (1 January 1818), where a small British detachment repelled 20,000 Marathas. Peshwa forces suffered defeats at Ashti and elsewhere, culminating in Baji Rao's surrender on 3 June 1818 near the Godavari River; he received a 8 lakh rupee annual pension and exile to Bithur. Maratha principalities like Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda became British-protected states, while Peshwa domains were annexed, marking the effective end of Maratha sovereignty and British paramountcy in India.

Geography and Territory

Core Deccan Heartland

The core Deccan heartland of the Maratha Empire comprised the western Deccan Plateau, centered in the Desh region of present-day Maharashtra, including the districts of Satara and Pune. This area formed the foundational territory from which Shivaji Bhonsle established Maratha independence in the mid-17th century, leveraging its strategic geography against the Bijapur Sultanate and later Mughal forces. The terrain consisted of the eastern slopes of the Sahyadri (Western Ghats) mountains, interspersed with valleys and dense forests, which facilitated defensive fortifications and mobile cavalry operations. Satara served as the primary capital of the early Maratha kingdom, with Shivaji capturing its fort in 1663 alongside Parali and constructing around 25 additional forts in the western part of the district to secure control. Pune emerged as a key military and administrative base under Shivaji, who carved out an independent zone there from Bijapur territories by 1674. Pratapgad Fort, located in Satara district, exemplified the heartland's defensive network, hosting the decisive 1659 encounter where Shivaji defeated Bijapur general Afzal Khan. These hill forts, numbering in the hundreds across the Ghats and Konkan coastal extensions, anchored Maratha sovereignty by controlling passes and water sources. The heartland's boundaries initially extended from the Konkan littoral westward to the Ghats' eastern foothills, incorporating fertile agrarian lands suited to sustaining warrior-peasant communities. This compact region, vulnerable to invasions yet ideal for guerrilla tactics, underpinned Maratha resilience during the prolonged Mughal-Maratha wars from 1682 to 1707, preventing full subjugation despite territorial pressures. Post-Shivaji, the core retained political significance, with Satara as the Chhatrapati's seat even as power shifted toward Peshwa-led expansions from Pune.

Phases of Territorial Expansion

The territorial expansion of the Maratha Empire unfolded in distinct phases, driven by opportunistic warfare against declining Mughal authority and regional powers following Aurangzeb's death in 1707. Initial growth under Shivaji (r. 1674–1680) focused on consolidating the Deccan heartland, with conquests of over 300 forts from the Bijapur Sultanate and Mughals by 1670, encompassing the Sahyadri ranges, Konkan coast, and territories between the Godavari and Krishna rivers, totaling approximately 20,000 square miles by his coronation in 1674. This phase emphasized guerrilla tactics and fort-based defense, establishing swarajya (self-rule) in western Maharashtra without venturing far beyond the Deccan plateau. From 1707 to 1719, amid Mughal-Maratha wars, expansion shifted to recovery and raiding under regents like Tarabai and Shahu, who exploited Mughal internal strife to reclaim lost Deccan lands and impose chauth (one-quarter tribute) on Mughal provinces in Gujarat and Malwa, extending influence northward without formal annexation. Balaji Vishwanath's diplomacy in 1719 secured imperial farman (decree) for chauth and sardeshmukhi (additional tenth) collections across six Mughal provinces, laying groundwork for systematic penetration into Malwa and Gujarat by the early 1720s. The most rapid phase occurred under Peshwa Baji Rao I (r. 1720–1740), whose 41 campaigns yielded control over Malwa (1728–1738), Bundelkhand, and Gujarat, with victories like Palkhed (1728) against the Nizam and Bhopal (1737) forcing cessions of 50,000 square miles in central India; by 1738, Maratha cavalry raided up to Delhi, establishing semi-autonomous outposts under sardars like Ranoji Scindia and Malhar Rao Holkar. This northward thrust, covering over 1,000 miles from Pune, relied on mobile light horse and bargir (allied) forces, extracting tribute from Rajput states and weakening Mughal viceroys. Under Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao (r. 1740–1761), expansion reached its zenith, incorporating eastern Bengal and Odisha via the 1751 treaty with Alivardi Khan (yielding 12 million rupees annually) and northern Punjab through the 1758 Attock expedition under Raghunath Rao, briefly touching the Indus River; the empire spanned from the Kaveri in the south to the Sutlej in the north, with confederate chiefs administering vast tracts—Scindia in Gwalior, Holkar in Indore, Bhonsle in Nagpur—totaling nearly two-thirds of the subcontinent by 1760. However, the Third Battle of Panipat (1761) against Ahmad Shah Durrani checked further gains, killing 100,000 Marathas and prompting temporary retrenchment. Post-1761 recovery under Madhavrao I (r. 1761–1772) recaptured northern territories from the Nizam and Rohillas, while confederate expansions by Gaekwad in Gujarat and Bhonsle in Bengal sustained growth until British interventions from 1775 eroded frontiers through the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775–1782), culminating in territorial losses formalized by the 1818 Treaty of Poona.

Administrative Divisions and Frontiers

The administrative divisions of the Maratha Empire evolved from a centralized structure under Shivaji to a more decentralized confederacy in the Peshwa era. Initially, Shivaji divided his core Swarajya territories, known as mulk-i-qadim (ancient lands), into provinces called prants, each governed by a subedar responsible for revenue collection, law enforcement, and military recruitment. These prants were further subdivided into tarfs (districts) and parganas (sub-districts), with villages (mau zas) as the basic units managed by hereditary village headmen (deshmukhs and deshpandes). Conquered Mughal or Bijapur territories, termed mulk-i-jadid (new lands), were administered separately through revenue farmers (ijaradars) to extract tribute without full integration. By the early 18th century, under Chhatrapati Shahu and the rising Peshwas, the system shifted toward feudal grants known as saranjams—assignments of land revenue rights (chauth and sardeshmukhi) in exchange for military service quotas from powerful Maratha sardars. Large provinces (chaklas or subhas) were placed under sarsubhedars or hereditary nobles, such as the Scindias in Malwa and Gwalior, Holkars in Indore, Bhonsles in Nagpur, and Gaekwads in Baroda, forming semi-autonomous principalities nominally loyal to the Peshwa in Pune. This confederate model facilitated rapid expansion but weakened central oversight, with sardars retaining troops and revenues from their saranjams. The empire's frontiers reflected this expansionist structure, originating in the Deccan plateau around Pune and Satara, bounded initially by the ghats to the west, Tungabhadra River to the south, and Godavari to the north. Under Baji Rao I (1720–1740), frontiers pushed northward into Gujarat and Malwa by 1730, reaching the Narmada River, and eastward toward Bengal. By 1760, under Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, Maratha influence extended to the Indus River in the northwest (including nominal control near Attock), the Bay of Bengal in the east, and the Krishna River in the south, encompassing over 1 million square kilometers through tribute extraction rather than direct rule. These frontiers were fluid, maintained via raiding (bargi) expeditions and alliances, but vulnerable to internal rivalries and external threats like the Nizam and Mughals.

