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History of Pakistan
History of Pakistan
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A map outlining historical sites in Pakistan.

The history of Pakistan preceding the country's independence in 1947[1] is shared with that of Afghanistan, India, and Iran. Spanning the western expanse of the Indian subcontinent and the eastern borderlands of the Iranian plateau, the region of present-day Pakistan served both as the fertile ground of a major civilization and as the gateway of South Asia to Central Asia and the Near East.[2][3]

Situated on the first coastal migration route of Homo sapiens out of Africa, the region was inhabited early by modern humans.[4][5] The 9,000-year history of village life in South Asia traces back to the Neolithic (7000–4300 BCE) site of Mehrgarh in Pakistan,[6][7][8] and the 5,000-year history of urban life in South Asia to the various sites of the Indus Valley Civilization, including Mohenjo Daro and Harappa.[9][10]

The ensuing millennia saw the region of present-day Pakistan absorb many influences—represented among others in the ancient, mainly Hindu-Buddhist, sites of Taxila, and Takht-i-Bahi, the 14th-century Islamic-Sindhi monuments of Thatta, and the 17th-century Mughal monuments of Lahore. Dynasties emerging from the region encompassing modern day Pakistan during this period included the Soomra dynasty, Samma dynasty, Sayyid dynasty, Kalhora dynasty, Talpurs, Langah Sultanate, Sultanate of Swat, Sial dynasty and the Shah Mir Dynasty. In the first half of the 19th century, the region was appropriated by the East India Company, followed, after 1857, by 90 years of direct British rule, and ending with the creation of Pakistan in 1947, through the efforts, among others, of its future national poet Allama Iqbal and its founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Since then, the country has experienced both civilian-democratic and military rule, resulting in periods of significant economic and military growth as well those of instability; significant during the latter, was the secession of East Pakistan as the new nation of Bangladesh.

Prehistory

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Paleolithic period

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The Soanian is archaeological culture of the Lower Paleolithic, Acheulean. It is named after the Soan Valley in the Sivalik Hills, near modern-day Islamabad and is dated between c.774,000 and c.11,700 BCE.[11]

Neolithic period

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Mehrgarh is an important Neolithic site discovered in 1974, which shows early evidence of farming and herding,[12] and dentistry.[13] The site dates back to 7000–5500 BCE and is located on the Kachi Plain of Balochistan. The residents of Mehrgarh lived in mud brick houses, stored grain in granaries, fashioned tools from copper, cultivated barley, wheat, jujubes and dates, and herded sheep, goats and cattle. As the civilisation progressed (5500–2600 BCE) residents began to engage in crafts, including flint knapping, tanning, bead production, and metalworking. The site was occupied continuously until 2600 BCE,[14] when climatic changes began to occur. Between 2600 and 2000 BCE, region became more arid and Mehrgarh was abandoned in favour of the Indus Valley,[15] where a new civilisation was in the early stages of development.[16]

Bronze Age

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Indus Valley Civilisation

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The "Priest King" sculpture is carved from steatite.
The Dancing Girl of Mohenjo-daro
Excavated ruins of the Great Bath at Mohenjo-daro in Sindh

The Bronze Age in the Indus Valley began around 3300 BCE with the Indus Valley Civilization.[17] Along with Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, it was one of three early civilisations of the Old World, and of the three the most widespread,[18] covering an area of 1.25 million km2.[19] It flourished in the basins of the Indus River, in what is today the Pakistani provinces of Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan, and along a system of perennial, mostly monsoon-fed, rivers that once coursed in the vicinity of the seasonal Ghaggar-Hakra River in parts of north-west India.[17] At its peak, the civilisation hosted a population of approximately 5 million spread across hundreds of settlements extending as far as the Arabian Sea to present-day southern and eastern Afghanistan, and the Himalayas.[20] Inhabitants of the ancient Indus river valley, the Harappans, developed new techniques in metallurgy and handicraft (carneol products, seal carving), and produced copper, bronze, lead, and tin.

The Mature Indus civilisation flourished from about 2600 to 1900 BCE, marking the beginning of urban civilisation in the Indus Valley. The civilisation included urban centres such as Harappa, Ganeriwala and Mohenjo-daro as well as an offshoot called the Kulli culture (2500–2000 BCE) in southern Balochistan and was noted for its cities built of brick, roadside drainage system, and multi-storeyed houses. It is thought to have had some kind of municipal organisation as well.

During the late period of this civilisation, signs of a gradual decline began to emerge, and by around 1700 BCE, most of the cities were abandoned. However, the Indus Valley Civilisation did not disappear suddenly, and some elements of the Indus Civilisation may have survived. Aridification of this region during the 3rd millennium BCE may have been the initial spur for the urbanisation associated with the civilisation, but eventually also reduced the water supply enough to cause the civilisation's demise, and to scatter its population eastward. The civilisation collapsed around 1700 BCE, though the reasons behind its fall are still unknown. Through the excavation of the Indus cities and analysis of town planning and seals, it has been inferred that the Civilization had high level of sophistication in its town planning, arts, crafts, and trade.[21]

Early history – Iron Age

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Vedic period

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Cremation urn, Gandhara grave culture, Swat Valley, c. 1200 BCE

The Vedic Period (c. 1500 – c. 500 BCE) is postulated to have formed during the 1500 BCE to 800 BCE. As Indo-Aryans migrated and settled into the Indus Valley, along with them came their distinctive religious traditions and practices which fused with local culture.[22] The Indo-Aryans religious beliefs and practices from the Bactria–Margiana Culture and the native Harappan Indus beliefs of the former Indus Valley Civilisation eventually gave rise to Vedic culture and tribes.[23][note 1] Early Indo-Aryans were a Late Bronze Age society centred in the Punjab, organised into tribes rather than kingdoms, and primarily sustained by a pastoral way of life. During this period the Vedas, the oldest scriptures of Hinduism, were composed.[note 2]

Ancient history

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Achaemenid Empire

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Much of the area corresponding to modern-day Pakistan was subordinated to the Achaemenid Empire and forced to pay tributes to Persia.

The main Vedic tribes remaining in the Indus Valley by 550 BCE were the Kamboja, Sindhu, Taksas of Gandhara, the Madras and Kathas of the River Chenab, Mallas of the River Ravi and Tugras of the River Sutlej. These several tribes and principalities fought against one another to such an extent that the Indus Valley no longer had one powerful Vedic tribal kingdom to defend against outsiders and to wield the warring tribes into one organised kingdom. King Pushkarasarin of Gandhara was engaged in power struggles against his local rivals and as such the Khyber Pass remained poorly defended. King Darius I of the Achaemenid Empire took advantage of the opportunity and planned for an invasion. The Indus Valley was fabled in Persia for its gold and fertile soil and conquering it had been a major objective of his predecessor Cyrus the Great.[26] In 542 BCE, Cyrus had led his army and conquered the Makran coast in southern Balochistan. However, he is known to have campaigned beyond Makran (in the regions of Kalat, Khuzdar and Panjgur) and lost most of his army in the Gedrosian Desert (speculated today as the Kharan Desert).

In 518 BCE, Darius led his army through the Khyber Pass and southwards in stages, eventually reaching the Arabian Sea coast in Sindh by 516 BCE. Under Persian rule, a system of centralised administration, with a bureaucratic system, was introduced into the Indus Valley for the first time, establishing several satrapies: Gandāra around the general region of Gandhara, Hindush around Punjab and Sindh, Arachosia, encompassing parts of present-day Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan,[27] Sattagydia around the Bannu basin,[28] and Gedrosia covering much of the Makran region of southern Balochistan.[29]

What is known about the easternmost satraps and borderlands of the Achaemenid Empire is alluded to in the Darius inscriptions and from Greek sources such as the Histories of Herodotus and the later Alexander Chronicles (Arrian, Strabo et al.). These sources list three Indus Valley tributaries or conquered territories that were subordinated to the Persian Empire and made to pay tributes to the Persian Kings.[28]

Macedonian Empire

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Alexander's campaigns in modern-day Pakistan
Porus, with Alexander the Great

By spring of 326 BCE, Alexander began on his Indus expedition from Bactria, leaving behind 3500 horses and 10,000 soldiers. He divided his army into two groups. The larger force would enter the Indus Valley through the Khyber Pass, just as Darius had done 200 years earlier, while a smaller force under the personal command of Alexander entered through a northern route, possibly through Broghol or Dorah Pass near Chitral. Alexander was commanding a group of shield-bearing guards, foot-companions, archers, Agrianians, and horse-javelin-men and led them against the tribes of the former Gandhara satrapy.

The first tribe they encountered were the Aspasioi tribe of the Kunar Valley, who initiated a fierce battle against Alexander, in which he himself was wounded in the shoulder by a dart. However, the Aspasioi eventually lost and 40,000 people were enslaved. Alexander then continued in a southwestern direction where he encountered the Assakenoi tribe of the Swat and Buner valleys in April 326 BCE. The Assakenoi fought bravely and offered stubborn resistance to Alexander and his army in the cities of Ora, Bazira (Barikot) and Massaga. So enraged was Alexander about the resistance put up by the Assakenoi that he killed the entire population of Massaga and reduced its buildings to rubble – similar slaughters followed in Ora.[30] A similar slaughter then followed at Ora, another stronghold of the Assakenoi. The stories of these slaughters reached numerous Assakenians, who began fleeing to Aornos, a hill-fort located between Shangla and Kohistan. Alexander followed close behind their heels and besieged the strategic hill-fort, eventually capturing and destroying the fort and killing everyone inside. The remaining smaller tribes either surrendered or like the Astanenoi tribe of Pushkalavati (Charsadda) were quickly neutralised where 38,000 soldiers and 230,000 oxen were captured by Alexander.[31] Eventually Alexander's smaller force would meet with the larger force which had come through the Khyber Pass met at Attock. With the conquest of Gandhara complete, Alexander switched to strengthening his military supply line, which by now stretched dangerously vulnerable over the Hindu Kush back to Balkh in Bactria.

After conquering Gandhara and solidifying his supply line back to Bactria, Alexander combined his forces with the King Ambhi of Taxila and crossed the River Indus in July 326 BCE to begin the Archosia (Punjab) campaign. His first resistance would come at the River Jhelum near Bhera against King Porus of the Paurava tribe. The famous Battle of the Hydaspes (Jhelum) between Alexander (with Ambhi) and Porus would be the last major battle fought by him. After defeating Porus, his battle weary troops refused to advance into India[32] to engage the army of Nanda Dynasty and its vanguard of trampling elephants. Alexander, therefore proceeded south-west along the Indus Valley.[33] Along the way, he engaged in several battles with smaller kingdoms in Multan and Sindh, before marching his army westward across the Makran desert towards what is now Iran. In crossing the desert, Alexander's army took enormous casualties from hunger and thirst, but fought no human enemy. They encountered the "Fish Eaters", or Ichthyophagi, primitive people who lived on the Makran coast, who had matted hair, no fire, no metal, no clothes, lived in huts made of whale bones, and ate raw seafood.

Mauryan Empire

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Mansehra Rock Edicts, one of the edicts of the Mauryan emperor Ashoka

The Maurya Empire was a geographically extensive Iron Age historical power in South Asia based in Magadha, having been founded by Chandragupta Maurya in 322 BCE, and existing in loose-knit fashion until 185 BCE.[34] The Maurya Empire was centralised by the conquest of the Indo-Gangetic Plain, and its capital city was located at Pataliputra (modern Patna). Outside this imperial centre, the empire's geographical extent was dependent on the loyalty of military commanders who controlled the armed cities sprinkling it.[35][36][37] During Ashoka's rule (ca. 268–232 BCE) the empire briefly controlled the major urban hubs and arteries of the Indian subcontinent excepting the deep south.[34] It declined for about 50 years after Ashoka's rule, and dissolved in 185 BCE with the assassination of Brihadratha by Pushyamitra Shunga and foundation of the Shunga Empire in Magadha.

Chandragupta Maurya raised an army, with the assistance of Chanakya, author of Arthasastra,[38] and overthrew the Nanda Empire in c. 322 BCE. Chandragupta rapidly expanded his power westwards across central and western India by conquering the satraps left by Alexander the Great, and by 317 BCE the empire had fully occupied northwestern India.[39] The Mauryan Empire then defeated Seleucus I, a diadochus and founder of the Seleucid Empire, during the Seleucid–Mauryan war, thus acquiring territory west of the Indus River.[40][41]

Under the Mauryas, internal and external trade, agriculture, and economic activities thrived and expanded across South Asia due to the creation of a single and efficient system of finance, administration, and security. The Maurya dynasty built a precursor of the Grand Trunk Road from Patliputra to Taxila.[42] After the Kalinga War, the Empire experienced nearly half a century of centralised rule under Ashoka. Ashoka's embrace of Buddhism and sponsorship of Buddhist missionaries allowed for the expansion of that faith into Sri Lanka, northwest India, and Central Asia.[43]

The population of South Asia during the Mauryan period has been estimated to be between 15 and 30 million.[44] The empire's period of dominion was marked by exceptional creativity in art, architecture, inscriptions and produced texts.[45]

Classical history

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Indo-Greek Kingdom

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Greco-Buddhist representation of the Buddha, seated to the left of a depiction of Vajrapani in the guise of the Hellenic god Heracles[46]

The Indo-Greek Menander I (reigned 155–130 BCE) drove the Greco-Bactrians out of Gandhara and beyond the Hindu Kush, becoming king shortly after his victory. His territories covered Panjshir and Kapisa in modern Afghanistan and extended to the Punjab region, with many tributaries to the south and east, possibly as far as Mathura. The capital Sagala (modern Sialkot) prospered greatly under Menander's rule and Menander is one of the few Bactrian kings mentioned by Greek authors.[47]

The classical Buddhist text Milinda Pañha praises Menander, saying there was "none equal to Milinda in all India".[48] His empire survived him in a fragmented manner until the last independent Greek king, Strato II, disappeared around 10 CE. Around 125 BCE, the Greco-Bactrian king Heliocles, son of Eucratides, fled from the Yuezhi invasion of Bactria and relocated to Gandhara, pushing the Indo-Greeks east of the Jhelum River. The last known Indo-Greek ruler was Theodamas, from the Bajaur area of Gandhara, mentioned on a 1st-century CE signet ring, bearing the Kharoṣṭhī inscription "Su Theodamasa" ("Su" was the Greek transliteration of the Kushan royal title "Shau" ("Shah" or "King")). Various petty kings ruled into the early 1st century CE, until the conquests by the Scythians, Parthians and the Yuezhi, who founded the Kushan dynasty.

It is during this period that the fusion of Hellenistic and Asiatic mythological, artistic and religious elements becomes most apparent, especially in the region of Gandhara, straddling western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. Detailed, humanistic representations of the Buddha begin to emerge, depicting the figure with a close resemblance to the Hellenic god Apollo; Greek mythological motifs such as centaurs, Bacchanalian scenes, Nereids and deities such as Tyche and Heracles are prominent in the Buddhistic art of ancient Pakistan and Afghanistan.[citation needed]

Indo-Scythian Kingdom

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A stone palette of the type found in the Early Saka layer at Sirkap, Punjab

The Indo-Scythians were descended from the Sakas (Scythians) who migrated from southern Central Asia into Pakistan and Arachosia from the middle of the 2nd century BCE to the 1st century BCE. They displaced the Indo-Greeks and ruled a kingdom that stretched from Gandhara to Mathura. The power of the Saka rulers started to decline in the 2nd century CE after the Scythians were defeated by the south Indian Emperor Gautamiputra Satakarni of the Satavahana dynasty.[49][50] Later the Saka kingdom was completely destroyed by Chandragupta II of the Gupta Empire from eastern India in the 4th century.[51]

Indo-Parthian Kingdom

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Ancient Buddhist monastery Takht-i-Bahi (a UNESCO World Heritage Site) constructed by the Indo-Parthians

The Indo-Parthian Kingdom was ruled by the Gondopharid dynasty, named after its eponymous first ruler Gondophares. They ruled parts of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan,[52] and northwestern India, during or slightly before the 1st century CE. For most of their history, the leading Gondopharid kings held Taxila (in the present Punjab province of Pakistan) as their residence, but during their last few years of existence the capital shifted between Kabul and Peshawar. These kings have traditionally been referred to as Indo-Parthians, as their coinage was often inspired by the Arsacid dynasty, but they probably belonged to a wider groups of Iranic tribes who lived east of Parthia proper, and there is no evidence that all the kings who assumed the title Gondophares, which means "Holder of Glory", were even related. Christian writings claim that the Apostle Saint Thomas – an architect and skilled carpenter – had a long sojourn in the court of king Gondophares, had built a palace for the king at Taxila and had also ordained leaders for the Church before leaving for Indus Valley in a chariot, for sailing out to eventually reach Malabar Coast.

Kushan Empire

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Peshawar's Kanishka stupa once kept sacred Buddhist relics in the Kanishka casket.

The Kushan Empire expanded out of what is now Afghanistan into the northwest of the subcontinent under the leadership of their first emperor, Kujula Kadphises, about the middle of the 1st century CE. They were descended from an Indo-European, Central Asian people called the Yuezhi,[53][54] a branch of which was known as the Kushans. By the time of his grandson, Kanishka the Great, the empire spread to encompass much of Afghanistan[55] and the northern parts of the Indian subcontinent at least as far as Saketa and Sarnath near Varanasi (Benares).[56]

Emperor Kanishka was a great patron of Buddhism; however, as Kushans expanded southward, the deities[57] of their later coinage came to reflect its new Hindu majority.[58] The monumental Kanishka stupa is believed to have been established by the king near the outskirts of modern-day Peshawar, Pakistan.

The Kushan dynasty played an important role in the establishment of Buddhism in India and its spread to Central Asia and China. Historian Vincent Smith said about Kanishka in particular:

He played the part of a second Ashoka in the history of Buddhism.[59]

The empire linked the Indian Ocean maritime trade with the commerce of the Silk Road through the Indus valley, encouraging long-distance trade, particularly between China and Rome. The Kushans brought new trends to the budding and blossoming Gandharan Art, which reached its peak during Kushan Rule.

H.G. Rowlinson commented:

The Kushan period is a fitting prelude to the Age of the Guptas.[60]

By the 3rd century, their empire in India was disintegrating and their last known great emperor was Vasudeva I.[61][62]

Alchon Huns

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The Alchon Empire was the third of four major Huna states established in Central and South Asia. The Alchon were preceded by the Kidarites and succeeded by the Hephthalites in Bactria and the Nezak Huns in the Hindu Kush. The names of the Alchon kings are known from their extensive coinage, Buddhist accounts, and a number of commemorative inscriptions throughout the Indian subcontinent. Toramana's son Mihirakula, a Saivite Hindu, moved up to near Pataliputra to the east and Gwalior to central India. Hiuen Tsiang narrates Mihirakula's merciless persecution of Buddhists and destruction of monasteries, though the description is disputed as far as the authenticity is concerned.[63] The Alchons have long been considered as a part or a sub-division of the Hephthalites, or as their eastern branch, but now tend to be considered as a separate entity.[64][65][66] The Huns were defeated by the alliance of Indian rulers, Maharaja (Great King) Yasodharman of Malwa and Gupta Emperor Narasimhagupta in the 6th century. Some of them were driven out of India and others were assimilated in the Indian society.[67]

Medieval period

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Arab Caliphate

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The expansion of the Arab Caliphate.
  Expansion under Muhammad, 622–632
  Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661
  Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750

After conquering the Middle East from the Byzantine Empire and the Sasanian Empire, the Rashidun Caliphate reached the coastal region of Makran in present-day Balochistan. In 643, the second caliph Umar (r. 634–644) ordered an invasion of Makran against the Rai dynasty. Following the Rashidun capture of Makran, Umar restricted the army to not pass beyond and consolidated his position in Makran.[68] During the reign of the fourth caliph Ali (r. 656–661), the Rashidun army conquered the town of Kalat in the heart of Balochistan.[69] During the reign of the sixth Umayyad caliph al-Walid I (r. 705–715), the Arab military general Muhammad ibn al-Qasim commanded the Umayyad incursion into Sindh. In 712, he defeated the army of the Hindu maharaja Dahir of Aror (r. 695–712) and established the caliphal province of Sind. The historic town of al-Mansura was administered as the capital of the province. Afterward, Ibn al-Qasim proceeded to conquer Multan, which subsequently became a prominent centre of Islamic culture and trading. In 747, the anti-Umayyad rebel Mansur ibn Jumhur al-Kalbi seized Sind and was defeated by Musa ibn Ka'b al-Tamimi of the succeeding Abbasid Caliphate. In the 9th-century, Abbasid authority gradually declined in Sind and Multan. The tenth Abbasid caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–861) assigned the governorship of Sind to Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Habbari, who founded the hereditary Habbarid dynasty and became the autonomous ruler of Sind in 854. Around the same time, the Banu Munnabih established the Emirate of Multan while Ma'danids reigned over Sultanate of Makran. There was gradual conversion to Islam in the south, especially amongst the native Hindu and Buddhist majority, but in areas north of Multan, Hindus and Buddhists remained numerous.[70] By the end of the 10th century CE, the region was ruled by several Hindu kings.

Odi Shahis

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Amb Temples, built by the Hindu Shahi dynasty between the 7th and 9th centuries CE

The Turk Shahis ruled Gandhara from the decline of the Kushan Empire in the 3rd century until 870, when they were overthrown by the Hindu Shahis. The Hindu Shahis are believed to belong to the Uḍi/Oḍi tribe, namely the people of Oddiyana in Gandhara.[71][72]

The first king Kallar had moved the capital into Udabandhapura from Kabul, in the modern village of Hund for its new capital.[73][74][75][76] At its zenith, the kingdom stretched over the Kabul Valley, Gandhara and western Punjab under Jayapala.[77] Jayapala saw a danger in the consolidation of the Ghaznavids and invaded their capital city of Ghazni both in the reign of Sebuktigin and in that of his son Mahmud, which initiated the Muslim Ghaznavid and Hindu Shahi struggles.[78] Sebuk Tigin, however, defeated him, and he was forced to pay an indemnity.[78] Jayapala defaulted on the payment and took to the battlefield once more.[78] Jayapala however, lost control of the entire region between the Kabul Valley and Indus River.[79]

However, the army was defeated in battle against the western forces, particularly against the Mahmud of Ghazni.[79] In the year 1001, soon after Sultan Mahmud came to power and was occupied with the Qarakhanids north of the Hindu Kush, Jaipal attacked Ghazni once more and upon suffering yet another defeat by the powerful Ghaznavid forces, near present-day Peshawar. After the Battle of Peshawar, he died because of regretting as his subjects brought disaster and disgrace to the Shahi dynasty.[78][79]

Jayapala was succeeded by his son Anandapala,[78] who along with other succeeding generations of the Shahiya dynasty took part in various unsuccessful campaigns against the advancing Ghaznvids but were unsuccessful. The Hindu rulers eventually exiled themselves to the Kashmir Siwalik Hills.[79]

Ghaznavid dynasty

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Ghaznavid Empire at its greatest extent in 1030 CE

In 997 CE, the Turkic ruler Mahmud of Ghazni, took over the Ghaznavid dynasty empire established by his father, Sebuktegin, a Turkic origin ruler. Starting from the city of Ghazni (now in Afghanistan), Mehmood conquered the bulk of Khorasan, marched on Peshawar against the Hindu Shahis in Kabul in 1005, and followed it by the conquests of Punjab (1007), deposed the Shia Ismaili rulers of Multan, (1011), Kashmir (1015) and Qanoch (1017). By the end of his reign in 1030, Mahmud's empire briefly extended from Kurdistan in the west to the Yamuna river in the east, and the Ghaznavid dynasty lasted until 1187. Contemporary historians such as Abolfazl Beyhaqi and Ferdowsi described extensive building work in Lahore, as well as Mahmud's support and patronage of learning, literature and the arts.

Mahmud's successors, known as the Ghaznavids, ruled for 157 years. Their kingdom gradually shrank in size, and was racked by bitter succession struggles. The Hindu Rajput kingdoms of western India reconquered the eastern Punjab, and by the 1160s, the line of demarcation between the Ghaznavid state and the Hindu kingdoms approximated to the present-day boundary between India and Pakistan. The Ghurid Empire of central Afghanistan occupied Ghazni around 1160, and the Ghaznavid capital was shifted to Lahore. Later Muhammad Ghori conquered the Ghaznavid kingdom, occupying Lahore in 1187.[citation needed]

Ghurid dynasty

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Map of Ghurid territory, before the assassination of Muhammad of Ghor.[80][81][82] In the west, Ghurid territory extended to Nishapur and Merv,[83][84] while Ghurid troops reached as far as Gorgan on the shores of the Caspian Sea.[85][86] Eastward, the Ghurids invaded as far as Bengal.[87]

The Ghaznavids under either Khusrau Shah or his son Khusrau Malik lost their control over Ghazni to the Ghuzz Turks along with some other territories. In the 1170s, Ghurid prince Muhammad of Ghor raided their territory and captured Ghazni from them and was crowned there by his brother Ghiyath al-Din Muhammad in 1173. Muhammad of Ghor marched from Gomal Pass into Pakistan and captured Multan and Uch before being rebuffed by Gujarat's Hindu Chaulukya (Solanki) rulers, which forced him to press upon the trumbling Ghaznavids. By 1186–87, he deposed the last Ghaznavid ruler Khusrau Malik, bringing the last of Ghaznevid territory under his control and ending the Ghaznavid empire. The Ghurids were overthrown in 1215, although their conquests in the Indian Subcontinent survived for several centuries under the Delhi Sultanate established by the Ghurid Mamluk Qutb ud-Din Aibak.

Delhi Sultanate

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Tomb of Shah Rukn-e-Alam, built by Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq in 1324 CE

The Turkic origin Mamluk Dynasty, seized the throne of the Sultanate in 1211. Several dynasties ruled their empires from Delhi: the Mamluk (1211–90), the Khalji (1290–1320), the Tughlaq (1320–1413), the Sayyid (1414–1451) and the Lodhi (1451–1526).[88] Although some kingdoms remained independent of Delhi, almost all of the Indus plain came under the rule of these large sultanates.

