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India–Pakistan relations
India–Pakistan relations
from Wikipedia

India–Pakistan relations
Map indicating locations of Pakistan and India

Pakistan

India
Diplomatic mission
High Commission of Pakistan, New DelhiHigh Commission of India, Islamabad
Envoy
Ambassador Saad Ahmad WarraichAmbassador Geetika Srivastava

India and Pakistan have a complex and largely hostile relationship that is rooted in a multitude of historical and political events, most notably the partition of British India in August 1947.

Two years after World War II, the United Kingdom formally dissolved British India, dividing it into two new sovereign nations: the Union of India and Pakistan. The partitioning of the former British colony resulted in the displacement of up to 15 million people, with the death toll estimated to have reached between several hundred thousand and one million people as Hindus and Muslims migrated in opposite directions across the Radcliffe Line to reach India and Pakistan, respectively.[1] In 1950, India emerged as a secular republic with a Hindu-majority population. Shortly afterwards, in 1956, Pakistan emerged as an Islamic republic with a Muslim-majority population.

While the two South Asian countries established full diplomatic ties shortly after their formal independence, their relationship was quickly overshadowed by the mutual effects of the partition as well as by the emergence of conflicting territorial claims over various princely states, with the most significant dispute being that of Jammu and Kashmir. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have fought three major wars and one undeclared war, and have also engaged in numerous armed skirmishes and military standoffs; the Kashmir conflict has served as the catalyst for every war between the two states, with the exception of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, which instead occurred alongside the Bangladesh Liberation War, which saw the secession of East Pakistan as the independent country of Bangladesh. It resulted in a large displacement of Pakistan's Hindu minority.[2][3]

The India–Pakistan border is one of the most militarized international boundaries in the world. There have been numerous attempts to improve the relationship, notably with the 1972 Shimla summit, 1999 Lahore summit, and the 2001 Agra summit in addition to various peace and co-operation initiatives. Despite those efforts, relations between the countries have remained frigid as a result of repeated acts of cross-border terrorism sponsored by the Pakistani side and alleged subversive acts sponsored by India.[4] The lack of any political advantages on either side for pursuing better relations has resulted in a period of "minimalist engagement" by both countries. This allows them to keep a "cold peace" with each other.[5]

Northern India and most of modern-day eastern Pakistan overlap with each other in terms of their common Indo-Aryan demographic, natively speaking a variety of Indo-Aryan languages (mainly Punjabi, Sindhi, and Hindi–Urdu). Although the two countries have linguistic and cultural ties, the size of India–Pakistan trade is very small relative to the size of their economies and the fact that they share a land border.[6] Trade across direct routes has been curtailed formally,[7] so the bulk of India–Pakistan trade is routed through Dubai in the Middle East.[8] According to a BBC World Service poll in 2017, only 5% of Indians view Pakistan's influence positively, with 85% expressing a negative view, while 11% of Pakistanis view India's influence positively, with 62% expressing a negative view.[9]

Background

[edit]

Pre-partition era

[edit]
British troops crossing the Sutlej river in 1846 during the first Anglo-Sikh war. By 1849, Punjab was annexed

Most of the pre-British invasions into India (the Muslim conquests having been the most impactful) took place from the northwest through the modern-day territory of Pakistan. This geography meant that Pakistan absorbed more Persian and Muslim influences than the rest of the subcontinent, which can be seen in its usage of a modified Perso-Arabic alphabet for writing its native languages.[10]

In the 1840s, Sindh, Kashmir, and Punjab, which are along today's India–Pakistan border, were annexed into British India. British historian John Keay notes that while the rest of British India had generally been consolidated through treaties and more nonviolent means, much of what is now Pakistan had to be physically conquered.[11] By the early 20th century, the Pakistan Movement had emerged, demanding a separate nation for Indian Muslims carved out of the northwestern and northeastern regions.[12]

Seeds of conflict during independence

[edit]
Jinnah and Gandhi engaged in a heated conversation. A well-known photograph recently attributed to Kulwant Roy.

Massive population exchanges occurred between the two newly formed states in the months immediately following the partition. There was no conception that population transfers would be necessary because of the partitioning. Religious minorities were expected to stay put in the states they found themselves residing in. However, while an exception was made for Punjab, where the transfer of populations was organised because of the communal violence affecting the province, this did not apply to other provinces.[13][14]

A refugee special train at Ambala Station during the partition of India

The partition of British India split the former British province of Punjab and Bengal between the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The mostly Muslim western part of the province became Pakistan's Punjab province; the mostly Hindu and Sikh eastern part became India's East Punjab state (later divided into the new states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh). Many Hindus and Sikhs lived in the west, and many Muslims lived in the east, and the fears of all such minorities were so great that the Partition saw many people displaced and much inter-communal violence. Some have described the violence in Punjab as a retributive genocide.[15] Total migration across Punjab during the partition is estimated at 12 million people;[16] around 6.5 million Muslims moved from East Punjab to West Punjab, and 4.7 million Hindus and Sikhs moved from West Punjab to East Punjab.

According to the British plan for the partition of British India, all the 680 princely states were allowed to decide which of the two countries to join. With the exception of a few, most of the Muslim-majority princely-states acceded to Pakistan while most of the Hindu-majority princely states joined India. However, the decisions of some of the princely states would shape the Pakistan–India relationship considerably in the years to come.

Junagadh issue

[edit]
Junagadh is one of the modern districts of Saurashtra, Gujarat

Junagadh was a state on the south-western end of Gujarat, with the principalities of Manavadar, Mangrol and Babriawad. It was not contiguous to Pakistan and other states physically separated it from Pakistan. The state had an overwhelming Hindu population which constituted more than 80% of its citizens, while its ruler, Nawab Mahabat Khan, was a Muslim. Mahabat Khan acceded to Pakistan on 15 August 1947. Pakistan confirmed the acceptance of the accession on 15 September 1947.

India did not accept the accession as legitimate. The Indian point of view was that Junagadh was not contiguous to Pakistan, that the Hindu majority of Junagadh wanted it to be a part of India, and that the state was surrounded by Indian territory on three sides.

The Pakistani point of view was that since Junagadh had a ruler and governing body who chose to accede to Pakistan, it should be allowed to do so. Also, because Junagadh had a coastline, it could have maintained maritime links with Pakistan even as an enclave within India.

The partition of India: green regions were all part of Pakistan by 1948, and orange ones part of India.

Neither of the states was able to resolve this issue amicably and it only added fuel to an already charged environment. Sardar Patel, India's Home Minister, felt that if Junagadh was permitted to go to Pakistan, it would create communal unrest across Gujarat. The government of India gave Pakistan time to void the accession and hold a plebiscite in Junagadh to pre-empt any violence in Gujarat. Samaldas Gandhi formed a government-in-exile, the Arzi Hukumat (in Urdu: Arzi: Transitional, Hukumat: Government) of the people of Junagadh. Patel ordered the annexation of Junagadh's three principalities.

India cut off supplies of fuel and coal to Junagadh, severed air and postal links, sent troops to the frontier, and occupied the principalities of Mangrol and Babariawad that had acceded to India.[17] On 26 October, Nawab of Junagadh and his family fled to Pakistan following clashes with Indian troops. On 7 November, Junagadh's court, facing collapse, invited the Government of India to take over the State's administration. The Dewan of Junagadh, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, the father of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, decided to invite the Government of India to intervene and wrote a letter to Mr. Buch, the Regional Commissioner of Saurashtra in the Government of India to this effect.[18] The Government of Pakistan protested. The Government of India rejected the protests of Pakistan and accepted the invitation of the Dewan to intervene.[19] Indian troops occupied Junagadh on 9 November 1947. In February 1948, a plebiscite held almost unanimously voted for accession to India.

Kashmir conflict

[edit]
India claims the entire erstwhile British Indian princely state of Jammu and Kashmir based on an instrument of accession signed in 1947.

Kashmir was a Muslim-majority princely state, ruled by a Hindu king, Maharaja Hari Singh. At the time of the partition of India, Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of the state, preferred to remain independent and did not want to join either the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan.

Despite the standstill agreement with Pakistan, teams of Pakistani forces were dispatched into Kashmir. Backed by Pakistani paramilitary forces, Pashtun Mehsud tribals[20] invaded Kashmir in October 1947 under the code name "Operation Gulmarg" to seize Kashmir. The Maharaja requested military assistance from India. The Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, required the Maharaja to accede to India before India could send troops. Accordingly, the instrument of accession was signed and accepted during 26–27 October 1947. The accession as well as India's military assistance were supported by Sheikh Abdullah, the state's political leader heading the National Conference party, and Abdullah was appointed as the Head of Emergency Administration of the state the following week.

Pakistan refused to accept the state's accession to India and escalated the conflict, by giving full-fledged support to the rebels and invading tribes. A constant replenishment of Pashtun tribes were organised, and provided arms and ammunition as well as military leadership.

Indian troops managed to evict the invading tribes from the Kashmir Valley but the onset of winter made much of the state impassable. In December 1947, India referred the conflict to the United Nations Security Council, requesting it to prevent the outbreak of a general war between the two fledgling nations. The Security Council passed Resolution 47, asking Pakistan to withdraw all its nationals from Kashmir, asking India to withdraw the bulk of its forces as a second step, and offering to conduct a plebiscite to determine the people's wishes. Though India rejected the resolution, it accepted a suitably amended version of it negotiated by the UN Commission set up for the purpose, as did Pakistan towards the end of 1948. A ceasefire was declared on 1 January the following year.

However, India and Pakistan could not agree on the suitable steps for demilitarisation to occur as prelude to the plebiscite. Pakistan organised the rebel fighting forces of Azad Kashmir into a full-fledged military of 32 battalions, and India insisted that it should be disbanded as part of the demilitarisation. No agreement was reached and the plebiscite never took place.

Wars, conflicts, and disputes

[edit]

India and Pakistan have fought in numerous armed conflicts since their independence. There are three major wars that have taken place between the two states, namely in 1947, 1965 and the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. In addition to this was the unofficial Kargil War in 1999 and some border skirmishes.[21] While both nations have held a shaky cease-fire agreement since 2003, they continue to trade fire across the disputed area. Both nations blame the other for breaking the cease-fire agreement, claiming that they are firing in retaliation for attacks.[22] On both sides of the disputed border, an increase in territorial skirmishes that started in late 2016 and escalated into 2018 killed hundreds of civilians and made thousand homeless.[21][22]

War of 1965

[edit]

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 started following the culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 and Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India.[23] India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II.[24][25] Hostilities between the two countries ended after a United Nations-mandated ceasefire was declared following diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[26] The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.

War of 1971

[edit]
Pakistan's Lt Gen Niazi (sitting second from right) signing the Instrument of Surrender, following the defeat of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Pakistan, since independence, was geo-politically divided into two major regions, West Pakistan and East Pakistan. East Pakistan was occupied mostly by Bengali people. After a Pakistani military operation and a genocide on Bengalis in December 1971, following a political crisis in East Pakistan, the situation soon spiralled out of control in East Pakistan and India intervened in favour of the rebelling Bengali populace. The conflict, a brief but bloody war, resulted in the independence of East Pakistan. In the war, the Indian Army invaded East Pakistan from three sides, while the Indian Navy used the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant to impose a naval blockade of East Pakistan. The war saw the first offensive operations undertaken by the Indian Navy against an enemy port, when Karachi harbour was attacked twice during Operation Trident (1971) and Operation Python. These attacks destroyed a significant portion of Pakistan's naval strength, whereas no Indian ship was lost. The Indian Navy did, however, lose a single ship, when INS Khukri (F149) was torpedoed by a Pakistani submarine. 13 days after the invasion of East Pakistan, 93,000 Pakistani military personnel surrendered to the Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini. After the surrender of Pakistani forces, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh.

1999 Kargil War

[edit]
Indian soldiers after capturing a hill from Pakistani forces during the Kargil war in 1999.

In May 1999 some Kashmiri shepherds discovered the presence of militants and non-uniformed Pakistani soldiers (many with official identifications and Pakistan Army's custom weaponry) in the Kashmir Valley, where they had taken control of border hilltops and unmanned border posts. The incursion was centred around the town of Kargil, but also included the Batalik and Akhnoor sectors and artillery exchanges at the Siachen Glacier.[27][28]

The Indian army responded with Operation Vijay, which launched on 26 May 1999. This saw the Indian military fighting thousands of militants and soldiers in the midst of heavy artillery shelling and while facing extremely cold weather, snow and treacherous terrain at the high altitude.[29] Over 500 Indian soldiers were killed in the three-month-long Kargil War, and it is estimated around 600–4,000 Pakistani militants and soldiers died as well.[30][31][32][33] India pushed back the Pakistani militants and Northern Light Infantry soldiers. Almost 70% of the territory was recaptured by India.[29] Vajpayee sent a "secret letter" to U.S. President Bill Clinton that if Pakistani infiltrators did not withdraw from the Indian territory, "we will get them out, one way or the other".[34]

After Pakistan suffered heavy losses, and with both the United States and China refusing to condone the incursion or threaten India to stop its military operations, General Pervez Musharraf was recalcitrant and Nawaz Sharif asked the remaining militants to stop and withdraw to positions along the LoC.[35] The militants were not willing to accept orders from Sharif but the NLI soldiers withdrew.[35] The militants were killed by the Indian army or forced to withdraw in skirmishes which continued even after the announcement of withdrawal by Pakistan.[35]

A subsequent military coup in Pakistan that overturned the democratically elected Nawaz Sharif government in October of the same year also proved a setback to relations.

Water disputes

[edit]

The Indus Waters Treaty governs the rivers that flow from India into Pakistan. Water is cited as one possible cause for a conflict between the two nations, but to date issues such as the Nimoo Bazgo Project have been resolved through diplomacy.[36]

Bengal refugee crisis (1949)

[edit]

In 1949, India recorded close to 1 million Hindu refugees, who flooded into West Bengal and other states from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), owing to communal violence, intimidation and repression from authorities. The plight of the refugees outraged Hindus and Indian nationalists, and the refugee population drained the resources of Indian states, which were unable to absorb them. While not ruling out war, Prime Minister Nehru and Sardar Patel invited Liaquat Ali Khan for talks in Delhi. Although many Indians termed this appeasement, Nehru signed a pact with Liaquat Ali Khan that pledged both nations to the protection of minorities and creation of minority commissions. Khan and Nehru also signed a trade agreement, and committed to resolving bilateral conflicts through peaceful means. Steadily, hundreds of thousands of Hindus returned to East Pakistan, but the thaw in relations did not last long, primarily owing to the Kashmir conflict.

