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Kriegsmarine
Kriegsmarine
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Kriegsmarine
Helmet decal of Kriegsmarine
Founded21 May 1935; 90 years ago (1935-05-21)
Disbanded20 September 1945; 80 years ago (1945-09-20)
Country Germany
Allegiance Adolf Hitler[1]
BranchWehrmacht
TypeNavy
Size810,000 peak in 1944[2]
1,500,000 (total 1939–45)
Part ofWehrmacht
EngagementsSpanish Civil War (1936–1939)
World War II (1939–1945)
Commanders
OKMSee list
Notable
commanders
Erich Raeder
Karl Dönitz
Insignia
War ensign
(1935–1938)
War ensign
(1938–1945)
Land flag

The Kriegsmarine (German pronunciation: [ˈkʁiːksmaˌʁiːnə], lit.'War Navy') was the navy of Nazi Germany from 1935 to 1945. It superseded the Imperial German Navy of the German Empire (1871–1918) and the inter-war Reichsmarine (1919–1935) of the Weimar Republic. The Kriegsmarine was one of three official branches, along with the Heer and the Luftwaffe, of the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces from 1935 to 1945.

In violation of the Treaty of Versailles, the Kriegsmarine grew rapidly during the German naval rearmament in the 1930s. The 1919 treaty had limited the size of the German navy and prohibited the building of submarines.[3]

Kriegsmarine ships were deployed to the waters around Spain during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) under the guise of enforcing non-intervention, but in reality supporting the Nationalists against the Spanish Republicans.

In January 1939, Plan Z, a massive shipbuilding programme, was ordered, calling for surface naval parity with the British Royal Navy by 1944. When World War II broke out in September 1939, Plan Z was shelved in favour of a crash building programme for submarines (U-boats) instead of capital surface warships, and land and air forces were given priority of strategic resources.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine (as for all branches of the armed forces during the period of absolute Nazi power) was Adolf Hitler, who exercised his authority through the Oberkommando der Marine ('High Command of the Navy').

Among the Kriegsmarine's most significant ships were its U-boats, most of which were constructed after Plan Z was abandoned at the beginning of World War II. Wolfpacks were rapidly assembled groups of submarines which attacked British convoys during the first half of the Battle of the Atlantic, but this tactic was largely abandoned by May 1943, when U-boat losses mounted. Along with the U-boats, surface commerce raiders (including auxiliary cruisers) were used to disrupt Allied shipping in the early years of the war, the most famous of these being the heavy cruisers Admiral Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer and the battleship Bismarck. However, the adoption of convoy escorts, especially in the Atlantic, greatly reduced the effectiveness of surface commerce raiders against convoys.

Following the end of World War II in 1945, the Kriegsmarine's remaining ships were divided up among the Allied powers and were used for various purposes including minesweeping. Some were loaded with superfluous chemical weapons and scuttled.[4]

History

[edit]

Post–World War I origins

[edit]

Under the terms of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, Germany was only allowed a minimal navy of 15,000 personnel, six capital ships of no more than 10,000 tons, six cruisers, twelve destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, and no submarines or aircraft carriers. Military aircraft were also banned, so Germany could have no naval aviation. Under the treaty Germany could only build new ships to replace old ones. All the ships allowed and personnel were taken over from the Kaiserliche Marine, which was renamed the Reichsmarine.

From the outset, Germany worked to circumvent the military restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles. The Germans continued to develop U-boats through a submarine design office in the Netherlands (NV Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw) and a torpedo research program in Sweden where the G7e torpedo was developed.[5]

Even before the Nazi seizure of power on 30 January 1933 the German government decided on 15 November 1932 to launch a prohibited naval re-armament program that included U-boats, airplanes, and an aircraft carrier.

The launching of the first pocket battleship, Deutschland in 1931 (as a replacement for the old pre-dreadnought battleship Preussen) was a step in the formation of a modern German fleet. The building of the Deutschland caused consternation among the French and the British as they had expected that the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles would limit the replacement of the pre-dreadnought battleships to coastal defence ships, suitable only for defensive warfare. By using innovative construction techniques, the Germans had built a heavy ship suitable for offensive warfare on the high seas while still abiding by the letter of the treaty.

Nazi control

[edit]
Erich Raeder, commander of the Kriegsmarine until 1943

When the Nazis came to power in 1933, Hitler soon began to more brazenly ignore many of the Treaty restrictions and accelerated German naval rearmament. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935 allowed Germany to build a navy equivalent to 35% of the British surface ship tonnage and 45% of British submarine tonnage; battleships were to be limited to 35,000 tons. That same year the Reichsmarine was renamed as the Kriegsmarine. In April 1939, as tensions escalated between the United Kingdom and Germany over Poland, Hitler unilaterally rescinded the restrictions of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

The building-up of the German fleet in the time period of 1935–1939 was slowed by problems with marshaling enough manpower and material for ship building. This was because of the simultaneous and rapid build-up of the German Army and Air Force which demanded substantial effort and resources. Some projects, like the D-class cruisers and the P-class cruisers, had to be cancelled.

Spanish Civil War

[edit]

The first military action of the Kriegsmarine came during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Following the outbreak of hostilities in July 1936 several large warships of the German fleet were sent to the region. The heavy cruisers Deutschland and Admiral Scheer, and the light cruiser Köln were the first to be sent in July 1936. These large ships were accompanied by the 2nd Torpedo-boat Flotilla. The German presence was used to covertly support Francisco Franco's Nationalists although the immediate involvement of the Deutschland was humanitarian relief operations and evacuating 9,300 refugees, including 4,550 German citizens. Following the brokering of the International Non-Intervention Patrol to enforce an international arms embargo, the Kriegsmarine was allotted the patrol area between Cabo de Gata (Almeria) and Cabo de Oropesa. Numerous vessels served as part of these duties including Admiral Graf Spee. On 29 May 1937 the Deutschland was attacked off Ibiza by two bombers from the Republican Air Force. Total casualties from the Republican attack were 31 dead and 110 wounded, 71 seriously, mostly burn victims. In retaliation the Admiral Scheer shelled Almeria on 31 May killing 19–20 civilians, wounding 50 and destroying 35 buildings.[6] Following further attacks by Republican submarines against the Leipzig off the port of Oran between 15 and 18 June 1937 Germany withdrew from the Non-Intervention Patrol.

U-boats also participated in covert action against Republican shipping as part of Operation Ursula. At least eight U-boats engaged a small number of targets in the area throughout the conflict. (By comparison the Italian Regia Marina operated 58 submarines in the area as part of the Sottomarini Legionari.)

Plan Z

[edit]

The Kriegsmarine saw as her main tasks the controlling of the Baltic Sea and winning a war against France in connection with the German army, because France was seen as the most likely enemy in the event of war. But in 1938 Hitler wanted to have the possibility of winning a war against Great Britain at sea in the coming years. Therefore, he ordered plans for such a fleet from the Kriegsmarine. From the three proposed plans (X, Y and Z) he approved Plan Z in January 1939. This blueprint for the new German naval construction program envisaged building a navy of approximately 800 ships during the period 1939–1947. Hitler demanded that the program be completed by 1945. The main force of Plan Z were six H-class battleships. In the version of Plan Z drawn up in August 1939, the German fleet was planned to consist of the following ships by 1945:

Personnel strength was planned to rise to over 200,000.

The planned naval program was not very far advanced by the time World War II began. In 1939 two M-class cruisers and two H-class battleships were laid down and parts for two further H-class battleships and three O-class battlecruisers were in production. The strength of the German fleet at the beginning of the war was not even 20% of Plan Z. On 1 September 1939, the navy still had a total personnel strength of only 78,000, and it was not at all ready for a major role in the war. Because of the long time it would take to get the Plan Z fleet ready for action and shortage in workers and material in wartime, Plan Z was essentially shelved in September 1939 and the resources allocated for its realisation were largely redirected to the construction of U-boats, which would be ready for war against the United Kingdom more quickly.[7]

World War II

[edit]
U-boat crew

The Kriegsmarine took part in the Battle of Westerplatte and the Battle of the Danzig Bay during the invasion of Poland. In 1939, major events for the Kriegsmarine were the sinking of the British aircraft carrier HMS Courageous and the British battleship HMS Royal Oak and the loss of Admiral Graf Spee at the Battle of the River Plate. Submarine attacks on Britain's vital maritime supply routes (Battle of the Atlantic) started immediately at the outbreak of war, although they were hampered by the lack of well placed ports from which to operate. Throughout the war the Kriegsmarine was responsible for coastal artillery protecting major ports and important coastal areas. It also operated anti-aircraft batteries protecting major ports.[8]

In April 1940, the German Navy was heavily involved in the invasion of Norway, where it suffered significant losses, which included the heavy cruiser Blücher sunk by artillery and torpedoes from Norwegian shore batteries at the Oscarsborg Fortress in the Oslofjord. Ten destroyers were lost in the Battles of Narvik (half of German destroyer strength at the time), and two light cruisers, the Königsberg which was bombed and sunk by Royal Navy aircraft in Bergen, and the Karlsruhe which was sunk off the coast of Kristiansand by a British submarine. The Kriegsmarine did in return sink some British warships during this campaign, including the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious.

The losses in the Norwegian Campaign left only a handful of undamaged heavy ships available for the planned, but never executed, invasion of the United Kingdom (Operation Sea Lion) in the summer of 1940. There were serious doubts that the invasion sea routes could have been protected against British naval interference. The Fall of France and the conquest of Norway gave German submarines greatly improved access to British shipping routes in the Atlantic. At first, British convoys lacked escorts that were adequate either in numbers or equipment and, as a result, the submarines had much success for few losses (this period was dubbed the First Happy Time by the Germans).

Italy entered the war in June 1940, and the Battle of the Mediterranean began: from September 1941 to May 1944 some 62 German submarines were transferred there, sneaking past the British naval base at Gibraltar. The Mediterranean submarines sank 24 major Allied warships (including 12 destroyers, 4 cruisers, 2 aircraft carriers, and 1 battleship) and 94 merchant ships (449,206 tons of shipping). None of the Mediterranean submarines made it back to their home bases, as they were all either sunk in battle or scuttled by their crews at the end of the war.[9]

The crew of a minesweeper in France, 1941

In 1941, one of the four modern German battleships, Bismarck sank HMS Hood while breaking out into the Atlantic for commerce raiding. The Bismarck was in turn hunted down by much superior British forces after being crippled by an air-launched torpedo. She was subsequently scuttled after being rendered a burning wreck by two British battleships.

In November 1941 during the Battle of the Mediterranean, German submarine U-331 sank the British battleship Barham, which had a magazine explosion and sank in minutes, with the loss of 862, or 2/3 of her crew.[10]

During 1941, the Kriegsmarine and the United States Navy became de facto belligerents, although war was not formally declared, leading to the sinking of the USS Reuben James. This course of events were the result of the American decision to support Britain with its Lend-Lease program and the subsequent decision to escort Lend-Lease convoys with US war ships through the western part of the Atlantic.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent German declaration of war against the United States in December 1941 led to another phase of the Battle of the Atlantic. In Operation Drumbeat and subsequent operations until August 1942, a large number of Allied merchant ships were sunk by submarines off the US coast as the Americans had not prepared for submarine warfare, despite clear warnings (this was the so-called Second Happy Time for the German Navy). The situation became so serious that military leaders feared for the whole Allied strategy. The vast American ship building capabilities and naval forces were however now brought into the war and soon more than offset any losses inflicted by the German submariners. In 1942, the submarine warfare continued on all fronts, and when German forces in the Soviet Union reached the Black Sea, a few submarines were eventually transferred there.

In February 1942, the three large warships stationed on the Atlantic coast at Brest were evacuated back to German ports for deployment to Norway. The ships had been repeatedly damaged by air attacks by the RAF, the supply ships to support Atlantic sorties had been destroyed by the Royal Navy, and Hitler now felt that Norway was the "zone of destiny" for these ships. The two battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen passed through the English Channel (Channel Dash) on their way to Norway despite British efforts to stop them.[11][12][13] Not since the Spanish Armada in 1588 had any warships in wartime done this. It was a tactical victory for the Kriegsmarine and a blow to British morale, but the withdrawal removed the possibility of attacking allied convoys in the Atlantic with heavy surface ships.

With the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 Britain started to send Arctic convoys with military goods around Norway to support their new ally. In 1942 German forces began heavily attacking these convoys, mostly with bombers and U-boats. The big ships of the Kriegsmarine in Norway were seldom involved in these attacks, because of the inferiority of German radar technology,[14] and because Hitler and the leadership of the Kriegsmarine feared losses of these precious ships. The most effective of these attacks was the near destruction of Convoy PQ 17 in July 1942. Later in the war German attacks on these convoys were mostly reduced to U-boat activities and the mass of the allied freighters reached their destination in Soviet ports.

The Battle of the Barents Sea in December 1942 was an attempt by a German naval surface force to attack an Allied Arctic convoy. However, the advantage was not pressed home and they returned to base. There were serious implications: this failure infuriated Hitler, who nearly enforced a decision to scrap the surface fleet. Instead, resources were diverted to new U-boats, and the surface fleet became a lesser threat to the Allies.