The sultans (emperors) of Delhi enjoyed cordial relations with rulers in the Near East but owed them no allegiance. While the sultans ruled from urban centres, their military camps and trading posts provided the nuclei for many towns that sprang up in the countryside. Close interaction with local populations led to cultural exchange and the resulting "Indo-Islamic" fusion has left a lasting imprint and legacy in South Asian architecture, music, literature, life style and religious customs. In addition, the language of Urdu (literally meaning "horde" or "camp" in various Turkic dialects, but more likely "city" in the South Asian context) was born during the Delhi Sultanate period, as a result of the mingling of speakers of native Prakrits, Persian, Turkish and Arabic languages.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of the Sultanate was its temporary success in insulating South Asia from the Mongol invasion from Central Asia in the 13th century; nonetheless the sultans eventually lost western Pakistan to the Mongols (see the Ilkhanate dynasty). The Sultanate declined after the invasion of Emperor Timur, who founded the Timurid Empire, and was eventually conquered in 1526 by the Mughal Emperor Babar.

The Delhi Sultanate and later Mughal Empire attracted Muslim refugees, nobles, technocrats, bureaucrats, soldiers, traders, scientists, architects, artisans, teachers, poets, artists, theologians and Sufis from the rest of the Muslim world and they migrated and settled in the South Asia. During the reign of Sultan Ghyasuddin Balban (1266–1286) thousands of Central Asian Muslims sought asylum including more than 15 sovereigns and their nobles due to the Mongol invasion of Khwarezmia and Eastern Iran. At the court of Sultan Iltemish in Delhi the first wave of these Muslim refugees escaping from the Central Asian genocide by the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan, brought administrators from Iran, painters from China, theologians from Samarkand, Nishapur and Bukhara, divines and saints from the rest of Muslim world, craftsmen and men and maidens from every region, notably doctors adept in Greek medicine and philosophers from everywhere.

Kingdom of Sindh

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Soomra dynasty

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The Soomra dynasty was a local Sindhi Muslim dynasty that ruled between the early 11th century and the 14th century.[89][90][91]

Later chroniclers like Ali ibn al-Athir (c. late 12th c.) and Ibn Khaldun (c. late 14th c.) attributed the fall of Habbarids to Mahmud of Ghazni, lending credence to the argument of Hafif being the last Habbarid.[92] The Soomras appear to have established themselves as a regional power in this power vacuum.[92][93]

The Ghurids and Ghaznavids continued to rule parts of Sindh, across the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, alongside the Soomrus.[92] The precise delineations are not yet known, but Sommrus were probably centred in lower Sindh.[92]

Some of them were adherents of Isma'ilism.[93] One of their kings, Shimuddin Chanisar, had submitted to Iltutmish, the Sultan of Delhi, and was allowed to continue on as a vassal.[94]

Samma dynasty

[edit]
The Makli Necropolis at Thatta is one of the largest funerary sites in the world.[95]

The Samma dynasty was a Sindhi dynasty that ruled in Sindh, and parts of Kutch, Punjab and Balochistan from c. 1351 to c. 1524 CE, with their capital at Thatta.[96][97][98]

The Sammas overthrew the Soomra dynasty soon after 1335 and the last Soomra ruler took shelter with the governor of Gujarat, under the protection of Muhammad bin Tughluq, the sultan of Delhi. Mohammad bin Tughlaq made an expedition against Sindh in 1351 and died at Sondha, possibly in an attempt to restore the Soomras. With this, the Sammas became independent. The next sultan, Firuz Shah Tughlaq attacked Sindh in 1365 and 1367, unsuccessfully, but with reinforcements from Delhi he later obtained Banbhiniyo's surrender. For a period the Sammas were therefore subject to Delhi again. Later, as the Sultanate of Delhi collapsed they became fully independent.[99] Jam Unar was the founder of Samma dynasty mentioned by Ibn Battuta.[99]

The Samma civilisation contributed significantly to the evolution of the Indo-Islamic architectural style. Thatta is famous for its necropolis, which covers 10 square km on the Makli Hill.[100] It has left its mark in Sindh with magnificent structures including the Makli Necropolis of its royals in Thatta.[96][101]

Early Modern Period

[edit]

Mughal Empire

[edit]
The Alamgiri Gate of the Lahore Fort was built during the reign of Aurangzeb.[102]
Diwan-i-Khas at Lahore Fort was built during the reign of Shah Jahan.
The Badshahi Mosque, built by Aurangzeb, is one of the largest mosques in Pakistan.
Wazir Khan Mosque at Lahore, richly decorated with Mughal frescoes
The Akbari Sarai features a monumental gateway that leads to the Tomb of Jahangir.

In 1526, Babur, a Timurid descendant of Timur and Genghis Khan from Fergana Valley (modern-day Uzbekistan), swept across the Khyber Pass and founded the Mughal Empire, covering parts of modern-day eastern- Afghanistan, much of what is now Pakistan, parts of India and Bangladesh.[103] The Mughals were descended from Central Asian Turks (with significant Mongol admixture).

However, his son and successor Humayun was defeated by Sher Shah Suri of Sasaram, in the year 1540, and Humayun was forced to retreat to Kabul. After Sher Shah died, his son Islam Shah Suri became the ruler, on whose death his prime minister, Hemu, ascended the throne and ruled North India from Delhi for one month. He was defeated by Emperor Akbar's forces in the Second Battle of Panipat on 6 November 1556.

Akbar was both a capable ruler and an early proponent of religious and ethnic tolerance and favored an early form of multiculturalism. For example, he declared "Amari" or non-killing of animals in the holy days of Jainism and rolled back the jizya tax imposed upon non-Islamic, mainly Hindu people. The Mughal dynasty ruled most of South Asia by 1600. The Mughal emperors married local royalty and allied themselves with local maharajas. Akbar was succeeded by Jahangir, who was succeeded by Shah Jahan. Shah Jahan was replaced by Aurangzeb following the Mughal war of succession (1658–1659).

After the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, different regions of modern Pakistan and India began asserting independence. The empire went into a rapid decline, and by about 1720 only really controlled a small region around Delhi. The emperors continued to pay lip service to them as "Emperor of India" by the other powers in South Asia until the British finally abolished the empire in 1858.

For a short time in the late 16th century, Lahore was the capital of the empire. The architectural legacy of the Mughals includes the Lahore Fort, Wazir Khan Mosque, Shalimar Gardens, Tomb of Jahangir, Tomb of Nur Jahan, Akbari Sarai, Hiran Minar, Shah Jahan Mosque and the Badshahi Mosque.[102] The Mughal Empire had a great impact on the culture, cuisine, and architecture of Pakistan.

18th Century Punjabi Muslim states

[edit]

Chattha State (1750–1797)

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The Chatthas under their leader Nur Muhammad Chattha declared independence from Mughal Empire in 1750 and formed the Chattha State.[104] After Pir Muhammad Chattha's death his son Ghulam Muhammad Chattha inherited the Chattha state and the hatred of Sukerchakias. The rivalry was passed down to Mahan Singh and Ghulam Muhammad Chattha.[105][106]

Under his leadership the Chathas gained several successes over the Sikhs,[107] and it at one time looked as if the progress of the Sikh arms had been arrested and their dominion in the Doab annihilated.[105]

Chattha State was annexed when Jan muhammad Chattha was killed in a siege led by Ranjit Singh when the latter recovered the lost Chattha state with Afghan aid.[108]

Pakpattan state (1692–1810 CE)

[edit]

Following the disintegration of the Mughal Empire, the shrine's Dīwān was able to forge a political independent state centered on Pakpattan.[109] In 1757, Dīwān 'Abd as-Subḥān gathered an army of his Jat murīds, attacked the Raja of Bikaner, and thereby expanded the shrine's territorial holdings for the first time east of the Sutlej.[109] Around 1776, the Dīwān, supported mainly by his Wattu murīds, successfully repelled an attack by the Sikh Nakai Misl, resulting in the death of the Nakai leader, Heera Singh Sandhu.[109]

Sial State (1723–1816)

[edit]

Sial state was established by the 13th Sial Chief Nawab Walidad Khan Sial in 1723.[110] He gradually gained control of the lower Rachna doab, including the cities of Chiniot, Pindi Bhattian, Jhang and Mankera.[111]

Next chief, Inayatullah Khan (r. 1747– 1787) was a successful general who won 22 battles against Bhangi Misl and the Multan chiefs.[112]

Sikh Empire invaded Jhang multiple times from 1801 to 1816.[113] Sial state was annexed by Sikh Empire and Ahmad Khan Sial was awarded a Jagir by Ranjit Singh.[114]

Maratha Empire

[edit]

By early 18th century, the Mughal empire declined. In 1749, the Mughals were induced to cede Sindh, the Punjab region and the important trans Indus River to Ahmad Shah Durrani in order to save his capital from Afghan attack.[115] Ahmad Shah sacked Delhi in 1757 but permitted the Mughal dynasty to remain in nominal control of the city as long as the ruler acknowledged Ahmad Shah's suzerainty over Punjab, Sindh, and Kashmir. Leaving his second son Timur Shah to safeguard his interests, Ahmad Shah left India to return to Afghanistan.

In 1751–52, Ahamdiya treaty was signed between the Marathas and Mughals, when Balaji Bajirao was the Peshwa.[116] Through this treaty, the Marathas controlled whole of India from their capital at Pune and the Mughal rule was restricted only to Delhi (the Mughals remained the nominal heads of Delhi). Marathas were now straining to expand their area of control towards the Northwest of India. Ahmad Shah sacked the Mughal capital and withdrew with the booty he coveted. To counter the Afghans, Peshwa Balaji Bajirao sent Raghunathrao. He defeated the Rohillas and Afghan garrisons in Punjab and succeeded in ousting Timur Shah and his court from India and brought Lahore, Multan, Kashmir and other subahs on the Indian side of Attock under Maratha rule.[117] Thus, upon his return to Kandahar in 1757, Ahmad was forced to return to India and face the Maratha Confederacy.

The Bala Hissar fort in Peshawar was one of the royal residences of the Durrani kings.

In 1758, the Maratha Empire's general Raghunath Rao attacked and conquered Punjab, frontier regions and Kashmir and drove out Timur Shah Durrani, the son and viceroy of Ahmad Shah Abdali. In 1759, the Marathas and its allies won the Battle of Lahore, defeating the Durranis,[118][119] hence, Lahore, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, Peshawar, Kashmir, and other subahs on the south eastern side of Afghanistan's border fell under the Maratha rule.[120]

Ahmad Shah declared a jihad (or Islamic holy war) against the Marathas, and warriors from various Afghan tribes joined his army. Early skirmishes were followed by decisive victory for the Afghans against the much larger Maratha garrisons in Northwest India and by 1759 Ahmad Shah and his army reached Lahore and were poised to confront the Marathas. By 1760, the Maratha groups had coalesced into a big enough army under the command of Sadashivrao Bhau. Once again, Panipat was the scene of a confrontation between two warring contenders for control of northern India. The Third Battle of Panipat (14 January 1761), fought between largely Muslim and largely Hindu armies was waged along a twelve-kilometer front. Although the Durrani's army decisively defeated the Marathas, they suffered heavily in the battle.

The victory at Panipat was the high point of Ahmad Shah's—and Afghan—power. However, even prior to his death, the empire began to face challenges in the form of a rising Sikhs in Punjab. In 1762, Ahmad Shah crossed the passes from Afghanistan for the sixth time to subdue the Sikhs. From this time and on, the domination and control of the Empire began to loosen, and by the time of Durrani's death he had completely lost Punjab to the Sikhs, as well as earlier losses of northern territories to the Uzbeks, necessitating a compromise with them.[121]

Sikh Empire

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Samadhi of Ranjit Singh, with the minaret of Badshahi Mosque in the background

Guru Nanak (29 November 1469 – 22 September 1539), Sikhism's founder, was born into a Hindu Khatri family in the village of Rāi Bhōi dī Talwandī (present day Nankana, near Sial in modern-day Pakistan). He was an influential religious and social reformer in north India and the saintly founder of a modern monotheistic order and first of the ten divine Gurus of Sikh religion. At the age of 70, he died at Kartarpur, Punjab of modern-day Pakistan.

The Sikh Empire (1799–1849) was formed on the foundations of the Sikh Khalsa Army by Maharaja Ranjit Singh who was proclaimed "Sarkar-i-Khalsa", and was referred to as the "Maharaja of Lahore".[122] It consisted of a collection of autonomous Punjabi Misls, which were governed by Misldars,[123] mainly in the Punjab region. The empire extended from the Khyber Pass in the west, to Kashmir in the north, to Multan in the south and Kapurthala in the east. The main geographical footprint of the empire was the Punjab region. The formation of the empire was a watershed and represented formidable consolidation of Sikh military power and resurgence of local culture, which had been dominated for hundreds of years by Indo-Afghan and Indo-Mughal hybrid cultures.

The foundations of the Sikh Empire, during the time of the Sikh Khalsa Army, could be defined as early as 1707, starting from the death of Aurangzeb. The fall of the Mughal Empire provided opportunities for the Sikh army to lead expeditions against the Mughals and Pashtuns. This led to a growth of the army, which was split into different Sikh armies and then semi-independent "misls". Each of these component armies were known as a misl, each controlling different areas and cities. However, in the period from 1762 to 1799, Sikh rulers of their misls appeared to be coming into their own. The formal start of the Sikh Empire began with the disbandment of the Sikh Khalsa Army by the time of coronation of Ranjit Singh in 1801, creating a unified political state. All the misl leaders who were affiliated with the Army were from Punjab's nobility.[123]

Colonial period

[edit]

British conquest and organisation

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None of the territory of modern Pakistan was ruled by the British, or other European powers, until 1839, when Karachi, then a small fishing village with a mud fort guarding the harbour, was taken, and held as an enclave with a port and military base for the First Afghan War that soon followed. The rest of Sindh was taken in 1843, and in the following decades, first the East India Company, and then after the post-Sepoy Mutiny (1857–1858) direct rule of Queen Victoria of the British Empire, took over most of the country partly through wars, and also treaties. The main wars were that against the Baloch Talpur dynasty, ended by the Battle of Miani (1843) in Sindh, the Anglo-Sikh Wars (1845–1849) and the Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–1919). By 1893, all modern Pakistan was part of the British Indian Empire, and remained so until independence in 1947.[124]

Under the British, modern Pakistan was mostly divided into the Sind Division, Punjab Province, and the Baluchistan Agency. There were various princely states, of which the largest was Bahawalpur. Sindh was part of the Bombay Presidency, and there were many complaints over the years that it was neglected by its distant rulers in modern Mumbai, although there was usually a Commissioner based in Karachi.[citation needed]

The Punjab (which included the modern Indian state) was instead technically ruled from even more distant Calcutta, as part of the Bengal Presidency, but in practice most matters were devolved to local British officials, who were often among the most energetic and effective in India. At first there was a "Board of Administration" led by Sir Henry Lawrence, who had previously worked as British Resident at the Lahore Durbar and also consisted of his younger brother John Lawrence and Charles Grenville Mansel.[125] Below the Board worked a group of acclaimed officers collectively known as Henry Lawrence's "Young Men". After the Mutiny, Sir John Lawrence became the first Governor of Punjab. The Punjab Canal Colonies were an ambitious and largely successful project, begun in the 1880s, to create new farmland through irrigation, to relieve population pressure elsewhere (most of the areas involved are now in Pakistan).

The Baluchistan Agency largely consisted of princely states and tribal territories, and was governed with a light touch, although near the Afghan border Quetta was built up as a military base, in case of invasion by either the Afghans or the Russians. The 1935 Quetta earthquake was a major disaster. From 1876 the sensitive far north was made a "Chief Commissioner's Province". The border with Afghanistan, which remains the modern border of Pakistan, was finally fixed on the Durand Line in 1893.

Railway construction began in the 1850s, and most of the network (some now discontinued) was completed by 1900. Karachi expanded enormously under British rule, followed to a lesser extent by Lahore and the other larger cities.

Different regions of Pakistan were conquered by East India Company as below:
Sindh was conquered by Battle of Hyderabad and Battle of Miani in 1843.
Punjab and eastern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa were conquered during Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849.

Regions conquered by British Raj are as below:
•Southern Balochistan came under control by Treaty of Kalat in 1876.
•Western Balochistan was conquered by British empire in Second Anglo-Afghan War through Treaty of Gandamak, in 1879.

Early period of Pakistan Movement

[edit]

In 1877, Syed Ameer Ali had formed the Central National Muhammadan Association to work towards the political advancement of the Indian Muslims, who had suffered grievously in 1857, in the aftermath of the failed Sepoy Mutiny against the East India Company; the British were seen as foreign invaders. But the organisation declined towards the end of the 19th century.

Lord Minto met with the Muslim delegation in June 1906. The Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909 called for separate Muslim electorates.

In 1885, the Indian National Congress was founded as a forum, which later became a party, to promote a nationalist cause.[126] Although the Congress attempted to include the Muslim community in the struggle for independence from the British rule – and some Muslims were very active in the Congress – the majority of Muslim leaders, including the influential Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, did not trust the party.

A turning point came in 1900, when the British administration in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh acceded to Hindu demands and made Hindi, the version of the Hindustani language written in the Devanagari script, the official language. The proselytisation conducted in the region by the activists of Arya Samaj, a Hindu reformist movement also stirred Muslim concerns about their faith. Eventually, the Muslims feared that the Hindu majority would seek to suppress the rights of Muslims in the region following the departure of the British.

Muslim League

[edit]

The All-India Muslim League was founded by Shaiiq-e-Mustafa on 30 December 1906, in the aftermath of division of Bengal, on the sidelines of the annual All India Muhammadan Educational Conference in Shahbagh, Dhaka East Bengal.[127] The meeting was attended by three thousand delegates and presided over by Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk. It addressed the issue of safeguarding interests of Muslims and finalised a programme. A resolution, moved by Nawab Salimullah and seconded by Hakim Ajmal Khan. Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk (conservative), declared:

The Musalmans are only a fifth in number as compared with the total population of the country, and it is manifest that if at any remote period the British government ceases to exist in India, then the rule of India would pass into the hands of that community which is nearly four times as large as ourselves ... our life, our property, our honour, and our faith will all be in great danger, when even now that a powerful British administration is protecting its subjects, we the Musalmans have to face most serious difficulties in safe-guarding our interests from the grasping hands of our neighbors.[128]

The constitution and principles of the League were contained in the Green Book, written by Maulana Mohammad Ali. Its goals at this stage did not include establishing an independent Muslim state, but rather concentrated on protecting Muslim liberties and rights, promoting understanding between the Muslim community and other Indians, educating the Muslim and Indian community at large on the actions of the government, and discouraging violence. However, several factors over the next thirty years, including sectarian violence, led to a re-evaluation of the League's aims.[129][130] Among those Muslims in the Congress who did not initially join the League was Jinnah, a prominent statesman and barrister in Bombay. This was because the first article of the League's platform was "To promote among the Mussalmans (Muslims) of India, feelings of loyalty to the British Government". The League remained loyal to the British administration for five years until the British decided to reverse the partition of Bengal. The Muslim League saw this British decision as partial to Hindus.[131]

George VI, Emperor of India

In 1907, a vocal group of Hindu hard-liners within the Indian National Congress movement separated from it and started to pursue a pro-Hindu movement openly. This group was spearheaded by the famous triumvirate of Lal-Bal-PalLala Lajpat Rai, Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Bipin Chandra Pal of Punjab, Bombay and Bengal provinces respectively. Their influence spread rapidly among other like minded Hindus – they called it Hindu nationalism – and it became a cause of serious concern for Muslims. However, Jinnah did not join the League until 1913, when the party changed its platform to one of Indian independence, as a reaction against the British decision to reverse the 1905 Partition of Bengal, which the League regarded it as a betrayal of the Bengali Muslims.[132] After vociferous protests of the Hindu population and violence engineered by secret groups, such as Anushilan Samiti and its offshoot Jugantar of Aurobindo and his brother etc., the British had decided to reunite Bengal again. Till this stage, Jinnah believed in Mutual co-operation to achieve an independent, united 'India', although he argued that Muslims should be guaranteed one-third of the seats in any Indian Parliament.

Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal

The League gradually became the leading representative body of Indian Muslims. Jinnah became its president in 1916, and negotiated the Lucknow Pact with the Congress leader, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, by which Congress conceded the principle of separate electorates and weighted representation for the Muslim community.[133] However, Jinnah broke with the Congress in 1920 when the Congress leader, Mohandas Gandhi, launched a law violating Non-Cooperation Movement against the British, which a temperamentally law-abiding barrister Jinnah disapproved. Jinnah also became convinced that the Congress would renounce its support for separate electorates for Muslims, which indeed it did in 1928. In 1927, the British proposed a constitution for India as recommended by the Simon Commission, but they failed to reconcile all parties. The British then turned the matter over to the League and the Congress, and in 1928 an All-Parties Conference was convened in Delhi. The attempt failed, but two more conferences were held, and at the Bombay conference in May, it was agreed that a small committee should work on the constitution. The prominent Congress leader Motilal Nehru headed the committee, which included two Muslims, Syed Ali Imam and Shoaib Quereshi; Motilal's son, Pt Jawaharlal Nehru, was its secretary. The League, however, rejected the committee's report, the so-called Nehru Report, arguing that its proposals gave too little representation (one quarter) to Muslims – the League had demanded at least one-third representation in the legislature. Jinnah announced a "parting of the ways" after reading the report, and relations between the Congress and the League began to sour.

Muslim homeland – "Now or Never"

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Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman seconding the Resolution with Jinnah and Ali Khan presiding the session

The general elections held in the United Kingdom had already weakened the leftist Labour Party led by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.[134] Furthermore, the Labour Party's government was already weakened by the outcomes of World War I, which fuelled new hopes for progress towards self-government in British India.[134] In fact, Mohandas K. Gandhi travelled to London to press the idea of "self-government" in British India, and claimed to represent all Indians whilst duly criticising the Muslim League as being sectarian and divisive.[134] After reviewing the report of the Simon Commission, the Indian Congress initiated a massive Civil Disobedience Movement under Gandhi; the Muslim League reserved their opinion on the Simon Report declaring that the report was not final and the matters should be decided after consultations with the leaders representing all communities in India.[134]

The Round-table Conferences were held, but these achieved little, since Gandhi and the League were unable to reach a compromise.[134] Witnessing the events of the Round Table Conferences, Jinnah had despaired of politics and particularly of getting mainstream parties like the Congress to be sensitive to minority priorities. During this time in 1930, notable writer and poet, Muhammad Iqbal called for a separate and autonomous nation-state, who in his presidential address to the 1930 convention of the Muslim League said that he felt that a separate Muslim state was essential in an otherwise Hindu-dominated South Asia.[135][136]

India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages, and professing different religions [...] Personally, I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.

Dream of Iqbal and Ali's Now or Never idealised the merger of the four provinces into a nation-state, called Pakistan.

The name of the nation-state was coined by the Cambridge University's political science student and Muslim nationalist Rahmat Ali,[137] and was published on 28 January 1933 in the pamphlet Now or Never.[138] After coining the name of the nation-state, Ali noticed that there is an acronym formed from the names of the "homelands" of Muslims in northwest India:

After the publication of the pamphlet, the Hindu Press vehemently criticised it, and the word 'Pakstan' used in it.[140] Thus this word became a heated topic of debate. With the addition of an "i" to improve the pronunciation, the name of Pakistan grew in popularity and led to the commencement of the Pakistan Movement, and consequently the creation of Pakistan.[141] In Urdu and Persian languages, the name encapsulates the concept of Pak ("pure") and stan ("land") and hence a "Pure Land".[142] In 1935, the British government proposed to hand over substantial power to elected Indian provincial legislatures, with elections to be held in 1937.[143] After the elections the League took office in Bengal and Punjab, but the Congress won office in most of the other provinces, and refused to devolve power with the League in provinces with large Muslim minorities citing technical difficulties. The subsequent Congress Rule was unpopular among Muslims and seen as a reign of Hindu tyranny by Muslim leaders. Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared 22 December 1939, a "Day of Deliverance" for Indian Muslims. It was meant to celebrate the resignation of all members of the Congress party from provincial and central offices.[144]

Meanwhile, Muslim ideologues for independence also felt vindicated by the presidential address of V.D. Savarkar at the 19th session of the famous Hindu nationalist party Hindu Mahasabha in 1937. In it, this legendary revolutionary – popularly called Veer Savarkar and known as the iconic father of the Hindu fundamentalist ideology – propounded the seminal ideas of his Two Nation Theory or ethnic exclusivism, which influenced Jinnah profoundly.

1940 Resolution

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The Working Committee of the Muslim League in Lahore (1940)

In 1940, Jinnah called a general session of the Muslim League in Lahore to discuss the situation that had arisen due to the outbreak of World War II and the Government of India joining the war without consulting Indian leaders. The meeting was also aimed at analysing the reasons that led to the defeat of the Muslim League in the general election of 1937 in the Muslim majority provinces. In his speech, Jinnah criticised the Indian Congress and the nationalists, and espoused the Two-Nation Theory and the reasons for the demand for separate homelands.[145] Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Chief Minister of Punjab, drafted the original resolution, but disavowed the final version,[146] that had emerged after protracted redrafting by the Subject Committee of the Muslim League. The final text unambiguously rejected the concept of a United India because of increasing inter-religious violence[147] and recommended the creation of independent states.[148] The resolution was moved in the general session by Shere-Bangla Bengali nationalist, AKF Haq, the Chief Minister of Bengal, supported by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman and other leaders and was adopted on 23 March 1940.[149] The Resolution read as follows:

No constitutional plan would be workable or acceptable to the Muslims unless geographical contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary. That the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign ... That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in the units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights of the minorities, with their consultation. Arrangements thus should be made for the security of Muslims where they were in a minority.[150]

Final phase of the Pakistan Movement

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Karachi War Cemetery. About 87,000 soldiers from British India (which includes modern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) died in World War II. Millions of civilians also died due to famines.