Insurgency in Kashmir (1989–present)

[edit]
Map showing disputed territories of India

According to some reports published by the Council of Foreign Relations, the Pakistan military and the ISI have provided covert support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir, including the al-Qaeda affiliate Jaish-e-Mohammed.[37][38] Pakistan has denied any involvement in terrorist activities in Kashmir, arguing that it only provides political and moral support to the secessionist groups who wish to escape Indian rule. Many Kashmiri militant groups also maintain their headquarters in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which is cited as further proof by the Indian government.

Journalist Stephen Suleyman Schwartz notes that several militant and criminal groups are "backed by senior officers in the Pakistani army, the country's ISI intelligence establishment and other armed bodies of the state."[39]

Insurgent attacks

[edit]
  • Insurgents attack on Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly: A car bomb exploded near the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly on 1 October 2001, killing 27 people on an attack that was blamed on Kashmiri separatists. It was one of the most prominent attacks against India apart from on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The dead bodies of the terrorists and the data recovered from them revealed that Pakistan was solely responsible for the activity.[40]
  • Qasim Nagar Attack: On 13 July 2003, armed men believed to be a part of the Lashkar-e-Toiba threw hand grenades at the Qasim Nagar market in Srinagar and then fired on civilians standing nearby killing twenty-seven and injuring many more.[41][42][43][44][45]
  • Assassination of Abdul Ghani Lone: Abdul Ghani Lone, a prominent All Party Hurriyat Conference leader, was assassinated by an unidentified gunmen during a memorial rally in Srinagar. The assassination resulted in wide-scale demonstrations against the Indian occupied-forces for failing to provide enough security cover for Mr. Lone.[1]
  • 20 July 2005 Srinagar Bombing: A car bomb exploded near an armoured Indian Army vehicle in the Church Lane area in Srinagar killing four Indian Army personnel, one civilian and the suicide bomber. Terrorist group Hizbul Mujahideen, claimed responsibility for the attack.[2]
  • Budshah Chowk attack: A terrorist attack on 29 July 2005 at Srinigar's city centre, Budshah Chowk, killed two and left more than 17 people injured. Most of those injured were media journalists.[3]
  • Murder of Ghulam Nabi Lone: On 18 October 2005, a suspected man killed Jammu and Kashmir's then education minister Ghulam Nabi Lone. No Terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attack.[4]
  • 2016 Uri attack: A terrorist attack by four heavily armed terrorists on 18 September 2016, near the town of Uri in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, killed 18 and left more than 20 people injured. It was reported as "the deadliest attack on security forces in Kashmir in two decades".[46]
  • 2019 Pulwama attack: On 14 February 2019, a convoy of vehicles carrying security personnel on the Jammu Srinagar National Highway was attacked by a vehicle-bound suicide bomber in Lethpora near Awantipora, Pulwama district, Jammu and Kashmir, India. The attack resulted in the death of 38 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and the attacker. The responsibility of the attack was claimed by the Pakistan-based Islamist militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed.[47]
  • 2025 Pahalgam attack: On 22 April 2025, 26 tourists were attacked by terrorists, resulting in the death of 28 people, including a local from Jammu and Kashmir and two foreigners from Nepal and the UAE. India stopped supplying the Indus river to Pakistan.

Insurgent activities elsewhere

[edit]

The attack on the Indian Parliament was by far the most dramatic attack carried out allegedly by Pakistani terrorists. India blamed Pakistan for carrying out the attacks, an allegation which Pakistan strongly denied. The following 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff raised concerns of a possible nuclear confrontation. However, international peace efforts ensured the cooling of tensions between the two nuclear-capable nations.

Apart from this, the most notable was the hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 en route New Delhi from Kathmandu, Nepal. The plane was hijacked on 24 December 1999 approximately one hour after takeoff and was taken to Amritsar airport and then to Lahore in Pakistan. After refuelling the plane took off for Dubai and then finally landed in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Under intense media pressure, New Delhi complied with the hijackers' demand and freed Maulana Masood Azhar from his captivity in return for the freedom of the Indian passengers on the flight. The decision, however, cost New Delhi dearly. Maulana, who is believed to be hiding in Karachi, later became the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed, an organisation which has carried out several terrorist acts against Indian security forces in Kashmir.[5]

On 22 December 2000, a group of terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Toiba stormed the Red Fort in New Delhi. The fort houses an Indian military unit and a high-security interrogation cell used both by the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Indian Army. The terrorists successfully breached the security cover around the Red Fort and opened fire at the Indian military personnel on duty killing two of them on spot. The attack was significant because it was carried out just two days after the declaration of the cease-fire between India and Pakistan.[6]

In 2002, India claimed again that terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir were infiltrating into India, a claim denied by Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, who claimed that such infiltration had stopped—India's spokesperson for the External Affairs Ministry did away with Pakistan's claim, calling it "terminological inexactitude".[48] Only two months later, two Kashmiri terrorists belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammed raided the Swami Narayan temple complex in Ahmedabad, Gujarat killing 30 people, including 18 women and five children. The attack was carried out on 25 September 2002, just few days after state elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir. Two identical letters found on both the terrorists claimed that the attack was done in retaliation for the deaths of thousands of Muslims during the Gujarat riots.[7]

Two car bombs exploded in south Mumbai on 25 August 2003; one near the Gateway of India and the other at the Zaveri Bazaar, killing at least 48 and injuring 150 people. Though no terrorist group claimed responsibility for the attacks, Mumbai Police and RAW suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba's hand in the twin blasts.[8]

In an unsuccessful attempt, six terrorists belonging to Lashkar-e-Toiba, stormed the Ayodhya Ram Janmbhomi complex on 5 July 2005. Before the terrorists could reach the main disputed site, they were shot down by Indian security forces. One Hindu worshipper and two policemen were injured during the incident.[9]

2001 Indian Parliament attack

[edit]

The 2001 Indian Parliament attack was an attack at the Parliament of India in New Delhi on 13 December 2001, during which fourteen people, including the five men who attacked the building, were killed. The perpetrators were Lashkar-e-Taiba (Let) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists.[49][50] The attack led to the deaths of five terrorists, six Delhi Police personnel, two Parliament Security Service personnel and a gardener, in total 14[51] and to increased tensions between India and Pakistan, resulting in the 2001–02 India–Pakistan standoff.[52]

2001–02 India–Pakistan standoff

[edit]

The 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff was a military standoff between India and Pakistan that resulted in the massing of troops on either side of the border and along the Line of Control (LoC) in the region of Kashmir. This was the first major military standoff between India and Pakistan since the Kargil War in 1999. The military buildup was initiated by India responding to a 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2001 Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly attack.[53] India claimed that the attacks were carried out by two Pakistan-based terror groups, the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, both of whom India has said are backed by Pakistan's ISI[54] a charge that Pakistan denied.[55][56][57] Tensions de-escalated following international diplomatic mediation which resulted in the October 2002 withdrawal of Indian[58] and Pakistani troops[59] from the international border.

2007 Samjhauta Express bombings

[edit]

The 2007 Samjhauta Express bombings was a terrorist attack targeted on the Samjhauta Express train on 18 February. The Samjhauta Express is an international train that runs from New Delhi, India to Lahore, Pakistan, and is one of two trains to cross the India–Pakistan border. At least 68 people were killed, mostly Pakistani civilians but also some Indian security personnel and civilians.[60]

2008 Mumbai attacks

[edit]

The 2008 Mumbai attacks by ten Pakistani terrorists killed over 173 and wounded 308. The sole surviving gunman Ajmal Kasab who was arrested during the attacks was found to be a Pakistani national. This fact was acknowledged by Pakistani authorities.[61] In May 2010, an Indian court convicted him on four counts of murder, waging war against India, conspiracy and terrorism offences, and sentenced him to death.[62]

India blamed the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group, for planning and executing the attacks. Indian officials demanded Pakistan extradite suspects for trial. They also said that, given the sophistication of the attacks, the perpetrators "must have had the support of some official agencies in Pakistan".[63] In July 2009 Pakistani authorities confirmed that LeT plotted and financed the attacks from LeT camps in Karachi and Thatta.[64] In November 2009, Pakistani authorities charged seven men they had arrested earlier, of planning and executing the assault.[65]

On 9 April 2015, the foremost ringleader of the attacks, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi[66][67] was granted bail against surety bonds of Rs. 200,000 (US$690) in Pakistan.[68][69]

Balochistan Insurgency

[edit]

The Balochistan Insurgency, ongoing since the early 2000s, involves separatist groups in Pakistan's Balochistan province seeking autonomy. The largest and most prominent group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has fought for independence, citing long-standing grievances over perceived discrimination and underdevelopment by the central government. The insurgency escalated in March 2025 when the BLA hijacked a train in a remote area of Balochistan, killing 26 people.

Pakistan's military has accused India of supporting the insurgents, citing the 2016 arrest of Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jadhav, who was convicted of espionage and allegedly aiding Baloch separatists. These accusations have been rejected by India, which denies any involvement in the insurgency. The region's strategic importance, with its oil and mineral wealth, and its proximity to India, has made the conflict a focal point in South Asian military tensions.[70][71]

2025 conflict

[edit]

Following the Pahalgam terrorist attack on April 22 which resulted in the deaths of 26 civilians, including 25 Indian tourists and one Nepali national, India–Pakistan relations have reached a critical low point. The attack, attributed by India to the Islamic Resistance Front, an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, has triggered a series of retaliatory measures from both nations, escalating tensions to levels not seen in years.[72][73] According to Indian news, unnamed sources have stated that Hashim Musa, a former para commando in the Pakistan Army's elite Special Service Group (SSG), was involved in the attack. Trained in covert and unconventional warfare, he is said to have joined the banned terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, after his dismissal from SSG and to have infiltrated Kashmir in September 2023. Unnamed sources say his name and SSG background were revealed during the interrogation of Over Ground Workers (OGWs) who supported the perpetrators.[74]

Diplomatic fallout
[edit]
India's response
[edit]

In response to escalating tensions, India has suspended the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, placing the long-standing water-sharing agreement "in abeyance" due to what it alleges is Pakistan's ongoing support for cross-border terrorism. Additionally, India has imposed visa and diplomatic restrictions, halting visa services for Pakistani nationals and expelling several Pakistani diplomats. As part of broader punitive measures, the Attari–Wagah border has been closed, effectively cutting off overland trade and further straining bilateral ties.[75][76]

Additionally, authorities across various states started a crackdown on illegal immigrants from Pakistan and began the process of deporting them. Many of these illegal immigrants had reportedly possessed voter IDs and ration cards, sparking a major controversy and debate as non-citizens do not have right to vote.[77] Furthermore, short term visas of several Pakistani visitors, some of who were married to Indians, were also being cancelled.[78]

Pakistan's countermeasures
[edit]

In retaliation, Pakistan announced a series of countermeasures. It suspended the 1972 Shimla Agreement, which had emphasized the peaceful resolution of bilateral disputes. Pakistan also closed its airspace to Indian aircraft and halted all trade with India. On the diplomatic front, Indian diplomats have been expelled, and the staff size at the Indian High Commission in Islamabad has been significantly reduced, deepening the diplomatic rift between the two countries.[73][79]

India's missile strikes
[edit]

On May 6, India targeted Pakistan proper and Pakistan-administered Kashmir with multiple airstrikes as part of Operation Sindoor, marking a significant escalation of the conflict.[80] India announced that it struck nine "terrorist infrastructure" sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, stating the targets were used to plan and direct attacks. It stressed the strikes were precise, avoided Pakistani military sites, and were non-escalatory. Jaish-e-Mohammad stronghold of Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba's base in Muridke were among the targets. Pakistan reported hits in Muzaffarabad, Kotli, and Bahawalpur.[81][82]

Diplomatic expulsions
[edit]

On 13 May, India reportedly declared Md. Ehsan Ur Rahim, a staff member at the Pakistan High Commission, persona non grata for engaging in activities inconsistent with his diplomatic status. He was allegedly involved in espionage.[83][84] More information on the expulsion was revealed to Indian media after 17 May when a YouTuber was arrested.[85] It was alleged that Ehsan used an Indian YouTuber, namely Jyoti Malhotra, for espionage activities.[86] He reportedly befriended the youtuber in 2023 and maintained close contact with her during the four-day military conflict. Over time, he reportedly cultivated her as an asset by introducing her to Pakistani contacts and facilitating her visit to Pakistan, where she met intelligence officials. The youtuber is believed to have maintained communication with these officials through encrypted platforms like WhatsApp, Telegram, and Snapchat, and shared sensitive information, according to Indian police.[87][88]

Weapons of mass destruction

[edit]

India has a long history of nuclear weapons development.[89] The origins of India's nuclear program date back to 1944, when it started a nuclear program soon after obtaining independence.[90] In the 1940s–1960s, India's nuclear program slowly matured towards militarisation and expanded the nuclear power infrastructure throughout the country.[89] Decisions on the development of nuclear weapons were made by Indian political leaders after the 1962 Chinese invasion and territorial annexation of North India. In 1967, India's nuclear program was aimed at the development of nuclear weapons, with Indira Gandhi overseeing the development of the weapons.[91] In 1971, India gained military and political momentum over Pakistan, after their success in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. Starting preparations for a nuclear test in 1972, India finally exploded its first nuclear bomb at the Pokhran test range, codenamed Smiling Buddha, in 1974.[91] During the 1980s–90s, India began development of space and nuclear armed rockets with its Integrated Guided Missile Development Program, which marked Pakistan's efforts to engage in the space race with India.[92] Pakistan's own Integrated Missile Research and Development Programme developed space and nuclear missiles and began unmanned flight tests of its space vehicles in the mid-1990s.[92]

After their defeat in the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971, Pakistan launched its own nuclear bomb program in 1972, and accelerated its efforts in 1974, after India exploded its first nuclear bomb in Pokhran test range.[91][93] This large-scale nuclear bomb program was directly in response to India's nuclear program.[94] In 1983, Pakistan achieved a major milestone in its efforts after it covertly performed a series of non-fission tests, codenamed Kirana-I. No official announcements of such tests were made by the Pakistani Government.[94] Over the next several years, Pakistan expanded and modernized nuclear power projects around the country to supply its electricity sector and to provide back-up support and benefit to its national economy. In 1988, a mutual understanding was reached between the two countries in which each pledged not to attack nuclear facilities. Agreements on cultural exchanges and civil aviation were also initiated in 1988.[94] Finally, in May 1998, India carried out its second nuclear test series (see Pokhran-II) which caused Pakistan to reply with its own test series, also in May 1998 (see Chagai-I and Chagai-II).

