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International Atomic Energy Agency
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Atomic Energy Agency
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Key Information

International Atomic Energy Agency is located in Earth
Vienna (HQ)
Vienna (HQ)
New York
New York
Geneva
Geneva
Seibersdorf
Seibersdorf
Monaco
Monaco
Toronto
Toronto
Tokyo
Tokyo
Trieste
Trieste
class=notpageimage|
IAEA's worldwide sites:[3]

In Europe:

In North America:

In Asia:

  • Tokyo – Regional Safeguard Office

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an intergovernmental organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. It was established in 1957 as an autonomous organization within the United Nations system;[4][5] though governed by its own founding treaty, the organization reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and is headquartered at the UN Office at Vienna, Austria.

The IAEA was created in response to growing international concern toward nuclear weapons, especially amid rising tensions between the foremost nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.[4] U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech, which called for the creation of an international organization to monitor the global proliferation of nuclear resources and technology, is credited with catalyzing the formation of the IAEA, whose treaty came into force on 29 July 1957 upon U.S. ratification.

The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear power worldwide. It maintains several programs that encourage the development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, science, and technology; provide international safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear materials; and promote and implement nuclear safety (including radiation protection) and nuclear security standards. The organization also conducts research in nuclear science and provides technical support and training in nuclear technology to countries worldwide, particularly in the developing world.[6]

Following the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1968, all non-nuclear powers are required to negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which is given the authority to monitor nuclear programs and to inspect nuclear facilities. In 2005, the IAEA and its administrative head, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize "for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way".[7]

Missions

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Vienna International Center, location of IAEA Headquarters

The IAEA is generally described as having three main missions:[independent source needed]

  • Peaceful uses: Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by its member states,
  • Safeguards: Implementing safeguards to verify that nuclear energy is not used for military purposes, and
  • Nuclear safety: Promoting high standards for nuclear safety.[8][independent source needed]

Peaceful uses

[edit]

According to Article II of the IAEA Statute, the objectives of the IAEA are "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" and to "ensure ... that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." Its primary functions in this area, according to Article III, are to encourage research and development, to secure or provide materials, services, equipment, and facilities for Member States, and to foster the exchange of scientific and technical information and training.[9]

Three of the IAEA's six departments are principally charged with promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Department of Nuclear Energy focuses on providing advice and services to Member States on nuclear power and the nuclear fuel cycle.[10] The Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications focuses on the use of non-power nuclear and isotope techniques to help IAEA Member States in the areas of water, energy, health, biodiversity, and agriculture.[11] The Department of Technical Cooperation provides direct assistance to IAEA Member States, through national, regional, and inter-regional projects through training, expert missions, scientific exchanges, and provision of equipment.[12]

Safeguards

[edit]

Article II of the IAEA Statute defines the Agency's twin objectives as promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy and "ensur[ing], so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." To do this, the IAEA is authorized in Article III.A.5 of the Statute "to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy."[9]

The Department of Safeguards is responsible for carrying out this mission, through technical measures designed to verify the correctness and completeness of states' nuclear declarations.[13][independent source needed]

Nuclear safety

[edit]

The IAEA classifies safety as one of its top three priorities. It spends 8.9 percent of its 352 million-euro ($469 million) regular budget in 2011 on making plants secure from accidents. Its resources are used on the other two priorities: technical co-operation and preventing nuclear weapons proliferation.[14]

IAEA car in Dnipro, Ukraine

The IAEA itself says that, beginning in 1986, in response to the nuclear reactor explosion and disaster near Chernobyl, Ukraine, the IAEA redoubled its efforts in the field of nuclear safety.[15] The IAEA says that the same happened after the Fukushima disaster in Fukushima, Japan.[16]

In June 2011, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano said he had "broad support for his plan to strengthen international safety checks on nuclear power plants to help avoid any repeat of Japan's Fukushima crisis" and proposed peer-reviewed safety checks on reactors worldwide, organized by the IAEA.[17]

History

[edit]
The inspection team, led by Director-General Rafael Grossi, Head of the Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Lydie Evrard and Head of the Department of Safeguards Massimo Aparo, that on 1 September 2022 started IAEA's first inspection of a nuclear plant in a war zone, at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine[18][19]

In 1946 United Nations Atomic Energy Commission was founded, but stopped working in 1949 and was disbanded in 1952. In 1953, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the creation of an international body to both regulate and promote the peaceful use of atomic power (nuclear power), in his Atoms for Peace address to the UN General Assembly.[20][21] In September 1954, the United States proposed to the General Assembly the creation of an international agency to take control of fissile material, which could be used either for nuclear power or for nuclear weapons. This agency would establish a kind of "nuclear bank".[20]

The United States also called for an international scientific conference on all of the peaceful aspects of nuclear power.[22][independent source needed] By November 1954, it had become clear that the Soviet Union would reject any international custody of fissile material if the United States did not agree to disarmament first, but that a clearinghouse for nuclear transactions might be possible. From 8 to 20 August 1955, the United Nations held the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva, Switzerland. In October 1957, a Conference on the IAEA Statute was held at the Headquarters of the United Nations to approve the founding document for the IAEA, which was negotiated in 1955–1957 by a group of twelve countries.[20] The Statute of the IAEA was approved on 23 October 1956 and came into force on 29 July 1957.[23][24]

Former US Congressman W. Sterling Cole served as the IAEA's first Director-General from 1957 to 1961. Cole served only one term, after which the IAEA was headed by two Swedes for nearly four decades: the scientist Sigvard Eklund held the job from 1961 to 1981, followed by former Swedish Foreign Minister Hans Blix, who served from 1981 to 1997. Blix was succeeded as Director General by Mohamed ElBaradei of Egypt, who served until November 2009.[25]

Beginning in 1986, in response to the nuclear reactor explosion and disaster near Chernobyl, Ukraine, the IAEA increased its efforts in the field of nuclear safety.[15] The same happened after the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Fukushima, Japan.[16]

Both the IAEA and its then Director General, ElBaradei, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. In his acceptance speech in Oslo, ElBaradei stated that only one percent of the money spent on developing new weapons would be enough to feed the entire world, and that, if we hope to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience, and no role in our security.[26]

On 2 July 2009, Yukiya Amano of Japan was elected as the Director General for the IAEA,[27] defeating Abdul Samad Minty of South Africa and Luis E. Echávarri of Spain. On 3 July 2009, the Board of Governors voted to appoint Yukiya Amano "by acclamation", and IAEA General Conference in September 2009 approved. He took office on 1 December 2009.[28][29][30] After Amano's death,[31] his Chief of Coordination Cornel Feruta of Romania was named Acting Director General.[32][33]

On 2 August 2019, Rafael Grossi was presented as the Argentine candidate to become the Director General of IAEA.[34] On 28 October 2019, the IAEA Board of Governors held its first vote to elect the new Director General, but none of the candidates secured the two-thirds majority (23 votes) in the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors that was needed to be elected. The next day, 29 October, the second voting round was held, and Grossi won 24 votes.[35][36] He assumed office on 3 December 2019. Following a special meeting of the IAEA General Conference to approve his appointment, on 3 December Grossi became the first Latin American to head the Agency.[37][38]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Grossi visited Ukraine multiple times as part of the ongoing efforts to help prevent a nuclear accident during the war. He warned against any complacency towards the dangers that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, Europe's largest nuclear power plant, was facing. The plant has come under fire multiple times during the war.[39]

Function and structure

[edit]

General

[edit]
A laboratory technician at the IAEA's Plant Breeding Unit in Seibersdorf checking on a phial containing a young banana plant

The IAEA's mission is guided by the interests and needs of Member States, strategic plans, and the vision embodied in the IAEA Statute (see below). Three main pillars – or areas of work – underpin the IAEA's mission: Safety and Security; Science and Technology; and Safeguards and Verification.[40]

The IAEA as an autonomous organization is not under the direct control of the UN, but the IAEA does report to both the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Unlike most other specialized international agencies, the IAEA does much of its work with the Security Council, and not with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The structure and functions of the IAEA are defined by its founding document, the IAEA Statute (see below). The IAEA has three main bodies: the Board of Governors, the General Conference, and the Secretariat.[41]

The IAEA exists to pursue the "safe, secure and peaceful uses of nuclear sciences and technology" (Pillars 2005). The IAEA executes this mission with three main functions: the inspection of existing nuclear facilities to ensure their peaceful use, providing information and developing standards to ensure the safety and security of nuclear facilities, and as a hub for the various fields of science involved in the peaceful applications of nuclear technology.

The IAEA recognizes knowledge as the nuclear energy industry's most valuable asset and resource, without which the industry cannot operate safely and economically. Following the IAEA General Conference since 2002 resolutions the Nuclear Knowledge Management, a formal program was established to address Member States' priorities in the 21st century.[42]

In 2004, the IAEA developed a Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT). PACT responds to the needs of developing countries to establish, to improve, or to expand radiotherapy treatment programs. The IAEA is raising money to help efforts by its Member States to save lives and reduce the suffering of cancer victims.[43]

The IAEA has established programs to help developing countries in planning to build systematically the capability to manage a nuclear power program, including the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Group,[44] which has carried out Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review missions in Indonesia, Jordan, Thailand and Vietnam.[45] The IAEA reports that roughly 60 countries are considering how to include nuclear power in their energy plans.[46]

To enhance the sharing of information and experience among IAEA Member States concerning the seismic safety of nuclear facilities, in 2008 the IAEA established the International Seismic Safety Centre. This centre is establishing safety standards and providing for their application in relation to site selection, site evaluation and seismic design.

The IAEA has its headquarters since its founding in Vienna, Austria. The IAEA has two "Regional Safeguards Offices" which are located in Toronto, Canada, and in Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA also has two liaison offices which are located in New York City, United States, and in Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, the IAEA has laboratories and research centers located in Seibersdorf, Austria, in Monaco and in Trieste, Italy.[3]

Board of Governors

[edit]
"UNO City" another name for the Vienna office complex in which is located IAEA Headquarters

The Board of Governors is one of two policy-making bodies of the IAEA. The Board consists of 22 member states elected by the General Conference, and at least 10 member states nominated by the outgoing Board. The outgoing Board designates the ten members who are the most advanced in atomic energy technology, plus the most advanced members from any of the following areas that are not represented by the first ten: North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East, and South Asia, South East Asia, the Pacific, and the Far East. These members are designated for one year terms. The General Conference elects 22 members from the remaining nations to two-year terms. Eleven are elected each year. The 22 elected members must also represent a stipulated geographic diversity.

The Board generally meets five times per year: in March and June, twice in September (before and after the General Conference) and in November.[47] In its meetings, it is responsible for making most of the policies of the IAEA. The Board makes recommendations to the General Conference on IAEA activities and budget, is responsible for publishing IAEA standards and appoints the Director-General subject to General Conference approval. Board members each receive one vote. Budget matters require a two-thirds majority. All other matters require only a simple majority. The simple majority also has the power to stipulate issues that will thereafter require a two-thirds majority. Two-thirds of all Board members must be present to call a vote. The Board elects its own chairman.