Islamic scholars debated over whether it was possible for the proposed Pakistan to truly become an Islamic state.[151][152]

While the Congress' top leadership had been in prison following the 1942 Quit India Movement, there was intense debate among Indian Muslims over the creation of a separate homeland.[152] The majority of Barelvis[153] and Barelvi ulema supported the creation of Pakistan[154] and pirs and Sunni ulema were mobilised by the Muslim League to demonstrate that India's Muslim masses wanted a separate country.[155] The Barelvis believed that any co-operation with Hindus would be counter productive.[156] On the other hand, most Deobandis, who were led by Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and the two-nation theory. According to them Muslims and Hindus could be one nation and Muslims were only a nation of themselves in the religious sense and not in the territorial sense.[157][158][159] At the same time some Deobandi ulema such as Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanvi, Mufti Muhammad Shafi and Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani were supportive of the Muslim League's demand to create a separate Pakistan.[155][160]

Muslims who were living in provinces where they were demographically a minority, such as the United Provinces where the Muslim League enjoyed popular support, were assured by Jinnah that they could remain in India, migrate to Pakistan or continue living in India but as Pakistani citizens.

In the Constituent Assembly elections of 1946, the Muslim League won 425 out of 496 seats reserved for Muslims (polling 89.2% of total votes).[132] The Congress had hitherto refused to acknowledge the Muslim League's claim of being the representative of Indian Muslims but finally acquiesced to the League's claim after the results of this election. The Muslim League's demand for Pakistan had received overwhelming popular support from India's Muslims, especially those Muslims who were living in provinces such as UP where they were a minority.[161]

The British had neither the will, nor the financial resources or military power, to hold India any longer but they were also determined to avoid partition and for this purpose they arranged the Cabinet Mission Plan.[162] According to this plan India would be kept united but would be heavily decentralised with separate groupings of Hindu and Muslim majority provinces. The Muslim League accepted this plan as it contained the 'essence' of Pakistan but the Congress rejected it. After the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan, Jinnah called for Muslims to observe Direct Action Day to demand the creation of a separate Pakistan. The Direct Action Day morphed into violent riots between Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta, with the violence displaying elements of ethnic cleansing. The riots in Calcutta were followed by intense communal rioting elsewhere, including in Noakhali (where Hindus were attacked by Muslims) and Bihar (where Hindus attacked Muslims) in October, resulting in large-scale displacement. In March 1947, such violence reached Punjab, where Sikhs and Hindus were massacred and driven out by Muslims in the Rawalpindi Division.[163]

The British Prime Minister Attlee appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten as India's last viceroy, to negotiate the independence of Pakistan and India and immediate British withdrawal. British leaders including Mountbatten did not support the creation of Pakistan but failed to convince Jinnah otherwise.[164][165] Mountbatten later confessed that he would most probably have sabotaged the creation of Pakistan had he known that Jinnah was dying of tuberculosis.[166]

In early 1947, the British had announced their desire to grant India its independence by June 1948. However, Lord Mountbatten decided to advance the date. In a meeting in June, Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad representing the Congress, Jinnah representing the Muslim League, B. R. Ambedkar representing the Untouchable community, and Master Tara Singh representing the Sikhs, agreed to partition India along religious lines.[citation needed]

Independence from the British Empire

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On 14 August 1947, Pakistan gained independence. India gained independence the following day. The two provinces of British India, Punjab and Bengal, were divided along religious lines by the Radcliffe Commission. Mountbatten is alleged to have influenced the Radcliffe Commission to draw the line in India's favour.[167][168] Punjab's mostly Muslim western part went to Pakistan and its mostly Hindu/Sikh eastern part went to India but there were significant Muslim minorities in Punjab's eastern section and likewise there were many Hindus and Sikhs living in Punjab's western areas.

Intense communal rioting in the Punjab forced the governments of India and Pakistan to agree to a forced population exchange of Muslim and Hindu/Sikh minorities living in Punjab. After this population exchange only a few thousand low-caste Hindus remained in Pakistan's side of Punjab and only a tiny Muslim population remained in the town of Malerkotla in India's part of Punjab.[169] Political scientist Ishtiaq Ahmed says that although Muslims started the violence in Punjab, by the end of 1947 more Muslims had been killed by Hindus and Sikhs in East Punjab than the number of Hindus and Sikhs who had been killed by Muslims in West Punjab.[170][171]

More than ten million people migrated across the new borders and between 200,000 and 2,000,000[172][173][174] people died in the spate of communal violence in the Punjab in what some scholars have described as a 'retributive genocide' between the religions.[175] The Pakistani government claimed that 50,000 Muslim women were abducted and raped by Hindu and Sikh men and similarly the Indian government claimed that Muslims abducted and raped 33,000 Hindu and Sikh women.[176][177][178] The two governments agreed to repatriate abducted women and thousands of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim women were repatriated to their families in the 1950s. The dispute over Kashmir escalated into the first war between India and Pakistan. The conflict remains unresolved.

For the history after independence, see History of Pakistan (1947–present).

History by region

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See also

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Notes

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References

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The history of Pakistan documents a region within the that encompasses the succession of civilizations, empires, and political entities within the modern territory of , commencing with the Bronze Age Indian subcontinental urban society, the Indus Valley Civilization, from approximately 3300 to 1300 BCE, an early urban society characterized by planned cities, advanced sanitation, and trade networks extending to , with major sites including and located in present-day and provinces; later, the northwestern Indian subcontinental region encompassed a significant portion of ancient Indo-Aryan heritage. This era was followed by invasions and rule under the , in 326 BCE, the under , Greco-Buddhist kingdom of the Indo-Greeks and the syncretic , and Hindu dynasties such as the influence, followed by local Buddhist and Hindu polities such as the (Buddhist) and (Hindu Brahmin), before the arrival of via conquests in the 8th century CE. A defining shift occurred with the Umayyad Caliphate's conquest in 711–712 CE, led by Muhammad bin Qasim, who defeated Hindu ruler and established the first enduring Muslim governance in the Indian subcontinent. Afterwards, medieval Sindh witnessed indigenous dynasties such as the (1024–1351 CE, possibly from the Parmar Rajput tribe) and (1351–1524 CE, possibly of Rajput tribal origin), and the Punjab region was governed by the , leading to the establishment of Muslim sultanates including the and by the 11th-12th centuries. Subsequent centuries saw the 's extension into the region, peaking under the from the 16th to 19th centuries, which centralized administration, promoted Persianate culture, and built architectural landmarks like the , though marked by regional autonomy and eventual decline. This decline accelerated amid the northward expansion of the Hindu under leaders like Mahadji Scindia into Punjab and the Doab regions following recovery from the 1761 Third Battle of Panipat, and the rise of Sikh Misls—confederacies of warrior groups that unified territories through guerrilla warfare and political alliances, laying the foundation for Maharaja 's , which encompassed Punjab including large parts of present-day Pakistan and effectively supplanted Mughal authority. British colonial rule consolidated after the 1849 annexation of and 1857 suppression of the Indian Rebellion, integrating the area into the until the 1947 , driven by the Muslim League's demand for a separate homeland under . Pakistan's founding is associated with the vision of Muhammad Iqbal and the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and the Two-Nation theory, an idea championed by the and many Indian Muslims, which asserts that Muslims and Hindus in British India formed two distinct nations—exemplified by the All-India Muslim League's call for on 16 August 1946, when Muslim League’s Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared the only possibilities were "either a divided India or a destroyed India"—which led to communal riots, particularly the Great Calcutta Killings in Calcutta and the Noakhali riots, involving attacks by Muslim mobs on Hindus and Sikhs resulting in thousands of deaths, displacements, and atrocities including abductions and assaults on non-Muslim women and children—, resulting in Pakistan's independence on August 14, 1947, but accompanied by partition riots that caused 12-15 million displacements and hundreds of thousands to over a million deaths from communal violence, particularly targeting Hindus and Sikhs in territories that became Pakistan and later Bangladesh. Since independence, Pakistan has navigated foundational challenges including the 1947-1948 Indo-Pakistani War over , the 1956 republican constitution, military coups in 1958 by Ayub Khan and 1977 by Zia-ul-Haq imposing Islamization policies, the 1971 war leading to East Pakistan's secession as , economic under followed by his 1979 execution, democratic transitions marred by corruption allegations, the 1998 nuclear tests amid sanctions, and post-2001 counterterrorism efforts against Taliban-linked militancy, alongside persistent issues of governance instability, ethnic tensions, and economic volatility despite growth in agriculture and remittances.

Prehistoric Era

Paleolithic and Neolithic Periods

Archaeological evidence indicates human presence in the territory of modern Pakistan during the period, with stone tools discovered in the Soan Valley of the Potwar Plateau dating back to approximately 2.5 million to 10,000 BCE, representing some of the earliest hominid activity in . Sites such as Riwat in yield artifacts suggesting occupation around 1.9 million years ago, among the oldest evidence of early humans outside Africa. In , Middle to tools from Ongar and near are associated with Pleistocene deposits, spanning roughly 500,000 to 11,700 years ago, though systematic surveys remain limited due to challenging terrain and preservation issues. Middle occupations in the , dated 80,000 to 40,000 years ago via optically stimulated luminescence, include flakes, pointing to adaptations in arid environments. The transition to the period, marked by sedentism and early agriculture, is exemplified by the site in Balochistan's Kacchi Plain, where recent of human tooth enamel revises the onset of farming communities to approximately 5200 BCE, rather than the previously estimated 7000–9000 BCE. This short-lived initial phase (Period I, lasting a few centuries) features mud-brick structures, domesticated ( and einkorn) and , and herd animals like and sheep, evidencing a shift from to cultivation independent of Near Eastern influences, as supported by genetic and archaeobotanical analyses. Artifacts include early fibers, the oldest known in the , and proto-dentistry in burials, with the site's continuity into later periods highlighting gradual technological advancements like and metallurgy precursors. These findings underscore Balochistan's role as a cradle for Neolithic innovation in , predating broader Indus Valley developments.

Indus Valley Civilization

The northwest Indian subcontinental Indus Valley Civilization (IVC), also termed the Harappan Civilization, emerged around 3300 BCE and persisted until approximately 1300 BCE, primarily along the and its tributaries in regions now encompassing Pakistan's and provinces. Its core phase, from 2600 to 1900 BCE, featured expansive urban settlements demonstrating advanced engineering, with over 1,000 sites identified, including major centers like in and in . , excavated starting in 1922, covered about 250 hectares and housed an estimated population of 40,000, while spanned similar scales with comparable infrastructure. These sites reveal a society reliant on flood-irrigated , cultivating , , , and pulses, supplemented by domesticated animals such as , sheep, and elephants. Urban planning in Indian subcontinental IVC cities exhibited remarkable uniformity, with streets laid out in a grid pattern oriented to the cardinal directions, constructed using standardized fired bricks measuring approximately 28x14x7 cm. Multi-story houses featured private wells, bathrooms, and covered drains connected to a city-wide sewerage system that channeled wastewater to brick-lined pits or cesspools, evidencing sophisticated sanitation predating similar developments elsewhere by millennia. Absence of monumental palaces or temples suggests a decentralized authority, possibly managed by councils or merchant elites, as inferred from the lack of royal burials and prevalence of equal-sized dwellings. Artifacts like the bronze "Dancing Girl" figurine from Mohenjo-Daro and the steatite "Priest-King" statue indicate skilled metallurgy and craftsmanship, with jewelry, pottery, and seals produced in specialized workshops. The economy thrived on internal trade networks and limited external exchanges, evidenced by carnelian beads and etched seals found in Mesopotamian sites dated to circa 2300 BCE, implying maritime or overland commerce via the . , comprising over 400 pictographic symbols on seals and tablets, remains undeciphered despite computational and linguistic efforts, hindering direct insights into governance, religion, or administration. Religious practices, reconstructed from seals depicting horned figures in yogic postures—potentially proto-Shiva—and tree worship motifs, point to animistic or proto-Hindu elements, though interpretations vary due to interpretive biases in secondary analyses. Decline commenced around 1900 BCE in the Mature phase, marked by urban abandonment and shift to rural settlements, attributed primarily to climatic and weakening—corroborated by sediment cores showing a drying the Ghaggar-Hakra (ancient Sarasvati) river system—rather than or alone. Multiple stressors, including tectonic shifts altering river courses and reduced agricultural yields, likely prompted migration eastward, with Late Harappan phases persisting until 1300 BCE in de-urbanized forms. Archaeological continuity in and subsistence patterns indicates gradual transformation rather than catastrophic , challenging earlier hypotheses lacking empirical support from skeletal trauma data.

Ancient Periods

Vedic and Iron Age Developments

The decline of the Indian subcontinental Indus Valley Civilization around 1900 BCE led to a phase of de-urbanization in the region of modern , with evidence of continued but smaller-scale settlements and a shift toward in the and areas. By approximately 1500 BCE, migrations of Indo-Aryan-speaking pastoralists from the Eurasian steppes introduced new genetic components, as demonstrated by analysis from sites in the Swat Valley showing admixture of up to 20-30% Steppe-related ancestry in local populations, distinct from earlier Indus Valley genetic profiles dominated by ancient Zagrosian-related farmers and Ancient Ancestral South Indian elements. This influx aligns with linguistic evidence from the , the earliest Vedic text composed circa 1500–1200 BCE, which locates early Indo-Aryan tribal society in the Sapta Sindhu—the land of seven rivers including the Indus (Sindhu), (Vitasta), Chenab (Asikni), Ravi (Parushni), and others flowing through modern Pakistani , with rituals and battles such as the Dasarajna () described along these waterways. Vedic culture emphasized oral transmission of hymns, cattle-based economy, horse-drawn chariots, and fire sacrifices, reflecting a semi-nomadic, patrilineal tribal without monumental , which limits direct archaeological correlates. Archaeological transitions in the post-Harappan period include at (circa 1900–1300 BCE), featuring urns and shifts that parallel Vedic funerary practices, though continuity from local traditions cannot be ruled out. Genetic data further supports a male-biased migration pattern, with Steppe ancestry appearing prominently in Y-chromosome lineages linked to , suggesting elite dominance or warrior groups integrating with indigenous populations. These developments mark the onset of Vedic religious and social frameworks, including early formulations of the varna (social division) system, though empirical evidence remains textual and genetic rather than artifactual due to the perishable nature of Vedic . The in the region, commencing around 1200–1000 BCE, is exemplified by the in northern Pakistan's Swat, Dir, and Peshawar valleys, spanning circa 1200–800 BCE and characterized by over 1,000 documented stone cist and chamber graves containing grey-black , spindle whorls, copper/bronze ornaments, and rare horse remains indicative of pastoral mobility. This culture reflects protohistoric , with varying by sex and status—women's burials often including jewelry and men’s with weapons—potentially tied to Indo-Aryan or early Indo-Iranian groups via ceramic styles and burial orientations, though local continuity from traditions is also evident. Iron artifacts, such as tools and weapons, appear in later phases around 800–500 BCE at sites like Butkara in Swat, signaling the adoption of from regional innovations or diffusion, which enhanced agricultural clearance and warfare capabilities amid population growth. By the late (circa 1000–500 BCE), iron use facilitated settled villages and early chiefdoms in , bridging to urban revivals under subsequent empires, with Vedic texts attesting to expanding rituals and iron weaponry (ayas).

Achaemenid, Macedonian, and Mauryan Empires

The expanded into the northwestern regions of the under Darius I, incorporating and parts of the Indus Valley as satrapies by approximately 518 BCE, as evidenced by the which lists provinces including Hinduš (the Indus region) and Gandāra. These territories, encompassing areas now in modern such as and , were administered from , which served as a provincial capital, and contributed tribute including gold dust extracted from river sands, as described by in his account of the empire's 20th satrapy combining eastern Iranian lands with Indian districts. Persian control facilitated trade along the Royal Road extending to the Indus and introduced administrative practices, coinage, and script influences in the region, though local autonomy persisted under satraps who collected taxes and levied troops. Alexander the Great's invasion reached the Punjab region in 327–326 BCE, following his conquest of the Achaemenid satrapy of Gandhara, where Taxila submitted without resistance under its ruler Ambhi (Taxiles), providing supplies and guides for the Macedonian advance. The pivotal Battle of the Hydaspes occurred in May 326 BCE along the Jhelum River against King Porus, ruler of the Paurava kingdom between the Hydaspes and Acesines rivers, where Alexander's forces, employing innovative tactics like a feigned crossing and cavalry flanking despite monsoon rains and Porus's war elephants, secured victory after heavy casualties on both sides. Porus surrendered but was reinstated as a vassal ally, controlling territories up to the Hyphasis (Beas) River; however, Macedonian troop mutiny at the Hyphasis halted further eastward expansion, leading Alexander to consolidate holdings in the Punjab before withdrawing westward in 325 BCE, leaving garrisons and founding cities like Nicaea and Bucephala. Following 's death in 323 BCE, the Mauryan Empire under (r. c. 321–297 BCE) absorbed the northwestern territories previously held by the short-lived Greco-Bactrian successors, defeating in a campaign culminating in a 303 BCE treaty that ceded , , and (encompassing parts of modern Pakistan's and ) in exchange for 500 war elephants, thereby securing Mauryan dominance over and . 's grandson (r. c. 268–232 BCE) extended centralized rule, evidenced by the Mansehra Rock Edicts inscribed around 260 BCE in using on three boulders near in northern Pakistan, recording 14 major edicts promoting moral governance, non-violence, and Buddhist-influenced Dhamma policies to diverse subjects including frontier tribes. These edicts, alongside similar ones at Shahbazgarhi, represent the earliest confirmed writing in the region and underscore 's administrative reach, with functioning as a key Mauryan provincial center fostering trade, education, and religious propagation until the empire's fragmentation after his death.

Post-Mauryan Central Asian Invasions and Kingdoms

Following the disintegration of the Mauryan Empire around 185 BCE, the northwestern frontier regions of the Indian subcontinent, including Gandhara, Taxila, and parts of Punjab corresponding to modern Pakistan, faced successive incursions from Hellenistic successors of Alexander's empire and nomadic tribes originating from Central Asia. These invasions exploited the power vacuum left by Mauryan decline, leading to the establishment of short-lived kingdoms characterized by military conquests, coinage reforms, and cultural syncretism, particularly in Gandhara where Greco-Buddhist art emerged. The Indo-Greeks initiated this era, followed by Sakas (Scythians), Parthians, and culminating in the Kushan Empire's dominance. The emerged from Greco-Bactrian expansions into the northwest around 180 BCE under I, who conquered , , and possibly reached the , establishing control over by the mid-2nd century BCE. Key rulers included (c. 165–130 BCE), whose reign centered in (Sialkot in modern ) and who patronized as evidenced by the Milindapanha dialogues and his coinage featuring Buddhist symbols alongside Greek deities. The kingdom fragmented due to internal strife and external pressures, persisting in pockets until approximately 10 BCE, with archaeological evidence from and showing Hellenistic urban planning and bilingual inscriptions. Indo-Greek rule facilitated the transmission of Greek artistic techniques, influencing later Gandharan sculpture that blended Apollonian ideals with Buddhist iconography. Subsequent Saka invasions, by nomadic Iranian-speaking tribes displaced from the Central Asian steppes, began around 85 BCE under , who established the first Indo-Scythian kingdom in and , issuing coins that mimicked Indo-Greek styles but incorporated Scythian motifs. The Sakas divided into branches, with the Northern Sakas controlling parts of and the upper Indus by the 1st century BCE, as attested by Rudradaman's Junagadh inscription referencing their earlier dominance before Satavahana resistance elsewhere. Their rule, lasting until roughly the early 1st century CE, emphasized cavalry-based warfare and trade facilitation along emerging routes, though political instability from tribal confederations limited centralized governance. Indo-Parthian rule overlapped with waning power, commencing around 19 BCE under , a Parthian noble who seized and extended authority into and , as confirmed by coins and the inscription naming him as "Maharajadhiraja." This kingdom, centered in and , endured until circa 45 CE, promoting Zoroastrian influences alongside tolerance for , evidenced by ' patronage of monastic sites. Parthian administration introduced administrative efficiencies from Iranian models, but vulnerability to migrations contributed to its rapid eclipse. The Kushans, a confederation of the Yuezhi tribes driven southward by Xiongnu pressures around the 1st century BCE, consolidated under (c. 30–80 CE), who unified Central Asian holdings and overran Indo-Parthian territories in and by 50 CE. (c. 127–150 CE), the empire's zenith figure, established his capital at Purushapura (, Pakistan), expanding from the to the Valley, with the detailing his conquests and promotion of a Buddhist ecumene via the Fourth Buddhist Council at Kundalvana. , featuring deities like Oesho () and , standardized gold issues weighing about 8 grams and facilitated transcontinental trade, while Gandharan art under their patronage—exemplified by schist statues from and Butkara—fused Hellenistic realism with Indic themes, influencing Buddhist iconography across . The empire's decline after (c. 190–230 CE) stemmed from Sassanian incursions and internal fragmentation, ending Kushan control in the northwest by 375 CE.

Early Islamic and Medieval Periods

Arab Conquest and Early Muslim Rule

The Arab conquest of the region comprising modern-day began in 711 AD when Muhammad bin Qasim, a 17-year-old general and nephew of the Umayyad viceroy , led an expedition against the Hindu ruler Raja Dahir of the Brahmin dynasty. Triggered by raids on Arab merchant ships and the execution of Muslim prisoners by Dahir's forces, the invasion involved an army of approximately 6,000 Syrian cavalry, 6,000 Arab cavalry, and additional infantry supported by five manjaniks (catapults) transported by sea. Qasim's fleet, commanded by his cousin Muhammad al-Harith, landed near (modern-day near ) in late 711 AD, where the initial succeeded after the use of the catapults breached the city's defenses, leading to its capture and the death of its governor. Advancing inland, Qasim defeated Dahir's army at the Battle of Aror (near modern ) in 712 AD, where Dahir was killed, allowing the conquest of the capital Alor and much of lower . The campaign continued northward, with falling in 713 AD after a that exploited internal divisions and the promise of lighter taxation to induce surrender from local leaders. By this point, Arab forces controlled and parts of southern , incorporating the territories into the as a frontier province with Qasim establishing administrative centers and garrisons. Under Qasim's governance from 712 to 715 AD, non-Muslims were permitted to retain their religious practices in exchange for tax, fostering relative stability and some conversions among lower castes disillusioned with Brahmanical rule. He organized the region into fiscal units (iqtas), appointed local officials, and promoted settlement in urban areas while maintaining troops as the core force. However, following Al-Hajjaj's death in 714 AD and political shifts in , Qasim was recalled, imprisoned, and executed in 715 AD on unsubstantiated charges, marking the end of direct expansion beyond the Indus. Subsequent Umayyad governors, such as Habib ibn Abi Ubayda, continued administration until the Abbasid Revolution in 750 AD transferred nominal to , with functioning as a semi-autonomous marchland. Abbasid oversight involved periodic governors and tribute collection, but Arab influence waned without large-scale immigration, leading to reliance on local converts and mawali (non-Arab Muslims) in governance by the mid-8th century. links with the Islamic heartlands persisted via overland and sea routes, facilitating cultural exchange, though Islam's spread remained gradual, confined largely to urban elites and garrisons until the . By the mid-, weakening Abbasid control allowed local dynasties to emerge, signaling the decline of direct caliphal rule in the region.

Local Dynasties in Sindh and Multan

In , the Habbari dynasty, an Arab Muslim family originating from the tribe, established semi-independent rule as emirs from 854 to 1024 CE, nominally under Abbasid suzerainty. The dynasty's founder, Umar ibn Abdullah al-Habbari, capitalized on the weakening Abbasid control to assert local authority, with subsequent rulers like Abdullah al-Habbari and Muhammad al-Habbari maintaining power through military strength and alliances with local tribes. Their governance focused on Mansura as capital, fostering trade along the while defending against internal rebellions and external threats from the Saffarids and Samanids. The dynasty's end came with Mahmud of Ghazni's invasion in 1024 CE, which sacked and extended to Sindh, leading to the Habbari's overthrow. Parallel to Sindh's developments, emerged as a distinct under the Banu Munabbih, an Arab , who governed the from approximately 855 to 959 CE following the fragmentation of Umayyad and early Abbasid oversight. This period saw Multan function as a with a mixed Muslim-Hindu population, where rulers like the Banu Munabbih collected from non-Muslims and maintained independence amid regional power vacuums. By 959 CE, Ismaili missionaries under Fatimid influence, led by da'i Jaylam bin Shayban, seized control, establishing an Ismaili that lasted until 1005 CE. Under Ismaili rule, figures such as Hamid Lodi (r. circa 991 CE) promoted da'wa efforts, converting significant numbers of Hindus to Ismailism and aligning with the in , while issuing coinage invoking Fatimid imams. The 's tolerance of diverse faiths contrasted with orthodox Sunni pressures, but it ended with of Ghazni's conquest in 1005 CE, which massacred Ismailis and looted the Sun Temple. Following Ghaznavid raids, which did not result in permanent occupation, the of native Sindhi origin rose in around 1024 CE, ruling until 1351 CE and reasserting local autonomy after Habbari collapse. Claimed by some traditions to descend from the Rai kings or Arab settlers, the Soomras, starting with Al-Khafif (r. circa 1024–1050 CE), shifted capitals from Mansura to Thari and later Bhambore, emphasizing resistance to alien overlords and unification of Sindhi tribes. Their reign, marked by Shi'i leanings in some accounts, saw economic revival through and , with rulers like Bhoongar (r. circa 1090 CE) consolidating power against Ghaznavid remnants. The dynasty's longevity stemmed from adept diplomacy and military defenses, though internal feuds weakened it by the . The succeeded the Soomras in 1351 CE, governing until 1524 CE as a confederacy of pastoral tribes from the Kutch-Sindh borderlands. Founded by Jam Unar after assassinating the last Soomra ruler, the Sammas established as capital, expanding influence into , , and at peak under Jam Nizamuddin II (r. 1461–1509 CE), who minted coins, built infrastructure, and patronized Sufi orders. Their rule blended Hindu customs with Islam, evidenced by tombs featuring syncretic architecture, and focused on naval trade via the Indus delta. The dynasty fragmented due to succession disputes and Arghun Turkic incursions, ending with Samma capitulation in 1524 CE.