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's 2025 assessment stated that Pakistan viewed India as an existential threat and was modernizing its military, focusing on tactical nuclear weapons to counter India's conventional superiority. The report estimated Pakistan's arsenal at 170 warheads in 2024, potentially rising to 200 by 2025, and noted growing defense ties with China, a key supplier for materials and technologies for its weapons of mass destruction programs.[95][96]

In August 2025, Pakistan's army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir issued a nuclear threat against India during a black-tie dinner in Tampa, Florida, stating that if Pakistan faced an existential threat, "we'll take half the world down with us."[97][98] India condemned the remarks as "nuclear sabre-rattling," with Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal stating that it was "Pakistan's stock-in-trade" and adding that "the international community can draw its own conclusions on the irresponsibility inherent in such remarks."[99] Pakistan's Foreign Office claimed the remarks were "distorted."[100]

Terrorism charges

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Border terrorism

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Countries including India and the United States have demanded that Pakistan stop using its territory as a base for terrorist groups following multiple terrorist attacks by Islamic jihadists in Kashmir and other parts of India.[101] The Pakistani government has denied the accusation and accused India of sponsoring so-called "state-backed terror".[102]

Fugitives

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India has accused some of the most wanted Indian fugitives, such as Dawood Ibrahim, of having a presence in Pakistan. On 11 May 2011, India released a list of 50 "Most Wanted Fugitives" hiding in Pakistan. This was to tactically pressure Pakistan after the killing of Osama bin Laden in his compound in Abbottabad.[103] After two errors in the list received publicity, the Central Bureau of Investigation removed it from their website, pending review.[104] After this incident, the Pakistani interior ministry rejected the list forwarded by India to Islamabad, saying it should first probe if those named in the list were even living in the country.[105]

Talks and other confidence-building measures

[edit]

After the 1971 war, Pakistan and India made slow progress towards the normalisation of relations. In July 1972, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met in the Indian hill station of Shimla. They signed the Shimla Agreement, by which India would return all Pakistani personnel (over 90,000) and captured territory in the west, and the two countries would "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations." Diplomatic and trade relations were also re-established in 1976.

1990s

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In 1997, high-level Indo-Pakistan talks resumed after a three-year pause. The Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India met twice and the foreign secretaries conducted three rounds of talks. In June 1997, the foreign secretaries identified eight "outstanding issues" around which continuing talks would be focused. The conflict over the status of Kashmir, (referred by India as Jammu and Kashmir), an issue since Independence, remains the major stumbling block in their dialogue. India maintains that the entire former princely state is an integral part of the Indian union, while Pakistan insists that UN resolutions calling for self-determination of the people of the state/province must be taken into account. It however refuses to abide by the previous part of the resolution, which calls for it to vacate all territories occupied.

In September 1997, the talks broke down over the structure of how to deal with the issues of Kashmir, and peace and security. Pakistan advocated that the issues be treated by separate working groups. India responded that the two issues be taken up along with six others on a simultaneous basis.

Attempts to restart dialogue between the two nations were given a major boost by the February 1999 meeting of both Prime Ministers in Lahore and their signing of three agreements.

2000s

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In 2001, a summit was called in Agra; Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf turned up to meet Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The talks fell through.

On 20 June 2004, with a new government in place in India, both countries agreed to extend a nuclear testing ban and to set up a hotline between their foreign secretaries aimed at preventing misunderstandings that might lead to a nuclear war.[106]

Baglihar Dam issue was a new issue raised by Pakistan in 2005.

After Dr. Manmohan Singh become prime minister of India in May 2004, the Punjab provincial Government declared it would develop Gah, his place of birth, as a model village in his honour and name a school after him.[107] There is also a village in India named Pakistan, despite occasional pressure over the years to change its name the villagers have resisted.[108]

The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service has helped ease tensions between India and Pakistan. Shown here is India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh flagging off the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus in Srinagar on 7 April 2005.

Violent activities in the region declined in 2004. There are two main reasons for this: warming of relations between New Delhi and Islamabad which consequently lead to a ceasefire between the two countries in 2003 and the fencing of the Line of Control being carried out by the Indian Army. Moreover, coming under intense international pressure, Islamabad was compelled to take action against the militants' training camps on its territory. In 2004, the two countries also agreed upon decreasing the number of troops present in the region.

Under pressure, Kashmiri militant organisations made an offer for talks and negotiations with New Delhi, which India welcomed.

India's Border Security Force blamed the Pakistani military for providing cover-fire for the terrorists whenever they infiltrated into Indian territory from Pakistan. Pakistan in turn has also blamed India for providing support to terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan such as the BLA.

In 2005, Pakistan's information minister, Sheikh Rashid, was alleged to have run a terrorist training camp in 1990 in N.W. Frontier, Pakistan. The Pakistani government dismissed the charges against its minister as an attempt to hamper the ongoing peace process between the two neighbours.

Both India and Pakistan have launched several mutual confidence-building measures (CBMs) to ease tensions between the two. These include more high-level talks, easing visa restrictions, and restarting of cricket matches between the two. The new bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad has also helped bring the two sides closer. Pakistan and India have also decided to co-operate on economic fronts.

Some improvements in the relations are seen with the re-opening of a series of transportation networks near the India–Pakistan border, with the most important being bus routes and railway lines.

A major clash between Indian security forces and militants occurred when a group of insurgents tried to infiltrate into Kashmir from Pakistan in July 2005. The same month also saw a Kashmiri militant attack on Ayodhya and Srinagar. However, these developments had little impact on the peace process.

An Indian man held in Pakistani prisons since 1975 as an accused spy walked across the border to freedom 3 March 2008, an unconditional release that Pakistan said was done to improve relations between the two countries.[109]

In 2006, a "Friends Without Borders" scheme began with the help of two British tourists. The idea was that Indian and Pakistani children would make pen pals and write friendly letters to each other. The idea was so successful in both countries that the organisation found it "impossible to keep up". The World's Largest Love Letter was recently sent from India to Pakistan.[110]

2010s

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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi received by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in December 2015, during a visit to Pakistan by Modi.[111]

In December 2010, several Pakistani newspapers published stories about India's leadership and relationship with militants in Pakistan that the papers claimed were found in the United States diplomatic cables leak. A British newspaper, The Guardian, which had the Wikileaks cables in its possession reviewed the cables and concluded that the Pakistani claims were "not accurate" and that "WikiLeaks [was] being exploited for propaganda purposes."[112]

On 10 February 2011, India agreed to resume talks with Pakistan which were suspended after 26/11 Mumbai Attacks.[113] India had put on hold all the diplomatic relations saying it will only continue if Pakistan will act against the accused of Mumbai attacks.

On 13 April 2012, following a thaw in relations whereby India gained most favoured nation status in the country, India announced the removal of foreign direct investment restrictions from Pakistan to India.[114]

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Hina Rabbani Khar on 11 July 2012, stated in Phnom Penh that her country is willing to resolve some of the disputes, including Sir Creek and Siachen, on the basis of agreements reached in past.[115]

On 7 September 2012, Indian External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna would pay a 3-day visit to Pakistan to review the progress of bilateral dialogue with his Pakistani counterpart.[116]

In August 2019, following the approval of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill in the Indian Parliament, which revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir,[117][118] further tension was brought between the two countries, with Pakistan downgrading their diplomatic ties, closing its airspace, and suspending bilateral trade with India.[119]

The Kartarpur Corridor was opened in November 2019.[120]

2020s

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On 25 February 2021, India and Pakistan issued a joint statement indicating that both sides agreed to stop firing at each other at the Line of Control (LOC, disputed de facto border) in Kashmir.[121]

Despite this, in July 2021 Indian government rejected Pakistan's call for talks, stating that "Peace, prosperity can't coexist with terrorism".[122]

On 16 October 2024, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar met Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to discuss topics at the SCO Summit dinner in Islamabad.[123][124][125]

Response to natural calamities

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2001 Gujarat earthquake in India

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In response to the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, Pakistani President Pervez Mushrraf sent a plane load of relief supplies from Islamabad to Ahmedabad.[126] They carried 200 tents and more than 2,000 blankets.[127] Furthermore, the President called Indian PM to express his 'sympathy' over the loss from the earthquake.[128]

2005 earthquake in Pakistan

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India offered aid to Pakistan in response to the 2005 Kashmir earthquake on 8 October. Indian and Pakistani High Commissioners consulted with one another regarding cooperation in relief work. India sent 25 tonnes of relief material to Pakistan including food, blankets and medicine. Large Indian companies such as Infosys offered aid up to $226,000. On 12 October, an Ilyushin-76 cargo plane ferried across seven truckloads (about 82 tons) of army medicines, 15,000 blankets and 50 tents and returned to New Delhi. A senior air force official also stated that they had been asked by the Indian government to be ready to fly out another similar consignment.[129]

On 14 October, India dispatched the second consignment of relief material to Pakistan, by train through the Wagah Border. The consignment included 5,000 blankets, 370 tents, 5 tons of plastic sheets and 12 tons of medicine. A third consignment of medicine and relief material was also sent shortly afterwards by train.[130] India also pledged $25 million as aid to Pakistan.[131] India opened the first of three points at Chakan Da Bagh, in Poonch, on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan for earthquake relief work.[132]

2022 Pakistan floods

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Amid the 2022 Pakistan floods, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed his "heartfelt condolences to families of the victims".[133] As of 30 August, it has been reported that the government of India is considering sending relief aid to Pakistan.[134]

Economic relations

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India and Pakistan have curtailed formal trade; South Asia, the region inhabited by the two countries, is the least economically integrated region in the world, with only 5% of its trade conducted internally.[135] However, there is an informal bilateral trade of around $10 billion, with most of the goods imported by Pakistan.[136]

During the 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, bilateral maritime trade was suspended.[137]

Social relations

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Organisational ties

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The 2007 SAARC Car rally crossing the Wagah border. The event saw travellers commute throughout the SAARC nations[138]

India and Pakistan both feature in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Commonwealth of Nations. SAARC membership initially helped the two countries come to certain agreements, such as simplifying visa access for each other, while in the early years of independence, one of the reasons both countries remained in the Commonwealth was arguably to prevent a British preference towards the other country.[139][140] Eventually SAARC became defunct largely due to the impasse between the two nations,[141] and since the 2025 Pahalgam attack, India removed SAARC visa privileges for Pakistani nationals.[142]

Aman ki Asha is a joint venture and campaign between The Times of India and the Jang Group started in 2010 calling for mutual peace and development of diplomatic and cultural relations.[143]

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The Kartarpur Corridor (left) was launched in 2019 to allow Indian Sikhs to visit Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur (right), which is 4km across the border[144]

India and Pakistan, particularly Northern India and Eastern Pakistan, to some degree have similar cultures, cuisines and languages due to common Indo-Aryan heritage which spans through the two countries and throughout much of the northern subcontinent which also underpin the historical ties between the two. Pakistani singers, musicians, comedians and entertainers have enjoyed widespread popularity in India, with many achieving overnight fame in the Indian film industry Bollywood. Likewise, Indian music and film are very popular in Pakistan. Being located in the northernmost region of South Asia, Pakistan's culture is somewhat similar to that of North India, especially the northwest.

The Punjab region was split into Punjab, Pakistan and Punjab, India following the independence and partition of the two countries in 1947. The Punjabi people are today the largest ethnic group in Pakistan and also an important ethnic group of northern India. The founder of Sikhism was born in the modern-day Pakistani Punjab province, in the city of Nankana Sahib. Each year, millions of Indian Sikh pilgrims cross over to visit holy Sikh sites in Nankana Sahib. The Sindhi people are the native ethnic group of the Pakistani province of Sindh. Many Hindu Sindhis migrated to India in 1947, making the country home to a sizeable Sindhi community. In addition, the millions of Muslims who migrated from India to the newly created Pakistan during independence came to be known as the Muhajir people; they are settled predominantly in Karachi and still maintain family links in India.

Relations between Pakistan and India have also resumed through platforms such as media and communications.

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The evening flag lowering ceremony at the India–Pakistan border near Wagah.

The India–Pakistan border is the official international boundary that demarcates the Indian states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat from the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The Wagah border is the only road crossing between India and Pakistan and lies on the Grand Trunk Road, connecting Lahore, Pakistan with Amritsar, India. Each evening, the Wagah–Attari border ceremony takes place, in which the flags are lowered and guards on both sides make a pompous military display and exchange handshakes.

Linguistic ties

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The name Hindustani written in Hindi and Urdu scripts

Hindustani is the lingua franca of North India and Pakistan, as well as the official language of both countries, under the standard registers Hindi and Urdu, respectively. Standard Urdu is mutually intelligible with standard Hindi. Hindustani is also widely understood and used as a lingua franca amongst South Asians including Sri Lankans, Nepalis and Bangladeshis, and is the language of Bollywood, which is enjoyed throughout much of the subcontinent.

Apart from Hindustani, India and Pakistan also share a distribution of the Punjabi language (written in the Gurmukhi script in Indian Punjab, and the Shahmukhi script in Pakistani Punjab), Kashmiri language and Sindhi language, mainly due to population exchange. These languages belong to a common Indo-Aryan family that are spoken in countries across the subcontinent.

Matrimonial ties

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Some Indian and Pakistani people marry across the border at instances. Many Indians and Pakistanis in the diaspora, especially in the United States, intermarry, as there are large cultural similarities between the two countries respectively.[145]

In April 2010 a high-profile Pakistani cricketer, Shoaib Malik married the Indian tennis star Sania Mirza.[146] The wedding received much media attention and was said to transfix both India and Pakistan.[147]

Sporting ties

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2023 Cricket World Cup match

Cricket and hockey matches between the two (as well as other sports to a lesser degree such as those of the SAARC/South Asian Games) have often been political in nature. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan General Zia-ul Haq travelled to India for a bout of "cricket diplomacy" to keep India from supporting the Soviets by opening another front. Pervez Musharaff also tried to do the same more than a decade later but to no avail.

