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History of the Soviet Union (1927–1953)
History of the Soviet Union (1927–1953)
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Stalinist Era
1927–1953
History of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union (1917–1927) History of the Soviet Union (1953–1964) class-skin-invert-image
Photograph of Stalin writing at a desk with a pipe in his mouth
Joseph Stalin led the Soviet Union during the era.
LocationSoviet Union
IncludingWorld War II, Cold War
LeaderJoseph Stalin
Key eventsIndustrialization in the Soviet Union
The Great Purge
Holodomor
Kazakh Famine
Spanish Civil War
Polish Operation of the NKVD
Occupation of the Baltic states
Winter War
Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact
Great Patriotic War
Population transfer in the Soviet Union
Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran
Battle of Berlin
Soviet invasion of Manchuria
Chinese Civil War
1944 Bulgarian coup d'état
Turkish Straits crisis
1948 Czechoslovak coup d'état
1948 Arab–Israeli War
Berlin Blockade
Tito–Stalin split
Korean War
Death and state funeral of Joseph Stalin

The history of the Soviet Union between 1927 and 1953, commonly referred to as the Stalin Era or the Stalinist Era, covers the period in Soviet history from the establishment of Stalinism through victory in the Second World War and down to the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. Stalin sought to destroy his enemies while transforming Soviet society with central planning, in particular through the forced collectivization of agriculture and rapid development of heavy industry. Stalin consolidated his power within the party and the state and fostered an extensive cult of personality. Soviet secret-police and the mass-mobilization of the Communist Party served as Stalin's major tools in molding Soviet society. Stalin's methods in achieving his goals, which included party purges, ethnic cleansings, political repression of the general population, and forced collectivization, led to millions of deaths: in Gulag labor camps[1] and during famine.[2][3]

World War II, known as "the Great Patriotic War" by Soviet historians, devastated much of the USSR, with about one out of every three World War II deaths representing a citizen of the Soviet Union. In the course of World War II, the Soviet Union's armies occupied Eastern Europe, where they established or supported Communist puppet governments. By 1949, the Cold War had started between the Western Bloc and the Eastern (Soviet) Bloc, with the Warsaw Pact (created 1955) pitched against NATO (created 1949) in Europe. After 1945, Stalin did not directly engage in any wars, continuing his totalitarian rule until his death in 1953.[4]

Soviet state's development

[edit]

Industrialization in practice

[edit]

The mobilization of resources by state planning expanded the country's industrial base. From 1928 to 1932, pig iron output, necessary for further development of the industrial infrastructure rose from 3.3 million to 6.2 million tons per year. Coal production, a basic fuel of modern economies and Stalinist industrialization, rose from 35.4 million to 64 million tons, and the output of iron ore rose from 5.7 million to 19 million tons. A number of industrial complexes such as Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the Moscow and Gorky automobile plants, the Ural Mountains and Kramatorsk heavy machinery plants, and Kharkiv, Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk tractor plants had been built or were under construction.[5]

In real terms, the workers' standards of living tended to drop, rather than rise during industrialization. Stalin's laws to "tighten work discipline" made the situation worse: e.g., a 1932 change to the RSFSR labor law code enabled firing workers who had been absent without a reason from the workplace for just one day. Being fired accordingly meant losing "the right to use ration and commodity cards" as well as the "loss of the right to use an apartment″ and even blacklisted for new employment which altogether meant a threat of starving.[6] Those measures, however, were not fully enforced, as managers were hard-pressed to replace these workers. In contrast, the 1938 legislation, which introduced labor books, followed by major revisions of the labor law, was enforced. For example, being absent or even 20 minutes late were grounds for becoming fired; managers who failed to enforce these laws faced criminal prosecution. Later, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 26 June 1940 "On the Transfer to the Eight-Hour Working Day, the Seven-day Work Week, and on the Prohibition of Unauthorized Departure by Laborers and Office Workers from Factories and Offices"[7] replaced the 1938 revisions with obligatory criminal penalties for quitting a job (2–4 months imprisonment), for being late 20 minutes (6 months of probation and pay confiscation of 25 per cent), etc.

Based on these figures, the Soviet government declared that the Five Year Industrial Production Plan had been fulfilled by 93.7% in only four years, while parts devoted to the heavy industry parts were fulfilled by 108%. Stalin in December 1932 declared the plan success to the Central Committee since increases in the output of coal and iron would fuel future development.[8]

During the Second Five-Year Plan (1933–1937), on the basis of the huge investment during the first plan, the industry expanded extremely rapidly and nearly reached the plan's targets. By 1937, coal output was 127 million tons, pig iron 14.5 million tons, and there had been very rapid development of the armaments industry.[9]

While making a massive leap in industrial capacity, the First Five Year Plan was extremely harsh on industrial workers; quotas were difficult to fulfill, requiring that miners put in 16- to 18-hour workdays.[10] Failure to fulfill quotas could result in treason charges.[11] Working conditions were poor, even hazardous. Due to the allocation of resources for the industry along with decreasing productivity since collectivization, a famine occurred. In the construction of the industrial complexes, inmates of Gulag camps were used as expendable resources. But conditions improved rapidly during the second plan. Throughout the 1930s, industrialization was combined with a rapid expansion of technical and engineering education as well as increasing emphasis on munitions.[12]

From 1921 until 1954, the police state operated at high intensity, seeking out anyone accused of sabotaging the system. The estimated numbers vary greatly. Perhaps, 3.7 million people were sentenced for alleged counter-revolutionary crimes, including 600,000 sentenced to death, 2.4 million sentenced to labor camps, and 700,000 sentenced to expatriation. Stalinist repression reached its peak during the Great Purge of 1937–1938, which removed many skilled managers and experts and considerably slowed industrial production in 1937.[13]

Economy

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Collectivization of agriculture

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Propaganda shows the use of tractors (in this case McCormick-Deering 15–30) as a backbone of collectivization. Soviet Ukraine, 1931

Under the NEP (New Economic Policy), Lenin had to tolerate the continued existence of privately owned agriculture. He decided to wait at least 20 years before attempting to place it under state control and in the meantime concentrate on industrial development. However, after Stalin's rise to power, the timetable for collectivization was shortened to just five years. Demand for food intensified, especially in the USSR's primary grain producing regions, with new, forced approaches implemented. Upon joining kolkhozes (collective farms), peasants had to give up their private plots of land and property. Every harvest, Kolkhoz production was sold to the state for a low price set by the state itself. However, the natural progress of collectivization was slow, and the November 1929 Plenum of the Central Committee decided to accelerate collectivization through force. In any case, Russian peasant culture formed a bulwark of traditionalism that stood in the way of the Soviet state's goals.

Given the goals of the first Five-Year Plan, the state sought increased political control of agriculture in order to feed the rapidly growing urban population and to obtain a source of foreign currency through increased cereal exports. Given its late start, the USSR needed to import a substantial number of the expensive technologies necessary for heavy industrialization.

By 1936, about 90% of Soviet agriculture had been collectivized. In many cases, peasants bitterly opposed this process and often slaughtered their animals rather than give them to collective farms, even though the government only wanted the grain. Kulaks, prosperous peasants, were forcibly resettled to Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Russian Far North (a large portion of the kulaks served at forced labor camps). However, just about anyone opposing collectivization was deemed a "kulak". The policy of liquidation of kulaks as a class—formulated by Stalin at the end of 1929—meant some executions, and even more deportation to special settlements and, sometimes, to forced labor camps.[14]

Despite the expectations, collectivization led to a catastrophic drop in farm productivity, which did not return to the levels achieved under the NEP until 1940. The upheaval associated with collectivization was particularly severe in Ukraine and the heavily Ukrainian Volga region. Peasants slaughtered their livestock en masse rather than give them up. In 1930 alone, 25% of the nation's cattle, sheep, and goats, and one-third of all pigs were killed. It was not until the 1980s that the Soviet livestock numbers would return to their 1928 level. Government bureaucrats, who had been given a rudimentary education on farming techniques, were dispatched to the countryside to "teach" peasants the new ways of socialist agriculture, relying largely on theoretical ideas that had little basis in reality.[15] Even after the state inevitably won and succeeded in imposing collectivization, the peasants did everything they could in the way of sabotage. They cultivated far smaller portions of their land and worked much less. The scale of the Ukrainian famine has led many Ukrainian scholars to argue that there was a deliberate policy of genocide against the Ukrainian people. Other scholars argue that the massive death totals were an inevitable result of a very poorly planned operation against all peasants, who had given little support to Lenin or Stalin.

Almost 99% of all cultivated land had been pulled into collective farms by the end of 1937. The ghastly price paid by the peasantry has yet to be established with precision, but probably up to 5 million people died of persecution or starvation in these years. Ukrainians and Kazakhs suffered worse than most nations.

— Robert Service, Comrades! A History of World Communism (2007) p. 145

Early Soviet poster: The smoke of chimneys is the breath of Soviet Russia

In Ukraine alone, the number of people who died in the famines is now estimated to be 3.5 million.[16][17]

The USSR took over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940, which were lost to Germany in 1941, and then recovered in 1944. The collectivization of their farms began in 1948. Using terror, mass killings and deportations, most of the peasantry was collectivized by 1952. Agricultural production fell dramatically in all the other Soviet Republics.[18]

Rapid industrialization

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In the period of rapid industrialization and mass collectivization preceding World War II, Soviet employment figures experienced exponential growth. 3.9 million jobs per annum were expected by 1923, but the number actually climbed to an astounding 6.4 million. By 1937, the number rose yet again, to about 7.9 million. Finally, in 1940 it reached 8.3 million. Between 1926 and 1930, the urban population increased by 30 million. Unemployment had been a problem in late Imperial Russia and even under the NEP, but it ceased being a major factor after the implementation of Stalin's massive industrialization program. The sharp mobilization of resources used in order to industrialize the heretofore agrarian society created a massive need for labor; unemployment virtually dropped to zero. Wage setting by Soviet planners also contributed to the sharp decrease in unemployment, which dropped in real terms by 50% from 1928 to 1940. With wages artificially depressed, the state could afford to employ far more workers than would be financially viable in a market economy. Several ambitious extraction projects were begun that endeavored to supply raw materials for both military hardware and consumer goods.

The Moscow and Gorky automobile plants produced automobiles for the public—despite few Soviet citizens being able to afford a car—and the expansion of steel production and other industrial materials made the manufacture of a greater number of cars possible. Car and truck production, for example, reached 200,000 in 1931.[19]

A minimum wage of 110–115 rubles was established in 1937; private gardens were allowed for one million workers to farm in their private plots. Even so, most Soviet workers lived in crowded communal housings and dormitories and suffered from extreme poverty.[20]

Society

[edit]

Propaganda

[edit]
1950 postage stamp: a class of schoolchildren. On a banner on the wall is written, "Thank you, dear Stalin, for our happy childhood!"

Most of the top communist leaders in the 1920s and 1930s had been propagandists or editors before 1917, and were keenly aware of the importance of propaganda. As soon as they gained power in 1917 they seized the monopoly of all communication media, and greatly expanded their propaganda apparatus in terms of newspapers, magazines and pamphlets. Radio became a powerful tool in the 1930s.[21] Stalin, for example, has been an editor of Pravda. Besides the national newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, there were numerous regional publications as well as newspapers and magazines and all the important languages. Ironclad uniformity of opinion was the norm during the Soviet era. Typewriters and printing presses were closely controlled until the late 1980s to prevent unauthorized publications. Samizdat illegal circulation of subversive fiction and nonfiction was brutally suppressed. The rare exceptions to 100% uniformity in the official media were indicators of high-level battles. The Soviet draft constitution of 1936 was an instance. Pravda and Trud (the paper for manual workers) praised the draft constitution. However Izvestiia was controlled by Nikolai Bukharin and it published negative letters and reports. Bukharin won out and the party line changed and started to attack "Trotskyite" oppositionists and traitors. Bukharin's success was short-lived; he was arrested in 1937, given a show trial and executed.[22]

Education

[edit]

Industrial workers needed to be educated in order to be competitive and so embarked on a program contemporaneous with industrialization to greatly increase the number of schools and the general quality of education. In 1927, 7.9 million students attended 118,558 schools. By 1933, the number rose to 9.7 million students in 166,275 schools. In addition, 900 specialist departments and 566 institutions were built and fully operational by 1933. Literacy rates increased substantially as a result, especially in the Central Asian republics.[23][24]

Women

[edit]

The Soviet people also benefited from a type of social liberalization. Women were to be given the same education as men and, at least legally speaking, obtained the same rights as men in the workplace.[citation needed] Although in practice these goals were not reached, the efforts to achieve them and the statement of theoretical equality led to a general improvement in the socio-economic status of women.[citation needed]

Women were notably recruited as clerks for the expanding department stores, resulting in a "feminization" of department stores as the number of female sales staff rose from 45 percent of the total sales staff in 1935 to 62 percent of the total sales staff in 1938.[25] This was in part due to a propaganda campaign launched in 1931 which linked femininity with "culture" and asserted that the New Soviet Woman was also a working woman.[25] Furthermore, department store staff had a low status in the Soviet Union and many men did not want to work as sales staff, leading to the jobs as sales staff going to poorly educated working-class women and from women newly arrived in the cities from the countryside.[25]

However, many rights were rolled back by the authorities during this era, such as abortion, which was legalized before Stalin came to power, was banned in 1936[26] after controversial debate among citizens.[27] Women's issues were also largely ignored by the government.[28]

Health

[edit]

Stalinist development also contributed to advances in health care, which marked a massive improvement over the Imperial era. Stalin's policies granted the Soviet people access to free health care and education. Widespread immunization programs created the first generation free from the fear of typhus and cholera. The occurrences of these diseases dropped to record-low numbers and infant mortality rates were substantially reduced, resulting in the life expectancy for both men and women to increase by over 20 years by the mid-to-late 1950s.[29]

Youth

[edit]
"Foreigners in Leningrad" by Ivan Vladimirov (1937), depicting Young Pioneers

The Komsomol or Youth Communist League, was an entirely new youth organization designed by Lenin became an enthusiastic strike force that organized communism across the Soviet Union often called on to attack traditional enemies.[30] The Komsomol played an important role as a mechanism for teaching Party values to the younger generation. The Komsomol also served as a mobile pool of labor and political activism, with the ability to relocate to areas of high-priority at short notice. In the 1920s the Kremlin assigned Komsomol major responsibilities for promoting industrialization at the factory level. In 1929 7,000 Komsomol cadets were building the tractor factory in Stalingrad, 56,000 others built factories in the Urals, and 36,000 were assigned work underground in the coal mines. The goal was to provide an energetic hard-core of Bolshevik activists to influence their coworkers the factories and mines that were at the center of communist ideology.[31][32]

Komsomol adopted meritocratic, supposedly class-blind membership policies in 1935, but the result was a decline in working class youth members, and a dominance by the better educated youth. A new social hierarchy emerged as young professionals and students joined the Soviet elite, displacing proletarians. Komsomol's membership policies in the 1930s reflected the broader nature of Stalinism, combining Leninist rhetoric about class-free progress with Stalinist pragmatism focused on getting the most enthusiastic and skilled membership.[33] Under Stalin, the death penalty was also extended to adolescents as young as 12 years old in 1935.[34][35][36]

Modernity

[edit]

Urban women under Stalin, paralleling the modernization of western countries, were also the first generation of women able to give birth in a hospital with access to prenatal care. Education was another area in which there was improvement after economic development, also paralleling other western countries. The generation born during Stalin's rule was the first near-universally literate generation. Some engineers were sent abroad to learn industrial technology, and hundreds of foreign engineers were brought to Russia on contract. Transport links were also improved, as many new railways were built, although with forced labour, costing thousands of lives. Workers who exceeded their quotas, Stakhanovites, received many incentives for their work, although many such workers were in fact "arranged" to succeed by receiving extreme help in their work, and then their achievements were used for propaganda.[37]

Religion

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Cover of Bezbozhnik in 1929, magazine of the Society of the Godless. The first five-year plan of the Soviet Union is shown crushing the gods of the Abrahamic religions.