The battleship Tirpitz in Norway, 1944

After December 1943 when Scharnhorst had been sunk in an attack on an Arctic convoy in the Battle of North Cape by HMS Duke of York, most German surface ships in bases at the Atlantic were blockaded in, or close to, their ports as a fleet in being, for fear of losing them in action and to tie up British naval forces. The largest of these ships, the battleship Tirpitz, was stationed in Norway as a threat to Allied shipping and also as a defence against a potential Allied invasion. When she was sunk, after several attempts, by British bombers in November 1944 (Operation Catechism), several British capital ships could be moved to the Far East.

From late 1944 until the end of the war, the surviving surface fleet of the Kriegsmarine (heavy cruisers: Admiral Scheer, Lützow, Admiral Hipper, Prinz Eugen, light cruisers: Nürnberg, Köln, Emden) was heavily engaged in providing artillery support to the retreating German land forces along the Baltic coast and in ferrying civilian refugees to the western Baltic Sea parts of Germany (Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein) in large rescue operations. Large parts of the population of eastern Germany fled the approaching Red Army out of fear for Soviet retaliation (mass rapes, killings, and looting by Soviet troops did occur[citation needed]). The Kriegsmarine evacuated two million civilians and troops in the evacuation of East Prussia and Danzig from January to May 1945. It was during this activity that the catastrophic sinking of several large passenger ships occurred: Wilhelm Gustloff and Goya were sunk by Soviet submarines, while Cap Arcona was sunk by British bombers, each sinking claiming thousands of civilian lives. The Kriegsmarine also provided important assistance in the evacuation of the fleeing German civilians of Pomerania and Stettin in March and April 1945.

A desperate measure of the Kriegsmarine to fight the superior strength of the Western Allies from 1944 was the formation of the Kleinkampfverbände (Small Battle Units). These were special naval units with frogmen, manned torpedoes, motorboats laden with explosives and so on. The more effective of these weapons and units were the development and deployment of midget submarines like the Molch and Seehund. In the last stage of the war, the Kriegsmarine also organised a number of divisions of infantry from its personnel.[8]

Between 1943 and 1945, a group of U-boats known as the Monsun Boats (Monsun Gruppe) operated in the Indian Ocean from Japanese bases in the occupied Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Allied convoys had not yet been organised in those waters, so initially many ships were sunk. However, this situation was soon remedied.[15] During the later war years, the Monsun Boats were also used as a means of exchanging vital war supplies with Japan.

During 1943 and 1944, due to Allied anti-submarine tactics and better equipment, the U-boat fleet started to suffer heavy losses. The turning point of the Battle of the Atlantic was during Black May in 1943, when the U-boat fleet started suffering heavy losses and the number of Allied ships sunk started to decrease. Radar, longer range air cover, sonar, improved tactics, and new weapons all contributed. German technical developments, such as the Schnorchel, attempted to counter these. Near the end of the war a small number of the new Elektroboot U-boats (types XXI and XXIII) became operational, the first submarines designed to operate submerged at all times. The Elektroboote had the potential to negate the Allied technological and tactical advantage, although they were deployed too late to see combat in the war.[16]

War crimes

[edit]
Anti-Jewish measures ordered by the German naval commander in Liepāja, 5 July 1941[17]

Following the capture of Liepāja in Latvia by the Germans on 29 June 1941, the town came under the command of the Kriegsmarine. On 1 July 1941, the town commandant Korvettenkapitän Stein ordered that ten hostages be shot for every act of sabotage, and further put civilians in the zone of targeting by declaring that Red Army soldiers were hiding among them in civilian attire.

On 5 July 1941 Korvettenkapitän Brückner, who had taken over from Stein, issued a set of anti-Jewish regulations[18] in the local newspaper, Kurzemes Vārds.[17] Summarized, the regulations were as follows:[19]

  • All Jews were to wear the yellow star on the front and back of their clothing;
  • Shopping hours for Jews were restricted to 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. Jews were only allowed out of their residences for these hours and from 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.;
  • Jews were barred from public events and transportation and were not to walk on the beach;
  • Jews were required to leave the pavement if they encountered a German in uniform;
  • Jewish shops were required to display the sign "A Jewish-owned business" in the window;
  • Jews were to surrender all radios, typewriters, uniforms, arms, and means of transportation

On 16 July 1941, Fregattenkapitän Dr. Hans Kawelmacher was appointed the German naval commandant in Liepāja.[20] On 22 July, Kawelmacher sent a telegram to the German Navy's Baltic Command in Kiel, which stated that he wanted 100 SS and fifty Schutzpolizei (protective police) men sent to Liepāja for "quick implementation Jewish problem".[21] Kawelmacher hoped to accelerate the killings, complaining: "Here about 8,000 Jews... with present SS-personnel, this would take one year, which is untenable for [the] pacification of Liepāja."[22] Kawelmacher telegram on 27 July 1941 read: "Jewish problem Libau largely solved by execution of about 1,100 male Jews by Riga SS commando on 24 and 25.7."[21]

In September 1939, U-boat commander Fritz-Julius Lemp of U-30 sank SS Athenia (1922) after mistaking it for a legitimate military target, resulting in the deaths of 117 civilians. Germany did not admit responsibility for the incident until after the war. Lemp was killed in action in 1941. U-247 was alleged to have shot at sunken ship survivors, but as the vessel was lost at sea with its crew, there was no investigation.

In 1945, U-boat Commander Heinz-Wilhelm Eck of U-852 was tried along with four of his crewmen for shooting at survivors. All were found guilty, with three of them, including Eck, being executed. In 1946, Hellmuth von Ruckteschell was sentenced to 10 years in prison, reduced to 7 years on appeal, for the illegal sinking of ships and criminal negligence for failing to protect the downed crew of the SS Anglo Saxon. Ruckteschell died in prison in 1948.

Post-war division

[edit]

After the war, the German surface ships that remained afloat (only the cruisers Prinz Eugen and Nürnberg, and a dozen destroyers were operational) were divided among the victors by the Tripartite Naval Commission. The US used the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in nuclear testing at Bikini Atoll in 1946 as a target ship for the Operation Crossroads. Some (like the unfinished aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin) were used for target practice with conventional weapons, while others (mostly destroyers and torpedo boats) were put into the service of Allied navies that lacked surface ships after the war. The training barque SSS Horst Wessel was recommissioned USCGC Eagle and remains in active service, assigned to the United States Coast Guard Academy. The British, French, and Soviet navies received the destroyers, and some torpedo boats went to the Danish and Norwegian navies. For the purpose of mine clearing, the Royal Navy employed German crews and minesweepers from June 1945 to January 1948,[23] organised in the German Mine Sweeping Administration (GMSA), which consisted of 27,000 members of the former Kriegsmarine and 300 vessels.[24]

The destroyers and the Soviet share light cruiser Nürnberg were all retired by the end of the 1950s, but five escort destroyers were returned from the French to the new West German Navy in the 1950s and three 1945 scuttled type XXI and XXIII U-boats were raised by West Germany and integrated into their new navy. In 1956, with West Germany's accession to NATO, a new navy was established and was referred to as the Bundesmarine (Federal Navy). Some Kriegsmarine commanders like Erich Topp and Otto Kretschmer went on to serve in the Bundesmarine. In East Germany the Volksmarine (People's Navy) was established in 1956. With the reunification of Germany in 1990, it was decided to use the name Deutsche Marine (German Navy).

Major wartime operations

[edit]
  • Wikinger ("Viking") (1940) – foray by destroyers into the North Sea
  • Weserübung ("Operation Weser") (1940) – invasion of Denmark and Norway
  • Juno (1940) – operation to disrupt Allied supplies to Norway
  • Nordseetour (1940) – first Atlantic operation of Admiral Hipper
  • Berlin (1941) – Atlantic cruise of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
  • Rheinübung ("Rhine exercise") (1941) – breakout by Bismarck and Prinz Eugen
  • Doppelschlag ("Double blow") (1942) – anti-shipping operation off Novaya Zemlya by Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper
  • Sportpalast (1942) – aborted operation (including Tirpitz) to attack Arctic convoys
  • Rösselsprung ("Knights Move") (1942) – operation (including Tirpitz) to attack Arctic convoy PQ 17
  • Wunderland (1942) – anti-shipping operation in Kara Sea by Admiral Scheer
  • Paukenschlag ("Drumbeat" ("Beat of the Kettle Drum"); "Second Happy Time") (1942) – U-boat campaign off the United States east coast
  • Neuland ("New Land") (1942) – U-boat campaign in the Caribbean Sea; launched in conjunction with Operation Drumbeat
  • Regenbogen ("Rainbow") (1942) – failed attack on Arctic convoy JW 51B, by Admiral Hipper and Lützow
  • Cerberus (1942) – movement of capital ships from Brest to home ports in Germany (Channel Dash)
  • Ostfront ("East front") (1943) – final operation of Scharnhorst, to intercept convoy JW 55B
  • Domino (1943) – second aborted Arctic sortie by Scharnhorst, Prinz Eugen, and destroyers
  • Zitronella ("Lemon extract") (1943) – raid upon Allied-occupied Spitzbergen (Svalbard)
  • Hannibal (1945) – evacuation proceedings from Courland, Danzig-West Prussia, and East Prussia
  • Deadlight (1945) – the British Royal Navy's postwar scuttling of Kriegsmarine U-boats

Ships

[edit]
R boats operating near the coast of occupied France, 1941

By the start of World War II, much of the Kriegsmarine were modern ships: fast, well-armed, and well-armoured. This had been achieved by concealment but also by deliberately flouting World War I peace terms and those of various naval treaties. However, the war started with the German Navy still at a distinct disadvantage in terms of sheer size with what were expected to be its primary adversaries – the navies of France and Great Britain. Although a major re-armament of the navy (Plan Z) was planned, and initially begun, the start of the war in 1939 meant that the vast amounts of material required for the project were diverted to other areas. The sheer disparity in size when compared to the other European powers navies prompted Raeder to write of his own navy once the war began "The surface forces can do no more than show that they know how to die gallantly." A number of captured ships from occupied countries were added to the German fleet as the war progressed.[25] Though six major units of the Kriegsmarine were sunk during the war (both Bismarck-class battleships and both Scharnhorst-class battleships, as well as two heavy cruisers), there were still many ships afloat (including four heavy cruisers and four light cruisers) as late as March 1945.

Some ship types do not fit clearly into the commonly used ship classifications. Where there is argument, this has been noted.

Surface ships

[edit]

The main combat ships of the Kriegsmarine (excluding U-boats):

Aircraft carriers

[edit]

Construction of Graf Zeppelin was started in 1936 and construction of an unnamed sister ship was started two years later in 1938, but neither ship was completed. In 1942 conversion of three German passenger ships (Europa, Potsdam, Gneisenau) and two unfinished cruisers, the captured French light cruiser De Grasse and the German heavy cruiser Seydlitz, to auxiliary carriers was begun. In November 1942 the conversion of the passenger ships was stopped because these ships were now seen as too slow for operations with the fleet. But conversion of one of these ships, the Potsdam, to a training carrier was begun instead. In February 1943 all the work on carriers was halted because of the German failure during the Battle of the Barents Sea, which convinced Hitler that large warships were useless.

All engineering of the aircraft carriers like catapults, arresting gears and so on were tested and developed at the Erprobungsstelle See Travemünde (Experimental Agency Sea in Travemünde) including the airplanes for the aircraft carriers, the Fieseler Fi 167 ship-borne biplane torpedo and reconnaissance bomber and the naval versions of two key early war Luftwaffe aircraft: the Messerschmitt Bf 109T fighter and the Junkers Ju 87C Stuka dive bomber.

Battleships

[edit]
The Bismarck after the Battle of the Denmark Strait

The Kriegsmarine completed four battleships during its existence. The first pair were the 11-inch gun Scharnhorst class, consisting of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which participated in the invasion of Norway in 1940, and then in commerce raiding until the Gneisenau was heavily damaged by a British air raid in 1942 and the Scharnhorst was sunk in the Battle of the North Cape in late 1943. The second pair were the 15-inch gun Bismarck class, consisting of the Bismarck and Tirpitz. The Bismarck was sunk on her first sortie into the Atlantic in 1941 (Operation Rheinübung) although she did sink the battlecruiser Hood and severely damaged the battleship Prince of Wales, while the Tirpitz was based in Norwegian ports during most of the war as a fleet in being, tying up Allied naval forces, and subject to a number of attacks by British aircraft and submarines. More battleships were planned (the H-class), but construction was abandoned in September 1939.

Pre-dreadnought battleships

[edit]
Two large ships bristling with guns moored close to shore.
Schlesien (background) and Schleswig-Holstein (right side-foreground) in Westerplatte following the occupation of the port

The World War I-era pre-dreadnought battleships Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein were used mainly as training ships, although they also participated in several military operations, with the latter bearing the distinction of firing the opening shots of World War II. Zähringen and Hessen were converted into radio-guided target ships in 1928 and 1930 respectively. Hannover was decommissioned in 1931 and struck from the naval register in 1936. Plans to convert her into a radio-controlled target ship for aircraft was cancelled because of the outbreak of war in 1939.

Battlecruisers

[edit]

Three O-class battlecruisers were ordered in 1939, but with the start of the war the same year there were not enough resources to build the ships.

Panzerschiffe and Heavy cruisers

[edit]

The Deutschland-class cruisers were the Deutschland (renamed Lützow), Admiral Scheer, and Admiral Graf Spee. Modern commentators favour classifying these as "heavy cruisers" and the Kriegsmarine itself reclassified these ships as such (Schwere Kreuzer) in 1940.[26] In German language usage these three ships were designed and built as "armoured ships" (Panzerschiffe) – "pocket battleship" is an English label.