Ghaznavid, Ghurid, and Mamluk Invasions

The Ghaznavid dynasty, ruled by Turkic Muslims from , marked the onset of sustained Central Asian incursions into the northwestern , targeting territories now in . Sultan (r. 998–1030) led 17 expeditions between 1000 and 1025, focusing on and during summer months to evade monsoons. These raids exploited fragmented Hindu kingdoms like the Shahis and Pratiharas, employing superior cavalry tactics. In 1005, defeated the Hindu Shahi king near , annexing frontier districts. By 1021, after a prolonged siege, he captured , depopulating and torching the city before installing as governor and designating it the eastern capital. Mahmud's campaigns emphasized plunder over permanent settlement, yielding vast treasures—including gold from sacked temples in and —that funded Ghazni's cultural patronage. , under Ismaili rule, fell early, with its ruler executed for heresy. The invasions devastated local economies, scattered populations, and introduced Islamic governance, though Hindu resistance persisted amid caste divisions hindering unified defense. Ghaznavid control over endured until Seljuk pressures weakened the empire by the mid-11th century. The Ghurid dynasty, Persianized Tajiks from central Afghanistan, overthrew Ghaznavid remnants and expanded into Punjab and Sindh under Mu'izz ad-Din Muhammad (r. 1173–1206). In 1175, Muhammad seized Multan via the Gomal Pass, ousting the Qarmatian Ismailis. He then captured Uch from Bhatti Rajputs and fortified it. By 1179, Peshawar submitted; Sindh followed in 1182. Punjab's core, including Lahore, was conquered by 1186 after three sieges against Khusrau Malik, the last Ghaznavid. Muhammad appointed Qutb ud-Din Aibak as viceroy for Indian territories, blending raid with administration. Ghurid victories, bolstered by iron resources and horse breeding from Ghor, defeated forces at battles like Tarain (1191–1192), securing regions adjacent to . These conquests facilitated deeper Islamic penetration, with governors enforcing tribute and conversions, though full consolidation awaited successors. The empire's eastern thrust laid groundwork for the , transforming into a Muslim-ruled . The Mamluk (Slave) dynasty emerged from Ghurid slaves post-Muhammad's 1206 assassination in . , his Turkic general, proclaimed independence in before shifting to , founding the dynasty (1206–1290). (r. 1206–1210) campaigned to stabilize Ghurid holdings, suppressing revolts in and the Indus Valley without major new invasions. He secured and extended to the , commissioning structures like Delhi's Quwwat-ul-Islam mosque from temple debris. Successors like Iltutmish (r. 1211–1236) consolidated Punjab, quelling Mongol threats and integrating Sindh-Multan. The dynasty ruled core Pakistani regions—Punjab, Sindh—via iqta land grants to Turkic slaves, fostering military aristocracy. This era entrenched Turkish-Islamic rule, blending Persian administration with local taxation, amid ongoing Rajput and Mongol pressures.

Sultanate and Pre-Mughal Era

Delhi Sultanate Expansion into Punjab and Sindh

Shams-ud-Din , the second sultan of the Mamluk dynasty (r. 1211–1236), consolidated authority over and through military campaigns against regional rivals who had emerged following the fragmentation after of Ghor's in 1206. Nasir-ud-Din Qabacha, a former Ghurid subordinate, had established semi-independent rule over , , and surrounding areas in and southern , exploiting the power vacuum. In 1227, after repelling Mongol threats and stabilizing internal rule, dispatched separate armies: one from targeting and another advancing on to subdue Qabacha. The siege of began in early 1228, lasting approximately three months until Qabacha fled and drowned in the around May 1228 while attempting escape. 's forces subsequently captured and annexed the territories, placing them under loyal governors and integrating them into the system of land grants to Turkish nobles for administrative and military control. This reconquest extended Delhi's direct influence westward, securing Punjab's core regions like Lahore—previously under fluctuating Ghurid control—and Sindh's key forts, which had seen earlier and local dynastic rule. The victories numbered among Iltutmish's key achievements, alongside recognition from the Abbasid caliph in 1229, affirming the sultanate's sovereignty over these frontier provinces amid ongoing threats from Central Asian nomads. Subsequent rulers maintained and reinforced this control. Ghiyas-ud-Din Balban (r. 1266–1287) suppressed rebellions in and fortified borders against Mongol incursions, dispatching punitive expeditions to and regions. Under Alauddin Khilji (r. 1296–1316), in late 1296, and Zafar Khan led forces to quell a revolt in led by Arkali Khan, reasserting authority and establishing garrisons to counter Mongol raids from the northwest. These efforts transformed and into defensive bulwarks, with serving as a critical outpost; by the early , the sultanate's extended firmly across the Indus Valley, facilitating tribute collection and troop levies despite periodic instability.

Timurid Incursions and Fragmentation

In 1398, , the Turco-Mongol conqueror ruling from , launched an expedition into the , targeting the weakening of the . His forces, numbering approximately 90,000 to 200,000 troops, crossed the near on 24 September, entering the region. They quickly subdued local resistance, besieging and capturing after overcoming determined defense from its garrison, which inflicted significant casualties on the invaders before surrendering. Advancing eastward through , Timur's army devastated towns and countryside, enslaving tens of thousands and massacring resistors, including at where 100,000 were reportedly killed for opposing him. Timur's campaign reached its climax with the sack of on 17–20 December 1398, where his troops looted the city for several days, killing an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants and carrying off vast treasures, artisans, and slaves. Before withdrawing northwestward in early 1399—without establishing permanent garrisons—Timur appointed , a Punjabi chieftain who had submitted to him, as viceroy over , , and upper to collect tribute for the . This arrangement nominally extended Timurid influence into these territories but proved short-lived, as Timur prioritized consolidation in Persia and over sustained occupation. The invasion precipitated the fragmentation of Delhi Sultanate authority in and , as central control collapsed amid anarchy, famine, and depopulation. In , provincial governors and tribal leaders, including Khokhars and Janjuas, asserted de facto independence; expanded from his base in and to seize in 1414, founding the (1414–1451), which maintained fragile rule over core territories but lost effective hold on outer districts to local potentates. Upper saw similar devolution, with Timurid-appointed officials unable to enforce tribute amid revolts. In lower , the , already semi-autonomous since the mid-14th century, consolidated power around , rejecting Delhi's and expanding influence free from Tughlaq oversight. This era of persisted until the Lodi dynasty's partial restoration of central power in the early , fostering enduring regional identities and power vacuums exploited by later invaders.

Mughal and Early Modern Era

Establishment and Peak of Mughal Rule

The Mughal Empire's establishment in the regions comprising modern Pakistan began with Zahir-ud-din 's campaigns in the early . , a Timurid descendant, captured in 1524, securing a foothold in amid conflicts with local Afghan rulers. His decisive victory over Ibrahim Lodi at the on April 21, 1526, marked the foundation of the empire, extending Mughal control over northern including , though initial holdings in the northwest remained contested by Afghan remnants. 's memoirs detail his consolidation of territories, leveraging artillery and cavalry tactics superior to local forces, but his rule was brief, ending with his death in 1530. Humayun, Babur's successor, faced immediate challenges, losing control of Punjab and Delhi to the Suri dynasty under Sher Shah in 1540 after defeats at Chausa and Kannauj. Exiled until 1555, Humayun regained Delhi with Safavid aid, reasserting Mughal authority over Punjab by 1556, though his death shortly after left the empire fragile. Akbar, ascending at age 13 in 1556, stabilized the northwest through the Second Battle of Panipat, defeating Hemu and securing Punjab as a base for further expansion. Akbar's reign (1556–1605) represented the empire's peak in administrative consolidation and territorial reach within modern Pakistan's borders. He occupied Lahore and seized Multan, integrating fully into the imperial structure, and established as the capital from 1584 to 1598 to oversee northwestern frontiers against Afghan and Central Asian threats. Conquests extended to in 1591 under Mirza Muhammad Jani Beg Tarkhan, incorporating and Balochistan fringes, while Subah was reorganized for revenue extraction from the Indus valley's agriculture. Akbar's mansabdari system assigned ranks to nobles overseeing these provinces, fostering loyalty and efficient taxation, with Punjab's fertile lands yielding substantial zabt revenue assessed via zabt-i-dahsala. Successors Jahangir (1605–1627) and (1628–1658) maintained this zenith, with evolving as a cultural hub of gardens, forts, and naqshbandi Sufi influences, while subahs like and supported imperial armies numbering over 200,000 horsemen. (1658–1707) achieved maximal territorial extent, fortifying northwest defenses against Safavids and , but prolonged strained resources, initiating subtle decline in peripheral control over 's Pashtun areas despite peak revenues exceeding 100 million rupees annually. Mughal rule introduced Persian administration, land grants (jagirs), and Islamic legal frameworks, transforming local economies through canal irrigation precursors and trade routes linking to via .

Decline, Successor States, and Regional Powers

The death of Emperor in 1707 marked the onset of the Mughal Empire's decline, exacerbated by protracted wars in the Deccan that depleted the treasury and overstretched administrative control, particularly in peripheral subahs like () and . Succession struggles among weak emperors, such as (r. 1713–1719) and [Muhammad Shah](/page/Muhammad Shah) (r. 1719–1748), further eroded central authority, allowing local governors and zamindars in the northwest to assert greater autonomy amid rising rebellions and fiscal shortfalls. In , Mughal governors like Abdus Samad Khan ( 1713–1726) attempted to suppress Sikh misls and restore order but faced persistent resistance, highlighting the empire's inability to maintain coercive power in the region. The Persian invasion by in 1739 delivered a severe blow, as his forces traversed en route to the decisive on February 24, 1739, where Mughal armies numbering around 300,000 were routed by Nader's 55,000 troops due to superior tactics and artillery. Following the occupation of and a triggered by riots—resulting in an estimated 20,000–30,000 deaths—Nader extracted immense tribute, including the and diamond, while compelling Emperor to cede all territories west of the , effectively detaching and parts of modern northwestern Pakistan from Mughal suzerainty. This plunder, valued at over 700 million rupees, crippled Mughal finances and prestige, accelerating fragmentation by emboldening regional actors and exposing military vulnerabilities. Ahmad Shah Durrani's establishment of the in 1747, following Nader's assassination, positioned it as the dominant regional power in the northwest, with eight invasions of between 1748 and 1767 that nominally vassalized and extracted annual tribute from . After his third campaign in 1752, Ahmad Shah annexed and , appointing governors such as Mir Mannu (1748–1753), who oscillated between Mughal titles and allegiance, underscoring the empire's role in supplanting Mughal influence without full annexation. These incursions, culminating in the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761 against the Marathas, temporarily stabilized Afghan dominance over but drained local resources, fostering conditions for local resistance. In , the emerged as a successor state amid Mughal enfeeblement, initially as appointees like Yar Muhammad Kalhoro (d. 1718), who was granted authority over the around 1701, but achieving independence by the 1730s under Noor Muhammad Kalhoro (r. 1719–1753). The consolidated control over , southern , and parts of Kutch from their capital at Khudabad (founded c. ), leveraging Sufi networks and projects to build a sovereign polity that reduced Mughal oversight to nominal tribute until the dynasty's fall in 1783. This transition exemplified how peripheral Mughal provinces transitioned into autonomous entities, with the representing indigenous Sindhi assertion against imperial decay, though internal strife and Baloch incursions later undermined their stability. Similarly, the in maintained semi- under Brahui rulers, paying lip service to Mughals while expanding influence eastward.

Sikh Empire and Maratha Interventions

In the mid-18th century, amid the fragmentation of Mughal authority in Punjab, Maratha forces under Raghunath Rao invaded the region to counter Afghan incursions led by . In April 1758, the Marathas captured after defeating local Afghan governors, establishing control over the city and extending their campaigns to secure , , and by May of that year. These conquests were facilitated by alliances with Sikh misls and the Punjabi governor Adina Beg, who sought to expel Durrani's influence from the five rivers' territory. The Marathas held for approximately 18 months, imposing tribute and administering the area nominally on behalf of the Mughal emperor, until Durrani's counteroffensive in October 1759 recaptured Punjab, routing Maratha garrisons. The Maratha presence in Punjab ended decisively with their defeat at the Third Battle of Panipat on January 14, 1761, where an estimated 45,000–60,000 Maratha troops and 200,000 non-combatants faced Durrani's coalition of , Rohillas, and Oudh forces, resulting in 60,000–70,000 Maratha deaths and the slaughter of 40,000 prisoners. This battle, fought near , inflicted around 100,000 total Maratha casualties and halted their northward expansion, destabilizing their confederacy for roughly a decade while enabling Sikh misls to regroup and challenge Afghan dominance in . Post-Panipat, Maratha recovery under Peshwa Madhavrao focused southward, abandoning sustained claims on , where local Sikh warriors exploited the power vacuum through guerrilla resistance against repeated Afghan invasions between 1762 and 1790s. The vacuum left by Maratha withdrawal paved the way for Sikh consolidation, culminating in the establishment of the under Maharaja . Born in 1780 near (in present-day ), , leader of the , captured from Afghan control on July 7, 1799, unifying disparate Sikh confederacies into a centralized state by 1801. His reign (1801–1839) saw systematic expansion across Punjab's plains from the to Indus rivers, incorporating territories now comprising Pakistani Punjab, including the annexation of in June 1818 following a prolonged against Nawab Muzaffar Khan. Further conquests included the Peshawar Valley, secured after the in March 1823 against Afghan forces, with full control asserted by 1834 under . The empire's territorial peak encompassed as capital, , and extensions into modern , bolstered by the Treaty of on April 25, 1809, whereby the British East India Company recognized Sikh sovereignty north of the Sutlej River in exchange for non-aggression. Ranjit Singh's multi-ethnic , integrating Sikh, Muslim, and European officers, maintained stability through and efficient revenue systems, controlling key trade routes and fortresses in the region until his death on June 27, 1839. Subsequent court intrigues and succession disputes eroded central authority, rendering the empire vulnerable to British intervention by the late .

British Colonial Period

Conquest of Sindh, Punjab, and Frontier

The initiated the conquest of in early 1843, motivated by strategic interests in securing the route and countering perceived threats from the Talpur Amirs' alliances with Persia and . General Sir Charles Napier, commanding approximately 2,800 troops, advanced against the forces of Hosh Muhammad, an Amir of Hyderabad, culminating in the on February 17, 1843. Despite facing an enemy force estimated at 20,000 to 30,000, including Baloch cavalry, the British secured victory through disciplined infantry volleys and artillery, inflicting around 6,000 casualties while suffering 270 of their own. This engagement shattered the Talpur resistance, leading to the (or Dubba) on March 24, 1843, where Napier defeated remaining Amirs, resulting in Sindh's formal annexation as a British province under his governorship. The annexation of Punjab followed the erosion of the Sikh Empire after Ranjit Singh's death in 1839, marked by internal instability and British suspicions of Sikh military buildup near the Sutlej River. The erupted in December 1845 when Sikh forces crossed into British territory, prompting Governor-General Sir Henry Hardinge to deploy 20,000 troops against a Sikh army of comparable size. Key battles included Mudki (December 18, 1845), Ferozeshah (December 21–22, 1845), and Sobraon (February 10, 1846), where British resilience overcame initial setbacks, leading to the on March 9, 1846. This treaty ceded Jullundur Doab territories, imposed a 1.5 million indemnity (partially remitted via the diamond), and installed a British resident to oversee the young Duleep Singh. Renewed Sikh revolts, including the uprising led by Mulraj Chopra in April 1848, ignited the Second Anglo-Sikh War. British forces under Lord Gough faced fierce resistance at Chillianwala (January 13, 1849), a costly draw with heavy losses on both sides—around 2,300 British casualties against 4,000 Sikh—but decisively triumphed at Gujrat on February 21, 1849, using overwhelming artillery against 60,000 Sikhs. The Sikh army surrendered on March 12, 1849, enabling Governor-General Lord Dalhousie to proclaim Punjab's annexation on March 29, 1849, incorporating its revenues and the Sikh into British administration while exiling the . The North-West Frontier, extending from the Indus to the Afghan border and dominated by independent , presented ongoing challenges post-Punjab annexation, as the had only loosely controlled it through subsidies and forts. British policy initially favored a "closed frontier" of non-interference beyond the settled districts, but tribal raids and Russian-Afghan tensions necessitated expeditions, such as the 1852–1853 Black Mountain campaign against Hassanzai tribesmen, involving 5,000 troops to punish raids and secure supply lines. Further operations, including the 1863–1864 Umbeyla Campaign against Bunerwals and the 1897 Tirah Expedition against Afridis and Orakzais (mobilizing 34,000 troops under Sir William Lockhart), aimed at punitive destruction of strongholds rather than permanent occupation, reflecting a balance between forward defense and cost constraints. These efforts culminated in the 1901 demarcation of the from , administering settled areas like and under a chief commissioner, while leaving tribal agencies semi-autonomous under political officers enforcing the boundary established in 1893.

Administrative Reforms and Canal Colonies

Following the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the British established a Board of Administration comprising Sir Henry Lawrence, John Lawrence, and Charles Mansell to implement administrative and economic reforms across the province's six divisions. This body focused on stabilizing governance by formalizing land revenue systems, conducting initial settlements that assessed ownership and taxation rights for 15-year terms, and prioritizing efficient tax collection through rural land formalization. Reforms included creating institutions for revenue, finance, and education, while adapting pre-existing Sikh-era structures to British oversight without wholesale replacement. In , annexed in 1843, British administration emphasized revenue extraction via the system, directly assessing individual cultivators rather than intermediaries, which contrasted with 's village-based assessments and aimed to curb local taluqdars' influence. Key legislative measures, such as the Punjab Land Alienation Act of , restricted permanent land transfers from "agricultural tribes" (primarily Muslim and Sikh peasants) to non-agriculturists like urban moneylenders, intending to shield indebted farmers from dispossession amid rising indebtedness; however, it disrupted credit access and favored certain ethnic groups deemed martially reliable by British officials. These reforms reinforced a paternalistic framework, classifying communities by perceived loyalty and productivity to sustain and agricultural output. Parallel to administrative changes, British engineers developed extensive canal to reclaim arid tracts in western , initiating with the Upper Bari Doab Canal (completed 1873, operational from 1859) to irrigate higher "bar" lands. From 1885 to 1940, nine major canal colonies—such as Chenab, , and Lower Bari Doab—were established, transforming over 14 million acres from desert into arable land by 1947, up from 3 million in 1885, and settling more than 1 million colonists, predominantly and selected for their agricultural and military utility. This system boosted wheat production and revenue, funding further infrastructure, though it exacerbated ethnic tensions by allocating prime lands preferentially to loyal groups and displacing nomadic pastoralists. In , complementary projects like the (planned post-1920s but foundational in earlier barrages) extended , yet 's colonies dominated due to the Indus and its tributaries' perennial flow.

Socio-Economic Transformations and Famines

The British administration in , following its in , implemented land revenue assessments based on and productivity, shifting from pre-colonial irregular collections to fixed cash payments every 30 years, which incentivized in but imposed strains during shortages. In , conquered in 1843, a system was introduced, granting individual cultivators proprietary rights while demanding direct revenue payments, fostering some commercialization but yielding lower assessments than in due to arid conditions. The , incorporated gradually from the 1850s, retained tribal jirga-based revenue in agency areas, with limited formal assessments in settled districts, prioritizing security over economic overhaul. Canal irrigation projects marked a pivotal transformation, particularly in , where irrigated acreage expanded from approximately 3 million acres in 1885 to 14 million by 1947 through systems like the Chenab and canals, enabling a shift from subsistence farming to commercial and production that positioned as a key exporter. These canal colonies, allocated preferentially to "martial races" such as and for , boosted agricultural output—wheat exports rose significantly by the —but entrenched social hierarchies by favoring loyal groups and displacing pastoral nomads. In , barrages like the Lloyd Barrage (completed 1932) irrigated over 5 million acres, promoting and , though benefits accrued unevenly to large landlords. regions saw minimal , with economic activity confined to timber and routes, supplemented by British-built roads for strategic access. Railway expansion from the integrated these regions into global markets, facilitating grain exports—Punjab's wheat shipments to Britain surged post-1880—while cash crops like supported demands, though overall industrialization remained negligible, with limited to small-scale ginning and flour mills. Socially, these changes eroded tribal communal landholding in favor of individual proprietorship, spurring rural indebtedness among smallholders and urban migration, yet also enabling a class of prosperous farmers in colonies. Demographic pressures intensified, with Punjab's growing from 20 million in 1881 to 34 million by 1941, straining resources amid . Famines recurrently exposed vulnerabilities in these systems, triggered primarily by monsoon failures but aggravated by rigid revenue demands and food exports. The Upper Doab famine of 1860–1861, affecting Punjab's canal-irrigated tracts, caused around 2 million deaths from and due to crop failures and inadequate initial relief. The impacted and amid the El Niño drought, killing over 5 million across affected areas, with colonial exports of grain continuing despite local scarcity, prompting criticism of policy priorities. Later, the 1896–1897 and 1899–1900 famines struck and parts of , claiming hundreds of thousands amid epidemics decimating livestock, though British relief works—employing laborers on canals—mitigated totals compared to earlier events. Responses evolved with the Famine Codes from 1883, mandating grain reserves and , which curbed mortality in subsequent scarcities, reflecting adaptive despite underlying extraction. In the , localized scarcities persisted without major recorded famines, as tribal economies relied on mobility.

Pakistan Movement

Origins of Muslim League and Two-Nation Theory

The was established on December 30, 1906, during the annual session of the Muhammadan Educational Conference in , then part of British India's . The founding followed the of October 1906, in which a delegation of 35 Muslim leaders, led by , met Viceroy Lord Minto to demand and separate electorates for Muslims in legislative councils, citing their demographic minority status—approximately 25% of British India's population—and cultural distinctions from the Hindu majority. These demands reflected growing Muslim apprehensions over the Indian National Congress's push for elected governance, which elites feared would sideline Muslim interests in a Hindu-dominated , especially after the 1905 partition of temporarily enhanced Muslim leverage in the province before its 1911 reversal. The League's initial objectives, as outlined in its 1906 platform, focused on promoting loyalty to the British Crown, protecting Muslim political rights, and preventing Hindu-majority rule without safeguards, rather than immediate separatism. Aga Khan III served as its first president, with early leadership comprising landed aristocracy and professionals who viewed the organization as a counterweight to Congress's unitary nationalism. Membership remained limited to elites, numbering around 1,300 by 1927, underscoring its origins as a defensive elite forum amid British India's evolving constitutional reforms, such as the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909 that conceded separate electorates. The , positing Hindus and Muslims as distinct nations based on irreconcilable religious, cultural, and social differences, emerged from 19th-century Muslim intellectual responses to colonial demographics and Hindu revivalism. Its foundational articulation is attributed to Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898), founder of the , who shifted from early advocacy of Hindu-Muslim unity to separatism following the 1867 Hindi-Urdu controversy, where Hindu campaigns to replace Urdu script with in official use highlighted linguistic divides rooted in religious identities. In 1888, Sir Syed explicitly stated that mixing Hindus and Muslims was like mixing "two different nations," warning that democratic self-rule would lead to Muslim subjugation given their numerical disadvantage and historical conquest-based presence in . He urged Muslims to prioritize Western education and British allegiance over participation, fostering institutions like to build a separate Muslim political consciousness. This theory gained momentum in the League's framework, with Muhammad Iqbal's 1930 Allahabad presidential address envisioning a consolidated Muslim state in northwest to preserve Islamic identity against assimilation. , initially a advocate for composite nationalism, embraced it post-1937 provincial elections, where ministries allegedly marginalized Muslims through policies like the Wardha Scheme, prompting League reorganization and mass mobilization. The theory's causal logic rested on empirical realities: Muslims' non-assimilative faith, separate legal codes (e.g., vs. ), and regional concentrations (e.g., 55% in , 52% in per 1941 census), which rendered unified governance untenable without partition to avert civil strife. While critics, including some leaders, dismissed it as elite-driven divisiveness, proponents substantiated it with evidence of intercommunal riots (e.g., 1920s-1930s violence claiming thousands of lives) and failed unity pacts like the 1937 elections' aftermath.