The systematic attacks on the Russian Orthodox Church began as soon as the Bolsheviks took power in 1917. In the 1930s, Stalin intensified his war on organized religion.[38] Nearly all churches and monasteries were closed and tens of thousands of clergymen were imprisoned or executed. An estimated 5,000 to 10,000 Orthodox clergy died by execution or in prison 1918–1929, plus an additional 45,000 in 1930–1939.[39] Monks, nuns, and related personnel added an additional 40,000 dead.[39]

The state propaganda machine vigorously promoted atheism and denounced religion as being an artifact of capitalist society. In 1937, Pope Pius XI decried the attacks on religion in the Soviet Union. By 1940, only a small number of churches remained open. The early anti-religious campaigns under Lenin were mostly directed at the Russian Orthodox Church, as it was a symbol of the czarist government. In the 1930s however, all faiths were targeted: minority Christian denominations, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. During World War II state authorities eased pressures on Religion in Russia and stopped prosecuting the church. The Orthodox Church was, therefore, able to help the Soviet Army to defend Russia.[40] Religions in former USSR republics revived and once again flourished after the fall of communism in the 1990s. As Paul Froese explains:

Atheists waged a 70-year war on religious belief in the Soviet Union. The Communist Party destroyed churches, mosques, and temples; it executed religious leaders; it flooded the schools and media with anti-religious propaganda; and it introduced a belief system called “scientific atheism,” complete with atheist rituals, proselytizers, and a promise of worldly salvation. But in the end, a majority of older Soviet citizens retained their religious beliefs and a crop of citizens too young to have experienced pre-Soviet times acquired religious beliefs.[41]

According to 2012 official statistics, nearly 15% of ethnic Russians identify as atheist, and nearly 27% identify as unaffiliated.[42]

Ethnic policies

[edit]
A poster celebrating the unity of the USSR under Stalin. The writing on the flag reads "Greetings to the great Stalin" (in each of the 15 national languages), the text below "Long live the brotherly union and great friendship of the peoples of the USSR!" (in Russian).

The Soviet Union authorities systematically promoted the national consciousness of indigenous peoples and established institutional forms characteristic of a modern nation for them.[43] In Central Asia the liberation of women was approached in the same revolutionary way as the assault on the religion. In 1927 the campaign against paranja (veil) started, called "hujum" (assault). However, it produced a massive backlash and paranja did not disappear until the 1950s.[44][45]

In 1937, as a part of the Great Purge, repressive “national operations” were conducted. Representatives of “Western” minorities were targeted because of their possible connections to countries hostile to the USSR and fear of disloyalty in case of an invasion.[43]

Great Purge

[edit]
Red Army Soldiers watching a parade on 1 May 1936, at the Beginning of the Great Purge

As this process unfolded, Stalin consolidated near-absolute power by destroying the potential opposition. In 1936–1938, about three quarters of a million Soviets were executed, and more than a million others were sentenced to lengthy terms in harsh labour camps. Stalin's Great Terror ravaged the ranks of factory directors and engineers, and removed most of the senior officers in the Army.[46] The pretext was the 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov (which many suspect Stalin of having planned, although there is no evidence for this).[47] Nearly all the old pre-1918 Bolsheviks were purged. Trotsky was expelled from the party in 1927, exiled to Kazakhstan in 1928, expelled from the USSR in 1929, and assassinated in 1940. Stalin used the purges to politically and physically destroy his other formal rivals (and former allies) accusing Grigory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev of being behind Kirov's assassination and planning to overthrow Stalin. Ultimately, the people arrested were tortured and forced to confess to being spies and saboteurs, and quickly convicted and executed.[48]

Several show trials were held in Moscow, to serve as examples for the trials that local courts were expected to carry out elsewhere in the country. There were four key trials from 1936 to 1938, The Trial of the Sixteen was the first (December 1936); then the Trial of the Seventeen (January 1937); then the trial of Red Army generals, including Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (June 1937); and finally the Trial of the Twenty One (including Bukharin) in March 1938. During these, the defendants typically confessed to sabotage, spying, counter-revolution, and conspiring with Germany and Japan to invade and partition the Soviet Union. The initial trials in 1935–1936 were carried out by the OGPU under Genrikh Yagoda. In turn the prosecutors were tried and executed. The secret police were renamed the NKVD and control given to Nikolai Yezhov, known as the "Bloody Dwarf".[49]

The "Great Purge" swept the Soviet Union in 1937. It was widely known as the "Yezhovschina", the "Reign of Yezhov". The rate of arrests was staggering. In the armed forces alone, 34,000 officers were purged, including many at the higher ranks.[50] The entire Politburo and most of the Central Committee were purged, along with foreign communists who were living in the Soviet Union, and numerous intellectuals, bureaucrats, and factory managers. The total of people imprisoned or executed during the Yezhovschina numbered about two million.[51] By 1938, the mass purges were starting to disrupt the country's infrastructure, and Stalin began winding them down. Yezhov was gradually relieved of power. Yezhov was relieved of all powers in 1939, then tried and executed in 1940. His successor as head of the NKVD (from 1938 to 1945) was Lavrentiy Beria, a Georgian friend of Stalin's. Arrests and executions continued into 1952, although nothing on the scale of the Yezhovschina ever happened again.

During this period, the practice of mass arrest, torture, and imprisonment or execution without trial, of anyone suspected by the secret police of opposing Stalin's regime became commonplace. By the NKVD's own count, 681,692 people were shot during 1937–1938 alone, and hundreds of thousands of political prisoners were transported to Gulag work camps.[52] The mass terror and purges were little known to the outside world, and some western intellectuals and fellow travellers continued to believe that the Soviets had created a successful alternative to a capitalist world. In 1936, the country adopted its first formal constitution, which only on paper granted freedom of speech, religion, and assembly. Scholars estimate the total death toll for the Great Purge (1936–1938), including fatalities attributed to prison conditions, to be roughly 700,000-1.2 million.[53][54][55][56][57]

In March 1939, the 18th congress of the Communist Party was held in Moscow. Most of the delegates present at the 17th congress in 1934 were gone, and Stalin was heavily praised by Litvinov and the western democracies criticized for failing to adopt the principles of "collective security" against Nazi Germany.

Interpreting the purges

[edit]

Two major lines of interpretation have emerged among historians. One argues that the purges reflected Stalin's ambitions, his paranoia, and his inner drive to increase his power and eliminate potential rivals. Revisionist historians explain the purges by theorizing that rival factions exploited Stalin's paranoia and used terror to enhance their own position. Peter Whitewood examines the first purge, directed at the Army, and comes up with a third interpretation that: Stalin and other top leaders, assuming that they were always surrounded by enemies, always worried about the vulnerability and loyalty of the Red Army. It was not a ploy – Stalin truly believed it. “Stalin attacked the Red Army because he seriously misperceived a serious security threat”; thus “Stalin seems to have genuinely believed that foreign‐backed enemies had infiltrated the ranks and managed to organize a conspiracy at the very heart of the Red Army.” The purge hit deeply from June 1937 and November 1938, removing 35,000; many were executed. Experience in carrying out the purge facilitated purging other key elements in the wider Soviet polity.[58][59] Historians often cite the disruption as factors in its disastrous military performance during the German invasion.[60]

Foreign relations, 1927–1939

[edit]
Endorsed by the Constitution of the USSR in 1924, the State Emblem of the Soviet Union (above) was a hammer and sickle symbolizing the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. Ears of wheat were entwined in a scarlet band with the inscription in the languages of all the 15 union republics: "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" The grain represented Soviet agriculture. A five-pointed star, symbolizing the Soviet Union's solidarity with socialist revolutionaries on five continents, was drawn on the upper part of the Emblem.

The Soviet government had forfeited foreign-owned private companies during the creation of the RSFSR and the USSR. Foreign investors did not receive any monetary or material compensation. The USSR also refused to pay tsarist-era debts to foreign debtors. The young Soviet polity was a pariah because of its openly stated goal of supporting the overthrow of capitalistic governments. It sponsored workers' revolts to overthrow numerous capitalistic European states, but they all failed. Lenin reversed radical experiments and restored a sort of capitalism with the NEC. The Comintern was ordered to stop organizing revolts. Starting in 1921 Lenin sought trade, loans and recognition. One by one, foreign states reopened trade lines and recognized the Soviet government. The United States was the last major polity to recognise the USSR in 1933. In 1934, the French government proposed an alliance and led 30 governments to invite the USSR to join the League of Nations. The USSR had achieved legitimacy but was expelled in December 1939 for aggression against Finland.[61][62]

In 1928, Stalin pushed a leftist policy based on his belief in an imminent great crisis for capitalism. Various European communist parties were ordered not to form coalitions and instead to denounce moderate socialists as social fascists. Activists were sent into labour unions to take control away from socialists–a move the British unions never forgave. By 1930, the Stalinists started suggesting the value of alliance with other parties, and by 1934 the idea to form a Popular Front had emerged. Comintern agent Willi Münzenberg was especially effective in organizing intellectuals, antiwar and pacifist elements to join the anti-Nazi coalition.[63] Communists would form coalitions with any party to fight fascism. For Stalinists, the Popular Front was simply an expedient, but to rightists, it represented the desirable form of transition to socialism.[64]

Franco-Soviet relations were initially hostile because the USSR officially opposed the World War I peace settlement of 1919 that France emphatically championed. While the Soviet Union was interested in conquering territories in Eastern Europe, France was determined to protect the fledgling states there. However, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy centered on a massive seizure of Central European, Eastern European, and Russian lands for Germany's own ends, and when Hitler pulled out of the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1933, the threat hit home. Soviet Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov reversed Soviet policy regarding the Paris Peace Settlement, leading to a Franco-Soviet rapprochement. In May 1935, the USSR concluded pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. Stalin-ordered the Comintern to form a popular front with leftist and centrist parties against the forces of Fascism. The pact was undermined, however, by strong ideological hostility to the Soviet Union and the Comintern's new front in France, Poland's refusal to permit the Red Army on its soil, France's defensive military strategy, and a continuing Soviet interest in patching up relations with Nazi Germany.

The Soviet Union supplied military aid to the Republican faction of the Second Spanish Republic during the Spanish Civil War, including munitions and soldiers, and helped far-left activists come to Spain as volunteers. The Spanish government let the USSR have the government treasury. Soviet units systematically liquidated anarchist supporters of the Spanish government. Moscow's support of the government gave the Republicans a Communist taint in the eyes of anti-Bolsheviks in Britain and France, weakening the calls for Anglo-French intervention in the war.[65]

Nazi Germany promulgated an Anti-Comintern Pact with Imperialist Japan and Fascist Italy, along with various Central and Eastern European states (such as Hungary), ostensibly to suppress Communist activity but more realistically to forge an alliance against the USSR.[66]

World War II

[edit]
Common parade of Wehrmacht and Red Army in Brest at the end of the Invasion of Poland. At the center Major General Heinz Guderian and Brigadier Semyon Krivoshein

Stalin arranged the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, a non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany on 23 August along with the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement to open economic relations. A secret appendix to the pact gave Eastern Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Bessarabia and Finland to the USSR, and Western Poland and Lithuania to Nazi Germany. This reflected the Soviet desire of territorial gains.

Following the pact with Hitler, Stalin in 1939–1940 annexed half of Poland, the three Baltic States, and Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in Romania. They no longer were buffers separating the USSR from German areas, argues Louis Fischer. Rather they facilitated Hitler's rapid advance to the gates of Moscow.[67]

Propaganda was also considered an important foreign relations tool. International exhibitions, the distribution of media such as films, e.g.: Alexander Nevski, as well as inviting prominent foreign individuals to tour the Soviet Union, were used as a method of gaining international influence and encouraging fellow travelers and pacifists to build popular fronts.[68]

Start of World War II

[edit]

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September; the USSR followed on 17 September. The Soviets quelled opposition by executing and arresting thousands. They relocated suspect ethnic groups to Siberia in four waves, 1939–1941. Estimates varying from the figure over 1.5 million.[69]

After Poland was divided up with Germany, Stalin made territorial demands to Finland, claiming security needs regarding the protection of Leningrad. After the Finns refused the demands, the Soviets invaded Finland on 30 November 1939, launching the Winter War, with the goal of annexing Finland into the Soviet Union.[70] Despite outnumbering Finnish troops by over 2.5:1, the war proved embarrassingly difficult for the Red Army, which was ill-equipped for the winter weather and lacking competent commanders since the purge of the Soviet high command. The Finns resisted fiercely, and received some support and considerable sympathy from the Allies. On 29 January 1940, the Soviets put an end to their puppet Terijoki Government that they had intended on inserting into Helsinki, and informed the Finnish government that the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate peace.[71] The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on 12 March 1940, with the war ending the following day. By the terms of the treaty, Finland relinquished the Karelian Isthmus and some smaller territories.[72] London, Washington—and especially Berlin—calculated that the poor showing of the Soviet army indicated it was incompetent to defend the USSR against a German invasion.[73][74]

In 1940, the USSR occupied and illegally annexed Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. On 14 June 1941, the USSR performed first mass deportations from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

On 26 June 1940 the Soviet government issued an ultimatum to the Romanian minister in Moscow, demanding the Kingdom of Romania immediately cede Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Italy and Germany, which needed a stable Romania and access to its oil fields urged King Carol II to do so. Under duress, with no prospect of aid from France or Britain, Carol complied. On 28 June, Soviet troops crossed the Dniester and occupied Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Hertsa region.[75]

Great Patriotic War

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Soviet children celebrating the school year end on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, 21 June 1941.