The Graf Spee was scuttled by her own crew in the Battle of the River Plate, in the Rio de la Plata estuary in December 1939. Admiral Scheer was bombed on 9 April 1945 in port at Kiel and badly damaged, essentially beyond repair, and rolled over at her moorings. After the war that part of the harbor was filled in with rubble and the hulk buried. Lützow (ex-Deutschland) was bombed 16 April 1945 in the Baltic off Swinemünde just west of Stettin, and settled on the shallow bottom. With the Red Army advancing across the Oder, the ship was destroyed in place to prevent the Soviets capturing anything useful. The wreck was dismantled and scrapped in 1948–1949.[27]

The Admiral Hipper-class cruisers in active service were Admiral Hipper, Blücher, and Prinz Eugen. Cruisers Seydlitz, and Lützow were never completed.

Light cruisers

[edit]
Königsberg visiting Gdynia, Poland

The term "light cruiser" is a shortening of the phrase "light armoured cruiser". Light cruisers were defined under the Washington Naval Treaty by gun calibre. Light cruiser describes a small ship that was armoured in the same way as an armoured cruiser. In other words, like standard cruisers, light cruisers possessed a protective belt and a protective deck. Prior to this, smaller cruisers tended to be of the protected cruiser model and possessed only an armoured deck. The Kriegsmarine light cruisers were as follows:

Never completed: three M-class cruisers

Never completed: KH-1 and KH-2 (Kreuzer (cruiser) Holland 1 and 2). Captured in the Netherlands 1940. Both being on the stocks and building continued for the Kriegsmarine.

In addition, the former Kaiserliche Marine light cruiser Niobe was captured by the Germans on 11 September 1943 after the capitulation of Italy. She was pressed into Kriegsmarine service for a brief time before being destroyed by British MTBs.

Auxiliary cruisers

[edit]
The auxiliary cruiser Kormoran meeting a U-boat, 1940

During the war, some merchant ships were converted into "auxiliary cruisers" and nine were used as commerce raiders sailing under false flags to avoid detection, and operated in all oceans with considerable effect. The German designation for the ships was 'Handelstörkreuzer' thus the HSK serial assigned. Each had as well an administrative label more commonly used, e.g. Schiff 16 = Atlantis, Schiff 41 = Kormoran, etc. The auxiliary cruisers were:

  • Orion (HSK-1, Schiff 36)
  • Atlantis (HSK-2, Schiff 16)
  • Widder (HSK-3, Schiff 21)
  • Thor (HSK-4, Schiff 10)
  • Pinguin (HSK-5, Schiff 33)
  • Stier (HSK-6, Schiff 23)
  • Komet (HSK-7, Schiff 45)
  • Kormoran (HSK-8, Schiff 41)
  • Michel (HSK-9, Schiff 28)
  • Coronel (HSK number not assigned, Schiff 14, never active in raider operations.)
  • Hansa (HSK not assigned, Schiff 5, never active in raider operations, used as a training ship)[28]

Destroyers

[edit]
Destroyer Z1 Leberecht Maass

Although the German World War II destroyer (Zerstörer) fleet was modern and the ships were larger than conventional destroyers of other navies, they had problems. Early classes were unstable, wet in heavy weather, suffered from engine problems, and had short range. Some problems were solved with the evolution of later designs, but further developments were curtailed by the war and, ultimately, by Germany's defeat. In the first year of World War II, they were used mainly to sow offensive minefields in shipping lanes close to the British coast.[citation needed]

Torpedo boats

[edit]
Raubtier-class torpedo boats

These vessels evolved through the 1930s from small vessels, relying almost entirely on torpedoes, to what were effectively small destroyers with mines, torpedoes, and guns. Two classes of fleet torpedo boats were planned, but not built, in the 1940s.

E-boats (Schnellboote)

[edit]

The E-boats were fast attack craft with torpedo tubes. Over 200 boats of this type were built for the Kriegsmarine.

Troop ships

[edit]

Cap Arcona, Goya, General von Steuben, Monte Rosa, Wilhelm Gustloff.

Miscellaneous

[edit]

Thousands of smaller warships and auxiliaries served in the Kriegsmarine, including minelayers, minesweepers, mine transports, netlayers, floating AA and torpedo batteries, command ships, decoy ships (small merchantmen with hidden weaponry), gunboats, monitors, escorts, patrol boats, sub-chasers, landing craft, landing support ships, training ships, test ships, torpedo recovery boats, dispatch boats, aviso, fishery protection ships, survey ships, harbor defense boats, target ships and their radio control vessels, motor explosive boats, weather ships, tankers, colliers, tenders, supply ships, tugs, barges, icebreakers, hospital and accommodation ships, floating cranes and docks, and many others. The Kriegsmarine employed hundreds of auxiliary Vorpostenboote during the war, mostly civilian ships that were drafted and fitted with military equipment, for use in coastal operations.

Submarines

[edit]
Admiral Karl Dönitz inspecting the Saint-Nazaire submarine base in France, June 1941

The Submarine Arm of the Kriegsmarine was titled the U-bootwaffe ("submarine force"). At the outbreak of war, it had a fleet of 57 submarines.[29] This was increased steadily until mid-1943, when losses from Allied counter-measures matched the new vessels launched.[30]

The principal types were the Type IX, a long range type used in the western and southern Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans; the Type VII, the most numerous type, used principally in the north Atlantic; and the small Type II, for coastal waters. Type X was a small class of minelayers and Type XIV was a specialised type used to support distant U-boat operations – the "Milchkuh" (Milkcow).

Types XXI and XXIII, the "Elektroboot", could have negated much of the Allied anti-submarine tactics and technology, but only a few of this new type of U-boat became ready for combat at the end of the war. Post-war, they became the prototype for modern conventional submarines, such as the Soviet Zulu class.

During World War II, about 60% of all U-boats commissioned were lost in action; 28,000 of the 40,000 U-boat crewmen were killed during the war and 8,000 were captured. The remaining U-boats were either surrendered to the Allies or scuttled by their own crews at the end of the war.[31]

Top 10 U-boat aces in World War II
Name Shipping sunk
Otto Kretschmer 274,333 tons (47 ships sunk)
Wolfgang Lüth 225,712 tons (43 ships)
Erich Topp 193,684 tons (34 ships)
Karl-Friedrich Merten 186,064 tons (29 ships)
Victor Schütze 171,164 tons (34 ships)
Herbert Schultze 171,122 tons (26 ships)
Georg Lassen 167,601 tons (28 ships)
Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock 166,596 tons (22 ships)
Heinrich Liebe 162,333 tons (30 ships)
Günther Prien 160,939 tons (28 ships),
plus the British battleship HMS Royal Oak inside Scapa Flow

Captured ships

[edit]

The military campaigns in Europe yielded a large number of captured vessels, many of which were under construction. Nations represented included Austria (riverine craft), Czechoslovakia (riverine craft), Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States (several landing craft), and Italy (after the armistice). Few of the incomplete ships of destroyer size or above were completed, but many smaller warships and auxiliaries were completed and commissioned into Kriegsmarine during the war. Additionally many captured or confiscated foreign civilian ships (merchantmen, fishing boats, tugboats etc.) were converted into auxiliary warships or support ships.

Major enemy warships sunk or destroyed

[edit]

On 3 September 1939, during the early days of the invasion of Poland, the Polish destroyer ORP Wicher of the Polish Navy, was sunk by German Ju 87 dive bombers belonging to Trägergeschwader 186—a Luftwaffe unit established for naval aviation and intended for deployment aboard the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin. However, as the Graf Zeppelin was not operational and never saw combat, these aircraft conducted their attacks from land-based airfields under Kriegsmarine direction.[32]

Ship Type Date Action
HMS Courageous (Royal Navy) Fleet aircraft carrier 17 September 1939 Torpedoed by submarine U-29
HMS Royal Oak (Royal Navy) Battleship 14 October 1939 Torpedoed at anchor by submarine U-47
HNoMS Eidsvold (Royal Norwegian Navy) Coastal defence ship 9 April 1940 Torpedoed in Narvik harbor by destroyer Z21 Wilhelm Heidkamp
HNoMS Norge (Royal Norwegian Navy) Coastal defence ship 9 April 1940 Torpedoed in Narvik harbor by destroyer Z11 Bernd von Arnim
Jaguar (French Navy) Large destroyer 23 May 1940 Torpedoed by torpedo boats (E-boats) S21 and S23
HMS Glorious (Royal Navy) Fleet aircraft carrier 8 June 1940 Sunk by battleships Gneisenau and Scharnhorst
HMS Hood (Royal Navy) Battlecruiser 24 May 1941 Sunk by the battleship Bismarck
HMS Ark Royal (Royal Navy) Fleet aircraft carrier 14 November 1941 Torpedoed by submarine U-81 on 13 November, sank while under tow to Gibraltar
HMAS Sydney (Royal Australian Navy) Light cruiser 19 November 1941 Sunk by the auxiliary cruiser Kormoran. The Kormoran was also sunk in the battle.
HMS Dunedin (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 24 November 1941 Torpedoed by submarine U-124
HMS Barham (Royal Navy) Battleship 25 November 1941 Torpedoed by submarine U-331. While the attack on the ship was recorded, the Kriegsmarine were unaware that it had been sunk until 27 January 1942 when the Admiralty admitted Barham's loss.
HMS Galatea (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 14 December 1941 Torpedoed by submarine U-557
HMS Audacity (Royal Navy) Escort carrier 21 December 1941 Torpedoed by submarine U-751
HMS Naiad (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 11 March 1942 Torpedoed by submarine U-565
HMS Edinburgh (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 2 May 1942 Torpedoed by U-456 and destroyers Z7 Hermann Schoemann, Z24 and Z25, abandoned and scuttled
HMS Hermione (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 16 June 1942 Torpedoed by submarine U-205
HMS Eagle (Royal Navy) Aircraft carrier 11 August 1942 Torpedoed by submarine U-73
HMS Avenger (Royal Navy) Escort carrier 15 November 1942 Torpedoed by submarine U-155
HMS Welshman (Royal Navy) Minelaying cruiser 1 February 1943 Torpedoed by U-617
HMS Abdiel (Royal Navy) Minelaying cruiser 10 September 1943 Sunk by mines in Taranto harbor while operating as a transport. The mines were laid by torpedo boats (E-boats) S54 and S61.
HMS Charybdis (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 23 October 1943 Torpedoed by torpedo boats T23 and T27
HMS Penelope (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 18 February 1944 Torpedoed by submarine U-410
USS Block Island (US Navy) Escort carrier 29 May 1944 Torpedoed by submarine U-549
HMS Scylla (Royal Navy) Light cruiser 23 June 1944 Mine hit, declared a constructive total loss
ORP Dragon (Polish Navy) Light cruiser 7 July 1944 Torpedoed by a Neger manned torpedo, abandoned and scuttled
HMS Nabob (Royal Navy) Escort carrier 22 August 1944 Torpedoed by U-354, judged not worth repairing, beached and abandoned
HMS Thane (Royal Navy) Escort carrier 15 January 1945 Torpedoed by U-1172, declared a constructive total loss

[33][34]

Organisation

[edit]

Command structure

[edit]
Karl Dönitz meeting with Adolf Hitler in 1945

Adolf Hitler was the Supreme Commander of all German forces, including the Kriegsmarine. His authority was exercised through the Oberkommando der Marine (OKM) with a Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine), a Chief of Naval General Staff (Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung), and a Chief of Naval Operations (Chef der Operationsabteilung).[35] The first Commander-in-Chief of the OKM was Erich Raeder who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichsmarine when it was renamed and reorganised in 1935. Raeder held the post until falling out with Hitler after the German failure in the Battle of the Barents Sea. He was replaced by Karl Dönitz on 30 January 1943 who held the command until he was appointed President of Germany upon Hitler's suicide in April 1945. Hans-Georg von Friedeburg was then Commander-in-Chief of the OKM for the short period of time until Germany surrendered in May 1945.

Subordinate to these were regional, squadron, and temporary flotilla commands. Regional commands covered significant naval regions and were themselves sub-divided, as necessary. They were commanded by a Generaladmiral or an Admiral. There was a Marineoberkommando for the Baltic Fleet, Nord, Nordsee, Norwegen, Ost/Ostsee (formerly Baltic), Süd, and West. The Kriegsmarine used a form of encoding called Gradnetzmeldeverfahren to denote regions on a map.

Each squadron (organised by type of ship) also had a command structure with its own Flag Officer. The commands were Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Submarines (Führer der Unterseeboote), Torpedo Boats, Minesweepers, Reconnaissance Forces, Naval Security Forces, Big Guns and Hand Guns, and Midget Weapons.

Major naval operations were commanded by a Flottenchef. The Flottenchef controlled a flotilla and organized its actions during the operation. The commands were, by their nature, temporary.

The Kriegsmarine's ship design bureau, known as the Marineamt, was administered by officers with experience in sea duty but not in ship design, while the naval architects who did the actual design work had only a theoretical understanding of design requirements. As a result, the German surface fleet was plagued by design flaws throughout the war.[36]

Communication was undertaken using an eight-rotor system of Enigma encoding.