Following the 2008 terror attack in Mumbai, India stopped playing bilateral cricket series against Pakistan. Since then, the Indian team has only played against them in ICC and Asian Cricket Council events such as the Cricket World Cup, T20 World Cup, Asia Cup and ICC Champions Trophy. In 2017, the then Sports Minister of India, Vijay Goel opposed further bilateral series due to Pakistan's alleged sponsoring of terrorism, saying that "there cannot be sports relations between the two countries [while] there is terrorism from the Pakistani side."[148] The Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) also opposed any further series without the permission of the Indian government.[149] The BCCI also did not allow Pakistani players to play in the Indian Premier League in the aftermath of the 2008 terror attack, although they were part of the inaugural season.[150]

The two nations also share some of the same traditional games, such as kabaddi and kho kho.[151] In tennis, Rohan Bopanna of India and Aisam-ul-Haq Qureshi of Pakistan have formed a successful duo and have been dubbed as the "Indo-Pak Express".[152]

Diasporic relations

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The large size of the Indian diaspora and Pakistani diaspora in many different countries throughout the world has created strong diasporic relations. It is quite common for a "Little India" and a "Little Pakistan" to co-exist in South Asian ethnic enclaves in overseas countries.

British Indians and British Pakistanis, the largest and second-largest ethnic minorities living in the United Kingdom respectively, are said to have friendly relations with one another.[153][154] There are various cities such as Birmingham, Blackburn and Manchester where British Indians and British Pakistanis live alongside each other in peace and harmony. Both Indians and Pakistanis living in the UK fit under the category of British Asian. The UK is also home to the Pakistan & India friendship forum.[155] In the United States, Indians and Pakistanis are classified under the South Asian American category and share many cultural traits, with intermarriage being common.[145]

The British MEP Sajjad Karim is of Pakistani origin. He is a member of the European Parliament Friends of India Group, Karim was also responsible for opening up Europe to free trade with India.[156][157] He narrowly escaped the Mumbai attacks at Hotel Taj in November 2008. Despite the atrocity, Karim does not wish the remaining killer Ajmal Kasab to be sentenced to death. He said: "I believe he had a fair and transparent trial and I support the guilty verdict. But I am not a supporter of capital punishment. I believe he should be given a life sentence, but that life should mean life."[158][159]

Head of state visits

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From India to Pakistan
Year Name
1953 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
1960 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
1964 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri
1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (Funeral of Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and SAARC Summit)
1989 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
1999 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
2004 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (SAARC Summit)
2015 Prime Minister Narendra Modi (Informal meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif)

See also

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Foreign relations

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History

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Human rights

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Cultural issues

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Wars and skirmishes

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Sports

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References

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

India–Pakistan relations comprise the diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural ties between the Republic of and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, two nations formed by the partition of British India on August 15, , which divided the subcontinent along religious lines amid demands for a separate Muslim-majority state. The partition triggered widespread communal riots and the largest mass migration in history, displacing approximately 15 million people and causing up to two million deaths from violence, disease, and starvation. Relations have since been defined by profound antagonism, stemming from the unresolved over Jammu and Kashmir—ignited by Pakistan's support for a tribal in , which prompted the Hindu ruler's accession to —and exacerbated by Pakistan's establishment as an contrasting India's secular framework.
The two countries have engaged in four full-scale wars (1947–1948, 1965, 1971, and 1999), with the 1971 conflict culminating in 's defeat and the secession of as after 's intervention against Pakistani atrocities there, alongside persistent proxy warfare through -backed militants in and elsewhere. 's agency has systematically sponsored terrorist groups like and , responsible for major attacks such as the 2008 assaults, as documented in international assessments identifying as a haven for such entities despite its denials. Both nations possess nuclear arsenals— conducting its first test in 1974 and in 1998—introducing catastrophic escalation risks to border skirmishes and crises, as evidenced by near-misses during the 1999 incursion and 2019 airstrikes. Intermittent diplomatic overtures, including the 1972 committing disputes to bilateral resolution and the 2019 facilitating Sikh pilgrimages, have fostered limited cross-border connectivity amid economic interdependence via informal trade exceeding formal volumes, yet structural distrust endures due to Pakistan's military dominance in politics and reliance on asymmetric tactics over genuine normalization. India's policy emphasizes countering as a prerequisite for engagement, reflecting empirical patterns where Pakistani ceasefires coincide with internal pressures rather than strategic shifts.

Historical Origins

Pre-Partition Dynamics

The was established on December 30, 1906, in , primarily to safeguard the political interests of Muslims in British India, who constituted approximately 25% of the population and feared marginalization under a Hindu-majority democratic system dominated by the , founded in 1885. Initially encouraged by British authorities, the League advocated loyalty to the empire while seeking separate electorates, formalized in the Morley-Minto Reforms, which institutionalized communal representation and exacerbated divisions by treating religious communities as political entities rather than a unified Indian nation. Hindu-Muslim relations, while featuring periods of cooperation such as the 1916 where and the League agreed on joint constitutional demands, deteriorated amid rising and political competition. One of the earliest major riots erupted in August 1893 in , killing around 100 people and injuring 800, often triggered by disputes over religious processions and cow slaughter. Violence intensified in the 1920s, with events like the 1923-1928 and Calcutta riots reflecting growing mistrust, as Muslims perceived 's non-cooperation movement as Hindu-centric, while Hindus viewed League demands for safeguards as divisive. British policies, including classifications from 1871 onward, further rigidified fluid pre-colonial identities into fixed communal categories, amplifying tensions. By the 1930s, these dynamics culminated in Muhammad Ali Jinnah's shift from promoting unity—having joined in 1906 before leading —to championing the , arguing that Muslims and Hindus represented distinct nations with irreconcilable cultural, religious, and social differences incapable of coexisting in a single state. This ideology gained traction after the 1937 provincial elections, where 's exclusion of ministers in Muslim-majority areas heightened fears of Hindu Raj, setting the stage for demands for autonomy in Muslim regions. Empirical demographic realities—Muslims concentrated in northwest and —underpinned the 's push for territorial separation, contrasting 's vision of a secular, united dominion.

Partition and the Two-Nation Theory

The maintained that Hindus and Muslims in British India represented two distinct nations, separated by irreconcilable differences in religion, language, culture, and social norms, rendering unified governance untenable without subjugating the Muslim minority to Hindu-majority dominance. This doctrine, articulated by as leader of the , evolved from earlier Muslim separatist sentiments but gained political momentum in amid fears that under Congress-led rule would marginalize Muslims demographically and politically. Jinnah emphasized that Muslims' distinct identity warranted safeguards beyond mere , positioning the theory as a pragmatic response to the subcontinent's religious demographics rather than mere communalism. The theory crystallized into a demand for territorial separation through the , adopted by the Muslim League on March 23, 1940, which called for "independent states" in Muslim-majority regions of northwestern and eastern British India, ensuring sovereignty over contiguous districts where Muslims predominated. This resolution, drafted amid uncertainties, rejected federal union under a central Hindu-dominated authority and laid the ideological groundwork for , though it initially envisioned multiple federated units rather than a single state. Its significance lay in unifying Muslim political aspirations, as evidenced by the League's sweeping victories in the 1946 provincial elections, where it captured nearly all Muslim-reserved seats, underscoring widespread support for partition. Escalating communal tensions, including the violent Direct Action Day riots in Calcutta on August 16, 1946, which killed thousands, rendered compromise impossible, prompting Viceroy Lord Mountbatten to propose partition in his June 3, 1947, plan. The British Parliament's Indian Independence Act, passed on July 18, 1947, enacted the division into the dominions of India and Pakistan, effective August 15, 1947, with princely states empowered to accede to either. Boundaries were hastily drawn by British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe, whose —announced August 17, 1947—bisected and based on district-level religious majorities, often ignoring economic, geographic, or ethnic realities. Partition unleashed unprecedented communal violence and displacement, as , , and fled across the new borders amid retaliatory massacres, with trains and convoys becoming sites of slaughter. Scholarly estimates place the scale at 14 to 18 million people uprooted—the largest migration in —and deaths ranging from 500,000 to 2 million, attributable to direct killings, starvation, and disease, though precise figures remain contested due to incomplete records and varying methodologies. This cataclysm, exacerbated by the rushed timeline and inadequate security preparations, entrenched mutual suspicions between India and the nascent Pakistan, framing their relations from inception.

Immediate Post-Independence Disputes

Following the partition of British India into the independent dominions of and on August 14 and 15, 1947, respectively, immediate disputes emerged over the accession of princely states, which were theoretically entities required to choose accession to one dominion or the other based on the Indian Independence Act. The primary conflicts involved and Jammu and Kashmir, where decisions by rulers clashed with the geographic, demographic, and strategic interests of the successor states, leading to diplomatic standoffs and military actions. In , a in present-day with a Muslim , Muhammad Mahabat Khanji III, ruling over a predominantly Hindu population of approximately 80%, the Nawab declared accession to on August 15, 1947, citing the despite the state's encirclement by Indian territory and lack of geographic contiguity with Pakistan. India contested this accession, arguing it contradicted the wishes of the Hindu majority and the principle of contiguity emphasized by Lord Mountbatten, and imposed an economic blockade while encouraging a led by local leaders. Pakistan dispatched a , but facing unrest and the Nawab's flight to Pakistan on October 25, 1947, Indian forces entered Junagadh on November 9, 1947, prompting a plebiscite on February 20, 1948, where 99.95% of voters opted to join India out of 190,779 participating. Pakistan recognized the accession initially but did not pursue military intervention, viewing it as inconsistent with India's later stance on . The Jammu and Kashmir dispute proved more escalatory, involving , a Hindu ruler presiding over a Muslim-majority population of about 77%, who initially sought a standstill agreement with both dominions and delayed accession amid internal unrest. On October 22, 1947, Pashtun tribesmen from , armed and logistically supported by Pakistani military officers though officially disavowed as irregulars, launched an invasion from 's , capturing and advancing toward , committing atrocities that displaced thousands. Facing imminent collapse, the signed the to on October 26, 1947, requesting military aid; Indian troops were airlifted to the next day, October 27, marking the onset of the first Indo-Pakistani War, which continued until a UN-mediated on January 1, 1949, leaving controlling roughly two-thirds of the territory. contested the accession's validity, alleging coercion and emphasizing the Muslim majority's preference for , while upheld it as legally binding under the paramountcy lapse doctrine.

Core Territorial Disputes

Kashmir Accession and Insurgency

The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, ruled by , initially sought to remain independent following the lapse of British paramountcy on August 15, 1947, entering into standstill agreements with both and for continued administrative services. However, on October 22, 1947, irregular tribal militias from Pakistan's , backed by Pakistani military officers and logistics, launched an invasion into , capturing and advancing toward while committing atrocities against civilians. This aggression prompted the to sign the to on October 26, 1947, formally integrating the state into the Indian Union and requesting military assistance; Indian troops airlifted into on October 27 halted the invaders' advance. The ensuing saw Indian forces reclaim much of the and but halt at the Uri-Poonch line after Pakistani regular troops entered in May 1948; a UN-mediated took effect on January 1, 1949, establishing the (LoC) that divided the region, with administering about two-thirds, including the populous , and controlling the remainder. UN Security Council Resolution 47, adopted on April 21, 1948, demanded Pakistan withdraw its tribesmen and nationals first, followed by Indian troop reductions, as preconditions for a plebiscite to determine accession, but Pakistan's non-compliance stalled implementation, leaving the accession's finality unresolved in 's view while contested its validity. The LoC demarcation formalized a partition, with periodic skirmishes but relative stability until the late 1980s. Tensions reignited with the alleged rigging of the 1987 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections, where the National Conference-Congress alliance manipulated results, defeating Muslim United Front candidates and eroding faith in democratic processes among Kashmiri youth, many of whom subsequently joined militant groups. The insurgency erupted in July 1988 with attacks by the (JKLF) and escalated in 1989, marked by the and bombings, evolving into a full-scale separatist and Islamist campaign involving thousands of militants trained in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) camps run by Pakistan's (ISI). Pakistan provided logistical, financial, and doctrinal support to at least 91 insurgent training facilities, enabling groups like to peak at several thousand active fighters by the early 1990s, though denied direct involvement, attributing it to indigenous discontent. Indian counterinsurgency operations, including the deployment of the and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-affiliated militias like the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin, reduced militant strength from peaks exceeding 10,000 in the mid-1990s to under 1,000 active by the 2010s, amid allegations of abuses on both sides; Pakistan's proxy strategy sustained low-level violence across the LoC, with infiltration attempts continuing despite India's fencing efforts. The insurgency's causal roots lie in local political alienation exacerbated by external sponsorship, as evidenced by captured militants' confessions and ISI documents, rather than purely spontaneous , though grievances over governance fueled initial recruitment.