On 22 June 1941, Adolf Hitler abruptly broke the non-aggression pact and invaded the Soviet Union. Stalin had made no preparations. Soviet intelligence was fooled by German disinformation and the invasion caught the Soviet military unprepared. In the larger sense, Stalin expected invasion but not so soon.[76] The Army had been decimated by the Purges; time was needed for a recovery of competence. As such, mobilization did not occur and the Soviet Army was tactically unprepared as of the invasion. The initial weeks of the war were a disaster, with hundreds of thousands of men being killed, wounded, or captured. Whole divisions disintegrated against the German onslaught. Soviet POWs in German prison camps were treated poorly, leading to only 1/10 of Red Army POWs surviving German camps. In contrast, 1/3 of German POWs survived the Soviet prison camps.[77][78][79][80][81][82] German troops reached the outskirts of Moscow in December 1941, but failed to capture it, due to staunch Soviet defence and counterattacks. At the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–1943, the Red Army inflicted a crushing defeat on the German army. Due to the unwillingness of the Japanese to open a second front in Manchuria, the Soviets were able to call dozens of Red Army divisions back from eastern Russia. These units were instrumental in turning the tide, because most of their officer corps had escaped Stalin's purges. The Soviet forces soon launched massive counterattacks along the entire German line. By 1944, the Germans had been pushed out of the Soviet Union onto the banks of the Vistula river, just east of Prussia. With Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov attacking from Prussia, and Marshal Ivan Konev slicing Germany in half from the south, the fate of Nazi Germany was sealed. On 2 May 1945 the last German troops surrendered to the Soviet troops in Berlin.

Wartime developments

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From the end of 1944 to 1949, large sections of eastern Germany came under the Soviet Union's occupation and on 2 May 1945, the capital city Berlin was taken, while over fifteen million Germans were removed from eastern Germany (renamed the Recovered Territories of the Polish People's Republic) and pushed into central Germany (later called the German Democratic Republic) and western Germany (later called the Federal Republic of Germany).

An atmosphere of patriotic emergency took over the Soviet Union during the war, and persecution of the Orthodox Church was halted. The Church was now permitted to operate with a fair degree of freedom, so long as it did not get involved in politics. In 1944, a new Soviet national anthem was written, replacing the Internationale, which had been used as the national anthem since 1918. These changes were made because it was thought that the people would respond better to a fight for their country than for a political ideology.

The Soviets bore the brunt of World War II because the West did not open up a second ground front in Europe until the invasion of Italy and the Battle of Normandy. Approximately 26.6 million Soviets, among them 18 million civilians, were killed in the war. Civilians were rounded up and burned or shot in many cities conquered by the Nazis.[citation needed] The retreating Soviet army was ordered to pursue a 'scorched earth' policy whereby retreating Soviet troops were ordered to destroy civilian infrastructure and food supplies so that the Nazi German troops could not use them.

Stalin's original declaration in March 1946 that there were 7 million war dead was revised in 1956 by Nikita Khrushchev with a round number of 20 million. In the late 1980s, demographers in the State Statistics Committee (Goskomstat) took another look using demographic methods and came up with an estimate of 26–27 million. A variety of other estimates have been made.[83] In most detailed estimates roughly two-thirds of the estimated deaths were civilian losses. However, the breakdown of war losses by nationality is less well known. One study, relying on indirect evidence from the 1959 population census, found that while in terms of the aggregate human losses the major Slavic groups suffered most, the largest losses relative to population size were incurred by minority nationalities mainly from European Russia, among groups from which men were mustered to the front in "nationality battalions" and appear to have suffered disproportionately.[84]

After the war, the Soviet Union occupied and dominated Eastern Europe, in line with Soviet ideology.

Stalin was determined to punish those peoples he saw as collaborating with Germany during the war and to deal with the problem of nationalism, which would tend to pull the Soviet Union apart. Millions of Poles, Latvians, Georgians, Ukrainians and other ethnic minorities were deported to Gulags in Siberia. (Previously, following the 1939 annexation of eastern Poland, thousands of Polish Army officers, including reservists, had been executed in the spring of 1940, in what came to be known as the Katyn massacre.) In addition, in 1941, 1943 and 1944 several whole nationalities had been deported to Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, including, among others, the Volga Germans, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, and Meskhetian Turks. Though these groups were later politically "rehabilitated", some were never given back their former autonomous regions.[85][86][87][88]

"Everything for the Front. Everything for Victory", Soviet World War 2 propaganda poster

At the same time, in a famous Victory Day toast in May 1945, Stalin extolled the role of the Russian people in the defeat of the fascists.

I would like to raise a toast to the health of our Soviet people and, before all, the Russian people. I drink, before all, to the health of the Russian people, because in this war they earned general recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the nationalities of our country... And this trust of the Russian people in the Soviet Government was the decisive strength, which secured the historic victory over the enemy of humanity – over fascism...[89]

World War II resulted in enormous destruction of infrastructure and populations throughout Eurasia, from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans, with almost no country left unscathed. The Soviet Union was especially devastated due to the mass destruction of the industrial base that it had built up in the 1930s. The USSR also experienced a major famine in 1946–1948 due to war devastation that cost an estimated 1 to 1.5 million lives as well as secondary population losses due to reduced fertility.[a] However, the Soviet Union recovered its production capabilities and overcame pre-war capabilities, becoming the country with the most powerful land army in history by the end of the war, and having the most powerful military production capabilities.

War and Stalinist industrial-military development

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Although the Soviet Union received aid and weapons from the United States under the Lend-Lease program, the Soviet production of war materials was greater than that of Nazi Germany because of rapid growth of Soviet industrial production during the interwar years (additional supplies from lend-lease accounted for about 10–12% of the Soviet Union's own industrial output). The Second Five Year Plan raised steel production to 18 million tons and coal to 128 million tons. Before it was interrupted, the Third Five Year Plan produced no less than 19 million tons of steel and 150 million tons of coal.[91][citation needed]

The Soviet Union's industrial output provided an armaments industry which supported their army, helping it resist the Nazi military offensive. According to Robert L. Hutchings, "One can hardly doubt that if there had been a slower buildup of industry, the attack would have been successful and world history would have evolved quite differently."[92] For the laborers involved in industry, however, life was difficult. Workers were encouraged to fulfill and overachieve quotas through propaganda, such as the Stakhanovite movement.

Some historians, however, interpret the lack of preparedness of the Soviet Union to defend itself as a flaw in Stalin's economic planning. David Shearer, for example, argues that there was "a command-administrative economy" but it was not "a planned one". He argues that the Soviet Union was still suffering from the Great Purge, and was completely unprepared for the German invasion. Economist Holland Hunter, in addition, argues in his Overambitious First Soviet Five-Year Plan, that an array "of alternative paths were available, evolving out of the situation existing at the end of the 1920s... that could have been as good as those achieved by, say, 1936 yet with far less turbulence, waste, destruction and sacrifice."

Cold War

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Soviet control over Eastern Europe

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Soviet expansion, change of Central-eastern European borders and creation of the Eastern Bloc after World War II

In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union extended its political and military influence over Eastern Europe, in a move that was seen by some as a continuation of the older policies of the Russian Empire. Some territories that had been lost by Soviet Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) were annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II: the Baltic states and eastern portions of interwar Poland. The Russian SFSR also gained the northern half of East Prussia (Kaliningrad Oblast) from Germany. The Ukrainian SSR gained Transcarpathia (as Zakarpattia Oblast) from Czechoslovakia, and Ukrainian populated Northern Bukovina (as Chernivtsi Oblast) from Romania. Finally, by the late 1940s, pro-Soviet Communist Parties won the elections in five countries of Central and Eastern Europe (specifically Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) and subsequently became People's Democracies. These elections are generally regarded as rigged, and the Western powers recognized them as show elections. For the duration of the Cold War, the countries of Eastern Europe became Soviet satellite states — they were "independent" nations, which were one-party communist states whose General Secretary had to be approved by the Kremlin, and so their governments usually kept their policy in line with the wishes of the Soviet Union, although nationalistic forces and pressures within the satellite states played a part in causing some deviation from strict Soviet rule.

Tenor of Soviet–U.S. relations

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Stalin, during his 70th Birthday Celebration, with Mao Zedong, Nikolai Bulganin, and Walter Ulbricht

The USSR urgently needed munitions, food and fuel that was provided by the U.S. and also Britain, primarily through Lend Lease. The three powers kept in regular contact, with Stalin trying to maintain a veil of secrecy over internal affairs. Churchill and other top Soviets visited Moscow, as did Roosevelt's top aide Harry Hopkins. Stalin repeatedly requested that the United States and Britain open a second front on Continental Europe; but the Allied invasion did not occur until June 1944, more than two years later. In the meantime, the Russians suffered high casualties, and the Soviets faced the brunt of German strength. The Allies pointed out that their intensive air bombardment was a major factor that Stalin ignored.[93][94][95]

Korean War

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In 1950, the Soviet Union protested against the fact that the Chinese seat at the United Nations Security Council was held by the Nationalist government of China, and boycotted the meetings.[96] While the Soviet Union was absent, the UN passed a resolution condemning North Korean actions and eventually offered military support to South Korea.[97] After this incident the Soviet Union was never absent at the meetings of the Security Council.

Domestic events

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Censorship

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Art and science were subjected to rigorous censorship under Stalin's direct oversight. Where previously The All- Russian Union of Writers (AUW) had attempted to publish apolitical writing, The Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) insisted on the importance of politics in literary work, and published content which primarily embodied the hegemony of the working-class values in fiction. In 1925, The RAPP launched a campaign against the AUW chairman Yevgeny Zamyatin. It resulted in the defeat of the AUW, and they were replaced by the All-Russian Union of Soviet Writers, which strictly adopted the literary style of socialist realism. Soviet biology studies were heavily influenced by the now-discredited biologist Trofim Lysenko, who rejected the concept of Mendelian inheritance in favor of a form of Lamarckism. In physics, the theory of relativity was dismissed as "bourgeois idealism". Much of this censorship was the work of Andrei Zhdanov, known as Stalin's "ideological hatchet man", until his death from a heart attack in 1948.[98]

Stalin's cult of personality reached its height in the postwar period, with his picture displayed in every school, factory, and government office, yet he rarely appeared in public. Postwar reconstruction proceeded rapidly, but as the emphasis was all on heavy industry and energy, living standards remained low, especially outside of the major cities.[99]

Post-war period

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The mild political liberalization that took place in the Soviet Union during the war quickly came to an end in 1945. The Orthodox Church was generally left unmolested after the war and was even allowed to print small amounts of religious literature, but persecution of minority religions was resumed.[100]

Stalin and the Communist Party were given full credit for the victory over Germany, and generals such as Zhukov were demoted to regional commands (Ukraine in his case). With the onset of the Cold War, anti-Western propaganda was stepped up, with the capitalist world depicted as a decadent place where crime, unemployment, and poverty were rampant.[101]

The late Stalinist period saw the emergence of a tacit "big deal" between the state and the Soviet nomenklatura and the experts whose status corresponded to that of the Western middle class under which the state would accept "bourgeois" habits such as a degree of consumerism, romance, and domesticity in exchange for the unflinching loyalty of the nomenklatura to the state.[102] The informal "big deal" was a result of World War Two as many of the Soviet middle classes expected a higher standard of living after the war in exchange for accepting wartime sacrifices, and as the Soviet system could not function with the necessary technical experts and the nomenklatura, the state needed the services of such people, leading to the informal "big deal".[103] Furthermore, during the war, the state had to a certain extent relaxed its control and allowed informal practices to exist that usually contravened the rules.[104] After 1945, this loosening of social control was never completely undone as instead the state sought to co-opt the certain elements of the population, allowing certain rules to be contravened provided that the populace remained overall loyal.[105] One result of the "big deal" was a rise in materialism, corruption and nepotism that continued to color daily life in the Soviet Union for the rest of its existence.[103] Another example of the "big deal" was the publication starting in the late 1940s of a series of romance novels aimed at a female audience; a choice of subject matter that would have been unthinkable before the war.[102]

In particular, the late 1940s saw the rise of the vory v zakone ("thieves in law") as Russian organised crime is known who form a very distinctive subculture complete with their own dialect of Russian. Despite their name, the vory v zakone are not just thieves, but engage in the entire gamut of criminal activities. The vory v zakone did well as blackmarketers in a post-war society that suffered from a shortage of basic goods. The crime wave that gripped the Soviet Union in the late 1940s was the source of much public disquiet at the time.[106] A particular source of worry was the rise of juvenile crime with one police study from 1947 showing that 69% of all crimes were committed by teenagers under the age of 16.[107] Most of the juvenile criminals were orphans from the war living on the streets who turned to crime as the only way to survive.[107] Most of the complaints about juvenile crime concerned street children working as prostitutes, thieves or hiring their services out to the vory v zakone.[108] Various economic reforms like Monetary reform of 1947 were undertaken in order to stabilize post-war economy and suppress illegal trade.