Lahore Resolution and Demand for Pakistan

The annual session of the All-India Muslim League, its 27th, convened in Lahore from March 22 to 24, 1940, amid escalating tensions over constitutional reforms and the outbreak of World War II, which had prompted the British to involve Indian leaders without consensus. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as League president, delivered a presidential address on March 22 emphasizing irreconcilable differences between Hindus and Muslims, declaring them two distinct nations based on divergent religious philosophies, social customs, literatures, and civilizations that precluded unified governance. This articulation built on earlier ideas, such as those from poet Muhammad Iqbal in 1930, but Jinnah framed it as a pragmatic response to perceived Hindu dominance under potential Congress-led rule, rejecting federalism under the 1935 Government of India Act as unworkable for Muslim interests. On March 23, 1940, the —drafted by committee including Zafarullah Khan and moved by —was adopted unanimously by the assembly of approximately 100,000 attendees at Iqbal Park (then Minto Park). The text rejected the of a single Indian federation, instead demanding that Muslim-majority districts in the north-western and eastern zones of British India be grouped into independent states with sovereign, autonomous units, allowing Muslims to order their lives per Islamic principles free from non-Muslim majorities. It specified no constitutional plan should impose domination by one community over another, reflecting League concerns over the 1937 provincial elections where victories had sidelined Muslim representation despite separate electorates. Though the resolution avoided the term "Pakistan"—coined by in 1933 as an for Muslim-majority regions—it crystallized the demand for territorial separation, evolving from vague calls into a for sovereign Muslim homelands, later interpreted as endorsing partition. Jinnah initially maintained ambiguity on "Pakistan's" precise form, using it as leverage in negotiations, but by 1946, League explicitly tied it to statehood. The condemned it as divisive, with leaders like labeling it a "reactionary" threat to unity, while opposed any concessions to separatism. In and , communitarian responses varied, with some Muslim groups initially favoring federation but shifting toward League positions amid fears of marginalization. The resolution marked a pivotal escalation in the , galvanizing Muslim political mobilization and shifting League support from 4.8% in 1937 elections to majorities in key provinces by 1946, as it provided a clear ideological and territorial framework rooted in the . British officials, including Viceroy Linlithgow, noted its implications for postwar settlements, though implementation hinged on wartime alliances and failed unity talks like the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan. In retrospect, while some historians debate its intent as a maximalist bargaining position rather than fixed partition blueprint, its adoption formalized the irretrievable demand for Muslim , culminating in the 1947 creation of .

Partition Negotiations and Independence in 1947

Lord Mountbatten, appointed of in March 1947, began urgent negotiations with leaders of the (such as and ) and the under to accelerate the transfer of power. These talks took place amid mounting communal unrest and the Muslim League’s demand for a separate Muslim-majority state based on the . The tensions had intensified following the Great Calcutta Killings of August 1946, which erupted after Jinnah’s call for Direct Action Day on August 16 to press for Pakistan. He had warned that the choice was “either a divided India or a destroyed India.” The riots, initiated by Muslim League–inspired Muslim mobs, resulted in an estimated 4,000–10,000 deaths within four days and were soon followed by further communal violence in Noakhali in October 1946, where Muslim League–inspired Muslim mobs launched widespread attacks on Hindus, leading to thousands more casualties. The talks revealed irreconcilable demands: favored a united federal with strong central authority, while the League rejected power-sharing arrangements that it viewed as risking Hindu-majority dominance over , leading Mountbatten to abandon plans for a united dominion. On June 3, 1947, Mountbatten announced his partition plan, which proposed dividing British India into two independent dominions— and —with comprising the Muslim-majority provinces of , , , the , and Baluchistan, though subject to boundary adjustments. The plan allowed princely states to accede to either dominion or remain independent, advanced the independence date from June 1948 to August 15, 1947, to preempt further violence following events like the 1946 Calcutta Killings, and required provincial assemblies in and to vote on partitioning those provinces along religious lines. Both and the League accepted the proposal by June 10, despite 's reservations about the hasty timeline and potential for chaos. To demarcate boundaries, Mountbatten established the and Boundary Commissions in June 1947, chaired by British lawyer Cyril Radcliffe, who arrived in on July 8 with a five-week deadline despite lacking prior knowledge of the regions. The commissions considered factors like contiguous Muslim or non-Muslim majorities, natural boundaries, and irrigation systems, but political pressures and incomplete census data led to contentious decisions, such as awarding (with a Muslim majority) to , enabling access to . The , as the boundary became known, was finalized but withheld until August 17, 1947—two days after independence—to avoid preemptive violence, exacerbating uncertainty during migrations. The British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act on July 18, 1947, which legally partitioned British India into the dominions of and effective August 15, terminated British suzerainty over princely states, and empowered the new dominions to frame their own constitutions while retaining Commonwealth ties. declared independence at midnight on August 14, 1947, with Jinnah sworn in as its first in ; followed at midnight on August 15, with Nehru addressing the in . The partition triggered immediate mass migrations, with approximately 14.5 to 18 million people— and eastward to , westward to —crossing borders amid widespread communal riots, train massacres, and village burnings, particularly in . Reliable estimates place deaths from violence, disease, and starvation between 500,000 and 2 million, though exact figures remain disputed due to chaotic record-keeping and politicized reporting. The British military's withdrawal to barracks prior to left limited forces to quell unrest, contributing to the scale of the .

Early Republic (1947-1958)

Refugee Crisis, Integration of Princely States, and Dominion Status

The partition of British India triggered one of the largest forced migrations in history, with approximately 14 to 17 million people displaced amid , particularly in and . In the territories comprising , around 7 million Muslim refugees arrived from by 1951, overwhelming urban centers like , , and refugee camps in , where inadequate infrastructure led to disease outbreaks, food shortages, and makeshift settlements. The exodus of roughly 6.5 million and from to left abandoned properties, which were later classified as evacuee assets for redistribution to incoming refugees, though mismanagement fueled corruption and disputes. Accompanying riots and massacres claimed between 200,000 and 2 million lives across the subcontinent, with experiencing targeted attacks on minorities and retaliatory killings, exacerbating the new state's administrative and humanitarian burdens. Efforts to integrate princely states focused on securing Muslim-majority or strategically vital territories, with Pakistan inheriting fewer such entities than —primarily in , , and the northwest frontier. State, covering 45,000 square kilometers and ruled by Nawab Sadiq Muhammad Khan V, acceded on 5 October 1947, providing vital economic resources including canal-irrigated lands. Khairpur State in followed on 3 October 1947 under Regent Mir Ghulam Hussain Khan Talpur, bolstering Pakistan's control over the Indus region. The , encompassing Balochistan's core areas like and including subordinate states such as Las Bela and Kharan, resisted initial overtures; its ruler, Ahmad Yar Khan, declared independence on 15 August 1947, but after failed negotiations and the arrest of Baloch levies, formally acceded on 27 March 1948. Frontier agencies like Dir, Swat, , and Amb acceded between August and October 1947, often through tribal jirgas, ensuring border security against . These integrations, completed by 1949, involved treaties preserving some rulers' privileges until the 1955 abolished most states, merging them into . Pakistan entered as a in the British on 14 August 1947, with the British monarch—initially , then after 1952—serving as ceremonial , represented locally by a governor-general appointed on the advice of the Pakistani prime minister. assumed the role of first governor-general, wielding significant executive powers under the borrowed , until his death on 11 September 1948; he was succeeded by (1948–1951), Ghulam Muhammad (1951–1955), and Iskander Mirza (1955–1956). Dominion status facilitated transitional governance amid constitutional delays caused by linguistic divides, Islamic provisions, and East Pakistan's demands for parity, avoiding immediate republican upheaval. This arrangement ended with the 23 March 1956 constitution, which established as an , retained membership, and shifted to a in practice under Mirza.

Constitutional Debates and 1956 Republic Declaration

Following independence on August 14, 1947, Pakistan's , comprising members indirectly elected by provincial legislatures, convened its first session on August 10 to draft a , with elected as its president. The assembly initially operated under the modified , retaining dominion status under the British Crown, as framing a new document was deferred amid immediate crises including mass refugee influxes exceeding 7 million and the integration of princely states covering 56% of territory. Debates centered on reconciling Islamic principles with democratic governance, balancing East Pakistan's population majority (54% of total) against West Pakistan's geographic and administrative diversity, and representation formulas that initially favored parity over population proportionality, exacerbating East-West tensions. The , moved by Prime Minister on March 7, 1949, and adopted on March 12, served as a for future constitutional efforts, asserting that resides with , exercised through representatives under Islamic democratic ideals, while guaranteeing and fundamental freedoms subject to law and public morality. This resolution, passed by a vote of 21-10 amid opposition from Hindu members citing potential minority subordination, embedded religious directives like enabling Muslims to live per and , yet faced criticism for vagueness on implementation, reflecting ideological divides between secular nationalists and Islamists. Subsequent reports in 1950 and proposed Islamic , separate electorates for minorities, and excessive central powers, but were rejected due to East Pakistani objections over weakened provincial and disputes, culminating in 1952 riots after Urdu's imposition as sole despite Bengali's demographic weight. Delays persisted through leadership vacuums—Jinnah's death on September 11, 1948, and Liaquat's assassination on October 16, 1951—and political fragmentation, with the assembly dissolving ministries thrice by 1953 amid no-confidence motions. The 1954 elections rendered the assembly defunct, prompting Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad to appoint a second assembly in July 1955, which enacted the merging West Pakistan's provinces into a single entity for equal footing with in a bicameral parliament (300 seats total, half each wing). Under Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, this body finalized the draft after reconciling federal lists (defense, central) with , incorporating directive principles for Islamic economic equity and education. The 1956 Constitution, adopted unanimously on February 29, 1956, and authenticated by Governor-General Iskander Mirza on March 2, proclaimed Pakistan an effective March 23, ending dominion status with Mirza as first president under a where the held executive authority and the president ceremonial duties. Key provisions included unicameral (initially), with Islamic provisos, an Islamiyat advisory council, and prohibitions on and alcohol, though enforcement mechanisms remained advisory, prioritizing unity over rigorous . This document, spanning 234 articles, addressed prior impasses but sowed seeds of instability through One Unit's artificial parity, ignoring East Pakistan's numerical edge and cultural distinctions, factors later contributing to its abrogation in 1958.

Political Instability Leading to Martial Law

Following the death of on September 11, 1948, Pakistan experienced a leadership vacuum that exacerbated governance challenges in the nascent state. succeeded as , but real executive power shifted toward bureaucratic and military influences amid ongoing refugee integration and territorial disputes. The assassination of Prime Minister on October 16, 1951, in further destabilized the political order, leaving Nazimuddin to assume the premiership while Ghulam Muhammad became . This event highlighted vulnerabilities to internal threats, including suspected conspiracies involving disaffected elements, and prompted a reliance on interim leadership without clear succession mechanisms. Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad's dismissal of Prime Minister Nazimuddin on April 17, 1953, despite parliamentary support, marked a pivotal erosion of democratic norms, justified by Muhammad as necessary to counter anti-government agitations like the over the community's status. He appointed Muhammad Ali as , initiating a pattern of executive overreach where the wielded disproportionate dismissal powers under the borrowed Government of India Act, 1935. 's tenure saw the formation of a "Ministry of Talent" in 1954 to sideline entrenched politicians, but Ghulam Muhammad's own incapacitation led to Iskander Mirza's appointment as acting in 1954 and full in 1955. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali replaced as in 1955, overseeing the merger of West Pakistan's princely states into "One Unit" to balance East Pakistan's demographic weight, yet this administrative reform fueled regional grievances rather than resolving them. Constitutional delays compounded the instability, with the first Constituent Assembly dissolved by Ghulam Muhammad in October 1954 on grounds of inefficiency, leading to legal challenges and the formation of a second assembly in 1955. The 1956 Constitution, promulgated on March 23, 1956, established Pakistan as an Islamic republic with Iskander Mirza as its first president, but it failed to curb factionalism; prime ministers changed rapidly—Chaudhry Muhammad Ali resigned in September 1956, followed by brief tenures of (October–December 1956) and Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1956–1957), culminating in Malik Firoz Khan Noon's appointment in December 1957. These seven prime ministerial shifts in eleven years reflected chronic horse-trading among Muslim League factions, provincial lobbies, and bureaucratic cabals, alongside economic strains like food shortages and , which eroded public confidence. Ethnic and linguistic tensions intensified the crisis, notably the 1952 in protesting Urdu's imposition as the sole national language, resulting in deaths on February 21, 1952, and sowing seeds of East-West alienation. Suhrawardy's ouster in October 1957 via a no-confidence vote, amid allegations of and inability to manage One Unit dissent, left Noon facing a fragmented . By 1958, escalating street protests, opposition alliances like the Progressive Democratic Front, and military unease over civilian incompetence prompted President Mirza to declare on October 7, 1958, abrogating the constitution, dissolving assemblies, and banning political parties. Mirza appointed General Muhammad Ayub Khan as , citing the need to end "political chaos and misrule" that had paralyzed development and . This intervention, while initially welcomed by some for restoring order, entrenched military dominance, as Ayub soon ousted Mirza on October 27, 1958, assuming full control.

Ayub Khan Military Regime (1958-1969)

Basic Democracies System and Economic Industrialization

The Basic Democracies Order, promulgated by President Muhammad Ayub Khan on October 26, 1959, established a tiered system of local designed to promote grassroots participation while maintaining centralized executive control. This framework replaced the previous parliamentary structure, which Ayub deemed inefficient and prone to , with elected councils at four levels: union (local village or ward level), (sub-district), district, and division. Approximately 80,000 basic democrats—elected representatives without strict party affiliations—were chosen through non-partisan elections held between December 1959 and January 1960, forming the foundational for higher administrative and national decisions. The system's architects argued it would channel public input into development projects, such as rural and , bypassing urban-dominated that had stalled national progress since 1947. Implementation emphasized administrative efficiency over broad political pluralism, with basic democrats tasked with advisory roles in local affairs, revenue collection, and , while higher councils handled development planning under bureaucratic oversight. In practice, the regime restricted opposition involvement, co-opting many basic democrats through , which ensured loyalty during key events like the 1962 constitutional —where 75,283 of 80,000 voted in favor—and Ayub's indirect election as president in 1965 via the same . Proponents credited the system with stabilizing after years of instability, enabling focused for local works that improved rural connectivity and basic services in provinces like and . Critics, however, highlighted its authoritarian undertones, as it subordinated elected bodies to the president's discretion, limiting and fostering dependency on military-backed administration rather than genuine . Empirical outcomes included expanded rural and road networks, though data on participation rates showed uneven engagement, with turnout varying from 50-70% in initial polls. Concurrently, Ayub's economic policies accelerated industrialization, framing 1958-1968 as the "Decade of Development" through export-led growth, private investment incentives, and state-guided planning. The second five-year plan (1960-1965) allocated 20% of investments to heavy industries like , chemicals, and machinery, supported by the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation's establishment of 45 public projects, while protective tariffs and tax rebates spurred expansion in textiles and consumer goods. grew at an average annual rate of 6.8%, outpacing of 2.4%, with industrial output rising from 11.9% of GDP in 1959-1960 to 14.5% by 1964-1965; specifically expanded by 9-10% yearly, driven by and processing that boosted exports from $60 million in 1958 to $250 million by 1968. Finance Minister Muhammad Shoaib's liberalization measures, including rupee devaluation and foreign aid inflows exceeding $3 billion (much from U.S. agreements), facilitated capital imports for factories, though this increased to 25% of GDP by 1969. These reforms yielded measurable gains in urban employment and infrastructure, with climbing from 272 rupees in 1959-1960 to 418 rupees by 1969-1970, but disparities emerged as benefits concentrated in West Pakistan's industrial belts like and , exacerbating regional imbalances with and fueling later unrest. Industrial licensing favored large conglomerates, enabling 22 families to control 66% of banking and 87% of by 1968, per a commission's findings, which critics linked to despite official claims of merit-based allocation. Overall, the era's causal drivers—stable governance via Basic Democracies and pro-business policies—demonstrated that prioritizing production over redistribution could generate surplus for reinvestment, though sustainability hinged on addressing inequities, as evidenced by stagnating agricultural shares (dropping to 43% of GDP) without complementary land reforms.

1965 War with India and Tashkent Agreement

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War originated from the unresolved Kashmir dispute, with Pakistan seeking to alter the status quo through military means amid perceived Indian weakness after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. President Ayub Khan authorized Operation Gibraltar, a covert infiltration plan launched in early August 1965, involving over 30,000 Pakistani personnel disguised as Kashmiri locals crossing the Line of Control to incite an uprising in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. The operation presupposed widespread local support for accession to Pakistan, but it collapsed due to lack of insurgency, effective Indian counterintelligence, and the capture or neutralization of most infiltrators by mid-August. India responded with limited offensives to secure infiltration routes, prompting Pakistan to escalate on September 1, 1965, with aimed at capturing the bridge to sever Indian supply lines to . India countered by opening a new front in the sector on September 6, leading to intense ground battles including the tank engagements at Chawinda—described as the largest since —and Phillora, as well as air and naval actions such as Pakistan's bombing of port. The conflict expanded beyond into and , involving over 1,000 tanks total, but neither side achieved breakthroughs; a United Nations-mandated ceasefire took effect on September 23, 1965, following Security Council Resolution 211. Casualty estimates remain contested: Indian records report approximately 3,000 killed and 100 tanks lost, while claiming 5,800 Pakistani deaths and 200-450 tanks destroyed; Pakistani figures invert these, asserting lower own losses around 3,800 killed. Declassified U.S. intelligence assessed India as the victor, citing greater territorial gains (about 1,900 km² versus Pakistan's 540 km²) and proportionally fewer manpower and matériel losses. The war ended in military stalemate, with no permanent territorial changes and mutual exhaustion, compounded by a U.S.- that disproportionately strained Pakistan's re-equipment needs. Postwar negotiations culminated in the , mediated by Soviet Premier and signed on January 10, 1966, by Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister in , . The agreement mandated mutual withdrawal of forces to positions held before August 5, 1965, by February 25, 1966; cessation of hostilities and propaganda; non-interference in internal affairs; restoration of diplomatic, economic, trade, communications, cultural, and consular ties; repatriation of prisoners of war; and establishment of mechanisms for ongoing dialogue, though it deferred substantive talks on . Shastri's sudden death the following day fueled Indian suspicions, but withdrawals proceeded. In Pakistan, the declaration provoked domestic backlash against Ayub for forgoing wartime gains without concessions on , portraying it as a diplomatic retreat that undermined the military's claimed defensive success and eroded his regime's legitimacy amid rising opposition.

Green Revolution and Social Reforms

The in Pakistan during Ayub Khan's regime (1958–1969) marked a pivotal shift in , emphasizing high-yielding crop varieties, chemical inputs, and expanded to achieve food self-sufficiency. Initiated in the early 1960s, it drew on global innovations like Norman Borlaug's dwarf strains, which were adapted locally through collaborations with international agencies; these varieties, combined with increased use and tubewell , boosted per-acre yields significantly, particularly in province. incentives, including subsidized seeds and credit via institutions like the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (established 1961), facilitated rapid adoption among progressive farmers, resulting in output nearly doubling from 3.8 million metric tons in 1960 to 7.3 million metric tons by 1968. However, the revolution's benefits skewed toward larger landowners capable of investing in and inputs, exacerbating rural inequalities and contributing to environmental issues like from over-. Complementing agricultural modernization, Ayub Khan pursued land reforms in 1959 to dismantle feudal structures and enhance productivity, imposing ceilings of 500 acres for irrigated land and 1,000 acres for unirrigated land per individual, with excess redistributed to tenants. A Commission, formed in January 1959, recommended these measures to promote owner-cultivation and reduce absentee landlordism, though implementation was limited—only about 1.3 million acres were redistributed by 1969, as exemptions for orchards and religious endowments diluted impact, and evasion through benami transfers persisted. These reforms causally linked to gains by enabling smaller holdings to adopt , yet they failed to fundamentally erode elite land control due to weak enforcement and political resistance from agrarian interests. Social reforms under Ayub emphasized secular modernization, most notably the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance promulgated on March 15, 1961, which mandated registration of marriages, required arbitration councils for divorce (talaq), and conditioned on the existing wife's consent and proof of financial capacity. Aimed at curbing arbitrary practices and empowering women through legal safeguards, the ordinance drew from a 1959 commission's report but faced clerical opposition for allegedly overriding ; empirically, it reduced unregulated polygamous unions and streamlined inheritance claims for females, though cultural enforcement lagged in conservative areas. These measures reflected Ayub's top-down vision of controlled social progress, prioritizing state-mediated equity over traditional norms, but they sowed seeds of Islamist backlash by prioritizing administrative efficiency over theological consensus.

Yahya Khan Interregnum and 1971 War (1969-1971)

1970 Elections and East Pakistan Civil Unrest

The Legal Framework Order of March 30, 1970, promulgated by President Yahya Khan, served as an interim constitutional framework following the abrogation of the 1962 Constitution, stipulating that the National Assembly—elected on the basis of population—would draft a new constitution within 120 days of its first meeting. This order delineated Pakistan into two provinces (East and West) with one unit each, allocated 162 seats to East Pakistan and 138 to West Pakistan in the 300-seat National Assembly, and emphasized Islamic principles alongside federalism with provincial autonomy. Elections were scheduled for October but postponed due to the Bhola cyclone on November 12, 1970, which killed an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 people in East Pakistan; the central government's delayed and inadequate relief efforts exacerbated Bengali grievances over perceived neglect by the Punjabi-dominated West Pakistani elite. The general elections on December 7, 1970, marked Pakistan's first instance of direct universal adult for the , with regional assemblies elected on December 17. In , Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's campaigned on its Six-Point program demanding greater provincial autonomy, including separate currencies, fiscal powers, and paramilitary forces, capitalizing on long-standing resentments over economic exploitation—East Pakistan generated most export revenue but received disproportionate development—and cultural marginalization, such as the imposition of . Turnout exceeded 50 percent amid cyclones' disruptions, but the secured a sweeping victory in the East, winning 160 of 162 seats allocated there, translating to 167 overall seats and an absolute majority. In , Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's (PPP) won 81 seats, primarily on socialist promises, while other parties fragmented the remainder.
PartyLeaderSeats Won (National Assembly)Primary Base
Awami League167
81 (, )
Others (e.g., , independents)Various52Scattered in West
This outcome exposed the federation's structural fragility: East Pakistan's 55 percent population share yielded democratic control to Bengali nationalists, whom West Pakistani military and political leaders viewed as a to national unity, fearing dilution of Punjabi-Muhajir influence in the army and . convened the Assembly for February 3, 1971, but postponed it indefinitely after Bhutto threatened street agitation in the West, insisting on no government formation without PPP participation despite the Awami League's majority mandate. Negotiations in from January to March 1971 faltered over the Six Points; Mujibur Rahman rejected dilutions, while Yahya and prioritized a strong center. On March 1, Yahya announced further delays, prompting Mujibur to launch a non-cooperation movement on March 2, including hartals (strikes) and tax boycotts, paralyzing East Pakistan's administration and economy. Escalating protests turned violent, with Bengali nationalists forming militias; the central government accused of sedition, citing arms smuggling and Indian interference, though evidence of premeditated Bengali separatism predated the elections. On March 25, Yahya imposed , arrested Mujibur, and launched —a military crackdown involving targeted killings of intellectuals, leaders, and Hindus suspected of disloyalty—which ignited full-scale , displacing 10 million refugees into and causing 300,000 to 3 million deaths per varying estimates from Pakistani military records and Bengali accounts. The unrest stemmed causally from unaddressed disparities—East Pakistan's lagged 40 percent behind the West despite higher population—and the military's refusal to honor electoral results, prioritizing over democratic consent.

Indo-Pak War, Simla Accord, and Bangladesh Independence

The Indo-Pakistani War erupted on December 3, 1971, when Pakistan launched airstrikes on eleven Indian airbases in the northwest, initiating a two-front conflict amid the ongoing crisis in . Indian forces, having provided covert support to Bengali insurgents since the Pakistani military's crackdown, responded with a coordinated offensive: in the east, rapid advances toward overwhelmed Pakistani defenses, while in the west, Indian troops held positions against Pakistani incursions in and . The eastern theater proved decisive, as units, bolstered by air and naval superiority, encircled Pakistani forces within two weeks, leading to logistical collapse and widespread desertions among East Pakistan-based troops. On December 16, 1971—thirteen days into the war—Lieutenant General , commander of Pakistani forces in , signed the instrument of surrender to Indian Lieutenant General in , capitulating over 90,000 Pakistani military personnel and civilians as prisoners of war. This unconditional surrender marked the effective end of Pakistani control over , enabling the provisional government of Bangladesh, led by figures like —who had declared independence on March 26, 1971, in response to the Pakistani army's —to assert sovereignty. The operation, ordered by President on to quash Bengali political demands following the Awami League's electoral victory, had instead fueled separatist resistance and a massive refugee exodus of approximately 10 million into , providing the for Indian intervention. The war's conclusion precipitated political upheaval in Pakistan: Yahya Khan resigned amid national humiliation, handing power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who became president. Bangladesh's independence severed Pakistan's eastern wing, reducing its territory by over half and reshaping South Asian geopolitics, with emerging as the dominant regional power. The 93,000 prisoners of war, held primarily in Indian camps, became a focal point of postwar negotiations, straining Pakistan's economy and military recovery. The , signed on July 2, 1972, by and Indian Prime Minister , sought to stabilize relations and address territorial and POW issues. The pact committed both nations to resolving disputes bilaterally without third-party involvement, withdrawing troops to prewar lines in the west (except for minor adjustments), and respecting the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir as the de facto pending future talks. It emphasized peaceful coexistence, non-interference, and respect for , while implicitly linking POW to progress on these fronts—though full release of the 93,000 detainees occurred only via a subsequent 1973 after Bangladesh's recognition of . The accord's bilateral framework sidelined international mediation, such as UN resolutions, but its vague provisions on fueled later disputes, as viewed it as constraining its claims while prioritized status quo stabilization.