List of chairs
Name[48] Nationality Term
HE Mr Ian Biggs[49] Australia Australia 2025 – 2026
HE Ms Matilda Aku Alomatu Osei-Agyeman[50] Ghana Ghana 2025 – 2025
HE Ambassador Philbert Abaka Johnson[51] Ghana Ghana 2024 – 2025
HE Mr Holger Federico Martinsen[52] Argentina Argentina 2023 – 2024
HE Mr Ivo Sramek[53] Czech Republic Czechia 2022 – 2023
List of vice-chairs
Name Nationality Term
HE Ms Emilia Kraleva[54] Bulgaria Bulgaria 2023 – 2024
HE Mr Peter Potman[54] Netherlands Netherlands 2023 – 2024
HE Mr Eoin O'Leary[55] Republic of Ireland Ireland 2022 – 2023
HE Mr Carlos Sérgio Sobral Duarte[55] Brazil Brazil 2022 – 2023

General Conference

[edit]

The General Conference is made up of all 180 member states. It meets once a year, typically in September, to approve the actions and budgets passed on from the Board of Governors. The General Conference also approves the nominee for Director General and requests reports from the Board on issues in question (Statute). Each member receives one vote. Issues of budget, Statute amendment and suspension of a member's privileges require a two-thirds majority and all other issues require a simple majority. Similar to the Board, the General Conference can, by simple majority, designate issues to require a two-thirds majority. The General Conference elects a President at each annual meeting to facilitate an effective meeting. The President only serves for the duration of the session (Statute).

The main function of the General Conference is to serve as a forum for debate on current issues and policies. Any of the other IAEA organs, the Director-General, the Board and member states can table issues to be discussed by the General Conference (IAEA Primer). This function of the General Conference is almost identical to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Secretariat

[edit]

The Secretariat is the professional and general service staff of the IAEA. The Secretariat is headed by the Director General. The Director General is responsible for enforcement of the actions passed by the Board of Governors and the General Conference. The Director General is selected by the Board and approved by the General Conference for renewable four-year terms. The Director General oversees six departments that do the actual work in carrying out the policies of the IAEA: Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Safety and Security, Nuclear Sciences and Applications, Safeguards, Technical Cooperation, and Management.

The IAEA budget is in two parts. The regular budget funds most activities of the IAEA and is assessed to each member nation (€344 million in 2014).[56] The Technical Cooperation Fund is funded by voluntary contributions with a general target in the US$90 million range.[56]

Directors General

[edit]
Name Nationality Duration Duration (years)
W. Sterling Cole United States American 1 December 1957 – 30 November 1961 4
Sigvard Eklund Sweden Swedish 1 December 1961 – 30 November 1981 20
Hans Blix Sweden Swedish 1 December 1981 – 30 November 1997 16
Mohamed ElBaradei Egypt Egyptian 1 December 1997 – 30 November 2009 12
Yukiya Amano Japan Japanese 1 December 2009 – 18 July 2019 9
Cornel Feruță (Acting) Romania Romanian 25 July 2019 – 2 December 2019 0.33
Rafael Grossi Argentina Argentine 3 December 2019 – present 5

Membership

[edit]
Main article: Member states of the International Atomic Energy Agency
  Member states
  Observer states
  Membership withdrawn
  Non-members

The process of joining the IAEA is fairly simple.[57] Normally, a State would notify the Director General of its desire to join, and the Director would submit the application to the Board for consideration. If the Board recommends approval, and the General Conference approves the application for membership, the State must then submit its instrument of acceptance of the IAEA Statute to the United States, which functions as the depositary Government for the IAEA Statute. The State is considered a member when its acceptance letter is deposited. The United States then informs the IAEA, which notifies other IAEA Member States. Signature and ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are not preconditions for membership in the IAEA.[citation needed]

The IAEA has 180 member states.[58] Most UN members and the Holy See are Member States of the IAEA.[58]

Four states have withdrawn from the IAEA. North Korea was a Member State from 1974 to 1994, but withdrew after the Board of Governors found it in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and suspended most technical co-operation.[59] Nicaragua became a member in 1957, withdrew its membership in 1970, and rejoined in 1977,[60][61] Honduras joined in 1957, withdrew in 1967, and rejoined in 2003,[62] while Cambodia joined in 1958, withdrew in 2003, and rejoined in 2009.[63][64][65]

Regional Cooperative Agreements

[edit]

There are four regional cooperative areas within IAEA, that share information, and organize conferences within their regions:

AFRA

[edit]

The African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA):[66]

ARASIA

[edit]

Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA):[67]

RCA

[edit]

Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA):[68]

ARCAL

[edit]
Latin American IAEA Fellows at the Regional Training Course on Mutation Breeding and Efficiency Enhancing Techniques for Resistance to Banana Fusarium Wilt TR4, 2022

Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL):[69]

Criticism

[edit]
IAEA experts at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Unit 4

In 2011, Russian nuclear accident specialist Yuliy Andreev was critical of the response to Fukushima, and says that the IAEA did not learn from the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. He has accused the IAEA and corporations of "wilfully ignoring lessons from the world's worst nuclear accident 25 years ago to protect the industry's expansion".[70] The IAEA's role "as an advocate for nuclear power has made it a target for protests".[71]

The journal Nature has reported that the IAEA response to the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in Japan was "sluggish and sometimes confusing", drawing calls for the agency to "take a more proactive role in nuclear safety". But nuclear experts say that the agency's complicated mandate and the constraints imposed by its member states mean that reforms will not happen quickly or easily, although its INES "emergency scale is very likely to be revisited" given the confusing way in which it was used in Japan.[71]

Some scientists say that the Fukushima nuclear accidents have revealed that the nuclear industry lacks sufficient oversight, leading to renewed calls to redefine the mandate of the IAEA so that it can better police nuclear power plants worldwide.[72] There are several problems with the IAEA says Najmedin Meshkati of University of Southern California:

It recommends safety standards, but member states are not required to comply; it promotes nuclear energy, but it also monitors nuclear use; it is the sole global organisation overseeing the nuclear energy industry, yet it is also weighed down by checking compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[72]

In 2011, the journal Nature reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency should be strengthened to make independent assessments of nuclear safety and that "the public would be better served by an IAEA more able to deliver frank and independent assessments of nuclear crises as they unfold".[73]

Publications

[edit]

Typically issued in July each year, the IAEA Annual Report summarizes and highlights developments over the past year in major areas of the Agency's work. It includes a summary of major issues, activities, and achievements, and status tables and graphs related to safeguards, safety, and science and technology.[74] Alongside the Annual Report, the IAEA also issues Topical Reviews which detail specific sectors of its work, comprising the Nuclear Safety Review, Nuclear Security Review, Safeguards Implementation Report, Nuclear Technology Review, and Technical Cooperation Report.

See also

[edit]

Nuclear technology portal icon Energy portal

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

International Atomic Energy Agency

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international organization established in 1957 within the United Nations system to advance the peaceful uses of atomic energy while seeking to prevent its diversion to military ends. Headquartered at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA functions as the world's primary intergovernmental platform for scientific and technical cooperation across nuclear applications, including energy production, medicine, agriculture, and environmental monitoring. Its core activities encompass verifying state compliance with non-proliferation treaties through safeguards inspections—covering nuclear materials and facilities in over 140 countries—formulating global nuclear safety standards, and delivering technical assistance to member states for sustainable development via nuclear techniques. The agency's dual mandate to promote nuclear technology's benefits and enforce verification has positioned it at the center of global nuclear governance, yielding achievements such as enhanced reactor safety protocols post-Chernobyl and Fukushima, yet also sparking disputes over inspection access and the detection of undeclared programs, as evidenced in cases involving Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In recognition of its non-proliferation efforts, the IAEA shared the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize with Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.

Mandate and Objectives

Promotion of Peaceful Nuclear Uses

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 following U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech to the on December 8, 1953, which proposed an to promote the peaceful applications of while inhibiting its military use. The IAEA's , adopted on July 23, 1957, and entering into force on July 29, 1957, explicitly mandates the agency to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world" through fostering international cooperation in non-military nuclear science and technology. This core objective distinguishes the IAEA from purely regulatory bodies, positioning it as a facilitator of technology transfer and capacity-building for member states. The IAEA's primary mechanism for promoting peaceful nuclear uses is its Technical Cooperation (TC) Programme, initiated in 1957 and operationalized through national, regional, and interregional projects tailored to member states' development needs. By 2024, the TC Programme had delivered assistance to approximately 150 countries, including at least 35 least developed countries, focusing on fields such as nuclear power infrastructure, human health, agriculture, water resource management, and environmental protection. For instance, in nuclear energy, the IAEA provides milestones-based guidance for newcomer countries embarking on nuclear power programs, including infrastructure development planning that requires 10-15 years of preparation for legal frameworks, regulatory bodies, and waste management systems. Examples include advisory services and reviews that have supported countries like the United Arab Emirates in establishing commercial nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards. In health applications, the IAEA facilitates the use of nuclear techniques for cancer and treatment, supplying radiotherapy and to address global shortages; in 2024 alone, TC projects contributed to expanding access in underserved regions, aligning with on . Agricultural initiatives employ nuclear methods for and via sterile insect techniques, enhancing ; the agency has supported over 3,200 mutant varieties released worldwide since the program's inception. Similarly, in water management, isotope techniques aid in assessment, benefiting arid regions in and . To bolster funding and implementation, the IAEA launched the Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) in as a voluntary extrabudgetary mechanism, which by had mobilized over $267 million for projects in , and , and environment, and . The PUI emphasizes by building expertise through fellowships (over 18,000 awarded historically) and missions, ensuring sustained benefits post-project. These efforts underscore the IAEA's in disseminating verified, nuclear technologies, with safeguards integrated to prevent diversion to weapons programs, thereby linking promotion to non-proliferation imperatives.

Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Verification

The IAEA implements safeguards to verify that states fulfill their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials or activities to weapons purposes, primarily through inspections, monitoring, and nuclear material accountancy. These measures apply to declared nuclear facilities and materials under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs), ensuring compliance with treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As of May 3, 2023, the IAEA has concluded CSAs with 182 states, covering all nuclear material in those states except amounts exempted as small quantities. CSAs originated from NPT requirements under Article III, mandating non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to accept IAEA verification of peaceful nuclear activities; the first such agreement entered into with on February 9, 1972. These agreements shifted from earlier item-specific safeguards—limited to particular facilities or materials transferred internationally—to comprehensive coverage of all peaceful nuclear programs within a state. Verification relies on state declarations of inventories, which IAEA through physical measurements, , and using seals, cameras, and sensors to detect anomalies. To address limitations exposed by events like Iraq's clandestine program in the 1990s, the IAEA strengthened its system with the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), adopted in 1997, which expands access to information on undeclared activities, environmental sampling, and complementary access to suspect sites. The Protocol is supplementary to CSAs, enabling wider declarations of nuclear-related activities and short-notice inspections, though it requires state ratification; as of 2018, 133 states had brought it into force, with 15 more signed. Inspections include routine visits for ongoing monitoring, ad hoc checks on initial or changed declarations, and special inspections for unresolved issues, with over 800 conducted in the U.S. alone since 1974. Non-proliferation verification extends to voluntary offer agreements with nuclear-weapon states, where the IAEA monitors designated peaceful facilities, and to specific protocols like those under regional treaties. Effectiveness depends on state cooperation, as safeguards detect but do not prevent diversion; unresolved questions in some states, such as Iran's safeguards issues reported annually, highlight enforcement limits tied to UN Security Council referrals under NPT Article XII. The system integrates advanced technologies like and , but resource constraints—relying partly on voluntary contributions—can affect implementation scale.