The Great Patriotic War despite the immense sufferings and losses, thanks to propaganda, came to be looked backed nostalgically as a time of excitement, adventure, danger, and national solidarity while life in the post-war era was seen as dull, stagnant, mundane and as a time when people put their own individual interests ahead of the greater good.[104] There was a widespread feeling that though the war had been won, the peace had been lost as the wartime expectations and hopes for a better world after the war were dashed.[104] The post-war era saw the emergences of various subcultures that usually in some way deviated from what was officially ascribed (for an example listening to smuggled records of Western pop music), and depending upon the nature of the subcultures were either tolerated by the authorities or cracked down upon.[104] Another post-war social trend was the emergence of greater individualism and a search for privacy as the demand grew for private apartments while those in urban areas sought to spend more time in the countryside, where the state had less control over daily life.[109] For members of the nomenklatura, the ultimate status symbol came to be the dacha in the countryside where the nomenklatura and their families could enjoy themselves far from prying eyes.[109] Others sought their own personal space by devoting themselves to apolitical pursuits such as the hard sciences or by moving to a remote region such as Siberia where the state had less control.[109] Informal networks of friends and relatives known as svoi ("one's own") emerged that functioned as self-help societies, and often became crucial to determining one's social success as the membership of the right svoi could improve the odds of one's children attending a prestigious university or allow one to obtain basic goods in short supply such as toilet paper.[109] Another example of the social trend towards a greater personal spaces for ordinary people was the rise in popularity of underground poetry and of the samizdat literature that criticized the Soviet system.[110]

Despite the best efforts of the authorities, many young people in the late 1940s liked to listen to the Russian language broadcasts of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), leading to a major campaign launched in 1948 intended to discredit both radio stations as "capitalist propaganda".[111] Likewise, the journals Amerika (America) and Britanskii Soiuznik (British Ally) published by the American and British governments were very popular with young people in the late 1940s, selling out within minutes of appearing on kiosks in Moscow and Leningrad (modern St. Petersburg).[111] The German historian Juliane Fürst has cautioned the interest of young people in the Anglo-American culture was not necessarily a rejection of the Soviet system, but instead reflected mere curiosity about the world beyond the Soviet Union.[112] Fürst wrote that many young people in the late 1940s-early 1950s displayed ambivalent attitudes, being on one hand convinced that their nation was the world's greatest and most progressive nation while at the same time displaying a certain nagging self-doubt and a belief that just might be something better out there.[113] The way that Russian nationalism had merged with Communism during the Great Patriotic War to create a new Soviet identity based equally upon pride in being Russian and being Communist allowed the authorities to cast criticism of the Soviet system as "unpatriotic", which for the time seemed to rebuff the elements of self-doubt that were residing with certain segments of the people.[113]

Another sign of a growing search for a personal space of one's own after 1945 were the popularity of apolitical films such as musicals, comedies and romances over the more political films that glorified Communism.[114] The late 1940s were a time of what the Hungarian historian Peter Kenz called the "film hunger" as the Soviet film industry could not release enough films owing to the problems posed by post war reconstruction, and so as a result Soviet cinemas showed American and German films captured by the Red Army in the eastern parts of Germany and in Eastern Europe, known in the Soviet Union as "trophy films".[114] Much to the worry of the authorities, American films such as Stagecoach, The Roaring Twenties, The Count of Monte Cristo, and Sun Valley proved to be extremely popular with Soviet audiences.[114] The most popular of all the foreign films were the 1941 German-Hungarian romantic musical film The Girl of My Dreams, which was released in the Soviet Union in 1947, and the 1941 American film Tarzan's New York Adventures, which was released in the Soviet Union in 1951.[114] The musician Bulat Okudzhava recalled: "It was the one and only thing in Tbilisi for which everyone went out of their minds, the trophy film, The Girl of My Dreams, with the extraordinary and indescribable Marika Rökk in the main role. Normal life stopped in the city. Everyone talked about the film, they ran to see it whenever they had a chance, in the streets people whistled melodies from it, from half-open windows you hear people playing tunes from it on the piano".[114]

As early as the late 1940s, the Austrian scholar Franz Borkenau contended that the Soviet government was not a monolithic totalitarian machine, but instead divided into vast chefstvo (patronage) networks extending down from the elite to the lowest ranks of power with Stalin more as the ultimate arbiter of the various factions instead of being the leader of a 1984 type state.[115] Borkenau's techniques were a minute analysis of official Soviet statements and the relative placement of various officials at the Kremlin on festive occasions to determine which Soviet official enjoyed Stalin's favour and which official did not.[115] Signs such as newspaper editorials, guest lists at formal occasions, obituaries in Soviet newspapers, and accounts of formal speeches were important to identifying the various chefstvo networks.[115] Borkenau argued that even small changes in the formalistic language of the Soviet state could sometimes indicate important changes: "Political issues must be interpreted in the light of formulas, political and otherwise, and their history; and such interpretation cannot be safely concluded until the whole history of the given formula has been established from its first enunciation on".[115]

Terror by the secret police continued in the postwar period. Although nothing comparable to 1937 ever happened again, there were many smaller purges, including a mass purge of the Georgian Communist Party apparatus in 1951–52. Starting in 1949, the principle enemy of the state came to be portrayed as the "rootless cosmopolitans", a term that was never precisely defined.[116] The term "rootless cosmopolitan" in practice was used to attack intellectuals, Jews and frequently both.[116] Stalin's health also deteriorated precipitously after WWII. He suffered a stroke in the fall of 1945 and was ill for months. This was followed by another stroke in 1947. Stalin became less active in the day-to-day running of the state and instead of party meetings, preferred to invite the Politburo members to all-night dinners where he would watch movies and force them to get drunk and embarrass themselves or say something incriminating.[117]

In October 1952, the first postwar party congress convened in Moscow. Stalin did not feel up to delivering the main report and for most of the proceedings sat in silence while Nikita Khrushchev and Georgy Malenkov delivered the main speeches. He did suggest however that the party be renamed from "The All-Union Party of Bolsheviks" to "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union" on the grounds that "There was once a time when it was necessary to distinguish ourselves from the Mensheviks, but there are no Mensheviks anymore. We are the entire party now." Stalin also mentioned his advancing age (two months away from 73) and suggested that it might be time to retire. Predictably, no one at the congress would dare agree with it and the delegates instead pleaded for him to stay.

Post Stalin's death

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On 1 March 1953, Stalin's staff found him semi-conscious on the bedroom floor of his Volynskoe dacha.[118] He had suffered a cerebral hemorrhage.[119] Stalin died on 5 March 1953.[120] An autopsy revealed that he had died of a cerebral hemorrhage and that he also suffered from severe damage to his cerebral arteries due to atherosclerosis.[121] It is possible that Stalin was murdered.[122] Beria has been suspected of murder, although no firm evidence has ever appeared.[119]

Stalin left no anointed successor nor a framework within which a transfer of power could take place.[123] The Central Committee met on the day of his death, with Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev emerging as the party's key figures.[124] The system of collective leadership was restored, and measures introduced to prevent any one member attaining autocratic domination again.[125] The collective leadership included the following eight senior members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union listed according to the order of precedence presented formally on 5 March 1953: Georgy Malenkov, Lavrentiy Beria, Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, Nikita Khrushchev, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich and Anastas Mikoyan.[126] Reforms to the Soviet system were immediately implemented.[127] Economic reform scaled back the mass construction projects, placed a new emphasis on house building, and eased the levels of taxation on the peasantry to stimulate production.[128] The new leaders sought rapprochement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and a less hostile relationship with the United States,[129] pursuing a negotiated end to the Korean War in July 1953.[130] The doctors who had been imprisoned were released and the anti-Semitic purges ceased.[131] A mass amnesty of 1953 for certain categories of imprisoned was issued, halving the country's inmate population, while the state security and Gulag systems were reformed, with torture being banned in April 1953.[128]

Notes

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References

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
The history of the Soviet Union from 1927 to 1953 spans the period of Joseph Stalin's unchallenged dictatorship, initiated by his "revolution from above" that ended the New Economic Policy and imposed centralized command over the economy and society. This era featured forced collectivization of agriculture, which dismantled private farming and triggered famines, including the Holodomor in Ukraine, resulting in millions of deaths due to starvation, deportation, and execution. Concurrently, aggressive industrialization via the first Five-Year Plans shifted resources to heavy industry, achieving rapid output growth in steel, machinery, and electricity but reliant on coerced labor and causing widespread hardship among workers and peasants. Political consolidation culminated in the Great Purge of 1936–1938, a campaign of terror that executed or imprisoned hundreds of thousands of party officials, military leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens suspected of disloyalty, decimating the Communist Party elite and Red Army command structure. In foreign affairs, the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, enabling joint invasion and partition of Poland and facilitating Stalin's annexation of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, and parts of Romania, actions that expanded Soviet territory but aligned temporarily with fascist aggression. The Nazi invasion in June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, inflicted catastrophic losses, with Soviet military and civilian deaths exceeding 26 million, yet the Red Army's resilience, bolstered by mass mobilization and Allied aid, turned the tide at battles like Stalingrad and Kursk, contributing decisively to Germany's defeat by 1945. Postwar, Stalin imposed communist regimes across Eastern Europe, creating a buffer zone of satellite states through rigged elections, purges, and military occupation, while domestically reimposing harsh controls, including renewed deportations of ethnic groups deemed unreliable. Economic recovery was swift in reconstruction, but at the cost of continued repression and inefficiency, setting the stage for superpower rivalry with the United States. Stalin's death in March 1953 marked the end of this phase, leaving a legacy of industrial might forged through human suffering and a vast empire sustained by fear and ideology.

Political Consolidation Under Stalin

Triumph Over Rivals and End of the NEP Era

The culmination of internal party struggles occurred at the 15th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), held from December 2 to 19, 1927, where the United Opposition—comprising Leon Trotsky, Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, and their allies—was decisively defeated. Congress delegates, numbering over 1,000, overwhelmingly endorsed Joseph Stalin's political line, condemning the opposition for factionalism and deviation from Leninist principles; resolutions demanded the opposition's unconditional capitulation, leading to the expulsion of 23 prominent members, including Trotsky's supporters, from the Central Committee and other bodies. This event solidified Stalin's control over the party's apparatus, as his loyalists dominated regional organizations and the secretariat, enabling him to marginalize rivals through bureaucratic maneuvering rather than ideological debate alone. Trotsky, already isolated, faced further isolation, culminating in his internal exile to Alma-Ata in January 1928 and deportation from the USSR in 1929. Stalin then pivoted against the Right Opposition, led by Nikolai Bukharin, Alexei Rykov, and Mikhail Tomsky, who advocated continuing the New Economic Policy (NEP) with its limited market mechanisms to foster gradual development. Bukharin, as editor of Pravda and a Politburo member, initially allied with Stalin against the Left but opposed rapid industrialization and forced collectivization, warning of peasant resistance. By April 1929, following private confrontations, Bukharin was removed from the Politburo and Pravda editorship, while the Right's platform was branded as capitulationist at the 16th Party Conference in April 1929, effectively neutralizing it. This shift reflected Stalin's strategic flexibility, allying temporarily with erstwhile opponents to eliminate threats sequentially, thereby achieving unchallenged dominance over the party's 1.5 million members by late 1929. Parallel to these political maneuvers, the grain procurement crisis of 1927–1928 precipitated the abandonment of NEP, which had permitted private trade and peasant incentives since 1921 but increasingly strained state control amid urbanization demands. In the winter of 1927–1928, procurements fell short by over 2 million tons despite a record harvest of 73 million tons, as peasants withheld surpluses due to fixed low and high industrial goods costs, not widespread sabotage as claimed. Responding in 1928, dispatched OGPU-led teams to , , and the Urals for "extraordinary measures," including house searches, confiscations, and arrests of some 4,000 "kulaks," requisitioning 1.6 million tons forcibly and bypassing NEP's contractual . This "Ural-Siberian method" marked NEP's effective end by spring 1928, transitioning to command economy elements, though formally declared at the 16th Congress in 1929; it exacerbated rural discontent, with urban bread rationing reimposed in major cities by mid-1928. The Shakhty trial, from May 25 to July 6, 1928, in Moscow, further advanced Stalin's consolidation by targeting perceived bourgeois elements in industry. Fifty-three engineers and managers from the Donbas coal region, mostly pre-revolutionary specialists, were accused of sabotage, espionage for foreign powers (including Germany and Poland), and conspiracy with former owners to wreck production; five were executed, 44 imprisoned, and others exiled or fined. While Soviet authorities presented confessions—extracted under duress—as evidence of systemic counter-revolutionary activity undermining NEP-era recovery, post-Soviet archival reviews and contemporary analyses indicate fabricated charges to discredit cautious experts opposing accelerated targets, justifying purges of the technical intelligentsia numbering tens of thousands by 1930. The trial's international publicity, covered by foreign correspondents, served propagandistic purposes, portraying Stalin's regime as vigilant against internal enemies while signaling intolerance for dissent in economic policy implementation.

Centralization of Power and Bureaucratic Control

During the late , consolidated his authority within the by leveraging his position as General Secretary to control appointments and expel opponents, culminating in the defeat of the led by at the 15th Party Congress in December 1927 and the associated with by 1929. This process involved systematic use of police repression to eliminate internal party dissent, enabling to establish dominance over the party's central apparatus. The system, originating in the early but intensified under 's rule, served as a primary mechanism for bureaucratic control by requiring party approval for appointments to thousands of key administrative, economic, and cultural positions. Through this cadre policy, the party—effectively directed by —vetted and placed loyal personnel, ensuring alignment with central directives and preventing autonomous power centers within the state or society. By , this system encompassed a hierarchical list of posts from local to national levels, fostering a dependent that prioritized political reliability over competence. Parallel to party mechanisms, the secret police apparatus, reorganized as the Unified State Political Administration (OGPU) in the 1920s and elevated to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs () in 1934, acquired expansive punitive authority to enforce centralization. Under Stalin's oversight, the monitored and suppressed potential threats within bureaucratic ranks, conducting arrests and investigations that reinforced top-down command structures across government ministries and industrial commissariats. This integration of coercive organs with the bureaucracy minimized deviations, as officials faced constant scrutiny for ideological conformity. The bureaucratic framework expanded significantly during the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), with the creation of centralized planning bodies like to direct resource allocation, drawing millions into administrative roles subordinated to Moscow's directives. By the mid-1930s, this apparatus permeated all sectors, from to , but operated under rigid hierarchies that stifled initiative and amplified Stalin's personal influence until his death in 1953. Such structures, while enabling rapid policy implementation, engendered inefficiencies due to overlapping jurisdictions and fear-driven compliance rather than expertise.

The Great Purge and Mass Repressions

The Great Purge, known internally as the Yezhovshchina after NKVD chief Nikolai Yezhov, encompassed a series of political repressions from approximately 1936 to 1938, directed by Joseph Stalin to eliminate perceived internal threats to his rule. This campaign targeted former political rivals, military officers, party officials, intellectuals, and broad social categories labeled as "enemies of the people," including kulaks, clergy, and ethnic minorities suspected of disloyalty or espionage. Stalin's directives, conveyed through quotas to regional NKVD branches, encouraged fabricated confessions via torture and extrajudicial proceedings, reflecting a calculated strategy to consolidate absolute personal power amid fears of opposition networks. The purge intensified following the assassination of Sergei Kirov in December 1934, but escalated dramatically in 1936 with the appointment of Yezhov as head in September, replacing . Key events included three major show trials in : the August 1936 , where and were convicted of treason and executed; the January 1937 trial of seventeen Trotskyists, including Yuri Pyatakov; and the March 1938 Trial of the Twenty-One, implicating and Yagoda, both executed. These public spectacles, featuring coerced admissions of conspiracy with and foreign powers, served to justify the broader terror while decimating the old Bolshevik leadership. Simultaneously, a secret military tribunal on June 11, 1937, convicted Marshal and seven other high-ranking officers of plotting a coup, resulting in their immediate execution and the purge of approximately 35,000 officers, including three of five marshals and 13 of 15 army commanders. Mass repressions extended beyond elites through , issued on July 30, 1937, which authorized troikas—extrajudicial panels—to arrest and sentence "anti-Soviet elements" such as former kulaks, criminals, and clergy under fixed quotas. This operation alone led to 767,397 arrests, with 386,798 executions and the remainder imprisoned, often in the expanding system. Additional national operations targeted ethnic groups, notably Poles (over 111,000 arrested, with about 85% executed), Germans, and Koreans, under accusations of sabotage and spying. Declassified Soviet archives confirm that total executions during the 1937–1938 peak reached 681,692, with arrests exceeding 1.5 million, though these figures exclude deaths in custody or subsequent Gulag mortality. Party membership was also ravaged, with over 100,000 members expelled or arrested by 1938, halving the . The mechanisms of repression relied on denunciations, often incentivized by career advancement or fear, and NKVD practices of , beatings, and threats to families to extract confessions. Regional officials competed to exceed quotas, amplifying the scale beyond initial intentions, as evidenced by Stalin's later criticisms of "excesses." The terror abated in late 1938 after Yezhov's on November 10, 1938, and replacement by in December, with a decree on November 17 condemning "excessive" repressions. Yezhov himself was tried and executed in February 1940, scapegoated for the campaign's fervor. This phase left the Soviet elite homogenized under Stalin's control but critically weakened the military and administrative apparatus on the eve of .