Indus Waters and Resource Conflicts

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed on September 19, 1960, in by Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani President Ayub Khan under World Bank mediation, allocates the waters of the system between the two nations. The treaty divides the six main rivers into eastern (Ravi, , ), allocated to India for unrestricted use, and western (, , Chenab), primarily allocated to with India permitted limited non-consumptive uses such as run-of-the-river projects subject to constraints on storage capacity (maximum 3.6 million acre-feet combined) and diversion volumes to prevent significant reduction in downstream flows. receives approximately 80% of the total Indus basin flow through the western rivers, reflecting India's upstream position but its concessions on these rivers during negotiations amid post-partition tensions. The agreement established the Permanent Indus Commission, comprising one commissioner from each country, to facilitate data exchange and , with escalation options to a neutral expert or Court of Arbitration. Disputes have centered on India's hydropower projects on western rivers, which Pakistan alleges violate treaty provisions by enabling excessive storage, flooding risks, or flow reductions during dry seasons critical for its agriculture-dependent economy. The 1978 Salal Dam on the Chenab prompted Pakistan's objections to India's designs, resolved bilaterally with design modifications increasing spillway capacity. In the Baglihar Dam case on the Chenab, commissioned in 2008, Pakistan filed objections in 2005 over reservoir size and gate operations; a World Bank-appointed neutral expert ruled in 2007 largely in India's favor, requiring minor adjustments to sluice gate heights but affirming the project's overall compliance with run-of-river criteria. Similarly, the Kishanganga (renamed Shahid Abbas Raza) hydroelectric project on a Jhelum tributary, operational since 2018 with 330 MW capacity, faced Pakistani claims of excessive diversion; the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2013 permitted the project but mandated a 9 cubic meters per second minimum environmental flow to Pakistan, a ruling India implemented after initial resistance. The Ratle hydroelectric project on the Chenab, planned at 850 MW, has mirrored these tensions since Pakistan's 2012 objections to its storage and power generation features, leading to parallel proceedings: a neutral expert process initiated in 2010 (reinvigorated post-2016) and a 2016 Pakistani request at the PCA over interpretation of terms like "run-of-river." In January 2025, the neutral expert ruled in India's favor, validating the project's design under treaty limits, though Pakistan contested the decision's scope. The PCA's August 8, 2025, addressed general interpretation, affirming its competence but deferring specific project adjudications pending bilateral compliance. Tensions escalated after terrorist attacks attributed to Pakistan-based groups, with India reviewing treaty implementation following the 2016 Uri incident and announcing measures to utilize its full eastern river share in 2019 post-Pulwama. On April 23, 2025, placed the in citing after a deadly attack in , suspending data sharing and project consultations while halting World Bank-mediated proceedings on Kishanganga and Ratle; this move prompted to urge revival and compliance, amid claims of withheld river flow data. has advanced plans, including expanding canals on the Chenab to capture more silt-laden flows, potentially reducing downstream supplies to by altering and timing without formally abrogating the . These actions underscore 's vulnerability, as Indus waters constitute 45% of its irrigation needs, while 's upstream leverage has fueled accusations of weaponization, though mechanisms have historically mitigated outright conflict despite three wars. As of October 2025, the suspension persists without formal termination, with mediation calls from bodies like emphasizing de-escalation to avert broader resource crises amid climate-induced variability in basin flows.

Other Border and Maritime Disputes

The Sir Creek dispute centers on a 96-kilometer-long tidal in the marshlands of the , separating in India from in . This , originating from differing interpretations of colonial-era maps dating to 1914 and 1925, has remained unresolved since the 1947 partition. India asserts the international boundary follows the eastern bank (Green Line) of the creek, citing its non-navigability and historical administrative lines from the era. Pakistan counters that the creek is navigable for much of its length, advocating a midline (Orange Line) demarcation in line with international maritime law principles. The dispute's significance extends beyond the land border to maritime claims, as the creek's demarcation determines the starting point for exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Arabian Sea, potentially encompassing hydrocarbon reserves estimated in billions of barrels. Resolution of the land boundary is prerequisite for delimiting maritime boundaries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which neither party has fully invoked bilaterally due to the linkage. India has unilaterally extended its continental shelf claims to the UN in 2009 and 2015, bypassing Pakistan's position, while Pakistan insists on joint resolution. Incidents, such as the 1999 downing of a Pakistani naval aircraft near the area and frequent fisherman arrests, underscore enforcement challenges, with over 200 Indian fishermen detained annually by Pakistan in disputed waters as of recent years. Negotiations have occurred sporadically, including during the 1969 Tashkent talks post-Rann of Kutch conflict and composite dialogue rounds from 2004–2007, which produced a nautical chart but no agreement on the boundary line. A 2007 joint survey confirmed technical feasibility for demarcation but stalled amid broader bilateral tensions following the . No significant progress has been made since, with the issue de-linked from but tied to trust deficits. As of October 2025, tensions have escalated, with constructing fortifications along the creek and its naval chief inspecting disputed sites, prompting Indian warnings of retaliation. India's tri-services exercise "Trishul" near the in late October 2025 led to restrict airspace, highlighting Sir Creek's potential as a flashpoint amid posturing. Analysts note that unresolved mapping discrepancies and strategic resource stakes perpetuate the , with little prospect for bilateral resolution absent political will.

Direct Military Engagements

1947–1948 War

The arose from the disputed accession of the of Jammu and Kashmir following the partition of British on August 15, 1947. Under the Indian Independence Act, could accede to either or or remain independent, based on geographic contiguity and popular sentiment. Jammu and Kashmir, ruled by Hindu despite its Muslim-majority population, initially pursued a policy of non-alignment through standstill agreements with both dominions. However, tensions escalated due to and Pakistan's concerns over potential Indian dominance in the region. On October 22, 1947, Pashtun tribesmen from 's , armed and logistically supported by elements of the Pakistani military, launched an invasion into , aiming to capture the region and install a pro-Pakistan government. These irregular forces, numbering several thousand, advanced rapidly, looting and committing atrocities against civilians in areas like and , which fell within days. The incursion overwhelmed the poorly equipped Jammu and Kashmir State Forces, prompting widespread panic and an estimated 35,000 to 40,000 deaths among local residents during the initial phase, primarily non-combatants. Pakistan denied direct involvement, framing it as a spontaneous tribal uprising, but declassified records and eyewitness accounts indicate state orchestration to preempt Indian influence. Facing collapse, Maharaja signed the to India on October 26, 1947, formally integrating into the Indian Union and requesting military assistance. India accepted the accession on October 27, conditional on future consultation with Kashmiri representatives, and airlifted troops to the same day, securing the airport and halting the tribal advance. Pakistani regulars began infiltrating in November, escalating the conflict into full-scale warfare involving Indian advances in the and , and Pakistani counteroffensives in areas like Uri and Poonch. Key battles included Indian recapture of and the defense of , where local militias aided Indian forces against encirclement. India referred the matter to the on January 1, 1948, alleging Pakistani aggression. The UN established the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), which in August 1948 proposed a followed by phased withdrawal of forces—Pakistani first, then Indian—and a plebiscite under international supervision. Negotiations stalled over demilitarization, with Pakistan refusing withdrawal without guarantees. A formal took effect on January 1, 1949, delineating the (later the ), leaving approximately two-thirds of under Indian administration and one-third under Pakistani control. Military casualties totaled around 1,500 Indian soldiers killed and several thousand Pakistani and tribal fighters, though exact figures remain disputed due to incomplete records. The war entrenched the dispute, with neither side achieving total victory and the plebiscite unresolved amid mutual accusations of non-compliance.

1965 War

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 originated from Pakistan's strategic miscalculation aimed at seizing control of the disputed Jammu and Kashmir region through covert infiltration. In early August 1965, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, dispatching approximately 26,000 to 33,000 regular troops and irregulars disguised as Kashmiri locals across the ceasefire line to incite an uprising against Indian administration and precipitate a rebellion. The operation, premised on the assumption of widespread local support for accession to Pakistan, encountered immediate resistance from Indian forces and local populations, failing to spark the anticipated insurgency due to poor intelligence on Kashmiri sentiments and logistical challenges in the rugged terrain. This failure prompted Pakistan to escalate with Operation Grand Slam on September 1, 1965, a conventional offensive in the Chhamb sector of Jammu to capture Akhnoor and sever Indian supply lines to Kashmir. India's response shifted the conflict from limited skirmishes to full-scale war, launching counteroffensives that expanded operations beyond into and . On September 6, 1965, Indian forces crossed the international border toward , aiming to relieve pressure on by threatening Pakistan's core territory; simultaneous advances targeted and the vital rail hub at Chawinda, where the war's largest armored engagement since unfolded from September 14–19, involving over 400 tanks on both sides. Pakistani defenses held in , inflicting heavy Indian tank losses (India reported 29 destroyed at Chawinda, while Pakistan claimed 120), but Indian troops captured key positions like the Haji Pir Pass on August 28, shortening supply routes to by 200 kilometers. In the air domain, the conducted over 4,000 sorties, achieving air superiority through strikes on Pakistani bases, though both sides claimed disproportionate victories—Pakistan asserted downing 104 Indian aircraft for 19 losses, while India reported destroying 73 Pakistani planes for 35 of its own. Naval engagements remained limited, with India blockading on September 8 but avoiding deep-water confrontations. The war concluded without a decisive military outcome, as international intervention halted advances amid mounting casualties and economic strain. A United Nations-mandated ceasefire took effect on September 22, 1965, after 17 days of intense fighting, during which gained about 1,900 square kilometers of territory (mostly in ) while captured around 550 square kilometers (primarily in Chhamb). Casualty figures remain disputed: Indian official estimates report 3,264 killed and 8,443 wounded, contrasted by Pakistani claims of 3,800 killed and Indian losses exceeding 10,000; tank attrition was severe, with India losing 128 and Pakistan 200–250. Mediated by the , the Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 1966, committing both nations to withdraw forces to pre-war positions by February 25 and restore diplomatic relations, though it failed to address underlying disputes and sowed seeds for future mistrust. The conflict exposed Pakistan's overreliance on offensive gambles without sufficient conventional superiority, while India's defensive depth and numerical advantages prevented territorial losses but highlighted vulnerabilities in armored doctrine.

1971 War and Bangladesh Liberation

The 1971 Indo-Pakistani War arose from a deepening political crisis in Pakistan after the December 1970 general elections, where the Awami League—championing greater autonomy for East Pakistan—won an absolute majority in the National Assembly. Pakistani military leaders under President Yahya Khan blocked the assembly's convening and the transfer of power to Awami League head Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, sparking mass protests and civil unrest in East Pakistan. On March 25, 1971, Pakistani forces initiated , a coordinated military campaign to crush Bengali resistance by targeting civilian populations, intellectuals, students, and infrastructure across . The operation triggered widespread atrocities, with death toll estimates ranging from 500,000 to over 3 million killed during the ensuing conflict. This repression displaced approximately 10 million refugees into , imposing severe economic and security burdens on the Indian government. India provided sanctuary to the refugees and covertly supported the , irregular Bengali forces conducting against Pakistani troops. To counter potential external threats, India signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on August 9, 1971. Escalation peaked on December 3, 1971, when Pakistan launched preemptive air strikes on Indian airfields and military targets, prompting India to respond with a full invasion of while defending its western border against Pakistani incursions. Indian forces advanced swiftly, isolating Pakistani units and converging on . The war concluded on December 16, , with the of Pakistani Eastern Command forces in , led by Lieutenant General to Indian Lt. Gen. . Approximately 93,000 Pakistani personnel—soldiers, sailors, and airmen—became prisoners of war, the largest capitulation since . Indian military losses included 2,307 killed and 6,163 wounded, per official reports. The surrender facilitated the emergence of as an independent state, fundamentally altering South Asian by partitioning . The conflict's outcome humiliated Pakistan's military establishment and strained India-Pakistan relations to their nadir, as India's decisive intervention not only ended the but also exposed the fragility of Pakistan's two-wing federation. Subsequent diplomatic efforts, including the 1972 , aimed to repatriate POWs and establish bilateral mechanisms for resolving disputes, though underlying animosities persisted.

Siachen Glacier Conflict

The Siachen Glacier conflict encompasses the high-altitude military standoff between and over the and the Saltoro Ridge in the range of the greater Kashmir region, where the international border remains undefined beyond map coordinate on the 1949 line established after the first Indo-Pakistani . The dispute intensified in the early 1980s amid competing mountaineering expeditions and territorial assertions, with both nations claiming the area based on interpretations of the 1972 , which called for resolution along the but left the glacier's status ambiguous. viewed the extending northeast from toward the , while asserted a line southeast to the glacier, prompting preemptive military action. On April 13, 1984, India launched , airlifting troops via helicopters to seize control of the Sia La and Bilafond La passes, thereby securing approximately 70 kilometers of the 76-kilometer-long glacier and its tributary areas, including key heights dominating the region. This operation preempted a planned Pakistani advance under Operation Ababeel and established Indian dominance over the Saltoro Ridge, from which positions overlook potential infiltration routes into and the Valley. responded with counteroffensives but failed to regain the high ground, leading to intermittent artillery exchanges and patrols in the ensuing years. In June 1987, India conducted , advancing to capture the Pakistani-held Quaid Post at 6,500 meters elevation, further consolidating control over strategic outposts like Bana Top and Gyong La. The conflict has resulted in significant non-combat casualties due to extreme environmental conditions at altitudes exceeding 6,000 meters, including , frostbite, hypoxia, and hypothermia, with official Indian figures reporting 846 soldier deaths between and , the majority attributable to these factors rather than direct enemy fire. Pakistan has incurred comparable losses, though precise numbers remain classified and unverified in open sources; estimates suggest thousands of total casualties on both sides over four decades, underscoring the glacier's designation as the world's highest . Logistical challenges, including the need for sustained resupply and infrastructure like roads and bunkers, have imposed annual costs exceeding hundreds of millions of dollars for alone, with Pakistan facing similar burdens. Diplomatic efforts to resolve the standoff, including proposals for mutual disengagement and demilitarization discussed since the 1989 Lahore talks, have repeatedly stalled over verification mechanisms and authentication of troop withdrawals, with India insisting on prior Pakistani pullback from lower positions and Pakistan demanding joint monitoring. The 1999 Lahore Declaration and subsequent composite dialogue process referenced Siachen but yielded no agreement, as did 2012 negotiations in Islamabad, where core issues of trust and strategic positioning persisted. India maintains its presence to safeguard northern access routes and prevent Chinese-Pakistani encirclement via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, while Pakistan frames the glacier as an environmental and humanitarian concern requiring de-militarization for peace. As of 2025, the standoff continues without major escalations, marking over 41 years of Operation Meghdoot as India's longest sustained military deployment.