Historical Development

Founding and Initial Framework (1953-1968)

The origins of the International Atomic Energy Agency trace to President Dwight D. Eisenhower's address to the on , 1953, titled "Atoms for Peace," in which he proposed establishing an international atomic energy agency under UN control to promote peaceful applications of while inhibiting its military diversion. This initiative responded to post-World War II anxieties over nuclear proliferation amid the Cold War, aiming to channel atomic energy toward civilian benefits like power generation, medicine, and agriculture, with the offering to contribute fissile material to an international stockpile. The speech prompted UN General Assembly discussions and preparatory work, including a 1955 advisory committee that drafted principles for the agency's statute. The IAEA was unanimously approved on , , by representatives of 81 nations at a conference in New York, defining the agency's objectives to accelerate atomic energy's contributions to , , and while ensuring safeguards against diversion to uses. Opened for on , , the required ratification by at least 26 states, including those with advanced nuclear capabilities, to enter into did so on , , following ratifications by key powers including the , , , and . The established the agency's governance through a General Conference of all members, a Board of Governors comprising designated states, and a Secretariat led by a Director General, with headquarters provisionally set in Vienna, Austria, to facilitate neutral operations. Initial operations commenced in late 1957 under first Director General W. Sterling Cole of the United States, who oversaw the inaugural General Conference in October 1957 and focused on building technical infrastructure, including laboratories and information services. Early activities emphasized technical assistance programs, such as fellowships and expert missions to developing nations for nuclear applications in agriculture and health, alongside bilateral safeguards agreements to verify non-proliferation in assisted projects under Article III of the statute. By 1961, with Cole's departure and Sigvard Eklund's appointment as Director General, the agency had expanded its framework to include research contracts and the development of inspection protocols, laying groundwork for multilateral verification amid growing global nuclear commerce; this period saw the application of safeguards to over a dozen projects, though challenges arose from superpower rivalries limiting Soviet-Western cooperation. Through the 1960s, the IAEA's initial framework solidified with the 1961 agreement on safeguards with EURATOM, enhancing verification in Europe, and the establishment of the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste in 1964 to foster scientific collaboration in developing regions. These efforts prioritized empirical verification of peaceful intent via on-site inspections and material accounting, reflecting causal mechanisms where institutional independence from national interests proved essential to building trust among nuclear suppliers and recipients, despite initial funding constraints and geopolitical tensions that slowed membership growth to around 100 states by 1968. The agency's early emphasis on safeguards as a voluntary, project-specific tool anticipated broader non-proliferation roles, with data from inspections informing confidence in civilian programs while exposing limitations in enforcing compliance without comprehensive state-level agreements.

Expansion During the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Era (1968-1990)

The entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on March 5, 1970, markedly expanded the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) role in verifying compliance with non-proliferation commitments, as Article III of the NPT mandated non-nuclear-weapon states to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA to ensure nuclear materials were not to purposes. In response, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the model comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/153) in 1971, standardizing inspections, material accountancy, and reporting requirements for NPT parties. The number of safeguards agreements surged from 43 in 1968 to 173 by 1990, reflecting widespread among newly acceding states and routine IAEA inspections at thousands of facilities worldwide. This growth in verification activities necessitated expanded technical capabilities, including advanced and deployed during the period. IAEA membership increased modestly from 101-102 states in 1968 to 110-112 by 1990, incorporating more developing nations amid and NPT accessions, which broadened the agency's geographic scope and technical cooperation mandates. Technical assistance programs proliferated to promote peaceful nuclear applications, with the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) target rising from $2 million in 1970 to $44.55 million by 1990, funding projects in isotope hydrology, food irradiation, and agricultural pest control via sterile insect techniques in regions like and Latin America. Regional cooperative frameworks emerged, such as the Regional Cooperative Agreement for , Development and Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA) in 1972 with initial Asian-Pacific participants, later expanding to 17 members by the mid-1990s, alongside ARCAL in 1982 for Latin America and AFRA in 1990 for . These initiatives supported over 370 fellowships and expert missions annually by the early 1970s, fostering nuclear infrastructure in non-industrialized states while tying assistance to safeguards adherence. Challenges like India's 1974 nuclear test prompted safeguards revisions, including explicit prohibitions on military diversions in agreements and enhanced controls via the guidelines issued in , which the IAEA incorporated into its verification practices. Nuclear accidents further drove expansion in safety oversight: the 1979 Three Mile Island incident led to the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) program with five codes and ten guides by 1979, while the 1986 Chernobyl disaster spurred the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (effective October 1986) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident (effective February 1987), with IAEA-led missions like the International Chernobyl Project (1989-1991) assessing radiological impacts. Information systems also grew, including the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) operational from 1970, processing 60,000-70,000 citations yearly by the mid-1970s, and the Power Reactor Information System (PRIS) launched in 1980 for global reactor data tracking. By 1990, these developments positioned the IAEA as a central pillar of the non-proliferation regime, with its regular budget reaching $173.72 million to sustain expanded operations.

Post-Cold War Challenges and Reforms (1991-2010)

Following the 1991 , revelations from IAEA and UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in exposed fundamental weaknesses in the Agency's traditional safeguards system, which had focused primarily on verifying declared nuclear materials at known facilities rather than detecting activities. Iraqi authorities had concealed a sophisticated clandestine program, including electromagnetic (calutrons) for enrichment and designs for components, producing over 48 kilograms of highly and nearly weapon-grade despite NPT compliance declarations. This breach, undetected for years, prompted the UN to mandate comprehensive dismantlement efforts, involving over 700 inspections by 1998, and underscored the need for broader verification tools amid post-Cold War proliferation risks from unsecured Soviet-era materials and emerging rogue programs. Concurrent challenges arose with North Korea, where IAEA safeguards implementation faltered after initial 1992 inspections revealed discrepancies in declared nuclear activities, including undeclared reprocessing of spent fuel from the Yongbyon reactor yielding plutonium for potential weapons. Pyongyang's refusal to allow special inspections of suspect waste sites, coupled with its 1993 announcement of intent to withdraw from the NPT, escalated tensions, nearly precipitating conflict until the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework froze its program in exchange for light-water reactors and fuel aid, though IAEA access remained limited and monitoring relied on bilateral arrangements rather than full safeguards enforcement. These episodes highlighted systemic vulnerabilities, including over-reliance on state cooperation and insufficient intelligence integration, spurring the IAEA's 1993 initiation of the "93+2" program to reform safeguards through enhanced detection of covert programs. Reforms culminated in the 1997 approval by the IAEA Board of Governors of the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540), expanding safeguards to include declarations of all nuclear-related activities, short-notice inspections beyond declared sites, and environmental sampling for materials. This voluntary measure, designed to complement comprehensive safeguards agreements, enabled a state-level approach integrating , , and wide-area sampling, with over 130 states adopting it by 2010 despite resistance from non-NPT states and partial implementers like . In , post-2002 disclosures of enrichment facilities at Natanz and Arak triggered IAEA investigations revealing violations of safeguards obligations, including covert uranium conversion and centrifuge operations from the late 1980s, leading to multiple Board resolutions demanding transparency and temporary suspensions under UN Security Council referrals by 2006. These adaptations strengthened verification efficacy but faced ongoing hurdles from non-cooperative states, resource constraints, and geopolitical pressures, with IAEA inspector-days in surging to thousands annually by the late 2000s amid unresolved questions on weaponization .

Contemporary Operations and Geopolitical Engagements (2011-Present)

Following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the IAEA developed and implemented the Action Plan on Nuclear , which outlined measures across 12 areas including safety assessments of nuclear power plants, peer reviews, and emergency preparedness to enhance global nuclear safety standards. This response involved technical support to , information , and revisions to IAEA safety standards based on lessons from the event, such as improved stress tests for reactors and better management of extreme hazards. In non-proliferation verification, the IAEA intensified of Iran's nuclear program, releasing a 2011 detailing of activities relevant to nuclear explosives, including computer modeling of warheads and initiators. Under the 2015 (JCPOA), the agency verified Iran's compliance through monitoring until U.S. withdrawal in 2018, after which Iran reduced cooperation; by December 2015, the IAEA Board concluded no credible indications of ongoing weapons-related work post-2009, though unresolved issues persisted. Ongoing , such as GOV/2025/50, continue to assess verification and monitoring amid Iran's enrichment exceeding JCPOA limits. For North Korea, IAEA access has been absent since April 2009, with the agency issuing annual safeguards reports highlighting unresolved plutonium separation and undeclared uranium enrichment facilities; a September 2011 report noted evidence of new enrichment at Yongbyon, contributing to assessments of non-compliance with the NPT. Geopolitical engagements escalated with Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, prompting IAEA missions to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Europe's largest, seized by Russian forces in March 2022; Director General Rafael Grossi led a September 2022 cross-frontline deployment of experts to monitor safety, resulting in seven pillars of recommendations for demilitarization and off-site power restoration adopted by the UN General Assembly. As of October 2025, IAEA teams remain on-site amid shelling risks and power disruptions, with Update 318 noting reactors shut down since 2022 but ongoing cooling needs reliant on diesel generators until external power restoration after 30 days offline. Under Grossi (since 2019), the IAEA has expanded diplomatic efforts, including briefings to the UN on in 2025 and partnerships like the 2025 World Bank agreement for nuclear energy in development. Operations include inspecting over 1,300 nuclear sites annually and technical via initiatives like Atoms4Food for , reflecting a balance of safeguards and peaceful applications amid rising geopolitical tensions.

Organizational Framework

Governance and Decision-Making Bodies

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) maintains two primary policy-making organs responsible for governance and decision-making: the General Conference and the Board of Governors. These bodies establish the Agency's programmes, approve budgets, and oversee strategic directions, with the General Conference holding ultimate authority on key matters while the Board handles operational policy and recommendations. Decisions within these bodies typically proceed by consensus where possible, though formal voting occurs under the IAEA Statute, granting each member state one vote and requiring a two-thirds majority for budget approvals. The General Conference consists of representatives from all IAEA Member States, along with delegates from invited non-Member States and international organizations as observers. It convenes annually in September at the Vienna International Centre, electing a President and a General Committee at the session's outset to guide proceedings for that year. Among its functions, the General Conference approves the Agency's annual budget and programmes, reviews reports from the Board of Governors and Director General, and addresses substantive issues raised by Member States, including elections to the Board and confirmation of the Director General's appointment. Special sessions may be called by the Director General at the Board's request or by a majority of Member States. The Board of Governors comprises 35 Member States, selected to ensure equitable geographic representation and inclusion of nations with advanced atomic energy programmes. Twenty-two members are designated based on their technological advancement and regional balance, with the remainder elected by the General Conference every two years to fill rotating seats, as seen in the election of 11 new members for the 2025–2027 period on 19 September 2025. The Board meets five times annually—in March, June, twice in September (coinciding with the General Conference), and November—primarily in Vienna, where it examines financial statements, recommends budgets and programmes to the General Conference, approves safeguards agreements and safety standards, and appoints the Director General subject to General Conference confirmation. Leadership includes a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected from Board members at the first post-General Conference meeting, such as the 2025–2026 Chairperson HE Ian David Grainge Biggs of Australia. The Board's decisions guide day-to-day policy implementation, bridging the General Conference's broad oversight with the Secretariat's execution.