Interpretations and Historiographical Debates on the Purges

The historiographical debate on the Great Purge, spanning 1936–1938, centers on whether it constituted a premeditated, top-down campaign orchestrated by Joseph Stalin or a more decentralized escalation driven by systemic and local dynamics. Traditional interpretations, advanced by Robert Conquest in The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (1968, revised 1990), portray the purges as Stalin's deliberate strategy to consolidate absolute power by eliminating perceived rivals, including old Bolsheviks, military leaders, and ethnic minorities, fueled by personal paranoia and ideological conformity. Conquest initially estimated up to 1 million executions and broader casualties in the millions, attributing the terror's scale to Stalin's manipulation of the NKVD and show trials to fabricate conspiracies like the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. This totalitarian model emphasizes causal agency residing with Stalin, viewing the purges as an extension of Bolshevik logic rather than mere bureaucratic malfunction. Revisionist scholars, notably J. Arch Getty in Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938 (1985) and co-authored The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932–1939 (1999), counter that the terror emerged organically from party verification drives, regional factionalism, and administrative pressures to root out "wreckers" amid rapid industrialization and social upheaval. Getty argued that while Stalin encouraged purges, the process spiraled due to bottom-up denunciations and quota fulfillments by overzealous local officials, rather than a master plan, with archival evidence showing chaotic NKVD operations and not all victims tied to high politics. These views, prominent in post-Cold War academia, often portray the purges as a dysfunctional response to genuine internal threats, such as Kirov's 1934 assassination and espionage fears, downplaying Stalin's intentionality to highlight structural Bolshevik pathologies. Declassified Soviet archives since 1991 have partially bridged these perspectives, confirming Stalin's central role—he personally reviewed and approved execution lists for over 40,000 cases—while revealing decentralized excesses, such as Order No. 00447's mass operation quotas that led regional officials to fabricate arrests to meet targets. Empirical data from these sources document 681,692 executions in 1937–1938, primarily kulaks, clergy, and Poles under nationality campaigns, alongside millions deported to Gulags, validating high human costs but refuting Conquest's earliest extrapolations. Synthesis interpretations, like those in quantitative studies of purges (affecting 35,000 officers, or two-thirds of generals), attribute the terror to Stalin's preemptive strike against disloyalty amid rising war tensions, enabling bureaucratic renewal at the expense of competence, as evidenced by the 1937 Tukhachevsky affair. Revisionist tendencies in some academic circles, potentially shaped by ideological preferences for structural over personal explanations, have been critiqued for understating Stalin's veto power over chief Yezhov, whose 1939 execution underscored the purges' self-consuming logic. Alternative causal analyses posit modernization imperatives, where terror cleared inefficient cadres for Five-Year Plan enforcement, though this risks excusing outcomes without addressing Stalin's documented directives. Overall, evidence prioritizes Stalin's agency in initiating and scaling the purges, tempered by regime-wide incentives for excess.

Economic Policies and Forced Modernization

Collectivization of Agriculture and Resulting Famines


The Soviet collectivization campaign began in earnest in late 1929, following Joseph Stalin's rejection of the New Economic Policy's limited market mechanisms in agriculture, which had prioritized individual peasant farming. The policy sought to amalgamate private holdings into collective farms (kolkhozy) and state farms (sovkhozy) to facilitate state procurement of grain for export and urban industrialization funding, with the Central Committee's December 7, 1929, resolution endorsing "complete collectivization" in key grain-producing regions within one to three years. By , 1930, Stalin issued a accelerating the process nationwide, leading to rapid formation of collectives; collectivized households rose from 4.1% in 1929 to 58.5% by March 1930.
Dekulakization formed the coercive core of implementation, targeting "kulaks"—prosperous peasants deemed class enemies—for elimination as a social stratum. The December 1929 plenum classified kulaks into three categories: counter-revolutionaries subject to execution or camps; those to be deported to remote regions; and those resettled locally under . Between 1930 and 1932, authorities deported approximately 1.8 million kulaks (381,000 families) to special settlements in and , while executing around 242,000; overall, 5 to 10 million peasants faced repression, including property confiscation and forced labor. Resistance manifested in widespread peasant revolts, with over 13,754 documented uprisings in 1930 alone, involving arson, livestock slaughter (reducing cattle from 30.5 million in 1929 to 14.9 million in 1933), grain concealment, and armed clashes suppressed by OGPU troops and units. Stalin's March 2, 1930, article "Dizzy with Success" temporarily blamed local excesses for overzealousness, prompting a brief decollectivization wave as peasants exited farms, but enforcement resumed harshly by autumn 1930, achieving 62% collectivization by 1932 and near-universality by 1937. Collectivization precipitated catastrophic declines in due to disrupted incentives, mismanagement, and . Grain harvests fell from 73.3 million tons in to 69.5 million in , despite favorable weather, as state procurement quotas—often exceeding harvests—led to seed confiscation and exhaustion of reserves; livestock inventories halved overall, with horses dropping 43% by 1933. These failures, compounded by continued grain exports (18.1 million tons in ) to finance imports of industrial equipment, triggered famines across grain belts, most severely in (Holodomor), Kazakhstan, and from mid-1931 to 1933. The 1932–1933 famine resulted from policy-driven causation, including inflated procurement demands (44% of harvest in Ukraine versus 30–32% elsewhere), blacklisting of non-compliant villages, and border closures preventing migration or aid; econometric analysis attributes up to 92% of ethnic Ukrainian deaths to these measures rather than natural factors like drought. Death toll estimates for Ukraine range from 3.5 to 5 million, with overall Soviet losses at 5–7 million, including 1.3–1.5 million in Kazakhstan from nomadic sedentarization failures; excess mortality peaked in spring–summer 1933, marked by cannibalism reports and mass graves. While some Soviet-era accounts attributed shortages to kulak sabotage or weather, declassified archives confirm deliberate exaggeration of harvest forecasts and punitive grain seizures to crush rural opposition and Ukrainian national elements, though debates persist on genocidal intent versus systemic incompetence. By 1934, coerced recovery stabilized output, but long-term collectivization entrenched inefficiencies, with per-hectare yields lagging pre-1928 levels into the 1950s.

The Five-Year Plans and Rapid Industrialization

The Five-Year Plans were a series of centralized economic initiatives launched by in late 1928 to propel the toward rapid industrialization, replacing the market-oriented with command economy directives managed by the State Planning Committee (). , established in 1921 but expanded under , coordinated national resource allocation, set production quotas across sectors, and drafted detailed blueprints for and output targets, emphasizing to build a socialist industrial base capable of withstanding perceived capitalist encirclement. The plans prioritized producer goods—such as machinery, steel, and energy—over consumer products, reflecting Marxist-Leninist theory that industrial might underpinned proletarian power. The First Five-Year Plan, spanning October 1928 to December 1932, aimed to triple overall industrial investment while doubling coal and steel production, with specific targets including raising pig-iron output from 3.3 million tons in 1928 to 10 million tons by 1932 and expanding electricity generation through projects like the . Implementation involved constructing over 1,500 new industrial enterprises, including the massive steel complex in the Urals, financed partly by agricultural exports and foreign loans, with mobilization of rural labor into urban factories driving a surge in the industrial workforce from 4 million to over 6 million by 1932. Quotas were enforced through party cells in factories, incentivized by propaganda campaigns promoting "shock work" brigades and material rewards, though frequent revisions upward reflected ideological zeal over practical feasibility. Succeeding plans built on this foundation: the Second Five-Year Plan (1933–1937) sustained heavy industry expansion, targeting further increases in coal from 64 million tons to 152 million tons and introducing modest consumer goods production, while the Third Plan (1938–1942) shifted toward armaments and defense industries amid rising international tensions, though interrupted by World War II after 1941. Foreign technology transfers, including contracts with Western firms for turbines and engineering expertise, supplemented domestic efforts, enabling construction of canals, railways, and chemical plants essential for self-sufficiency. By prioritizing quantitative growth through administrative commands rather than market signals, the plans facilitated the Soviet Union's transition from agrarian backwardness to a major industrial entity, albeit with inherent rigidities in planning that often prioritized political directives over economic efficiency.

Economic Outcomes: Achievements, Inefficiencies, and Human Costs

The Soviet Union's forced industrialization under the Five-Year Plans resulted in substantial expansion of , transforming the economy from predominantly agrarian to one capable of supporting large-scale military production by the late . Estimates indicate that industrial labor grew from 4.6 million workers in 1928 to 12.6 million by 1940, with factory output increasing dramatically in key sectors such as machinery and . Gross industrial output reportedly expanded at an average annual rate of around 12-13% during the , enabling the USSR to rise from approximately one-quarter of the U.S. economy's size in 1928 to about 40% by 1955, though wartime destruction interrupted this trajectory between 1941 and 1945. Official Soviet statistics claimed national income growth of 14% annually from 1928 to 1941, though independent assessments adjust this downward to account for inflated reporting and quality declines. Despite these gains, the command economy exhibited profound inefficiencies inherent to central planning, including resource misallocation, chronic shortages of consumer goods, and hidden inflation that overstated real productivity. Soviet planners prioritized heavy industry at the expense of agriculture and light manufacturing, leading to persistent imbalances where steel production surged but consumer needs remained unmet, with output quality often substandard due to rushed targets and lack of market signals. The system's reliance on quotas fostered falsified reporting and waste, as managers prioritized quantity over efficiency, resulting in technological lags in civilian sectors and an inability to adapt to local conditions without bureaucratic delays. By the early 1940s, these distortions contributed to agricultural stagnation post-collectivization, exacerbating food shortages even before the war. The human costs of these policies were immense, with economic transformation enforced through coercion, repression, and mass suffering that claimed millions of lives. Collectivization to extract surplus for industrialization caused the 1932-1933 , with demographic estimates placing excess deaths at 5 to 10.8 million, primarily in and , due to grain requisitions and disrupted farming. Forced labor in the system, peaking at over 2 million inmates by 1940, provided inputs for projects like canals and mines but at efficiency costs exceeding free labor, with mortality rates in camps averaging 5-10% annually from exhaustion, , and . Overall, policies from 1927 to 1953 contributed to demographic losses of 15-20 million from , deportations, executions, and labor exploitation, excluding combat deaths, underscoring the causal link between rapid modernization targets and systemic disregard for human welfare. These tolls reflected not mere implementation errors but the regime's prioritization of output metrics over , as evidenced by persistent underinvestment in living standards despite industrial advances.

Social Engineering and Control Mechanisms

Propaganda, Censorship, and Ideological Indoctrination

The Soviet regime under Joseph Stalin intensified propaganda efforts to legitimize one-party rule, mobilize the populace for economic goals, and foster loyalty to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Central Committee's Agitation and Propaganda Department (Agitprop), operational since 1920 but expanded in the late 1920s, directed state-controlled media including newspapers like Pravda (circulation exceeding 1.7 million by 1939) and Izvestia, which disseminated official narratives on collectivization, industrialization, and anti-fascist themes. Radio broadcasts, initiated with regular programming in 1924 and reaching millions by the 1930s via wired systems in factories and homes, reinforced messages of socialist progress, while films produced by Mosfilm—over 200 annually by the late 1930s—promoted heroic worker archetypes, as seen in Sergei Eisenstein's state-commissioned works like Alexander Nevsky (1938). Posters and public art, numbering in the thousands, depicted Stalin as a paternal figure alongside industrial triumphs, with themes evolving from class struggle in the 1920s to a personal cult by the 1930s, including mandatory portraits in public spaces. ![McCormick-Deering 15-30 The First Tractor Propaganda Shot.jpg][float-right] Censorship mechanisms ensured ideological conformity, with the Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs (Glavlit), formalized in May 1922 under the People's Commissariat for Education, expanding its purview by 1927 to pre-approve all publications, manuscripts, and even personal correspondence in sensitive sectors. By 1939, Glavlit employed over 4,000 censors nationwide, confiscating or destroying millions of books deemed "counter-revolutionary," including pre-revolutionary literature and works by Trotsky or Bukharin; self-censorship proliferated among intellectuals following the 1934 assassination of Sergei Kirov, which triggered show trials publicized as exposés of "enemies of the people." Artistic output adhered to socialist realism, decreed as the official doctrine at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in August 1934, prohibiting formalism or abstraction—evident in the suppression of composers like Dmitri Shostakovich's opera Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District in 1936 after Pravda's denunciation. During World War II (1941–1945), censorship relaxed slightly for patriotic content but intensified against defeatism, with over 500,000 items reviewed monthly by 1942. Ideological indoctrination permeated education and youth organizations, embedding Marxist-Leninist principles as state orthodoxy. From 1927 onward, school curricula—revised in 1931 to emphasize polytechnical education and party history—required daily political lessons, reaching 30 million students by 1940, with textbooks like the 1938 Short Course on the History of the CPSU(B) portraying Stalin as Lenin's infallible successor. The Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Young Communist League), with membership surging from 2 million in 1927 to 4.5 million by 1933, organized mandatory ideological seminars, anti-religious drives, and labor brigades, enforcing denunciations of "deviationists" during the Great Purge (1936–1938). Workplace and military indoctrination, via political commissars in the Red Army (reinstated in 1937), promoted Stalin's "short victories" doctrine, while post-1945 campaigns against "rootless cosmopolitans" targeted Jewish intellectuals, censoring Yiddish publications and enforcing Russocentric narratives. These efforts, while achieving high literacy rates (from 51% in 1926 to 81% by 1939), suppressed empirical critique, fostering a reality distorted by falsified statistics, such as exaggerated harvest yields during the 1932–1933 famine. Historians note that such indoctrination sustained regime stability amid repression but eroded intellectual autonomy, with dissident accounts emerging only after Stalin's death in March 1953.