Government and Administration

Centralized Monarchy under Chhatrapatis

The centralized monarchy under the Chhatrapatis was formalized through Shivaji's coronation as Chhatrapati on 6 June 1674 at Raigad Fort, establishing him as the sovereign ruler of the Maratha Swarajya with absolute authority over civil, military, and religious affairs. This event marked the transition from guerrilla leadership to a structured kingship, where the Chhatrapati embodied the state's centralized power, directly overseeing administration to counter Mughal feudal fragmentation. The king's role as pivot ensured decisions flowed from the throne, minimizing autonomous provincial lords and emphasizing personal loyalty over hereditary privileges. To operationalize this centralization, Shivaji created the Ashtapradhan council in 1674, consisting of eight appointed ministers, each heading a key department and reporting exclusively to the Chhatrapati without hierarchical interdependence among themselves. The ministers received fixed salaries rather than land grants, preventing the emergence of semi-independent jagirdars and reinforcing fiscal control at the center; Shivaji replaced the jagir system with direct revenue collection via cash payments to officials. This structure covered:
  • Peshwa: Prime minister handling general administration and finance.
  • Amatya (Mazumdar): Revenue and accounts.
  • Dabir (Sachiva): Foreign correspondence and treaties.
  • Shurnavis: Internal correspondence and intelligence.
  • Panditrao: Religious endowments and charities.
  • Senapati: Military command.
  • Nyayadhish: Justice and judiciary.
  • Chitnis: Royal correspondence and archives.
Judicial authority culminated in the Chhatrapati as the highest appellate court, with local disputes resolved by mamlatdars under central oversight, promoting uniform application of Hindu law while curbing local abuses. Militarily, the king commanded the forces directly, organizing them into salaried units like bargirs (cavalry) and siledars (volunteers), which bypassed feudal levies for rapid mobilization under royal orders. Sambhaji, succeeding in 1680, maintained this centralized framework amid Mughal wars, introducing specialized departments for artillery and navy to enhance efficiency without diluting monarchical control. Reforms under his rule, such as dedicated administrative wings, underscored continuity in vesting ultimate power with the Chhatrapati, though prolonged conflicts strained resources and foreshadowed regency influences post-1689. This model of direct royal oversight persisted as the ideological core of Maratha governance until executive delegation eroded it in the early 18th century.

Peshwa-Dominated Executive

The office of the Peshwa, originally one of the Ashtapradhan ministers established by Shivaji as prime minister, evolved into the dominant executive authority following the appointment of Balaji Vishwanath on 16 November 1713 by Chhatrapati Shahu. This appointment resolved succession disputes and marked the hereditary transfer of the Peshwa position to Balaji's family, granting the Peshwa extensive control over military campaigns, diplomacy, and revenue collection, while the Chhatrapati retained nominal sovereignty. Under the Peshwas, the central administration centered on the Huzur Daftar secretariat in Poona, where the Peshwa directed a hierarchy of officials including Kamavisdars for revenue oversight and subahdars for provincial governance. The Peshwa assumed the religious headship of the state, integrating executive and spiritual authority, and effectively usurped royal prerogatives, transforming the monarchy into a ceremonial institution by the mid-18th century. Successive Peshwas, such as Baji Rao I (1720–1740) and Balaji Baji Rao (1740–1761), expanded this dominance through aggressive expansionist policies, coordinating semi-autonomous sardars while maintaining Peshwa oversight via treaties and tribute systems like chauth. Judicial administration reflected Peshwa preeminence, with the Peshwa at the apex, followed by sar-subahdars and mamlatdars handling local disputes under customary Hindu law, though enforcement often prioritized fiscal extraction over uniform justice. This structure facilitated rapid decision-making in wartime but sowed seeds of decentralization, as powerful hereditary sardars like the Holkars and Scindias gained autonomy, eroding Peshwa centrality after the 1761 Third Battle of Panipat. By the late 18th century, the Peshwa's executive role persisted formally until Baji Rao II's deposition in 1818, amid British ascendancy.

Revenue and Fiscal Policies

The Maratha revenue system originated under Shivaji (r. 1674–1680), who established a structured land taxation framework emphasizing direct assessment from cultivators to minimize intermediaries, akin to a proto-ryotwari system. Land was measured using standardized units called chavars (a chain of 72 feet) to replace variable rope measurements, ensuring accuracy in irrigated and dry lands; revenue demand was set at approximately one-third (33%) of gross produce initially, rising to 40% over time, with collections in cash or kind based on market value for dry lands. A cornerstone of Maratha fiscal policy was the exaction of chauth (one-fourth, or 25%, of revenue or produce) and sardeshmukhi (an additional one-tenth, or 10%, on claimed hereditary territories), totaling about 35% from subjugated regions, ostensibly as tribute for protection against raids and recognition of Maratha overlordship. Shivaji formalized sardeshmukhi as a claim to supremacy over Deccan lands previously under Bijapur and Mughals, while chauth was levied on Mughal-held territories to avert invasions, with collections enforced through military expeditions starting in the 1650s. Under the Peshwas (1713–1818), fiscal administration shifted toward greater centralization and efficiency, with land revenue remaining the primary source but increasingly managed via tax farming (ijaradari), where contractors bid for fixed annual sums from assigned territories, a practice expanded under Peshwa Baji Rao II (r. 1795–1818) to secure predictable inflows amid wartime needs. Village headmen (patils) handled local collections, reporting yields and settlers, while Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao (r. 1740–1761) streamlined assessments through periodic surveys to counter evasion, though this often led to over-extraction and peasant burdens. Supplementary revenues included customs duties on trade routes, tribute from vassal states, and wartime indemnities, but fiscal strains emerged from expansionist campaigns, prompting reliance on debasement of currency and loans from merchant bankers (shroffs), which exacerbated inflation in the later Peshwa period. This extractive approach sustained military mobility but contributed to administrative fragmentation, as confederate sardars retained autonomy over their jagir revenues.

Military System

Land Forces and Cavalry Emphasis

The land forces of the Maratha Empire formed the backbone of its military power, comprising primarily cavalry and infantry units, though with a pronounced emphasis on cavalry for rapid maneuvers and territorial expansion. This structure evolved from Shivaji's early forces in the mid-17th century, which by 1659 fielded approximately 10,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, reflecting a balanced approach adapted to the rugged Deccan terrain where infantry excelled in defensive guerrilla actions while cavalry enabled offensive strikes. The cavalry, numbering around 40,000 in Shivaji's later reign, constituted the core striking force, organized into two main categories: bargirs, who were provided with horses, arms, and pay by the state, ensuring reliability and uniformity; and silahdars, semi-feudal horsemen who supplied their own equipment in exchange for service, allowing for scalable recruitment during campaigns. Maratha cavalry emphasized light, mobile horsemen riding sturdy local breeds like the Bhimthadi horse, optimized for speed over endurance in prolonged charges, which proved effective against the heavier, slower Mughal cavalry in hit-and-run tactics. Units were typically structured in groups of 25 troopers under a hawaldar, supported by specialists such as water-carriers and farriers to maintain operational tempo during extended raids. Weapons favored by cavalry included curved talwars for close combat, spears for charging, composite bows for ranged harassment, and increasingly matchlock muskets by the 18th century, enabling versatile engagements from ambushes to skirmishes. This light cavalry doctrine prioritized logistical simplicity—eschewing heavy baggage trains—and exploited the empire's peasant-soldier base, allowing armies to swell to over 100,000 horsemen in the Peshwa era for expansive operations across India. Infantry, though secondary, complemented cavalry through disciplined mavli hill troops skilled in musketry and melee, often numbering comparably to cavalry in early formations but growing less proportionally as expansion favored mounted forces. Elite units like the khas paga or huzoorat cavalry, directly maintained by the Peshwa's treasury, provided a professional core for decisive battles, underscoring the empire's reliance on cavalry mobility for both conquest and survival against numerically superior foes like the Mughals and later the British. By the late 18th century, while European-style infantry reforms were attempted, the persistent cavalry emphasis sustained Maratha raiding efficacy until defeats exposed vulnerabilities to disciplined linear tactics and artillery.

