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Quebec sovereignty movement
Quebec sovereignty movement
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A poster for Quebec sovereignty during the 1995 referendum: Oui, et ça devient possible (French for 'Yes, and it becomes possible').
Location, in dark blue, of Quebec within North America.

The Quebec sovereignty movement (French: mouvement souverainiste du Québec, pronounced [muvmɑ̃ suvʁɛnɪst d͡zy kebɛk]) is a political movement advocating for Quebec's independence from Canada. Proponents argue that Quebecers form a distinct nation with a unique culture, language, history, and set of values, and thus should exercise their right to self-determination.[1] This principle includes the possibility of choosing between integration with a third state, political association with another state, or full independence, enabling Quebecers to establish a sovereign state with its own constitution.

Supporters believe that an independent Quebec would be better positioned to promote its economic, social, environmental, and cultural development.[1] They contend that self-governance would allow Quebec to manage its resources, such as its vast renewable natural assets and strategic geographic location, in alignment with its interests.[1] Additionally, sovereignty would enable Quebec to establish its own fiscal policies, participate directly in international forums, and uphold its commitment to the French language and intercultural integration model.[1]

The movement is rooted in Quebec nationalism, emphasizing the province's distinct identity and the desire for political autonomy to achieve its full potential as a nation.

Overview

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The goal of Quebec's sovereignist movement is to make Quebec an independent state.[1][2] In practice, the terms independentist, sovereignist, and separatist are used to describe people adhering to this movement, although the latter term is perceived as pejorative by those concerned as it de-emphasizes that the sovereignty project aims to achieve political independence without severing economic connections with Canada. Most of the prime ministers of Canada's speeches use the term sovereignist in French to moderate remarks made on the Quebec electorate. In English, the term separatist is often used to accentuate negative dimensions of the movement.

The idea of Quebec sovereignty is based on a nationalist vision and interpretation of historical facts and sociological realities in Quebec, which attest to the existence of a Québécois people and a Quebec nation. On November 27, 2006, the House of Commons of Canada adopted, by 266 votes to 16, a motion recognizing that “Québécois form a nation within a united Canada”.[3] On November 30, the National Assembly of Quebec unanimously adopted a motion recognizing "the positive character" of the motion adopted by Ottawa and proclaiming that said motion did not diminish "the inalienable rights, the constitutional powers and the privileges of the 'National Assembly and of the Quebec nation'".[4]

Sovereignists believe that the natural final outcome of the Québécois people's collective adventure and development is the achievement of political independence, which is only possible if Quebec becomes a sovereign state and if its inhabitants not only govern themselves through independent democratic political institutions, but are also free to establish external relations and make international treaties without the federal government of Canada being involved.[1][2]

Through parliamentarism, Québécois currently possess a certain democratic control over the Quebec state. However, within the Canadian federation, Quebec does not have all the constitutional powers that would allow it to act as a true national government. Furthermore, the policies pursued by Quebec and those pursued by the federal government often come into conflict. Various attempts to reform the Canadian federal system have failed (most notably the defunct Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords), due to conflicting interests between the sovereignist and federalist elites of Quebec, as well as with English Canada (see Constitutional Debate in Canada).

Although Quebec's independence movement is a political movement, cultural and social concerns that are much older than the sovereignist movement, as well as Quebecers' national identity, are also at the base for the desire to emancipate Quebec's population. One of the main cultural arguments sovereigntists cite is that if Quebec were independent, Québécois would have a national citizenship, which would solve the problem of Québécois cultural identity in the North American context (ex. who is a Québécois and who is not, what is uniquely Québécois, etc.). Another example is that by establishing an independent Quebec, sovereigntists believe that the culture of Québécois and their collective memory will be adequately protected, in particular against cultural appropriation by other nations, such as the incident with Canada's national anthem, originally a French Canadian patriotic song appropriated by the anglophone majority of Canada. Adherents also believe an independent Quebec would also adequately and definitively resolve the issue of needing to protect the French language in Quebec; French is the language of the majority in Quebec, but since it is the language of a cultural minority in Canada – and since Quebec does not have the legislative powers of an independent state – French is still considered threatened by many Quebecers (see Language demographics of Quebec, OQLF, and Charter of the French Language).[5][6][7]

History

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Before the 1960s

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Sovereignty and sovereignism are terms derived from the modern independence movement, which started during the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s. However, the roots of Quebecers' desire for political autonomy are much older than that.

Francophone nationalism in North America dates back to 1534, the year Jacques Cartier landed in the Gespe'gewa'gi district of Miꞌkmaꞌki claiming Canada for France, and more particularly to 1608, the year of the founding of Québec by Samuel de Champlain, the first permanent settlement for French colonists and their descendants in New France (who were called Canadiens, Canayens or Habitants). Following the British conquest of New France, the Canadien movement, which lasted from 1760 to the late 18th century and sought to restore the traditional rights of French Canadians abolished by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, began. During this period, French Canadians began to express an indigenous form of nationalism which emphasized their longstanding residence in North America. The period was briefly interrupted by the Quebec Act of 1774, which granted certain rights to Canadiens but did not truly satisfy them, and was notably exacerbated by the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which ceded parts of the Quebec to the United States, and the Constitutional Act of 1791, which established the Westminster system.[8]

The Patriote movement was the period lasting from the beginning of the 19th century to the defeat of the Patriotes at the Battle of Saint-Eustache in 1837, the final battle in the Patriotes War. It began with the founding of the Parti Canadien by the Canadiens. It stands out for its notorious resistance to the influence of the Château Clique, a group of wealthy families in Lower Canada in the early 19th century who were the Lower Canadian equivalent of the Family Compact in Upper Canada.

The perfidious plans of the British authorities have broken all ties of sympathy with a motherland which shows itself to be insensitive. A separation has begun between parties whose union it will never be possible to cement again, but which will continue with increasing vigor, until an unexpected and unforeseen event, as we are offered from time to time in the course of the present times, provides us with a favorable opportunity to take our place among the independent sovereignties of America. We missed two great opportunities: let's all be prepared for a third.[9] – 1837 Address of the Sons of Liberty

La Survivance is the period beginning after the defeat of the Patriotes in the rebellions of 1837–1838 and lasting until the Quiet Revolution. It concerns the survival strategies employment by the French-Canadian nation and the ultramontane of the Catholic Church following the enactment of the Act of Union of 1840 which established a system whose goal was to force the cultural and linguistic assimilation of French Canadians into English-Canadian culture. In addition to la Revanche des berceaux, a phlegmatic character was adopted in response to the mass immigration of English-speaking immigrants. Some French Canadians left Quebec during this period in search of job security and protection of their culture. This phenomenon, known as the Grande Hémorragie (French for 'great bleeding'), is the origin of the Quebec diaspora in New England and Northeastern Ontario among other places. It led to the creation of permanent resistance movements in those new locations. Groups of nationalists outside Quebec have since then promoted Quebec's cultural identity, along with that of the Acadians in the Maritime provinces and in Louisiana, represented by the Société Nationale de l'Acadie since 1881. Louis-Alexandre Taschereau coming to power in 1920 created an upheaval in French-Canadian society for most of the interwar period. The confrontations and divergence of political opinions led to the rise of a new form of nationalism, called clerico-nationalism, promoted by Maurice Duplessis and the Union Nationale party during the Grande Noirceur of 1944 to 1959.

During the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s to 1970s, the modern Québécois sovereignist movement took off, with René Lévesque as one of its most recognizable figures. Various strategies were implemented since its rise, and it constitutes a continuity in French-speaking nationalism in North America. Now the patriotism is Quebec-focused, and the identifier has been changed from French-Canadian nationalism or identity to Québécois nationalism or identity.

The Quiet Revolution (1960s-1970s)

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The Quiet Revolution in Quebec brought widespread change in the 1960s. Among other changes, support for Quebec independence began to form and grow in some circles. The first organization dedicated to the independence of Quebec was the Alliance Laurentienne, founded by Raymond Barbeau on January 25, 1957.

On September 10, 1960, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN) was founded, with Pierre Bourgault quickly becoming its leader. On August 9 of the same year, the Action socialiste pour l'indépendance du Québec (ASIQ) was formed by Raoul Roy. The "independence + socialism" project of the ASIQ was a source of political ideas for the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ).

On October 31, 1962, the Comité de libération nationale and, in November of the same year, the Réseau de résistance were set up. These two groups were formed by RIN members to organize non-violent but illegal actions, such as vandalism and civil disobedience. The most extremist individuals of these groups left to form the FLQ, which, unlike all the other groups, had made the decision to resort to violence in order to reach its goal of independence for Quebec. Shortly after the November 14, 1962, Quebec general election, RIN member Marcel Chaput founded the short-lived Parti républicain du Québec.

In February 1963, the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) was founded by three Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale members who had met each other as part of the Réseau de résistance. They were Georges Schoeters, Raymond Villeneuve, and Gabriel Hudon.

In 1964, the RIN became a provincial political party. In 1965, the more conservative Ralliement national (RN) also became a party.

During this period, the Estates General of French Canada are organized. The stated objective of these Estates General was to consult the French-Canadian people on their constitutional future.

The historical context of the time was a period when many former European colonies were becoming independent. Some advocates of Quebec independence saw Quebec's situation in a similar light; numerous activists were influenced by the writings of Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi, and Karl Marx. [citation needed]

In June 1967, French president Charles de Gaulle, who had recently granted independence to Algeria, shouted "Vive le Québec libre!" during a speech from the balcony of Montreal's city hall during a state visit to Canada. In doing so, he deeply offended the federal government, and English Canadians felt he had demonstrated contempt for the sacrifice of Canadian soldiers who died on the battlefields of France in two world wars. The visit was cut short and de Gaulle left the country.

Finally, in October 1967, former Liberal cabinet minister René Lévesque left that party when it refused to discuss sovereignty at a party convention. Lévesque formed the Mouvement souveraineté-association and set about uniting pro-sovereignty forces.

He achieved that goal in October 1968 when the MSA held its only national congress in Quebec City. The RN and MSA agreed to merge to form the Parti Québécois (PQ), and later that month Pierre Bourgault, leader of the RIN, dissolved his party and invited its members to join the PQ.

Meanwhile, in 1969 the FLQ stepped up its campaign of violence, which would culminate in what would become known as the October Crisis. The group claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange, and in 1970 the FLQ kidnapped British Trade Commissioner James Cross and Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte; Laporte was later found murdered.

Jacques Parizeau joined the Parti Québécois on September 19, 1969, and Jérôme Proulx of the Union Nationale joined on November 11 of the same year.

In the 1970 provincial election, the PQ won its first seven seats in the National Assembly. René Lévesque was defeated in Mont-Royal by the Liberal André Marchand.

The referendum of 1980

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In the 1976 election, the PQ won 71 seats — a majority in the National Assembly. With voting turnouts high, 41.4 percent of the electorate voted for the PQ. Prior to the election, the PQ renounced its intention to implement sovereignty-association if it won power.[10]

On August 26, 1977, the PQ passed two main laws: first, the law on the financing of political parties, which prohibits contributions by corporations and unions and set a limit on individual donations, and second, the Charter of the French Language.

On May 17 PQ Member of the National Assembly Robert Burns resigned, telling the press he was convinced that the PQ was going to lose its referendum and fail to be re-elected afterwards.

At its seventh national convention from June 1 to 3, 1979, the sovereignist adopted their strategy for the coming referendum. The PQ then began an aggressive effort to promote sovereignty-association by providing details of how the economic relations with the rest of Canada would include free trade between Canada and Quebec, common tariffs against imports, and a common currency. In addition, joint political institutions would be established to administer these economic arrangements.

Sovereignty-association was proposed to the population of Quebec in the 1980 Quebec referendum. The proposal was rejected by 60 percent of the Quebec electorate.

In September, the PQ created a national committee of Anglophones and a liaison committee with ethnic minorities.

The PQ was returned to power in the 1981 election with a stronger majority than in 1976, obtaining 49.2 percent of the vote and winning 80 seats. However, they did not hold a referendum in their second term, and put sovereignty on hold, concentrating on their stated goal of "good government".

René Lévesque retired in 1985 (and died in 1987). In the 1985 election under his successor Pierre-Marc Johnson, the PQ was defeated by the Liberal Party.

Sovereignty-association

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The history of the relations between French-Canadians and English-Canadians in Canada has been marked by periods of tension. After colonizing Canada from 1608 onward, France lost the colony to Great Britain at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War in 1763, in which France ceded control of New France (except for the two small islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon) to Great Britain, which returned the French West Indian islands they had captured in the 1763 Treaty of Paris.[citation needed]

Over the next century, French Canadians were supplanted by waves of Anglophone immigrants, notably outside of Quebec (where they became a minority) but within the province as well, as much of the province's economy was dominated by English-Canadians. The cause of Québécois nationalism, which waxed and waned over two centuries, gained prominence from the 1960s onward. The use of the word "sovereignty" and many of the ideas of this movement originated in the 1967 Mouvement Souveraineté-Association of René Lévesque. This movement ultimately gave birth to the Parti Québécois in 1968.[citation needed]

Sovereignty-association (French: souveraineté-association) is the combination of two concepts:

  1. The achievement of sovereignty for the Quebec state.
  2. The creation of a political and economic association between this new independent state and Canada.

It was first presented in Lévesque's political manifesto, Option Québec.

The Parti Québécois defines sovereignty as the power for a state to levy all its taxes, vote on all its laws, and sign all its treaties (as mentioned in the 1980 referendum question).

The type of association between an independent Quebec and the rest of Canada was described as a monetary and customs union as well as joint political institutions to administer the relations between the two countries. The main inspiration for this project was the then-emerging European Community. In Option Québec Lévesque expressly identified the EC as his model for forming a new relationship between sovereign Quebec and the rest of Canada, one that would loosen the political ties while preserving the economic links. The analogy, however, is counterproductive, suggesting Lévesque did not understand the nature and purpose of the European Community nor the relationship between economics and politics that continue to underpin it. Advocates of European integration had, from the outset, seen political union as a desirable and natural consequence of economic integration.[11]

The hyphen between the words "sovereignty" and "association" was often stressed by Lévesque and other PQ members, to make it clear that both were inseparable. The reason stated was that if Canada decided to boycott Quebec exports after voting for independence, the new country would have to go through difficult economic times, as the barriers to trade between Canada and the United States were then very high. Quebec would have been a nation of 7 million people stuck between two impenetrable protectionist countries. In the event of having to compete against Quebec, rather than support it, Canada could easily maintain its well-established links with the United States to prosper in foreign trade.

Sovereignty-association as originally proposed would have meant that Quebec would become a politically independent state, but would maintain a formal association with Canada — especially regarding economic affairs. It was part of the 1976 sovereignist platform which swept the Parti Québécois into power in that year's provincial elections – and included a promise to hold a referendum on sovereignty-association. René Lévesque developed the idea of sovereignty-association to reduce the fear that an independent Quebec would face tough economic times. In fact, this proposal did result in an increase in support for a sovereign Quebec: polls at the time showed that people were more likely to support independence if Quebec maintained an economic partnership with Canada. This line of politics led the outspoken Yvon Deschamps to proclaim that what Quebecers want is an independent Quebec inside a strong Canada, thereby comparing the sovereignist movement to a spoiled child that has everything it could desire and still wants more.