Education, Youth Organizations, and Cultural Shifts

The Soviet education system underwent profound transformation during the Stalin era, beginning with the of 1928–1931, which sought to eradicate bourgeois influences and cultivate a proletarian through aggressive class warfare tactics, including the dismissal of thousands of educators deemed ideologically unreliable. This period involved mass campaigns to proletarianize universities and schools, with student activists raiding institutions and targeting "class enemies" among faculty, resulting in widespread purges that disrupted academic continuity but aligned education with Bolshevik priorities. By 1931, Stalin's intervention moderated these excesses, shifting emphasis toward technical and vocational training to support rapid industrialization, as evidenced by curriculum reforms prioritizing , physics, and over . Compulsory education expanded to the seventh grade, contributing to dramatic literacy gains—from approximately 51% in 1926 to over 80% by 1939—through state-run likbez (liquidation of illiteracy) programs that mobilized millions into evening classes and factory-based instruction. However, this universal access served as a vehicle for ideological indoctrination, with textbooks and lessons infused with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Stalin's cult of personality, and anti-capitalist narratives, fostering obedience to the regime rather than critical inquiry. Higher education enrollment surged, from 170,000 students in 1927 to over 600,000 by 1937, but access was rationed via exams and political vetting, privileging worker and peasant origins while purging suspect elements during the Great Terror. Youth organizations functioned as extensions of party control, inculcating loyalty from childhood. The All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (Komsomol), for ages 14–28, grew to 4.5 million members by 1933, serving as a recruitment ground for the Communist Party and a mechanism for surveillance, where members reported deviations and participated in purges, including the denunciation of peers during 1937–1938. The Young Pioneers, targeted at children aged 9–14, emphasized collectivism through uniforms, oaths pledging devotion to Lenin and the Motherland, and activities like shock work brigades, with membership nearing universal among eligible urban youth by the 1930s. These groups mobilized youth for economic campaigns, such as collectivization drives, and wartime efforts, but enforced conformity, expelling or repressing those exhibiting individualism or dissent. Cultural shifts enforced ideological uniformity, culminating in the adoption of socialist realism as the state-mandated aesthetic at the 1934 First Congress of Soviet Writers, which demanded art depict reality in its "revolutionary development" to glorify socialism and Stalin. Avant-garde experimentation of the 1920s, including constructivism and abstract forms, was suppressed as "formalist" and decadent; by 1932, the Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP) was dissolved, and non-conformist artists faced censorship, exile, or execution during the purges. Literature, theater, and music were redirected toward propaganda, with figures like Maxim Gorky promoted for works praising Soviet achievements, while jazz and modernism were stigmatized as bourgeois until partial post-war relaxations under Andrei Zhdanov, whose 1946–1948 campaigns further purged "cosmopolitan" influences. This regimentation extended to mass culture, fostering a monolithic narrative that prioritized heroic realism over artistic freedom, though it achieved broad literacy in propaganda dissemination.

Policies on Women, Family, and Public Health

Under Stalin's regime, policies toward women initially built on early Bolshevik efforts to promote gender equality through workforce participation and legal reforms, but shifted toward pronatalism to support industrialization and military needs. The Zhenotdel, the Communist Party's women's department established in 1919 to mobilize women for socialism, was abolished in September 1930 on the grounds that the "woman question" had been resolved through proletarian emancipation, integrating women's issues into general party work. This coincided with rapid female entry into the labor force during the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), where women comprised about 39% of industrial workers by 1932, often in low-skilled roles like textiles and agriculture, driven by state quotas and propaganda emphasizing women's "shock work" contributions. However, this created a persistent double burden: women worked full-time shifts—up to 8–10 hours daily—while retaining primary responsibility for unpaid domestic labor, including childcare and food production on private plots, as state services like nurseries covered only 10–15% of urban children by the late 1930s. Family policies underwent a sharp reversal from the liberal 1926 Family Code, which permitted easy no-fault divorce and abortion on request, to conservative measures reinforcing traditional structures. In June 1936, the Soviet government banned abortions except in cases threatening maternal health, imposing penalties of up to two years' imprisonment for providers and framing the policy as protecting "the interests of the working woman" and preventing "criminal" interruption of pregnancy; this reversed the 1920 legalization, which had made the USSR the first country to permit abortions, amid concerns over declining birth rates during urbanization. Divorce procedures were also tightened, requiring court hearings, mutual consent proofs, and escalating fees (from 50 to 300 rubles after multiple divorces), while alimony obligations were strengthened and bigamy criminalized to stabilize families and boost population growth for industrial and defense needs. Mothers of large families received state honors, such as the "Mother Heroine" award for ten or more children (introduced in 1944), cash payments, and priority housing, reflecting a causal link between demographic engineering and wartime losses, with births encouraged to offset the 20–30 million excess deaths from famines and purges in the 1930s. Post-World War II, the 1944 Family Decree further entrenched patriarchal norms by easing paternity suits but restricting illegitimate children's rights and raising divorce costs, aiming to repair family structures devastated by 27 million Soviet deaths. Public health initiatives, centralized under the People's Commissariat of Health led by Nikolai Semashko until 1930 and successors, emphasized universal free care, sanitation, and preventive medicine to build a "healthy ," but outcomes were uneven due to resource strains from forced modernization. Life expectancy at birth rose from approximately 44 years in 1926–1927 to 58–60 years by 1950, attributed to expanded clinics (from 1,000 hospitals in 1928 to over 7,000 by 1937), drives eradicating epidemics, and maternity protections like 112 days' paid leave and factory nurseries. fell from 180 per 1,000 live births in 1926 to around 80 by 1940 in urban areas, supported by state campaigns against and infectious diseases, though rural rates remained higher due to collectivization disruptions. These gains masked severe setbacks: the 1932–1933 killed 5–7 million, spiking mortality and stunting growth, while purges decimated medical personnel (e.g., 60% of doctors repressed by 1938), leading to shortages and reliance on undertrained staff. policies tied into family incentives, with prenatal clinics and anti-abortion promoting "rational" motherhood, yet the double burden exacerbated exhaustion and untreated conditions, contributing to higher female morbidity in overwork-prone sectors. Wartime (1941–1945) strained the system further, with evacuations and causing temporary drops to 40–45 years, though post-1945 reconstruction rebuilt facilities amid demographic recovery efforts. Overall, health policies prioritized collective productivity over individual welfare, yielding statistical improvements but at the cost of systemic inefficiencies and human suffering from policy-induced crises.

Suppression of Religion and Ethnic Policies

The Soviet regime under Stalin intensified its suppression of as part of the broader ideological drive toward , particularly from the late 1920s onward. The League of Militant Atheists, established in 1925 and reorganized in , played a central role in this effort, organizing anti-religious , lectures, and campaigns to dismantle religious institutions across the USSR. By the early , the league claimed millions of members and aimed to eradicate religious influence through publications, museums of , and public activism, though its efforts often relied on rather than voluntary conversion. The anti-religious campaigns of the 1930s resulted in the closure or destruction of tens of thousands of churches, mosques, and synagogues. Pre-revolutionary Russia had approximately 54,000 Orthodox churches; by the late 1930s, virtually all had been shuttered, with only around 4,225 still functioning by 1939. In 1937 alone, during the height of the Great Terror, approximately 8,000 churches were closed or demolished, and over 35,000 clergy and religious personnel were repressed, including executions and arrests. The NKVD targeted Orthodox clergy extensively, with tens of thousands arrested and shot between 1937 and 1938 as part of the purges, framing religion as a counter-revolutionary threat. This persecution extended to other faiths, including Islam, Judaism, and Protestant denominations, with religious leaders labeled as enemies of the state and subjected to show trials or labor camps. World War II prompted a temporary relaxation of anti-religious measures to bolster national unity, allowing some churches to reopen for patriotic purposes. However, postwar policies resumed suppression, though less intensely than in the 1930s, until Stalin's death in 1953. Mortality among repressed clergy was high, with estimates of 25,000 to 40,000 executed in the 1930s and 1940s, contributing to the near-elimination of organized religion's public presence. Parallel to religious suppression, Stalin's ethnic policies emphasized Russification and preemptive removal of perceived disloyal groups, often through mass deportations justified as security necessities. In 1937, amid fears of Japanese espionage, approximately 173,000 Soviet Koreans were forcibly relocated from the Far East to Central Asia under NKVD Order No. 00486, with significant deaths during transit due to starvation and disease. This was followed by operations against Poles, Finns, and others during the Great Purge, targeting "national contingents" suspected of foreign ties. The German invasion in 1941 escalated these policies. On August 28, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed the deportation of over 400,000 to and , accusing the entire ethnic group of potential regardless of individual loyalty; mortality rates in special settlements reached 15-20% in the first years. Similar operations targeted Caucasian peoples: in February 1944, Operation Lentil deported about 500,000 and Ingush to , with 20-25% perishing en route or in exile due to brutal conditions, exposure, and inadequate provisions. Crimean Tatars followed in May 1944, with around 200,000 exiled on charges of collaboration, though evidence of widespread was fabricated or exaggerated. These deportations, affecting over 3 million people from 13 ethnic groups between 1937 and 1949, involved rounding up entire populations with minimal notice, loading them into cattle cars, and resettling them in remote areas under harsh special settlement regimes. Casualties were substantial, with overall deportation mortality estimated at 15-20%, driven by , , and forced labor; policies also abolished autonomous republics, such as that of the , and imposed Russian cultural dominance to forge a unified Soviet identity. Historians note that these measures stemmed from Stalin's about internal rather than empirical evidence of disloyalty, resulting in demographic catastrophes for targeted nationalities.

Foreign Policy and International Relations (1927–1939)

Comintern Activities and Support for Global Revolution

The Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held from July 17 to September 1, 1928, marked a pivotal shift under Stalin's influence, adopting the doctrine of the "Third Period" in which capitalism was deemed to be in its final mortal crisis, rendering social democracy a variant of fascism ("social fascism") and mandating a "class against class" strategy that eschewed alliances with non-communist left forces. This ultra-left line, endorsed in the congress's program and theses, prioritized revolutionary purity over pragmatic anti-fascist coalitions, directing affiliated parties to intensify attacks on reformist socialists as the primary enemy. The policy subordinated national communist movements to Moscow's directives, reflecting Stalin's prioritization of Soviet security and internal consolidation over genuine global proletarian uprising, often resulting in tactical blunders that isolated communists and facilitated fascist advances. In China, Comintern guidance post-1927 Shanghai Massacre—where Kuomintang forces slaughtered thousands of communists—insisted on maintaining a united front with the nationalists while pushing for urban insurrections, leading to catastrophic defeats like the Nanchang Uprising (August 1, 1927) and the Autumn Harvest Uprising (September 1927), which claimed over 5,000 CCP lives and forced survivors into rural guerrilla bases. Advisors such as Pavel Mif and Otto Braun enforced Soviet-preferred strategies favoring proletarian-led cities over Mao Zedong's peasant-based soviets, contributing to the Jiangxi Soviet's encirclement and the Long March (1934–1935), during which the CCP shrank from 300,000 to under 8,000 members. These directives, driven by Comintern's underestimation of agrarian realities and overreliance on Bolshevik models, undermined local adaptations and served Stalin's aim to control Asian communism amid tensions with Japan. European efforts fared similarly poorly under the Third Period line; in Germany, the (KPD) adhered to Comintern instructions by denouncing the Social Democrats (SPD) as betrayers, refusing a that might have blocked Hitler's appointment as on , 1933, after which the KPD's membership plummeted from 360,000 to near dissolution amid Nazi purges. The policy's rigidity, which equated moderate leftists with fascists, fragmented opposition and enabled the Nazi consolidation of power, costing the KPD an estimated 100,000 arrests by mid-1933. Comintern funding and operatives, including those from the International Liaison Department, funneled resources—totaling millions in rubles annually by the 1930s—into strikes, , and , yet yielded few revolutionary gains beyond temporary unrest. The Seventh World Congress in July–August 1935 reversed course amid rising fascist threats, adopting the strategy to ally communists with bourgeois democrats against , a tactical pivot aligned with Soviet diplomatic overtures to the West. In the (1936–1939), Comintern mobilized the , recruiting approximately 35,000 volunteers from 53 countries to bolster the Republican side, while Soviet arms shipments—over 1,000 aircraft and 700 tanks by 1938—were conditioned on purges of non-Stalinist leftists, including the execution of thousands of members and anarchists in (May 1937). This intervention prolonged the fight but prioritized Soviet geopolitical aims, suppressing revolutionary elements to curry favor with Western powers and prevent a broader European war, ultimately failing to secure victory as Franco triumphed in March 1939. Comintern activities extended to colonial and Latin American fronts, promoting anti-imperialist leagues and peasant leagues via fronts like the League Against Imperialism (founded 1927), which coordinated strikes in India and Indonesia but achieved limited uprisings due to logistical strains and local divergences from Moscow's blueprints. By the late 1930s, purges decimated leadership—executing or imprisoning figures like Nikolai Bukharin and Grigory Zinoviev—further centralizing control under Georgi Dimitrov, yet global membership stagnated below 3 million amid repression and policy whiplash. On May 15, 1943, the Comintern's Presidium, at Stalin's directive, voted unanimously to dissolve the organization, citing its fulfillment of historical tasks but primarily to assuage Allied suspicions during that the USSR harbored ambitions for exporting revolution, thereby facilitating cooperation against . The move, formalized in a , dismantled formal structures without halting Soviet backing for communist insurgencies, which persisted through bilateral channels into the postwar era, though the Comintern's era underscored the tensions between ideological and pragmatic .