Fortifications and Guerrilla Tactics

The Maratha military system emphasized a vast network of fortifications, primarily hill forts adapted from pre-existing structures in the rugged terrain of the Western Ghats, which provided natural defenses against superior invading forces such as the Mughals and Bijapur Sultanate. Chhatrapati Shivaji began consolidating control by capturing Torna Fort in 1646 at the age of 16, marking the inception of his territorial expansion through strategic seizures rather than construction from scratch. By the time of Shivaji's death in 1680, the Marathas held over 300 forts across the Konkan coast, Western Ghats, and central India, utilizing their elevated positions, steep approaches, and limited access points to deter prolonged sieges by larger armies reliant on heavy artillery and infantry. These forts, including Raigad as the imperial capital from 1674 and coastal strongholds like Sindhudurg built under Shivaji's direct oversight, functioned not merely as static defenses but as logistical hubs for provisioning cavalry and storing tribute extracted from surrounding territories. Fortifications integrated seamlessly with Maratha operational doctrine by enabling rapid dispersal into the surrounding ghats during threats, thereby frustrating enemy encirclement tactics employed by Mughal commanders. Examples include Panhala Fort, a hill-plateau type that Shivaji used in 1660 to evade a Bijapur siege through nocturnal escapes and counter-raids, and Pratapgad, where terrain advantages amplified defensive capabilities during the 1659 confrontation with Afzal Khan's forces. The design prioritized impregnability over opulence, with features like sheer cliffs, hidden water cisterns, and multiple gateways to channel attackers into kill zones, allowing a small garrison—often numbering in the hundreds—to hold against thousands. This approach stemmed from the Marathas' resource constraints, as their decentralized confederacy lacked the fiscal base for sustained conventional warfare, compelling reliance on terrain-exploiting defenses that prolonged conflicts and eroded invader morale through attrition. Complementing these static defenses were guerrilla tactics termed Ganimi Kava, or "one-on-one" warfare, which emphasized mobility, surprise, and evasion to neutralize numerical disadvantages against Mughal field armies often exceeding 100,000 troops. Shivaji systematized these methods, drawing on local knowledge of Deccan topography to conduct hit-and-run raids with lightly armored cavalry units of 500–5,000 horsemen, targeting supply convoys and isolated detachments while avoiding pitched battles. A prime instance occurred at the Battle of Pratapgad in November 1659, where Maratha forces ambushed and decimated Afzal Khan's 10,000-strong contingent through feigned retreats into forested hills, followed by coordinated flank attacks that exploited the enemy's overextension. This tactic relied on disciplined scouting networks for intelligence and rapid horse relays for communication, enabling strikes deep into enemy territory—such as the 1660 sack of Mughal outposts near Junnar—before withdrawing to fortified redoubts. Under Shivaji's successors and the Peshwa era, Ganimi Kava evolved into a confederate-wide strategy, with commanders like Santaji Ghorpade employing encirclement and feigned flights to harass Mughal campaigns in the Deccan during the 1690s, often launching from peripheral forts to disrupt logistics over vast expanses. The synergy between fortifications and guerrilla operations proved causally decisive: forts anchored territorial claims and replenished raiders, while raids prevented besiegers from consolidating gains, as evidenced by the prolonged Mughal failure to subdue the Marathas despite invasions under Aurangzeb from 1680 to 1707. European observers, including Portuguese chroniclers, noted the effectiveness of this asymmetric model in sustaining Maratha resilience against centralized empires, though it yielded to British disciplined infantry in the early 19th century due to the Marathas' internal fragmentation. The Maratha Empire's naval forces, known as the Armar, were established by Chhatrapati Shivaji in the mid-17th century to secure the Konkan coastline against Portuguese incursions and Siddi naval power based at Janjira. Shivaji initiated naval construction around 1657, commissioning the first warships and establishing bases such as Sindhudurg Fort in 1664, which served as a fortified shipyard capable of building vessels up to 30 meters long. By 1665, his fleet conducted its inaugural major operation, raiding Portuguese positions at Basrur and Vengurla, employing small, agile gurabs (sailing warships) and galbats (oared gunboats) suited for coastal guerrilla tactics rather than open-sea engagements. This force emphasized speed, shallow-draft vessels for riverine access, and integration with land-based artillery from coastal forts, enabling hit-and-run raids on enemy shipping to enforce tribute (chauth) on maritime trade. Under subsequent leaders, particularly Admiral Kanhoji Angre from 1699 to 1729, the navy peaked in effectiveness, controlling approximately 500 kilometers of coastline from Colaba to Vingoria and maintaining a fleet of around 80 to 100 vessels, including grabs for combat and merchant capture. Angre's command revived the fleet after disruptions following Shivaji's death in 1680 and Sambhaji's execution in 1689, focusing on asymmetric warfare: swarming larger European ships with numerous smaller craft, leveraging monsoon winds, and using fortified harbors like Vijaydurg for repairs and ambushes. Key engagements included repelling British East India Company attempts to seize Khanderi and Underi forts in 1717–1718, where Maratha forces sank or captured several British vessels despite inferior heavy armament, and ongoing skirmishes with Siddi fleets allied to the Mughals, preventing their dominance over Konkan trade routes. Against the Portuguese, the navy disrupted supply lines to Goa, as in raids during the 1710s that forced concessions on shipping tolls. The Maratha navy's strategic role extended to economic extraction, with squadrons intercepting merchant convoys to demand protection fees, thereby funding operations without a centralized treasury. European observers, such as British admiral Thomas Mathews, noted the fleet's resilience but criticized its reliance on plunder over disciplined logistics, attributing repeated failures to capture Maratha forts—like the 1721 bombardment of Vijaydurg, which damaged but did not subdue Angre's defenses—to superior Maratha knowledge of local currents and tidal shallows. Later, under Tulaji Angre in the 1750s, the navy clashed with the Dutch at Gheria (Vijaydurg), destroying several VOC ships in 1754 through coordinated fire from shore batteries and small-boat attacks, though internal Maratha divisions post-1729 eroded cohesion. By the 1760s, British naval superiority and Peshwa alliances with the East India Company diminished the Armar's autonomy, reducing it to auxiliary coastal patrols amid land-focused expansions. This coastal-oriented navy, while never challenging deep-water empires, effectively denied European monopolies on Indian Ocean trade for decades through persistent, low-cost attrition.