Air units

[edit]

The Luftwaffe had a near-complete monopoly on all German military aviation, including naval aviation, a source of great interservice rivalry with the Kriegsmarine. Catapult-launched spotter planes like Arado Ar 196 twin-float seaplanes were manned by the so-called Bordfliegergruppe 196 (shipboard flying group 196).[37] Trägergeschwader 186 (Carrier Air Wing 186) operated two Gruppen (Trägergruppe I/186 and Trägergruppe II/186) equipped with navalized Messerschmitt Bf 109T and Junkers Ju 87C Stuka; these units were intended to serve aboard the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin which was never completed, yet provided the Kriegsmarine with some air-power from bases on land.[38] Five coastal groups (Küstenfliegergruppen) with reconnaissance aircraft, torpedo bombers, Minensuch aerial minesweepers, and air-sea rescue seaplanes supported the Kriegsmarine, although with lesser resources as the war progressed.[39]

Coastal artillery, flak and radar units

[edit]

The coastal batteries of the Kriegsmarine were stationed on the German coasts. With the conquering and occupation of other countries coastal artillery was stationed along the coasts of these countries, especially in France and Norway as part of the Atlantic Wall.[40] Naval bases were protected by flak-batteries of the Kriegsmarine against enemy air raids. The Kriegsmarine also manned the Seetakt sea radars on the coasts.[40]

Marines

[edit]

At the beginning of World War II, on 1 September 1939, the Marinestoßtruppkompanie (Naval Shock Troop Company) landed in Danzig from the old battleship Schleswig-Holstein for conquering a Polish bastion at Westerplatte. A reinforced platoon of the Marine Stoßtrupp Kompanie landed with soldiers of the German Army from destroyers on 9 April 1940 in Narvik. In June 1940 the Marine Stoßtrupp Abteilung (Marine Attack Troop Battalion) was flown in from France to the Channel Islands to occupy this British territory.

In September 1944 amphibious units unsuccessfully tried to capture the strategic island Suursaari in the Gulf of Finland from Germany's former ally Finland (Operation Tanne Ost).

With the invasion of Normandy in June 1944 and the Soviet advance from the summer of 1944 the Kriegsmarine started to form regiments and divisions for the battles on land with superfluous personnel. With the loss of naval bases because of the Allied advance more and more navy personnel were available for the ground troops of the Kriegsmarine. About 40 regiments were raised and from January 1945 on six divisions. Half of the regiments were absorbed by the divisions.[41]

Personnel

[edit]
Personnel strength of the Kriegsmarine 1939-1945
Year Strength
1939 105,000
1940 280,000
1941 435,000
1942 569,000
1943 780,000
1944 810,000
1945 700,000
Source: [42]

Ranks and uniforms

[edit]
Kriegsmarine uniforms and rank insignia

Many different types of uniforms were worn by the Kriegsmarine; here is a list of the main ones:

  • Dienstanzug (Service suit)
  • Kleiner Dienstanzug (Lesser service uniform)
  • Ausgehanzug (Suit for walking out)
  • Sportanzug (Sportswear)
  • Tropen-und Sommeranzug (Tropical and summer suit) – uniforms for hot climates
  • Große Uniform (Parade uniform)
  • Kleiner Gesellschaftsanzug (Small party suit)
  • Großer Gesellschaftsanzug (Full dress uniform)

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Kriegsmarine was the naval branch of Nazi Germany's from its establishment on 21 May 1935 until the end of in 1945, succeeding the Weimar Republic's and operating under severe constraints initially imposed by the . Commanded initially by , who held the post from 1928 until his resignation in January 1943, the force emphasized submarine construction and wolfpack tactics due to limited resources for surface vessels, though it pursued a modest expansion of capital ships like the battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz. ![German battleship Bismarck after the sea battle][float-right] The Kriegsmarine's primary strategic objective during the war was to disrupt Allied maritime supply lines, particularly through unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic, where U-boat flotillas initially inflicted severe losses, sinking over 2,700 merchant vessels totaling approximately 14 million gross register tons between 1939 and 1945. This commerce-raiding campaign, intensified under Admiral Karl Dönitz—who succeeded Raeder as grand admiral and later became head of state in the war's final days—achieved notable early successes, such as during Operation Drumbeat off the U.S. East Coast in 1942, but faltered after mid-1943 due to Allied advances in radar, convoy escorts, code-breaking at Bletchley Park, and air cover, resulting in the loss of 783 U-boats and roughly 28,000 personnel. Surface operations, including the Bismarck's brief sortie in May 1941 that sank HMS Hood before its own destruction, and the Tirpitz's role as a "fleet-in-being" tying down British naval assets in northern waters, highlighted tactical prowess but underscored broader failures in challenging the Royal Navy's dominance or protecting German Baltic and Norwegian flanks. Despite these efforts, the Kriegsmarine's overall impact was limited by prewar production shortfalls, resource diversion to the army and air force, and Hitler's prioritization of land campaigns, leading to the near-total annihilation of its operational fleet by without achieving decisive command of the seas. Dönitz's advocacy for mass production proved prescient in concept but too late in execution, as Allied industrial superiority and antisubmarine innovations shifted the balance irreversibly, rendering the navy unable to fulfill its role in supporting or preventing the encirclement of the .

Origins and Rearmament

Versailles Treaty Constraints and Reichsmarine


The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, imposed severe restrictions on the German navy to prevent it from posing a future threat to Allied powers. Article 181 and subsequent naval clauses limited the fleet to six pre-dreadnought battleships of the Deutschland or Lothringen classes, six light cruisers not exceeding 6,000 long tons each, twelve destroyers, and twelve torpedo boats, with all other warships required to be scrapped or surrendered. Submarines were explicitly banned, as were aircraft carriers, heavy cruisers, and any form of naval aviation, while personnel was capped at 15,000 officers and enlisted men, prohibiting conscription and emphasizing a professional cadre focused on training rather than combat readiness. These measures effectively reduced the navy to a coastal defense force incapable of blue-water operations.
The remnants of the , known as the Kaiserliche Marine, were reorganized into the on April 1, 1919, under the , retaining select vessels such as the pre-dreadnoughts Schlesien and to meet treaty quotas. The prioritized personnel development and technical expertise, constructing a few compliant light cruisers like the (commissioned 1925) and the -class vessels to replace obsolete units, while maintaining a small inventory of torpedo boats and destroyers for training purposes. This era saw a shift toward qualitative improvements, with rigorous officer training programs designed to preserve institutional knowledge for potential future expansion, despite the treaty's prohibitions on offensive capabilities. Erich Raeder, a veteran of World War I, assumed command as Chief of the Naval Command on October 1, 1928, succeeding Admiral Hans Zenker and steering the toward subtle enhancements within treaty bounds. Under Raeder's leadership, efforts focused on maintaining morale and expertise amid economic constraints of the Weimar era. To circumvent the submarine ban, the engaged in covert activities, including the establishment of the Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw (IvS), a front company in the , where German engineers developed submarine designs and trained personnel discreetly from the early . These violations, exposed in scandals like the 1928 Lohmann Affair, underscored the navy's determination to retain prohibited technologies for eventual rearmament, though they remained limited in scale until the treaty's repudiation in the .

Nazi Ascension and Initial Expansion

Adolf Hitler's appointment as on 30 January 1933 enabled Admiral , who had commanded the since 1928, to intensify covert rearmament efforts in violation of the , which capped naval tonnage at 100,000 tons for surface ships and banned submarines and capital ships beyond outdated vessels. On 16 March 1935, Hitler openly repudiated the Versailles Treaty's military clauses, proclaiming the restoration of conscription, the creation of the , and naval expansion to include modern warships. This announcement facilitated the renaming of the to Kriegsmarine via the Law for the Reconstruction of the National Defense Forces, effective 21 May 1935, signaling a transition to an offensive-oriented force under Raeder's leadership. The , signed on 18 June 1935, provided diplomatic cover by authorizing the Kriegsmarine to build up to 35% of the Royal Navy's surface tonnage—approximately 420,000 tons—and 45% for , effectively nullifying Versailles limits while averting immediate British opposition. Early construction prioritized the Deutschland-class pocket battleships, designed as long-range commerce raiders exploiting Versailles loopholes with 11-inch guns and high speed within tonnage disguises: Admiral Scheer was commissioned on 12 November 1934, followed by Admiral Graf Spee on 30 January 1936. Parallel efforts launched the Zerstörer 1934 class, the first post-World War I destroyers built in , with four vessels—Z1 Leberecht Maass, Z2 Georg Thiele, Z3 Max Schultz, and Z4 Richard Beitzen—laid down between January 1934 and February 1935 and commissioned by 1937, emphasizing torpedo armament and fleet escort capabilities.

Plan Z and Long-Term Naval Ambitions

Plan Z, a long-term naval rearmament program initiated in 1938 and formally approved by in January 1939, aimed to transform the Kriegsmarine into a balanced fleet capable of challenging dominance in home waters and beyond. The blueprint targeted completion by 1944–1948, specifying 10 battleships, 3 battlecruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 15 Panzerschiffe (pocket battleships), 5 heavy cruisers, 44 light cruisers, 68 destroyers, 90 torpedo boats, and 240 U-boats, alongside extensive minelaying and auxiliary forces. This composition sought to enable decisive surface engagements while supporting commerce warfare, reflecting Erich Raeder's advocacy for a "risk fleet" that could force Britain into a two-front naval commitment. The plan's ambitions stemmed from Germany's geopolitical imperatives: countering British encirclement through a fleet approaching 1:3 against the Royal Navy, as permitted under the 1935 , but expanded covertly to project power into the Atlantic. Projected costs exceeded 33 billion Reichsmarks over eight years, with initial —such as the Graf Zeppelin (laid down 1936) and H-class battleships (two started July 1939)—prioritizing heavy units to deter or defeat British squadrons in fleet actions. Raeder envisioned carriers providing air cover absent from battleships, battlecruisers for raiding, and U-boats for attrition, forming a synergistic force unbound by Versailles-era restrictions. Resource limitations, however, exposed the plan's impracticality from inception. Hitler's strategic focus on rapid continental conquests favored the army's panzer divisions and Luftwaffe's bombers, subordinating naval steel allocations despite Raeder's lobbying; by 1938, ground and air forces consumed over 80% of armaments spending. Germany's infrastructure, concentrated in yards like and , lacked capacity for simultaneous heavy-ship construction—evidenced by pre-war output of just two battleships (Bismarck and Tirpitz)—while skilled labor shortages and import dependencies constrained scaling. Steel deficits further undermined feasibility, with production rising to 22.8 million tons in 1938 yet rationed amid competing demands; naval needs competed directly with and fabrication, where each required 30,000–50,000 tons of specialized , equivalent to hundreds of panzers. Empirical assessments of industrial throughput indicate that full execution would have demanded 2–3 times naval yard output, diverting resources from Hitler's prioritized land-air doctrine and risking economic overheating without Swedish ore imports or synthetic alternatives scaling adequately. Consequently, only skeletal progress occurred before , with unbuilt hulls later repurposed for submarines amid wartime exigencies.

Pre-War Engagements and Preparations

Spanish Civil War Operations

The Kriegsmarine's involvement in the (1936–1939) marked its first operational deployment, conducted under the pretext of enforcing the international non-intervention agreement while providing covert support to Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces. Following the outbreak of hostilities on July 17, 1936, German naval units, including pocket battleships Deutschland and Admiral Scheer as well as , were dispatched to Spanish waters starting July 23, 1936, for patrols ostensibly monitoring arms shipments but effectively aiding Nationalist blockade efforts and reconnaissance. These operations allowed testing of shipboard systems, anti-aircraft defenses, and crew endurance in a combat environment, though engagements remained limited to avoid broader escalation. A pivotal incident occurred on May 29, 1937, when the Deutschland, anchored off Ibiza, was struck by two bombs from Soviet Tupolev SB bombers operated by the Republican Air Force, resulting in 31 sailors killed and 101 wounded; one bomb damaged guns and ignited fires in crew spaces, while the other destroyed a floatplane. In retaliation, on May 31, 1937, Admiral Scheer—supported by four destroyers—shelled the Republican-held port of Almería, firing over 300 rounds from 28 cm main guns and secondary armament, destroying oil tanks, warehouses, and causing an estimated 19–35 civilian deaths alongside military targets. This action, ordered by Adolf Hitler, demonstrated the Kriegsmarine's willingness to apply coercive force and highlighted vulnerabilities in anchored positions, prompting improved vigilance protocols. The Leipzig also conducted patrols, suffering a near-miss strike on June 15, 1938, off , —attributed to Republican submarines but possibly a misperception—which reinforced lessons on threat identification amid foggy conditions and neutral shipping density. Overall, these deployments inflicted minimal losses but yielded practical experience in sustained operations, with Admiral Scheer logging extensive mileage for gunnery practice and evacuation of German nationals; total Kriegsmarine casualties numbered around 50, underscoring the risks of proxy conflicts despite nominal neutrality. The episodes validated the value of heavy cruisers for deterrence while exposing coordination challenges with elements, informing pre-World War II tactics without committing to full-scale commitment.