Board of Governors

The Board of Governors serves as the IAEA's primary executive authority, tasked with directing the Agency's activities, approving its program and budget, and ensuring compliance with safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials for military purposes, subject to oversight by the General Conference. Comprising 35 Member States, its composition balances technological leadership with equitable geographical distribution as outlined in Article VI of the IAEA Statute. The Board designates representatives from the 10 countries most advanced in atomic energy technology, including source material production, with additional designations to cover underrepresented regional areas such as North America, Latin America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, South East Asia and the Pacific, and the Far East. The General Conference then elects the remaining members—typically 20 for broad regional equity (e.g., five from Latin America, four from Western Europe) plus one or two more from specified developing regions—to fill the total to 35. Designated members serve one-year terms, renewable annually, while elected members hold two-year terms, with elections occurring at the annual General Conference to stagger membership for continuity. Each Board member appoints a Governor, usually a senior diplomat or technical expert from their country, who participates in deliberations. Decisions require a simple majority of members present and voting, except for budget approvals, which need a two-thirds majority; a quorum consists of two-thirds of the Board. The Board may establish committees and adopts its own rules of procedure, with the Director General attending meetings to provide guidance aligned with Agency policy. Key responsibilities include reviewing and approving safeguards agreements, safety standards for publication, membership applications, and the Agency's operational programs; appointing the (subject to General Conference ); and overseeing financial matters such as voluntary contributions and borrowing. The Board submits the budget estimate and program to the General Conference, prepares comprehensive reports on Agency activities for both the Conference and the , and authorizes technical assistance projects while verifying non-proliferation compliance. It convenes five times yearly—typically in March, June, twice in September around the General Conference, and —at IAEA in . Leadership rotates, with the Board electing a Chairperson and two Vice-Chairpersons from among its members for one- to two-year terms. As of , the Chairperson is Ian David Grainge Biggs of , with Vice-Chairpersons Azzeddine Farhane of and Stelian Stoian of . Recent elections in added 11 new members for 2025–2027 terms: , , , , , , the , , , , and , reflecting ongoing adjustments to maintain regional balance.

General Conference

The General Conference is the International Atomic Energy Agency's primary policy-making body, composed of representatives from all 180 member states, with sessions open to invited observers from non-member states and international organizations under established rules. It convenes once each year, typically in September, at the in , , for a one-week focused on deliberating Agency priorities. Pursuant to Article V of the IAEA Statute, the General Conference possesses authority to elect the 35 members of the Board of Governors—serving two-year terms with partial rotation to ensure continuity—approve the Agency's annual budget as proposed by the Board, and confirm the Board's recommendation for the Director General's appointment. It also approves applications for new state memberships, reviews the Board's annual report and the Director General's activities, and establishes financial rules governing voluntary contributions and the general fund. Further, the Conference may discuss any matter within the Statute's scope, make recommendations to member states or the Board, and approve agreements with the or other entities. Procedurally, each session opens with the of a President—selected from representatives—and members of the General Committee, comprising vice-presidents who assist in agenda setting, procedural oversight, and committee coordination for the session's duration. The plenary handles adoption of resolutions, often through consensus among delegations, addressing operational directives such as programme approvals and orientations in nuclear applications, safeguards, and standards. In practice, the General Conference shapes the IAEA's strategic framework; for example, it has authority to refer specific issues back to the Board for implementation while retaining oversight, and sessions frequently include parallel like the Scientific Forum to inform technical deliberations. Resolutions from recent meetings, such as those at the 68th session in September 2024, have targeted improvements in safeguards efficiency and technical cooperation funding allocations for subsequent years.

Executive Leadership and Secretariat

The executive of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) centers on the , who functions as the , head of the Secretariat, and principal for the . The oversees the of the IAEA's statutory objectives, including the promotion of peaceful nuclear applications, safeguards against proliferation, and technical among member states; manages a multinational staff of approximately 2,500 professionals drawn from over 100 countries; and reports to the Board of Governors and on Agency activities. The position demands diplomatic expertise, as the navigates geopolitical tensions in areas like verification inspections and nuclear assessments.

Director General's Role and Succession

The is nominated by the Board of Governors and formally appointed following approval by the General Conference, typically for a four-year term that can be renewed. This process ensures alignment with member states' priorities while maintaining institutional independence. The current , Rafael Mariano Grossi of , assumed office on 3 December 2019 after his appointment by the Board on 30 October 2019 and has been reappointed for a second term effective December 2023. Grossi, a career diplomat with prior in non-proliferation negotiations, succeeded Yukiya Amano of Japan, who served from 1 December 2009 until his death on 18 July 2019. Successive Directors General reflect a pattern of representation from major nuclear powers and developing nations, underscoring the IAEA's balancing of global interests:
No.NameNationalityTerm
1W. Sterling ColeUnited States1957–1961
2Sigvard EklundSweden1961–1981
3Hans BlixSweden1981–1997
4Mohamed ElBaradeiEgypt1997–2009
5Yukiya AmanoJapan2009–2019
6Rafael Mariano GrossiArgentina2019–present

Key Departments and Divisions

The IAEA Secretariat is structured into offices directly reporting to the and larger programmatic departments that execute core functions. Offices under the include the 's Office, which coordinates high-level strategy and crisis response; the Office of Legal Affairs, handling treaties, disputes, and compliance; the Office of Internal Oversight Services, ensuring accountability and audits; the Office of Public Information and Communication, managing outreach and media; and the Secretariat of Policy-Making Organs, supporting bodies. These units provide administrative and advisory support to maintain operational amid diverse stakeholder demands. Programmatic departments, each led by a Deputy Director General, focus on specialized mandates: the Department of Safeguards verifies compliance with non-proliferation commitments through inspections and monitoring; the Department of develops standards and assists in incident response; the Department of Nuclear Energy promotes efficient cycles and deployment; the Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications advances in , , and environment; the Department of Technical delivers capacity-building projects to member states; and the Department of Management handles budgeting, , and for approximately 2,500 staff across headquarters in and regional offices. This divisional setup enables the Secretariat to operationalize the IAEA's dual-track mission of peaceful nuclear promotion and proliferation prevention, with annual budgets exceeding €400 million allocated across these areas.

Director General's Role and Succession

The is the of the IAEA, tasked with directing the Secretariat, appointing and organizing staff, and ensuring the functioning of the under the of the Board of Governors. This encompasses overall coordination, , and representation of the agency in relations with member states, international organizations, and stakeholders. The also oversees the of IAEA programs, including nuclear safeguards verification, safety standards, technical cooperation, and promotion of peaceful nuclear applications in areas such as , , , and . The is appointed by the Board of Governors for a fixed term of four years, with the decision requiring subsequent approval by the General . The selection process typically involves nominations from member states, followed by confidential balloting among the 35 Board members until a secures a majority; regional rotation among continents is an informal practice to ensure equitable representation, though not mandated by . Terms are renewable, as evidenced by multiple incumbents serving consecutive periods, with the Board assessing performance and geopolitical suitability in reappointment decisions. Successive Directors General since the IAEA's establishment in 1957 are as follows:
NameNationalityTerm of Office
W. Sterling ColeUnited States1957–1961
Sigvard EklundSweden1961–1981
Hans BlixSweden1981–1997
Mohamed ElBaradeiEgypt1997–2009
Yukiya AmanoJapan2009–2019
Rafael Mariano GrossiArgentina2019–present (reappointed 2023 for term ending 2027)
The progression reflects a of from Western and later developing nations, with Grossi as the sixth emphasizing verification missions amid contemporary proliferation concerns.

Key Departments and Divisions

The IAEA Secretariat is organized into several key departments that report directly to the , each overseeing specialized functions in nuclear verification, , , technical assistance, and administrative support. These departments implement the agency's mandate under the , coordinating activities across headquarters in and regional offices. The Department of Safeguards verifies compliance with non-proliferation obligations, inspections at over nuclear facilities in 180 states as of 2023, including under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreements. It comprises divisions for operations (field inspections), and ( development), (), and technical and scientific support (analytical tools like environmental sampling). The Department of promotes standards and measures, developing guidelines adopted by member states and responding to incidents such as the 2011 Fukushima , where it coordinated international reviews. Key divisions include Nuclear Installation ( and facility design), Nuclear (preventing illicit use), and Radiation, Transport and (regulating radioactive sources and ). The Department of Nuclear Energy supports peaceful nuclear power applications, assisting in over 30 countries with reactor deployment and fuel cycle technologies as of 2022. Its divisions cover Nuclear Power (feasibility studies and operations), Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology (advanced fuels and disposal), and Planning, Information and Knowledge Management (data dissemination via platforms like the Power Reactor Information System). The Department of Nuclear Sciences and Applications advances nuclear techniques in non-energy fields, funding projects in isotope hydrology and food irradiation that benefit agriculture in developing regions. Divisions include Human Health (cancer therapy via radiotherapy), Food and Environmental Protection, and Physical and Chemical Sciences (material testing). The Department of Technical Cooperation manages the IAEA's primary aid mechanism, allocating approximately €100 million annually in 2023 for capacity-building in member states through national, regional, and interregional projects focused on health, agriculture, and energy. It includes divisions for programme development, operations, and policy, ensuring alignment with Sustainable Development Goals. The Department of Management handles internal operations, including budget execution of over €400 million in 2023, human resources for 2,500 staff, and facilities at the Vienna International Centre. Divisions address general services, budget and finance, and personnel, supporting the agency's global fieldwork.

Regional and Collaborative Mechanisms

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates four primary regional cooperative agreements to foster collaboration among member states in nuclear science, technology applications, research, development, and training, aligning with regional priorities for socio-economic advancement, safety, and sustainable development. These intergovernmental frameworks—AFRA for Africa, ARASIA for Arab States in Asia, RCA for Asia and the Pacific, and ARCAL for Latin America and the Caribbean—enable coordinated technical cooperation projects, resource pooling, and capacity building, often integrating IAEA extrabudgetary contributions and national commitments. Established under IAEA auspices, they promote self-reliance by facilitating joint programming cycles, expert missions, and fellowships, with annual coordination meetings held on the margins of the IAEA General Conference to align with global initiatives like the IAEA's technical cooperation strategy. These mechanisms enhance regional of nuclear applications in areas such as (e.g., cancer ), (e.g., pest control via ), and environmental , while supporting safeguards and standards. In 2024, discussions among the agreements led to the establishment of a quadripartite forum to boost inter-regional exchanges and synergies, addressing shared challenges like and . Participation varies by region, with agreements periodically extended; for instance, ARCAL was renewed for five years effective September 5, 2025.

Africa (AFRA)

The African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) was adopted on February 21, 1990, by IAEA African member states to amplify nuclear technology's role in continental development. It coordinates projects under IAEA's technical cooperation programme, emphasizing applications in agriculture, human health, water resource management, and industry, with 47 African states as potential participants though active engagement varies. AFRA supports initiatives like the African Nuclear Educational Network (AFRA-NEST) for capacity building in nuclear education and has facilitated over 200 technical cooperation projects since inception, funded partly through IAEA's regional resources and member contributions.

Arab States (ARASIA)

The Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA) promotes coordinated nuclear activities among 19 Arab states in Asia, focusing on , , and applications in , , and in partnership with the IAEA. It designates regional resource centers for specialized support, such as new centers in and established in 2025 for advanced nuclear techniques. ARASIA's board of representatives oversees project cycles, including capacity development in to combat cancer burdens, with activities integrated into IAEA's broader technical cooperation framework.

Asia-Pacific (RCA)

The Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA), initiated in 1972, serves as an intergovernmental framework for 22 member states to collaborate on nuclear programmes, including sustainable development goals like health diagnostics and environmental monitoring. It operates through a dedicated regional office and national representatives, delivering projects aligned with IAEA priorities for the 2026-2027 cycle, such as advanced radiotherapy and isotope hydrology. RCA has supported over 300 joint projects historically, emphasizing knowledge transfer via fellowships and workshops to build regional expertise.

Latin America (ARCAL)

The Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL), established in 1984, unites 19 IAEA member states for technical and economic cooperation in nuclear applications, marking 40 years in 2024 with emphasis on health, food security, and industrial processes. It guides regional strategic profiles, such as Agenda ARCAL 2030 (covering 2022-2029), which prioritizes socioeconomic progress through projects like radiation processing for agriculture and medical isotope production. ARCAL coordinates national, regional, and interregional initiatives, with extensions ensuring continuity, as in the 2025 renewal for five years.