1999 Kargil Intrusion

In February 1999, Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani Prime Minister signed the , committing both nations to respect the (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir and to avoid actions that could escalate tensions. However, in the ensuing months, Pakistani military personnel, primarily from the Northern Light Infantry, crossed the LoC into India's , occupying approximately 130 strategic mountain peaks and posts along ridges overlooking the vital National Highway 1A connecting to . This intrusion, initiated in early winter 1998–1999 to exploit winter vacancies in Indian forward positions, aimed to sever India's supply lines to and force negotiations on . Pakistani officials initially denied regular army involvement, attributing the actions to Kashmiri militants, a claim contradicted by captured equipment, documents, and later admissions. India confirmed the scale of the intrusion on May 3, 1999, after shepherds and patrols reported suspicious activity, followed by the of an Indian patrol near Batalik on May 5. In response, mobilized forces under Operation Vijay on May 10, 1999, launching ground offensives to recapture lost positions while adhering to international norms by not crossing the LoC. The joined with on May 26, conducting airstrikes despite challenges from high-altitude terrain and Pakistani anti-aircraft fire, which downed two Indian fighter jets. Key battles ensued in sectors like , Batalik, and Mushkoh, including the recapture of Tololing on June 13 after intense fighting at elevations over 16,000 feet, and Tiger Hill on July 4, where Indian troops scaled sheer cliffs under heavy artillery and small-arms fire. Other critical gains included Point 5140 on June 20 and Jubar Heights on July 7. Pakistani forces, facing mounting losses and logistical difficulties, began withdrawing under diplomatic pressure, particularly from U.S. President , who urged during a July 4, 1999, meeting in Washington to pull back troops to restore the LoC status quo. later acknowledged the operation as a violation of the and a strategic misadventure by Pakistan's military, admitting in 2024 that it was "our fault" and had violated the agreement he co-signed. India declared victory on July 26, 1999, after evicting all intruders, though the conflict exposed intelligence failures and the risks of limited wars between nuclear-armed states. Casualties were significant given the harsh conditions: India reported 527 soldiers killed and over 1,300 wounded, primarily from artillery barrages and close-quarters combat. Pakistan's official figures claimed around 453 military deaths, but independent analyses and later Pakistani admissions, including Sharif's references to losses exceeding 700–800, suggest higher tolls potentially reaching 4,000 when accounting for underreported regular troops and mercenaries. The war strained bilateral ties, led to Sharif's ouster in a military coup by General Pervez Musharraf—who had planned the incursion—and reinforced India's resolve to defend the LoC, influencing subsequent military doctrines on rapid mobilization and precision strikes.

2025 Missile Strikes and Four-Day War

The 2025 India–Pakistan conflict, commonly referred to as the Four-Day War, commenced on May 7, 2025, when India executed Operation Sindoor, involving precision-guided missile and airstrikes on nine sites identified as terrorist training facilities operated by groups such as and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and mainland Pakistan. The operation was a direct retaliation for a terrorist attack on April 22, 2025, in , Indian-administered , where militants from The Resistance Front (TRF)—a front for Pakistan-linked outfits—killed 26 civilians and security personnel. Indian officials maintained that the strikes avoided Pakistani military installations and civilian areas, focusing solely on militant infrastructure to degrade cross-border terrorism capabilities, marking a shift toward proactive, limited cross-border actions under a of "cumulative deterrence." Pakistan's military responded immediately with artillery barrages and drone incursions along the (LoC), targeting Indian positions in Jammu and Kashmir, including a reported blitz on Poonch district that destroyed homes and inflicted civilian casualties. Over the subsequent days—May 8 to 10—escalation intensified with mutual exchanges of conventionally armed missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cross-border shelling, representing the most lethal confrontation between the nuclear-armed rivals since the 1999 Kargil conflict. Casualty figures remain disputed: Pakistan reported 40 civilian deaths, including women and children, from the initial Indian strikes—alleging hits on mosques and residential zones—and confirmed 11 military personnel killed, while accusing of broader aggression; India contested these claims, asserting minimal collateral damage and highlighting Pakistani initiation of ground incursions. Independent assessments noted the role of advanced drones and missiles in amplifying the intensity without triggering nuclear thresholds, though both sides' narratives— emphasizing surgical success and touting "textbook deterrence"—reflected domestic political imperatives over objective outcomes. A ceasefire was announced on May 10, 2025, effective from 1700 hours IST, following diplomacy reportedly influenced by U.S. pressure, though initial violations including explosions in and were reported shortly after. The truce held thereafter, averting broader war, but left enduring tensions: viewed the episode as validation of preemptive strikes against , while leveraged it to underscore defensive resolve amid internal critiques of its establishment. Post-conflict analyses highlighted risks of miscalculation in future escalations, given the integration of cyber and space assets, yet noted neither side achieved decisive strategic gains, perpetuating the cycle of proxy threats and retaliatory posturing.

Proxy Warfare and State-Sponsored Terrorism

Pakistan's ISI Role in Militancy

The (ISI), Pakistan's primary intelligence agency established in 1948, has played a documented role in fostering militant networks as proxies against , particularly to sustain since the late 1980s. Following the in 1989, the ISI repurposed battle-hardened fighters and recruitment pipelines originally developed for the anti-Soviet , redirecting them toward cross-border operations in Kashmir to challenge Indian control without committing conventional forces. This strategy provided while imposing asymmetric costs on through sustained . Key groups like (LeT), founded in the mid-1980s with direct ISI backing, received training, funding, and logistical support to conduct operations in Indian-administered and beyond. LeT's partnership with the ISI intensified in the early 1990s, enabling the group to establish training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and province, from which thousands of fighters infiltrated the annually during peak insurgency years in the 1990s and 2000s. Similarly, (JeM), formed in 2000 after ISI-facilitated release of its founder in the IC-814 hijacking, relied on ISI networks for recruitment and arms, launching high-profile attacks such as the 2001 Indian Parliament assault that nearly escalated to full war. These groups' infrastructure, including safe houses and financing channels, was intertwined with ISI oversight to maintain operational control. Evidence of ISI orchestration emerged prominently in the , where 10 LeT gunmen killed 166 people; convicted plotter David Coleman Headley testified in U.S. federal court in 2011 that he met multiple ISI officers, including Major Iqbal and Major Samir Ali, who provided funding exceeding $25,000, tactical guidance, and approval for targeting Mumbai sites like the Taj Mahal Hotel and . Headley's accounts detailed ISI's "S Section" as a dedicated covert unit handling militant assets, contradicting Pakistan's official denials of state involvement. Captured militants and intercepted communications have further corroborated ISI handlers directing attacks, such as the 2016 airbase assault by JeM and the 2019 bombing that killed 40 Indian paramilitary personnel, prompting India's airstrikes. Pakistan maintains that the ISI combats terrorism domestically and that militant actions stem from non-state actors, yet U.S. assessments highlight persistent ISI tolerance of anti-India groups for strategic leverage against perceived Indian dominance in and . This duality—cooperation against while shielding Kashmir-focused militants—has strained alliances, as evidenced by frozen U.S. in 2018 over insufficient action against LeT and JeM sanctuaries. Indian intelligence estimates over 10,000 militants trained in ISI-linked facilities since 1990, with infiltration peaking at 2,000-3,000 annually in the mid-2000s, underscoring the agency's causal role in prolonging the conflict despite intermittent crackdowns.

Major Cross-Border Terror Attacks

Cross-border terrorist attacks attributed to Pakistan-based militant groups have primarily targeted Indian security forces in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as symbolic sites and urban centers, resulting in hundreds of deaths since the late 1990s. These incidents often involve infiltration across the (LoC) or sea routes, with perpetrators linked to UN-designated organizations like (LeT) and (JeM), which maintain operational bases in . India has consistently attributed state sponsorship to 's (ISI) through training, funding, and safe havens, though denies involvement, claiming the groups operate independently or framing attacks as indigenous insurgencies. On December 13, 2001, five armed militants attacked the Parliament in , killing nine people including five security personnel, a gardener, and the attackers themselves in a subsequent firefight. The assault, involving gunmen and car bombs, was claimed by JeM and LeT fronts, with Indian investigations identifying Pakistani nationals among the perpetrators and tracing handlers to Pakistan-based networks. The November 2008 Mumbai attacks saw ten Pakistani nationals from LeT conduct coordinated shootings and bombings at hotels, a train station, and a Jewish center, killing 166 people and injuring over 300 in a 60-hour siege. The sole survivor, , confessed to training in under LeT commanders, with forensic evidence and intercepted communications confirming ISI logistical support, despite Pakistan's initial denials. In January 2016, four militants assaulted the Air Force Station near the border, killing seven Indian security personnel over a four-day operation before being neutralized. Indian intelligence linked the attackers to JeM, with phone intercepts to handlers in 's region, highlighting persistent infiltration vulnerabilities. The September 18, 2016, Uri army base attack in Jammu and Kashmir involved four JeM militants who infiltrated from , killing 17-19 soldiers in a predawn assault using grenades and firearms. Indian forensic analysis of weapons and GPS devices traced the operation to Pakistan-based JeM leadership, prompting India's subsequent surgical strikes across the LoC. On February 14, 2019, a JeM rammed an explosive-laden into a convoy of personnel in , Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 officers. JeM publicly claimed responsibility via videos showing the attacker, Adil Ahmad Dar, radicalized locally but directed by Pakistan-based chief , with explosives sourced through cross-border smuggling networks. Pakistan condemned the attack but rejected involvement, amid evidence of JeM's sanctuary in .

Balochistan and Internal Insurgencies

The Baloch insurgency in Pakistan's province, which spans over 40% of the country's land area but houses less than 5% of its population, has persisted intermittently since Pakistan's in 1947, with the current phase intensifying after 2004 amid grievances over economic marginalization, forced disappearances estimated at over 5,000 cases by human rights monitors, and exploitation of natural resources like gas and minerals without proportional local benefits. Groups such as the (BLA), designated a terrorist organization by , the UN, and the in August 2025, have conducted over 100 attacks in 2025 alone, targeting Pakistani security forces and Chinese infrastructure under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), including a 2025 hijacking that killed dozens. attributes the 's resilience to external backing, estimating BLA strength at 5,000–6,000 fighters sustained by foreign funding, though domestic factors like underdevelopment—with 's rate below 40% and exceeding 70%—form the core drivers per independent analyses. Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of orchestrating the insurgency via its (RAW) to destabilize in retaliation for Pakistan's alleged support of militants in , claiming Indian consulates in served as hubs for funneling arms and cash to Baloch groups since the early 2010s. These allegations peaked after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's August 2016 Independence Day speech, which referenced Balochistan's "self-determination" struggles for the first time officially, prompting Pakistani retaliation in international forums. A pivotal case is the March 2016 arrest of near the Iran-Pakistan border in , whom Pakistan identified as a serving Indian naval officer coordinating sabotage with Baloch insurgents; Jadhav's televised confession detailed RAW-directed operations to disrupt CPEC and incite unrest. Convicted by a Pakistani court in April 2017 and sentenced to death for and , the case escalated bilateral tensions, with Pakistan presenting it as proof of Indian "." India has categorically denied sponsoring Baloch militants, asserting Jadhav was a retired naval officer and businessman kidnapped from while trading in , with his confession extracted under duress—a claim partially upheld by the (ICJ). In a ruling, the ICJ found Pakistan violated the Vienna Convention by denying consular access and ordered a review of Jadhav's sentence, though it did not assess his guilt; as of April 2025, Pakistan's upheld the verdict, denying appeal rights on grounds of . Independent verification of Pakistan's broader evidence—such as alleged Indian funding trails or training camps—remains absent, with claims relying on intercepted communications and detainee statements often dismissed by Western analysts as unproven amid Pakistan's history of deflecting internal governance failures onto external foes. , in turn, has highlighted Pakistan's coercive tactics, including airstrikes and village razings documented in 2025 reports, as self-inflicted wounds exacerbating separatism rather than foreign meddling. These mutual recriminations have entrenched as a proxy flashpoint in India-Pakistan relations, mirroring rhetoric but with scant prospect of resolution; Pakistan's 2020 dossier alleging 33 Indian-operated terror camps in , including for Baloch operatives, yielded no international action, underscoring the evidentiary gap. The insurgency's 2025 surge, with militant violence up 46% in Pakistan overall, has strained CPEC security—vital to Pakistan's economy—while India leverages Baloch abuses in diplomatic salvos, though without admitting operational ties. Analysts note that while Indian strategic interests oppose CPEC's encroachment near its borders, direct involvement risks escalation without clear gains, given the insurgency's indigenous roots in Baloch predating modern India-Pakistan animosities.

Nuclear Proliferation and Strategic Stability

Nuclear Programs and Tests

India initiated its nuclear research program in the late 1940s under the Atomic Energy Commission, established in 1948, with initial focus on civilian applications but evolving capabilities for military purposes by the 1960s. On May 18, 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, code-named "Smiling Buddha," at the Pokhran test range in Rajasthan's Thar Desert, detonating a plutonium-based implosion device with an estimated yield of 8-10 kilotons. Indian officials described the explosion as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" for civilian engineering purposes, though the device's design demonstrated weapons potential, utilizing plutonium produced in the CIRUS reactor with Canadian and U.S. assistance under safeguards later violated. This test prompted international sanctions and accelerated Pakistan's parallel efforts, heightening regional tensions without immediate escalation to overt weaponization by India. Pakistan's nuclear program originated in the 1950s for energy purposes but shifted toward weapons development following the 1971 war with and the 1974 test, under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's directive to match 's capabilities. The program relied on uranium enrichment technology acquired through A.Q. Khan's network, which illicitly obtained centrifuge designs from URENCO in the during the 1970s, enabling covert progress despite Western export controls. By the late 1980s, had achieved the capability to produce weapons-grade highly , though it maintained ambiguity until 1998. The nuclear programs culminated in overt tests in 1998 amid escalating border skirmishes and domestic political pressures. On May 11, 1998, India conducted three sub-kiloton underground tests at as part of Operation (), followed by two more low-yield detonations on May 13, claiming validation of fission, thermonuclear, and tactical designs with combined yields of approximately 40-45 kilotons, though independent seismic analyses estimated lower figures around 10-20 kilotons total. responded swiftly on May 28, 1998, with five simultaneous underground tests in the Ras Koh Hills of the Chagai region, code-named , using boosted fission devices with claimed aggregate yields of 40 kilotons, followed by a sixth test on May 30 yielding about 4-6 kilotons; seismic data suggested totals closer to 9-12 kilotons. These tit-for-tat detonations, the first in since 1974, confirmed both nations as nuclear-armed states, triggering U.S. sanctions under the Glenn Amendment and intensifying global nonproliferation concerns without resolving underlying deterrence instabilities.