Technological and Tactical Developments

Admiral Karl Dönitz, appointed Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote in October 1936, advanced the concept of Rudeltaktik, or wolfpack tactics, emphasizing massed U-boat attacks on merchant convoys to overwhelm defenses. Drawing from World War I unrestricted submarine warfare observations and interwar analysis, Dönitz conducted trials as early as 1936, refining coordinated search and assault methods that proved effective in simulated exercises against Kriegsmarine vessels mimicking convoys by May 1939. Submarine technology progressed with the Type VII class, designed in the early to circumvent Versailles Treaty tonnage limits while enhancing ocean-going capabilities. The first Type VIIA boats were laid down in , with commissioning beginning in 1936; these featured a surface speed of 17 knots, a range exceeding 6,500 nautical miles, and capacity for 11 torpedoes, surpassing the coastal-focused Type II predecessors. By 1939, over a dozen Type VII submarines were operational, forming the core of expansion under the . Surface fleet advancements included modernizations of inherited vessels and initiation of new builds. Pre-dreadnought battleships Schlesien and , retained for training, underwent boiler replacements and armament updates in the mid-1930s to extend utility despite obsolescence. Concurrently, construction started on advanced designs like the Scharnhorst-class battlecruisers in 1935, incorporating 28 cm guns and improved armor, alongside destroyers of the 1934A class with enhanced torpedoes and anti-aircraft batteries, prioritizing potential. Resource constraints from rearmament priorities limited sensor integration, yet passive systems advanced with the Gruppenhorchgerät (GHG), deployed on U-boats from 1936 onward, using arrays of 24 s for directional underwater detection up to several kilometers. Radar development lagged, with initial surface-search sets like FuMO emerging experimentally by 1937 on select cruisers, relying on meter-wave technology amid competing demands.

Strategic Doctrine and World War II Operations

Overall Naval Strategy Under Hitler

The Kriegsmarine's overarching naval strategy under Adolf Hitler centered on commerce raiding and avoidance of direct fleet engagements with the superior Royal Navy, reflecting Germany's limited industrial capacity and resource constraints relative to Britain's established maritime dominance. This approach stemmed from a realistic assessment of numerical disparities: in September 1939, Germany fielded 57 operational U-boats and a handful of surface combatants, including two battleships, three pocket battleships, and eight cruisers, against a Royal Navy boasting 15 battleships, numerous cruisers, and approximately 184 destroyers. Plan Z, Hitler's approved expansion blueprint from January 1939, aimed to rectify this imbalance over eight years by constructing a balanced fleet of 10 battleships, 4 aircraft carriers, 3 battlecruisers, 15 pocket battleships, 5 heavy cruisers, 44 light cruisers or flotilla leaders, 68 destroyers, 90 torpedo boats, and 240 submarines, but the premature outbreak of war halted progress, diverting steel and labor to land forces. Grand Admiral , as Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine, championed this surface-oriented "balanced fleet" doctrine, drawing from interwar analyses of World War I's Jutland battle to envision opportunistic raids and eventual decisive actions against divided British forces, rather than a Mahanist confrontation of battle lines. Raeder's vision prioritized capital ships for prestige and deterrence, influencing early commerce raider deployments like the pocket battleships Deutschland, Admiral Scheer, and Admiral Graf Spee, designed to disrupt trade routes while forcing the Royal Navy to disperse its assets. However, this strategy presupposed prolonged peacetime buildup, which Hitler's focus on rapid continental conquests undermined, as naval allocations remained subordinate to Heer expansion, capping the fleet at roughly 10% of total defense spending by 1939. In opposition, Commodore , commanding the force from 1936, advocated an asymmetric submarine-centric strategy, arguing in a memorandum that surface vessels were too vulnerable to air and threats in a scenario, and urging immediate production of 300 Type VII s to target merchant s en masse using wolfpack tactics. Dönitz's position gained traction post-war outbreak, as initial successes demonstrated commerce interdiction's potential to economically cripple Britain without risking capital ships, aligning with causal constraints of inferior shipbuilding capacity—Germany produced only 23 new s in 1939-1940, versus Britain's escort buildup. Hitler's directives introduced inconsistencies, as he endorsed Raeder's prestige-driven surface ambitions for political signaling—such as parading battleships like Bismarck—while intervening sporadically to align naval efforts with land priorities, exemplified by resource reallocations after Poland's invasion and reluctance to escalate early, fearing U.S. entry. This reflected Hitler's expectation of a swift European victory, rendering a global naval challenge unnecessary, yet it perpetuated a hybrid strategy ill-suited to sustained attrition, with surface raiders tying down U-boat escorts and diluting focus on tonnage warfare.

Early Campaigns: Poland, Scandinavia, and France

The Kriegsmarine's involvement in the began on 1 September 1939, when the Schleswig-Holstein, ostensibly on a goodwill visit to Danzig, commenced bombardment of the Polish ammunition depot at 4:45 a.m., firing the opening salvos of in Europe. This action supported marine infantry assaults, with the Polish holding out until surrendering on 7 September after seven days of resistance. Concurrently, light surface units engaged in the , where German destroyers and torpedo boats neutralized Polish minelayers and submarines, preventing effective counteraction by the small Polish fleet. To secure approaches against British and French naval response, the Kriegsmarine initiated defensive mining in the , employing destroyers, torpedo boats, and minelayers to establish barrages close to German coasts. In the Scandinavian theater, commenced on 9 April 1940 with amphibious assaults on and , utilizing the bulk of the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet—including Blücher, light cruisers, 10 destroyers, and transports—to land roughly 100,000 troops at key ports from Narvik to . surrendered the same day, but Norwegian defenses inflicted severe damage: Blücher was sunk by coastal batteries at in , claiming about 1,000 lives and delaying the capital's capture. The campaign exacted a heavy toll, with the Kriegsmarine losing one , one light cruiser (, air-attacked in ), 10 destroyers, and over 2,300 personnel at sea, alongside 3,700 ground casualties. Despite these irreplaceable losses—representing nearly half the destroyers and significant cruiser tonnage—the operation achieved strategic victory by mid-June, securing Norway's ports, denying Allied occupation, and safeguarding Swedish shipments vital to German industry. During the from 10 May to 25 June 1940, Kriegsmarine surface operations remained peripheral to the land-air , focusing on mine warfare to protect flanks and contest the Channel. Destroyers and specialized minelayers sowed extensive fields in the and approaches, including barrages off the and Dover Straits, to deter British naval movements and coastal raids. Direct fleet engagements were minimal, as superiority precluded major sorties, though E-boats and minesweepers supported coastal advances. Following the French armistice on 22 June, German occupation extended to Atlantic harbors—Brest, , , La Pallice, and —yielding fortified bases that bypassed chokepoints for direct ocean access. These facilities enhanced operational reach, though initial exploitation emphasized defensive consolidation over immediate offensive projection.

Battle of the Atlantic: U-Boat Dominance and Decline

The Battle of the Atlantic commenced on 3 September 1939, when U-30 sank the British liner SS Athenia, marking the initial U-boat engagement against Allied merchant shipping. With only 57 operational U-boats at the war's outset, primarily Type VII submarines, early sinkings were limited; in 1939, German submarines accounted for 57 merchant vessels totaling approximately 191,000 gross register tons (GRT). Sinkings escalated in 1940 amid the fall of France, which allowed U-boat bases on the Atlantic coast, reducing transit times and enabling more patrol days; that year, U-boats sank 783 ships for 3.2 million GRT, threatening Britain's imports of food, fuel, and raw materials. The period from June 1940 to May 1941, known as the , saw aces like and achieve notable successes against poorly defended convoys, with monthly sinkings averaging several hundred thousand tons and minimal losses. By early 1941, cumulative sinkings exceeded 1,000 ships, straining Britain's tonnage reserves to critical levels and prompting to describe the threat as the overriding priority. Admiral , head of the arm, refined tactics by emphasizing surfaced night attacks to evade Allied (ASDIC), which was effective against submerged boats but less so against fast surface targets. In mid-1941, Dönitz introduced wolfpack tactics (Rudeltaktik), directing groups of 5 to 20 s to concentrate on detected s via radio coordination, amplifying strike power against Allied formations that relied on escorts and rudimentary air cover limited by short-range . This evolution proved devastating in 1942, during the Second Happy Time off the U.S. East Coast, where unescorted or lightly protected ships yielded 609 vessels sunk for 3.1 million GRT with only 22 s lost. Overall, s sank over 1,000 ships in the Atlantic that year alone, outpacing Allied merchant construction temporarily and imperiling the buildup for operations like and . Allied countermeasures, including expanded systems and gradual extension of air patrols to close the mid-ocean gap, began eroding effectiveness, though sinkings peaked in at 567,000 GRT. The tide turned decisively in , dubbed Black May, when the Kriegsmarine lost 41 s—over 25% of its operational force—for only 258,000 GRT sunk, a ratio of roughly 6,000 tons per boat compared to prior highs exceeding 100,000. Dönitz temporarily withdrew s from the Atlantic, declaring the arm "stabbed through the heart," as Allied advantages in code intelligence, escort carriers, long-range aircraft, and hunter-killer groups enabled preemptive strikes on wolfpacks. German production lagged, commissioning fewer than 200 new boats in against mounting losses, while U.S. ships outproduced sinkings by over 7 million GRT annually. By 1944, operations shifted defensively, with snorkel-equipped boats suffering attrition rates above 50% per patrol; the campaign ultimately failed to sever Britain's supply lines, as total sinkings reached 2,779 Allied and neutral ships for 14.1 million GRT, insufficient against industrial output.

Surface Fleet Raids and Engagements

The Kriegsmarine employed its surface combatants for in the North and South Atlantic, aiming to disrupt Allied merchant shipping while avoiding decisive fleet engagements with the superior . These operations, conducted primarily by pocket battleships (Panzerschiffe) and battlecruisers, yielded tactical successes in tonnage sunk but exposed the fleet's vulnerabilities due to limited numbers of capital ships, chronic fuel shortages, and overwhelming British air and naval superiority. Between and , major surface raids accounted for approximately 400,000 gross tons of Allied shipping, a fraction compared to U-boat achievements, but each immobilized disproportionate British resources for pursuit. Early raids featured the Deutschland-class pocket battleships designed for independent operations under Versailles Treaty constraints. The Admiral Graf Spee, under Kapitän zur See , sailed from on 21 August 1939, sinking nine British merchant vessels totaling 50,089 gross tons in the South Atlantic and by early December. On 13 December 1939, she encountered HMS Ajax, , and off the River Plate, Uruguay, inflicting heavy damage on (two turrets disabled, speed reduced to 18 knots) while sustaining hits that damaged her fuel processing system and galley, leading Langsdorff to scuttle the ship on 17 December to avoid and further combat. The Deutschland conducted a brief North Atlantic from 24 September to 17 November 1939, capturing or sinking two ships (totaling 3,000 tons) without major engagements, while Admiral Scheer, from 23 October 1940 to 1 April 1941, sank 18 vessels (99,320 gross tons) across multiple oceans, refueling from supply ships and evading British patrols through superior speed and . These actions demonstrated the raiders' effectiveness against unarmed merchantmen but highlighted risks when facing concentrated cruiser forces. In February 1941, battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau executed Operation Berlin, departing on 22 January and operating undetected via the . The pair sank or captured 22 Allied (115,622 gross tons) between 8 February and 16 March, including damaging the British oiler Lustrous, before withdrawing to Brest on 22 March amid intensifying British searches that deployed over 20 warships. This raid succeeded due to coordinated wolfpack tactics with U-boats for spotting but ended with both ships damaged by RAF bombs in port, curtailing further independent operations. The Bismarck's in May 1941 paired the new with heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, departing Gotenhafen on 18 May; on 24 May, Bismarck sank in the battle (1,415 British killed, three survivors) with a magazine hit from her 38 cm guns at 24,000 meters, but sustained three shell hits and a strike, reducing speed to 28 knots. Pursued by the , Bismarck was crippled by air attacks from on 26 May (rudder jammed by ), then overwhelmed on 27 May by HMS Rodney and King George V, which fired over 700 16-inch and 14-inch shells, supplemented by torpedoes; she sank with 2,100 of 2,200 crew lost, her loss deemed irreplaceable and shifting German naval focus from surface raiders. By 1942, attrition and fuel rationing—exacerbated by Germany's reliance on synthetic oil production limited to 5 million tons annually—confined most surviving capital ships to French or Norwegian bases under constant RAF threat, with sorties averaging fewer than one per major unit quarterly. Operation Cerberus, the Channel Dash on 11-12 February 1942, saw Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen transit from Brest to Wilhelmshaven under heavy escort of destroyers and E-boats, braving minefields and air attacks that inflicted minor damage (e.g., Gneisenau hit by a bomb, temporarily disabling turrets). The flotilla evaded major Royal Navy interception due to intelligence failures and weather, reaching Germany with negligible losses, though Gneisenau later suffered a canal mine and torpedo damage rendering her inactive. Scharnhorst's final raid, Operation Ostfront on 22 December 1943, targeted Arctic convoy JW 55B off North Cape, Norway; detached from destroyers after shadowing the convoy, she engaged HMS Belfast's cruiser group at 0830 on 26 December, sustaining radar damage and 12-inch hits before breaking off. Re-engaging HMS Duke of York at 1647, Scharnhorst absorbed over 50 heavy shells and 11 torpedoes from accompanying destroyers, capsizing at 1945 with 1,932 of 1,968 crew killed, her destruction eliminating the last operational German battlecruiser threat. These engagements underscored the surface fleet's doctrinal emphasis on hit-and-run tactics but revealed systemic limitations: irreplaceable losses from concentrated Allied firepower and inability to sustain offensive operations amid resource scarcity.