Africa (AFRA)

The African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) is an intergovernmental framework established by IAEA Member States in to promote the peaceful applications of nuclear techniques for socio-economic development. It originated from an initiative by African states in 1988, who requested IAEA assistance to foster regional cooperation, leading to its formal adoption on 21 February 1990 and entry into force on 4 April 1990, initially founded by , , and . By 2024, AFRA encompassed 37 member countries, coordinating activities through national coordinators and technical working groups to align with regional development priorities. AFRA's objectives center on enhancing in nuclear applications, including food and (e.g., crop improvement, , and animal production), human health diagnostics and therapy, water resource management, industrial processes, and radiation safety infrastructure. The agreement operates under IAEA's technical cooperation programme, supporting national and regional projects that build capacity in areas such as non-destructive testing and nuclear like AFRA-NEST. Key mechanisms include biennial technical meetings, such as the 36th session held in , , in 2025, where members reviewed ongoing projects and recommended expansions in nuclear . Achievements under AFRA have included of regional for applying nuclear techniques to sustainable agriculture and , contributing to continental goals like those in the African Union's Agenda 2063. By 2014, marking its 25th anniversary, AFRA had broadened nuclear technology's role in addressing challenges like and across member states, with IAEA-supported projects enhancing infrastructure in over 40 African countries through the broader technical cooperation framework. Ongoing efforts emphasize , with recent extensions of the agreement (e.g., fifth extension) focusing on integrating nuclear methods into climate-resilient development.

Arab States (ARASIA)

The Cooperative Agreement for Arab States in Asia for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (ARASIA) facilitates regional among its member states in advancing peaceful nuclear applications. Adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on 12 2002 and entering into on 29 2002, ARASIA aims to integrate efforts in nuclear , development, , and technology applications to support socio-economic . Initially comprising , , and , the agreement expanded to include , , , , , the , and , totaling ten states parties as of 2025. ARASIA coordinates activities in alignment with IAEA technical cooperation frameworks, emphasizing capacity building in areas such as nuclear energy, , , and . Member states contribute to joint projects, including training programs, research networks, and the designation of Regional Resource Centres (RRCs) to bolster South-South cooperation; five such centres were recognized starting in 2018, focusing on and related fields. The agreement promotes systematic management enhancements, such as improved project ownership and procedural efficiency, through IAEA-supported initiatives like RAS/0/093. Notable ARASIA projects address regional challenges, including a 2023 initiative for protecting using nuclear techniques, approved under the IAEA's 2024–2025 technical cooperation programme. Emergency preparedness efforts, such as RAS/9/090, strengthen capabilities in radiological and nuclear response . In 2022, ARASIA marked its 20th anniversary by launching a dedicated fund to sustain operations, reflecting sustained growth from its foundational trio of members. Annual board meetings, including one held during the IAEA's 69th General in September 2025, continue to prioritize these collaborative mechanisms.

Asia-Pacific (RCA)

The Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific (RCA) is an intergovernmental framework established under IAEA auspices in 1972 to facilitate collaboration among Asian and Pacific states on peaceful nuclear applications. It entered into force on 12 June 1972 with six initial signatories—India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam—and has since expanded to 22 member states, including Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, and others. The agreement operates through national coordinating institutions, with governance provided by annual General Conference Meetings (GCMs); the 54th GCM occurred on 12 September 2025 in Vienna, chaired by Fiji, which assumed the rotating chairmanship earlier that year. A dedicated Regional Office (RCARO), hosted by Japan in Tokyo since the early 1990s, supports implementation and coordination. RCA's objectives center on promoting joint research, development, and training to address regional priorities in nuclear , emphasizing and without direct IAEA funding for projects; instead, it leverages IAEA technical cooperation to pool resources and expertise. Activities span multiple sectors, including (e.g., for crop improvement and management), (e.g., radiotherapy enhancement and via isotopes), industry (e.g., non-destructive testing and material ), and (e.g., for water resource assessment and monitoring). Projects are proposed and led by member states, often aligning with IAEA's technical cooperation cycles, such as the 2026-2027 initiatives discussed at the 2025 IAEA General Conference, which prioritize like and . Over five decades, RCA has delivered measurable impacts, including the training of thousands of specialists and the development of technologies adopted regionally, such as improved rice varieties through that boosted yields in multiple countries. Assessments from 2021 documented support for over 150 technical cooperation projects across 20 countries, enhancing radiotherapy access—reducing treatment wait times and expanding services in underserved areas—and advancing applications in , which have informed water management policies in arid Pacific islands and South Asian river basins. In industry and environment, RCA initiatives have contributed to air and tracking, with Pakistani scientists receiving awards in 2022 for advancements in these fields under the program. These outcomes underscore RCA's role in fostering practical, evidence-based nuclear applications, though effectiveness depends on member states' sustained funding and implementation capacities.

Latin America (ARCAL)

The Regional Co-operation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in and the Caribbean (ARCAL) was established in 1984 as a framework for technical and economic collaboration among IAEA Member States in the region to advance peaceful applications of nuclear techniques. Its primary objectives include fostering regional cooperation to address development priorities in areas such as , , , energy, industry, and radiological safety, with IAEA support facilitating project implementation and . ARCAL comprises 21 States Parties, encompassing most IAEA Member States from , including countries such as , , , , , , , and , among others; Jamaica acceded in 2012, marking the agreement's expansion to include additional Caribbean participants. Through this mechanism, the IAEA has delivered nearly 200 regional technical cooperation projects since inception, funding initiatives with a focus on knowledge sharing and infrastructure enhancement. Key achievements include over 35,000 professionals via approximately 1,500 courses, workshops, and meetings, which have built regional expertise in nuclear applications. In human health, ARCAL-supported efforts have equipped with its first computed machine and, under the IAEA's Rays of Hope initiative, provided 32 units across the region, enabling annual screening for 250,000 women. Agricultural advancements feature the development of mildew-resistant quinoa varieties in using and the in , which established fruit fly-free zones and boosted cherry exports to 5,600 tons per year. Environmental applications have leveraged nuclear techniques for climate monitoring in and harmonized protocols for assessment across 18 countries through the IAEA's NUTEC Plastics project, enhancing regional data comparability. Industrial contributions include Brazil's deployment of a mobile irradiation facility for , while broader impacts encompass gender-inclusive training, such as the first Regional for Leadership in the Nuclear Field targeted at young women, promoting equitable access to nuclear expertise. By 2009, ARCAL had completed 72 projects with $33.32 million in IAEA funding, demonstrating sustained investment in .

Core Programs and Technical Activities

Technical Cooperation Initiatives

The IAEA's Technical Cooperation Programme constitutes the agency's core mechanism for transferring and expertise to member states, enabling the peaceful applications of in addressing national development priorities across sectors including , , industry, and . This programme operates through a framework, where projects are co-developed with requesting countries via national programming frameworks, emphasizing measurable outcomes in and technology adoption. Initiatives encompass a mix of national technical cooperation projects tailored to individual member states, as well as regional and interregional projects fostering collaborative efforts, with delivery modalities including expert missions, equipment procurement, scientific visits, and hands-on training. Funding for the programme relies predominantly on the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF), an annual voluntary contribution mechanism from member states calculated based on United Nations-assessed shares, with a target of €96 million established for 2024 and similar levels projected for subsequent years through extrabudgetary supplements. Additional resources stem from targeted extrabudgetary pledges, such as those under the Peaceful Uses Initiative, which has enabled flexible responses to emerging needs by funding over 100 projects since its inception in 2010, focusing on nuclear and applications. In practice, major contributors like the provided over $23 million to the TCF in 2022, while countries including and members have sustained high levels of support into 2025, ensuring programme implementation despite occasional shortfalls in pledges. Prominent among technical cooperation initiatives is the Rays of Hope flagship effort, initiated to bridge the global cancer care divide by enhancing radiotherapy, , and diagnostic imaging in low- and middle-income countries, where over 90% of affected populations reside but access remains limited. By July 2025, more than 90 countries had joined, mobilizing over €90 million in pledges and resulting in tangible outputs such as upgraded hospital facilities, delivery of linear accelerators (LINACs), PET/CT scanners, and units, alongside training for thousands of medical professionals to sustain operations. Complementary projects address broader applications, such as hydrology for in arid regions and sterile techniques for in agriculture, with over 1,000 active projects annually supporting through nuclear-derived innovations. The programme also facilitates South-South cooperation, enabling knowledge exchange among developing nations, and has awarded fellowships to more than 20,000 professionals since 1958, prioritizing fields where nuclear methods demonstrably outperform conventional alternatives.

Nuclear Energy Development Support

The IAEA supports nuclear energy development primarily through its Technical Cooperation Programme, which transfers nuclear technology to member states and aids in identifying and addressing future energy demands while enhancing radiation safety and nuclear security frameworks. This programme facilitates legislative assistance, expert missions, and capacity-building activities tailored to countries embarking on or expanding nuclear power initiatives. A cornerstone of this support is the Milestones Approach, an internationally recognized framework that guides the establishment of national nuclear infrastructure over a preparatory period of 10–15 years, underscoring the long-term commitment of at least 100 years for a viable programme. The approach divides development into three progressive phases: Phase 1 focuses on initial considerations before a governmental commitment to ; Phase 2 involves preparatory work for bidding, contracting, and site preparation; and Phase 3 covers construction, commissioning, and operation of the first . Across these phases, it addresses 19 essential infrastructure issues, including legal and regulatory frameworks, project management, financing, human resource development, and industrial capabilities, with defined actions required at each stage. The IAEA delivers practical implementation support via guidance publications, such as the second revision of Milestones in the Development of a National for Nuclear Power, training programmes, and services like Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure (INIR) missions, which evaluate a country's progress upon invitation and provide actionable recommendations. These missions have assisted over 24 countries in assessing their status and advancing towards programme readiness. In August 2024, the Milestones guidance was updated to integrate considerations for small modular reactors (SMRs) and other advanced technologies, enabling more flexible pathways for nations with limited grids or resources. Recent initiatives emphasize application in developing regions, including a June 2025 partnership with the to promote safe and secure nuclear energy deployment for . In July 2025, the IAEA released an outlook on nuclear power's potential in , developed in cooperation with the , highlighting infrastructure needs and economic benefits for energy access in the continent. Complementary efforts, such as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), assess long-term of advanced reactor designs to inform national strategies.

Safety, Security, and Applications in Health and Environment

The IAEA establishes and promotes international nuclear standards through its Safety Standards series, comprising Safety Fundamentals, Requirements, and Guides, which provide a framework for protecting people, society, and the environment from harmful effects of . These standards underpin services, such as Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, where IAEA experts assess plants against best practices, having conducted over 200 such reviews since 1982 to identify improvements. Following major incidents, the agency developed the Action Plan on in 2011, enhancing standards, , and assistance to member states in areas like stress tests and severe accident management. In nuclear , the IAEA implements its Nuclear Security Plan, which outlines activities to prevent , , and unauthorized use of nuclear and radioactive materials, with the current plan (2022–2025) emphasizing guidance, training, and international cooperation. The Nuclear Security Series offers consensus-based publications on security fundamentals, including physical protection and mitigation, supporting member states in establishing robust regimes. Recent efforts include the 2024 Nuclear Security Review, which addresses evolving threats like cyber risks and non-state actors, alongside initiatives such as the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS 2024) to shape the 2026–2029 plan. The IAEA advances nuclear applications in health via its Human Health Programme, facilitating the use of nuclear techniques for disease prevention, diagnosis, and treatment, including radiotherapy and nuclear medicine procedures that annually benefit millions worldwide. Key efforts include quality assurance in radiation therapy and diagnostic imaging, with the Rays of Hope initiative launched in 2017 to expand access to radiotherapy in low-resource regions, particularly Africa, where over 450,000 new cancer cases occur yearly without adequate treatment. Coordinated research projects support innovations like isotope-based diagnostics for non-communicable diseases, emphasizing safe radiation use to minimize risks. In environmental applications, the IAEA employs isotopic and nuclear techniques to address challenges like water resource management, pollution tracking, and climate adaptation, using stable isotopes to trace and contamination pathways in arid regions. Programs monitor and carbon cycles through radionuclide analysis, aiding UN efforts like the 2022 UN , while land-based techniques assess and pollutant migration to support remediation. These methods, applied in over 100 member states, enhance ecosystem resilience, as seen in isotope hydrology projects that have quantified sustainable yields for major aquifers since the .