In 1979 the PQ began an aggressive effort to promote sovereignty-association by providing details of how the economic relations with the rest of Canada would include free trade between Canada and Quebec, common tariffs against imports, and a common currency. In addition, joint political institutions would be established to administer these economic arrangements. But the sovereignist cause was hurt by the refusal of many politicians (most notably the premiers of several of the other provinces) to support the idea of negotiations with an independent Quebec, contributing to the Yes side losing by a vote of 60 percent to 40 percent.

This loss laid the groundwork for the 1995 referendum, which stated that Quebec should offer a new economic and political partnership to Canada before declaring independence. An English translation of part of the Sovereignty Bill reads, "We, the people of Quebec, declare it our own will to be in full possession of all the powers of a state; to levy all our taxes, to vote on all our laws, to sign all our treaties and to exercise the highest power of all, conceiving, and controlling, by ourselves, our fundamental law."

This time, the sovereignists lost in a very close vote: 50.6 percent to 49.4 percent, or only 53,498 votes out of more than 4,700,000 votes cast. However, after the vote many within the sovereignist camp were very upset that the vote broke down heavily along language lines. Approximately 90 percent of English speakers and allophones (mostly immigrants and first-generation Quebecers whose native language is neither French or English) Quebecers voted against the referendum, while almost 60 percent of Francophones voted Yes. Quebec premier Jacques Parizeau, whose government supported sovereignty, attributed the defeat of the resolution to "money and ethnic votes." His opinion caused an outcry among English-speaking Quebecers, and he resigned following the referendum.

An inquiry by the director-general of elections concluded in 2007 that at least $500,000 was spent by the federalist camp in violation of Quebec's election laws. This law imposes a limit on campaign spending by both option camps. Parizeau's statement was also an admission of failure by the Yes camp in getting the newly arrived Quebecers to adhere to their political option.

Accusations of an orchestrated effort of "election engineering" in several polling stations in areas with large numbers of non-francophone voters, which resulted in unusually large proportions of rejected ballots, were raised following the 1995 referendum.[citation needed] Afterward, testimony by PQ-appointed polling clerks indicated that they were ordered by PQ-appointed overseers to reject ballots in these polling stations for frivolous reasons that were not covered in the election laws.

While opponents of sovereignty were pleased with the defeat of the referendum, most recognized[example needed] that there were still deep divides within Quebec and problems with the relationship between Quebec and the rest of the country.

The referendum of 1995

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The PQ returned to power in the 1994 election under Jacques Parizeau, this time with 44.75% of the popular vote. In the intervening years, the failures of the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Accord had revived support for sovereignty, which had been written off as a dead issue for much of the 1980s.[citation needed]

Another consequence of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord was the formation of the Bloc Québécois (BQ), a sovereignist federal political party, under the leadership of the charismatic former Progressive Conservative federal cabinet minister Lucien Bouchard. Several PC and Liberal members of the federal parliament left their parties to form the BQ. For the first time, the PQ supported pro-sovereigntist forces running in federal elections; during his lifetime Lévesque had always opposed such a move.

The Union Populaire had nominated candidates in the 1979 and 1980 federal elections, and the Parti nationaliste du Québec had nominated candidates in the 1984 election, but neither of these parties enjoyed the official support of the PQ; nor did they enjoy significant public support among Quebecers.

In the 1993 federal election, which featured the collapse of Progressive Conservative Party support, the BQ won enough seats in Parliament to become Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition in the House of Commons.

At the Royal Commission on the Future of Quebec (also known as the Outaouais Commission) in 1995, the Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada made a presentation in which the party leader, Hardial Bains, recommended to the committee that Quebec declare itself as an independent republic.[12]

1995 referendum results by constituency

Parizeau promptly advised the Lieutenant Governor to call a new referendum. The 1995 referendum question differed from the 1980 question in that the negotiation of an association with Canada was now optional. The open-ended wording of the question resulted in significant confusion, particularly amongst the "Yes" side, as to what exactly they were voting for. This was a primary motivator for the creation of the Clarity Act (see below).

The "No" campaign won, but only by a very small margin — 50.6% to 49.4%.[13] As in the previous referendum, the English-speaking (anglophone) minority in Quebec overwhelmingly (about 90%) rejected sovereignty, support for sovereignty was also weak among allophones (native speakers of neither English nor French) in immigrant communities and first-generation descendants. The lowest support for the Yes side came from Mohawk, Cree, and Inuit voters in Quebec, some first Nations chiefs asserted their right to self-determination with the Cree being particularly vocal in their right to stay territories within Canada. More than 96% of the Inuit and Cree voted No in the referendum. However, The Innu, Attikamek, Algonquin and Abenaki nations did partially support Quebec sovereignty. In 1985, 59 percent of Quebec's Inuit population, 56 percent of the Attikamek population, and 49 percent of the Montagnais population voted in favour of the Sovereignist Parti Québécois party. That year, three out of every four native reservations gave a majority to the Parti Québécois party.[14]

By contrast almost 60 percent of francophones of all origins voted "Yes". (82 percent of Quebecers are Francophone.) Later inquiries into irregularities determined that abuses had occurred on both sides: some argue that some "No" ballots had been rejected without valid reasons, and the October 27 "No" rally had evaded spending limitations because of out-of-province participation.[15] An inquiry by "Le Directeur général des élections" concluded in 2007 that the "No" camp had exceeded the campaign spending limits by $500,000.

The 1998 Quebec general election

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Expecting Bouchard to announce another referendum if his party won the 1998 Quebec general election, the leaders of all other provinces and territories gathered for the Calgary Declaration in September 1997 to discuss how to oppose the sovereignty movement. Saskatchewan's Roy Romanow warned "It's two or three minutes to midnight". Bouchard did not accept his invitation; organizers did not invite Chrétien. Experts debated whether Quebec was a "distinct society" or "unique culture".[16]

The Parti Québécois won re-election despite losing the popular vote to Jean Charest and the Quebec Liberals. In the number of seats won by both sides, the election was almost a clone of the previous 1994 election. However, public support for sovereignty remained too low for the PQ to consider holding a second referendum during their second term. Meanwhile, the federal government passed the Clarity Act to govern the wording of any future referendum questions and the conditions under which a vote for sovereignty would be recognized as legitimate. Federal Liberal politicians stated that the ambiguous wording of the 1995 referendum question was the primary impetus in the bill's drafting.

While opponents of sovereignty were pleased with their referendum victories, most recognized that there are still deep divides within Quebec and problems with the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

The Clarity Act

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In 1999, the Parliament of Canada, at the urging of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, passed the Clarity Act, a law that, amongst other things, set out the conditions under which the Crown-in-Council would recognize a vote by any province to leave Canada. It required a majority of eligible voters for a vote to trigger secession talks, not merely a plurality of votes. In addition, the act requires a clear question of secession to initiate secession talks. Controversially, the act gave the House of Commons the power to decide whether a proposed referendum question was considered clear, and allowed it to decide whether a clear majority has expressed itself in any referendum. It is widely considered by sovereignists as an illegitimate piece of legislation, who asserted that Quebec alone had the right to determine its terms of secession. Chrétien considered the legislation among his most significant accomplishments.

From 2000 to the present

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"Sovereignty-Association" is nowadays more often referred to simply as "sovereignty". However, in the 1995 Quebec referendum, in which the sovereignty option was narrowly rejected, the notion of some form of economic association with the rest of Canada was still envisaged (continuing use of the Canadian dollar and military, for example) and was referred to as "sovereignty-partnership" (French: souveraineté-partenariat). It remains a part of the PQ program[when?] and is tied to national independence in the minds of most Quebecers. This part of the PQ program has always been controversial, especially since Canadian federal politicians usually refuse the concept.

In 2003, the PQ launched the Saison des idées ("Season of ideas") which was a public consultation aiming to gather the opinions of Quebecers on its sovereignty project. The program and the revised sovereignty project were adopted at the 2005 Congress.

In the 2003 election, the PQ lost power to the Liberal Party. However, in early 2004, the Liberal government of Paul Martin had proved to be unpopular, and that, combined with the federal Liberal Party sponsorship scandal, contributed to a resurgence of the BQ. In the 2004 federal elections, the Bloc Québécois won 54 of Quebec's 75 seats in the House of Commons, compared to 33 previously. However, in the 2006 federal elections the BQ lost three seats and in the 2008 federal elections lost two additional seats, bringing their total down to 49, but was still the most popular federal party in Quebec up until the 2011 Canadian federal election, when the BQ was devastated by the federalist NDP, with the Bloc at a total of four seats and the loss of official party status in the Commons (compared to the NDP's 59 seats, Conservatives' five seats, and the Liberals' seven seats in Quebec).

Polling data by Angus Reid in June 2009 showed the support for Quebec separation was weaker and separatism unlikely to occur in the near future. Polling data showed that 32% of Quebecers believed that Quebec had enough sovereignty and should remain part of Canada, 28% thought they should separate, and 30% say they believed that Quebec does need greater sovereignty but should remain part of Canada. However the poll revealed that a majority (79%) of Quebecers still desired more autonomy. The number one area of autonomy that those polled had hoped for was with regard to culture at 34%, the next highest areas were the economy at 32%, taxation at 26%, and immigration and the environment at 15% each.[17]

The 2009 Angus Reid poll also revealed some effects of the Clarity Act in which they asked two questions, one a straightforward question for a separate nation, and the other a more muddled version on separation similar to the one posed in the 1995 referendum. The data on the questions revealed as follows to the first hard line question of "Do you believe that Quebec should become a country separate from Canada?" 34% replied yes, 54% said no, and 13% were unsure. To the less clear question of "Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within a scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec?" support for separation increased to 40% yes, the no vote still led with 41%, and the unsure increased to 19%. The most startling revelation of the poll was that only 20% or 1 in 5 polled believed that Quebec would ever separate from Canada.[17]

2011 was considered a watershed year for the sovereignist movement. In the aftermath of the 2011 federal election, Léger Marketing and pro-sovereignist newspaper Le Devoir conducted a poll on the question.[18] When asked whether they would vote Yes or No in the event of a referendum, 41% of the respondents said they would vote Yes. In 2011, the sovereignist movement splintered, with several new parties being formed by disaffected politicians, with some politicians dissatisfied with slow progress towards independence, and others hoping to put the sovereignty question on the backburner. Leadership by PQ leader Pauline Marois was divisive.[19]

During the 2015 federal election, the Bloc Québécois won 10 seats, in the 2019 election the BQ increased its number of seats from 10 in 2015, to 32 seats in 2019, both overtaking the NDP to become the third-largest caucus in the House of Commons and regaining official party status.

In the 2021 Canadian federal election, the BQ won 32 seats, unchanged from the prior election.

In 2021, François Legault's Coalition Avenir Québec government in Quebec proposed to amend the Charter of the French Language and the provincial constitution to more strongly entrench French as the sole official language. In response to this, the Bloc Québécois initiated a motion in the House of Commons endorsing the constitutionality of Legault's initiatives. The Commons passed the motion 281–2. There were 36 abstentions.[20]

In the 2025 Canadian federal election, the BQ won 22 seats, a loss of 10 seats. It retained official party status, and its status as the third-largest caucus in the House of Commons.

Sovereignist and sympathetic organizations

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Sovereignist political parties and parliamentary groups

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Sovereignist non-partisan organizations

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Le Réseau Cap sur l'Indépendance (RCI) is a network composed of several member organisations,[21][22] all of which are non-partisan. The RCI states that it seeks to promote and realize Quebec's independence. Its members are:

  1. La Fondation Octobre 70
  2. Les Aînés pour la souveraineté
  3. Organisations unies pour l'indépendance du Québec (OUI Québec) - previously "Conseil de la souveraineté du Québec"
  4. Jeunes Patriotes du Québec (JPQ)
  5. Les Intellectuels pour la souveraineté (IPSO)
  6. Mars 2011
  7. Libre marcheur
  8. Ligue d’action nationale
  9. Mouvement des étudiants souverainistes de l’université de Montréal (MESUM)
  10. Mouvement progressiste pour l’indépendance du Québec (MPIQ)
  11. Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN)
  12. Rassemblement pour un pays souverain (RPS)
  13. Mouvement souverainiste du Québec (MSQ)
  14. Réseau de Résistance du Québécois (RRQ)
  15. Société nationales des Québécoises et Québécois des Laurentides
  16. Société nationale Gaspésie—Îles-de-la-Madeleine
  17. Saint-Jean-Baptiste Society of Montreal
  18. Vigile (newspaper)
  19. Comité indépendantiste du cégep du Vieux-Montréal
  20. Comité souverainiste de l’UQÀM
  21. Regroupement des mouvements indépendantistes collégiaux
  22. Artistes volontaires
  23. Nouveau Mouvement pour le Québec

Sympathetic organizations

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  1. SN de l’Est du Québec
  2. SNQ du Saguenay—Lac-Saint-Jean
  3. SNQ de la Capitale
  4. SSJB de la Mauricie
  5. SN de l’Estrie
  6. SSJB de Montréal
  7. SNQ de l’Outaouais
  8. SNQ d’Abitibi-Témiscamingue et du Nord-du-Québec
  9. SNQ de la Côte-Nord
  10. SN Gaspésie-Îles-de-la-Madeleine
  11. SNQ de Chaudière-Appalaches
  12. SNQ de Laval
  13. SNQ de Lanaudière
  14. SNQ Région des Laurentides
  15. SNQ des Hautes-Rivières
  16. SNQ Richelieu—Saint-Laurent
  17. SNQ du Suroît
  18. SSJB Richelieu-Yamaska
  19. SSJB du Centre-du-Québec
  20. MNQ Headquarters

Sovereignist media

[edit]

Past parties, organizations and media

[edit]