Military Reorganization and POW Issues

Following the capitulation of Pakistani forces in on December 16, 1971, India detained approximately 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs), comprising and internees captured during the conflict. These detainees were held under the provisions of the Third Convention of 1949, which mandates humane treatment and repatriation without delay upon cessation of active hostilities, as stipulated in Article 118. Initial repatriations of wounded and sick POWs began in early 1972, including a specific operation on April 10 for those requiring . The POW issue became entangled with broader diplomatic negotiations, as Bangladesh sought to prosecute senior Pakistani officers for alleged atrocities committed during Operation Searchlight and the ensuing civil war, invoking universal jurisdiction under international law. Pakistan, under President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—who assumed power on December 20, 1971, after Yahya Khan's resignation—prioritized unconditional repatriation to avert trials that could destabilize the military hierarchy. The Simla Agreement, signed on July 2, 1972, between India and Pakistan, committed both parties to resolving POW repatriation bilaterally and withdrawing forces to pre-war lines, but Bangladesh's insistence on accountability delayed full release. Resolution came via the tripartite Delhi Agreement of August 28, 1973, involving , and , under which Pakistan formally recognized 's , and India agreed to repatriate all 93,000 POWs in phases starting September 1973, with completion by early 1974; in exchange, waived demands for trials except for 195 designated officers, who were to face Pakistani courts. A supplementary tripartite accord on , 1974, repatriated the remaining 195 without prosecution, fulfilling Geneva obligations amid mutual diplomatic concessions. This process averted potential International Committee of the Red Cross interventions for trials but highlighted tensions over accountability for an estimated 300,000 civilian deaths in , as documented in contemporaneous reports. Concurrently, internal military reorganization addressed the 1971 debacle's systemic failures, initiated through the , appointed on December 26, 1971, to probe political-military lapses leading to defeat. The commission's 1974 report, based on testimonies from over 200 witnesses including returning POW officers, indicted senior leadership—including and Lt. Gen. —for corruption, incompetence, and moral failings, recommending courts-martial for 195 officers and disqualifying 43 from future service. Bhutto implemented selective purges, dismissing or demoting implicated generals such as Niazi (reduced to ) and Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan, while promoting junior officers to leadership roles to instill loyalty to civilian authority and prevent recurrence of . These reforms curtailed the military's political influence through administrative measures, including for overaged personnel and command chains to favor merit over seniority, though initial troop reductions followed by selective expansions rebuilt capabilities amid economic constraints. The process emphasized , with new emphasis on armored divisions and indigenous production, but was criticized for politicization, as promotions aligned with Bhutto's loyalties rather than purely operational needs. By 1972, these changes facilitated a transition from direct military rule, though underlying civil-military frictions persisted, foreshadowing future interventions.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Era (1971-1977)

1973 Constitution and Federalism

The 1973 Constitution of was approved unanimously by the on April 10, 1973, authenticated by the Speaker on April 12, 1973, and enforced on August 14, 1973, replacing the suspended 1962 Constitution. Drafted under following the Pakistan Peoples Party's victory in the 1970 elections and the 1971 secession of , it represented the first post-independence constitution achieved through parliamentary consensus, incorporating input from opposition leaders to foster national unity. The document established as a federal parliamentary republic, with the holding executive authority and the President serving in a ceremonial role, while introducing a bicameral legislature comprising the (elected directly) and the (for equal provincial representation). Article 1 explicitly designated the state as the , declaring the state religion and mandating that all laws conform to Islamic principles, though without enforcing full implementation at the time. In terms of federalism, the Constitution divided legislative powers into three categories: the Federal Legislative List (exclusive to the center, covering defense, , and ), the Concurrent List (shared between federal and provincial governments, including and ), and residuary powers vested in the provinces for unenumerated matters. This structure aimed to balance central authority with provincial autonomy, addressing long-standing grievances over central dominance that contributed to the 1971 crisis, by granting provinces control over local resources, taxation, and administration while maintaining federal oversight in and . The four provinces—, , (later ), and —were recognized as federating units, with the allocated 14 seats per province to ensure equitable voice for smaller provinces against Punjab's demographic weight in the . To manage intergovernmental tensions, Article 153 established the (CCI), comprising the Prime Minister, provincial chief ministers, and federal ministers, tasked with resolving disputes over resource distribution, particularly water and natural gas, and formulating policies on matters affecting provinces collectively. Despite these provisions, the federal government's retained emergency powers under Article 232 and the ability to dissolve provincial assemblies limited true devolution, reflecting Bhutto's emphasis on centralized stability amid post-1971 reconstruction. The Constitution's federal framework endured multiple suspensions and amendments but provided a foundational model for power-sharing, influencing later reforms like the 18th Amendment in 2010 that devolved more concurrent subjects to provinces.

Nationalization Policies and Simla Accord Implementation

Following the 1971 war, President initiated as a core to dismantle the dominance of approximately 22 industrial families that controlled over 60% of Pakistan's industrial assets and banking sector, aiming to redistribute wealth and foster state-led development. On January 2, 1972, promulgated an executive order ten key industrial categories, including iron and steel, heavy machinery, motor vehicles, , , , electrical equipment, fertilizers, gas, and engineering works, affecting around 32 private units and placing them under the management of the federal government through newly formed corporations. This first phase targeted basic heavy industries to prevent and monopolistic practices that had exacerbated inequality post-independence. On May 1, 1972, extended to the banking sector, seizing 14 major commercial banks with combined assets exceeding 5.5 billion rupees, followed by companies, arguing that private control had prioritized profits over national interests. Subsequent phases in 1974–1976 nationalized additional sectors, including cotton ginning, rice husking, sugar mills, and vegetable ghee production, totaling over 2,000 units by 1977, with the stated intent of curbing speculation and ensuring equitable amid reconstruction needs. While initial GDP growth reached an estimated 6.5% in 1973, driven partly by agricultural recovery and remittances, nationalization correlated with industrial stagnation, as private investment declined by over 50% due to uncertainty, bureaucratic mismanagement, and political interference in state enterprises, leading to production shortfalls in (down 20% by 1976) and . Critics, including industrialists who relocated capital abroad, attributed these outcomes to the policy's disruption of market incentives and over-reliance on inefficient oversight, though proponents like claimed it empowered labor unions and increased wage shares in national income from 20% to 28% between 1972 and 1977. Concurrently, pursued diplomatic stabilization through the , signed on July 2, 1972, with Indian Prime Minister in , , following bilateral talks to address the war's aftermath, including territorial disputes and prisoner exchanges. The accord outlined principles for peaceful bilateral relations, committing both nations to withdraw forces to the December 17, 1971, positions, respect the (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir without unilateral alterations, resolve disputes like through direct negotiations excluding third parties, and repatriate over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) held by . It emphasized non-interference and voluntary troop reductions, with securing assurances against Indian troop concentrations near borders in exchange for forgoing international forums like the UN for arbitration. Implementation proceeded unevenly: Both sides completed military withdrawals by late 1972, restoring pre-war lines except in minor disputed pockets, and air and naval communications partially resumed, though full economic ties lagged due to mutual distrust. Pakistan's recognition of on February 22, 1974, during the Lahore Islamic Summit, unlocked POW repatriation, with India releasing the bulk by April 1974 under tripartite oversight involving , though approximately 617 ethnic Bengalis from Pakistan remained detained in India as a leverage point. Bhutto faced domestic backlash from Islamist and military factions for allegedly conceding Kashmir's internationalization, yet he defended the accord as a pragmatic retrieval of POWs without territorial cessions, maintaining that held fragile peace until the late 1970s; however, core issues like demilitarization stalled in subsequent talks, with interpreting the LoC as a border—a view Pakistan rejected, leading to persistent violations. Overall, while nationalization and Simla implementation bolstered Bhutto's populist image short-term, they sowed seeds of economic inefficiency and unresolved geopolitical tensions that undermined long-term stability.

Nuclear Ambitions and Baloch Insurgency

Following the 1971 war and the secession of , Prime Minister directed the initiation of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program on January 20, 1972, during a secret meeting in with top scientists from the , tasking them explicitly with developing an atomic bomb to counter 's conventional and emerging nuclear superiority. Bhutto had earlier articulated this determination in a 1965 press conference, declaring that Pakistan would "eat grass, even go hungry," but acquire nuclear capability if pursued it, a stance galvanized by the 1971 defeat and 's first nuclear test on May 18, 1974. To advance uranium enrichment—a critical shortfall in Pakistan's plutonium-focused early efforts—Bhutto authorized the recruitment of in December 1974; Khan, a metallurgist working in the , provided stolen designs for gas centrifuges from URENCO, enabling clandestine enrichment at the facility starting in 1975. These actions, codenamed , prioritized weaponization over civilian applications, with Bhutto allocating significant budget resources despite economic constraints, viewing nuclear deterrence as essential for national survival against a militarily dominant . Concurrently, Bhutto confronted the fourth Baloch insurgency, which erupted in February 1973 after he dismissed the elected Balochistan provincial government on February 15, citing its alleged complicity in sheltering Afghan and Iraqi-trained separatists following complaints from Iran about cross-border incursions. The dismissal, which replaced the coalition led by Ataullah Mengal with governor's rule, triggered armed resistance from Baloch sardars (tribal leaders) including Khair Bakhsh Marri and Akbar Bugti, who mobilized an estimated 10,000-20,000 guerrillas demanding greater autonomy or secession, fueled by longstanding grievances over resource exploitation, Punjabi dominance, and land reforms that undermined tribal authority. Bhutto responded with a full-scale military operation involving up to 80,000 troops, supported by Iranian-supplied helicopters and artillery, which by 1977 had suppressed the rebellion through intensive counterinsurgency tactics, including village raids and targeted killings, though at the cost of widespread civilian displacement and allegations of extrajudicial executions. The Baloch conflict strained Pakistan's post-1971 unity, with insurgents conducting ambushes on army convoys and sabotaging infrastructure, while the government's harsh measures—such as the execution of Baloch leaders and reported "kill and dump" operations—escalated ethnic tensions and concerns, though official narratives framed the response as necessary to prevent territorial disintegration akin to . Estimates of casualties vary, but declassified accounts indicate approximately 3,300 Pakistani personnel killed alongside 5,000-6,000 Baloch fighters and civilians, reflecting the insurgency's guerrilla nature and the military's overwhelming force disparity. The operation's end coincided with Bhutto's ouster in July 1977, after which General Zia-ul-Haq granted amnesty to surviving insurgents, temporarily quelling overt violence but leaving unresolved grievances over federal neglect and economic marginalization in Balochistan's gas-rich but underdeveloped regions. Bhutto's dual focus on nuclear deterrence and internal pacification underscored a realist prioritizing state integrity amid perceived existential threats, though critics, including Baloch nationalists, contend the approaches sowed seeds for future unrest by prioritizing over political accommodation.

Zia-ul-Haq Islamization (1977-1988)

Coup Against Bhutto and Hudood Ordinances

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, as Chief of Army Staff, executed Operation Fair Play, a bloodless military coup on July 5, 1977, deposing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto amid widespread protests following the disputed March 1977 general elections, in which Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was accused of rigging results against the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Zia declared martial law that day, suspending the constitution, dissolving the National Assembly, and imposing military rule under the Proclamation of Emergency, while arresting Bhutto and key cabinet members, citing the need to restore order and hold fair elections within 90 days—a promise repeatedly delayed. Bhutto was charged in September 1977 with authorizing the 1974 murder of political opponent Ahmad Raza Kasuri's father, tried by the under regulations that limited appeals and . The court sentenced him to death on March 18, 1978; Pakistan's upheld the conviction by a 4-3 majority on February 6, 1979, despite appeals from international leaders including U.S. President , who urged clemency. Bhutto was executed by hanging on April 4, 1979, at Rawalpindi Central Jail, an act later deemed by Pakistan's in 2024 to have violated and fair trial rights, reflecting procedural flaws under Zia's regime. As part of Zia's broader Islamization program to legitimize military rule through religious appeal, the Hudood Ordinances were promulgated on February 10, 1979, replacing secular provisions of the with punishments derived from for offenses including (sariqa), adultery/fornication (), false accusation of (), alcohol consumption, and highway robbery (hiraba). These laws prescribed fixed penalties such as amputation for , stoning for married adulterers, and 80 lashes for drinking, requiring stringent evidentiary standards like four male witnesses, but critics noted implementation ambiguities, particularly in the Zina Ordinance, which equated non-marital consensual sex with , leading to disproportionate convictions of women on flimsy evidence without distinguishing . Zia defended the ordinances as fulfilling Pakistan's Islamic foundations, though they drew opposition from secular groups and later amendments like the 2006 Protection of Women Act sought partial reforms amid concerns.

Afghan Jihad Proxy and US Alliance

The invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, prompting President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to declare Pakistan's solidarity with the Afghan fighters opposing the occupation, viewing it as a threat to Pakistan's security due to the shared 2,430-kilometer border. Zia's government, already pursuing an Islamization agenda, framed support for the as a religious duty, establishing refugee camps along the border that eventually housed over 3 million Afghans by the mid-1980s and serving as bases for guerrilla operations. Pakistan's (ISI) directorate, under Lieutenant General , coordinated logistics, training over 80,000 in camps near and , while channeling foreign-supplied weapons such as Chinese Type 56 rifles and U.S. Stinger missiles to factions like those led by and . The , seeking to counter Soviet expansion during the , forged a with despite prior sanctions imposed after Zia's 1977 coup, with President authorizing initial covert aid of up to $695,000 in July 1979 for non-lethal support to insurgents via third parties including . Under President , this escalated into , the CIA's largest-ever covert program, which by 1987 had funneled approximately $630 million directly to the through ISI intermediaries, supplemented by matching U.S. contributions dollar-for-dollar, totaling over $3 billion in arms and funds by the war's end. In exchange, the U.S. provided with a $3.2 billion aid package from 1982 to 1987, including 40 F-16 fighter jets and economic assistance, effectively waiving concerns over 's nuclear program under the Pressler Amendment's precursors. This proxy arrangement bolstered Zia's regime domestically by aligning military with anti-communist , but it also amplified radical influences within , as Saudi-funded madrassas proliferated in areas, indoctrinating thousands with Wahhabi and fostering networks that later contributed to sectarian violence and militancy. The influx of Arab volunteers, including , who established guesthouses in , introduced transnational jihadist elements, while ISI's favoritism toward Pashtun-centric groups sowed seeds for post-withdrawal Afghan instability and blowback against itself, evidenced by rising opium trafficking and arms smuggling that militarized border regions. By Zia's in a plane crash on August 17, 1988, the alliance had helped prolong Soviet commitment, leading to their withdrawal announcement in 1988, though it entrenched 's role as a conduit for with enduring security costs.

Constitutional Amendments and Sharia Integration

Following the imposition of in July 1977, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq pursued Islamization through a combination of presidential orders and constitutional modifications to embed principles into Pakistan's legal framework. In May 1980, the was established via President's Order No. 1 of 1980, which amended the suspended 1973 Constitution by inserting Chapter 3A (Articles 203A to 203J) in Part VII. This court was empowered to examine federal and provincial laws for repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the and , with the authority to declare such laws void, thereby institutionalizing based on Islamic . The FSC comprised a and up to four other judges, appointed by the president, with appeals lying to the on matters of . A pivotal constitutional change occurred in 1985 amid the partial revival of democratic institutions. On March 2, 1985, Zia promulgated the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order (P.O. No. 14 of 1985), which inserted Article 2A immediately after Article 2, elevating the of March 12, 1949, to the status of a substantive provision of the . The asserts that sovereignty belongs to alone, with authority exercisable by the state as a sacred trust; it mandates that the principles of , , equality, tolerance, and as enunciated by shall be observed; and it requires all laws to conform to the and , prohibiting any repugnant legislation. This amendment transformed the Resolution from a to an enforceable clause, providing a constitutional basis for challenging secular laws and reinforcing the Islamic Republic's foundational . The Constitution (Eighth Amendment) Act, enacted on November 9, 1985, by the Majlis-e-Shoora (a consultative assembly functioning in place of parliament), further integrated these changes by validating prior actions and incorporating Article 2A into the revived 1973 Constitution. While the amendment primarily expanded presidential powers—such as the authority under Article 58(2)(b) to dissolve the —it entrenched Sharia oversight by linking the FSC's mandate to the substantive Islamic principles in Article 2A. These reforms aimed to align the legal system with Islamic tenets, though relied heavily on executive ordinances like the Hudood Ordinances of 1979 rather than wholesale constitutional overhaul; the FSC's jurisdiction excluded personal laws, fiscal matters, and areas like the frontier regions initially. By Zia's death in August 1988, these amendments had established a where served as a supreme interpretive benchmark, influencing subsequent and enabling the FSC to strike down laws such as elements of the 1860 Penal Code deemed un-Islamic. However, the changes also centralized authority under the executive, blending religious mandates with military rule to legitimize governance amid . Efforts to enact a Ninth Amendment for fuller enforcement stalled under Zia, leaving partial integration that persisted through later democratic governments.

Alternating Democracies (1988-1999)

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif Administrations

was appointed Prime Minister on December 2, 1988, following the Pakistan Peoples Party's (PPP) victory in the November 16, 1988, general elections, where it won 94 of 207 seats and formed a with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Her administration sought to reverse aspects of Zia-ul-Haq's Islamization by commuting death sentences, banning except under Hadd ordinances, and establishing a Ministry of Human Rights, though these measures faced resistance from conservative elements and the judiciary. Economic conditions deteriorated amid high budget deficits, exceeding 10% annually, and rising , exacerbated by global oil price shocks and limited fiscal reforms. Bhutto's first term was undermined by ethnic violence in , including clashes between PPP loyalists and MQM supporters that killed over 1,000 people in and Hyderabad by mid-1990, prompting the imposition of governor's rule in the province. Corruption allegations intensified, particularly against Bhutto and her husband , involving kickbacks from foreign contracts such as a $9 million from a Swiss firm linked to deals. On August 6, 1990, President invoked Article 58(2)(b) of the to dismiss the , citing gross , , and inability to maintain law and order, charges that subsequent investigations partially substantiated through evidence of illicit financial gains. The October 1990 elections elevated of the (PML) and Islami Jamhoori Ittehad alliance to on November 6, 1990, after securing 106 seats. 's initial policies emphasized , including of 90 state-owned enterprises and to boost foreign investment, which contributed to GDP growth averaging 5.2% annually until 1992. In May 1991, his government enacted the Enforcement of Shariat Act, mandating Islamic principles in legislation, while launching a $1 billion Lahore-Islamabad superhighway project to modernize infrastructure. Political tensions arose from coalition fractures, such as Jamaat-e-Islami's exit in 1992, and confrontations with opposition figures like Bhutto, whom Sharif temporarily barred from entering major cities. Sharif's term ended abruptly on April 18, 1993, when President Khan again used Article 58(2)(b) to dissolve the assembly over allegations of and economic mismanagement, including unexplained growth in Sharif's family assets from $5.4 million in 1988 to over $200 million by the mid-1990s. The reinstated the government in May but a subsequent power-sharing deadlock led to Sharif's resignation in July 1993. In the October 1993 elections, the PPP reclaimed power with 86 seats, enabling Bhutto's second stint as from October 19, 1993. This period saw attempts at judicial reforms to separate the executive from the judiciary and the nomination of as president, but ethnic strife persisted in , and family scandals culminated in the September 1996 killing of Bhutto's brother by police, fueling accusations of extrajudicial actions. Bhutto's second government grappled with worsening economic indicators, including a fiscal deficit reaching 8% of GDP and foreign servicing consuming 30% of exports, amid stalled privatizations and reliance on IMF loans with stringent conditions. probes revealed Zardari's involvement in cases like the abduction of a businessman for ransom tied to government contracts. On November 5, 1996, President Leghari dismissed the administration under Article 58(2)(b), pointing to , judicial interference, and sanctioned police operations against opponents. The February 3, 1997, elections delivered a PML with 137 seats, returning as . He promptly passed the Thirteenth Amendment in April 1997, stripping the president of dismissal powers, and pursued aggressive centralization, including the controversial Ehtesab Ordinance for anti- enforcement that critics viewed as politically motivated. Sharif's second term featured nuclear tests on May 28, 1998, in response to India's actions, imposing that halved foreign aid and spiked to 12%. Attempts to enforce stricter observance alienated secular allies, while corruption claims surfaced over $160 million allegedly skimmed from highway contracts and $58 million from wheat imports. Escalating civil-military frictions, including Sharif's failed effort to dismiss Army Chief during the 1999 conflict with India, precipitated Musharraf's bloodless coup on October 12, 1999, ending the democratic interlude marked by repeated executive overreach and institutional instability.

Economic Liberalization and Corruption Scandals

The government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1990–1993) initiated Pakistan's major economic liberalization efforts, launching a privatization program on January 22, 1991, aimed at shifting from state-controlled industries to private-sector dominance through deregulation, denationalization, and market-oriented reforms. This included privatizing 90 state-owned entities, such as banks (e.g., Muslim Commercial Bank and Allied Bank in 1991), heavy industries, and power generation facilities, while reducing import tariffs and easing foreign investment restrictions to attract capital amid a balance-of-payments crisis. Annual GDP growth averaged 5.2% during 1991–1993, supported by these measures and remittances, though structural inefficiencies persisted. Benazir Bhutto's second administration (1993–1996) partially continued liberalization under IMF-mandated programs, privatizing additional telecom and transport assets, but reversed some Sharif-era deregulations, leading to policy inconsistency and slower growth averaging 4.0% annually. Sharif's return in 1997 accelerated reforms, including further banking privatizations and projects like the Lahore-Islamabad Motorway, yet overall GDP growth declined to an average of 4.4% post-1991 compared to 6.7% in the prior decade, attributed by analysts to fiscal deficits, political instability, and uneven implementation rather than liberalization itself. These efforts aligned with global neoliberal trends but faced criticism for benefiting industrial elites connected to the PML-N, exacerbating inequality without broad-based growth. Parallel to reforms, corruption scandals plagued both PPP and PML-N governments, eroding public trust and contributing to presidential dismissals under Article 58(2)(b) of the . Bhutto's first term (1988–1990) saw allegations of kickbacks in defense deals and misuse of state funds, culminating in her August 1990 dismissal by President , who cited evidence of billions in embezzlement funneled through her husband Asif Ali Zardari's businesses. Sharif's 1993 ouster by Khan involved claims of favoritism toward family conglomerates like Ittefaq Foundries in bids, though less substantiated than PPP cases at the time. Bhutto's 1996 dismissal by President explicitly referenced , including Swiss court investigations into her and Zardari's receipt of $13 million in bribes from two Swiss firms for government contracts, alongside domestic probes into land grabs and scams yielding over $200 million in losses. In April 1999, a court convicted Bhutto and Zardari on charges related to a Swiss case, sentencing her to five years' imprisonment and disqualifying her from office, though appeals lingered and convictions were later dropped in amid political deals. Sharif's administration faced probes into undervalued privatization sales and HUD allocations to allies, but escaped major convictions until later; ranked 98th out of 99 countries in perceived for 1999, reflecting systemic graft across administrations. These scandals, often weaponized in rivalries, highlighted patronage networks over merit, undermining liberalization's potential gains.

1998 Nuclear Tests and Kargil Conflict

On and 13, 1998, conducted five underground nuclear tests under Operation Shakti at , prompting 's leadership to accelerate its response to maintain strategic parity. authorized the tests despite internal military reservations and international pressure, leading to on May 28, 1998, involving five simultaneous detonations at the Ras Koh Hills in with an estimated total yield of 25-40 kilotons. This was followed by on May 30, a single low-yield test (under 1 kiloton) at the nearby Kharan site, confirming 's nuclear capabilities and ending its policy of ambiguity. The detonations, conducted by the under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan's oversight, elicited immediate U.S.-led sanctions under the Glenn Amendment, freezing foreign aid and imposing economic penalties estimated at over $100 million annually. The nuclear tests heightened Indo-Pakistani tensions but did not deter subsequent military adventurism. In early 1999, Pakistani Northern Light Infantry troops and Kashmiri militants, supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence, infiltrated across the Line of Control into the Kargil district of Indian-administered Kashmir, occupying strategic heights overlooking the Srinagar-Leh highway and severing Indian supply lines. India detected the incursion in May, launching Operation Vijay with air strikes and ground assaults involving over 200,000 troops, recapturing most positions by mid-July amid heavy casualties—approximately 500 Indian soldiers killed and 1,000 wounded, with Pakistani losses estimated at 400-4,000 depending on attribution of militants versus regulars. Pakistan initially denied regular army involvement, framing it as a mujahideen uprising, but evidence including captured equipment confirmed state orchestration under General Pervez Musharraf's command. The conflict's resolution hinged on diplomacy, as nuclear risks loomed post-tests. Facing international isolation and Indian advances, Sharif traveled to Washington on July 4, 1999, securing U.S. President Bill Clinton's endorsement for a Lahore-like peace process in exchange for Pakistani withdrawal to pre-conflict positions, completed by July 26. This Lahore Declaration commitment, however, masked Sharif's limited prior knowledge of the operation's scale, which he later described as a miscalculation violating the Line of Control and exacerbating Pakistan's diplomatic setbacks. Domestically, the perceived capitulation fueled military discontent, eroding Sharif's authority and paving the way for Musharraf's October 1999 coup, while economically, the events compounded sanctions' impact, contributing to a balance-of-payments crisis.

Pervez Musharraf Rule (1999-2008)

Coup, Referendum, and Devolution Plan

On October 12, 1999, General , then Chief of Army Staff, led a bloodless coup that ousted amid escalating tensions, including Sharif's failed attempt to dismiss Musharraf while he was abroad and orders to ground his plane upon return. Musharraf's forces secured key installations in and arrested Sharif, who was later convicted of hijacking and charges, though these were overturned in . The coup suspended the , , and , with Musharraf assuming the role of Chief Executive and promising reforms to address , economic decline, and governance failures under Sharif's administration. To consolidate power and gain civilian legitimacy, Musharraf held a presidential on April 30, 2002, seeking approval for a five-year extension of his term. Official results claimed 98% approval from over 44 million voters, with a purported turnout exceeding 70%, but the process faced widespread allegations of , including pre-stuffed ballots, coerced participation by state employees, and manipulation by local officials. Independent observers and opposition parties, including the and (Nawaz), boycotted and condemned it as undemocratic, arguing it violated constitutional norms and served to entrench military rule under a veneer of popular mandate. The later validated the referendum in a 2002 ruling but imposed a three-year deadline for restoring parliamentary . Parallel to these efforts, Musharraf introduced the Devolution of Power Plan in August to decentralize authority from federal and provincial levels to local governments, aiming to empower grassroots institutions and reduce . The plan restructured administration into three tiers—union councils (village level), councils (sub-district), and district councils—elected on a non-party basis through phased polls from to , covering over 6,000 union councils and allocating 30-40% of provincial budgets to districts for development. Proponents viewed it as a pragmatic shift toward , enhancing service delivery in rural areas, but critics contended it weakened provincial , bypassed political parties to fragment opposition, and maintained military oversight via appointed nazims (mayors) removable by the president. Elections saw high participation but were marred by non-party rules that favored independents aligned with the , leading to uneven implementation and later reversals post-Musharraf.