Secondary Theaters: Mediterranean, Arctic, and Baltic

The Kriegsmarine conducted limited but supportive operations in the , primarily through deployments to aid Italian efforts against Allied convoys bound for and . From September 1941 to May 1944, 62 s transited the , with nine sunk en route by Allied forces. These submarines, operating from bases such as and Salamis under the 23rd and 29th Flotillas, achieved peaks of 19 boats active simultaneously by November 1942. In coordination with Italian naval and air units, they targeted key supply runs; for instance, U-73 torpedoed and sank the HMS Eagle with four hits during on 11 August 1942, disrupting the convoy's protection. Despite such tactical successes, the theater's clear waters and Allied air superiority led to the loss of all 62 s, yielding minimal net tonnage sunk relative to the high attrition rate, which Admiral later deemed strategically inefficient. In the Arctic, the battleship Tirpitz served as a formidable deterrent against Allied convoys ferrying Lend-Lease aid to the via northern routes. Relocated to Norwegian fjords in January 1942 following the loss of Bismarck, Tirpitz attempted limited sorties, including Operation Sportpalast to intercept Convoy PQ-12 from 6 to 12 March 1942, though adverse weather prevented engagement. Its potential to sortie with supporting destroyers and heavy cruisers forced the Royal Navy to maintain a continuous presence of capital ships, carriers, and escorts in the region, diverting resources equivalent to several squadrons from other theaters like the Atlantic or Pacific. This "fleet-in-being" posture, rather than direct combat, immobilized British naval assets and influenced convoy routing decisions, such as the dispersal order for PQ-17 in July 1942 amid fears of Tirpitz's involvement. The Baltic theater saw the Kriegsmarine shift to defensive and evacuation roles as Soviet forces advanced in , culminating in from mid-January to early May. Ordered by Dönitz, the operation utilized surviving surface units, merchant vessels, ferries, and fishing boats to ferry approximately two million German troops and civilians from encircled ports like Pillau, Danzig, and to safer western bases amid the . Despite the scale—encompassing over 1,000 voyages—the effort incurred devastating losses from Soviet submarines, aviation, and mines, including the sinking of the liner Wilhelm Gustloff by S-13 on 30 January with about 9,400 fatalities, mostly refugees, and General von Steuben by S-13 on 9 February with over 4,000 dead. These actions preserved significant manpower from capture while highlighting the navy's improvised transport capabilities under dire coastal defense pressures.

Fleet Composition and Capabilities

Surface Combatants: Capital Ships to Destroyers

The Kriegsmarine's capital ships centered on the Bismarck-class battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz, each displacing over 50,000 tons at full load and ordered between 1935 and 1937 as Germany's response to Versailles Treaty restrictions. Designed for decisive fleet engagements in home waters, their heavy armament and armor prioritized countering British capital ships, though operational roles often shifted to Atlantic sorties that forced Allied forces to divert resources for convoy protection and interception. Bismarck sank HMS Hood on 24 May 1941 during Operation Rheinübung but was herself sunk three days later by British naval and air forces after sustaining battle damage. Complementing these were the Scharnhorst-class "battlecruisers" Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, launched in 1936 and 1938, which balanced speed and firepower for raiding operations like the 1941 Operation Berlin, where Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank 22 Allied merchant ships totaling 115,622 gross register tons before returning to Brest. Design compromises included lighter armor compared to true battleships to achieve 31-knot speeds, reflecting treaty-era constraints and emphasis on commerce disruption over direct confrontation. Scharnhorst was sunk on 26 December 1943 off by HMS Duke of York and accompanying destroyers during the . The Deutschland-class "pocket battleships"—Deutschland (renamed Lützow in 1940), Admiral Scheer, and Admiral Graf Spee—displaced around 15,000 tons and were engineered for extended commerce raiding, leveraging diesel propulsion for 28-knot speeds and superior range to outrun heavier opponents while outgunning cruisers. Admiral Scheer exemplified this role, operating from October 1940 to April 1941 and sinking 17 merchant vessels for 99,684 gross register tons without direct combat losses. Admiral Graf Spee scuttled herself on 17 December 1939 after the Battle of the River Plate to avoid encirclement, highlighting vulnerabilities to coordinated hunter-killer groups despite initial successes. These ships embodied naval treaty evasions, classifying as "heavy cruisers" under tonnage limits but functioning as fast battleship substitutes. Heavy cruisers of the Admiral Hipper class, including Admiral Hipper, Blücher, and Prinz Eugen, displaced approximately 18,000 tons and supported amphibious operations, such as Blücher's sinking during the 9 April 1940 invasion of by Norwegian coastal defenses and British submarines. Intended for scouting and independent raiding, they featured high speeds for commerce interception but faced design trade-offs in stability and seaworthiness due to top-heavy constructions. Light cruisers like the Königsberg class augmented these, with Königsberg sunk by RAF bombers on 10 April 1940 at , marking the first major warship lost to air attack. Destroyers, predominantly Z-class vessels of the 1934 and 1936 types, represented innovations in size and torpedo armament for fleet screening and offensive strikes, displacing up to 3,500 tons with enhanced anti-aircraft capabilities over Weimar-era designs. However, early attrition crippled numbers: during the April 1940 , ten destroyers were lost to British forces, comprising nearly half the Kriegsmarine's operational strength and exposing production shortfalls. Total wartime losses reached 27 destroyers, with only limited replacements amid resource prioritization for U-boats and aircraft, rendering the surface fleet increasingly defensive by 1942.
Ship CategoryKey ClassesPrimary RolesNotable Losses
Battleships/BattlecruisersBismarck, ScharnhorstFleet actions, threat to convoys4 sunk (Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Tirpitz, others including pre-dreadnoughts)
Pocket BattleshipsDeutschlandCommerce raiding1 scuttled (Graf Spee), others damaged/sunk late war
Heavy CruisersAdmiral HipperRaiding, invasions1 sunk early (Blücher), others interned or bombed
DestroyersZ-class (/1936)Escort, torpedo attacks27 total, 10 at Narvik
Overall, the Kriegsmarine lost seven capital ships across categories, underscoring design ambitions clashing with industrial limitations and Allied superiority in numbers and air power.

Submarine Force Structure

The Kriegsmarine's submarine force, known as the U-boat Arm, primarily consisted of Type VII and Type IX submarines, which dominated the fleet's composition for offensive operations. Type VII boats, optimized for Atlantic patrols with a range of approximately 8,500 nautical miles surfaced, formed the core with over 700 units commissioned across variants like the VIIC. Type IX submarines, larger and suited for extended voyages up to 13,000 nautical miles, numbered around 200, enabling operations in distant theaters. These types accounted for the bulk of the 1,153 U-boats commissioned between 1935 and 1945 by German shipyards. At the outbreak of war on , only 57 U-boats were operational, limiting initial capabilities. Production accelerated under resource prioritization, with annual commissions rising to peaks of over 240 in 1944, incorporating advanced designs like the Type XXI for higher underwater speeds. This ramp-up expanded the fleet's scale, though approximately 784 of the 1,156 built were lost, equating to a loss rate near 70 percent. U-boat crews, typically 40 to 55 men per vessel, endured severe conditions including extreme overcrowding, inadequate ventilation, and minimal hygiene facilities, with bunks often shared or placed near machinery and munitions. Patrol durations of three to six weeks demanded endurance under constant strain, yet refit times as short as two weeks enabled high rates, sustaining operational pressure through frequent deployments despite mounting attrition.

Auxiliary, Captured, and Support Vessels

The Kriegsmarine utilized auxiliary cruisers, converted with hidden armaments including 150 mm guns, torpedoes, and , to conduct long-range disguised as neutral vessels. Nine such raiders operated between 1939 and 1943 across the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, sinking or capturing over 140 Allied totaling more than 700,000 gross register tons before most were lost to enemy action or scuttled. The (HSK-2), commissioned in March 1940 under Kapitän zur See , exemplified their effectiveness, sinking or capturing 22 ships of 145,697 tons over 622 days at sea until her destruction by HMS Devonshire on 22 November 1941 south of . Other notable raiders included the Kormoran (HSK-8), which sank nine ships and damaged HMS Sydney in November 1941 before scuttling herself, contributing to the overall disruption of Allied shipping lanes without direct fleet engagements. Captured vessels from occupied nations supplemented the Kriegsmarine's auxiliary capacity after invasions in 1940. From the Netherlands, several gunboats and incomplete warships fell into German hands following the May 1940 capitulation, with three advanced destroyers seized and commissioned as Z1 to Z3 in 1941-42 for coastal duties after refit. In France, post-June 1940 armistice seizures included four Flower-class corvettes (Arquebuse, Hallebarde, Sabre, and Poignard) repurposed as convoy escorts, alongside the incomplete battleship Clemenceau, which remained unfinished due to resource shortages despite capture at Brest. These acquisitions, totaling dozens of smaller craft from Norway, Greece, and other territories, provided immediate logistical utility but often required extensive repairs and faced crew shortages, limiting their strategic impact. Support vessels formed the backbone of Kriegsmarine logistics, including converted tankers and tenders that refueled raiders and U-boats at sea via the secret supply service established in 1939. Minesweepers, critical for securing coastal and inland waterways, comprised 679 M-boats (motor minesweepers of various classes, typically 500-600 tons with 105 mm guns) and 424 R-boats (räumboote, 140-ton coastal types with 20 mm antiaircraft guns), which cleared minefields and escorted convoys. In the Baltic Sea, these craft enabled defensive operations against Soviet forces from 1941 onward, while in the Black Sea—accessed via Danube River disassembly and reassembly starting in 1942—similar small support flotillas, including R-boats and tenders, facilitated Army Group South's supply lines against Soviet naval threats until 1944 retreats. Troop transports and netlayers further sustained amphibious logistics in these enclosed theaters, though vulnerabilities to air attack and fuel scarcity hampered sustained effectiveness.

Organization, Command, and Personnel

Leadership and Command Structure

The Kriegsmarine's leadership was centered on the Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine ( of the Navy), who directed the Seekriegsleitung (SKL), the naval war staff in responsible for strategic planning and operational directives. This structure emphasized centralized control from the (OKM), with holding the position from the navy's formation in 1935 until January 30, 1943. Raeder advocated for a balanced surface fleet influenced by Mahanian principles, but execution was constrained by limited resources and Adolf Hitler's overriding authority on major decisions. Raeder's resignation stemmed from escalating conflicts with Hitler over surface fleet efficacy, particularly after the on December 31, 1942, during which German cruisers Admiral Hipper and Lützow withdrew from engaging Allied convoy JW 51B after sustaining damage and losing the destroyer Friedrich Eckoldt, allowing the convoy to reach intact. Hitler, viewing the incident as emblematic of naval incompetence, summoned Raeder on January 4, 1943, and decreed the scrapping of major surface warships to repurpose steel for land forces and U-boats. Raeder's inability to counter these criticisms led to his departure after nearly eight years in command. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz succeeded Raeder on January 30, 1943, shifting emphasis to where his prior experience as had yielded successes in the . Dönitz maintained the SKL's central role but granted greater operational latitude to commanders, contrasting the rigid oversight imposed on surface units. Hitler's interventions progressively undermined naval autonomy, as he personally vetoed risky sorties for capital ships like the Tirpitz and prioritized army needs over fleet maintenance, while theater-level commands—such as Marinegruppenkommando West for Atlantic operations—executed directives with diminished initiative. This top-down control, formalized through Hitler's absolute authority post-1939, subordinated professional judgment to political and land-centric imperatives, contributing to strategic inflexibility.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Training Regimes

The rank structure of the Kriegsmarine followed a traditional naval hierarchy, divided into enlisted personnel (Matrosen), non-commissioned officers (Unteroffiziere), and commissioned officers (Offiziere), with equivalents paralleling those in the Heer and but featuring naval-specific terminology and distinctions. Enlisted ranks began with and progressed through specialized ratings like , while NCO ranks included Bootsmann (boatswain) equivalents up to . Officer ranks started at Fähnrich zur See (midshipman) and ascended to , Vizeadmiral, , and the supreme Großadmiral, with holding the latter by 1943. included stripes for officers and badges for specialists, overlaid with the naval eagle (), a stylized eagle clutching a , rendered in embroidery for officers and yellow for enlisted on breast patches.
CategoryGerman RankEnglish EquivalentInsignia Notes
EnlistedMatroseSeamanBasic collar patches
NCOChevrons and specialty badges
Junior OfficerLeutnant zur SeeLieutenant (jg)Gold sleeve stripes
Senior OfficerKapitän zur SeeMultiple stripes, eagle on cap
Flag OfficerAdmiralBroad stripes, epaulets
Uniforms retained designs rooted in the Kaiserliche Marine tradition, with minimal evolution beyond practical adaptations for wartime conditions, emphasizing durability against oil and sea exposure. Standard enlisted attire comprised a blue jumper and trousers with a sailor collar edged in three white stripes, paired with a flat "" cap or for officers; summer variants included white uniforms for . Officers wore tunics in dark blue wool, accented by gold buttons and the naval eagle on the right breast, with s bearing wire-stiffened peaks and oak leaf bands for senior ranks. Fatigues shifted to gray-blue for shipboard work to resist stains, but shortages led to simplified production without altering core elements like the eagle . Training regimes prioritized technical proficiency and , reflecting the Kriegsmarine's emphasis on a small, skilled force amid rapid expansion constraints. Enlisted sailors underwent initial basic in gunnery, handling, and damage control at naval bases like or , followed by specialized shipboard assignments; U-boat crews received additional submerged and drills. Officer candidates, selected via rigorous psychological and physical exams, completed a three-year program starting with schooling, encompassing , , and tactics, often culminating in duty aboard surface vessels before specialization. Despite officer shortages from high attrition—exacerbated by the navy's pre-1939 limitations— maintained a focus on practical skills over ideological , though branches expanded to address technical demands. By mid-war, abbreviated courses for reserves strained quality, yet core regimens ensured operational competence in constrained resources.