Opinion polls

[edit]
Graphical summary (2005–present)
Date(s)
conducted
Polling organisation/client Sample size Should Quebec be an independent country? Lead
Yes No Undecided
18-20 October 2025 Léger 1047 35% 65% - 30%
6-12 October 2025 HTML 1058 34% 52% 14% 18%
12-15 September 2025 Léger 1053 37% 63% - 26%
5-6 September 2025 Pallas 1187 35% 55% 10% 20%
15-18 August 2025 Léger 977 32% 59% 9% 27%
July-August 2025 CROP 1000 41% 59% - 18%
20-24 June 2025 Mainstreet 910 30% 59% 11% 29%
20–22 June 2025 Léger 1056 33% 59% 8% 26%
14–16 June 2025 Pallas 1085 32% 56% 12% 24%
16–18 May 2025 Léger Marketing 412 33% 59% 8% 26%
10–14 April 2025 Léger Marketing 1,001 40% 60% - 20%
30 January - 2 February 2025 Léger Marketing 1,017 29% 59% 12% 30%
10–11 November 2024 Léger Marketing 1,010 37% 55% 8% 18%
23–25 August 2024 Léger Marketing 1,041 35% 56% 9% 21%
8 June 2024 Pallas 1,339 40% 52% 8% 12%
20–21 April 2024 Léger Marketing 1,026 36% 53% 11% 17%
16–18 March 2024 Léger Marketing 1,033 36% 53% 11% 17%
5–7 February 2024 Pallas 1,180 41% 48% 11% 7%
3–5 February 2024 Léger Marketing 1,040 35% 56% 9% 21%
4–6 December 2023 Léger Marketing Archived December 7, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 1,066 34% 55% 11% 21%
18–19 November 2023 Pallas 1,178 39% 48% 13% 9%
1 November 2023 Léger Marketing Archived November 1, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 1,066 35% 54% 11% 19%
27–28 September 2023 Pallas 1,095 37% 49% 14% 12%
20–21 August 2023 Léger Marketing Archived August 27, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 1,036 36% 53% 11% 17%
10–12 June 2023 Léger Marketing Archived June 14, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 1,042 37% 52% 11% 15%
24–26 February 2023 Léger Marketing/Le Devoir Archived March 1, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 1,000 38% 51% 10% 13%
The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is elected a 2nd term in the 2022 Quebec general election (October 3, 2022)
10 June 2022 Mainstreet Research 1,404 33% 67% ?
8–9 February 2021 Mainstreet Research 1,012 32% 56% 12% 24%
2–4 October 2020 Léger Marketing/Le Journal de Québec 1,013 36% 54% 10% 18%
The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is elected in the 2018 Quebec general election (October 1, 2018)
August 2018 Léger Marketing/Huffington Post 1,010 37% 63% ? 26%
29 April–2 May 2018 Ipsos 2,001 25% 55% 20% 30%
17–19 January 2017 Léger 1,005 35% 65% ? 30%
12–15 January 2017 CROP 1,000 33% 67% ? 34%
7–12 December 2016 CROP/ 1,000 30% 70% ? 40%
7–10 November 2016 Léger Marketing 999 37% 63% ? 26%
12–15 May 2016 CROP/La Presse 1,000 35% 50% 15% 15%
11–15 February 2016 CROP/La Presse 1,005 37% 63% ? 26%
01–4 February 2016 Léger Marketing 1,005 32% 59% 9% 27%
November 2015 Léger Marketing 1,005 39% 61% ? 22%
17–20 September 2015 CROP 1,000 32% 57% 11% 25%
The Quebec Liberal Party is elected in the 2014 Quebec general election (April 7, 2014)
The Parti Québécois is elected in the 2012 Quebec general election (September 4, 2012)
9–11 May 2011 Léger Marketing/Le Devoir 1,000 32% 68% ? 36%
13–20 April 2011 CROP 1,000 36% 49% 14% 13%
23–25 May 2009 Léger Marketing 1,053 41% 59% ? 18%
The Quebec Liberal Party is elected in the 2008 Quebec general election (December 8, 2008)
4–5 December 2006 Léger Marketing 602 46% 54% ? 8%
20–24 April 2005 Le Devoir/The Globe and Mail 1,008 54% 46% ? 8%

Archive of polls from 1962 until January 2008

Voting intentions before distribution

[edit]
History of referendum voting intentions in Quebec since 1990. Undecided non-distributed

Among French-speaking voters

[edit]
History of referendum voting intentions in Quebec since 1997. French-speaking voters
Date(s)
conducted
Polling organisation/client Sample size Should Quebec be an independent country? Lead
Yes No Undecided
April 16, 2025 [1] 746 50% 50% - 0%
November 11, 2024 [2] 854 45% 45% 9 0%
May 13, 2024 [3] 854 45% 43% 12 2%
April 22, 2024 [4] 977 45% 43% 12 2%
March 18, 2024 [5] 860 43% 46% 11 3%
February 5, 2024 [6] 836 43% 47% 9 4%
December 4, 2023 [7] Archived December 7, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 814 41% 47% 13 6%
November 19, 2023 [8] 970 45% 42% 13 3%
November 1, 2023 [9] Archived November 1, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 797 43% 45% 12 2%
September 28, 2023 [10] 907 43% 45% 12 2%
August 21, 2023 [11] Archived August 27, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 828 44% 44% 12 0%
June 12, 2023 [12] Archived March 1, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 803 45% 42% 13 3%
February 26, 2023 [13] Archived March 1, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 818 48% 41% 11 7%
The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is elected a 2nd term in the 2022 Quebec general election (October 3, 2022)
August 16, 2022 [14] 805 37% 45% 18 8%
June 19, 2022 [15] Archived June 22, 2022, at the Wayback Machine 822 39% 45% 17 6%
June 10, 2022 [16] Archived May 7, 2025, at the Wayback Machine 1204 41% 59% 18%
February 7, 2022 [17] 779 29% 35% 36 6%
February 9, 2021 [18] 926 39% 47% 14 8%
December 13, 2020 [19][permanent dead link] 804 33% 42% 25 9%
The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is elected in the 2018 Quebec general election (October 1, 2018)
May 2, 2018 [20] 1,265 38.3% 61.7% 23%
March 16, 2017 [21] 724 44% 56% 12%
January 19, 2017 [22] 733 43% 57% 14%
November 10, 2016 [23] 753 46% 54% 8%
May 5, 2016 [24] 731 52% 48% 4%
February 4, 2016 [25] 736 43% 57% 14%
November 19, 2015 [26] 735 48% 52% 4%
June 11, 2015 [27] 763 49% 51% 2%
May 17, 2015 [28] 731 51% 49% 2%
November 13, 2014 [29] 1,017 45% 55% 10%
September 25, 2014 [30] 671 51% 49% 2%
August 25, 2014 [31] 681 44% 56% 30%
The Quebec Liberal Party is elected in the 2014 Quebec general election (April 7, 2014)
March 3, 2014 [32] 1,048 51% 49% 2%
January 18, 2014 [33] 978 44% 41% 15 3%
December 5, 2013 [34] 787 41% 42% 18 1%
May 6, 2013 [35] 1,008 40% 45% 15 5%
February 6, 2013 [36] 750 45% 55% 5%
November 22, 2012 [37] 798 49% 51% 2%
November 12, 2012 [38] 1,017 36% 49% 15 13%
The Parti Québécois is elected in the 2012 Quebec general election (September 4, 2012)
January 12, 2012 [39] 806 44% 42% 14 2%
May 11, 2011 [40] 824 42% 42% 15 0%
September 2, 2009 [41] 795 48% 38% 14 10%
June 27, 2009 [42] 854 52% 48% 4%
The Quebec Liberal Party is elected in the 2008 Quebec general election (December 8, 2008)
May 17, 2009 [43] 833 50% 50% 0%
May 26, 2008 [44] 909 45% 49% 6 4%
November 4, 2007 [45] 43% 52% 5 9%
May 27, 2007 [46] 810 42% 54% 4 12%
April 30, 2006 [47] 50% 50% 0%
September 11, 2005 [48] 57% 43% 14%
May 30, 2005 [] 879 55% 37% 9 8%
May 14, 2005 [49] Archived April 10, 2022, at the Wayback Machine 62% 38% 24%
April 24, 2005 [50] Archived April 10, 2022, at the Wayback Machine 60% 40% 20%
April 24, 2005 [] 879 49% 41% 11 8%
September 26, 2004 [] 879 47% 40% 13 7%
April 25, 2004 [] 893 49% 39% 12 10%
January 18, 2004 [] 53% 43% 4 10%
December 9, 2002 [] 46% 54% 8
September 1, 2002 [] 39% 56% 5 17
May 27, 2002 [51] 48% 52% 4
February 5, 2002 [52] 1,017 48% 52% 4%
January 14, 2001 [] 551 49.9% 39.7% 10.3 10%
August 20, 2000 [] 51.7% 48.3% 2%
June 22, 1999 [53] 1,002 48.6% 51.4% 3%
November 23, 1998 [] 42% 48% 10% 16%
August 27, 1998 [] 50% 41% 9 9%
February 19, 1998 [] 41% 46% 14% 5%
September 30, 1997 [54] 45% 40% 14 5%
May 21, 1997 [] 860 43% 45% 12% 2%
March 6, 1997 [55] 51% 38% 11 13%
The 1995 Quebec independence referendum is held (October 30, 1995)
June 25, 1995 [56] 1,324 52% 33% 15 19%
September 8, 1994 [57] 36% 49% 15% 13%
December 5, 1991 [58] 53.9% 29.4% 16.7 24%
April 21, 1991 [59] 54% 36% 10 18%
March 22, 1990 [60] 68% 8%
March 21, 1990 [61] 63% 8%
September 19, 1989 [62] 46% 38% 16 8%
January 18, 1982 [63] 44% 36% 20 8%

Among non-French speaking voters

[edit]
Date(s)
conducted
Polling organisation/client Sample size Should Quebec be an independent country? Lead
Yes No Undecided
April 16, 2025 [64] 12% 88% - 73%
May 13, 2024 [65] 10% 83% 6% 73%
April 22, 2024 [66] 15% 73% 12% 68%
March 18, 2024 [67] 13% 78% 10% 65%
December 4, 2023 [68] Archived December 7, 2023, at the Wayback Machine 12% 81% 8% 69%
November 19, 2023 [69] 10% 73% 17% 63%
September 28, 2023 [70] 7% 71% 22% 64%
February 26, 2023 [71] 9% 82% 9% 73%
The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is elected a 2nd term in the 2022 Quebec general election (October 3, 2022)
August 16, 2022 [72] 9% 85% 7% 76%
The Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ) is elected in the 2018 Quebec general election (October 1, 2018)
May 2, 2018 [73] 8.6% 91.4% 82%
March 16, 2017 [74] 9% 91% 82%
January 19, 2017 [75] 7% 93% 86%
May 5, 2016 [76] 6% 94% 76%
February 4, 2016 [77] 8% 92% 84%
May 17, 2015 [78] 9% 91% 82%
August 25, 2014 [79] 8% 92% 84%
The Quebec Liberal Party is elected in the 2014 Quebec general election (April 7, 2014)
December 5, 2013 [80] 7% 84% 9% 77%
The Parti Québécois is elected in the 2012 Quebec general election (September 4, 2012)
September 2, 2009 [81] 14% 79% 7%
June 27, 2009 [82] 16% 84% 68%
The Quebec Liberal Party is elected in the 2008 Quebec general election (December 8, 2008)
November 4, 2007 [83] 15% 81% 4% 66%
April 30, 2006 [84] 11% 89% 88%
September 1, 2002 [85] 9% 84% 7% 75%
August 20, 2000 [] 21.5% 78.5% 57%
November 23, 1998 [86] 10% 86% 4% 76%
February 19, 1998 [87] 8% 76% 16% 68%
May 21, 1997 [] 10% 77% 13% 67%
The 1995 Quebec independence referendum is held (October 30, 1995)
June 25, 1995 [88] 11% 82% 7% 71%

Arguments

[edit]

Reasons for sovereignty

[edit]

Justifications for Quebec's sovereignty are historically nationalistic in character, claiming the unique culture and French-speaking majority (78% of the provincial population) are threatened with assimilation by either the rest of Canada or, as in Metropolitan France, by Anglophone culture more generally, and that the best way to preserve language, identity and culture is via the creation of an independent political entity.[25][26] Other distinguishing factors, such as religious differences (given the Catholic majority in Quebec), are also used to justify either separation or nationalist social policies advocated by the Parti Québécois.

The historical argument for Quebec independence stems from the region's history, as it was conquered by the British in 1760 and ceded to Great Britain in the 1763 Treaty of Paris; French Canadians in Canada were subsumed by waves of British immigrants. This argument makes the claim that Quebecers have the right of self-determination.

Eight of the other Canadian provinces are overwhelmingly (greater than 95%) English-speaking, while New Brunswick is officially bilingual and about one-third Francophone. Another rationale is based on resentment of anti-Quebec sentiment.[27] With regard to the creation of the sovereignist movement, language issues were but a sub-stratum of larger cultural, social and political differences. Many scholars point to historical events as framing the cause for ongoing support for sovereignty in Quebec, while more contemporary politicians may point to the aftermath of more recent developments like the Canada Act of 1982, the Meech Lake Accord or the Charlottetown Accord.

Arguments against sovereignty

[edit]

It has been argued by prominent Quebecers (sovereignists and ex-sovereignists, including former Quebec premier Lucien Bouchard) that sovereignty politics has distracted Quebecers from the real economic problems of Quebec, and that sovereignty by itself cannot solve those problems. In 2005 they published their position statement, "Pour un Québec lucide", ("For a lucid Quebec") which details the problems facing Quebec.[28]

Some arguments against sovereignty claim that the movement is illegitimate because of its Eurocentrism which alienates many among Canada's First Nations, as well as the Inuit, and Métis peoples and their sympathizers.[29] This sentiment is summed up by a quotation from a Mohawk from Akwsasne: "How can Quebec, with no economic base and no land base, ask to become sovereign? How can Quebec be a nation when they have no constitution? We have had a constitution since before the American revolution." Here the argument expresses the claim that the Mohawk nation has a greater case for self-determination due to already having a more legitimate claim to distinct nationhood that is based on traditional lands and a constitution predating confederation as well as the creation of Quebec and a Québécois identity.[30]

Similarly, the Cree have also asserted for many years that they are a separate people with the right to self-determination recognized under international law. They argue that no annexation of them or their territory to an independent Quebec should take place without their consent, and that if Quebec has the right to leave Canada then the Cree people have the right to choose to keep their territory in Canada. Cree arguments generally do not claim the right to secede from Canada; rather, the Cree see themselves as a people bound to Canada by treaty (see the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement), and as citizens of Canada.[31] The Cree have stated that a unilateral declaration of independence by Quebec would be a violation of fundamental principles of human rights, democracy and consent. If secession were to proceed, the Cree argue that they would seek protection through the Canadian courts as well as asserting Cree jurisdiction over its people and lands.[31]

Professor Peter Russell has said of Aboriginal peoples in Canada: "(they) are not nations that can be yanked out of Canada against their will by a provincial majority.... With few exceptions (they) wish to enjoy their right to self-government within Canada, not within a sovereign Quebec."[32] International human rights expert Erica-Irene Daes says the change "will leave the most marginalized and excluded of all the world's peoples without a legal, peaceful weapon to press for genuine democracy...."[32] This concern is connected to the claim that if Quebec were to be considered its own autonomous nation-state then it need not honour the treaties and agreements that were signed between First Nations and the British and French Crowns and are now maintained by the Canadian federal government.[33] Concern for this may stem from perception of neo-colonial or eurocentric attitudes in the leadership of former Quebec premiers, such as Robert Bourassa, the self-proclaimed "Conqueror of the North".[34]

Opinions in Quebec

[edit]

Francophones

[edit]

The sovereignty movement draws its largest support from the francophones of Quebec, and from all sides of the political spectrum. Francophones from Quebec City and more rural regions are thought to support the idea more, while people in Gatineau may do so less, perhaps due to their close proximity to and influence from Ottawa.

Anglophones

[edit]

Sovereignty has historically had little support among Anglo-Quebecers. Some anglophone Quebecers see the movement as a rejection of non-Francophones, or as an attempt to suppress their English language and deny the historical Anglophone contribution to Quebec. Some opponents may also view the project as ethnically exclusive.

Immigrants and Allophones

[edit]

Support for sovereignty varies greatly among different immigrant or allophone communities, and it has also changed throughout the decades. In the 1995 referendum, Haitian, Arab and Latin American immigrant communities voted "Yes", though for the rest the "No" won out.[citation needed]

Aboriginals

[edit]

Various Indigenous peoples in Quebec, such as Cree and Inuit, have historically opposed the independence of Quebec, mostly due to worries about territorial rights.[35][36][37]

Economic effect

[edit]

One study found that Quebec's separatist governments did not have a large negative impact on Quebec's economy – as sometimes seen with other independence movements in other countries – possibly due to a lack of violence.[38]

External positions

[edit]

Canada

[edit]

The other nine provinces of Canada have generally been opposed to Quebec sovereignty.