Post-9/11 Counterterrorism and Tribal Areas Operations

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President reversed Pakistan's prior support for the regime in and aligned with the in the global campaign against , announcing this shift in a televised address on September 19, 2001, which included offers of intelligence sharing, access, and logistical support for U.S. operations. This decision, driven by U.S. diplomatic pressure including threats of designating a state sponsor of , enabled the transit of U.S. supplies through Pakistani ports and roads to , while Pakistani forces secured borders to prevent militant escapes, though an influx of and fighters into the (FATA) followed the U.S.-led invasion of in October 2001. In exchange, the U.S. provided with approximately $10 billion in military and economic aid between 2002 and 2008, much of it earmarked for efforts, alongside and sanctions waivers on missile technology. Pakistan's (ISI) and military conducted numerous high-profile arrests of operatives, handing over at least 369 suspects to U.S. custody by 2004, including key figures such as in on March 28, 2002, and in Karachi on September 11, 2002. The most significant capture was , the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks, arrested on March 1, 2003, in , which U.S. officials credited to Pakistani intelligence tips. These actions, combined with the disruption of financing networks, contributed to the degradation of the group's operational capacity outside FATA, though critics, including U.S. congressional reports, noted persistent ISI ties to Afghan factions like the , which Pakistan viewed as hedges against Indian influence in post- rather than direct threats. Musharraf survived two attempts on December 14 and 25, 2003, in , attributed to operatives sheltered in tribal areas, underscoring the domestic blowback from this cooperation. Militancy in FATA escalated as the region's semi-autonomous status under the allowed foreign fighters to regroup, prompting Pakistan's first large-scale military incursion in June 2002 into the Valley of Khyber Agency to target hideouts. Operation Al-Mizan, launched in 2002 and intensified in 2004, deployed up to 80,000 troops across North and South Waziristan to eliminate Uzbek militants and local warlords like Nek Muhammad, who was killed in a U.S. drone strike on June 18, 2004, after defying peace terms; the operation resulted in hundreds of militant deaths but also over 1,000 Pakistani soldier casualties by 2006 and displaced tens of thousands of civilians. Subsequent efforts included short-lived peace accords, such as the September 2006 agreement with in South Waziristan, which temporarily reduced cross-border attacks but collapsed amid rising Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) violence, reflecting the tension between military coercion and tribal negotiation strategies rooted in 's historical frontier policy. By 2007, the in , involving FATA-linked radicals, catalyzed broader offensives, though full control remained elusive due to terrain, local sympathies, and strategic ambivalence toward anti-Indian militants.

2005 Earthquake Response and Lawyers' Movement

On October 8, 2005, a 7.6-magnitude centered near in Pakistan-administered Kashmir devastated northern Pakistan, killing at least 73,000 people, injuring over 70,000, and displacing approximately 3.3 million, with the hardest-hit areas including Azad Kashmir and the (now ). The disaster destroyed over 130,000 buildings and affected infrastructure across seven districts, exacerbating vulnerabilities in remote, mountainous regions prone to landslides. President Pervez Musharraf's government declared a and deployed the , which led rescue operations, distributed aid, and constructed temporary shelters, crediting the military's rapid mobilization for saving thousands despite the loss of many soldiers. However, the initial response faced criticism for delays in reaching isolated areas due to damaged roads, inadequate helicopters, and bureaucratic hurdles, with Musharraf attributing slowness to the terrain's inaccessibility rather than systemic failures. International assistance surged, with pledges totaling over $5.8 billion from donors including the ($510 million), the World Bank ($1 billion for reconstruction), and European nations, providing essentials like tents, blankets, and medical teams amid winter's approach. The Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was established in October 2005 to coordinate long-term recovery, focusing on rebuilding schools, hospitals, and , though implementation suffered from overlapping agencies, allegations, and slow disbursement, leaving many survivors in temporary camps years later. The crisis temporarily bolstered Musharraf's domestic image through visible military involvement but exposed weaknesses, including poor and reliance on foreign aid, while straining Pakistan-India relations over cross-border relief access. By 2006, reconstruction progress included resettling over 2 million people, but critiques persisted regarding inequitable aid distribution favoring urban areas. The emerged on March 9, 2007, when Musharraf suspended Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry on charges of misconduct and nepotism, prompting widespread protests by bar associations demanding and Chaudhry's reinstatement. Lawyers, donning black coats, organized marches, court boycotts, and rallies across cities like and , drawing tens of thousands and evolving into a broader challenge against overreach, with participation from opposition parties and media. A 13-judge bench reinstated Chaudhry on July 20, 2007, after references against him, marking a partial victory but intensifying tensions as Musharraf, facing reelection pressures, imposed a on November 3, 2007, suspending the , sacking over 60 judges, and detaining Chaudhry again. The movement persisted through arrests and violence, with lawyers enduring baton charges and over 4,000 detentions, framing their campaign around rule-of-law principles rather than partisan politics. The protests weakened Musharraf's legitimacy, contributing to his electoral defeat in the February 2008 parliamentary polls and resignation on August 18, 2008, amid threats, as the judiciary's assertiveness under Chaudhry challenged executive dominance. Post-Musharraf, the government under President faced sustained pressure, leading to the Supreme Court's ruling on July 31, 2009, declaring the 2007 emergency unconstitutional and restoring Chaudhry and other judges, fulfilling a key movement demand. The episode highlighted the legal community's role in curbing , fostering on issues like missing persons, though it also deepened without fully resolving military-civilian imbalances.

Hybrid Civilian-Military Dynamics (2008-2018)

Zardari Presidency and 18th Amendment

Following the February 18, 2008, general elections, in which the (PPP) secured 121 seats in the amid widespread rejection of Pervez Musharraf's rule, Yousaf Raza Gillani was elected prime minister on March 24, 2008, forming a coalition government with parties including the Pakistan Muslim League (N). Musharraf resigned on August 18, 2008, under threat of impeachment, paving the way for PPP co-chairman to contest the presidency. Zardari won the on September 6, 2008, obtaining 481 votes out of 702 in an comprising federal and provincial assemblies, defeating Musharraf's nominee by a wide margin. He was sworn in on September 9, 2008, by Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar, marking the return to civilian leadership after nearly a decade of military dominance. Zardari's operated within a parliamentary framework, with real executive authority vested in the , though the office retained significant influence over , appointments, and constitutional matters. The administration confronted acute challenges, including an economic downturn exacerbated by global financial turmoil—Pakistan's peaked at 25% in 2008 and foreign reserves fell below $4 billion—and escalating , with over 30 major bombings in 2008 alone targeting security forces and civilians. Zardari pursued reconciliation with opposition parties, notably restoring the judiciary via the November 2007 National Reconciliation Ordinance's extension and November 3 actions' annulment, while navigating tensions with the establishment over operations in the tribal areas. The centerpiece of Zardari's constitutional agenda was the Eighteenth Amendment, unanimously passed by parliament on April 8, 2010, after deliberations by a 21-member constitutional committee chaired by Senator Raza Rabbani. This reform altered approximately 36% of the 1973 Constitution by amending or inserting provisions in 102 of its 280 articles, notably repealing Article 58(2)(b)—which had empowered presidents to dissolve the National Assembly since General Zia-ul-Haq's 1985 amendments—and limiting the president's role to a largely ceremonial one, thereby reinforcing parliamentary supremacy and prime ministerial authority. It devolved 47 subjects from the federal concurrent legislative list to the provinces, including education, health, and labor, abolishing the concurrent list entirely to enhance provincial autonomy under the 18th-century federal structure envisioned in the original 1973 document. The amendment's passage, achieved through cross-party consensus despite initial resistance from some PML-N factions, symbolized a reversion to the 1973 Constitution's parliamentary ethos, curtailed executive overreach historically exploited by military rulers, and established the Council of Common Interests for intergovernmental coordination on shared resources like water and electricity. Implementation challenges persisted, including fiscal strains on provinces from newly devolved responsibilities without commensurate tax powers and delays in forming the mandated Implementation Commission until 2011, yet it marked a substantive step toward by redistributing the National Finance Commission's divisible pool, increasing provincial shares from 47.5% to over 57% by 2010-13. Zardari completed his five-year term on September 8, 2013—the first Pakistani president to do so without , , or coup—handing over to after PPP's reduced performance in the May 2013 elections.

Sharif Governments, Panama Papers, and Disqualifications

assumed office as for the third time on June 5, 2013, following the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)'s victory in the May 2013 general elections, where the party secured a simple majority in the . received 244 votes in the 342-seat assembly, enabling the formation of a PML-N-led that prioritized infrastructure development, energy sector reforms, and economic stabilization. Key initiatives included the launch of the China-Pakistan (CPEC) in 2015, which facilitated over $50 billion in promised Chinese investments for roads, ports, and power plants, alongside the addition of approximately 10,000 megawatts of electricity capacity to address chronic shortages. These efforts contributed to GDP growth averaging around 4.8% during the term, up from 2.8% in 2012, though they were accompanied by rising public debt and a current account deficit peaking at $18 billion in fiscal year 2018. The government's stability was disrupted by the April 2016 release of the , a leak of over 11 million documents from the Panamanian law firm , which exposed offshore financial dealings worldwide. Investigations revealed that three of Sharif's children—Maryam Nawaz, Hussain Nawaz, and Hasan Nawaz—were linked to offshore companies in the , including Nielsen Enterprises and Nescoll Limited, which owned or controlled luxury apartments in London's Avenfield House valued at millions of pounds. Although Sharif himself was not directly named as an owner, the documents showed unreceived salary payments from his Dubai-based company, Capital FZE, were used to repay loans for the properties, raising questions about undeclared assets and potential . Opposition parties, including led by , petitioned the , alleging corruption and violation of eligibility requirements under Article 62 of the Constitution, which mandates "truthful and honest" public officials. In response, the formed a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) in comprising representatives from intelligence agencies, the , and other bodies to probe the allegations. On July 28, , a five-judge bench unanimously disqualified from holding public office for dishonesty, citing his failure to disclose receivables from Capital FZE in parliamentary asset declarations, which constituted "conduct unbecoming" under Article 62(1)(f). resigned immediately, ending his tenure after four years, and was succeeded by as interim until the PML-N completed its term in May 2018. Subsequent accountability court proceedings in 2018 resulted in 's conviction on corruption charges related to the Avenfield properties, sentencing him to 10 years in , while the imposed a lifetime ban on his political participation in April 2018. The disqualifications weakened PML-N leadership but highlighted in enforcing accountability, amid claims from 's supporters of military influence in the process.

Mumbai Attacks Aftermath and US Drone Strikes

The , executed by ten (LeT) militants from between November 26 and 29, resulted in 166 deaths and heightened global demands for to curb terrorist networks operating from its soil. In the immediate aftermath, 's government under President condemned the attacks and arrested over 20 LeT suspects, including operations chief Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi on December 7, 2008, in connection with the plot. However, LeT founder was detained under in December 2008 but released by a Lahore court in June 2009 due to insufficient evidence, prompting criticism from and the for inadequate prosecution of high-level figures. India mobilized troops along the border, raising fears of escalation to war, but de-escalated following U.S. diplomatic intervention urging to cooperate with investigations revealing training camps and handlers in . The U.S., balancing its alliance with against Islamist militants in , intensified pressure on to dismantle LeT's infrastructure, designating additional LeT leaders as terrorists in 2012 and linking the attacks to broader threats via American operative , who scouted targets for LeT. 's selective crackdowns—targeting some affiliates while shielding anti-India groups like LeT—strained U.S.- ties, as evidenced by aid suspensions and demands for action against safe havens, though full cooperation remained limited amid allegations of (ISI) complicity. Concurrently, the U.S. escalated drone strikes in Pakistan's (FATA) targeting and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with operations intensifying under President from 2009 onward as part of post-9/11 . Between 2004 and 2018, the CIA conducted approximately 431 strikes, the majority after 2008, killing an estimated 2,200-3,800 militants and 158-965 civilians according to varying assessments from U.S. government data and NGOs like the New America Foundation. Pakistan's civilian governments publicly denounced the strikes as violations of sovereignty—filing lawsuits in the in 2009 and passing a 2013 resolution against them—yet leaked U.S. diplomatic cables revealed senior officials, including under Zardari, privately endorsed the program to eliminate mutual threats like TTP leadership. The dissonance between public protests and tacit approval underscored Pakistan's strategic hedging: cooperating against groups threatening the state while tolerating those focused on , such as LeT, which faced minimal disruption post-Mumbai. Drone operations peaked in with 118 strikes, contributing to the deaths of key figures like TTP leader in August 2009, but also fueled anti-U.S. sentiment, , and legal challenges over civilian casualties, with Pakistani reports often citing higher non-combatant deaths than U.S. estimates. This period highlighted the hybrid dynamics of U.S.- security cooperation, where drone strikes bolstered short-term tactical gains against transnational jihadists but exacerbated sovereignty tensions and failed to address Pakistan's differentiated approach to militant proxies.

Imran Khan Tenure (2018-2022)

PTI Electoral Victory and Accountability Courts

The 2018 Pakistani general elections, held on July 25, saw the (PTI), led by , secure 116 seats in the 272 directly elected seats of the , emerging as the single largest party but falling short of an outright majority. PTI formed a with independents and smaller parties, including the and , enabling Khan's election as on August 18. Voter turnout reached approximately 52%, with PTI gaining strong support in and while PML-N retained influence in urban despite Nawaz Sharif's prior disqualification. The polls faced widespread allegations of irregularities, including pre-election manipulation by the military establishment, which opponents claimed favored PTI through media censorship, candidate harassment, and vote tampering in favor of PTI-backed independents. PML-N and PPP leaders, including and , contested results, pointing to delays in counting and mobile service blackouts on as evidence of interference; international observers noted a level playing field was undermined by institutional biases against the incumbent PML-N. PTI's rise aligned with the military's preference for a controlled transition, building on Sharif's 2017 ouster via Supreme Court disqualification over Panama Papers-linked corruption allegations, which barred him from contesting and weakened PML-N's campaign. Accountability courts, specialized tribunals created under the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance of 1999 to expedite corruption trials, played a pivotal role in the pre-election landscape and PTI's subsequent governance. These courts, empowered by the 16th Constitutional Amendment in 2017 to handle NAB-referred cases exclusively, convicted Sharif on July 6, 2018, in the Avenfield reference, sentencing him in absentia to 10 years for possessing London apartments beyond declared income sources. A subsequent Al-Azizia verdict on the same day added a seven-year term for unaccounted assets, though Sharif was already in London for medical reasons; these rulings, upheld amid appeals, solidified PTI's narrative of elite corruption while critics argued NAB's selective targeting of PML-N figures reflected judicial overreach influenced by military and PTI pressures. During PTI's tenure, NAB intensified probes, arresting over 100 opposition politicians by 2020, including PML-N's (sentenced to eight years in Avenfield, later suspended) and PPP's on charges, amassing convictions totaling billions in fines and recoveries. However, the process drew accusations of politicization, as NAB's conviction rate hovered below 30% overall, with PTI allies largely spared despite similar allegations, prompting claims of a "witch hunt" to consolidate power rather than systemic reform. In December 2019, PTI diluted NAB's authority via ordinance, raising investigation thresholds and shielding cabinet decisions, a move decried by transparency advocates as after initial aggressive enforcement. This selective application underscored accountability's dual use: as a pre-PTI tool to dismantle rivals and a post-victory mechanism prone to institutional capture, reflecting Pakistan's recurring pattern of hybrid regimes where rhetoric masks power consolidation.

FATF Compliance, IMF Program, and COVID Response

Pakistan's government under prioritized compliance with the (FATF) standards to address deficiencies in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, following the country's placement on the FATF grey list in June 2018. The administration implemented a series of reforms, including proscribing 76 terrorist organizations, freezing assets of 3,000 individuals linked to banned groups, and convicting over 400 militants under anti-terror laws by mid-2022. These efforts addressed 26 of 27 action items, with the remaining one completed via legislative changes to non-profit oversight. On October 21, 2022, FATF removed Pakistan from the grey list after four years, citing substantial progress in curbing terror financing risks, though it urged sustained vigilance. Concurrently, facing a balance-of-payments crisis with foreign reserves dropping below $10 billion by early 2019, Khan's government negotiated an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the . On May 12, 2019, the IMF approved a $6 billion, 39-month program to stabilize the economy through fiscal consolidation, monetary tightening, and structural reforms, including shifting to a market-determined and broadening the base. Despite Khan's pre-election criticism of IMF bailouts as detrimental to , the deal was accepted amid depleting reserves and high exceeding 10%. Initial disbursements supported reserve rebuilding, but compliance challenges emerged later, including delays in reforms and targets. The , which reached in February , prompted a multifaceted response emphasizing economic protection for the vulnerable over stringent nationwide lockdowns. Khan opted for a "smart lockdown" strategy, targeting high-risk areas while allowing most economic activity to continue, arguing that full shutdowns would exacerbate poverty affecting over 40% of the population living below the poverty line. The Ehsaas Emergency Cash program, launched on May 2, , disbursed over 144 billion rupees ($1 billion) to 15 million low-income households, supplemented by military logistics for aid distribution and testing expansion to 90,000 daily capacity by mid-. reported approximately 1.3 million cases and 28,000 deaths by late 2022, with a relatively low excess mortality rate compared to regional peers, though critics attributed higher informal sector resilience rather than policy alone; the approach drew international praise for balancing health and livelihoods but faced domestic accusations of undercounting cases due to limited testing in rural areas.

Afghanistan Withdrawal Impacts and Cipher Controversy

The United States completed its military withdrawal from on August 30, 2021, following the 's rapid offensive that captured on August 15, 2021, ending the . This development reversed two decades of Pakistani support for U.S.-led efforts in the region, as Pakistan had provided logistical routes and intelligence while hosting millions of . For Pakistan, the 's return to power initially raised hopes of reduced cross-border militancy, given Islamabad's historical ties to Afghan factions, but it quickly exacerbated internal security challenges. The withdrawal enabled the resurgence of Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Sunni militant group distinct from but ideologically aligned with the Afghan , which had been weakened by Pakistani military operations from 2014 onward. Post-2021, TTP attacks surged, with the group exploiting Afghan territory as a safe haven for training and planning, leading to over 800 fatalities in Pakistan from in 2022 alone, a sharp increase from prior years. Pakistan accused the Afghan of failing to curb TTP operations, prompting to conduct airstrikes across the border in June 2022 and deport over 1.7 million undocumented by late 2023 amid heightened border fencing and closures. These measures reflected causal links between the power vacuum in and intensified drug trafficking, refugee flows, and insurgent incursions into Pakistan's and provinces. Amid these security strains, U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated further due to Khan's neutral stance on the in 2022 and his criticism of the rushed withdrawal, which he argued empowered global jihadists. The "cipher controversy" stemmed from a March 7, 2021, confidential sent by Pakistan's in Washington, , to , detailing a meeting with U.S. Wendy . The cable reportedly conveyed U.S. frustration over Khan's independent foreign policy, including his visit to on the eve of the invasion, with Sherman allegedly warning of strained bilateral ties and hinting at repercussions without Pakistan aligning against . Khan publicly brandished the cipher document at a , 2022, rally in , alleging it proved a U.S.-orchestrated "international conspiracy" involving domestic opposition to remove him from power, tying it to broader post-withdrawal geopolitical shifts. He declassified the cipher on , 2022, but faced accusations of violating the by retaining and politicizing it, rather than returning it promptly to the Foreign Ministry. The ensuing probe, initiated in August 2022, culminated in Khan's ouster via a no-confidence vote on April 10, 2022, which he attributed partly to the cipher's fallout and military establishment pressures. While Khan maintained the document evidenced foreign regime-change efforts, declassified excerpts revealed no explicit threats, only diplomatic rebukes, underscoring tensions over Pakistan's balancing act between U.S. demands and deepening China-Russia ties. The controversy highlighted dynamics, where civilian leaders navigated military oversight amid external pressures.

Recent Crises (2022-2025)

No-Confidence Ouster and Flood Disasters

On April 10, 2022, Pakistan's National Assembly passed a no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Imran Khan, marking the first successful ouster of a sitting premier through this parliamentary mechanism in the country's history. The opposition coalition, comprising parties including the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and defectors from Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) allies such as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), secured 174 votes in the 342-seat house, surpassing the required simple majority of 172. Khan had attempted to avert the vote by advising President Arif Alvi to dissolve the assembly on April 3 under Article 69 of the Constitution, triggering elections within 90 days, but the Supreme Court invalidated this on April 7, reinstating the assembly and mandating the vote proceed. Khan attributed the motion's success to a foreign conspiracy, specifically alleging U.S. involvement via a diplomatic from Pakistan's in Washington referencing a threat from of State if Khan did not improve ties with the Biden administration; however, U.S. officials denied orchestrating the ouster, and Pakistani investigations into the cipher yielded no conclusive evidence of external orchestration beyond diplomatic tensions. The opposition, conversely, cited economic mismanagement, rising exceeding 12% in early 2022, and failures as grounds, amid Khan's declining popularity following PTI's loss of by-elections and coalition fractures. Post-ouster, Khan mobilized PTI supporters for protests, framing the event as an "imported " imposed by the military establishment, though no formal charges of establishment complicity were substantiated in subsequent probes. On April 11, 2022, the elected of the PML-N as the new with 195 votes against PTI nominee Fazl-ur-Rehman's 92, forming a reliant on PPP support and independent legislators. Sharif's administration immediately prioritized economic stabilization, seeking an IMF amid foreign reserves dipping below $10 billion and a fiscal deficit of 7.1% of GDP, but faced immediate tests from inherited challenges including fuel shortages and currency depreciation. Just months later, from June to October 2022, unprecedented flooding devastated , submerging one-third of the country due to 27 trillion gallons of rainfall—eight times the 2010 volume—compounded by glacial melt from heatwaves, , and inadequate drainage . The killed at least 1,700 people, including over 600 children, displaced 8 million, and affected 33 million overall, with and provinces suffering the worst inundation, where rivers like the Indus swelled beyond record levels. Agricultural losses spanned 4 million hectares, destroying 40% of and crops and exacerbating food insecurity for 2.2 million children facing acute . Economic damages reached $14.9 billion, with additional losses of $15.2 billion from disrupted supply chains and destruction including 2,200 kilometers of roads and 580 bridges, pushing Pakistan's reconstruction needs to $16.3 billion in priority sectors like and . The government declared a national emergency, launching relief via the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) and appealing for international aid, which mobilized $2.6 billion in pledges from the UN, World Bank, and donors like the and for recovery efforts focused on resilient rebuilding. Critics, including PTI, highlighted pre-flood lapses under both administrations, such as stalled projects and urban encroachment on floodplains, while experts emphasized Pakistan's disproportionate despite low global emissions. By late 2022, disease outbreaks like affected 500,000 in camps, underscoring long-term recovery hurdles amid political instability.

2024 Election Rigging Allegations and PTI Suppression

Prior to the February 8, 2024, general elections, (PTI) faced extensive restrictions, including the revocation of its electoral symbol—the cricket bat—by the (ECP) in January 2024, compelling over 6,000 PTI candidates to contest as independents without party identification on ballots. founder , imprisoned since his arrest on May 9, 2023, following ouster via no-confidence vote, received multiple convictions in rapid succession, culminating in a 14-year sentence for on January 31, 2024, in the Toshakhana case, which PTI described as politically motivated to bar his participation. Authorities arrested thousands of PTI workers and leaders in the preceding months, disrupted party rallies, and invalidated PTI's internal elections, actions critics attributed to state machinery aiming to undermine PTI's organizational capacity. On , widespread suspension of mobile and services—reportedly affecting 28% of the country—hindered voter communication and result verification, while ballot stuffing allegations surfaced amid low oversight due to restricted international observers. Results were delayed for up to 96 hours in many constituencies, fueling PTI claims of tampering during consolidation; preliminary counts showed PTI-backed independents leading with over 150 seats based on Form 45 tallies, but official Form 47 constituency results reduced their tally to 93 of 266 directly elected seats. PML-N secured 75 seats and PPP 54, enabling a post-election excluding PTI, with elected on February 29, 2024. A pivotal admission came on February 17, 2024, when Commissioner Liaqat Ali Chattha publicly confessed to rigging 13 seats by reversing 70,000-vote margins to convert PTI losers into winners for PML-N and PPP candidates, implicating ECP Sikandar Sultan Raja and Qazi Faez Isa; Chattha resigned and offered self-surrender. The ECP dismissed the claims as unsubstantiated and initiated an inquiry, while PTI demanded forensic audits of Forms 45 and 47, citing discrepancies exceeding 100,000 votes in some constituencies as evidence of systematic manipulation. Independent monitors like the Free and Fair Election Network noted transparency issues in tabulation but affirmed polling station integrity, though U.S. State Department and observers urged probes into interference, highlighting pre-poll biases against PTI. Post-election, PTI's exclusion intensified: the initially awarded reserved seats to the coalition in July 2024, though a later ruling partially reversed this, affirming PTI's parliamentary status; government moves to ban PTI outright were floated in July 2024 amid ongoing arrests of protesters decrying "mandate theft." Clashes during PTI rallies in March and November 2024 led to hundreds detained, with military courts convicting 25 supporters in December 2024 for May 9, 2023, unrest linked to Khan's initial arrest. These measures, per PTI and analysts, reflected establishment efforts—implicitly military-backed—to suppress a party polling highest in surveys despite constraints, potentially eroding institutional legitimacy amid economic woes.