Doctrines, Crises, and Escalation Risks

India's nuclear doctrine, formalized in January 2003, emphasizes credible minimum deterrence with a commitment to no first use (NFU), restricting nuclear employment to retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or forces anywhere. This policy pairs with a pledge of massive retaliation to inflict unacceptable damage, aiming to deter aggression through assured second-strike capability via triad delivery systems including Agni missiles, submarines, and aircraft. Pakistan, in contrast, maintains a doctrine of full-spectrum deterrence without adopting NFU, explicitly reserving the right to employ nuclear weapons first—potentially at tactical levels—to counter existential conventional threats, such as an Indian armored thrust toward Lahore or Karachi. This approach, India-specific and defensive, incorporates low-yield systems like the Nasr missile (60-70 km range) to offset India's conventional superiority, lowering the threshold for nuclear initiation amid perceived vulnerabilities. Post-1998 nuclearization crises have underscored these doctrinal asymmetries and escalation perils. The 2001-2002 standoff, triggered by the December 13, 2001, attack on 's Parliament (killing 9), saw India mobilize 500,000 troops under Operation Parakram, prompting Pakistan's counter-mobilization and explicit nuclear signaling, with both sides' forces on high alert for 10 months until de-escalation in 2002 amid international mediation. Estimated costs exceeded $1.5 billion for India alone, with risks amplified by opaque command structures and inadvertent clashes, as troops faced off along the 3,300 km border. The 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis escalated further: a suicide bombing on February 14 killed 40 Indian personnel, leading to India's February 26 airstrikes on a militant camp in , , followed by Pakistan's February 27 aerial retaliation, downing an Indian MiG-21 and capturing pilot (released days later). This marked the first cross-Line of Control airstrikes since 1971, with both nations exchanging fire and claims of downed jets, heightening miscalculation risks under nuclear shadows before U.S.-brokered pullback. Escalation risks persist due to doctrinal ambiguities, arsenal expansion (India ~172 warheads, Pakistan ~170 as of 2023, per estimates), and sub-conventional triggers like blurring conventional-nuclear lines. Pakistan's tactical posture invites early nuclear use against limited Indian incursions—potentially invoking India's massive response—while India's debated NFU revisions (e.g., 2019 statements on responding to chemical/biological attacks) introduce uncertainty, though official remains unchanged. Simulations project 50-125 million immediate fatalities from mutual urban strikes, with global fallout, exacerbated by crisis-time fog, cyber vulnerabilities, and absent hotlines for tactical levels. Mutual deterrence holds, yet recurring —evident in ' restraint despite naval mobilizations—highlights inadvertent escalation potential absent robust risk-reduction measures.

Diplomatic Initiatives and Stalemates

Early Agreements and

The of July 27, 1949, delineated a ceasefire line in the disputed region following the 1947–1948 Indo-Pakistani War, supervised by military observers to prevent further hostilities along the . This accord, negotiated under the auspices of the UN Commission for and Pakistan, marked an initial effort to stabilize the frontier amid ongoing territorial claims, though it did not resolve the underlying sovereignty dispute. Subsequent diplomatic engagement addressed humanitarian concerns arising from partition violence, culminating in the Liaquat-Nehru Pact signed on April 8, 1950, in by Indian Prime Minister and Pakistani Prime Minister [Liaquat Ali Khan](/page/Liaquat Ali Khan). The pact committed both governments to ensuring equal citizenship rights, protection of life and property for religious minorities, and prevention of forced migrations or property seizures, with provisions for refugees to return and reclaim assets by December 31, 1950. Despite these intentions, implementation faced challenges from communal tensions, limiting its long-term efficacy in curbing cross-border displacements estimated at over 14 million people during partition. A landmark cooperative agreement emerged with the , signed on September 19, 1960, in by Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan, with World Bank mediation resolving a decade-long dispute over shared river systems originating in the . The treaty allocated the eastern rivers—Ravi, , and —to unrestricted Indian use for and , while granting Pakistan primary rights over the western rivers—Indus, , and Chenab—with India permitted limited non-consumptive uses such as run-of-the-river projects. This division, supported by a transitional financing plan for Pakistan's replacement costing approximately $893 million (equivalent to over $8 billion today), averted potential water weaponization amid agricultural dependencies, with Pakistan drawing 80% of its from these basins. Tensions persisted, erupting into the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War over infiltration and border clashes, which concluded with a UN-mandated ceasefire on September 23, 1965. Soviet-hosted talks in , , led to the on January 10, 1966, signed by Indian Prime Minister and Ayub Khan, pledging mutual renunciation of force, withdrawal of forces to August 5, 1965, positions within 21 days, and restoration of diplomatic and economic ties. The declaration emphasized peaceful dispute resolution through bilateral negotiations, excluding third-party arbitration except by mutual consent, but omitted explicit reference to 's status, reflecting unresolved core grievances. Shastri's sudden death hours after signing underscored the fragility of these accords, as subsequent domestic pressures in both nations undermined sustained implementation.

Lahore Declaration and Post-Nuclear Talks

Following the May 1998 nuclear tests by both nations— conducting five detonations on May 11 and 13, and responding with six on May 28 and 30— initiated diplomatic outreach to mitigate escalation risks and stabilize relations. In September 1998, Vajpayee proposed resuming dialogue, leading to plans for a symbolic bus service between and as a confidence-building measure. On February 19, 1999, Vajpayee boarded the inaugural "Sadbhavna" bus from , crossing the border into the next day, where he was received by . This gesture symbolized goodwill amid nuclear tensions, with Vajpayee emphasizing bilateral resolution of disputes, including , without third-party intervention. During the February 20–21, 1999, summit in Lahore, Vajpayee and Sharif signed the Lahore Declaration, affirming a shared commitment to peace, stability, and mutual prosperity while recognizing their nuclear capabilities. The document pledged to intensify efforts for an environment conducive to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and mutual security, explicitly undertaking to refrain from interference in internal affairs and to resolve differences through bilateral consultations. It highlighted the need to build trust via concrete steps, including dialogue on all issues, particularly Jammu and Kashmir, while underscoring that nuclear weapons do not obviate the responsibility for peace. Accompanying the declaration were two memoranda: one on advance notification of tests to prevent misinterpretation as hostile acts, and another on avoiding nuclear conflict through measures against accidents, unauthorized use, or escalation. These outlined exchanges of information on nuclear doctrines and facilities, aiming to reduce risks in a post-tests environment where both sides maintained voluntary moratoriums on further testing. The agreements built on prior understandings, such as the 1988 non-attack pact on nuclear installations, but introduced specific post-1998 safeguards amid heightened strategic parity. Initial follow-up talks proceeded in March 1999, with foreign secretaries meeting in to discuss implementation, including economic cooperation and Kashmir-specific . However, these efforts collapsed within months when Pakistani forces infiltrated across the in the in May 1999, prompting Indian military retaliation and exposing the fragility of the commitments. In 2024, acknowledged that the incursion violated the Lahore accords, attributing it to military pressures that undermined civilian-led diplomacy. The episode highlighted persistent trust deficits, as Pakistan's actions contradicted the declaration's emphasis on non-aggression and bilateral restraint, stalling nuclear risk-reduction dialogues until later composite talks in the early .

Post-2008 Standoffs and Frozen Dialogues

The November 26–29, 2008, Mumbai attacks, carried out by ten militants who infiltrated from and killed 166 people including foreign nationals, prompted to suspend the composite dialogue process that had been ongoing since 2004. attributed the planning, training, and execution to Pakistan-based elements with links to the , citing evidence such as the surviving attacker's confessions and communications intercepts. condemned the attacks, arrested some suspects including LeT operations chief Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, but did not extradite key figures or dismantle the group's infrastructure as demanded by , leading to a prolonged diplomatic freeze. Efforts to revive talks faltered amid recurring cross-border terrorism. In 2011, foreign secretaries met to resume dialogue, but progress stalled due to ongoing incidents like the 2010 Pune bombing. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, initial outreach included inviting Nawaz Sharif to his 2014 inauguration and Modi's unannounced December 25, 2015, visit to Lahore, yielding agreements on cultural exchanges but derailed by the January 2, 2016, Pathankot airbase assault, where Jaish-e-Mohammed militants killed seven Indian security personnel. The September 18, 2016, Uri army base attack, claiming 19 soldiers' lives and attributed to the same group, triggered India's September 29 surgical strikes on militant launch pads across the Line of Control, escalating tensions without formal dialogue resumption. The February 14, 2019, suicide bombing in Indian-administered , executed by and killing 40 personnel, marked a peak in hostilities. responded with February 26 airstrikes on a Jaish camp in , , claiming to have eliminated dozens of terrorists; denied significant casualties, conducted counter-airstrikes, and shot down an Indian MiG-21, capturing pilot who was released days later amid international mediation. 's August 5, 2019, revocation of and 's special status under Article 370 further strained ties, prompting to suspend bilateral trade, downgrade diplomatic relations, and halt all official dialogues, insisting on third-party involvement in which rejects. Since 2019, formal bilateral talks have remained frozen, with India conditioning resumption on Pakistan ceasing terrorism support and Pakistan demanding restoration of Kashmir's pre-2019 status. Sporadic ceasefire violations along the persisted, culminating in 2025 escalations following an April militant attack in killing 26 civilians, leading to Indian missile strikes on May 7 targeting alleged terror sites and a Pakistani counter-response, before a May 10 ceasefire. Despite U.S. and other external calls for , no structured dialogue has materialized, as mutual distrust—rooted in Pakistan's failure to prosecute attackers and India's preemptive military posture—entrenches the standoff.

Recent Confidence-Building Attempts

On February 25, 2021, the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of and reached a rare joint understanding to cease cross-border firing and shelling along the (LoC) and International Border, recommitting to all prior agreements on observance. This initiative followed heightened tensions after the and Balakot airstrikes, with both militaries agreeing to immediate disengagement where forces were in close proximity and to utilize existing hotlines for issue resolution. The agreement stemmed from mutual strategic interests in rather than broader , as pre- communications via backchannels highlighted risks of uncontrolled escalation amid nuclear postures. The 2021 ceasefire markedly reduced artillery exchanges and infiltration attempts, with reported violations dropping by over 80% in the first year compared to 2020 levels, allowing civilians in border districts like Jammu's Poonch and to resume farming and reducing forced migrations. Independent monitoring confirmed fewer than 100 incidents annually post-2021, versus thousands prior, though isolated breaches persisted, including a Pakistani troop intrusion in Poonch on April 2, 2025, met with Indian retaliation. This measure's durability reflects tactical restraint by both armies, constrained by domestic pressures and the high costs of sustained conflict, rather than trust-building. Annual exchanges of nuclear facility lists, mandated by the 1988 Agreement on Prohibition of Attacks Against Nuclear Installations, continued uninterrupted, with submissions occurring on January 1 each year through diplomatic channels in and ; the 2025 exchange adhered to this protocol amid the prior year's tensions. These notifications, listing over 20 sites per side, serve to avert inadvertent targeting during crises, though critics note their limited scope excludes or delivery system details. Following India's missile strikes on May 7, 2025, in response to a militant attack in , both sides agreed to an immediate on May 10, 2025, after four days of exchanges, and on May 15, 2025, recommitted to confidence-building steps for reducing troop alertness along the LoC. This de-escalation involved DGMO-level talks and partial pullbacks, averting wider conflict, but was framed by as contingent on curbing cross-border , with no revival of suspended bilateral dialogues. Such episodic CBMs highlight persistent fragility, as underlying disputes over and sponsorship remain unaddressed, limiting progress beyond tactical pauses.

Economic Interdependence and Barriers

Trade Volumes and Restrictions

Bilateral trade between and has remained limited and asymmetrical, with official volumes significantly lower than potential due to mutual restrictions and geopolitical tensions. In 2024, total merchandise trade stood at approximately $1.2 billion, down from a peak of $2.41 billion in 2018, reflecting a sharp decline post-2019 measures. exports to reached $1.18 billion that year, marking a five-year high and a 127% increase from $530.91 million in 2023, primarily comprising pharmaceuticals, cotton yarn, and chemicals. In contrast, exports to plummeted to just $480,000 in 2024 from $547.5 million in 2019, highlighting the one-sided nature of formal exchanges, with imports from totaling a mere $0.42 million during April-January 2024-25. Key restrictions originated in February 2019, when revoked 's (MFN) status following the attack that killed 40 Indian personnel, imposing 200% customs duties on Pakistani imports and restricting to a negative list of permitted items. retaliated by suspending all , closing the Attari-Wagah land route for goods, and halting imports from , though enforcement has proven porous. These measures, intended as punitive responses to terrorism sponsorship allegations, reduced formal but spurred indirect routes via third countries like the UAE and , where transaction costs inflate prices by 10-20%. Official data thus understates true economic flows, with estimates indicating $10 billion in annual Indian goods reaching informally, including textiles, pharmaceuticals, and machinery routed through .
YearIndia's Exports to Pakistan (US$ million)Pakistan's Exports to India (US$ million)Total Bilateral Trade (US$ billion)
2018~1,860~5472.41
2019N/A (post-revocation decline)547.5N/A
2023530.91Minimal~0.55
20241,1800.481.2
Despite the 2019 suspension, residual formal trade persists, such as 's imports of $26.8 million from in February 2025 alone, up 28% year-over-year, often reclassified or routed informally. Further escalation in April 2025 following a attack prompted threats of renewed halts, yet indirect trade volumes suggest barriers harm consumers more than intended targets, with facing higher costs for essential Indian pharmaceuticals and raw materials. Resuming MFN or normalizing routes could unlock $37 billion in untapped potential per some analyses, but security concerns sustain the status quo.