France

[edit]

Quebec's independence movement has benefited from support and encouragement from France.

One of the best-known examples is French president Charles de Gaulle's remark "Vive le Québec libre!" during a visit to Expo 67.[39] This declaration was consistent with de Gaulle's thinking, as he was attached to the idea of the independence of nations and sensitive to the historical impact of France's loss of New France to the British in the 18th century.

In September 1965, de Gaulle told Alain Peyrefitte: "The future of French Canada is independence. There will be a French Republic of Canada". According to Alain Peyrefitte, "without prejudging the form that Quebec sovereignty was to take, de Gaulle, with that historic sense which earned France its salvation, went to Montreal in July 1967 to urge French Canadians to preserve their French identity, which, under Louis XV, the indifference of the French elites had made such light work of.[40]

Similarly, when the French ambassador in Ottawa suggested associating France with Canada's centenary, De Gaulle replied with an apostille dated December 6, 1966: "There is no question of my sending a message to Canada to celebrate its 'centenary'. We can have good relations with the whole of what is now Canada. We must have excellent relations with French Canada. But we should not congratulate Canadians or ourselves on the creation of a 'state' based on our defeat in the past, and on the integration of part of the French people into a British entity. Incidentally, this whole has become quite precarious[41]...".

The French Foreign Office's current motto epitomizes the official position of the French State concerning Quebec's national question: "non-ingérence et non-indifférence" ("no interference and no indifference"). In other words, while Quebec stays within Canada, France will officially support the Canadian Confederation the way it is.[42]

Former French president Nicolas Sarkozy has stated on the record that he opposes the separation of Quebec from Canada.[43][44] This changed back to a neutral stance under Sarkozy's successor, François Hollande.[45]

United States

[edit]

The United States has officially always maintained a neutral attitude towards Quebec independence. However, since the relationship between Canada and the United States is privileged at various levels, the status quo is desired. In the event of a victory for the independence option in the 1995 referendum, Washington would have stated that "since Canadians have yet to work out their future constitutional arrangements, it is premature to consider the question of recognizing Quebec".[46] Thus, it is thought that, in the event of independence, the United States would be passive and wait for Canada itself to recognize the Quebec state.

The sovereigntists of the 1960s and 1970s, led by René Lévesque, believed they could easily win American sympathy for their cause, because they equated Quebec's independence with the United States' American Revolution against Great Britain in 1776. For 20th-century Americans, however, the idea of Quebec's separation was more akin to the most painful episode in their history, the American Civil War. What's more, the founding myth of the American melting pot made them resistant to any idea of intrastate nationalism.

"Melting pot, civil war. Two ideological walls that separate Quebec nationalists from American society, even left-wing, even intellectual."[47]

Jean-Francois Lisée

John F. Kennedy is said to be the only American politician open to this prospect. In the 1950s, Armand Morissette, the parish priest of Lowell, Massachusetts, informed him of the existence of an independence movement in Quebec. In order to gain access to the Senate, Kennedy wanted to win the votes of the large French-Canadian community in Massachusetts, so he had contact with Morissette, who was a convinced independentist. Kennedy drew parallels not with American independence, but with Irish independence, which was still quite recent (1922), as he himself was of Irish descent. The Kennedy family were Francophiles, and that the future president generally supported the self-determination of peoples. During his short term as President (1961–1963), however, Kennedy never publicly addressed this issue.[48]

[edit]

Films and television

[edit]
  • Richard Rohmer's novel Separation (1976) was turned into a TV-movie for the CTV network in 1977. In the movie, the Parti Québécois has formed the government of Quebec but Premier Gaston Bélisle has repeatedly put off its promise to hold a referendum. International politics forces Bélisle's hand.
  • In the mid-1980s, a sequel to Separation, Quebec-Canada 1995, depicts a meeting between the president of Quebec and the prime minister of Canada to discuss a crisis involving Quebec military occupations of parts of Ontario and New Brunswick. Canada's armed forces are stretched thin with peacekeepers in such varied places as the Falkland Islands (with "Lady Goosegreen" being Margaret Thatcher).
  • In the film Die Hard, Hans Gruber, the terrorist leader, demands, as a ruse, the release of imprisoned members of the fictional group Liberté du Québec, which is presumably meant to be a fictional version of the FLQ.
  • In the Simpsons episode "Homer to the Max", Homer Simpson is invited to an exclusive garden party by Trent Steel, a successful businessman whom he meets as a result of changing his name to Max Power. President Bill Clinton, a guest at the garden party, is called away to deal with Quebec "getting the bomb".
  • In The Critic episode "L.A. Jay", in a dream sequence, Jay Sherman, at his Oscar acceptance speech says he supports independence for Quebec, cutting to a room of Québécois saying "Viva Jay Sherman! Viva Quebec!" and unfurling a banner depicting Sherman as a beaver.

Books

[edit]
  • William Weintraub's satirical 1979 novel The Underdogs provoked controversy by imagining a future Quebec in which English-speakers were an oppressed minority, complete with a violent resistance movement. One planned stage version was cancelled before its premiere.
  • Margaret Atwood's 1979 novel Life Before Man is set in Toronto in the late 1970s and several characters watch and sometimes comment upon the elections and sovereignist movement in Quebec. The sovereignist movement and its struggles are metaphorically linked to the difficulties the characters in the novel have with separating their own personal relationships.
  • Clive Cussler's 1984 novel Night Probe! is set against a fictional attempt at secession in the late 1980s. Rights to newly discovered oil resources in Ungava Bay, discovered as Quebec moves to secede, clash with the ramifications of a rediscovered secret treaty negotiated between the U.K. and U.S. governments during World War I.
  • In the alternate history 1995 novel The Two Georges, co-authored by Richard Dreyfuss and Harry Turtledove, the American Revolution never occurs, resulting in the creation of the North American Union, a dominion of the British Empire. En route to the Six Nations, Thomas Bushell and Samuel Stanley of the Royal American Mounted Police discuss the nearby province of Quebec. Stanley muses that, being culturally French, the Québécois people would want to split off from the N.A.U. to become part of the Franco-Spanish Holy Alliance. However, the Francophobia of the Sons of Liberty prevents them from effectively joining forces with Québécois separatists.
  • David Foster Wallace's 1996 novel Infinite Jest includes both real and fictional Québécois separatist movements as integral to the plot. In the story, the United States has merged with Canada and Mexico to form the Organization of North American Nations (ONAN). Wheelchair-using Quebec separatists use a video so entertaining it leads to death to accomplish their goals of both Quebec independence and the end of the ONAN.
  • In the Southern Victory Series (1997-2007) of alternate history novels by Harry Turtledove, Quebec becomes a separate nation during the First Great War (an alternative World War I). Since the United States organized this separation to weaken Anglophone Canada (and the UK by extension) and to aid in the post-war occupation of Canada, the Republic of Quebec operated as a client state of the United States, rather than being truly independent.
  • In the 1999 novel Babylon Babies by the French-born Canadian cyberpunk writer Maurice Dantec, loosely adapted as the film Babylon A.D., Quebec is independent and referred to as the "Free Province of Quebec".
  • In Peter Watts' science fiction series, starting with the 1999 Starfish, Quebec has attained sovereignty and is an energetic/economic superpower within North America.
  • In the 2006 young adults' alternate history novel The Disunited States of America, by Harry Turtledove, the United States collapsed in the 1800s due to the retention of the Articles of Confederation, with states becoming sovereign nations by the 2090s. Quebec is an independent country in the 2090s, although it is not mentioned whether it remained an independent entity or seceded from a Canadian union.

Comics

[edit]
  • In DC Comics, the villain (and sometimes hero) Plastique is initially a Québécois freedom fighter, who resorts to acts of terrorism.
  • In Marvel Comics, the superhero Northstar was part of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) in his youth.
  • In Axis Powers Hetalia, Canada's nightmare features an independent Quebec.

Games

[edit]
  • In the roleplaying game Trinity, there are references made to a separatist Quebec nation who in return for independence helped the then formed "Confederated States of America" take control of Canada.
  • In the roleplaying game Shadowrun, Quebec exists as a sovereign nation alongside the United Canadian American States and the Confederated American States.
  • Canadian Civil War is a board game from 1977. The game simulates a hypothetical political struggle between factions, some of them seeking to redefine the terms of the Canadian confederation, others seeking to maintain the status quo.

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Quebec sovereignty movement is a political campaign within the Canadian province of advocating for the province's from to form an independent state, grounded in assertions of Quebec's distinct francophone identity, historical grievances, and desire for exclusive control over its political and economic affairs. The movement coalesced in the 1960s amid the Quiet Revolution's cultural and social upheavals, culminating in the founding of the (PQ) in 1968 by , a former Liberal minister turned separatist leader who envisioned "sovereignty-association"—political independence paired with continued economic partnership with . Lévesque's PQ won power in 1976, enabling the staging of referendums on sovereignty in 1980, where 59.56% voted against negotiating sovereignty-association, and in 1995, where the "No" side prevailed by a razor-thin margin of 50.58% amid intense federal intervention and economic uncertainty concerns. While the movement spurred significant policy achievements, including the enactment of French-language protections via (Bill 101) in 1977 to preserve Quebec's linguistic majority, it has faced persistent controversies over electoral irregularities in 1995, the subsequent federal imposing stricter referendum rules, and debates on economic viability, with proponents criticized for underestimating integration costs and opponents for centralizing power. Support has markedly eroded since the 1990s, with recent Léger polling in October 2025 indicating only about 35% favor sovereignty versus 65% opposed, reflecting broader Quebecer prioritization of federal stability and economic ties over separation amid demographic shifts and globalization.

Ideological and Historical Foundations

Core Ideology and Variants

The sovereignty movement centers on the assertion that constitutes a distinct defined primarily by its francophone majority, warranting political independence from to safeguard linguistic and cultural survival against perceived anglophone dominance and federal centralization. This ideology posits that 's integration into since in 1867 has systematically eroded control over essential domains such as immigration policy, taxation, and resource management, fostering economic dependency and cultural dilution. Proponents emphasize as a fundamental right, drawing on empirical observations of 's demographic shifts—where francophones comprise about 78% of the population but face assimilation pressures from non-francophone immigration—and historical grievances like the federal government's override of provincial jurisdiction in areas like language laws. At its foundation, sovereignism rejects symmetrical , arguing it treats as merely one among ten despite its unique societal composition, leading to policies that undermine French as the 's predominant and public identity. While early iterations incorporated socialist elements, as seen in the Front de libération du Québec's (FLQ) manifestos blending anti-colonial rhetoric with calls for worker control, the dominant strain prioritizes national preservation over class struggle, viewing as causally necessary to reverse declining French vitality metrics, such as the 20% drop in francophone relative share since 1971. Support remains concentrated among francophones, with polls consistently showing attachment to identity correlating positively with endorsement, independent of economic variables alone. Key variants distinguish between "hard" and "soft" approaches, though the movement coalesces around political as the end goal. Sovereignty-association, formalized in the Parti Québécois's 1974 white paper Québec dans un Québec libre, envisions as a exercising full legislative authority while negotiating a formal economic partnership with , including shared , central banking, and tariff-free modeled on emerging European integrations. This hybrid sought to mitigate economic risks highlighted in federalist critiques, such as potential trade disruptions, by preserving practical ties post-separation; however, it faced rejection in referenda for lacking enforceable guarantees on association terms. Purer independence variants, gaining traction post-1995 referendum, advocate complete rupture without predefined economic pacts, emphasizing unilateral to avoid dependency negotiations that could dilute gains, as articulated by figures like . Marginal fringes incorporate ideological overlays, such as eco-sovereignism tying independence to or conservative variants focusing on immigration controls to bolster francophone demographics, but these remain subsumed under the nationalist core. In practice, variants reflect tactical adaptations to polling—where sovereignty-association polled higher in the (around 40-45% support) versus outright separation's lower ceilings—yet all share the causal premise that federal structures inherently disadvantage Quebec's societal cohesion.

Pre-Confederation and Early 20th-Century Roots

The preservation of French Canadian identity following the British , formalized by the Treaty of Paris in 1763, laid early groundwork for autonomist sentiments by necessitating accommodations for a conquered population under Protestant British rule. The of 1774 addressed these tensions by restoring French civil law, permitting Catholic religious freedoms, and expanding territorial boundaries, which collectively reinforced a distinct cultural and institutional framework resistant to full assimilation. By the early 19th century, this identity coalesced into organized nationalism through the Parti patriote, which demanded elected assemblies and responsible government to counter the unelected Château Clique's dominance in . The resulting of 1837–1838 involved armed clashes, including victories at Saint-Denis on November 23, 1837, but ended in defeat after British reinforcements suppressed insurgents, with leaders like fleeing to the . These events, driven by demands for democratic reforms rather than territorial independence, prompted the of 1839 and the Act of Union in 1840, uniting Upper and Lower Canada under a single legislature that marginalized French influence, thereby deepening resentments over minority status within . Quebec's entry into on July 1, 1867, as one of four provinces granted linguistic and denominational school rights under Section 93 of the British North America Act, but persistent centralizing tendencies fueled ongoing nationalist advocacy for provincial autonomy. In the early 20th century, this evolved through opposition to imperial obligations, exemplified by widespread resistance to military during , which highlighted Quebec's disproportionate burden under federal policies favoring English Canada's commitments to Britain. Henri Bourassa, a and , channeled these grievances into a vision of bicultural nationalism, founding the Ligue Nationaliste in 1903 to combat and promote free from undue British influence. His newspaper , established in 1910, critiqued blind and advocated French Canadian rights across the Dominion, including during the 1917 conscription crisis where he argued against compulsory overseas service without parliamentary approval. While Bourassa envisioned a decentralized balancing French and English interests rather than separation, his emphasis on cultural survival and autonomy against anglophone dominance provided ideological continuity for later sovereignist arguments, amid demographic pressures from immigration and economic centralization in .

Influence of the Quiet Revolution

The Quiet Revolution, spanning roughly from 1960 to 1966 under Premier Jean Lesage's Liberal government, represented a profound shift in Quebec's governance and society, transitioning from the conservative, church-dominated regime of to a secular, interventionist state model. Key reforms included the nationalization of hydroelectric resources to form in 1962, the establishment of a Ministry of Education in 1964 to oversee a restructured system serving over one million students, and the Parent Report's recommendations leading to universal, free public education by the late 1960s. These changes, funded partly by federal transfers, empowered the provincial state to assert control over economic and cultural spheres previously influenced by English-Canadian capital and Catholic institutions, thereby elevating French-Canadian aspirations for . This modernization intensified by highlighting structural inequalities within , where French speakers, comprising 80% of 's population but holding only about 4% of corporate directorships in 1961, perceived federal policies as perpetuating anglophone dominance in finance and industry. The revolution's emphasis on linguistic and cultural affirmation—evident in measures like Bill 60 (), which mandated French proficiency in the —fostered a "neo-nationalist" viewing as the primary homeland for , distinct from the rest of . Economic data underscored the grievances: 's per capita income lagged behind Ontario's by roughly 20% in the early , fueling demands for greater provincial autonomy over taxation and resources to rectify perceived exploitation. The period directly catalyzed the organized sovereignty movement through the radicalization of reformist figures like , who as Lesage's Minister of Natural Resources from 1961 championed resource sovereignty but grew disillusioned with federal constraints, such as Ottawa's rejection of Quebec's bid for 25% of corporate tax revenues in 1966. 's departure from the Liberals in 1967, following the party's refusal to endorse sovereignty-association, led to the formation of the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association and culminated in the Parti Québécois's founding on October 14, 1968, which merged with political proposals. This evolution from federalist modernization to separatist advocacy reflected a causal chain: state-building successes exposed federalism's limits, channeling rising francophone confidence—manifest in union militancy, with strikes involving over 100,000 workers by 1966—into demands for a sovereign capable of fully realizing the revolution's progressive ideals.