Economic Bailouts, Militancy Resurgence, and IMF Reforms

Following the ouster of in April 2022, Pakistan's economy deteriorated amid political instability, with foreign exchange reserves dropping to $4.1 billion by June 2022—covering less than two weeks of imports—and surging to 38% by mid-2023, exacerbating a balance-of-payments crisis. To avert default, the government under secured emergency financing, including rollovers of $11 billion in deposits from allies: approximately $5 billion from , $4 billion from , and $2 billion from the UAE, which propped up reserves without addressing underlying fiscal imbalances. These measures provided short-term relief but highlighted Pakistan's reliance on external patrons, as domestic revenue shortfalls and in the sector—estimated at over 2.5 trillion rupees by 2023—persisted due to inefficient subsidies and poor collection, with the tax-to-GDP ratio remaining below 10%. In July 2023, the IMF approved a nine-month Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) of $3 billion (SDR 2.25 billion) to stabilize the , conditional on removing subsidies, tightening , and enhancing fiscal discipline, which initially unlocked $1.2 billion but faced delays over subsidy reversal commitments. This was followed in September 2024 by a 37-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) of $7 billion—Pakistan's 24th IMF program since 1958—requiring broader structural reforms such as expanding the tax base, privatizing state-owned enterprises, and reducing public spending, with assurances of continued support from , , and the UAE to bridge a $4 billion external financing gap. Implementation yielded mixed results: by May 2025, the IMF completed the first EFF review, disbursing $1 billion and noting improvements in reserves (to $9-10 billion) and inflation moderation to around 12%, but warned of risks from incomplete reforms, imposing 11 additional conditions—bringing the total to 50—including stricter fiscal targets and measures under a parallel Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Critics argue these programs perpetuate a cycle of dependency, as measures stifled growth (projected at 2-3% for FY2025) and raised to 9.7%, without resolving of subsidies or boosting exports, which hovered below $30 billion annually. Concurrently, militancy resurged, fueled by the 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, which enabled Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) regrouping across the border, with attacks rising 75% in 2024-2025 amid porous frontiers and perceived Afghan Taliban sanctuary. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies recorded approximately 586 militant incidents in 2023, escalating to a 46% jump in violence during Q3 2025 alone, including suicide bombings and ambushes killing hundreds of security personnel and civilians, primarily in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. TTP claimed responsibility for high-profile strikes, such as the October 2024 retaliation following the killing of leader Ustad Qureshi, exploiting political vacuums and economic grievances to recruit, while Islamabad's military operations displaced thousands but failed to dismantle core networks. This uptick strained resources, diverting funds from development and complicating IMF-mandated fiscal consolidation, as defense spending exceeded 2.5% of GDP amid calls for renewed counterterrorism pacts with Afghanistan, which yielded limited cooperation. By October 2025, the security environment remained volatile, with TTP affiliates expanding influence and external support allegations—unsubstantiated but persistent—further eroding investor confidence in reform efforts.

Cross-Cutting Themes

Role of the Military in Governance and Security

The Pakistan Army, established on August 15, 1947, following the partition of British India, has maintained a dominant position in national security and governance, justified by persistent existential threats from India and internal instability. Comprising over 650,000 active personnel as of 2023, it has conducted security operations across four major wars with India—in 1947–1948 over Kashmir, 1965 in Punjab and Kashmir, 1971 culminating in East Pakistan's secession as Bangladesh, and 1999's Kargil conflict—while also managing Afghan border incursions and counterinsurgency campaigns. These engagements, coupled with the military's early institutionalization under British-trained officers amid civilian leadership vacuums, fostered a praetorian ethos where the armed forces positioned themselves as the ultimate guarantors of state survival. Direct military rule occurred during three extended periods totaling approximately 33 years: from October 1958 to December 1971 under Generals Ayub Khan (1958–1969) and (1969–1971), marked by the 1958 martial law declaration abrogating the and centralizing power; from July 1977 to August 1988 under General Zia-ul-Haq, who overthrew via Operation Fair Play and imposed Islamization reforms alongside U.S.-backed anti-Soviet efforts in ; and from October 1999 to August 2008 under General , following his bloodless coup against amid the aftermath. These regimes often promised stability and economic modernization—Ayeb's "Basic Democracies" system and agriculture boosted growth to 6.8% annually in the 1960s—but were criticized for suppressing dissent, rigging transitions to civilian rule, and exacerbating ethnic divisions, as evidenced by the 1971 civil war's 3 million deaths and 10 million refugees. Post-2008, after Musharraf's amid threats, the military shifted to indirect governance, leveraging the (ISI) directorate and constitutional interpretations to influence civilian administrations without overt coups. This "hybrid" model manifested in the 2018 electoral support for Khan's (PTI), where military-backed accountability drives targeted rivals, followed by engineered opposition leading to Khan's April 2022 no-confidence ouster; similar dynamics shaped the February 2024 elections, with PTI suppressed via symbol bans and arrests, ensuring a fragmented PML-N and PPP coalition under military oversight. The establishment's power over —evident in calibrated ties with via the $62 billion and U.S. exceeding $33 billion since 2001—stems from civilian governments' fiscal dependencies and repeated scandals, reinforcing the military's self-perceived role as arbiter. In security domains, the military has executed large-scale operations against Islamist militancy, including 80,000 troops deployed in the 2009 Swat Valley offensive displacing 2 million civilians, and in 2014, which cleared of Tehrik-i- Pakistan (TTP) strongholds, killing over 3,500 militants per official counts. Border skirmishes with intensified post-2021 takeover, prompting cross-border strikes in 2024 against TTP sanctuaries, amid 1,500 annual militant attacks claiming 2,000 lives. These efforts, while reducing TTP capabilities by 70% from 2009 peaks according to U.S. assessments, have been hampered by selective focus—historically tolerating Afghan and Haqqani affiliates for against —leading to blowback like the killing 149. The military's political primacy is underpinned by an extensive commercial empire, termed "Milbus," encompassing conglomerates like (fertilizers, power plants, valued at $6 billion in 2025), (banking, ), and others controlling 10–12% of GDP through tax-exempt ventures in , shipping, and . Originating as welfare trusts post-1971 to support retirees, these entities—operating 50+ firms with assets over $20 billion by 2016—receive preferential contracts and land allocations, insulating the military from budget cuts (defense spending at 2.8% of GDP in 2024) and fostering elite cohesion that deters democratic encroachment. This economic autonomy, while providing internal funding for operations, distorts markets and perpetuates governance imbalances, as civilian oversight remains nominal despite 18th Amendment devolution efforts in 2010.

Islam's Influence on State and Society

The , adopted by Pakistan's on March 12, 1949, established sovereignty as belonging to alone, with the state enabling Muslims to order their lives according to Islamic teachings while guaranteeing and democratic principles. This resolution formed the to subsequent constitutions, embedding Islamic ideology as a foundational element of statehood and distinguishing from secular models. Pakistan's 1956 Constitution declared the country an , mandating policies to enable Muslims to live per 's teachings and requiring the head of state to be Muslim, though it did not explicitly name as the until the 1973 Constitution's Article 2. The 1973 framework further incorporated the as its preamble and established the to advise on compliance. Under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's military regime from 1977 to 1988, Islamization accelerated through ordinances enforcing elements, including the Hudood Ordinances of 1979, which prescribed Quranic punishments for offenses like theft, adultery, and alcohol consumption. The , established in 1980 via President's Order No. 1, was tasked with reviewing laws for repugnancy to Islamic injunctions, leading to amendments in civil and criminal codes. Blasphemy provisions, particularly Section 295-C of the amended in 1982, imposed a mandatory penalty for insulting the Prophet , resulting in over 1,800 accusations by 2021, often targeting minorities amid vigilante enforcement. In society, Deobandi institutions, emphasizing scriptural reform, gained political influence through alliances with the state and parties like , fostering networks linked to militancy, while Barelvi traditions, centered on Sufi practices, dominated popular devotion but faced rivalry, as seen in the rise of since 2011 advocating strict orthodoxy. Madrassas, numbering over 20,000 by the 2000s, provide free to millions but have been criticized for curricula prioritizing theology over modern skills, with some Deobandi-affiliated ones supplying recruits to groups like the during the 1980s Afghan jihad. Sectarian tensions between Sunni subsects and Shia Muslims escalated post-1980s, fueled by state favoritism toward certain Sunni groups and Saudi-Iran proxy influences, contributing to thousands of deaths in targeted violence. These policies reinforced conservative social norms, including gender segregation and veiling mandates in public sectors, while judicial reviews by the Shariat Court struck down interest-based banking elements, promoting riba-free alternatives by the 1980s. However, implementation inconsistencies, such as uneven Hudood enforcement and elite exemptions, highlighted causal tensions between stated Islamic ideals and pragmatic governance, exacerbating public disillusionment and Islamist mobilization.

Interstate Conflicts: India, Afghanistan, and Kashmir

Pakistan's interstate conflicts have predominantly involved over the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in four major wars since , and over the border and ethnic Pashtun , exacerbating proxy dynamics and militancy. These disputes stem from the 1947 partition of British , which left ambiguous princely state accessions and unratified colonial boundaries, fostering enduring strategic rivalries. Pakistan's military doctrine has emphasized and support for non-state actors to offset India's conventional superiority, though this approach has yielded mixed outcomes, including international isolation and domestic blowback. The first Indo-Pakistani war erupted on October 22, 1947, when Pashtun tribal militias from Pakistan's , backed by regular Pakistani forces, invaded the of Jammu and Kashmir to preempt its Hindu ruler's potential accession to amid communal violence. Maharaja acceded to on October 26, 1947, prompting Indian troop airlifts and counteroffensives that halted the invaders short of ; the conflict ended with a UN-mediated on January 1, 1949, dividing Kashmir along the , with Pakistan controlling about one-third. Casualties totaled approximately 1,500 Indian soldiers killed and 6,000-8,000 Pakistani forces, including tribesmen; UN resolutions called for demilitarization and a plebiscite, which never materialized due to mutual non-compliance. The 1965 war began on August 5 with Pakistan's , infiltrating 26,000-33,000 commandos into Indian-held to spark a Muslim uprising against Indian rule, but local support failed to materialize, allowing Indian forces to repel incursions and launch counteroffensives, including captures in the Haji Pir Pass on August 28 and threats to by September 6. Pakistan's on September 1 aimed to sever Indian supply lines but stalled under Indian reinforcements; intense tank battles in ensued, with both sides claiming tactical victories amid heavy losses—around 3,800 Pakistani and 3,000 Indian deaths. A UN took effect on September 22, 1965, followed by the Soviet-brokered in January 1966 restoring pre-war lines, though the stalemate exposed Pakistan's strategic overreach. The 1971 war, triggered by Pakistan's crackdown on Bengali separatists in via starting March 25, 1971—which killed up to 3 million civilians and displaced 10 million refugees into —escalated when intervened on December 3 after Pakistani preemptive air strikes on Indian bases. Indian forces, alongside Bengali guerrillas, advanced rapidly, encircling ; Pakistan's eastern command surrendered on December 16, 1971, yielding 93,000 prisoners of war and the secession of as independent . Western front clashes were limited, with gaining 710 square miles of Pakistani territory before the of 1972 formalized the ; the defeat weakened Pakistan's military and led to nuclear pursuits for deterrence. The 1999 Kargil conflict saw Pakistani Northern Light Infantry troops and Kashmiri militants occupy high-altitude positions across the in Indian-held Kargil district starting early May, undetected due to winter vacancies, aiming to interdict Indian supply routes and revive talks post-nuclear tests. mobilized 200,000 troops for Operation Vijay, recapturing peaks like Tololing on June 13 and Tiger Hill by July 4 through artillery barrages and infantry assaults, inflicting 400-700 Pakistani casualties against 527 Indian deaths; under U.S. pressure on Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan withdrew by July 14, 1999, marking a Pakistani setback that contributed to Sharif's ouster. The Kashmir dispute persists as a flashpoint, with denying direct involvement in the that intensified in amid local grievances over rigged elections and Indian , but U.S. and Indian intelligence attribute sustained militant operations to Pakistani provision of , finances, and safe havens for groups like and , enabling cross-border attacks such as the 2008 Mumbai assaults killing 166. frames support as moral aid to Kashmiri , yet declassified reports and captures reveal at least 91 camps and logistical networks, complicating peace despite ceasefires like the one violated over 5,000 times by 2019. Relations with Afghanistan hinge on the 2,640-kilometer Durand Line, demarcated in 1893 by British envoy Mortimer Durand and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman to curb Russian influence, ceding Pashtun tribal areas to British India—territory Afghanistan has contested since, viewing it as ethnically unified despite Pakistan's 1947 inheritance and fencing efforts since 2017 to curb smuggling and infiltration. Post-independence, Afghan support for a "Pashtunistan" state fueled irredentist claims, leading to UN complaints and border skirmishes in the 1950s-60s. During the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), Pakistan's ISI orchestrated aid to factions, channeling $3-6 billion in U.S. and Saudi funds to train 35,000-90,000 fighters in camps near , enabling guerrilla successes like the 1985 Panjshir ambushes that forced Soviet withdrawals, though this influx radicalized Pakistani border regions and birthed transnational jihadism. Pakistan's dual policy post-1991—harboring founders from Deobandi madrassas—facilitated their 1996 capture, with ISI providing logistics for 80% of their operations, recognizing the regime despite global isolation until 2001. Post-9/11 U.S. demands compelled to join the coalition, conducting operations against remnants while covertly sheltering leaders like in , sustaining their insurgency via ties; this hedging prolonged the conflict until the 's 2021 victory, which hailed but triggered Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) resurgence, with attacks surging from 267 incidents in 2021 to over 700 by 2023 from Afghan sanctuaries, killing thousands and straining bilateral ties amid refusals to curb TTP.

Regional Histories

Punjab: From Sikh Rule to Industrial Heartland

The , established by Maharaja in 1801 after consolidating power among Sikh misls, unified much of the region under centralized rule until his death in 1839, marking a period of military expansion, administrative reforms, and relative stability that fostered trade and agriculture across territories from the to the . 's forces, comprising diverse ethnic groups including , , and , repelled Afghan incursions and maintained a secular administration, with as the capital, enabling economic prosperity through taxation of fertile alluvial plains suited to wheat, cotton, and indigo cultivation. Following succession disputes and internal weakening, the empire faced British expansion, culminating in the (1845–1846), where British victories at Mudki and Ferozeshah led to the ceding territories west of the , and the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–1849), ending with the decisive British triumph at Gujrat on February 21, 1849, and full annexation of into British India on March 29, 1849. Under British rule from 1849 to 1947, transformed into a key agrarian province through extensive irrigation infrastructure, particularly the canal colonies system initiated in the , which irrigated over 14 million acres by 1947—expanding from just 3 million in 1885—and converted semi-arid western districts into wheat and powerhouses, allocating lands preferentially to loyal Muslim and Sikh Jat farmers to bolster colonial revenue and . This , including the Chenab Canal (completed 1892) and Lower Bari Doab, increased agricultural output fivefold in some areas, with supplying 40% of British India's wheat exports by , while fostering urban growth in Lyallpur (now ) as a planned colonial outpost for processing. The Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 preserved these gains by restricting land transfers to "agricultural tribes," mitigating indebtedness but entrenching rural hierarchies that persisted post-independence. The 1947 partition of Punjab along religious lines, formalized by the Radcliffe Award on August 17, 1947, bisected the province between and , displacing 10–12 million people in one of history's largest migrations and causing economic upheaval as inherited the less-industrialized western half, including key canal headworks but losing eastern manufacturing hubs like . Initial disruptions included refugee influxes straining infrastructure and temporary food shortages, yet the influx of skilled from eastern districts—entrepreneurs, traders, and professionals—provided for reconstruction, with borrowing 160,000 tons of grain from international to stabilize supplies amid severed links. By the , stabilized canal systems and land reforms under the Punjab Tenancy Act enabled agricultural recovery, positioning as 's breadbasket, producing over 70% of national wheat and cotton by the 1960s. Post-1947 industrialization accelerated Punjab's evolution into Pakistan's economic core, with state-led policies under Ayub Khan (1958–1969) prioritizing import-substitution via the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, establishing textile mills in and leveraging abundant cotton from canal-irrigated fields. , reoriented from its colonial agrarian role, emerged as the "Manchester of Pakistan" by the , hosting over 500 textile units by the 1980s that processed 80% of national cotton output into yarn, cloth, and garments, employing millions and driving export growth to 60% of 's total by the 2000s. developed as a diversified hub for engineering, pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods, bolstered by the Green Revolution's high-yield varieties that tripled Punjab's grain production between 1960 and 1980. Today, accounts for 55–60% of 's GDP, with industry (textiles dominant) contributing 25–30% provincially and agriculture 19% nationally, though challenges like and energy shortages persist amid over-reliance on low-value exports. This trajectory underscores 's shift from feudal to dominance, fueled by geographic advantages, post-partition demographics, and policy incentives, yet constrained by uneven and global .

Sindh: Arab Legacy to Urban Challenges

The Arab conquest of Sindh began in 711 AD when Muhammad bin Qasim, an Umayyad general aged 17, led an expedition against the Rai dynasty ruled by Raja Dahir, capturing Debal (near modern Karachi) after a siege and subsequently defeating Dahir at the Battle of Aror, establishing the first Muslim foothold in the Indian subcontinent. Bin Qasim's administration implemented policies of religious tolerance, allowing Hindus and Buddhists to retain practices while imposing jizya on non-Muslims, which facilitated gradual Islamization through intermarriage, conversions influenced by Sufi missionaries, and economic incentives, laying the foundation for Sindh's enduring Muslim identity. His recall and execution in 715 AD did not reverse the conquest, as Arab governors maintained control from Multan to the Arabian Sea until the rise of local dynasties. Following Abbasid decline, the , comprising local Parmar Rajputs who converted to , asserted independence around 1025 AD, ruling until 1351 AD and marking the first native Muslim governance in , with capitals at Mansura and Bhambore, emphasizing irrigation systems and trade. The succeeding (1351–1524 AD), of origin, expanded influence over and , fostering a syncretic culture blending Arab-Islamic and indigenous elements, exemplified by the near , a site containing over 500,000 tombs reflecting 14th–18th century Sindhi civilization through intricate stone carvings and architectural fusion. Under Mughal suzerainty from the 16th century, Sindh experienced nominal imperial oversight interspersed with semi-autonomous rule by dynasties like the Kalhoras (1701–1783) and Talpurs (1783–1843), who developed irrigation canals and fortified cities such as Hyderabad, but faced internal feuds and Afghan incursions. British forces annexed Sindh in 1843 following the Battle of Miani, where Charles Napier defeated Talpur amirs with 2,800 casualties against 6,000 British-Indian troops, integrating the province into Bombay Presidency and introducing railways, canals, and cash crops like cotton, though exploitative revenue systems exacerbated rural indebtedness. Post-1947 partition, absorbed over 1.5 million Muhajirs—Urdu-speaking Muslims fleeing —who predominantly settled in urban centers, transforming from a provincial port of 400,000 into Pakistan's teeming capital until 1959, with Muhajirs dominating bureaucracy, commerce, and politics amid Sindhi resentment over land allocations and cultural displacement. This demographic shift intensified after 1971, with additional Bihari refugees from , fueling ethnic tensions that erupted in the 1980s through the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), advocating Muhajir rights but linked to street violence claiming thousands of lives in by the . Karachi's population reached approximately 20.3 million by the 2023 census, straining infrastructure amid unplanned sprawl, with over 50% residing in katchi abadis (informal settlements) lacking sanitation and facing frequent evictions. persists, with per capita availability dropping below 1,000 cubic meters annually due to overuse, depletion, and in supply chains, exacerbating conflicts between ethnic groups and rural-urban migrants. resurfaced in the 2020s, including targeted killings and turf wars involving MQM factions, Pashtun nationalists, and criminal syndicates, hindering and despite Karachi generating 20–25% of Pakistan's GDP through ports and textiles.

Balochistan: Tribal Autonomy and Insurgencies

Baloch society has long been organized around tribal confederacies led by hereditary chiefs known as sardars, who exercise considerable authority over land, resources, and within their tribes, often functioning as semi-autonomous entities parallel to state administration. This sardari system, rooted in pre-colonial , persisted after Pakistan's formation in , with sardars resisting centralization efforts that threatened their influence, such as land reforms and resource . While some sardars aligned with for patronage, others leveraged tribal loyalties to mobilize against perceived encroachments, contributing to cycles of unrest where local grievances intertwined with demands for greater provincial control over 's mineral wealth, including discovered at Sui in 1952. The Pakistani state, in turn, has at times bolstered pro-government sardars to counter nationalist elements, perpetuating a fragmented power dynamic that hampers development and fuels insurgent narratives of exploitation. The initial flashpoint arose from Balochistan's contested integration into Pakistan. The , encompassing much of the region, declared independence on August 15, 1947, but faced economic blockade and military pressure; its ruler, Ahmad Yar Khan, acceded on March 27, 1948, after negotiations failed to secure sovereign status. This prompted the first insurgency, led by Prince Abdul Karim, the Khan's brother, who raised forces against the accession, clashing with Pakistani troops until his exile to in 1950; the conflict highlighted early tensions over autonomy, with rebels citing forced incorporation despite a prior 1947 standstill agreement. Subsequent phases escalated under centralizing policies: in 1958, Nauroz Khan's uprising against the —merging provinces into a single unit—drew military response, resulting in his surrender and execution of supporters, underscoring tribal opposition to diluted regional identity. A 1963-1969 revolt, involving figures like Sher Muhammad Marri, targeted infrastructure like railways to protest resource extraction without local benefits, ending in amnesty under . The most intense phase erupted in 1973 after dismissed Balochistan's elected coalition government, citing a plot, and launched a large-scale operation involving up to 80,000 troops against an estimated 10,000-50,000 insurgents under leaders like . Triggered by the discovery of Iraqi-trained guerrillas and arms caches, the conflict saw widespread guerrilla tactics, including ambushes and bombings, with Pakistan alleging foreign backing from Afghanistan and India; it displaced thousands and ended in 1977 under Zia-ul-Haq's amnesty, though underlying issues of revenue sharing from gas fields—supplying 40% of Pakistan's needs by the 1970s but yielding minimal royalties to locals—persisted. The contemporary insurgency, reignited in 2004-2005 amid protests over development and military cantonments, intensified after the August 2006 killing of and nationalist in a collapse during an raid, galvanizing groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and (BRA). Ongoing violence since 2006 has involved targeted assassinations, attacks on Chinese interests tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and allegations of enforced disappearances by , with insurgents demanding provincial resource control and demilitarization. Baloch nationalists frame the conflict as resistance to colonial-style extraction, citing Balochistan's 44% poverty rate despite vast reserves, while Pakistani authorities attribute unrest to separatist ideologies and external proxies, including Indian support via consulates in pre-2021. Efforts at , such as the 2005 Aghaz-e-Haqooq package offering fiscal , have faltered amid , with sardars' enduring influence both hindering state reforms and providing insurgents recruitment grounds in undergoverned areas. The interplay of tribal and central overreach has thus sustained , complicating Pakistan's governance in its largest but least populated province.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Pashtun Dynamics and Taliban Influence

, with a of 40.85 million as of the 2023 census, serves as the primary homeland for Pakistan's Pashtun ethnic group, which predominates the province's demographics alongside smaller communities of , Punjabi speakers, and others. Pashtun in the region is organized around tribal confederacies such as the , , and Mehsud, governed by the code emphasizing independence, hospitality, revenge, and collective decision-making through jirgas—traditional assemblies of tribal elders. This tribal structure has historically resisted centralized authority, from British colonial "closed door" policies that subsidized maliks (tribal leaders) to maintain buffer zones against Afghanistan, to post-independence Pakistani efforts to extend governance into the (FATA). The 1893 , dividing Pashtun territories between British India and Afghanistan, exacerbated cross-border kin ties and irredentist sentiments like the movement, fostering enduring skepticism toward Islamabad's control. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 catalyzed militant dynamics in , as the region hosted millions of and became a hub for U.S.-backed via the (ISI). Saudi-funded Deobandi madrassas proliferated, radicalizing Pashtun youth and laying groundwork for ideologies rooted in strict enforcement and anti-Western . Following the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan's alignment with coalition forces provoked backlash from tribes harboring fugitives, leading to the formation of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in December 2007 as an umbrella of militant factions opposing state incursions. TTP, drawing recruits from like the Mehsud, imposed Taliban-style rule in areas such as Swat Valley by 2008-2009, enforcing punishments, banning female education, and launching suicide attacks that killed thousands, including the 2007 . Pakistani military responses included Operation Rah-e-Rast in Swat and adjacent districts from May to July 2009, which displaced over 2 million civilians but reclaimed territory from TTP control, killing or capturing key leaders like Maulana Fazlullah. , launched June 15, 2014, in , targeted TTP and allied groups, resulting in over 3,500 militants killed and the destruction of 900 hideouts, though it displaced 1.9 million residents and failed to eradicate cross-border sanctuaries. The 25th Constitutional Amendment in May 2018 merged FATA into , aiming to extend judicial and administrative reforms, but implementation lagged, with limited infrastructure development and persistent tribal grievances fueling recruitment. TTP influence waned temporarily post-2014, but resurged after the Afghan Taliban's 2021 takeover, with attacks rising from 267 in 2021 to over 800 by 2023, often launched from Afghan soil and exploiting Pashtun cross-border networks. By 2025, TTP controls pockets along the in districts like Khyber and , conducting ambushes that martyred hundreds of security personnel annually, while leveraging Afghan safe havens despite Islamabad's diplomatic protests. Pashtun nationalist movements like (PTM) have protested military operations as abuses, alleging over 30,000 civilian deaths since 2001, though these claims blend genuine grievances with TTP propaganda. Tribal dynamics remain a double-edged sword: jirgas occasionally broker local ceasefires, but segmented loyalties—where subclans feud internally—enable militants to exploit divisions, perpetuating a cycle of resistant to purely kinetic solutions. Effective counterinsurgency requires addressing root causes like and porous borders, beyond reliance on subsidies or .

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