Assessments from Afghan, Mughal, and European Observers

Mughal chroniclers often portrayed the Marathas as predatory rebels who disrupted imperial order through guerrilla tactics and raids, yet grudgingly acknowledged their resilience and territorial gains. Khafi Khan, a contemporary Mughal historian, noted that despite Aurangzeb's extensive campaigns and sieges from 1680 to 1707, "the power of the Marathas increased day by day," attributing this to their unyielding resistance and ability to evade decisive defeat. This assessment reflected the Marathas' success in extracting tribute (chauth) from Mughal provinces, which strained imperial finances and forced resource diversion, contributing to the empire's fragmentation after Aurangzeb's death in 1707. Afghan observers, particularly during Ahmad Shah Durrani's invasions, regarded the Marathas as a formidable expansionist power threatening Muslim rule in northern India. Prior to the Third Battle of Panipat on January 14, 1761, Durrani declared a jihad against the Marathas, mobilizing Pashtun tribes to counter their control over Punjab and Delhi, which he viewed as an existential challenge to his influence. Contemporary accounts highlight the Afghans' recognition of Maratha numerical superiority—estimated at 55,000 cavalry and infantry against Durrani's 42,000—but criticized their overextended supply lines and unfamiliarity with northern terrain, factors enabling the Afghan victory that killed or captured up to 40,000 Marathas. Durrani's forces exploited these weaknesses through camel-mounted artillery and coordinated flanks, underscoring Afghan perceptions of Maratha strength in mobility but vulnerability in pitched battles. European observers, including British administrators and military officers, assessed the Marathas as adept in cavalry-based warfare and fortifications but critiqued their decentralized confederate structure for fostering internal rivalries and fiscal rapacity. James Grant Duff, British Resident at Pune from 1807 to 1818, described the Maratha military as reliant on light horse and guerrilla methods, effective for rapid expansion from 1674 to 1761 but ill-suited to disciplined European-style engagements, as evidenced by defeats at Assaye in 1803. He praised elements of their administration, such as revenue collection via sardeshmukhi and chauth, which sustained armies of 100,000–200,000 horsemen, though noting corruption and hereditary commands eroded efficiency. The Duke of Wellington, observing Maratha forces during the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803–1805), commended their artillery's European-influenced precision and infantry drills under commanders like Daulat Rao Scindia, yet attributed their losses to poor leadership cohesion rather than inherent inferiority. Other Europeans, such as French mercenaries in Maratha service, viewed the polity as a pragmatic Hindu revival against Mughal decline, with tolerant religious policies but extractive practices that alienated subjects.

Economy

Agrarian Base and Tribute Systems (Chauth and Sardeshmukhi)

The agrarian economy of the Maratha Empire was rooted in the Deccan region's predominantly rain-fed agriculture, with land revenue serving as the cornerstone of fiscal resources in core territories classified as swarajya. Principal crops encompassed drought-resistant millets such as jowar and bajra, supplemented by rice and pulses in irrigated riverine areas like the Godavari and Krishna basins, though erratic monsoons often constrained yields and necessitated storage granaries for stability. Shivaji restructured the revenue system around 1667–1669 by commissioning surveys under officials like Annaji Datto, adopting a measurement-based assessment akin to the Deccani kathi method—using a standardized rod to gauge cultivated land—and fixing the state's share at roughly 40% of gross produce, while eliminating Mughal-era illegal cesses and intermediaries to enhance collection efficiency. This ryotwari-like approach empowered hereditary village officers (patils and deshmukhs) for local enforcement but centralized oversight to curb feudal excesses, yielding an estimated annual revenue of several lakhs of rupees from khalisa (crown) lands by the late 17th century. To finance expansive military campaigns without the administrative burden of direct governance over vast peripheral territories, Shivaji introduced the tribute levies of chauth and sardeshmukhi in 1665, formalizing them by 1667 as alternatives to plunderous mulkgiri raids modeled on earlier Deccani and Islamic practices. Chauth, meaning "one-fourth," extracted 25% of the land revenue or produce from neighboring Mughal and sultanate domains—such as annual payments of 3 lakh rupees from Bijapur and 5 lakh from Golconda—to avert Maratha incursions, effectively functioning as a protection fee that subsidized troop maintenance and cavalry upkeep. Sardeshmukhi, an additional 10% surcharge, asserted Shivaji's claim as superior overlord (sardeshmukh) of the Deccan, drawing on purported hereditary tax rights over Maharashtra and levied only on payers of chauth, thereby totaling up to 35% extraction in compliant areas. Collection was decentralized through sardars and mamlatdars who dispatched raiding parties if tributes lagged, targeting Mughal Deccan provinces like Berar and Khandesh by the early 18th century under successors like Sambhaji and the Peshwas, who extended demands northward to Gujarat, Malwa, and beyond—encompassing roughly one-third of Mughal revenues by 1720. This system enabled a loose imperial structure, funding an army of 100,000–200,000 horsemen without proportional territorial administration, though it fostered economic disruption via periodic coercion and dual revenue layers that strained agrarian producers in tributary zones. By the mid-18th century, formalized grants like the 1719 Mughal firman to Kanhoji Angre institutionalized chauth rights over six Deccan subas, amplifying Maratha fiscal leverage amid imperial fragmentation.

Trade Networks and Mercantile Policies

The Maratha Empire's trade networks primarily comprised overland routes across the Deccan Plateau, Gujarat, Malwa, and into northern India, secured through the chauth levy—a tribute of approximately 25% of territorial revenue paid for military protection against raids, which effectively taxed caravans and ensured safer passage for merchants transporting textiles, spices, agricultural produce, and metal goods. This system, formalized under Shivaji in the 1670s and expanded under the Peshwas after 1713, integrated Maratha fiscal extraction with regional commerce, allowing control over Mughal-era trade corridors without direct administrative overhaul. Maritime networks were secondary but bolstered by Shivaji's naval buildup, focusing on coastal defense rather than export dominance, with routes linking Konkan ports to the Arabian Sea and countering European and Siddi interference. Shivaji's mercantile policies prioritized indigenous commerce through merchant protection, stable governance, and selective duties, including transit taxes on foreign goods passing through Maratha territories to shield local traders from external competition. He established fortified dockyards at Sindhudurg (constructed 1664–1667), Vijaydurg, and Khanderi to support shipbuilding and safeguard coastal trade from Portuguese, Dutch, and British vessels, while organized markets and fair taxation spurred internal exchanges of agrarian surpluses and crafts. These measures fostered economic resilience amid warfare, though they emphasized protectionism over expansive incentives. Under the Peshwas, particularly Bajirao I (1720–1740) and successors, policies shifted toward opportunistic integration with conquered merchant hubs, as in Gujarat after 1750s campaigns, where Peshwa deputies encouraged artisan and trader resettlement to revive urban economies disrupted by Mughal decline. Revenue farming involved merchant capital, blending state oversight with private networks for commodity procurement and credit, while chauth extensions into Bengal (post-1740s raids) tapped eastern trade flows in textiles and opium precursors. The Peshwa administration practiced state trading by collecting and redistributing commodities alongside cash revenues, yet this extractive approach—prioritizing military funding over infrastructure—drew criticism from European observers as unstable and disruptive to long-term commerce. Overall, Maratha policies yielded flexible adaptation to regional dynamics but remained geared toward tribute sustenance rather than autonomous mercantile expansion.