Key Political Developments and Events

Formation of Sovereignist Parties (1960s-1970s)

The Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) emerged as the first organized political entity dedicated to , initially formed as a citizens' movement on , 1960, by a group of about twenty individuals from diverse backgrounds including federal civil servants, students, and intellectuals. It formalized as a provincial party on March 3, 1963, during a congress in , advocating outright political sovereignty without economic association to , which appealed to younger, more radical nationalists amid the socioeconomic upheavals of the Quiet Revolution. Under leaders like Pierre Bourgault, who assumed presidency in 1964, the RIN emphasized cultural survival and anti-federalism but struggled electorally, securing only 7.6% of the vote in the 1966 provincial despite fielding candidates across . Parallel efforts coalesced around more moderate visions of sovereignty. The Ralliement national (RN), established in 1965 as a conservative splinter from the Party, prioritized economic pragmatism and appealed to rural and traditionalist voters wary of radical . Separately, , a former Liberal cabinet minister disillusioned with after the 1967 constitutional conference, founded the Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA) in late 1967 to promote a hybrid model of political independence paired with ongoing economic and with , aiming to broaden appeal beyond ideological purists. These factions unified in the late 1960s to counter electoral fragmentation. On October 14, 1968, the MSA merged with the RN under Lévesque's leadership to create the (PQ), adopting sovereignty-association as its platform to balance nationalist aspirations with economic realism. The RIN dissolved shortly after, on October 26, 1968, via a party congress vote led by Bourgault, urging its 11,000 members to join the PQ individually, thereby consolidating the sovereignist vote ahead of the 1970 election where the PQ garnered 24.6% support but no seats due to the first-past-the-post system. This formation marked a shift from splintered activism to a viable electoral force, though internal tensions persisted between hardline independentists and association advocates.

1980 Referendum on Sovereignty-Association

The 1980 referendum on sovereignty-association was initiated by the Parti Québécois government under Premier René Lévesque, following its 1976 election victory on a platform promising such a vote. The proposal outlined "sovereignty-association," whereby Quebec would gain exclusive authority over its laws, taxes, and international relations while preserving an economic partnership with Canada, including a shared currency. The referendum question, announced on December 20, 1979, sought a mandate for negotiations rather than immediate separation: "The Government of Québec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Québec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad – in other words, sovereignty – and at the same time, to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; no change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be effected without approval by the people through another referendum; on these terms, do you give the Government of Québec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Québec and Canada?" The Yes campaign, led by Lévesque and the , emphasized Quebec's cultural and linguistic distinctiveness and the need for amid perceived federal encroachments. Opposing it, the No side was coordinated by the federal Liberal government under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Quebec Liberal leader Claude Ryan, who argued that sovereignty-association would sever vital economic ties without guaranteed benefits. A pivotal moment occurred when Quebec Culture Minister Lise Payette criticized female No supporters as outdated "Yvettes," prompting a backlash that galvanized women voters; this led to the "Brunch des Yvettes" rally in , attended by over 15,000 people, which boosted federalist momentum. Trudeau's late-campaign intervention, promising constitutional and reforms to enhance provincial powers, further swayed undecided voters toward the No option. The occurred on May 20, 1980, with a turnout of 85.61% among 4,367,584 registered electors. Of 3,673,842 valid ballots, 1,485,851 (40.44%) voted Yes, while 2,187,991 (59.56%) voted No, yielding a No majority of 702,140 votes; rejected ballots numbered 65,012. Support for Yes was approximately 50% among francophones but weaker in anglophone and allophone-heavy areas like , reflecting divisions along linguistic and regional lines. The decisive No outcome halted immediate sovereignty pursuits, though it prompted subsequent federal-Quebec constitutional negotiations.

1995 Referendum and Near-Miss Dynamics

The on took place on , , under the government led by Premier . The ballot question read: "Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, ?" Voter turnout reached 93.52%, the highest in modern history, with 4,717,336 valid ballots cast. The No option prevailed with 2,385,800 votes (50.58%), defeating the Yes option's 2,331,774 votes (49.42%) by a margin of 54,026 votes, or roughly 1.2 percentage points. Results varied regionally, with strong Yes majorities in rural areas and Indigenous communities opposing in regions like territories, while and surrounding urban centers leaned No. Campaign dynamics featured a Yes surge after initial polling deficits, driven by leader Bouchard's charismatic involvement and emphasis on cultural preservation amid federal constitutional failures post-Meech Lake and accords. Polls from mid-September to early consistently showed Yes leading by 1-4 points among francophones, who comprised the decisive , though overall leads were narrower due to non-francophone opposition. The federal government countered with a $4 million "Unity Reserve" fund for advertising highlighting economic risks, including Quebec's share of national debt and potential trade disruptions, while No committee leader Daniel Johnson promised distinct society recognition. Youth turnout and first-time voter mobilization favored Yes, but economic anxieties and partnership ambiguities eroded support. The near-miss hinged on a late federalist resurgence, particularly a massive rally in on October 27, 1995, where Prime Minister and other Canadian leaders directly appealed to ' sense of belonging, drawing an estimated 100,000 participants and shifting undecided voters. Polling underestimated No support, likely due to among francophones and a surge in late deciders favoring stability, with women voting No at higher rates than men (a 6-8 point ). Federal spending outpaced Yes efforts in the final weeks, funding ads and phone banks that emphasized partition risks and uncertainty, contributing to a 2-3 point swing in the campaign's closing days. Action Démocratique leader Mario Dumont's qualified Yes endorsement added momentum but failed to fully consolidate non-PQ sovereignists. Post-vote analysis indicates the outcome reflected pragmatic calculations over identity fervor, as with —Quebec's exports heavily reliant on the U.S. via federal trade deals—outweighed sovereignty appeals for a slim majority.

Post-Referendum Federal Responses (Clarity Act and Sponsorship Scandal)

Following the , in which the "No" option secured 50.58% of the vote against 49.42% for , the federal Liberal government under pursued legislative measures to define conditions for any future process. In response to the of Canada's 1998 , which ruled that unilateral violated Canadian law but obligated negotiations if a demonstrated a "clear " on a "clear question," enacted the (S.C. 2000, c. 26) on June 29, 2000. The Act empowers the , within 30 days of a , to determine whether the question unambiguously proposes without confounding elements like economic association, and whether the affirmative vote constitutes a clear , factoring in turnout, margins, and any countervailing regional or demographic expressions. If either fails the clarity threshold—explicitly rejecting a bare 50%+1 as sufficient—the federal government holds no duty to negotiate constitutional changes, effectively raising barriers to Quebec's unilateral exit. Quebec's government, led by Premier , condemned the Act as an infringement on provincial sovereignty and democratic , arguing it imposed federal power over outcomes. The legislation passed with support from the Liberal majority and some opposition parties but faced unanimous rejection in the Quebec National Assembly, highlighting ongoing federal-provincial tensions. No subsequent Quebec has tested the Act's provisions, though it remains a cornerstone of federal strategy against . Concurrently, to reinforce federal presence and loyalty in amid lingering separatist momentum, the Chrétien government initiated the federal Sponsorship Program in 1996 through Public Works and Government Services (PWGSC). The initiative allocated public funds—totaling approximately $100 million in contracts—to subsidize cultural, sporting, and community events, requiring organizers to display flags and branding to underscore national unity. Administered with minimal oversight, contracts were disproportionately awarded to Quebec-based advertising firms sympathetic to the Liberals, such as Groupaction and Lafleur Communication, often for logo placement without substantive promotional work. Irregularities surfaced in a Auditor General report, which flagged $1.7 million in questionable payments, but the scandal escalated in 2004 with media exposés on kickbacks, inflated invoices, and funds funneled to the Liberal Party via intermediaries. , who succeeded Chrétien in December 2003, commissioned the Gomery Inquiry in February 2004, headed by Quebec Superior Court Justice John Gomery. The inquiry's first report, released November 1, 2005, documented $332 million expended overall on sponsorships and publicity (including $100 million to firms), attributing waste to political interference, lax PWGSC controls, and deliberate circumvention of contracting rules, though it cleared Chrétien of direct involvement while faulting his inner circle. The eroded public trust, contributing to the Liberal minority government's defeat in the January federal election, with the Conservatives under capitalizing on anti-corruption pledges. Subsequent prosecutions yielded convictions, including advertising executive Jean Brault for (sentenced to 2.5 years in ) and Liberal fundraiser Joe Morselli for influence peddling, though many charges were stayed or acquitted. The program's failure—intended to deter sovereignty but instead exemplifying federal overreach and corruption—further alienated voters, boosting support in .

Organizational Landscape

Active Sovereignist Political Parties

The (PQ) serves as the foremost provincial sovereignist party, dedicated to securing Quebec's political from . Founded in 1968, it combines social democratic policies with a core commitment to holding a upon forming government, a pledge maintained by current leader , elected in 2020. In the October 3, 2022, provincial election, the PQ garnered 14.61% of the popular vote but secured only 3 seats in the 125-seat due to the first-past-the-post . The party expanded to 4 seats following a victory in Arthabaska on August 11, 2025, where its candidate obtained 46% of the vote, signaling a resurgence amid dissatisfaction with the governing . Despite leading recent provincial polls, the PQ faces entrenched public resistance to , with polls indicating 65% opposition to a as of October 2025, yet Plamondon persists in framing as essential for Quebec's . Québec solidaire (QS), formed in 2006 through the merger of left-wing groups, positions sovereignty as integral to its democratic socialist platform, which prioritizes , , and anti-capitalist reforms. The party seeks to reframe for younger demographics by decoupling it from 1990s-era debates, emphasizing instead progressive free from federal constraints. In the 2022 election, QS achieved 15.43% of the vote—surpassing the PQ's share—but won zero seats, highlighting the system's bias against smaller parties without concentrated regional support. Lacking in the since then, QS remains active through organizing and alliances, though its sovereignty advocacy often competes with domestic issues like and climate policy for voter attention. At the federal level, the (BQ) functions as Quebec's sovereignist voice in , contesting only the province's 78 ridings to defend distinct interests and advance long-term independence. Established in 1991 post-Meech Lake Accord failure, the BQ under leader explicitly pursues "a new country called Québec," promoting , ecological standards, and equality while critiquing federal overreach. The party retained 22 seats in the following the April 2025 federal election, down from prior highs but sufficient for influence in a minority parliament, where it has conditioned support on concessions like agricultural aid. This reduced caucus reflects shifting Quebec voter priorities toward economic stability over separatism, yet the BQ sustains sovereignist momentum by leveraging federal-provincial tensions. No other parties with significant electoral presence or organizational capacity qualify as active sovereignists; minor or defunct groups like Option nationale have either merged into the PQ or faded since the .

Non-Partisan Advocacy Groups

Several non-partisan organizations advocate for Quebec through , commemoration, and efforts detached from electoral . These groups emphasize cultural preservation, historical reflection, and public discourse on , often operating as networks or targeted associations with modest memberships. Their activities include rallies, informational campaigns, and intergenerational dialogues, though they lack the institutional resources of sovereignist parties. The Réseau Cap sur l’indépendance serves as an umbrella network uniting approximately 29 member organizations dedicated to advancing via public education, debate facilitation, population mobilization, and expressions of support. Formed to coordinate non-partisan initiatives, it focuses on informing citizens about benefits and organizing events independent of party platforms. Member groups within the network, such as regional clubs, have expanded from five to 22 entities by October 2025, enabling broader outreach including recent marches commemorating the 1995 referendum. Les Aînés pour la souveraineté, a non-partisan entity within , promotes among Quebec's senior population by fostering discussions and exchanges on the topic. Established to leverage older generations' historical perspectives, it prioritizes awareness-raising without partisan endorsements, contributing to sustained advocacy despite fluctuating public support. Organisations unies pour l’indépendance du Québec (OUI Québec), launched on December 11, 2014, by activists seeking to revive momentum post-referenda defeats, operates as a non-partisan emphasizing for independence. Its efforts include rallying supporters for events like the October 2025 march marking the 30th anniversary of the 1995 vote, where its president highlighted shifts in the movement's dynamics. Anglophones for Québec Independence, founded in September 2016, targets with arguments framing as a logical choice for economic and democratic . As a small non-partisan group with initial membership in the dozens, it maintains online presence and publications to counter perceptions of anglophone opposition, which historically exceeded 90% against in referenda. These organizations persist amid low overall sovereignty support—typically below 40% in aggregate polls—but align with niche upticks, such as among , through targeted non-electoral strategies. Their non-partisan status allows flexibility but limits visibility compared to funded parties.

Sympathetic Media and Intellectual Networks

, established in 1910 by , maintains financial independence and has frequently hosted editorials and coverage sympathetic to Quebec nationalist causes, including sovereignty advocacy during referendum campaigns. L'aut'journal, a monthly tabloid with a circulation of approximately 35,000 as of 2006, explicitly promotes Quebec sovereignty alongside and labor union interests, deriving most of its funding from unions. Vigile.Québec operates as an online platform dedicated to , opening its pages to contributors mobilized by the cause and emphasizing freedom of expression within that framework. Among networks, Les Intellectuels pour la souveraineté (IPSO) functions as a collective of scholars and thinkers focused on researching and advancing arguments for , with members including long-time separatist figures. The Institut de recherche sur l'autodétermination (IRAI), launched in February 2016 by leader , serves as a dedicated to develop policy proposals and economic analyses supporting preparations for future referendums.