Manpower Mobilization and Losses

The Kriegsmarine began with approximately 78,000 personnel on 1 , primarily drawn from pre-war volunteers and early conscripts under the 1935 rearmament laws that mandated universal for German males aged 18-45. Expansion accelerated through compulsory induction, prioritizing skilled tradesmen for naval roles, though the service attracted fewer volunteers than the due to the perceived risks of ; by 1941, the force had grown to over 400,000, incorporating auxiliary coastal units and support personnel as surface and submarine operations intensified. Peak strength reached more than 800,000 in 1944, encompassing active sailors, reservists, foreign auxiliaries, and land-based naval infantry divisions formed from surplus manpower amid Germany's . Losses were disproportionately high, with the U-boat arm suffering the most severe attrition: of roughly 40,900 men recruited for submarine service, approximately 28,000 died and 5,000 were captured, yielding a fatality rate near 70% and the highest casualty proportion among Wehrmacht branches. Overall Kriegsmarine fatalities exceeded 100,000, driven by the sinking of 783 and numerous surface vessels, though exact totals remain imprecise due to incomplete records from late-war chaos; surface fleet personnel faced lower per capita losses, around 20-30%, as capital ships like the Bismarck and Tirpitz accounted for concentrated but sporadic casualties. These rates stemmed from Allied technological superiority in detection and convoy protection after , exacerbating equipment shortages and operational demands. Sustained attrition eroded morale and recruitment efficacy, with volunteers dwindling by mid-war as awareness of survival odds—often described internally as a "one-way ticket"—spread despite efforts; filled gaps but yielded undertrained crews, contributing to higher loss rates in 1944-1945 when monthly sinkings peaked at over 100. This manpower crisis forced reallocations from other services and reliance on minimal foreign volunteers, such as limited French naval units, underscoring the navy's vulnerability in a prolonged attrition war against superior Allied resources.

Technological Innovations and Challenges

Ship Design and Armament Advances

The Kriegsmarine's submarine designs centered on diesel-electric propulsion, which allowed efficient long-range surface cruising on diesel engines while enabling quiet submerged operations powered by batteries charged at sea. This system provided Type VII , the most numerous class, with a surfaced range of up to 8,500 nautical miles at 10 knots, facilitating extended patrols in the Atlantic. Later Type XXI "Elektroboote" advanced this concept with streamlined hulls, larger battery capacity for 340 km submerged at 5 knots, and automated loading for six bow tubes, though few entered service before war's end. The Schnorchel, or snorkel, represented a key adaptation for underwater diesel operation at depth, extending submerged time and reducing vulnerability to air detection; U-58 conducted initial tests in the Baltic during summer 1943, with operational deployment following in late 1943 on Type VIIC boats. However, its late introduction—after peak U-boat losses—limited strategic impact, as Allied air superiority and hunter-killer groups had already curtailed wolfpack effectiveness. Surface ship designs emphasized balanced armament under treaty constraints, exemplified by the Deutschland-class pocket battleships, which nominally displaced 10,000 tons but actually exceeded 12,000 tons, mounting six 28 cm guns for commerce raiding. Capital ships like Bismarck incorporated innovative welding techniques for superior armor penetration resistance and advanced optical fire control, yet anti-aircraft upgrades—adding layers of 105 mm, 37 mm, and 20 mm guns during refits—proved insufficient against massed carrier-based attacks, as demonstrated by the vulnerability of ships like Scharnhorst and Tirpitz to aerial strikes despite dense flak barrages. Resource shortages further hampered innovations; aluminum scarcity, prioritized for Luftwaffe aircraft, delayed the Graf Zeppelin carrier, whose construction halted in 1940 amid material reallocations, preventing completion of its planned dive-bomber and fighter air group.

Cryptographic Systems and Intelligence Failures

The Kriegsmarine employed the Enigma rotor-based cipher machine for encrypting radio communications, particularly vital for coordinating wolfpack operations in the Atlantic. The naval variants evolved from the M1 model in the to the M3 with three rotors and a plugboard in 1940, enhancing permutation complexity to over 10^14 possible daily settings. This system relied on daily key changes, rotor wirings, and reflector substitutions to achieve what German cryptologists deemed mathematically unbreakable against brute-force attacks. Allied cryptanalysts, building on Polish pre-war insights into Enigma mechanics, achieved consistent decryption of Kriegsmarine traffic by early 1940 through Bletchley Park's under , using electromechanical devices to test rotor configurations against cribs derived from predictable message formats. Ultra intelligence from these intercepts enabled the Allies to read position reports and orders from mid-1940, facilitating rerouting that evaded approximately 20 operational s in the North Atlantic during critical phases of the . However, the introduction of the four-rotor Enigma M4 on February 1, 1942, for networks quadrupled cryptographic depth and temporarily blinded Allied readers, creating a nine-month "blackout" until December 1942, when captures of codebooks and improved analytic techniques restored access. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, as , grew suspicious of compromises by late 1941 amid unexplained convoy evasions and sinkings, such as the January 12, 1942, interception far off despite no prior radio emissions. Investigations by his signals officer implicated (HF/DF) and potential espionage over outright code breakage, prompting procedural shifts like the M4 adoption and stricter , yet these arrived too late to stem mounting losses after Ultra resumed in earnest by March 1943. Dönitz's post-war testimony acknowledged persistent doubts but attributed persistence in Enigma use to assurances from the OKW cipher bureau that mathematical safeguards precluded decryption. A core intelligence failure stemmed from overreliance on Enigma's theoretical security, sidelining vulnerabilities in and operational discipline; frequent position reports essential for wolfpack tactics—up to 30 daily messages per boat—exposed locations via Allied HF/DF fixes even absent full decrypts, with German evaluators dismissing such patterns as insufficient evidence of systemic breach. Captured Enigma components and codebooks from scuttled s, like U-110 in May 1941, further eroded security without prompting wholesale abandonment, as faith in permutations overshadowed holistic . This doctrinal rigidity, prioritizing cryptographic elegance over empirical indicators of compromise, amplified Ultra's decisive edge in neutralizing effectiveness by mid-1943.

Torpedo and Weaponry Issues

The Kriegsmarine encountered severe technical deficiencies with its primary torpedoes, the G7a steam-driven and G7e electric models, which manifested as the "Torpedo Crisis" from September 1939 to mid-1942. These weapons suffered from inconsistent depth-keeping, where torpedoes ran deeper than preset—such as G7a units set at 4 meters actually averaging 6.5 meters, and G7e variants exceeding set depths by up to 1.5 meters or more due to balance chamber leaks and pressure imbalances. Magnetic influence pistols (MZ) triggered premature explosions at rates around 9.8% in early operations, exacerbated by environmental factors like the variations near and , while contact pistols (AZ) often failed to detonate on impact at angles shallower than 21 degrees, stemming from premature firing pin release and inadequate sensitivity. These defects resulted in dismal hit rates during critical early-war engagements, with successful detonations below 10% in high-profile attacks; for instance, during the April 1940 , only 5 of 44 torpedoes achieved hits (11% rate), and U-47's October 1939 raid yielded just 2 hits from 7 launches amid multiple duds. Overall early-war averages hovered around 40-48% from to April 1940, but crisis periods like saw sharp drops attributable to malfunctions rather than misses alone, undermining effectiveness against both warships and merchants. Surface torpedo tubes on destroyers and cruisers inherited similar variants, compounding issues with gyroangle firing instability from hull protrusions and heeling during launch. Root causes traced to production shortcuts and pre-war constraints under the Versailles Treaty, which limited live-fire testing to minimal warshot trials; designs prioritized magnetic innovation over robust depth mechanisms, with rushed scaling for wartime output bypassing iterative validation, as torpedo factories like those under Torpedo-Versuchsanstalt (TVA) overlooked seal integrity and tolerances in favor of quantity. Fixes lagged: magnetic pistols were banned on October 2, 1939, after initial failures, with partial contact upgrades (Type 3 AZ) and depth aids (TA-1 device) introduced by May 1940, yet full depth resolution required identifying balance chamber leaks in February 1942 via U-94 recovery data, and magnetic reliability only stabilized with Pi2 and TZ5 variants in late 1942. This delay forfeited opportunities in 1940-1941, when improved testing could have aligned reliability with pre-war prototypes, per analyses of Kriegsmarine war diaries. Weaponry beyond torpedoes faced ancillary challenges, including 88 mm and 105 mm deck on U-boats prone to in saltwater exposure without adequate seals, leading to misfires in prolonged patrols, though these were secondary to woes and addressed via field modifications by 1941. Larger surface combatants like destroyers experienced 12.7 cm hydraulic failures from rushed refits, but empirical data attributes most early combat ineffectiveness to unreliability rather than ordnance.

Military Effectiveness and Strategic Impact

Key Achievements and Near-Victories

The Kriegsmarine's fleet achieved its primary strategic success through commerce raiding in the , sinking 3,572 Allied merchant vessels totaling 14,218,345 gross registered tons (GRT) over the course of the war. These operations peaked in effectiveness during 1940–1942, with coordinated wolfpack tactics—developed by Admiral —involving patrol lines of submarines that shadowed and mass-attacked Allied convoys, exploiting gaps in escort coverage and air protection to maximize sinkings. In 1941 alone, U-boats accounted for over 4 million tons of Allied shipping losses, surpassing merchant construction rates and reducing British imports to critically low levels, where food and raw material shortages threatened economic collapse and forced to sustain the . Operation Weserübung, the April 1940 invasion of and , represented a bold surface fleet achievement, with Kriegsmarine warships transporting over 100,000 troops across contested waters to seize key ports like Narvik and despite inferior numbers to the Royal Navy. This operation secured Norwegian territory for iron ore shipments and bases, while the ensuing campaign tied down approximately one-third of British naval assets in Scandinavian waters, diverting them from other theaters and enabling German control of the region until 1945. German auxiliary cruisers and surface raiders, operating as disguised commerce destroyers from 1939 to 1941, sank or captured 140 ships totaling around 700,000 GRT, disrupting Allied trade routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans without direct fleet engagements. Near-victories included the Bismarck's May 1941 sortie, which sank the battlecruiser HMS Hood—Britain's largest warship—in a single salvo, demonstrating the potency of heavy surface units before the ship's subsequent pursuit and destruction. Similarly, the February 1942 Channel Dash allowed battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, along with cruiser Prinz Eugen, to transit the English Channel under Allied noses, evading air and surface interception to reach German home waters intact and preserving key assets for later operations. Wolfpack innovations, validated by these high-tonnage hauls, underscored the viability of group submarine tactics, later adapted by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific and informing modern anti-shipping doctrines emphasizing coordinated wolfpack-style assaults.

Critical Failures and Doctrinal Errors

The Kriegsmarine's pre-war doctrine, shaped by , emphasized a "balanced fleet" strategy focused on surface raiders and capital ships to contest British naval superiority, diverting industrial resources from . This approach yielded only 57 U-boats by 1 , with merely 26 capable of extended Atlantic operations, far short of the 300 advocated by commander as necessary for decisive commerce destruction. Raeder's insistence on prestige projects like the Bismarck—commissioned 24 August 1940 and sunk 27 May 1941 after sinking but inflicting limited broader damage—exemplified resource misallocation, as its construction consumed capacity equivalent to producing dozens of Type VII U-boats, each vital for sustained . Adolf Hitler's strategic preoccupation with defending occupied against hypothetical Allied invasions further paralyzed surface fleet operations, stationing key assets like the Tirpitz in fjords from January 1942, where they remained largely inert and vulnerable to air strikes. Hitler repeatedly vetoed offensive deployments for Tirpitz due to fears of catastrophic loss, confining it to a defensive role that tied down Allied forces but yielded no significant German naval initiative; the ship endured multiple raids before its destruction by 29 RAF Lancaster bombers using Tallboy bombs on 12 November 1944. This immobilization stemmed from Hitler's causal overemphasis on territorial security over fluid projection, rendering capital ships strategically impotent amid Allied air and dominance. Doctrinal and technical delays in adopting advanced submarines compounded these errors, particularly with the Type XXI "," designed for prolonged submerged operations but introduced too late to alter outcomes. Despite initiation in 1943, the first boats commissioned in faced production bottlenecks, crew training shortfalls, and Allied disruptions, with only two—U-2511 and U-3008—attempting patrols by early 1945; neither sank enemy vessels, as U-2511 detected but bypassed a convoy on 4 May 1945 per standing orders, and the war ended days later on 8 May. Of 118 completed, the majority remained non-operational, underscoring the Kriegsmarine's failure to prioritize scalable, adaptive technologies over rigid pre-war visions.