Fiscal Challenges and Extractive Practices

The Maratha Empire's fiscal system heavily relied on extractive levies such as chauth, nominally one-fourth of the revenue or produce from territories under nominal Mughal suzerainty, exacted as tribute to avert raids and ensure protection. This practice, institutionalized under Shivaji in the late 17th century and expanded by Peshwas like Baji Rao I from 1720 onward, generated substantial short-term inflows—estimated to constitute up to 45% of Maratha revenues by 1740—but fostered dependency on coercive military expeditions rather than stable agrarian taxation. Accompanying chauth was sardeshmukhi, an additional 10% levy on the same base, claiming the Marathas' overlordship, which compounded the total extraction to approximately 35% in affected regions, straining local economies and provoking resistance from Mughal governors and zamindars. These practices engendered fiscal volatility, as tribute collection hinged on repeated campaigns that disrupted trade and agriculture in subjugated areas, including Bengal and Gujarat by the 1740s, where demands escalated amid inter-sardar rivalries. In core Deccan territories, internal revenue assessment under a proto-ryotwari system—direct levies on cultivators—mirrored high rates, often 25-35% of produce, but administrative fragmentation under the confederacy post-1761 allowed sardars like Scindia and Holkar to withhold portions, undermining central Peshwa finances and fueling corruption in revenue farming. The Third Battle of Panipat in 1761 exacerbated strains, with reconstruction costs and lost northern tributes forcing inflated internal demands, while ongoing wars against the Nizam and Mysore depleted reserves without proportional territorial gains. Peasant burdens intensified under these extractive dynamics, as military requisitions and erratic collections—exacerbated by moneylender intermediaries—eroded cultivator incentives, hindering irrigation and crop improvements amid perpetual conflict. Though outright peasant revolts were less documented than under Mughal rule, localized discontent manifested in flight from lands and reduced yields in the Deccan by the 1780s, compounded by Peshwa-era inefficiencies like embezzlement in ashtaprakrit revenue grants. This over-reliance on predation over institutional reform contributed to systemic fragility, as fiscal shortfalls prompted further raids, perpetuating a cycle of extraction that prioritized elite military patronage over sustainable governance.

Society and Culture

Social Hierarchy and Maratha Caste Dynamics

The social hierarchy in the Maratha Empire integrated elements of the Hindu varna framework with fluid mobility driven by military success and administrative needs, diverging from rigid Mughal or earlier Deccan structures. The Chhatrapati, as sovereign ruler, embodied claimed Kshatriya authority, with Shivaji Bhonsle elevating the Maratha identity from agrarian roots to martial leadership in the 1670s. Beneath the monarch, a council of eight ministers (Ashtapradhan) included Brahmin appointees for fiscal and judicial roles, reflecting reliance on their scriptural and clerical expertise despite Shivaji's initial preference for Maratha loyalists. Maratha caste dynamics centered on the upward trajectory of the Maratha-Kunbi continuum, where peasant cultivators (Kunbis) transitioned into warrior elites through service in Shivaji's campaigns from 1645 onward, forming the backbone of cavalry and infantry forces. This group, comprising 96 clans, originated primarily from Shudra varna agrarian communities but asserted Kshatriya equivalence via genealogical ties to Rajput lineages and battlefield merit, enabling figures like Tanaji Malusare—a lowborn soldier—to attain high command by 1670. Social mobility contrasted with Brahmin dominance in civilian administration, as Chitpavan Brahmins ascended via the Peshwa office after 1713, handling revenue collection and diplomacy while Maratha sardars controlled territorial jagirs. Tensions arose from Brahminical enforcement of caste norms, with Peshwa regimes from Bajirao I (1720–1740) imposing restrictions on non-Brahmin rituals and inter-caste interactions to consolidate ritual purity and state control, as evidenced in 18th-century edicts regulating marriage and inheritance across varnas. Maratha nobility, rooted in 32-96 elite clans, often chafed at this, leading to factionalism; for instance, Chhatrapati Shahu (r. 1707–1749) balanced Brahmin Peshwa influence by empowering Maratha houses like Holkar and Scindia, whose leaders derived from pastoral or Kunbi origins yet wielded semi-autonomous power. This dynamic fostered a pragmatic hierarchy where martial prowess trumped birth in recruitment—evident in the empire's expansion to 250,000 square miles by 1760—but preserved endogamy and pollution taboos among elites. Lower strata included artisan and laboring castes subsumed under Kunbi-Maratha umbrellas, contributing to agrarian tribute systems like chauth, while Dalit and tribal groups remained marginalized, with limited upward paths beyond auxiliary roles. State interventions, such as caste panchayat validations, reinforced internal hierarchies within Maratha subgroups, where hypergamy linked elite warriors to peasant kin. By the late 18th century, Peshwa centralization exacerbated resentments, culminating in Maratha sardar revolts against Brahmin overreach, underscoring causal frictions between administrative monopoly and warrior autonomy.

Religious Policies and Hindu Revivalism

The religious policies of the Maratha Empire, initiated under Shivaji, centered on reasserting Hindu sovereignty amid Mughal expansion and iconoclasm. Shivaji's coronation on June 6, 1674, at Raigad Fort, conducted via Vedic rites by Gaga Bhatta, established him as Chhatrapati and symbolized the revival of indigenous Hindu kingship after prolonged foreign domination. This act legitimized Maratha rule through dharmic sanction, countering Islamic imperial norms and fostering a framework for Hindu self-rule known as Hindavi Swarajya. Shivaji actively patronized Hindu temples, allocating funds for repairs, rituals, and construction while granting lands for sustenance. He supported key sites such as the Tulja Bhavani Temple in Tuljapur—his family deity, from which he received the Bhavani Talwar sword—and the Vitthal Rukmini Temple in Pandharpur, securing pilgrimage routes for devotees across Maharashtra. Additional restorations occurred at Grishneshwar Temple in Ellora and construction of the Shambhu Mahadev Temple in Satara, reflecting a policy of cultural and spiritual resurgence. Shivaji prohibited the destruction of religious structures during campaigns, extending protection to Hindu sites vulnerable to prior invasions. These measures responded to Mughal policies under Aurangzeb, who reimposed the jizya tax on Hindus in 1679 and demolished temples, prompting Shivaji's resistance as a defender of Hindu dharma. While emphasizing revival, Shivaji maintained pragmatic tolerance, employing Muslim officers like Darya Sarang and Madari Mehtar, and safeguarding mosques and the Quran under his chief justice's 1669 ordinance for religious freedom. This balance prioritized Hindu protection without wholesale exclusion, driven by strategic needs in diverse territories. Successors, particularly the Brahmin Peshwas from Balaji Vishwanath onward in the early 18th century, intensified Hindu revivalism in conquered regions. In Malwa, Peshwa sardars restored temple prayers and rituals suppressed under Mughal governance, elevating Hinduism's public status. Peshwa Bajirao I (r. 1720–1740), styling himself as faith's guardian, supported expansions that facilitated temple protections and grants, including northern sites shielded from Afghan incursions. Yet, military raids—such as those in Karnataka during the 1750s under Balaji Bajirao—occasionally plundered temples in rival domains for tribute, underscoring policies geared toward political extraction over ideological purity. Overall, Maratha policies privileged Hindu institutions through endowments and defenses, enabling a resurgence that preserved dharma amid conquests, though tempered by realpolitik in alliances and warfare. This approach contrasted with prior orthodox impositions, attributing empire's ideological cohesion to revivalist legitimacy rather than mere opportunism.