Historical Polling Data and Shifts

Support for Quebec sovereignty, often measured through referendum intentions or hypothetical voting questions, has exhibited marked volatility tied to political events, but with an overall trajectory of rise, peak, and long-term decline since the . In the lead-up to the 1980 on sovereignty-association—a proposal for political independence paired with economic ties to —polls indicated Yes support fluctuating between 30% and 40%, culminating in a 40.44% Yes vote against 59.56% No on May 20, 1980. Following this defeat, support dipped into the low 30% range through the 1980s, reflecting disillusionment after the government's economic challenges and the rejection of constitutional reforms favoring . The early 1990s saw a resurgence, driven by federal constitutional failures like the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, pushing Yes intentions from around 30% to highs near 50% among decided voters by mid-1995; campaign polling captured this momentum, with Yes surging in the weeks before the October 30 vote, which ended 49.42% Yes to 50.58% No. Post-referendum, support collapsed to the mid-20% range by the late 1990s, influenced by federal Clarity Act requirements for clear questions and majority mandates, alongside economic recovery and unity campaigns. Subsequent decades reflect stagnation and erosion, with Yes support averaging 25-35% in aggregate polling, punctuated by brief spikes during federal-provincial frictions like the 1998 sponsorship program revelations or 2010s resource disputes, but lacking the intensity of prior eras. Generational shifts contribute to this, as younger francophones exhibit lower enthusiasm compared to pre-1995 cohorts.
DatePollster/EventYes %No %Undecided %Notes
May 20, 198040.459.6N/ASovereignty-association question.
October 30, 199549.450.6N/AAccession to sovereignty question.
October 2020Léger (n=1,013)365410Overall .
March 2023Léger (published in )38N/AN/AHypothetical referendum.
September 2025Léger (n=1,037)315910Recent low interest in sovereignty.
By the 2020s, polling consistently shows No majorities exceeding 50%, with Yes capped below 40% and widespread disinterest in new referendums, signaling the movement's marginalization amid stable and economic interdependence. Variations stem partly from question phrasing—pure yields lower Yes than association options—and sampling francophones versus all , where overall support lags 10-15 points behind the linguistic majority.

Demographic Breakdowns (Francophones, Anglophones, Allophones, Indigenous)

Support for the Quebec sovereignty movement has historically varied significantly across linguistic and ethnic demographics, with Francophones forming the primary base of backing while Anglophones, Allophones, and Indigenous groups have shown consistent opposition. Polling data indicate that sovereignty support is concentrated among French-speaking , who constitute about 78% of the province's as of the 2021 , whereas non-Francophones overwhelmingly favor remaining within . This demographic divide reflects linguistic identity, historical grievances, and differing perceptions of federalism's benefits. Among Francophones, support for sovereignty has fluctuated but remains the highest of any group, often exceeding 50% in favorable conditions. In the 1995 referendum, approximately 60% of Francophone voters supported the "Yes" option for sovereignty-association. Recent polling by CROP in August 2025 showed 50% support for independence among Francophones, compared to 44% overall in Quebec. This level aligns with patterns where Francophone identity correlates strongly with sovereigntist leanings, though support dips during economic uncertainty or federal concessions; for instance, post-1995 Clarity Act implementation saw temporary declines to around 30-40%. Younger Francophones under 35 exhibit even higher enthusiasm, with 56% favoring sovereignty in the same 2025 CROP survey, potentially driven by cultural preservation concerns amid immigration pressures. Anglophones, comprising roughly 10% of Quebec's population and concentrated in and the , have demonstrated near-unanimous opposition to . In the 1995 referendum, about 90-95% of Anglophone voters chose "No," a pattern rooted in stronger ties to Canadian federal institutions and fears of linguistic marginalization in an independent . Contemporary data confirms this persistence, with academic analyses noting that Anglophones "almost uniformly oppose" due to economic dependencies on interprovincial trade and federal protections under the of Rights and Freedoms. No recent polls show support exceeding 10% in this group, and many Anglophones have historically emigrated during sovereignty peaks, reducing their demographic footprint. Allophones, non-official language speakers (primarily immigrants speaking languages like , Spanish, or Chinese) who make up about 8-10% of the population, mirror Anglophone opposition levels. They tend to view as a more inclusive offering better integration and economic opportunities, with support for typically under 20% and often closer to 5-10% in aggregated polls. This stance is attributed to reliance on federal policies and skepticism toward Quebec's language laws, such as Bill 96, which prioritize French assimilation. Growth in the population since the 1990s has diluted overall support by bolstering the "No" coalition, as evidenced by demographic shifts weakening the Francophone majority's electoral leverage. Indigenous peoples, including , , and other First Nations representing about 2% of Quebec's population but controlling vast northern territories, have firmly rejected sovereignty, prioritizing federal treaties and self-government arrangements. In parallel 1995 referendums, 96% of voted to remain with , and 95% of opposed Quebec sovereignty, citing risks to land claims like the and Northern (1975). Indigenous leaders have repeatedly affirmed loyalty to for funding and jurisdiction over resources, with no significant pro-sovereignty shift in subsequent decades; for example, in 2014, First Nations chiefs warned against revisiting separation amid election rhetoric. This opposition stems from causal realities of providing leverage against provincial overreach, as Indigenous governance models emphasize nation-to-nation relations with over Quebec's assimilationist framework.

Recent Polls (2010s-2025) and Methodological Caveats

Support for Quebec sovereignty has remained a minority position in polls throughout the 2010s and 2020s, typically ranging from 25% to 40% among Quebec residents, with "No" votes consistently commanding majorities of 48% to 67%. Aggregated data from polling firms such as Léger, Pallas Data, and indicate no sustained upward trend, despite occasional fluctuations tied to political events like the rise of the (PQ) in provincial voting intentions since 2022. For instance, a Léger poll in October 2025 found 65% would vote "No" in a hypothetical , reflecting broad disinterest even as the PQ led electoral polls.
DatePollsterYes (%)No (%)Undecided (%)
2018-05-01255520
2020-10-03Léger365410
2023-02-25Léger385110
2024-06-08Pallas Data40528
2025-09-27Léger315910
Recent surveys highlight demographic variations, with support among younger rising to around 50% in some 2025 polls, such as a survey showing 56% favorable among youth, though overall figures remain subdued. A September 2025 Pallas Data poll reported stagnant sovereignty backing at approximately 35%, underscoring that PQ electoral gains have not translated into parallel enthusiasm for independence. Methodological caveats include significant variability from question wording: polls specifying " with economic and political partnership" often yield higher "Yes" responses than those emphasizing standalone , potentially overstating viable support. Sample composition poses challenges, as modern online panels may underrepresent rural or older voters less inclined toward , while telephone methods risk lower response rates from non-francophones. Undecided respondents (typically 8-20%) are frequently prorated, which can inflate "Yes" estimates if sovereignists are more decisive; historical campaigns revealed late swings toward "No" not captured in pre-vote surveys. Aggregators like Qc125 apply uniform weighting, but differences in pollster incentives—such as those affiliated with pro-sovereignty media—may introduce subtle biases, though reputable firms like Léger maintain methodological transparency. Turnout modeling is another limitation, as pro-sovereignty voters may overestimate participation, yet from past s shows "No" sides mobilizing broader electorates.

Arguments For Sovereignty

Cultural and Identity-Based Claims


Proponents of Quebec sovereignty maintain that the province's unique francophone identity, encompassing language, civil law traditions, and historical heritage, faces existential risks within Canada's federal structure, necessitating to ensure cultural survival in an anglophone North American context. This perspective roots in Quebec's origins as , established in 1608, and its endurance as a French-speaking enclave after the British conquest, which positioned francophones as a demographic minority amid expanding English settlement. Sovereigntists argue that perpetuates this vulnerability by diluting Quebec's control over key levers like and , potentially accelerating linguistic assimilation as non-francophone populations grow.
Central to these claims is the primacy of the , spoken by approximately 7.7 million as a majority but vastly outnumbered continent-wide by over 300 million English speakers. Advocates assert that only can secure uncompromised authority to prioritize French in public life, building on measures like the 1977 (Bill 101), which mandates French for commercial signage and limits English schooling access, yet remains subject to federal overrides via or the notwithstanding clause. Recent polling underscores this linkage, with 88 percent of 2024 sovereigntist respondents perceiving the French language in as threatened, far exceeding non-sovereigntist views and correlating with identity-driven support for separation. The Quiet Revolution of the amplified these identity-based arguments by secularizing and modernizing society, shifting focus from clerical deference to state-led cultural assertion and fueling demands for as a means to "master one's destiny" against perceived anglophone dominance. Proponents contend that federal policies fragment Quebec's cohesive national narrative, contrasting with the province's emphasis on , where immigrants integrate into a dominant francophone framework rather than parallel ethnic enclaves. , they claim, would enable tailored selecting for French proficiency, reinforcing demographic majorities and cultural continuity amid projections of rising populations. Beyond language, cultural claims highlight Quebec's distinct , derived from French Napoleonic traditions rather than English , and its historical narrative of resilience against and . Sovereigntists argue that embedding these elements in a —complete with national citizenship, symbols like the flag, and unified governance—would foster a profound sense of belonging absent in federal arrangements, where Quebec's 23 percent of Canada's yields disproportionate influence but persistent grievances over powers and asymmetry. This identity preservation is framed not as isolationism but as pragmatic defense against cultural erosion, with historical precedents like the 1837-38 Patriote rebellions underscoring long-standing quests for tied to francophone survival.

Economic Self-Determination Arguments

Proponents of Quebec sovereignty assert that independence would grant the province complete authority over its taxation, spending, and , eliminating what they describe as a structural under where collects disproportionate revenues from Quebec's economic output only to redistribute them elsewhere. According to a 2023 fiscal analysis commissioned by the (PQ) and authored by former PQ finance minister Nicolas Marceau, a sovereign Quebec would possess the financial capacity to maintain current public services while achieving budgetary surpluses, projecting that the elimination of federal transfers and associated administrative costs would enhance fiscal health without necessitating tax increases or spending cuts. This perspective holds that Quebec's current net contributions to federal coffers—despite receiving equalization payments—understate the potential gains from retaining full control over personal and corporate income taxes, GST revenues, and other levies, allowing for policies tailored to Quebec's high-productivity sectors like , , and . A central pillar of these arguments centers on sovereignty's potential to maximize returns from Quebec's abundant natural resources, particularly its hydroelectric capacity managed by the Crown corporation . Quebec generates nearly 99% of its electricity from renewable sources, predominantly , positioning it as a net exporter of clean power to the and other provinces, with exports contributing significantly to provincial revenues through sales and dividends. Sovereignists contend that federal oversight in interprovincial trade and international negotiations constrains Quebec's ability to secure optimal export contracts or invest export surpluses directly into provincial priorities, such as or a modeled on resource-rich independent nations like ; under independence, Quebec could negotiate bilateral energy deals unencumbered by Canadian constitutional divisions of power, potentially increasing 's net contributions to the treasury, which exceeded CAD 2 billion in dividends in recent years. Furthermore, advocates argue that economic self-determination would enable Quebec to pursue autonomous , monetary, and regulatory policies better suited to its francophone and geographic advantages, fostering innovation and attracting investment without federal redistribution mechanisms that they claim dilute local competitiveness. The PQ has emphasized maintaining economic association with , including use of the Canadian dollar and , to mitigate transition risks while asserting that independence would resolve chronic disputes over federal intrusions in areas like employment insurance and , ultimately leading to higher GDP through undistorted resource management and fiscal . These claims, however, rely on assumptions of seamless post-sovereignty partnerships, as outlined in PQ platforms, and are advanced amid critiques that overlook empirical net federal inflows to .

Critiques of Federalism

Sovereigntists contend that , established by the , lacks legitimacy in due to its colonial origins and absence of direct democratic consent from at the time. leader described the system in 2025 as "born of a British law, purely colonial in 1867, without the democratic consent of Quebecers," arguing it imposes an outdated framework unsuited to modern national aspirations. This view frames not as a compact between equals but as an imposition that subordinates Quebec's distinct societal interests to a centralized English-Canadian majority. A core structural critique targets the federal spending power, which enables to fund programs in areas of exclusive provincial , effectively bypassing constitutional divisions of power and eroding Quebec's . Successive Quebec governments, including sovereignist administrations, have maintained that this power constitutes an illegitimate encroachment, with the echoing calls for its elimination in provincial domains to prevent federal overreach into , , and education. Sovereignists argue this mechanism fosters dependency and undermines fiscal , as federal conditional distort provincial priorities without corresponding representation of Quebec's francophone-majority perspective. The 1982 patriation of the without Quebec's agreement exemplifies 's , according to sovereignists, as it entrenched an amending formula and Charter of Rights that Quebec officials deemed incompatible with the province's linguistic and cultural safeguards. The Quebec government under Premier refused to sign the , viewing the process—initiated by —as a unilateral severance from British oversight that excluded Quebec's veto and ignored its demands for distinct society recognition. This event, coupled with the failure of subsequent accords like Meech Lake (collapsed in 1990) and (rejected in 1992 referendums), is cited as evidence that cannot decentralize sufficiently to accommodate Quebec's nationhood claims. Further highlighting perceived anti-democratic tendencies, sovereignists denounce the federal of 2000, enacted post-1995 , for arrogating to Parliament the authority to deem questions unclear or majorities insufficient—requiring more than a simple 50%+1 threshold for negotiations. The responded with Bill 99, affirming Quebec's unilateral right to determine its future via majority vote, and labeled the an intrusion into provincial democratic institutions. Critics within the movement argue this legislation prioritizes federal unity over principles enshrined in , such as those in the UN Charter, thereby institutionalizing barriers to Quebec's sovereign will. These elements collectively portray as a rigid, centralizing system that systematically marginalizes Quebec's aspirations for enhanced autonomy or independence.

Arguments Against Sovereignty

Empirical Evidence of Economic Risks

Empirical analyses of Quebec sovereignty highlight substantial economic risks, primarily through disruptions to trade, finance, and investor confidence during transition periods. The 1995 referendum, which narrowly rejected sovereignty with 50.58% voting "No," triggered immediate market turmoil, including the Stock Exchange's sixth-largest single-day drop and declines in the dollar's value alongside rising bond yields. Quebec-based firms experienced particularly acute negative stock returns in the short run following the vote, reflecting heightened political uncertainty. Similarly, periods of elevated separatist rhetoric, such as under governments from 1976 to 1985, correlated with the relocation of approximately 700 companies from Quebec to other provinces, contributing to Montreal's population stagnation and a widening unemployment gap from 2% to 6% relative to the rest of . Economic modeling underscores long-term output losses, with one quantitative assessment estimating a potential 10% depression in Quebec's real GDP in the short run due to a confidence crisis, escalating to sustained 5% reductions from factors including trade barriers and fiscal adjustments. These projections assume an acrimonious separation without automatic retention of the Canadian dollar, leading to currency risks such as devaluation or elevated interest rates from a new monetary authority, potentially costing 1% of GDP or $40 billion in transition expenses. Trade disruptions in integrated sectors like softwood lumber (-1.2% GDP impact) and dairy further compound losses, alongside the emigration of anglophone capital and skilled labor, estimated at 1-2% of GDP. Fiscal strains amplify these risks, as an independent would assume 22-25% of Canada's federal —roughly $150-200 billion based on share—elevating its net from around 40% to 95%, necessitating tax hikes of 2-3% of GDP or spending cuts to service higher borrowing costs amid a . Recent critiques of fiscal projections dismiss their assumptions of seamless assumption and zero transitional economic fallout as overly optimistic, ignoring empirical precedents of investment aversion during uncertainty spikes, where volatility rises and asset valuations discount .