Verification and Crisis Response Operations

Safeguards Implementation and Inspections

The IAEA implements safeguards through a structured verification process designed to confirm that nuclear material and activities in states parties to relevant agreements remain dedicated to peaceful purposes, as required under comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) and, where applicable, additional protocols (APs). This involves independent analysis of state declarations, on-site activities, and complementary information sources to detect any diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material—defined as amounts sufficient for one nuclear explosive device, such as 25 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90% U-235 or 8 kilograms of plutonium. In 2024, the IAEA applied safeguards across 190 states with agreements in force, drawing conclusions that nuclear material remained in peaceful activities for 106 states with CSAs (including those with APs), though limitations persisted in non-cooperative cases. Verification activities encompass accountancy, where states report inventories and transactions that IAEA inspectors through physical measurements, sampling, and non-destructive techniques; and measures, including tamper-indicating seals, cameras, and drone-based monitoring; and environmental sampling to detect trace nuclear particles indicative of undeclared activities. The process follows an annual cycle: collecting safeguards-relevant information from states, open sources, and ; developing state-level safeguards approaches tailored to each country's nuclear profile; conducting field activities; and formulating conclusions on the correctness and completeness of declarations. Technologies such as wide-area environmental sampling, next-generation systems with encrypted satellite links, and data analytics enhance efficiency, allowing inspectors to focus on high-risk elements while minimizing routine burdens. Inspections form the core of , categorized by type under CSAs and APs. Routine inspections occur on a predefined schedule at declared facilities to verify ongoing accountancy and operations, typically comprising the majority of activities. Ad hoc inspections verify specific declarations or resolve inconsistencies in reported data, while special inspections may be triggered by evidence of non-compliance or significant proliferation risks, requiring access within specified timelines. Complementary accesses under APs permit short-notice visits to undeclared locations, broadening detection of covert programs. In , the IAEA performed over 3,000 in-field verification activities, including inspections, at more than 1,300 nuclear facilities and locations outside facilities worldwide, demonstrating sustained operational scope despite logistical constraints like geopolitical tensions. Effectiveness relies on state for timely access and accurate reporting, with 137 states implementing both CSAs and APs by 2024, enabling broader verification of items. Where falters, such as delayed information submissions or restricted site access, safeguards conclusions are qualified, underscoring that the system's deterrent value stems from technical rigor combined with international oversight rather than unilateral enforcement powers. Ongoing innovations, including unmanned aerial vehicles for and advanced isotopic analysis, address resource strains from expanding nuclear programs, though challenges like increasing material under safeguards—spanning thousands of metric tons annually—necessitate continuous adaptation.

Iran Nuclear Program Monitoring

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has monitored Iran's nuclear program under Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) since 1974, with intensified verification following revelations of undeclared activities in the early 2000s. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards obligations due to failures to report nuclear material and activities, prompting referral to the UN Security Council. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) expanded IAEA access, including implementation of the Additional Protocol for broader inspections; the agency verified Iran's initial compliance steps on January 16, 2016, allowing sanctions relief. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran progressively reduced cooperation, ceasing Additional Protocol implementation in 2021 and deactivating IAEA monitoring equipment at key sites like Natanz and Fordow. IAEA reports document Iran's accumulation of far exceeding JCPOA limits, with total stockpiles reaching 9,247.6 kilograms as of early June 2025, including enriched to 60% U-235—a level close to weapons-grade (90% required for bombs) and unnecessary for purposes. As of May 17, 2025, Iran's inventory of 60% in non- hexafluoride (UF6) forms stood at 2.0 kilograms, with ongoing production at facilities using advanced centrifuges like IR-6 models. The agency has repeatedly noted Iran's failure to resolve safeguards issues, including traces at undeclared sites such as Turquzabad (demolished in 2018), Varamin, and , where IAEA access remains restricted and explanations inadequate. No diversion of declared material to weapons has been detected, but the IAEA cannot assure the absence of parallel military activities due to incomplete declarations. On June 12, , the IAEA Board censured for the first time in nearly 20 years, declaring it in breach of non-proliferation obligations for persistently withholding information on and activities at multiple locations. responded by barring additional IAEA inspectors and announcing plans for a new enrichment facility, further complicating verification. IAEA Director General highlighted the proliferation risks of 's over 400 kilograms of 60% stockpile, sufficient—if further enriched—for multiple nuclear devices. UN Security Council Resolution 2231, endorsing the JCPOA, expired on October 18, 2025, after which , , and notified the IAEA on October 23 that its enhanced monitoring and reporting mandate under the resolution had ended, though core NPT safeguards obligations persist. This shift reduces IAEA's procurement channel oversight and JCPOA-specific transparency, amid Iran's continued high-level enrichment and unresolved safeguards violations, raising concerns about potential breakout timelines to weapons-usable material estimated at weeks for fissile production.

North Korea and Other Proliferation Cases

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985 and concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA on April 10, 1992, which entered into force as INFCIRC/403, requiring declarations of and IAEA access for verification. Initial IAEA inspections in May 1992 revealed discrepancies between DPRK declarations and indicating undeclared reprocessing activities, prompting the IAEA Board of Governors to request special inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites in February 1993; the DPRK refused access, leading to its announcement of intent to withdraw from the NPT on March 12, 1993, later suspended until June 1994 amid bilateral U.S.-DPRK talks. Under the 1994 , the IAEA monitored a freeze on the DPRK's 5 MW experimental and reprocessing at Yongbyon, applying measures and from 1994 until the DPRK ordered inspectors to leave on December 27, 2002, following its admission of a secret enrichment program; the IAEA withdrew its personnel by January 2003 and reported non-compliance to the UN Security Council. The DPRK formally withdrew from the NPT on January 10, 2003, the first state to do so, terminating all IAEA safeguards obligations and barring access to its facilities ever since; subsequent IAEA reports, drawing on intelligence and open-source data, have assessed DPRK capabilities including plutonium production estimated at 6-8 kg annually from Yongbyon before its 2007 disablement (later restarted) and uranium enrichment at undeclared sites like Kangson. The IAEA has repeatedly called for DPRK return to safeguards, including full declarations and special inspections, as a prerequisite for any denuclearization verification, but no on-site activities have occurred post-2002 despite (2003-2009) and U.S.-DPRK summits in 2018-2019 that referenced IAEA roles without implementation. In other proliferation cases, the IAEA conducted post-war inspections in from 1991-1998 under UN Security Council resolutions, verifying the dismantlement of its undeclared nuclear weapons program, including destruction of 48 kg of highly and calutrons for enrichment, though access was obstructed until the 2003 invasion revealed residual activities missed in IAEA reports. Libya's 2003 decision to abandon its program enabled IAEA verification from December 2003 to 2004, confirming dismantlement of undeclared uranium enrichment centrifuges supplied via the A.Q. Khan network and removal of 25 kg of highly to secure facilities abroad. In , IAEA investigations from 2007-2011, prompted by Israeli strikes on the Al-Kibar site, concluded via environmental sampling and particle analysis that it was an undeclared capable of 20-40 kg annually, though denied access and the site was destroyed; the IAEA Board found non-compliance in 2011, referring the matter to the UN Security Council without resolution. These cases highlight IAEA reliance on special inspections, intelligence cooperation, and post-exposure verification, often limited by state non-cooperation and geopolitical constraints.

Responses to Nuclear Accidents and Conflicts

![IAEA Expert Mission](./assets/IAEA_Expert_Mission_0201123202011232 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responds to nuclear accidents and conflicts by coordinating international assistance, conducting safety assessments, verifying nuclear material safeguards, and facilitating remediation efforts under frameworks like the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, established in 1986. These responses emphasize rapid notification, expert missions, and long-term technical cooperation to mitigate radiological risks and prevent proliferation. IAEA actions often involve on-site inspections, environmental monitoring, and policy recommendations derived from post-event analyses, prioritizing empirical data on radiation releases and safety lapses over political attributions.

Chernobyl and Early Incidents

Following the accident on , , in the , the IAEA provided immediate support for , decommissioning, and management. Over the subsequent three decades, the agency delivered more than $15 million in assistance through national and regional programs to , , and , focusing on decontamination, health impact studies via the Chernobyl Forum (coordinated with WHO and others), and monitoring of radioactive fallout. The IAEA's International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) updated its analysis in 1992, attributing the accident primarily to design flaws in the reactor and operator errors during a safety test, based on declassified Soviet data. Prior to Chernobyl, IAEA responses to earlier incidents, such as the 1957 in the UK or the 1979 Three Mile Island partial meltdown in the , were more advisory and standards-oriented, lacking the on-site intervention scale seen later due to limited mandate and notification mechanisms at the time. The prompted the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, mandating states to report transboundary releases, including details on time, location, and nature, thereby institutionalizing IAEA's role in global emergency coordination.

Fukushima Daiichi Assessment

In response to the March 11, 2011, Fukushima Daiichi accident triggered by a magnitude 9.0 and , the IAEA dispatched fact-finding missions and produced a comprehensive in 2015, comprising a Director General's summary and five technical volumes analyzing causes, consequences, and international implications. The assessment identified inadequate tsunami defenses and loss of ultimate heat sinks as key factors, leading to core meltdowns in three units and explosions, with no direct deaths but significant environmental releases of cesium-137 and iodine-131. IAEA Member States endorsed the 2011 Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, enhancing peer reviews, stress tests, and emergency preparedness standards globally. Ongoing support includes monitoring the 2021 initiation of treated water discharges via the Advanced Liquid Processing System (), with IAEA-verified sampling confirming compliance with international safety limits as of June 2025.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Situation

Since Russia's military actions in beginning February 24, 2022, the IAEA has conducted over 20 missions to the Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), Europe's largest, deploying a permanent team on September 1, 2022, led by Rafael Mariano Grossi to monitor safety amid frontline hostilities. The agency's reports document recurrent risks, including multiple shelling incidents near reactors, severed external power lines (e.g., October 2022 and repeated in 2024-2025), reliance on diesel generators for cooling, and military presence on site complicating safeguards verification. As of September 2024, two years of presence have prevented escalation to accident conditions through recommendations on off-site power restoration and demilitarization, though full access to certain areas remains restricted. IAEA assessments attribute vulnerabilities to the conflict's dynamics rather than inherent plant design, urging cessation of attacks on nuclear facilities.