Cultural and Intellectual Life

The Maratha Empire's cultural life emphasized Marathi literary traditions, particularly the composition of powadas, ballad-like narratives extolling the exploits of Shivaji and subsequent rulers to foster a sense of martial valor and collective identity. These works, often performed orally, emerged prominently in the late 17th century and continued into the Peshwa era, drawing from earlier bardic forms but adapted to glorify Maratha sovereignty against Mughal dominance. Under Peshwa rule from the early 18th century, patronage extended to classical Marathi poetry and drama, with tamasha—a folk theater form blending music, dance, and satire—gaining official support at the Pune court, reflecting a blend of devotional and secular themes rooted in regional customs. Lavani, an energetic dance accompanied by poetic lyrics on themes of love and heroism, also proliferated during this period, performed by courtesans and troupes under aristocratic sponsorship, though its sensual elements drew periodic moral scrutiny from orthodox Brahmin elites. Visual arts saw the development of a distinct Maratha style in the 18th century, as Mughal atelier artists migrated southward amid imperial decline, producing miniatures, murals, and glass paintings depicting courtly scenes, deities, and battles under commissions from Peshwas and sardars like those in Thanjavur. This patronage preserved Indo-Persian techniques while infusing Hindu iconography, evident in illustrated manuscripts and palace decorations. Intellectually, Maratha rulers supported Sanskrit scholarship, with figures like Shahaji Bhonsle granting villages to pandits in the late 17th century, enabling compositions in grammar, poetics, and Vedantic philosophy that sustained pre-modern Indic learning amid political upheaval. While Shivaji prioritized state-building over extensive cultural sponsorship, Peshwa Brahmins like Balaji Bajirao fostered religious and literary institutions, aligning patronage with Hindu orthodoxy rather than innovative philosophical inquiry.

Key Figures and Houses

Chhatrapati Lineage

The Chhatrapati title, meaning "paramount sovereign," was first assumed by Shivaji Bhonsle upon his coronation on June 6, 1674, at Raigad Fort, marking the formal inception of Maratha kingship independent of Mughal suzerainty. Shivaji reigned until his death on April 3, 1680, having laid the foundations of Maratha administration, military tactics, and territorial expansion through conquests in the Deccan. Shivaji was succeeded by his eldest son Sambhaji, who ruled from 1681 to 1689, continuing resistance against Mughal forces under Aurangzeb, including victories over Portuguese and Mysore rulers, before his capture and execution by the Mughals on March 11, 1689. Sambhaji's death precipitated a succession crisis, resolved by Shivaji's younger son Rajaram ascending the throne in 1689; Rajaram shifted operations southward to Gingee to evade Mughal pursuit, employing guerrilla warfare until his death on March 3, 1700. Following Rajaram's demise, his widow Tarabai assumed regency for their infant son Shivaji II from 1700 to 1707, mounting fierce defenses against Mughal incursions. Concurrently, Sambhaji's son Shahu, released from Mughal captivity in 1707, contested the throne, prevailing in the ensuing civil war by 1708 and establishing Satara as the capital; Shahu I reigned until his death on December 15, 1749, during which he formalized the Peshwa system, delegating executive authority to Balaji Vishwanath and his descendants, thereby diminishing the Chhatrapati's direct power. Lacking a direct heir, Shahu I adopted Ramraja (also known as Rajaram II), a descendant in the Bhonsle line through Rajaram's branch, who ruled nominally from 1749 to 1777 amid Peshwa dominance. Ramraja was succeeded by his adopted son Shahu II in 1777, who held the title until his death on May 3, 1808, by which time the Chhatrapati served primarily as ceremonial figures within the Maratha Confederacy, with real authority vested in Peshwas and sardars like the Holkars and Scindias. The Satara lineage persisted post-1818 under British paramountcy as a princely state until its merger into independent India, but the imperial phase effectively concluded with the Third Anglo-Maratha War.
ChhatrapatiReign YearsKey Succession Note
Shivaji I1674–1680Founder; direct descent from Shahji Bhonsle.
Sambhaji1681–1689Eldest son of Shivaji.
Rajaram1689–1700Younger son of Shivaji.
Shahu I1707–1749Son of Sambhaji; prevailed over Tarabai's regency.
Ramraja1749–1777Adopted by Shahu I; Bhonsle descendant.
Shahu II1777–1808Adopted by Ramraja; nominal rule.

Peshwa Bhat Family

The Bhat family, originating from Chitpavan Brahmins in the Konkan region of Maharashtra, assumed the hereditary office of Peshwa (prime minister) in the Maratha Empire starting with Balaji Vishwanath's appointment by Chhatrapati Shahu in 1713. This position, initially administrative, evolved under the Bhat Peshwas into de facto rulership, centralizing power in Pune and diminishing the Chhatrapati's direct authority after Shahu's death in 1749. Balaji Vishwanath (1662–1720) laid the foundation by negotiating the 1719 Mughal-Maratha treaty, securing formal rights to collect chauth (25% tribute) and sardeshmukhi (10% surcharge) from Deccan territories, which provided fiscal stability amid Mughal decline. His son, Baji Rao I (1700–1740), transformed the empire through aggressive expansion, leading Maratha cavalry in 41 battles without a single loss and extending influence into Gujarat, Malwa, Bundelkhand, and Rajputana by 1740. Baji Rao's strategy emphasized rapid mobile warfare, exploiting Mughal fragmentation to establish Maratha hegemony north of the Vindhyas, though he avoided permanent territorial administration in favor of tribute extraction. Succeeded by his son Balaji Baji Rao (Nanasaheb, 1720–1761), the family reached its territorial zenith, incorporating Punjab and Bengal fringes, but Nanasaheb's reliance on diplomacy over military resolve contributed to overextension. The disastrous defeat at the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761 against Ahmad Shah Durrani, resulting in over 100,000 Maratha casualties, exposed vulnerabilities in supply lines and confederate coordination, shattering central authority. Nanasaheb's grandson Madhavrao I (1745–1772) attempted revival through administrative reforms, including streamlined revenue collection, anti-corruption measures, and military reorganization that emphasized disciplined infantry alongside cavalry. Victories against the Nizam at Rakshasbhuvan (1763) and expeditions into the Carnatic against Hyder Ali restored some prestige, but his early death at age 27 in 1772 triggered succession crises. Narayanrao (1772–1773), Madhavrao's brother, was assassinated in a palace intrigue led by uncle Raghunathrao, fracturing family unity and empowering rival confederate sardars like the Holkars and Scindias. Under Madhavrao II (1774–1795, largely a minor under regents) and Baji Rao II (1796–1818), Peshwa influence waned amid internal feuds and British subsidiary alliances. Raghunathrao's (1734–1783) failed bid for power, including his 1775 alliance with the British against kin, eroded legitimacy. Baji Rao II's adoption of the 1802 Treaty of Bassein subordinated Maratha sovereignty to British protection, provoking the Second and Third Anglo-Maratha Wars; defeat at Kirkee and Koregaon in 1817–1818 led to the Peshwa's deposition and exile, annexing Pune territories and dissolving central authority. The Bhat Peshwas' rule, spanning 105 years, shifted the Maratha polity from a kingdom to a confederacy dominated by semi-autonomous houses, with their Brahminical administration fostering resentment among warrior castes but enabling peak expansion before structural weaknesses—overreliance on plunder, familial discord, and failure to modernize against European artillery—precipitated collapse.