Diplomatic Maneuvers with the West and Nazi Germany

In the early , Soviet under People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs emphasized arrangements with Western powers to counter the rising threat of , reflecting Stalin's prioritization of national security over ideological isolationism. This shift aimed to integrate the USSR into international frameworks that could deter German expansionism, particularly after Hitler's accession to power in 1933 and rearmament efforts that violated the . Litvinov's advocacy for multilateral pacts was pragmatic, seeking to leverage Western military guarantees while the underwent modernization amid internal purges. A key step was the Soviet Union's admission to the League of Nations on September 18, 1934, as a permanent Council member, following invitations from 30 member states and endorsements from France and Britain. This entry positioned the USSR to champion anti-aggression resolutions, such as condemning Italian actions in Ethiopia, though the League's ineffectiveness—evident in its failure to impose sanctions—highlighted structural weaknesses in collective security. Concurrently, the USSR pursued bilateral mutual assistance treaties; the Franco-Soviet Pact, signed on May 2, 1935, obligated France and the Soviet Union to aid each other against unprovoked aggression, particularly from Germany, with ratification exchanged on March 27, 1936. A similar pact with Czechoslovakia followed on May 16, 1935, but both were conditioned on League of Nations involvement and hampered by French hesitancy, Polish opposition to Soviet troop transit, and domestic political opposition in France to allying with the communist state. Diplomatic overtures to Britain yielded limited results, with relations strained since the 1927 rupture over the Arcos raid but partially restored through trade talks. Soviet proposals for a broader Eastern Locarno Pact in 1932–1933, envisioning non-aggression guarantees from the Baltic to the Black Sea, were rebuffed amid Western suspicions of Soviet revolutionary aims via the Comintern. By 1938, the Munich Agreement—ceding Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland to Germany on September 30 without Soviet consultation—eroded trust, as Moscow viewed it as Western appeasement enabling Hitler's further ambitions and a deliberate exclusion that undermined the 1935 pacts. Soviet protests emphasized readiness to aid Czechoslovakia if Poland and Romania permitted troop passage, but Warsaw's refusal and Anglo-French prioritization of concessions to Hitler signaled to Stalin the unreliability of anti-German alliances. Tripartite talks in Moscow from April to August 1939 between Britain, France, and the USSR collapsed over disputes on military commitments, with the Soviets demanding 120–180 divisions and air forces for joint action against Germany, while the West offered only expeditionary forces and insisted on Polish consent for Soviet basing—conditions unmet due to mutual ideological distrust and Poland's fear of Soviet dominance. This failure prompted Stalin's dismissal of Litvinov on May 3, 1939, interpreted as signaling a pivot away from collective security toward pragmatic accommodation with Germany, given Litvinov's staunch anti-Nazi stance. Negotiations with Nazi Germany accelerated, culminating in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact signed on August 23, 1939, which included a secret protocol dividing Eastern Europe into spheres of influence—Soviet control over eastern Poland, the Baltics, and parts of Romania—to secure territorial buffers and economic credits (1 billion Reichsmarks in goods) while buying time for military preparations. The pact reflected Stalin's causal assessment that Western appeasement had neutralized anti-Hitler coalitions, rendering a temporary détente with Germany the optimal short-term strategy to avoid two-front war, despite ideological antagonism.

Border Conflicts and Preparations for War

In the late 1930s, the Soviet Union engaged in significant border clashes primarily with Japan along its Far Eastern frontiers. The Changkufeng Incident, occurring from July 29 to August 11, 1938, involved Japanese forces from Manchukuo attempting to seize disputed hills near Lake Khasan on the Soviet-Korean border. Soviet troops, initially outnumbered, launched counterattacks that repelled the invaders, resulting in approximately 792 Soviet deaths and over 500 Japanese fatalities. The conflict ended with a negotiated withdrawal under Soviet pressure, highlighting Japan's tactical shortcomings against Soviet artillery and armor. Escalating tensions led to the larger Battles of Khalkhin Gol from May 11 to September 16, 1939, along the Mongolia-Manchuria border. Japanese forces, seeking to enforce their territorial claims, crossed the Khalkhin Gol River, prompting a Soviet-Mongolian response commanded by Georgy Zhukov. After initial skirmishes, Zhukov orchestrated a massive encirclement operation on August 20, annihilating the Japanese 6th Army and inflicting around 17,000-20,000 Japanese casualties against Soviet losses estimated at 9,000-10,000 killed or wounded. These victories deterred further Japanese aggression in the east, paving the way for the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 1941. Border frictions also intensified with , driven by Soviet security concerns over Leningrad's proximity to the Finnish border, just 32 kilometers away. Throughout 1938-1939, demanded territorial concessions, including a 25-kilometer and naval base leases, which Finland rejected amid fears of sovereignty loss. These disputes culminated in the Mainila shelling incident on November 26, 1939—a fabricated Soviet pretext for invasion—initiating the on November 30. Such conflicts underscored Stalin's expansionist buffer strategy amid perceived threats from fascist powers. Parallel to these skirmishes, the Soviet Union accelerated military preparations through the Five-Year Plans, prioritizing heavy industrialization for defense production. By 1933, annual tank output reached 3,509 units from 170 in 1930, alongside rapid aircraft manufacturing expansion, enabling a shift from agrarian vulnerability to mechanized capability. Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky championed "deep battle" doctrine and mechanization initiatives starting in 1927, advocating integrated armored-air operations to penetrate enemy lines. However, Stalin's Great Purge severely undermined these efforts, with military purges from 1937-1938 arresting nearly two-thirds of general-grade officers and executing about half, including Tukhachevsky in June 1937 on fabricated treason charges. This decapitation removed experienced commanders, fostering paranoia and incompetence that hampered operational readiness, as evidenced by poor performance in the Winter War and early stages of the German invasion in 1941. The purges prioritized political loyalty over competence, reflecting Stalin's causal prioritization of internal control amid external threats, though at the cost of doctrinal innovation and troop morale.

The Soviet Union in World War II

Outbreak of War and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact

![Joint German-Soviet military parade in Brest-Litovsk, September 22, 1939][float-right] In early 1939, as Nazi Germany annexed Czechoslovakia and tensions escalated over Poland, the Soviet Union pursued diplomatic alliances to counter potential German aggression. Negotiations with Britain and France began in April 1939 for a mutual defense pact, but progressed slowly due to low-level British and French delegations traveling by slow means, Soviet demands for transit rights through Poland and Romania—which Warsaw rejected—and Stalin's skepticism toward Western intentions after Munich. By August, with talks stalled, Stalin shifted toward Germany, authorizing Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov to engage Berlin. On August 23, 1939, Molotov and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow, effective immediately and lasting ten years. The public pact pledged neutrality if either party entered war and included economic provisions for Soviet raw materials in exchange for German technology and machinery. A secret additional protocol, revealed postwar, divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence: Germany recognized Soviet interests in eastern Poland (along the Curzon Line, roughly ethnographic boundaries between Poles and Ukrainians/Belarusians), Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Bessarabia; Lithuania initially fell to Germany but was later traded to the Soviet sphere. This arrangement enabled Stalin to reclaim territories lost in World War I and buffer zones, while buying time to rebuild the Red Army weakened by purges. The pact facilitated the outbreak of . On , invaded western using tactics, prompting Britain and to declare war on September 3. With the Soviet threat neutralized, Hitler avoided a two-front conflict. On , 1939, Soviet forces invaded eastern from the east without , encountering minimal resistance from the disorganized Polish already reeling from German advances; Soviet justified the action as protecting ethnic and from anarchy. By late September, the two powers coordinated a partition, with German and Soviet troops holding a joint in Brest-Litovsk on September 22. The USSR annexed about 201,000 square kilometers of territory and 13.3 million people, incorporating areas into and SSRs after rigged elections. Soviet gains extended beyond Poland. In September–October 1939, the USSR compelled Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to accept mutual assistance pacts allowing Soviet military bases, paving the way for their 1940 annexation. Demands on Finland led to the Winter War (November 1939–March 1940), where initial Soviet setbacks highlighted Red Army deficiencies but ended with territorial concessions from Helsinki. The pact's secret clauses thus reshaped the Baltic and Nordic regions, reflecting Stalin's opportunistic expansionism amid ideological enmity with Nazism, which both sides publicly downplayed for pragmatic ends.

Barbarossa Invasion and Early Defeats

Operation Barbarossa commenced on June 22, 1941, when Nazi Germany, supported by Axis allies including Romania, Hungary, and Finland, launched a massive invasion of the Soviet Union along a 1,800-mile front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The German Wehrmacht deployed three army groups—North, Center, and South—comprising roughly 3 million troops, 3,600 tanks, 2,500 aircraft, and 600,000 motorized vehicles, dwarfing prior operations in scale and aiming to seize European Russia up to the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line within months. Soviet forces, reorganized after the 1939-1940 Winter War setbacks and Stalin's 1937-1938 purges that eliminated about 35,000 officers including much of the high command, fielded approximately 2.9 million troops in the western districts but suffered from poor coordination, outdated tactics emphasizing offensive doctrines over defense, and incomplete fortifications along the new borders established by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The invasion achieved tactical surprise despite multiple intelligence alerts from Soviet spies like and British sources, which Stalin dismissed as provocations or disinformation, fearing they aimed to disrupt Soviet-German non-aggression ties; this disbelief, compounded by his purges' erosion of command experience, led to initial paralysis where units received no mobilization orders until after German artillery and strikes had destroyed over 1,200 Soviet aircraft on the ground in the first day. Group Center, under , advanced 200 miles in the first week, encircling and capturing by July 9, where Soviet Western Front forces lost four armies and over 300,000 men in the war's largest initial pocket. The Battle of followed from July 10 to September 10, delaying German progress toward but costing the Soviets another 300,000 casualties and enabling further encirclements that shattered their central defenses. In the south, under encircled Kiev in a from September 7 to 26, 1941, trapping Southwestern Front elements and yielding the Red Army's most catastrophic defeat with over 452,000 prisoners, 884 tanks, and vast losses across four field armies and 43 divisions. Overall, by , Soviet casualties exceeded 4 million, including 3 million prisoners many of whom perished from starvation in German camps, as disorganized retreats, rigid orders prohibiting withdrawals, and the purges' legacy of inexperienced leadership—replacing seasoned officers with juniors lacking institutional knowledge—prevented effective countermeasures against tactics. Stalin's initial response involved executing or demoting commanders like Dmitry Pavlov for the Minsk disaster, but these measures failed to stem the tide of defeats that saw German forces capture Ukraine's industrial heartland, , and approach Leningrad and by autumn.

Turning Points and the Great Patriotic War Effort

The Battle of Moscow, spanning October 1941 to January 1942, constituted the initial major reversal for German forces on the Eastern Front, as Soviet reinforcements, including Siberian divisions transferred after intelligence confirmed no Japanese threat, halted Army Group Center's advance just 20-30 kilometers from the capital. A subsequent Soviet counteroffensive expelled German troops 100-250 kilometers westward, inflicting 250,000-400,000 German casualties against Soviet losses of 600,000-1.3 million killed, wounded, or captured. This engagement exposed logistical overextension and winter unpreparedness in the Wehrmacht, while preserving Moscow as a political and transportation hub prevented potential collapse of Soviet command structures. The , from August 1942 to February 1943, emerged as a pivotal turning point, where urban culminated in the Soviet counteroffensive on November 19, 1942, encircling the German 6th Army and its Axis allies through exploitation of overstretched flanks held by weaker Romanian and Italian units. By February 2, 1943, surrendered the remnants of his force, with 91,000 Germans captured; total Axis casualties exceeded 800,000, while Soviet losses surpassed 1 million. This catastrophe destroyed an elite , shattered Hitler's no-retreat policy, and shifted strategic initiative to the , enabling subsequent offensives that reclaimed southern territories. The in July-August 1943 confirmed Soviet ascendancy, as defensive preparations neutralized German —the last major offensive on the Eastern Front—resulting in a failed pincer attempt on the salient involving over 2 million troops and 6,000 tanks overall. Soviet forces absorbed the assault, then launched counteroffensives like , inflicting disproportionate tank losses (Soviet ~6,000 versus German ~1,500 irretrievable) and ~200,000 German casualties against ~800,000 Soviet. This engagement eroded German armored reserves and operational tempo, paving the way for continuous advances toward . Underpinning these victories, the Soviet war effort demanded total societal mobilization, conscripting approximately 34 million personnel into the Red Army amid staggering losses of 8.7 million military dead and 19 million civilian fatalities from combat, famine, and repression. Industrial relocation efforts evacuated over 1,500 factories and 10 million workers eastward to the Urals and Siberia by late 1941, restoring production rapidly—yielding 105,000 tanks and self-propelled guns by war's end despite initial disruptions. Harsh measures, including Order No. 227's penal enforcement and Gulag labor integration, sustained output but at immense human cost, with causal factors like geographic depth, raw material reserves, and Allied Lend-Lease supplies (though comprising under 10% of Soviet armor) enabling outproduction of Axis forces.

Wartime Economy, Society, and Allied Coordination

Following the German invasion on June 22, 1941, the Soviet government rapidly reoriented its economy toward total war production, evacuating over 1,500 industrial enterprises and approximately 10 million workers to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia between July and December 1941 to preserve manufacturing capacity east of the front lines. This relocation, coordinated by the State Defense Committee under Stalin, enabled the relocation of factories producing 80% of Soviet munitions output by early 1942, despite initial disruptions and losses of up to 60% of pre-war industrial capacity in occupied territories. Soviet gross industrial output fell by 34% in 1942 compared to 1940 but recovered to exceed pre-war levels by 1943, with tank production reaching 24,000 T-34 and other models annually by 1944. United States Lend-Lease aid, initiated in October 1941 and totaling $11.3 billion by war's end (equivalent to about 4-10% of Soviet GDP during the period), supplied critical materials including 400,000 trucks, 14,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, and vast quantities of food, fuel, and explosives that comprised one-third of Soviet aviation fuel and high-octane gasoline needs. These inputs were essential for maintaining Soviet mobility and logistics; without them, rail transport would have collapsed, as acknowledged by Soviet planners, and offensives like those at Stalingrad and Bagration might have faltered due to shortages in automotive and aviation sectors. Rationing of food, clothing, and fuel was enforced nationwide from July 1941, with urban civilians receiving as little as 700-800 grams of bread daily, leading to widespread malnutrition and labor productivity declines, though agricultural output was sustained through forced collectivization and peasant conscription. Soviet society underwent severe strain, with 27 million total deaths including over 8 million military and up to 19 million civilian fatalities from combat, starvation, disease, and repression. Women comprised 53% of the industrial workforce by mid-war, filling roles in factories, mines, and defense production previously held by men sent to , often under coercive labor decrees that penalized absenteeism with imprisonment. The system expanded to provide forced labor for war industries, with prisoner numbers peaking at around 2 million by 1942, contributing to infrastructure like the Pechora coal mines despite high mortality rates from overwork and inadequate rations. Propaganda campaigns emphasized sacrifice for the "Great Patriotic War," boosting morale through appeals to rather than , while was suppressed via enforcement. Allied coordination intensified after the Tehran Conference from November 28 to December 1, 1943, where Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill agreed on Operation Overlord's timing for May 1944 to open a Western Front, easing pressure on Soviet forces, in exchange for Soviet commitments to enter the Pacific War against Japan. At the Yalta Conference from February 4-11, 1945, the leaders delineated postwar spheres, with Stalin securing recognition of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, including Poland's eastern border along the Curzon Line and promises of free elections (later unfulfilled), alongside agreements on United Nations voting and Soviet entry into the war against Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. These pacts facilitated joint strategic planning, such as synchronized offensives and intelligence sharing, but Soviet noncompliance with democratization pledges sowed seeds of postwar distrust, as Stalin prioritized consolidating control over liberated territories through provisional governments and Red Army occupation.