Chernobyl and Early Incidents

The Chernobyl nuclear disaster occurred on April 26, 1986, at reactor unit 4 of the in the (now ), resulting from a flawed reactor , inadequate safety protocols, and operator errors during a low-power test, leading to a , fire, and release of radioactive materials equivalent to about 400 bombs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responded rapidly by dispatching international experts to assess the situation and provide technical assistance to the Soviet authorities, focusing on immediate containment, radiation monitoring, and evacuation guidance. In August 1986, the IAEA coordinated a Post-Accident Review Meeting in , producing the Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG-1), which initially attributed the incident primarily to and violations of operating procedures, though later analyses incorporated deficiencies of the reactor type. The disaster prompted the IAEA to facilitate two landmark conventions adopted in September 1986: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, requiring states to promptly inform the IAEA and affected countries of incidents with potential transboundary impact, and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, establishing mechanisms for mutual aid in expertise, equipment, and materials. These frameworks marked a shift toward institutionalized global cooperation in crisis response, with the IAEA serving as a central notification and coordination hub. In 1992, the IAEA's International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) updated its findings in INSAG-7, emphasizing broader systemic failures including insufficient safety culture and regulatory oversight in the Soviet nuclear program, based on additional data from Soviet disclosures. Prior to Chernobyl, the IAEA's involvement in nuclear incidents was limited, reflecting its nascent emergency response capabilities established only after its 1957 founding. For instance, the 1957 in the , which released and caused milk bans across Britain, coincided with the IAEA's early operations but elicited no formal international intervention from the agency, as its safety standards were still developing. Similarly, the 1961 reactor accident in the United States, a killing three operators, and the 1979 Three Mile Island partial meltdown in , which involved coolant loss and hydrogen ignition but minimal off-site , saw minimal direct IAEA action; post-Three Mile Island, the agency's Board of Governors began discussing enhanced international emergency , but responses remained advisory rather than operational. These pre-Chernobyl events underscored gaps in global coordination, driving the IAEA's post-1986 emphasis on safety standards, peer reviews, and the eventual creation of the Incident and Emergency Centre in 1989 to systematize notifications and assessments. Long-term IAEA efforts following Chernobyl included establishing the Chernobyl Forum in 2003 with partners like the World Health Organization and United Nations agencies to evaluate health, environmental, and socio-economic impacts, concluding that direct radiation deaths numbered around 30-50 initially, with thousands of thyroid cancer cases linked to iodine-131 exposure, though broader cancer attributions remain debated due to confounding factors like lifestyle and screening biases. The agency has delivered over $15 million in technical cooperation since 1986, aiding remediation in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia through waste management, decommissioning, and monitoring programs, while promoting RBMK upgrades and the New Safe Confinement structure completed in 2016 to entomb the reactor ruins. These initiatives highlighted the IAEA's dual mandate tensions, balancing nuclear promotion with safeguards, but established precedents for future accident responses like Fukushima.

Fukushima Daiichi Assessment

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiated its response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident on March 11, 2011, following a magnitude 9.0 and ensuing that disabled cooling systems at the (TEPCO) facility. The IAEA's Incident and Emergency Centre coordinated international efforts, providing technical expertise to Japanese authorities and sharing real-time updates with member states through daily briefings. In the immediate aftermath, IAEA dispatched fact-finding missions, including an initial team in late March 2011 to assess on-site conditions and radiation monitoring. Subsequent missions in 2011 and 2012 evaluated remediation strategies, such as efforts in affected areas. These activities informed the IAEA's broader verification of safeguards amid the crisis, confirming no diversion despite disrupted operations. The IAEA's comprehensive assessment culminated in the 2015 Director General's Report, "The Fukushima Daiichi Accident," a 240-page document accompanied by five technical volumes analyzing causes, progression, and consequences. The report identified the accident's initiation by the exceeding plant design assumptions, leading to station blackout, failure of emergency diesel generators due to inundation, and subsequent core meltdowns in Units 1, 2, and 3, along with overheating in Unit 4. It highlighted regulatory shortcomings, including inadequate consideration of extreme external hazards and insufficient severe accident management provisions. Key findings emphasized that while direct radiation casualties were zero, atmospheric releases totaled approximately 940,000 terabecquerels of equivalent, prompting evacuations of over 160,000 and long-term contamination challenges. The assessment underscored effective post-accident measures, such as injection for cooling, which mitigated further escalation, though initial delays in venting and injection contributed to hydrogen explosions. impacts were projected to be low, with no detectable increase in cancer rates beyond background levels based on dose reconstructions. Recommendations from the drove global enhancements, including the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety adopted in 2011, which prompted member states to stress-test facilities against extreme events, bolster regulatory independence, and improve emergency preparedness. It advocated for multi-layered defense-in-depth, enhanced instrumentation for beyond-design-basis scenarios, and better coordination between operators and authorities. Ongoing IAEA involvement includes monitoring TEPCO's decommissioning, projected to span decades, and verifying safeguards on remaining . In 2023, the IAEA completed an independent review of Japan's plan to discharge Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS)-treated water, concluding that the approach aligns with international safety standards and poses negligible radiological impact to people and the environment, with continuous monitoring affirmed.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant Situation

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) deployed its first expert mission to the (ZNPP) on September 1, 2022, led by Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, crossing the front line to assess nuclear safety amid ongoing military conflict following Russia's occupation of the facility in March 2022. Since then, the IAEA has maintained a continuous on-site presence with rotating teams of up to 20 experts to monitor critical safety indicators, including levels, reactor cooling systems, and power supply integrity. These missions have confirmed that the six reactor units, placed in cold shutdown since September 2022, show no abnormal or core damage, with spent fuel pools adequately cooled under normal conditions. Despite these stable nuclear parameters, IAEA assessments have repeatedly highlighted precarious safety conditions due to the plant's location in an active combat zone, with teams reporting near-daily shelling, explosions, and gunfire as of September 2025—three years into the deployment. Off-site power transmission lines, essential for safe operations, have failed 10 times since the conflict's onset, most recently on September 23, 2025, forcing reliance on emergency diesel generators for up to four weeks—the longest outage recorded—which risks fuel depletion and cooling system failures if prolonged. IAEA Director General Grossi has outlined seven pillars for restoring safety: demilitarization of the area, cessation of attacks on the plant, secure off-site power, reliable emergency supplies, operational instrumentation, protected spent fuel storage, and unrestricted qualified personnel access, though implementation remains incomplete amid disputed personnel changes imposed by occupying forces. In response to infrastructure damage, including from the June 2023 affecting water supplies for cooling, IAEA teams have conducted technical assessments of seven critical electrical substations and facilitated limited repairs. On October 17, 2025, following IAEA-brokered local ceasefires, repair work began on damaged 750 kV lines after the extended blackout, restoring external power and averting immediate crisis escalation. IAEA reports emphasize that while no radiological release has occurred, the combination of military activities and Russian control—opposed by General Conference resolutions calling for de-occupation—continues to undermine safeguards and heighten accident risks.

Controversies and Critiques

Tensions Between Promotion and Safeguards Mandates

The IAEA's founding statute establishes a dual mandate: Article II directs the agency to promote the peaceful applications of atomic energy for economic and scientific progress, while Article III.A.4 requires it to establish and administer safeguards to verify that nuclear materials are not diverted to military purposes. This structure reflects the 1950s Atoms for Peace initiative, which sought to harness nuclear technology for development while mitigating proliferation risks, but it has engendered ongoing institutional tensions as promotional activities—such as technical cooperation projects funded at approximately €90 million annually—can expand nuclear capabilities in states with questionable compliance records. These tensions arise primarily from political and operational dynamics within the IAEA's governance. Developing member states, which form a majority on the Board of Governors, often prioritize Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rights to peaceful nuclear technology transfers, pressuring the agency to allocate resources to technical assistance over rigorous safeguards enforcement. Conversely, nuclear-weapon states emphasize non-proliferation under NPT Article III, leading to budgetary imbalances where safeguards funding (€135 million as of recent estimates) must compete with promotional programs, potentially diluting verification independence. A 1979 Board resolution attempted to mitigate this by requiring supplementary agreements for technical aid to ensure end-use verification, yet implementation has varied, highlighting the challenge of separating promotional incentives from regulatory oversight. Critics, including non-proliferation analysts, contend that the promotional mandate fosters a , as the IAEA's role in facilitating nuclear infrastructure—such as research reactors or fuel cycles—may incentivize states to conceal diversion risks to avoid jeopardizing assistance. In , for instance, the agency provided technical cooperation for projects like the Arak heavy-water reactor redesign amid unresolved safeguards questions in the early , prompting accusations that promotional engagements softened against undeclared nuclear activities documented in IAEA reports from onward. Similar concerns emerged in prior to 1991, where IAEA-promoted civilian programs coexisted with undetected clandestine weaponization efforts, exposing safeguards limitations when promotional optimism overlooked gaps. Defenders of the IAEA argue that the agency maintains a functional separation through distinct departments—Technical Cooperation for promotion and Safeguards for verification—and that dual engagement builds trust essential for access, as evidenced by over 2,000 annual inspections across 190 states without proven systemic compromise. Nonetheless, the persistence of such critiques underscores a structural vulnerability: promotional successes, while advancing global energy access, amplify the stakes for safeguards failures in an era of advancing dual-use technologies like laser enrichment.

Allegations of Political Bias and Ineffectiveness

Critics, including Israeli officials and U.S.-based think tanks, have alleged that the IAEA exhibits insufficient rigor in confronting Iran's nuclear program, enabling to amass significant stockpiles of highly —over 400 kilograms at 60% purity by mid-2025, a level approaching weapons-grade—while limiting inspector access to sites and failing to resolve outstanding questions on possible military dimensions. This perceived leniency stems from the agency's dependence on state cooperation for verification, compounded by board resolutions that stop short of referral to the UN Security Council despite repeated findings of non-compliance with safeguards agreements. Iran, in response, accuses the IAEA of pro-Western bias, claiming its reports provide intelligence for military actions, such as the June 2025 strikes on facilities like and Fordow, and reflect undue influence from major funders like the , which contributes 25-30% of the budget. points to structural double standards, such as the IAEA's inability to inspect non-NPT states like , estimated to possess 80-200 warheads without safeguards, while subjecting signatories like Iran to intense scrutiny. In the since 2022, has charged the IAEA with partiality by not attributing shelling damage to Ukrainian forces, despite on-site observations of incidents, leading to claims that the agency prioritizes Western narratives over technical neutrality. and allies counter that the IAEA's reluctance to condemn Russian occupation and of the site— including the exclusion of certain inspectors deemed "biased" by —undermines safety assessments amid ongoing hostilities. Broader allegations of ineffectiveness highlight the IAEA's limited enforcement powers, as evidenced by North Korea's 2003 NPT withdrawal, subsequent nuclear tests yielding an arsenal of approximately 50 warheads by 2025, and undetected clandestine programs in prior to revelations. Despite strengthened safeguards post-1990s, the agency's verification relies on voluntary compliance and diplomatic pressure, failing to deter proliferation when states like suspend Additional Protocol implementation in 2021 or expel inspectors, eroding timely detection capabilities. These shortcomings are attributed to resource constraints— with voluntary contributions filling gaps in the regular budget—and the politicized 35-member board, where consensus often dilutes decisive action.