SAARC Failures and Bilateral Projects

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established on December 8, 1985, in , aimed to promote economic and cultural cooperation among eight South Asian nations, including and . However, bilateral disputes, particularly over and cross-border terrorism, have repeatedly paralyzed the organization, leading to nine postponements or cancellations of summits between 1985 and 2016, often triggered by Indo-Pakistani escalations such as the 1990 crisis and the 2001-2002 military standoff. The , scheduled for November 2016 in , exemplified this dysfunction when boycotted it on October 2, 2016, citing Pakistan's alleged support for the Uri terrorist attack on September 18, 2016, which killed 19 Indian soldiers; , , , and followed suit, forcing cancellation and highlighting Pakistan's regional isolation. No summit has convened since the 18th in on November 26-27, 2014, rendering SAARC inactive amid 's shift toward subregional forums like BIMSTEC that exclude Pakistan to circumvent bilateral vetoes. In parallel, sporadic bilateral projects have emerged as alternatives to stalled multilateralism, focusing on limited people-to-people and trade facilitation. The Kartarpur Corridor, a 4.1-kilometer visa-free pathway linking Dera Baba Nanak in India's Punjab to Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan's Narowal district—where Guru Nanak spent his final years—was inaugurated on November 9, 2019, allowing up to 5,000 Indian pilgrims daily access despite ongoing tensions. The underlying agreement, signed October 24, 2019, was renewed on October 22, 2024, for five years until 2029, demonstrating rare continuity in cooperation amid security concerns. The Attari-Wagah Integrated Check Post, operational since April 10, 2012, remains the sole authorized land route for , handling goods like textiles, chemicals, and fruits, though annual volumes have hovered below $3 million since 2019 due to restrictions and suspensions following attacks, such as the full closure from May 1, 2025, onward. Other initiatives, including the 2005 Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service across the , have been intermittently halted by violence, underscoring the fragility of such projects against persistent mistrust.

Societal and Humanitarian Connections

Cultural and Linguistic Overlaps

India and Pakistan exhibit profound linguistic overlaps rooted in their shared pre-partition history, with Hindustani serving as the primary across northern regions of both nations. Hindustani comprises the colloquial spoken forms of , an official language of , and , the national language of , which possess identical , structures, and a substantial core vocabulary influenced by , , Persian, and . These variants demonstrate high in everyday speech, differing primarily in literary registers, scripts— for and Perso-Arabic for —and certain loanwords, a divergence formalized during the 19th-century language standardization efforts under British colonial rule. Regional languages reinforce these connections; Punjabi, spoken predominantly in the divided province, features lexico-syntactic parallels between Indian and Pakistani dialects, including shared vocabulary and sentence structures, despite phonological variations and script differences ( in , in Pakistan). Similar overlaps occur in Sindhi, with its ancient literary tradition preserved across the border, and other Indo-Aryan tongues like Saraiki, which echo dialects in adjacent Indian areas. These linguistic ties trace to the undivided subcontinent's , predating the 1947 partition by centuries. Culturally, the two countries share elements from Mughal and indigenous South Asian traditions, including culinary staples like , , and spice blends derived from common historical recipes, as well as attire such as the worn widely in both. Sufi devotional practices, exemplified by celebrations at shrines honoring shared saints like , exhibit parallel ritual patterns in music, poetry recitation, and communal feasting, reflecting persistent South Asian influences in Muslim observances despite religious divergences post-partition. forms, including Hindustani ragas and performances, draw from a unified heritage, with performers and compositions historically traversing the pre-1947 .

Disaster Aid Exchanges

Despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, and have periodically extended humanitarian assistance to each other during , though acceptances have been selective and often limited by mutual suspicions, domestic politics, and logistical challenges. These exchanges, sometimes termed "disaster diplomacy," have occasionally led to temporary improvements in bilateral communication but rarely sustained cooperation. In January 2001, following the earthquake in , , which killed over 20,000 people, Pakistan's President offered relief supplies and dispatched a military aircraft loaded with tents, blankets, and medical aid to , marking one of the early instances of Pakistani assistance to amid partition-era animosities. accepted the shipment, though the gesture was overshadowed by broader security concerns. The October , with an epicenter in Pakistan-administered territory but impacts on both sides of the , prompted reciprocal offers. India dispatched five aircraft carrying over 20 tonnes of relief materials, including blankets, tents, and medicines, to and pledged $25 million through the for reconstruction in housing and education sectors. , in turn, offered aid for the affected areas in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, but declined, citing sufficient domestic capacity to manage relief efforts. This asymmetry highlighted 's preference for self-reliance in crises while extending support to its neighbor. During the devastating 2010 floods in Pakistan, which displaced millions and caused over 1,700 deaths, initially offered $5 million in during a telephonic between foreign ministers, followed by an additional $20 million commitment channeled through international agencies. accepted the initial $5 million tranche, utilizing it for immediate , though broader bilateral flows remained constrained by political rhetoric and 's reliance on multilateral donors. In more recent disasters, such as the 2022 floods affecting one-third of and impacting 33 million people, India extended offers of and relief materials, but did not formally request or fully accept bilateral aid, prioritizing assistance from Western donors and citing logistical independence. Similarly, 's offers to during events like the 2013 floods were declined, reflecting a pattern where pride, anti- sentiment in , and 's growing infrastructure limit deeper exchanges. These instances underscore that while humanitarian gestures occur, they are frequently symbolic and do not translate into normalized due to underlying strategic distrust.

Sports Rivalries and People-to-People Ties

India and share one of the world's most intense sports rivalries, dominated by , where bilateral series have been suspended since due to security concerns, limiting encounters to neutral-venue multilateral tournaments. Matches between the two sides routinely attract over a billion viewers worldwide, fueled by nationalistic fervor and historical animosity. In One Day Internationals (ODIs), the teams have contested 136 fixtures as of 2025, with securing 73 wins to 's 58, alongside five no-results. In Internationals (T20Is), holds a decisive edge, winning 13 of 16 clashes. The 2025 final, where defeated amid heightened border tensions, exemplified the rivalry's persistence, with post-match handshakes notably absent, reflecting broader diplomatic strains. Field hockey, once a shared stronghold with Olympic golds for both nations, sustains the rivalry through events like the Sultan of Johor Cup, where junior teams exchanged high-fives in October 2025 despite recent cricket controversies over courtesies. However, political frictions have disrupted participation; Pakistan withdrew from the FIH Men's Junior Hockey World Cup scheduled for India in November-December 2025, citing venue neutrality demands. Kabaddi matches, such as India's 81-26 rout of Pakistan in 2025, have similarly featured no-handshake incidents, underscoring how sportsmanship varies amid escalating hostilities. People-to-people ties persist tenuously despite visa restrictions and suspended cultural pacts, primarily through family visits and limited . Pakistan issues visitor visas to Indian nationals for meeting relatives or legitimate purposes, while India requires similar invitations for Pakistani applicants, often necessitating no-objection certificates for minors or spouses. The 1988 bilateral cultural agreement provides a framework for exchanges, but implementation has faltered post-2019, with Pakistan banning Indian content and India halting communications after terror incidents. Virtual connections via shared media and diaspora networks offer indirect bonds, yet cross-border remains negligible, hampered by security protocols and mutual distrust. The daily flag-lowering at the Wagah-Attari serves as a ritualistic , drawing crowds for its choreographed display of military precision and national pride.

Geopolitical Externalities

China's Pakistan Alignment

China and have maintained an "all-weather strategic cooperative partnership" since the early , characterized by deepened economic, military, and diplomatic ties that serve as a counterbalance to India's regional influence. This alignment, formalized through high-level agreements such as the 2025-2029 for a China- community with a shared future, emphasizes mutual support in security and development, with viewing as a gateway to the and via the (BRI). In practice, this partnership has exacerbated tensions in India- relations by bolstering 's capabilities amid ongoing disputes, particularly over , where has staked territorial claims overlapping with Pakistan-administered areas. The flagship of this alignment is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched in 2013 as a $62 billion network of infrastructure projects connecting China's region to Pakistan's , with investments exceeding $65 billion by 2025. CPEC includes energy plants, highways, and rail links, aimed at enhancing Pakistan's but criticized for contributing to its debt burden through high-interest Chinese loans. India has repeatedly objected to CPEC on sovereignty grounds, as projects traverse , which India claims as part of Jammu and Kashmir, viewing the corridor as enabling Chinese strategic encirclement and militarization near its borders. Recent extensions, such as proposals to link CPEC with in 2025, have intensified Indian concerns about third-party involvement in disputed territories. Militarily, China has become Pakistan's primary arms supplier, accounting for 81% of its imports over the past five years and 63% of China's total arms exports, valued at $5.28 billion in recent deals. Co-production of the JF-17 Thunder fighter jet, with Pakistan operating over 160 units, exemplifies joint defense manufacturing, while deliveries of advanced submarines—such as the second of eight Yuan-class vessels in March 2025—enhance Pakistan's naval asymmetry against India. This cooperation, including shared intelligence from past India-Pakistan conflicts, strengthens Pakistan's deterrence posture, prompting India to accelerate its own military modernization and border fortifications along the Line of Actual Control with China. Diplomatically, consistently backs on the issue, advocating for "impartial investigations" into attacks in the region and urging bilateral dialogue while reaffirming "ironclad" support for . Beijing's stance, including blocking UN designations of Pakistan-based militants, aligns with its territorial interests in and Shaksgam Valley, ceded by to in 1963, further complicating India-Pakistan resolutions. This alignment has led to trilateral dynamics where Chinese mediation attempts, such as post-conflict de-escalation calls in 2025, prioritize stability for CPEC over addressing India's security grievances, perpetuating a frozen equilibrium in South Asian .

US Strategic Shifts and Interventions

During the , the aligned strategically with as a bulwark against Soviet influence in , providing military aid and incorporating into alliances like SEATO in 1954 and in 1955, while pursued non-alignment and closer ties with the . In the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War, the US imposed an on both nations after 's initial incursions into escalated into full conflict, suspending economic and military assistance to pressure de-escalation, though this disproportionately affected as 's primary supplier shifted to the USSR. The 1971 war marked a pivotal US intervention favoring Pakistan, as President Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger viewed Pakistani President Yahya as a conduit to amid US-China ; the administration provided diplomatic cover at the UN and dispatched the USS Enterprise-led to the on December 10, 1971, to signal deterrence against Indian advances, despite India's role in responding to East Pakistan's and independence drive. This "tilt" policy, documented in declassified records, prioritized geopolitical maneuvering over balancing the conflict's ethnic and territorial dynamics, contributing to Pakistan's defeat and Bangladesh's creation on December 16, 1971. In the 1980s, US-Pakistan ties deepened with over $3.2 billion in covert military aid to support Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet invasion from 1979, channeled through Pakistan's ISI, though this fueled Islamist networks that later complicated regional stability. The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and Cold War's end prompted a US pivot; sanctions followed Pakistan's nuclear program revelations and India's 1998 tests, but post-9/11 exigencies reinstated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally in 2004, with $33 billion in aid from 2002-2017 tied to cooperation against and sanctuaries. Post-2000 dehyphenation decoupled engagement with from Pakistan, recognizing India's economic rise and democratic stability as counterweights to 's expansion, exemplified by the 2008 civil nuclear agreement that ended three decades of sanctions on India, enabling fuel imports and reactor construction while exempting India from NPT obligations—a move Pakistan criticized as discriminatory, accelerating its nuclear ties with China. In the 1999 Kargil conflict, US diplomacy under President Clinton pressured Pakistan's withdrawal from occupied Indian positions by July 1999, citing violation of the and risks of nuclear escalation, marking a shift from even-handedness to favoring India's territorial integrity. Under administrations from Obama onward, US strategy emphasized as a Quad partner against , with defense pacts like the 2016 Logistics Exchange Memorandum and $3 billion in arms sales by 2020, while Pakistan aid dwindled post-Afghanistan drawdown due to documented ISI-Taliban links, reducing annual assistance to under $500 million by 2021. The Biden era (2021-2025) maintained low-level Pakistan engagement focused on and climate, but prioritized with joint military exercises and technology transfers, reflecting causal priorities: Pakistan's strategic value eroded by its alignment and reliability issues, versus 's alignment with US Indo-Pacific goals amid Beijing's assertiveness. Interventions in crises like the urged restraint but avoided equating aggressor and defender, underscoring deprioritization of Pakistan-centric mediation.

Regional and Global Implications

The India–Pakistan rivalry has profoundly destabilized , perpetuating a cycle of military standoffs and proxy conflicts that hinder regional cooperation and economic integration. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), intended to foster multilateral ties, has been paralyzed by bilateral tensions, with summits frequently canceled due to disputes, such as the 2016 cancellation following the Uri attack. Recent escalations, including the April 22, 2025, militant attack in Indian-administered , which killed over 20 civilians and triggered cross-border strikes, underscored how localized incidents can threaten broader regional stability, drawing in neighbors like and through refugee flows and terror spillovers. This volatility exacerbates instability in , where Pakistan's historical support for the —evident in its post-2021 diplomatic engagement—clashes with India's $3 billion in reconstruction aid since 2001, complicating efforts and border security for both states. The dispute amplifies these regional risks, serving as a flashpoint whose resolution eludes multilateral frameworks due to its strategic geography, bordering and providing potential land access to . Control over influences water resources via the of 1960, with Pakistan dependent on upstream rivers for 80% of its irrigation, making disputes over dams like India's Kishanganga project a perennial source of tension that could cascade into humanitarian crises affecting millions in and provinces. Neighboring states navigate this dyad cautiously; and , for instance, balance economic ties with India—totaling $15 billion in annual trade—against Pakistan's appeals to Islamic solidarity, often tilting toward neutrality to avoid entanglement in escalatory cycles that deter foreign investment across the subcontinent. Globally, the rivalry between these nuclear-armed states—India with approximately 172 warheads and Pakistan with 170 as of 2024—poses existential risks, as even a limited exchange could kill 20-50 million immediately and induce a starving up to 2 billion worldwide through disrupted monsoons and crop failures. The 2019 crisis and 2025 escalation demonstrated the "stability-instability paradox," where nuclear deterrence enables subconventional aggression but heightens miscalculation risks, prompting international interventions like U.S. mediation to avert broader conflict. Pakistan's alleged harboring of groups like , responsible for the killing 166, has global ramifications, straining alliances and fueling debates over sanctions, as evidenced by the Financial Action Task Force's 2018 greylisting of Pakistan for terror financing deficiencies. Great-power competition further globalizes the implications, with China's $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor embedding in the rivalry, challenging India's regional primacy and escalating Sino-Indian border tensions since 2020. U.S. strategic pivots, including the 2008 Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal and Quad framework, counterbalance this by aligning with India, yet risk polarizing into proxy arenas reminiscent of dynamics. These externalities undermine global non-proliferation norms, as both nations' arsenals—outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—spur arms races, with Pakistan's tactical nuclear weapons doctrine lowering escalation thresholds and complicating international stability efforts.

References

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