Confederacy Sardars (Holkar, Scindia, Bhonsle, Gaekwad)

The Maratha Confederacy's sardars, including the Holkar, Scindia, Bhonsle, and Gaekwad houses, emerged as semi-autonomous powers in the 18th century, administering territories in central and western India while nominally acknowledging Peshwa suzerainty. These families, originating as military commanders under early Maratha leaders like Peshwa Baji Rao I, expanded through conquests in Malwa, Gujarat, and beyond, collecting tribute systems such as chauth and engaging in internecine rivalries that weakened centralized authority. By the 1760s, their growing independence contributed to the confederacy's decentralized structure, with each house maintaining private armies numbering tens of thousands, such as the Holkars' forces exceeding 50,000 cavalry at peak. The Holkar dynasty, based in Indore, Malwa, was founded by Malhar Rao Holkar (1693–1766), who received the region as jagir in 1733 following Maratha conquests against Mughal governors. Malhar Rao, a key general under Baji Rao I, participated in campaigns extending Maratha influence to Punjab by 1758, amassing wealth through raids and establishing administrative control over 36 districts. After his death, his daughter-in-law Ahilyabai Holkar (1725–1795) assumed regency in 1767, ruling until 1795 with noted efficiency, constructing temples like those at Kashi and Gaya, and maintaining stability amid confederacy conflicts; her administration emphasized justice and infrastructure, contrasting the era's frequent warfare. The dynasty's later rulers, including Jaswant Rao Holkar (r. 1799–1811), defied Peshwa directives, leading to defeats in the Second Anglo-Maratha War and British subsidiary alliance in 1818. The Scindia (Shinde) family, centered in Gwalior and Ujjain, traced origins to Ranoji Scindia (d. 1745), appointed by Baji Rao I in 1731 to govern Malwa territories after victories over Nizam-ul-Mulk. Ranoji's successors consolidated power, with Mahadaji Scindia (1730–1794) restoring Maratha dominance in northern India post-Third Battle of Panipat (1761), allying with Mughals and defeating Afghan remnants by 1784; he commanded over 100,000 troops and influenced Delhi court politics until his death. The Scindias' autonomy grew, funding European-style armies with French mercenaries, but internal feuds and British interventions culminated in the 1803 Treaty of Surji-Anjangaon, ceding territories and accepting subsidiary status. The Bhonsle rulers of Nagpur, from the elder branch of the Maratha Bhonsle clan, established control under Raghoji I Bhonsle (r. 1739–1755), who expanded into Bengal and Odisha through raids yielding annual tributes of 1.2 million rupees by 1740s. Raghoji's campaigns, including the 1741 Bengal invasion, demonstrated confederacy aggression but strained resources; successors like Janoji (r. 1755–1772) faced Gond rebellions and Peshwa oversight. The house maintained a standing army of 40,000, focusing on eastern expansions, yet territorial losses in the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817–1818) ended independence, with Nagpur annexed under lapse doctrine in 1853. The Gaekwad dynasty of Baroda (Vadodara), Gujarat, originated with Pilaji Rao Gaekwad's conquest of the city from Mughal control in 1721, granted as fief by Chhatrapati Shahu I. Damaji Rao (r. 1732–1768) solidified holdings amid conflicts with Peshwas, while Fateh Singh Rao (r. 1771–1789) navigated alliances, including brief British pacts in 1780. The Gaekwads controlled fertile Gujarat plains, deriving revenue from ports like Surat, and fielded 20,000 cavalry; unlike other sardars, they allied early with British against rivals, securing subsidiary treaty in 1802 and retaining sovereignty until 1947 integration.

Legacy and Controversies

Geopolitical Impact and Decline Factors

The Maratha Empire exerted profound geopolitical influence by accelerating the Mughal Empire's disintegration after Aurangzeb's death in 1707. Through persistent military campaigns and negotiations, Marathas secured chauth rights over Deccan provinces in 1719 under Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, eroding Mughal revenue bases in regions like Malwa, Gujarat, and Bundelkhand. Peshwa Baji Rao I's expansions, including victories at the Battle of Palkhed in 1728 and the Battle of Bhopal in 1737–1738, extended Maratha control northward, culminating in raids on Delhi in 1737 and the Treaty of Bhopal that formalized dominance over Malwa. By 1752, the Ahadnama treaty rendered the Mughals dependent on Maratha protection, effectively supplanting imperial authority across much of northern and central India and fostering a fragmented landscape of regional powers. This expansive reach, however, sowed seeds of overextension, as the confederate structure prioritized sardar autonomy over centralized cohesion. The Third Battle of Panipat on January 14, 1761, against Ahmad Shah Durrani's Afghan forces resulted in catastrophic Maratha losses estimated at 60,000–70,000 troops, halting northern consolidation and inducing a decade of territorial instability. Recovery under Peshwa Madhavrao I proved temporary, undermined by escalating internal rivalries among houses like the Scindias and Holkars, which fragmented strategic decision-making. Economic pressures compounded these divisions, with chauth extraction failing to offset the fiscal burdens of prolonged warfare and administrative decentralization. Leadership vacuums post-1761, exemplified by Peshwa Baji Rao II's ineffectiveness, further eroded unity. External encroachments intensified via the Anglo-Maratha Wars: the First (1775–1782) ended in the Treaty of Salbai's stalemate but exposed vulnerabilities; the Second (1803–1805) saw defeats at Assaye and Argaon, enforcing the subsidiary Treaty of Bassein (1802) and territorial cessions; the Third (1817–1819) dismantled the confederacy through battles like Khadki and Mahidpur, annexing Peshwa domains and pensioning Baji Rao II. These conflicts, exploiting Maratha disunity, cemented British paramountcy, rendering the empire's geopolitical sway a precursor to colonial consolidation rather than enduring Hindu resurgence.