Fiscal Realities (Debt, Transfers, Trade)

Quebec's provincial net stood at 38.6% of GDP as of March 31, 2025, higher than the Canadian provincial average of 29.2%, with projections indicating a rise to 41.9% by 2027-28 due to ongoing deficits and spending pressures. In a scenario, would retain its provincial —estimated at over $200 billion gross in recent years—while assuming approximately 23% of Canada's federal , proportional to its population share, potentially adding $250-300 billion or more based on current federal liabilities exceeding $1.2 trillion. Economic analyses indicate this would elevate 's overall burden significantly, as it loses federal transfers that currently subsidize servicing and public spending, leading to higher borrowing costs and potential downgrades, as evidenced by 's recent adjustment to A+ from AA- amid fiscal strains. Federal transfers represent a substantial fiscal dependency for , which received $29.3 billion in major transfers for 2025-26, including equalization payments comprising over half of the national total at approximately $13.8 billion based on its 52.7% share of the $26.2 billion program. has been a consistent net recipient under equalization since the program's , with payments offsetting lower fiscal capacity from resource revenues and taxes compared to provinces like and ; independence would eliminate these inflows, forcing to cover equivalent expenditures—such as and social programs—through hikes or cuts, exacerbating budget shortfalls projected at record levels for 2025. Critics from fiscal conservative think tanks argue this dependency masks underlying structural weaknesses, as 's fiscal transfers exceed contributions, creating a net drain on the rest of estimated at $10-15 billion annually in recent decades. Trade realities underscore Quebec's with the rest of , where interprovincial flows account for 30-35% of provincial GDP, comparable to or exceeding certain international exports in volume for key sectors like , , and . Quebec's total exports reached $121 billion in 2024, with significant reliance on seamless Canadian supply chains; for instance, intra-Canadian in rivals U.S.-bound shipments in critical inputs, and barriers post-separation—such as , conversion, or renegotiated agreements—could disrupt these, as modeled in studies showing GDP contractions of 5-10% from frictions alone. advocates downplay this by emphasizing U.S. dominance (over 70% of exports), but empirical reviews highlight that losing tariff-free access to the 80% of Canada's outside would compound losses from foregone transfers, with net fiscal outflows turning into deficits without compensatory gains.

Unity and Practical Governance Challenges

The Quebec sovereignty movement has exhibited persistent internal divisions, undermining its cohesion and electoral viability. While the (PQ) remains the dominant sovereigntist force, it competes with softer nationalist elements within the (CAQ) and faces skepticism from younger voters and non-francophone demographics, contributing to sovereignty support hovering below 40% in recent polls. These fractures intensified after the 1995 referendum's narrow defeat (49.42% Yes), where post-vote recriminations over strategy—particularly the inclusion of economic partnership in the question—led to leadership changes and strategic debates within the movement. Critics, including former sovereignists, argue that such disunity reflects a lack of consensus on core objectives, with some favoring gradual over abrupt separation, further eroding momentum. Practical governance challenges for an independent Quebec encompass formidable institutional and logistical hurdles. Establishing monetary sovereignty would require creating a and transitioning from the Canadian dollar, a process PQ leader has proposed but which carries risks of , , and trade disruptions during the interim period. Economists have highlighted the PQ's financial projections as flawed, overlooking transition costs estimated in billions and assuming seamless adoption without empirical precedent for a subnational entity of Quebec's scale. Defense and present additional barriers, as lacks a standing military and would need to negotiate membership or build forces from scratch, potentially limited to a role per PQ plans, amid domestic opposition to higher defense spending. apportionment negotiations could prolong uncertainty, with 's hypothetical share of federal liabilities—based on population—exceeding $100 billion in early estimates, adjusted for current totals surpassing $1.2 nationally, complicating fiscal startup. Territorial disputes loom large, particularly with Indigenous nations like the James Bay , whose 1995 plebiscite rejected separation by 96%, signaling potential partition claims and legal entanglements over resource-rich northern regions. These factors collectively illustrate the administrative complexity of decoupling from federal structures, where untested governance models risk instability without proven mechanisms for rapid state-building.

Economic and Fiscal Analysis

Historical Economic Performance Under Federalism

Quebec's economy, integrated into since in 1867, experienced industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries but maintained lower per capita output compared to provinces like and resource-rich . By 1961, Quebec's average real income stood at approximately 80% of 's level, reflecting historical disparities in , capital access, and demographic pressures from high fertility rates. The Quiet Revolution of the , involving provincial government expansion and secularization, coincided with demographic shifts including declining birth rates, which facilitated labor force participation and partial economic convergence toward the Canadian average by the early . Real GDP per capita in grew from $36,161 in 1998 to $49,416 in 2023 (in chained 2017 dollars), representing a 36.7% increase, with average annual real GDP growth of 1.9% from 1998 to 2023 compared to Canada's 1.6%. Since 2000, 's real per-capita GDP has expanded at an annual average rate of 1.2%, outpacing 's 0.7% but trailing resource-driven provinces like . Relative to , 's per-capita GDP rose from 80.4% in 2000 to 90.6% in 2022, though absolute levels remain lower at roughly C$64,000 versus C$70,000 in recent years.
YearQuebec GDP per Capita (Chained 2017 $)Relative to (%)Relative to Average
1961~80% of 's real income level80Below average
1980Converged toward levels~78-92 (varied estimates)Near average
2000Baseline for recent catch-up80.4Below average
2022$49,000 (approx. USD equivalent)90.6Below average
Productivity levels in have hovered slightly below the national average, with growth contributing modestly to output gains, often constrained by lower business —Ontario's real per-capita business exceeded 's by 19-26% in recent decades. has provided access to a unified internal market and equalization payments (averaging billions annually as a recipient ), supporting stability amid provincial policies emphasizing social spending and labor regulations, though empirical analyses attribute convergence more to demographic and employment shifts than to expanded intervention. Persistent gaps in and suggest that while federal structures enabled catch-up from pre-1960 lags, provincial choices have limited outperformance relative to peers.

Projected Separation Scenarios and Studies

Several economic studies have modeled the potential impacts of Quebec's separation from , focusing on scenarios involving division, currency adoption, disruptions, and institutional transitions. These projections generally indicate substantial short-term economic contraction for Quebec, driven by uncertainty, , and the costs of establishing sovereign institutions, with longer-term effects depending on negotiation outcomes. For instance, a 1995 analysis projected that Quebec's real output could decline by up to 10% in the short run and 5% in the long run due to separation, with Quebec experiencing more severe effects than the rest of owing to its higher reliance on interprovincial and fiscal transfers. Adversarial scenarios, such as disputed sharing or barriers, could exacerbate losses, while amicable arrangements might mitigate them through continued economic partnerships. Key challenges in projected scenarios include dividing Canada's public debt, estimated at around 22% attributable to Quebec based on its GDP contribution rather than share, potentially adding tens of billions in liabilities and higher costs from downgraded ratings. transitions pose another risk; retaining the Canadian dollar without formal union could limit control, while adopting a new might trigger and . Trade models highlight vulnerabilities, as Quebec's economy is integrated with Canada's, with past uncertainties leading to business relocations and depressed investment. Sovereigntist projections, such as the Parti Québécois's 2023 fiscal analysis, claim net gains of $82.3 billion annually from retaining federal transfers and lower defense spending at 0.65% of GDP ($3.6 billion), asserting viability without major disruptions. However, independent economists critique these as flawed, underestimating transition costs like replacing federal services, potential outflows, and NATO-aligned defense requirements at 2% of GDP (adding $8 billion yearly), while ignoring economic shocks from uncertainty. Empirical evidence from the 1995 referendum period supports such risks, with Quebec-based firms underperforming amid heightened instability.
Study/SourceShort-Term GDP Impact (Quebec)Long-Term ImpactKey Assumptions/Flaws Noted
Grady et al. (1995/2011 model)-10% output loss-5% output lossHigh uncertainty, trade shocks; Quebec hit harder than .
PQ Fiscal Study (2023)Minimal/no loss claimedViable with gainsOptimistic revenue retention; ignores debt adjustment (+$53B), defense hikes, credit risks.
Overall, while pro-sovereignty analyses emphasize benefits, data-driven models underscore fiscal and growth risks, with outcomes hinging on post-referendum negotiations and global perceptions of stability.

Equalization Payments and Dependency Critiques

has consistently been the largest recipient of Canada's equalization payments since the program's in , accounting for roughly half of all such transfers distributed nationwide, amounting to approximately $300 billion in nominal terms by early 2025. In the 2024-25 fiscal year, received $13.2 billion in equalization alone, part of total major federal transfers exceeding $25 billion, including and social program funding. These payments, calculated based on a province's fiscal capacity relative to the national average, have enabled to maintain public services without matching the tax rates of resource-rich provinces like or , which receive zero equalization. Critics, including economists at the , argue that Quebec's heavy reliance on equalization fosters fiscal dependency, disincentivizing structural reforms needed for self-sufficiency, such as reducing chronic provincial deficits—Quebec's 2025-26 budget projected a $13.6 billion deficit—and curbing higher-than-average provincial taxes and debt levels, which stood at 40% of GDP in 2024. This dependency is evident in net federal fiscal balances: analyses show Quebec as a consistent net beneficiary, receiving $5.7 billion more in federal expenditures than it contributes in taxes as of , with the pattern persisting into the 2020s due to disproportionate per-capita transfers amid lower economic productivity growth compared to the Canadian average. The equalization formula's partial exclusion of revenues, including 50% of Quebec's exports, has been faulted for subsidizing inefficient policies, such as expansive welfare spending, while shielding the province from market disciplines that could enhance competitiveness. In the context of the sovereignty movement, these dynamics underscore critiques that independence would expose Quebec to a severe fiscal shortfall, as equalization and other transfers—comprising about 20% of provincial revenues—would cease, potentially necessitating hikes of 20-30% or deep spending cuts to cover an estimated $15-20 billion annual gap, based on recent transfer volumes and Quebec's structural imbalances. Sovereigntist responses, often claiming Quebec over-contributes via federal es collected from its residents, overlook empirical net flows, where federal spending in Quebec (on transfers, , and ) exceeds contributions, perpetuating a cycle of entitlement rather than innovation-driven growth. Over the past decade, Quebec absorbed $129.9 billion in equalization, fueling arguments from federalist perspectives that the program entrenches regional inequities and , where recipient provinces like Quebec prioritize political leverage over economic diversification.
Fiscal YearEqualization to Quebec ($ billions)Total Major Federal Transfers to Quebec ($ billions)Quebec Provincial Deficit ($ billions)
2016-178.9~201.5
2020-2113.1~2311.0
2024-2513.2~258.1
2025-26 (proj.)~13.629.313.6
This table illustrates Quebec's growing transfer dependence amid widening deficits, with equalization forming the core, highlighting critiques that the program sustains rather than resolves underlying fiscal weaknesses.

Social and Cultural Dimensions

Language Laws and

The enactment of the , known as Bill 101, in 1977 by the government under Premier , established French as Quebec's sole and mandated its predominance in public signage, commercial communications, and education for most children of immigrants. This legislation responded to post-Quiet Revolution anxieties over anglicization, where English speakers comprised about 13% of Quebec's population in 1971, amid economic dominance by anglophone elites. Empirical data indicate that Bill 101 contributed to a decline in anglophone mother-tongue speakers to 7.5% by 2016, while bolstering French unilingualism to around 70% of the population. These measures intertwined with Quebec's , framing francophone preservation as essential to cultural survival within an anglophone-majority . Sovereigntists argue that federal bilingualism and erode Quebec's distinct society status, necessitating to enforce uncompromised language protections without interventions, which have overturned aspects of Bill 101, such as English school access provisions. Identity-driven support for correlates with linguistic anxieties; studies show francophones prioritizing French preservation exhibit higher preferences for separation, viewing federal structures as causal barriers to linguistic vitality. Subsequent reforms, including Bill 96 in 2022 under the , further amended the to impose French requirements on businesses with 25 or more employees, limit English eligibility in professional orders, and cap non-French to reinforce demographic francophone majorities. Despite these efforts, data reveal persistent trends: French spoken regularly at home fell to 85.5% in 2021 from higher historical levels, with English-French bilingualism rising to 46.4%, attributed partly to favoring non-official languages. Sovereignty advocates interpret such data as evidence of federal policy failures, positing independence would enable tailored and education controls to halt assimilation, though critics from anglophone communities contend these laws foster exclusionary at the expense of . In this framework, language laws sustain a of as a francophone under existential threat, galvanizing that underpin sovereignty rhetoric. Proponents, including figures, maintain that only sovereignty resolves the causal tension between Quebec's linguistic imperatives and Canada's pan-Canadian framework, where equalization and shared dilute provincial over cultural levers. This perspective persists amid low overall support, with francophone identity remaining a stronger predictor of sovereigntist leanings than economic factors alone.

Indigenous Sovereignty Conflicts

The indigenous peoples of Quebec, including the Cree of Eeyou Istchee (James Bay), the Inuit of Nunavik, and the Innu (Montagnais-Naskapi), have historically asserted sovereignty claims rooted in treaties and inherent rights that predate and conflict with Quebec's territorial ambitions for independence. These nations maintain that their land rights derive from agreements with the Canadian Crown, such as the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975, which established co-management of resources and self-governance frameworks under federal jurisdiction, rather than provincial authority. Quebec sovereigntists, conversely, have claimed that indigenous territories within Quebec's borders would automatically integrate into an independent Quebec, prompting assertions of unilateral inclusion that indigenous leaders argue violate principles of self-determination enshrined in Section 35 of Canada's Constitution Act, 1982. Opposition intensified during the 1980 and 1995 referendums on Quebec sovereignty. In the lead-up to the 1995 vote, the Grand Council of the Crees organized a parallel referendum on October 24, 1995, asking: "Do you consent, as a people, that the Government of Quebec separate the James Bay Crees and Cree traditional territory from Canada in order to adhere to a so-called sovereign Quebec which has never consented to our treaties?" With a 77% turnout, 96.3% voted no, affirming their desire to remain part of Canada. Similarly, the Inuit of Nunavik rejected separation by 96%, with 75% participation, while the Innu voted 99% against. These results underscored a causal disconnect: indigenous economies and governance, reliant on federal transfers, resource-sharing accords, and access to Canadian courts for treaty enforcement, faced existential risks from Quebec's proposed secession without negotiation. Post-referendum legal developments amplified these tensions. The Cree published Sovereign Injustice in 1995, arguing that forcible annexation into an independent Quebec would constitute a breach of international self-determination norms and domestic treaty obligations, as their rights are not devolved provincial matters but federal fiduciary duties. The Supreme Court of Canada's 1998 Reference re Secession of Quebec ruled that any unilateral declaration of independence would be illegitimate if it disregarded minority rights, including those of indigenous peoples, implicitly validating the need for negotiated partitions of territory like Nord-du-Québec, which encompasses over 70% of Quebec's land mass claimed by indigenous nations. Empirical data from indigenous-led studies post-1995 indicate sustained preference for federal ties, with polls showing 63% of Quebecers acknowledging indigenous rights to remain in Canada despite sovereignty outcomes. Ongoing conflicts persist in resource disputes and autonomy claims. For instance, the Cree-Inuit Regional Impact Study of 2019 highlighted how Quebec's hydroelectric projects, like those expanding the Agreement, strain relations when framed through lenses, as indigenous veto rights under clash with provincial assertions of jurisdiction. Indigenous leaders have invoked the UN Declaration on the Rights of (2007, endorsed by in 2010) to demand consent-based processes, rejecting Quebec's 1995 Bill 1, which presumed territorial indivisibility. These frictions reveal a fundamental causal realism: Quebec cannot empirically reconcile with indigenous nationhood without mutual consent, as evidenced by repeated indigenous referenda and litigation prioritizing Canadian federation over provincial separation.