Postwar Conferences and Territorial Gains

The , held from February 4 to 11, 1945, involved Soviet leader , U.S. President , and British Prime Minister [Winston Churchill](/page/Winston Churchill) to coordinate the final stages of [World War II](/page/World War II) in and postwar arrangements. Key outcomes included Stalin's agreement to enter the war against within three months of Germany's defeat, in exchange for territorial concessions such as the return of southern Island and the [Kuril Islands](/page/Kuril Islands) to Soviet control, restoration of Port Arthur as a , and internationalization of . On , the conferees recognized Soviet annexation of its eastern territories seized in 1939—approximately 180,000 square kilometers including areas now in and —and compensated Poland with provisional administration over German lands up to the Oder-Neisse line, pending final peace settlement. The Declaration on Liberated pledged free elections and democratic governments in Soviet-occupied territories, though Stalin subsequently violated these commitments by installing communist regimes. The Potsdam Conference, convened from July 17 to August 2, 1945, featured Stalin, U.S. President Harry Truman, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (later Clement Attlee), focusing on Germany's occupation, demilitarization, and reparations, as well as Polish borders. It confirmed the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western boundary, endorsing the expulsion of up to 12 million ethnic Germans from former German territories ceded to Poland and the Soviet Union, which received northern East Prussia including Königsberg (renamed Kaliningrad) as an exclave. Germany was divided into four occupation zones (Soviet, American, British, French), with Berlin similarly partitioned, facilitating Soviet control over eastern Germany. Reparations arrangements allowed the Soviet Union to claim equipment and resources from its zone plus 10% of industrial capital from western zones, bolstering postwar reconstruction amid 27 million Soviet deaths and widespread devastation. These conferences ratified Soviet territorial expansions totaling over 500,000 square kilometers, including the 1940 annexations of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, covering 175,000 square kilometers) reoccupied in 1944–1945 without Western recognition of their legitimacy. From Finland, the 1944 armistice—upheld postwar—ceded the Karelian Isthmus (45,000 square kilometers) and other border areas, while Romania's Bessarabia (now Moldova, 44,000 square kilometers) and northern Bukovina were retained from 1940 seizures. Against Japan, following the August 8, 1945, declaration of war and surrender, the Soviet Union annexed southern Sakhalin (36,000 square kilometers) and the Kuril Islands chain. These gains, secured through Red Army advances and Allied concessions acknowledging Soviet military contributions, established a buffer zone of satellite states in Eastern Europe while extending direct Soviet borders to the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, and Pacific.

Emergence of the Cold War and Postwar Domestic Affairs

Imposition of Soviet Control in Eastern Europe

Following the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945, the Red Army's occupation of Eastern Europe enabled the Soviet Union to install communist regimes across the region, ostensibly as a defensive buffer against potential Western aggression but effectively extending Moscow's ideological and political dominance. Soviet military presence, numbering over 500,000 troops in key areas by mid-1945, facilitated the empowerment of local communist parties through provisional governments and security apparatuses modeled on NKVD structures. These forces suppressed anti-communist elements, including former resistance fighters and democratic politicians, via arrests, executions, and deportations estimated in the tens of thousands across Poland, Hungary, and Romania alone. In Poland, Soviet influence began with the establishment of the Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin on July 22, 1944, which evolved into the Provisional Government of National Unity after the Yalta Conference in February 1945. A national referendum on June 30, 1946, purportedly approved government reforms with 90.6% support for nationalization and land reform, but ballot stuffing, intimidation by Soviet-backed security forces, and falsified counts—evidenced by discrepancies in rural versus urban tallies and witness testimonies—indicated actual approval closer to 50-60%. The subsequent parliamentary elections on January 19, 1947, allocated 80.1% of seats to the communist-led Democratic Bloc amid opposition arrests, media censorship, and voter suppression, consolidating one-party rule under Bolesław Bierut. Hungary exemplified gradual subversion through "salami tactics," a term coined by communist leader to describe slicing away opposition layers incrementally. After 1945 coalition elections yielding communists only 17% of votes, Soviet advisors orchestrated the dissolution of rival parties via coerced mergers, arrests of leaders like Smallholders' Party figures, and rigged 1947 elections that awarded 60% to the Independence People's Front despite evident fraud including invalid ballots exceeding opposition totals in . By 1948, Rákosi's government nationalized industry and agriculture, purging non-compliant elements in show trials that executed or imprisoned thousands. Czechoslovakia's takeover occurred via a swift coup from February 20-25, 1948, after communists, holding 38% from fair 1946 elections, resigned cabinet ministers to provoke crisis and mobilized armed workers' militias—numbering 15,000—to seize non-communist ministries and media. President , facing strikes and implicit Soviet threats, accepted the resignations, enabling Klement Gottwald's monopoly on power; Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had pre-approved the action in consultations. Parallel processes in (1946 rigged elections), (1946 communist dominance post-coalition purge), and the formation of the German Democratic Republic in October 1949 from Soviet-occupied zones completed the satellite network by 1949, reinforced by the Cominform's founding in September 1947 for ideological coordination and in January 1949 for economic subordination. These regimes aligned with Stalin's directives, suppressing dissent through Soviet-style security organs that conducted purges eliminating perceived "Titoists" or nationalists, with death tolls from exceeding 100,000 region-wide by 1953.

Escalating Tensions with the United States

Following the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, where Allied leaders agreed on principles for postwar Europe including free elections in liberated territories, Soviet authorities established communist governments in Poland, Romania, and other Eastern European states without permitting genuine multiparty contests, prompting U.S. policymakers to reassess cooperation with Moscow. This shift crystallized in George Kennan's February 22, 1946, "Long Telegram," which analyzed Soviet ideology as inherently expansionist and advocated a U.S. strategy of firm containment to counter it without direct military confrontation. Soviet leaders, viewing such analyses as ideological warfare, intensified their consolidation of the Eastern Bloc through organizations like the Cominform, established on September 22, 1947, to align communist parties against perceived Western imperialism. The , announced on March 12, 1947, marked a formal U.S. commitment to support nations resisting communist subversion, providing $400 million in aid to and amid Soviet demands for territorial concessions and influence in the latter. Soviet Foreign Minister denounced the doctrine as an aggressive intervention violating international norms, though had withdrawn support for Greek communists and pressured only after initial territorial claims in 1945. This was followed by George Marshall's June 5, 1947, proposal for economic recovery aid to war-devastated Europe, extended to Soviet satellites but rejected by on July 2, 1947, which then coerced allies like and to decline participation, fearing economic dependence on the West would undermine Stalinist control. The U.S.-led plan ultimately aided 16 Western European nations with over $13 billion, bolstering anti-communist stability while highlighting the ideological economic divide. Tensions peaked with the , initiated by Soviet forces on June 24, 1948, in response to Western Allies' introduction of a new in their occupation zones and the formation of the of (Bizonia merged into Trizonia). Stalin aimed to expel Western presence from , an enclave deep in the Soviet zone, by halting all rail, road, and canal access, leaving 2.5 million West Berliners at risk of starvation. The U.S. and British mounted the Berlin Airlift from June 1948 to May 1949, delivering over 2.3 million tons of supplies via 278,000 flights without armed escalation, forcing Stalin to lift the blockade on May 12, 1949, after it failed to achieve its objectives and instead unified Western resolve. In reaction to ongoing Soviet actions, including the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the United States and 11 other nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, establishing NATO as a collective defense pact under Article 5, which deemed an attack on one member an attack on all, explicitly to deter further expansionism. Soviet propaganda portrayed NATO as an offensive encirclement, though declassified records indicate Moscow's prior aggressions, such as the Berlin crisis, directly spurred its creation rather than vice versa. Escalation intensified on August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic device, RDS-1, at Semipalatinsk, ending the U.S. nuclear monopoly four years ahead of American intelligence estimates and, aided by espionage from figures like the Rosenbergs, triggering a U.S. push for hydrogen bomb development. These developments entrenched mutual suspicion, with Stalin accelerating military buildups and purging perceived internal threats amid fears of capitalist encirclement.

The Korean War and Proxy Conflicts

The Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces, led by Kim Il-sung, launched a full-scale invasion across the 38th parallel into , an action that had received prior approval from following consultations with . Stalin had initially deferred Kim's repeated requests for support in unifying Korea by force during meetings in 1949, citing the need for caution amid U.S. presence in the region, but reversed course in early 1950 after Mao's communists secured victory in , viewing the opportunity to expand Soviet influence in Asia without direct confrontation. Declassified Soviet documents reveal Stalin's strategic calculus: he conditioned approval on Chinese commitment to intervene if necessary and ensured Soviet involvement remained deniable, supplying North Korea with tanks, artillery, and aircraft while framing the conflict as a local unification effort rather than communist expansion. Soviet support extended covertly into the war itself, including diplomatic maneuvers such as the USSR's boycott of the United Nations Security Council in January 1950 over Taiwan's representation, which enabled UN authorization of forces to repel the invasion without Soviet veto. Militarily, the USSR provided over 70% of North Korea's pre-war arsenal through 1949–1950 transfers, including T-34 tanks and Yak fighters, and later funneled aid to Chinese "volunteers" after their entry in October 1950. In the air campaign, Soviet pilots from the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, operating MiG-15 jets from bases in China and the Soviet Maritime Province, engaged U.S. aircraft in "MiG Alley" along the Yalu River, accounting for a significant portion of UN air losses—estimated at up to 1,100 sorties daily by late 1951—while suffering around 300 pilots killed, their identities concealed by flying in Chinese-marked aircraft and under foreign aliases to avert escalation into direct superpower war. This conflict exemplified Stalin-era proxy warfare, where the USSR avoided overt troop commitments to prevent nuclear confrontation with the , instead leveraging client states like and to probe Western resolve and advance ideological goals. Stalin's correspondence with Kim in 1950–1951 urged persistence despite setbacks, including after U.S. landings at Inchon in September 1950, reflecting a calculated risk to tie down American resources in amid European tensions. The war persisted as a until Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, after which his successors accelerated talks, culminating in the July 27, 1953, agreement that restored the pre-war boundary, leaving Korea divided and over 2.5 million dead, with Soviet backing having prolonged the fighting without achieving unification. Beyond Korea, Soviet proxies in the late 1940s included material aid to Greek communists during their 1946–1949 civil and early support for Ho Chi Minh's against French forces starting in 1946, though these were secondary to the Korean theater's scale and direct Stalin oversight.

Postwar Reconstruction, Purges, and Cultural Campaigns

The Soviet Union emerged from World War II with catastrophic destruction: approximately 1,710 cities and towns ruined, over 70,000 villages burned, and 32,000 industrial enterprises lost, alongside the deaths of about 27 million people. Reconstruction prioritized rapid restoration of the economy through the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–1950), allocating 88% of investments to heavy industry and transportation to rebuild the fuel-energy base and military-industrial capacity. By 1950, gross industrial output exceeded 1940 levels by 73%, with steel production reaching 27 million tons annually, though consumer goods and housing lagged severely, leaving 25 million homeless. Agricultural recovery faltered due to war damage, labor shortages, and a devastating in 1946, triggering the of 1946–1947 that killed 1 to 2 million, mainly in , , and the . Crop yields plummeted to 46% of 1940 levels in 1946, compounded by state grain procurements that exported food abroad despite domestic shortages, reflecting centralized planning's prioritization of industrial goals over rural welfare. Forced labor from the and demobilized soldiers supplemented rebuilding efforts, enabling urban industrialization but entrenching coercion in the economy. To preempt challenges to his authority amid postwar shifts, Stalin orchestrated purges targeting perceived rivals. The (1949–1950) accused wartime city leaders of separatism and economic sabotage, leading to the execution of Politburo member , Central Committee secretary Aleksei , and at least 23 senior officials, with thousands more arrested, demoted, or exiled. Fabricated charges masked Stalin's elimination of independent figures who had gained prominence during the siege of Leningrad, ensuring loyalty through terror rather than merit. Cultural campaigns reinforced ideological conformity, beginning with Andrei Zhdanov's 1946–1948 crackdown—known as Zhdanovshchina—against "decadent" arts influenced by the West. Composers like Dmitri Shostakovich and poets like Anna Akhmatova faced public denunciations for formalism, while theaters and journals were purged of "cosmopolitans" favoring foreign aesthetics over socialist realism. The subsequent anti-cosmopolitan drive (1948–1953) escalated, disproportionately targeting Jewish intellectuals as "rootless" elements, resulting in thousands dismissed, imprisoned, or executed for alleged disloyalty. This fused with xenophobia, culminating in the January 1953 Doctors' Plot, accusing nine mostly Jewish physicians of plotting assassinations via medical malpractice, which incited pogrom-like threats before Stalin's death intervened. These efforts aimed to insulate Soviet culture from external ideas, prioritizing Russocentric propaganda to sustain regime control.

Stalin's Final Years and Death

Following the end of , 's health began to decline noticeably, marked by a series of strokes starting in 1945, attributed to untreated and exacerbated by heavy . By the late , his physical deterioration included limited mobility and slurred speech, yet he retained firm control over Soviet policy and personnel decisions. Stalin's paranoia intensified during this period, leading to renewed purges targeting perceived internal threats. The of 1949 involved the arrest and execution of prominent Leningrad Party officials, including Aleksei Kuznetsov and , on fabricated charges of sabotage, treason, and plotting against the central government; at least 23 high-ranking figures were executed, with hundreds more imprisoned or demoted. This campaign eliminated potential rivals and consolidated Moscow's dominance over regional power centers. Similarly, the from 1951 to 1952 targeted ethnic Mingrelians in Georgia, particularly officials, accusing them of nationalist conspiracies and economic corruption; thousands were arrested, deported, or purged, reflecting Stalin's efforts to curb regional ethnic influences, including those linked to . In January 1953, Stalin orchestrated the Doctors' Plot, arresting nine prominent physicians—six of them Jewish—on allegations of conspiring to assassinate Soviet leaders through deliberate medical malpractice. State media, including Pravda, publicized the charges, framing the accused as part of a broader "Zionist" and Western-backed network; this campaign fueled antisemitic rhetoric and raised fears of mass deportations of Jews from major cities. The plot was later acknowledged as fabricated after Stalin's death, with the arrests annulled in April 1953 due to lack of evidence. On the night of February 28–March 1, 1953, after a gathering at his Kuntsevo dacha near , Stalin suffered a severe cerebral hemorrhage, likely precipitated by his and prior . He was discovered unconscious on the floor the next morning but received no immediate medical attention, as guards hesitated to enter without permission; doctors were not summoned until hours later, contributing to suspicions of deliberate neglect by his inner circle. Stalin died on March 5, 1953, at age 74, with the official confirming from a massive brain hemorrhage without evidence of external trauma or poisoning. While some analyses have speculated on warfarin poisoning based on symptoms like , forensic reviews emphasize natural causes amid the delayed response, which may have worsened his outcome. His triggered a power struggle among successors, including , , and Beria, marking the end of his absolute rule.

References

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