Specific Disputes in Verification and Reporting

The IAEA's verification efforts in Iran have been marked by prolonged disputes over access, unresolved undeclared activities, and Iran's rejection of findings on potential military dimensions. Revelations in 2002 of covert facilities at Natanz and Arak triggered IAEA investigations, leading to over 50 reports documenting Iran's failure to declare and experiments linked to weapons development, including high-explosive testing and initiators. Iran has consistently contested these assessments, attributing traces of man-made uranium at undeclared sites like Turquzabad (discovered 2018) and Varamin to environmental contamination or , while restricting access and removing surveillance equipment. The suspension of the Additional Protocol in February 2021 ended daily access and complementary monitoring, eroding the IAEA's continuity of knowledge on centrifuges and stockpiles. Escalation occurred in 2025 amid regional conflict. Following damage to Iranian sites during the June 2025 12-Day War, Iran suspended broader IAEA cooperation in July, permitting only limited visits like refueling while denying verification of 440.9 kg of 60% overdue by over 2.5 months as of September. The IAEA Board of Governors censured on May 31, 2025, for safeguarding violations, including late declaration of the Fuel Enrichment Plant and unaddressed 2018 issues, prompting to de-designate two experienced in over alleged concerns. , alongside and , further disputed IAEA authority post-October 18, 2025, expiration of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, arguing it nullified enhanced monitoring mandates. In , disputes centered on the Al-Kibar site destroyed by in September 2007. IAEA analysis of and soil samples from a June 2008 inspection revealed graphite blocks, particles, and annular design features indicative of an undeclared capable of producing 20-40 kg of annually, with evidence of North Korean technical assistance. denied any nuclear purpose, claiming the site was a conventional facility under , and obstructed follow-up by allowing only a single, abbreviated four-hour inspection with minimal sampling, refusing access to related sites like Dair Alzour. The IAEA sought additional environmental samples and documentation, but 's non-cooperation left the investigation stalled, preventing confirmation of diversion or full accounting of materials. North Korea's verification disputes trace to foundational safeguards breaches. In 1992, the IAEA detected inconsistencies in declared production at Yongbyon, requesting special inspections of waste sites in February 1993 to verify reprocessing; North Korea refused, citing U.S. military exercises, and announced NPT withdrawal intent, averting crisis only via bilateral U.S. talks. By 2003, amid undeclared fuel reprocessing, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and disabled cameras, ending on-site verification; subsequent nuclear tests and reactor restarts confirmed noncompliance without remedy. The IAEA has since lacked access, reporting ongoing violations of the 1992 safeguards agreement, with North Korea's 2003 NPT withdrawal rendering comprehensive reporting impossible. These cases underscore how state denial of access and documentation impedes IAEA resolution of proliferation concerns, often escalating to Board referrals without enforcement.

Membership, Funding, and Global Influence

State Participation and Voting Dynamics

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprises 180 member states, representing the vast majority of members that have formally adhered to its . Membership is open to any state that accepts the 's obligations to promote peaceful nuclear uses while submitting to safeguards against diversion to military purposes; applicants submit a formal letter to the , which the Board of Governors reviews for compliance with criteria such as ability and willingness to advance the IAEA's objectives, before recommending approval to the General Conference by simple majority vote. Withdrawal is permitted after three months' notice to the , with obligations persisting for prior violations; , which joined in 1974, effected the sole formal withdrawal in 1994 amid disputes over safeguards compliance. Decision-making occurs primarily through two organs: the General Conference, comprising all member states with one vote each, and the 35-member Board of Governors. The General Conference convenes annually in to approve the IAEA's program, budget (requiring two-thirds majority for adoption), and safeguards referrals to the UN Security Council; it elects 22 Board members biennially and amends the by two-thirds approval. Board decisions, which include operational oversight, safeguards implementation, and recommendations to the Conference, proceed by majority of members present and voting, except for budget matters needing two-thirds support; the Board meets five times yearly, fostering consensus amid geopolitical tensions but without formal veto powers. The Board's composition balances technical expertise and geographic equity: 13 seats are designated annually for states most advanced in nuclear technology (typically including major producers like the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom, plus others such as Japan and Germany), while 22 are elected by the General Conference in rotating groups of 11 for two-year terms to represent eight specified regional groups—Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East and South Asia—ensuring no region dominates. This structure amplifies influence for technologically advanced states on the designated seats, which recur predictably due to objective criteria like uranium production and reactor capacity, while elected seats rotate to incorporate developing nations' perspectives, though major contributors like the United States (providing about 25% of the budget) exert de facto sway through policy advocacy rather than weighted votes. For the 2025–2026 term, designated members include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, India, among others, reflecting this hybrid model. Voting dynamics reveal tensions between consensus-seeking and bloc voting, particularly on contentious issues like safeguards in or , where alignments often follow geopolitical lines—Western states pushing enforcement, versus opposition from and —yet the one-state-one-vote prevents unilateral dominance, as evidenced by repeated Board resolutions on Iran's non-compliance passing by narrow majorities since 2005. Empirical patterns show advanced nuclear states retaining Board influence across terms, correlating with their capacity to shape technical standards, while smaller states leverage regional caucuses for on technical cooperation funds.

Budgetary and Resource Mechanisms

The IAEA's regular is financed through mandatory assessed contributions from its member states, calculated via a scale of assessments adopted by the General Conference every few years and derived from the scale of assessments, adjusted to reflect IAEA membership and states' capacity to pay. This mechanism ensures predictable funding for core activities, including nuclear safeguards verification, safety standards development, and administrative operations, with the scale periodically revised to account for economic changes among members. The proposes the programme and biennially, which the Board of Governors reviews before submission to the General Conference for approval, typically in September of odd-numbered years. For the 2024–2025 biennium, the regular constitutes approximately 57% of the agency's total anticipated resources, supporting six major programmes such as nuclear power applications and non-proliferation safeguards. Complementing the regular budget, the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) channels voluntary contributions to deliver transfer and capacity-building projects to member states, particularly in developing countries. The Board of Governors sets an annual TCF target based on indicative shares aligned with the assessed contributions scale, though payments remain voluntary, leading to reliance on timely pledges and collections for programme execution. In 2024, the TCF achieved a 95% payment attainment rate against its target, enabling support for projects in areas like , diagnostics, and resource management. National participation costs from recipient states and in-kind contributions, such as expert services, further augment TCF resources. Extrabudgetary contributions provide flexible, donor-designated for targeted initiatives beyond regular allocations, accounting for the remaining 43% of projected 2024–2025 resources and including pledges to mechanisms like the Peaceful Uses Initiative, which has mobilized over €100 million from 24 member states and the since 2010 for 194+ projects. These funds often support safeguards enhancements, responses, or specialized , but their variability—dependent on geopolitical priorities and economic conditions—can constrain long-term . The Major Capital , replenished via transfers from regular appropriations, finances major , such as laboratory upgrades or facility expansions. Overall, this hybrid model balances mandatory stability with voluntary adaptability, though underfunding risks, particularly in voluntary streams, have prompted calls for increased assessed financing to mitigate donor influence on priorities.

Achievements, Impact, and Future Projections

Verified Contributions to Nuclear Expansion

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has facilitated nuclear energy expansion primarily through its Technical Cooperation Programme, which transfers and expertise to member states for peaceful applications, including power generation infrastructure development. This programme supports over 60 countries in building capabilities, focusing on , feasibility studies, and regulatory frameworks to enable safe and production. A key tool in this effort is the IAEA's Milestones Approach, a phased methodology introduced to guide countries in establishing national for programmes, covering 19 infrastructure issues across three phases from consideration to sustained operation. Adopted by more than two dozen nations exploring nuclear energy addition to their grids, the approach has been applied in emerging markets such as , , and , where first plants are under with IAEA advisory input on and . Updated in 2024 to incorporate small modular reactors (SMRs), it emphasizes comprehensive preparation to mitigate risks and optimize deployment timelines. IAEA technical assistance extends to operational enhancements, such as the 2024 launch of the International Network on Life Management of Plants, which aids countries in extending reactor lifespans and improving efficiency, thereby supporting capacity growth without new builds. Partnerships amplify these efforts; for instance, a 2025 agreement with the Fund targets innovative nuclear technologies for energy diversification in developing states, while collaboration with the World Bank focuses on financing advanced reactors and plant life extensions to bolster low-carbon energy access. These contributions have empirically advanced global nuclear capacity by providing standardized, verifiable pathways that reduce entry barriers for non-proliferative expansion, with documented outcomes including enhanced grid stability in assisted nations through IAEA-verified training and safety protocols.

Successes in Non-Proliferation and Technical Aid

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has achieved notable successes in nuclear non-proliferation through its safeguards verification activities, particularly in confirming the dismantlement of weapons programs. In , following the country's disclosure of its covert nuclear arsenal in 1993, IAEA teams conducted 22 missions and over 150 inspections between 1991 and 1994, verifying the complete dismantlement of six nuclear devices, the destruction of associated stocks exceeding 200 kg of highly unsuitable for weapons production, and the absence of any ongoing proliferation activities. Similarly, in , after the regime's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction in December 2003, IAEA verification missions initiated that month and continuing into 2004 confirmed the scope of the clandestine program—including designs acquired via illicit networks—and oversaw the removal of key equipment and materials, ensuring no residual nuclear weapons capability remained under safeguards. These cases demonstrate the IAEA's capacity to apply layered technical inspections, environmental sampling, and material accountancy to establish compliance with non-proliferation commitments, deterring diversion by increasing detection risks. Ongoing safeguards implementation further underscores these accomplishments, with the IAEA conducting more than 3,000 in-field verification activities across over 1,300 nuclear facilities and locations in 2023 alone, enabling safeguards conclusions for 188 states with agreements in force. The adoption of the Model Additional Protocol since 1997 has enhanced these efforts by expanding access to undeclared sites and complementary information, contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons among non-nuclear-weapon states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In technical cooperation, the IAEA has facilitated the peaceful application of nuclear techniques in developing countries, implementing over 450 new projects in 148 member states in , with a focus on , , and environmental . Key achievements include support for programs that have developed resilient crop varieties, such as drought-tolerant grasses and forages, enhancing in regions like and through improved systems. In human , technical aid has expanded radiotherapy capacity, providing training and equipment to address gaps, while projects on zoonotic and plastic pollution monitoring apply isotopic tracers for better . Marine science initiatives, for instance, have transferred nuclear-derived tools to assess sustainable fisheries in coastal nations, aiding evidence-based policy for preservation. These efforts, funded through a dedicated programme with annual expenditures exceeding $100 million, have built local expertise via fellowships and workshops, enabling self-sustaining applications of without proliferation risks.

Recent Developments and Long-Term Outlook

In September 2025, the IAEA raised its projections for global capacity for the fifth consecutive year, estimating that operational reactors could reach up to 992 gigawatts electric by 2050 in a high-growth scenario, driven by demands for low-carbon amid goals, compared to 377 gigawatts electric at the end of 2024 with 417 operational reactors. This upward revision reflects empirical trends in nuclear expansion, including new builds in and renewed interest in advanced reactors, though actual outcomes depend on regulatory, economic, and supply-chain factors. On non-proliferation fronts, the IAEA Board of Governors declared in non-compliance with safeguards obligations on June 12, 2025, citing unresolved questions over undeclared nuclear materials and activities, but and the agency reached an agreement on September 9 to resume comprehensive inspections at all sites, enabling verification under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In , IAEA-monitored repairs restored off-site power to the on October 22, 2025, after a month-long outage reliant on diesel generators, conducted under localized ceasefires to mitigate risks from ongoing conflict; the agency's continuous on-site presence has verified no elevated levels despite shelling threats. Additionally, in June 2025, the IAEA formalized a partnership with the to advance nuclear energy deployment in developing nations, focusing on technical cooperation for safe, sustainable applications. Looking ahead, the IAEA anticipates sustained growth in nuclear applications, including fusion energy advancements outlined in its 2025 World Fusion Outlook, which catalogs dozens of plant concepts and recent breakthroughs in plasma confinement and , potentially diversifying energy sources beyond fission. Long-term non-proliferation efficacy hinges on states adopting Additional Protocols for enhanced verification, fostering confidence for expanded peaceful , though geopolitical tensions—such as post-strike uncertainties in Iran's program—could strain resources and perceptions if major powers withhold support. The agency's 2024 safeguards implementation across 190 states underscores its foundational role, but causal pressures from needs and proliferation risks necessitate adaptive technologies like remote monitoring to maintain credibility amid rising global nuclear inventories.

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