Immigration and Demographic Shifts

Quebec's francophone faces demographic pressures from low birth rates and high reliance on for growth. The province's fell to a historic low in 2024, contributing to zero natural increase, with the entirety of a 155,000-person gain driven by net . Quebec's fertility rate was 1.38 children per in 2023, well below the replacement level of 2.1, exacerbating an aging structure among native-born francophones. Projections indicate that without policy changes, the share of French-speaking could decline to between 69% and 72% by 2036, as immigrants and their descendants increasingly adopt English or retain non-official languages. Under the 1991 Canada-Quebec Immigration Accord, Quebec selects most economic immigrants but operates within federal targets for overall numbers, leading to tensions over integration into francophone society. In 2024, international migration added 158,600 residents, down from a 2023 peak but still dominating growth amid housing strains and slower acquisition rates among newcomers from , , and . Sovereignty proponents, including the , contend that federal policies enable "massive" inflows that dilute the French-speaking majority, undermining Quebec's cultural distinctiveness and necessitating full control over borders for demographic preservation. This view posits that sustained high without stringent assimilation erodes the francophone base essential for , as non-francophones show minimal support for . Empirical data on sovereignty support underscore these divides: historical referendums saw anglophones reject separation by about 90%, while allophones and recent immigrants largely prioritize economic stability within over nationalist goals. Recent polls reflect identity-driven patterns, with 56% of 18- to 34-year-olds favoring in a 2025 CROP survey— a cohort still predominantly francophone despite immigration trends—compared to 37% among those 55 and older. Overall support hovers around 38-40% province-wide, but remains concentrated among francophones, whose demographic erosion could further marginalize the movement absent reforms to selection or language enforcement. Quebec's responses, such as Bill 96 strengthening French requirements, aim to counter these shifts but highlight federal-provincial frictions that fuel separatist critiques of inadequate autonomy.

External and Federal Perspectives

Rest-of-Canada Opposition and Unity Efforts

Opposition to Quebec sovereignty in the rest of Canada has historically been near-universal, driven by apprehensions over economic disruption, territorial integrity, and the dissolution of shared federal institutions. Polls consistently indicate minimal support for independence, with focus groups and surveys emphasizing the interdependence of Canada's economy and the risks of partition, including disputes over federal assets and borders. For instance, a 1995 Angus Reid poll found that only 25% of English-speaking Canadians favored economic and political association with a sovereign Quebec, while 71% opposed it, reflecting widespread reluctance to accommodate separation on favorable terms. Similar sentiments persist, as evidenced by a 2000s Ipsos analysis underscoring enduring resistance in English Canada to post-independence ties. Federal unity efforts intensified around the and referendums, with the national government mobilizing resources to counter separatist momentum. In the lead-up to the 1995 vote, Jean Chrétien's administration shifted from relative passivity to active intervention, including public commitments to enhanced federal-provincial partnerships and deficit reduction appeals tailored to Quebec voters. Post-referendum, the razor-thin "No" victory (50.58% to 49.42%) prompted the federal reference to the on , which in 1998 affirmed that violated Canadian law and the but obligated negotiations only upon a "clear majority" on a "clear question." This ruling directly informed the (Bill C-20), enacted in June 2000, which empowers the to determine the clarity of any future referendum question and majority threshold, rejecting ambiguous formulations like "sovereignty-association." Provincial leaders outside Quebec echoed federal resistance, often prioritizing national cohesion over concessions. Western provinces, in particular, expressed skepticism toward special status for Quebec, with polls showing 72% of Western Canadians insisting on a "clear majority" for recognition of sovereignty claims. Efforts to bolster unity included multilateral constitutional talks, such as the failed (1987-1990) and (1992), aimed at addressing Quebec's distinct society claims within federation, though their collapses fueled temporary separatist gains. Ongoing federal strategies emphasize fiscal equity critiques and infrastructure investments to underscore federal benefits, countering sovereignty narratives amid persistently low support levels in the rest of Canada.

International Views (U.S., France, Others)

The has consistently upheld a policy of neutrality on Quebec sovereignty, prioritizing 's territorial integrity and avoiding interference in its domestic constitutional matters. During preparations for the 1995 referendum, U.S. officials prepared contingency plans but stated they would not recognize Quebec independence absent a negotiated settlement with the federal government and other provinces. This stance reflects broader U.S. strategic interests in North American stability, including economic integration via NAFTA (later USMCA) and security cooperation, where Quebec separation could introduce uncertainties in trade, borders, and defense alliances like . In recent years, informal U.S. commentary, such as President-elect Donald Trump's 2024-2025 remarks on annexation, has highlighted potential economic vulnerabilities for a sovereign Quebec but has not altered official non-interventionism. France's position has evolved from early cultural affinity to formal neutrality, influenced by diplomatic caution toward . President Charles de Gaulle's 1967 visit and call of "Vive le Québec libre!" symbolized French support for Quebec's distinct identity amid federal tensions, but subsequent governments distanced themselves from endorsing to preserve bilateral relations with . Ahead of the 1995 referendum, dispatched observers but refrained from overt advocacy, aligning with international norms favoring negotiated resolutions over unilateral separation. By 2012, under President , explicitly revived a neutral policy after meetings with Quebec Premier , emphasizing democratic processes without favoring independence. This restraint stems from France's recognition that Quebec sovereignty could complicate EU- trade agreements and global francophone cooperation, while avoiding precedents for separatist movements in regions like or . Views from other nations remain subdued, with most aligning behind Canada's unity under principles of enshrined in , such as the UN Charter's emphasis on non-interference. The , as , has expressed support for without direct intervention, viewing Quebec separation as a risk to post-colonial stability models. Indigenous groups and international observers, including those from the , have highlighted potential conflicts over treaty rights and land claims in a sovereign Quebec, underscoring unresolved aboriginal sovereignty issues that could invite broader geopolitical scrutiny. Overall, global reactions prioritize empirical stability over ideological sympathy for , given Quebec's with and lack of widespread separatist recognition abroad. The Supreme Court of Canada, in its 1998 Reference re Secession of Quebec ( 2 S.C.R. 217), ruled unanimously that Quebec possesses no unilateral right to secede from Canada under either Canadian constitutional law or international law. The Court emphasized that the Canadian Constitution, as a binding framework among provinces and the federal government, does not permit alteration of its fundamental terms—such as territorial integrity—without negotiation and amendment, and that international law similarly lacks support for unilateral secession by a democratic province within a stable federation. However, the ruling established that a clear majority vote, on a clear question favoring secession in a provincial referendum, would trigger a constitutional duty on the federal government and other provinces to negotiate the terms of separation in good faith, guided by principles of federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, and the protection of minorities. In response to the Reference, the federal Parliament enacted the Clarity Act (S.C. 2000, c. 26) on June 29, 2000, to codify and operationalize these requirements. The Act mandates that the assess, within 30 days of a , whether the question posed was clear (explicitly addressing rather than vague partnership offers) and whether the was unambiguous, considering factors like , regional disparities, and minority participation; it explicitly rejects simple majorities as sufficient if clarity is absent. Furthermore, the Act prohibits the Governor in Council or Parliament from authorizing unilateral changes to or the based on a result alone, and it bars negotiation of economic or other associations without addressing division of assets, liabilities, borders, and Aboriginal rights. Quebec's countered with An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental democratic rights of and others (S.Q. 2000, c. 26), assented to December 13, 2000, asserting that a simple majority (50% plus one) in a constitutes a democratic mandate for and that alone determines the clarity of its questions and results. This provincial declares any federal interference, such as the , inapplicable within and affirms the primacy of 's democratic will, but it holds no force in overriding federal constitutional authority or triggering negotiations beyond the Reference's framework. Constitutionally, any negotiated secession would necessitate amendments under sections 38 or 41 of the , potentially requiring approval from , seven provinces representing 50% of the population (general formula), or unanimity for core elements like provincial boundaries; the underscores that failure to reach agreement could lead to for reasonableness, but no predefined secession mechanism exists. Complications arise from Indigenous treaty under section 35, unresolved territorial claims (e.g., and assertions in northern ), and federal jurisdiction over currency, defense, and debt, rendering separation a multifaceted process without guaranteed success even post-referendum. Internationally, the aligns with norms against forcible in established democracies, as affirmed in cases like the EU's handling of , where recognition hinges on constitutional compliance rather than unilateral acts.

Contemporary Developments (2000-2025)

Decline and Sporadic Revivals

Following the narrow defeat in the 1995 referendum, where 50.6% voted against sovereignty-association, public support for Quebec independence steadily eroded in the early 2000s, dropping to an average of 32% in polls by 2003-2005 amid economic recovery and sustained federal transfers exceeding $10 billion annually to the province. This decline reflected growing recognition of economic interdependence with the rest of Canada, including reliance on interprovincial trade accounting for over 60% of Quebec's exports by value, and the absence of acute crises that had previously fueled separatist sentiment. The federal Clarity Act of 2000, requiring a clear referendum question and substantial majority for negotiations, further dampened prospects by raising legal hurdles to separation. The Parti Québécois (PQ), the primary vehicle for sovereignty, lost the 2003 provincial election to the Quebec Liberal Party, which captured 76 seats on 45.9% of the vote while the PQ fell to 36 seats on 33.0%. Voter turnout dropped to 71.4%, signaling reduced mobilization around sovereignty issues. In 2007, the PQ again secured 36 seats but only 28.4% of the vote, as the Action démocratique du Québec siphoned nationalist votes with 41 seats on 30.8%. Support for independence hovered at 25-30% in contemporaneous polls, influenced by demographic factors including immigration, where non-francophone newcomers overwhelmingly favored federalism, comprising up to 20% of the electorate by 2010. Sporadic revivals occurred amid provincial discontent, notably in 2012 when the PQ under formed a with 54 seats on 31.2% of the vote, capitalizing on backlash against Liberal corruption scandals and student protests over tuition hikes that briefly elevated support to 35-40% among francophones. However, the government lasted 18 months before falling in 2014, where the PQ won 30 seats on 25.4% amid a Liberal of 70 seats. By 2018, backing had stabilized at 28-32%, with 82% of in a 2018 survey agreeing the question was settled, reflecting satisfaction with enhanced provincial powers in areas like and under . The PQ's vote share plummeted to 17.1% and 9 seats in 2018, displaced by the Coalition Avenir Québec's autonomist appeal. Further erosion followed, with independence support dipping below 25% in some 2019-2020 polls during and the response, where federal aid packages totaling over $100 billion nationally underscored fiscal ties. In the 2022 election, the PQ collapsed to 3 seats on 14.6% of the vote, its lowest ever, as voters prioritized identity protection through language reforms like Bill 96 over separation. This trajectory stemmed from intergenerational shifts, with pre-1995 cohorts driving residual support while younger francophones, facing globalized economies, viewed sovereignty as riskier given Quebec's $400 billion GDP heavily integrated with Canadian markets.

Parti Québécois By-Election Gains (2023-2025)

The achieved notable by-election successes between 2023 and 2025, capturing three seats previously held by the governing (CAQ), which signaled growing voter dissatisfaction with the CAQ amid controversies over governance, identity policies, and economic pressures. These victories expanded the PQ's caucus from three seats following the 2022 general election to six, positioning the party as a primary opposition force despite stagnant support for . Political analysts attributed the gains to anti-incumbent sentiment rather than a sovereignty revival, with PQ leader framing them as evidence of the party's resurgence. In the October 2, 2023, in , triggered by the resignation of CAQ MNA Joëlle Boutin, PQ candidate Pascal Paradis secured victory with 31.2% of the vote, defeating the CAQ's Émilie Bouchard-Biron (28.3%) and Liberal candidate Véronique Côté (22.3%). This marked the first PQ win in the historically Liberal-turned-CAQ riding, which the party had never held federally or provincially, and boosted morale for the PQ's minimal . was approximately 43%, reflecting localized discontent with CAQ policies on and public services. The PQ's momentum continued in the March 17, 2025, Terrebonne by-election northeast of Montreal, vacated by CAQ MNA André Fortin, where candidate Catherine Gentilcore won decisively with 52.74% of the vote against the CAQ's Alex Gagné (28.78%) and Conservative Éric Duhaime's proxy challenger. Terrebonne, a longtime PQ stronghold lost in , returned to the party amid criticisms of CAQ handling of and impacts, with Gentilcore emphasizing local identity preservation. The result underscored the PQ's strength in francophone suburbs, where turnout reached 38%. Culminating the streak, the August 11, 2025, Arthabaska in a rural riding, following CAQ MNA Éric Lefebvre's resignation, saw PQ candidate Alex Boissonneault prevail with 46.1% of the vote, edging out Conservative leader Éric Duhaime (39.2%) and the CAQ's Jean-François Lisée (10.5%). This flipped a seat the PQ had not held in nearly three decades, despite polls predicting a tight Conservative upset, and was interpreted as a rejection of CAQ fatigue and Conservative overreach on critiques. Analysts like Raphaël Melançon described it as affirming the PQ as Quebec's "number one political force" in opposition dynamics, with turnout at 52%.

Prospects Amid Low Support Levels

Recent polls indicate persistently low support for Quebec sovereignty, with a Léger survey in October 2025 finding that 65 percent of would vote against in a , while only about 35 percent would support it. Among francophones, support hovers around 40 percent but has not shown significant upward movement despite recent (PQ) electoral gains. Overall opposition stands even higher, with an EKOS study reporting 86 percent of rejecting aspirations for separation from . These low support levels diminish the immediate prospects for a successful sovereignty referendum, as historical precedents like the 1995 vote, which failed by a 50.58 percent to 49.42 percent margin, required near-majority francophone backing that remains elusive today. A majority of Quebec residents, approximately 60 percent, oppose holding another referendum even if the PQ forms the government following the 2026 provincial election. The PQ's recent by-election successes, including gains in 2023 and 2025, reflect voter dissatisfaction with the incumbent rather than renewed enthusiasm for independence, as pollster Jean-Marc Léger has noted. Sovereigntist leaders face internal and external challenges that further constrain revival efforts. Former PQ Premier Lucien Bouchard advised party leader Paul St-Pierre Plamondon in August 2025 to reconsider pledging a referendum without "winning conditions," citing economic risks and lack of public appetite. Economic interdependence with Canada, including trade reliance and fiscal transfers, underpins widespread skepticism, with 84 percent of Quebecers viewing independence as unlikely in the foreseeable future. Demographic shifts from immigration, which dilute the francophone majority, and federal accommodations like asymmetric federalism further erode momentum, as non-francophones overwhelmingly oppose separation. While pockets of support persist—such as among roughly half of younger Quebecers per a June 2025 poll—translating this into broader viability requires addressing core obstacles like unclear post-independence economic models and partition risks in anglophone and indigenous regions. Without a catalyst like severe federal-provincial conflict or economic downturn disproportionately affecting , prospects remain subdued, with the movement functioning more as a cultural vehicle than a viable separatist force. Analysts argue that sustaining the PQ's revival depends on pivoting toward identity and autonomy issues rather than insisting on , given the entrenched low polling.

References

  1. https://www.[cbc.ca](/page/CBC.ca)/news/canada//arthabaska-byelection-1.7605676
  2. https://global[news](/page/News).ca/news/11331000/parti-quebecois-win-quebec-byelection-in-arthabaska/
  3. https://www.ctv[news](/page/News).ca//article/3-for-3-pq-the-number-one-political-force-in-quebec-says-political-analyst/
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