Historiographical Debates on Empire vs. Confederacy

The historiographical debate on the Maratha polity revolves around its characterization as either a centralized empire comparable to the Mughals or a decentralized confederacy of semi-autonomous chiefs, with neither label fully capturing its fluid, opportunistic structure. Indian nationalists, seeking to elevate Maratha resistance to Mughal and British rule, emphasized its imperial coherence, portraying figures like Shivaji and the Peshwas as architects of a unified sovereign state that dominated the subcontinent by the mid-18th century. In opposition, British colonial accounts, such as those by James Grant Duff in his 1826 History of the Mahrattas, depicted it as a fractious confederacy to underscore the disunity that facilitated East India Company conquests, highlighting the independent actions of sardars in regions like Malwa and Gujarat. Scholars like Barbara Ramusack have critiqued these binaries, arguing that "empire" overstates the degree of centralization, as the Chhatrapati's authority waned after 1731 under Peshwa rule, while "confederacy" misrepresents the absence of enduring institutional power-sharing, with alliances often dissolving amid rivalries among houses like the Holkars and Scindias. Stewart Gordon, in his analysis of Maratha governance from 1600 to 1818, rejects an imperial model akin to Mughal graded hierarchies, noting the lack of formalized civilian or military rankings and the reliance on personal loyalties and plunder-based expansion rather than bureaucratic control. He similarly qualifies "confederacy," as Maratha chiefdoms exhibited short-term coordination under Peshwa leadership—such as in the 1737 Battle of Bhopal—but frequently pursued divergent territorial ambitions, as seen in the post-1761 Panipat fragmentation where Scindia forces in Delhi operated with minimal oversight from Pune. Empirical evidence from administrative practices supports a hybrid view: Shivaji's coronation in 1674 established centralized elements like the Ashta Pradhan council and direct revenue collection in swarajya territories totaling about 4,000 villages by 1680, yet subsequent growth depended on delegating chauth (25% tribute) rights to sardars, fostering de facto autonomy by the 1720s under Balaji Vishwanath's expansions into northern India. By the 1740s under Bajirao I, who commanded over 100,000 cavalry across campaigns, Peshwa primacy persisted through hereditary offices and periodic durbars, but enforcement faltered as sardars amassed private armies—Holkar forces numbered 50,000 by 1750—and defied orders, exemplified by the 1791 rift between Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao and Nana Fadnavis' factionalism. This decentralization, while enabling rapid conquests covering 250 million acres by 1760, undermined resilience against Anglo-Maratha wars, where disunited fronts led to defeats at Assaye in 1803 and the 1818 treaty subsuming Pune. Modern assessments, informed by archival records like Peshwa daftar documents, thus favor a "predatory federation" model over rigid empire or confederacy, attributing its dynamism to adaptive warlordism rather than institutional unity, though nationalist historiography persists in Maharashtra for cultural identity.

Modern Claims, Caste Narratives, and Nationalistic Interpretations

In contemporary Indian nationalism, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj and the Maratha Empire are frequently invoked as symbols of Hindu resistance against Mughal dominance, with Shivaji portrayed as a foundational figure in the narrative of indigenous sovereignty and military innovation. This interpretation gained prominence during the Indian independence movement, where figures like Bal Gangadhar Tilak elevated Shivaji's 1895 tercentenary celebrations into platforms for anti-colonial sentiment, framing the Marathas as precursors to a unified Hindu resurgence against foreign rule. However, such views often simplify Shivaji's pragmatic diplomacy, including temporary alliances with Muslim powers like the Mughals and Bijapur Sultanate, which prioritized territorial expansion over ideological purity. Hindu nationalist discourse in the 20th and 21st centuries has amplified the Marathas' role in curbing Islamic expansion, crediting their confederacy with weakening the Mughal Empire by 1761 at the Third Battle of Panipat and facilitating British ascendancy indirectly. Proponents argue this legacy underscores a causal chain of decentralized warrior resistance enabling later national consolidation, though critics, including some historians, contend it overlooks the empire's internal fragmentation and reliance on fiscal extraction rather than cohesive ideology. In Maharashtra, Shivaji's coronation on June 6, 1674, is commemorated as emblematic of self-rule (swarajya), influencing political rhetoric and iconography in regional parties like Shiv Sena, which merged Maratha pride with broader Hindutva appeals. Caste narratives surrounding the Marathas revolve around contested claims to Kshatriya (warrior) status, rooted in 17th-century assertions by Shivaji's lineage to legitimize rule through Vedic sanction, including the 1674 coronation rituals involving Brahmin genealogists tracing descent to Rajput Sisodias. Colonial ethnographies distinguished "higher" Marathas as landowning elites with Kshatriya pretensions from Kunbi cultivators deemed Shudra, a dichotomy that fueled 19th-century polemics where non-Brahmin reformers like Jyotirao Phule challenged Kshatriya narratives to highlight peasant origins and critique Brahmanical hierarchy. By the late 1800s, Maratha literati produced texts affirming Kshatriya pedigree to counter low-caste ascriptions, yet empirical data on agrarian dominance— with Marathas comprising about 30-35% of Maharashtra's population and controlling significant farmland—reveals a fluid identity blending martial heritage with rural peasantry. Modern reservation agitations, peaking in 2018 and 2023-2025, invert historical Kshatriya claims by seeking Other Backward Classes (OBC) status through equivalence with Kunbis, arguing socioeconomic decline post-1947 land reforms eroded elite advantages, with over 80% of Marathas now engaged in farming amid stagnant per capita income. Activists like Manoj Jarange Patil mobilized surveys claiming 2.5 million Maratha-Kunbi certificates by 2024, yet this strategy provoked intra-caste friction, as upwardly mobile subgroups resisted subsumption under a "socially inferior" Kunbi label, highlighting tensions between aspirational warrior identity and empirical backwardness metrics like literacy rates lagging OBC averages by 5-7%. Courts struck down the 2018 Maharashtra law granting 16% reservation as exceeding the 50% cap, citing inadequate exceptional circumstances despite data showing Marathas' overrepresentation in suicides (28% of farmers) but underrepresentation in poverty alleviation schemes. These debates underscore causal factors like fragmented landholdings and political patronage failures, rather than primordial caste essence, in driving demands, with OBC opposition framing it as elite capture of quotas originally for ritually disadvantaged groups. Recent heritage recognitions, such as UNESCO's 2025 inscription of 12 Maratha military forts as "Maratha Military Landscapes," reinforce claims to exceptional strategic ingenuity, attributing their design to adaptations in the Sahyadri terrain that enabled guerrilla warfare against larger foes. This bolsters nationalistic narratives of Maratha engineering prowess—evident in over 300 forts by 1707—but also invites scrutiny of pre-Maratha foundations, as many structures originated under Yadava or earlier dynasties and were merely fortified, challenging attributions of wholesale innovation. Pro-Maratha advocates cite such listings to assert cultural continuity, yet empirical analysis reveals selective emphasis, downplaying the confederacy's later administrative decentralization that prioritized sardari autonomy over imperial unity.

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