Comparative Analysis with Allied Navies

The Kriegsmarine operated at a profound material disadvantage relative to the Royal Navy, constrained by the 1935 to no more than 35% of British surface and 45% for , though actual deployments fell far short of even these limits due to Germany's delayed rearmament and resource priorities favoring land and air forces. In 1939, the Royal Navy displaced over 1.4 million tons across 15 battleships, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers, and 184 destroyers, while the Kriegsmarine mustered approximately 240,000 tons, including just 2 battleships (one outdated), no carriers, 6 cruisers, and 21 destroyers. This disparity—roughly one-tenth in effective surface combat power—compelled German planners to prioritize asymmetric strategies over symmetric fleet engagements, leveraging for rather than contesting Allied control of sea lanes through superiority. Doctrinally, the Kriegsmarine emphasized qualitative edges in targeted domains, such as Type VII U-boat designs optimized for Atlantic wolfpack tactics to disrupt Allied supply lines, contrasting with Allied emphasis on quantitative depth, convoy defenses, and integrated air-naval operations. German surface units, like pocket battleships and heavy cruisers, were built for hit-and-run raids on merchant traffic, reflecting a commerce-war focus inherited from but adapted to avoid Mahanian decisive battles against numerically superior foes. The Royal and emerging U.S. , conversely, invested in balanced fleets with growing carrier aviation and (ASW) escorts, enabling sustained projection of power and adaptation to technological counters like and . This doctrinal divergence proved viable for Germany in radar-scarce early phases, where U-boats achieved sinkings exceeding 500,000 tons monthly in 1941-1942 through coordinated packs, but faltered as Allied industrial mobilization scaled ASW assets. Allied production overwhelmed Axis constraints, exemplified by U.S. shipyards commissioning 145 s and over 100 destroyer escorts in alone, alongside merchant output surpassing sinkings by a factor of two-to-one by mid-. Total U.S. wartime construction reached 5,777 major vessels, including 504 destroyer escorts tailored for protection, dwarfing Germany's peak output of 250 units annually by 1944 amid bombing-disrupted yards. The Kriegsmarine's qualitative innovations, such as schnorkel-equipped submarines, yielded disproportionate early impacts—sinking 14 million gross registered tons of Allied shipping overall—but could not offset systemic industrial inferiority, as Allied merchant replacements exceeded losses from onward, ensuring logistical resilience. This asymmetry underscored how German reliance on precision strikes eroded against opponents' capacity for attrition, rendering pre-radar advantages obsolete in a economy.
AspectKriegsmarine (Peak Strength)Royal Navy (1939)U.S. Navy (1943 Output Example)
Surface Tonnage Ratio to RN~17% (effective)BaselineN/A (expanded fleet)
U-boats Built~1,170 totalMinimal submarine focus504 destroyer escorts for ASW
Annual Escorts/Destroyers~20-30 surface escorts184 destroyers initial145+ destroyers + DEs
The table illustrates raw disparities, with Allied scaling enabling doctrinal flexibility—such as escort carrier integration—that neutralized German raiding efficacy by 1944.

Controversies, War Conduct, and Ethical Realities

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare Practices

The Kriegsmarine initiated upon the outbreak of on 3 September 1939, authorizing U-boats to attack enemy merchant shipping without prior warning or adherence to traditional prize rules within declared war zones around Britain. This departure from surface raider protocols stemmed from the numerical inferiority of Germany's surface fleet against the Royal Navy, necessitating a focus on asymmetric commerce destruction to sever Britain's lifelines of food, fuel, and raw materials in a scenario. Under Admiral Karl Dönitz's leadership as from 1939, the strategy emphasized a "" aimed at sinking merchant vessels at a rate exceeding Allied construction capacity, thereby compelling Britain to divert resources from offensive operations. Wolfpack tactics, involving coordinated groups of U-boats shadowing and mass-attacking convoys at night, maximized efficiency by overwhelming escorts and concentrating strikes on high-value targets. Operational imperatives in prioritized rapid sinkings over survivor rescues, as surfacing to assist exposed submarines to detection by , destroyers, or vessels, while diverting patrol time from further engagements. Dönitz's directives evolved to explicitly limit such actions, recognizing that the vulnerability of single U-boats precluded the extended protocols feasible for larger warships, thus aligning with the causal demands of sustained . German U-boats achieved approximately 70% of total Allied merchant tonnage losses, sinking 2,770 ships totaling 14.5 million gross registered tons, predominantly without support from the surface fleet crippled by early losses such as the of major units post-Norway and Bismarck operations. This empirical dominance underscored the policy's effectiveness in isolating the British economy until mid-1943 countermeasures like improved protections and air cover shifted the balance.

Specific Incidents and Alleged Atrocities

The occurred on 12 September 1942 when German U-156, commanded by Kapitänleutnant , torpedoed the British RMS Laconia in the South Atlantic, resulting in over 1,800 deaths but with approximately 2,200 survivors initially afloat. Hartenstein ordered the rescue of survivors, including Allied personnel, and broadcast a message offering to deliver them safely to neutral or French control if Allied forces refrained from attacks; Italian and vessels responded to assist. On 16 September, a U.S. Army Air Forces B-24 Liberator bomber, despite recognizing the Red Cross markings on U-156 and the rescue flotilla, attacked the submarine with bombs and runs, killing several dozen survivors and crew while forcing Hartenstein to scuttle the effort and submerge. This event prompted Admiral to issue the "" on 17 September 1942, directing commanders to cease rescue operations for enemy survivors to prioritize operational security and avoid similar betrayals, though it explicitly prohibited killing castaways unless they resisted or threatened the boat. Post-war Allied claims alleged widespread machine-gunning of shipwrecked survivors by Kriegsmarine U-boats as a deliberate policy, but British and U.S. naval investigations, including those at the , verified only isolated deviations rather than systematic practice. The sole confirmed case of intentional machine-gunning involved U-852 under Heinz-Wolfgang Eck, which sank the Greek steamer on 30 March 1944 off ; Eck ordered his crew to fire on lifeboats and rafts with machine guns and shoot at individual swimmers, then depth-charge the debris to eliminate evidence, motivated by fears of detection rather than the . Three survivors reached British authorities, leading to Eck's trial by a British court in 1945, where he was convicted of war crimes and executed by hanging; no other U-boat commander faced similar conviction for survivor mistreatment. Under the Führerbefehl () issued by on 18 October 1942, Kriegsmarine coastal and port security units were required to execute captured Allied commandos operating behind lines, even in uniform, to deter sabotage against naval infrastructure such as U-boat pens and drydocks. This applied to naval encounters during amphibious raids, such as elements of the St. Nazaire operation (March 1942, predating the order but influencing its rationale) where captured raiders were interrogated by naval intelligence before handover to the for execution or trial; post-order incidents involved summary treatment of saboteurs posing as fishermen or infiltrators near occupied harbors. The order's rationale stemmed from perceived violations of Hague Conventions by irregular fighters, amid threats like attacks on ships, though it bypassed POW status; Dönitz endorsed its application to submarine-transported commandos but faced no conviction for enforcement, as the noted equivalent Allied practices against paratroopers. Verified executions numbered in the dozens for naval-captured personnel, contextualized by the high operational risks to Kriegsmarine assets from such incursions.

Contextual Comparisons to Allied Naval Actions

Allied naval forces, particularly the Royal Navy and US Navy, engaged in practices during World War II that paralleled aspects of Kriegsmarine unrestricted submarine warfare, including attacks on vessels displaying medical markings and the strafing of survivors in the water. On 18 November 1944, two British double-engine bombers attacked the German hospital ship near Pola in the , using machine guns and bombs despite its marked status, resulting in damage and casualties among medical personnel and patients. Similarly, on 3 May 1944, four British fighter aircraft machine-gunned survivors from the near Bender-Beila, , after its sinking, in an incident documented as a violation of conventions on shipwrecked personnel. These actions occurred amid broader Allied policies prioritizing operational and resource constraints, where efforts for Axis submariners diminished as the war progressed, reflecting pragmatic adaptations to rather than isolated aberrations. The Royal Navy's blockade of Germany from September 1939 onward, enforced through contraband control and mining, aimed to cripple the Axis economy by restricting food and raw materials, leading to severe and among German civilians, with caloric intake dropping to as low as 1,000-1,500 per day by 1944-1945. This economic strangulation mirrored the Kriegsmarine's against Allied merchant shipping, which sought to starve Britain of imports; both strategies accepted civilian hardship as a byproduct of denying resources to the , with the contributing to heightened vulnerability during the war's final phases. Complementing naval efforts, RAF Bomber Command's of 14 February 1942 explicitly targeted German cities to undermine industrial output and civilian morale, resulting in operations like the Hamburg of July 1943, which killed approximately 42,600 civilians through incendiary attacks on urban areas. These aerial campaigns, dropping over 1.5 million tons of bombs on German targets by war's end, paralleled the indirect civilian toll of naval s by systematically disrupting , , and , underscoring a shared Allied commitment to total . In the context of mutual escalation, such practices on both sides stemmed from the imperatives of a conflict where conventional restraints eroded under the pressure of survival and victory; Allied sinkings of Axis vessels and targeting of population centers were not framed as uniquely barbaric in contemporary accounts but as necessary countermeasures to German initiatives like the of 1942, which prioritized operations over survivor rescue. Historians note that while post-war narratives emphasized Axis violations, declassified records reveal symmetric deviations from and protocols when tactical advantages dictated, with no evidence of systematic Kriegsmarine policies exceeding Allied equivalents in intent or execution during unrestricted phases. This equivalence highlights total war's causal dynamics, where both coalitions pursued victory through comprehensive attrition, rendering claims of one-sided ethical lapses untenable without ignoring comparable empirical outcomes.

Dissolution and Post-War Legacy

Surrender, Division, and Trials

Following Adolf Hitler's suicide on April 30, 1945, succeeded him as head of state, serving briefly until May 23, 1945, during which he authorized the Kriegsmarine's cessation of hostilities. On May 4, 1945, Dönitz issued orders to all commanders to surface, fly black flags indicating surrender, and proceed to designated Allied ports, effectively ending operations. Of the 64 s at sea that day, 56 surrendered, though 41 were subsequently scuttled in harbors under Operation Regenbogen to prevent their capture and use by the Allies. The broader Kriegsmarine formally capitulated with Germany's on May 7–8, 1945, after which surviving vessels were either seized, scuttled, or repurposed for Allied under , where over 100 s were sunk off between June and August 1945. Post-surrender, the Kriegsmarine was dissolved by Allied decree, with its remnants divided along occupation zone lines. In the Western zones, surviving ships and equipment were largely scrapped or used temporarily for before , paving the way for the Bundesmarine's establishment on January 26, 1956, as West Germany's NATO-integrated navy; this force incorporated vetted former Kriegsmarine personnel, including officers, after processes. In the Soviet-occupied East, naval assets were systematically dismantled and scrapped to eliminate any militaristic continuity, with no direct inheritance; East Germany's , formed in 1956, relied on new Soviet-supplied vessels rather than Kriegsmarine relics. At the (1945–1946), Kriegsmarine leaders faced charges of planning aggressive war and violations of naval warfare conventions. , commander until 1943, received a life sentence for his role in pre-war naval expansion and early war planning but was released in 1955 after nine years due to health issues. Dönitz, tried for and issuing the May 1945 orders, was convicted on one count and sentenced to 10 years, serving until 1956; the tribunal noted his actions mirrored Allied practices, contributing to the relatively lenient outcome compared to army counterparts, many of whom faced execution for land-based atrocities. No other senior Kriegsmarine figures received death penalties, reflecting the 's primary focus on maritime operations distant from continental war crimes.

Historiographical Debates and Modern Reassessments

Modern scholarship has increasingly challenged earlier portrayals of the Kriegsmarine as fundamentally incompetent or ideologically driven to failure, emphasizing instead empirical constraints and strategic contingencies. Gordon Williamson's 2022 analysis in Hitler's Navy: The Kriegsmarine in reassesses the service's structure, personnel, and materiel, underscoring the fleet's operational potency despite limited industrial output; by 1941, produced only 242 Type VII submarines, far short of the 300 per month deemed necessary for decisive attrition of Allied merchant tonnage. This work highlights how doctrinal focus on asymmetric nearly succeeded, with U-boats accounting for 70% of Allied shipping losses (approximately 14.5 million gross register tons sunk between 1939 and 1945), peaking in May 1942 when sinkings outpaced new constructions by a factor of 2:1. Debates persist over causal primacy in the navy's strategic shortfalls, with emerging as a core factor over inherent doctrinal flaws or ideological rigidity. Erich Raeder's advocacy for a surface-oriented Z-Plan, approved by Hitler in 1939 for 10 battleships and 4 aircraft carriers by 1948, diverted steel and labor from expansion, yielding just 57 operational submarines by September 1939 against Britain's 750 warships; Dönitz later calculated that reallocating these assets could have doubled U-boat output, potentially tipping the before Allied countermeasures like centimetric matured in 1943. Postwar analyses, including those in the U.S. Naval Institute's proceedings, attribute defeat not to naval ineptitude but to Germany's broader prioritization of land campaigns, which consumed 85% of war production by 1942, leaving the Kriegsmarine with 1.2% of GDP allocation versus the Royal Navy's 60%. On ethical dimensions, historiographical contention surrounds extensions of the debunked "clean Wehrmacht" myth to the navy, where evidence of complicity in executions (e.g., 1940 Norwegian sabotage reprisals) and auxiliary roles in occupied territories refutes claims of apolitical professionalism, yet critics argue that academia's emphasis on such incidents—often amplified by institutional biases toward moral framing—obscures tactical innovations like wolfpack tactics, which inflicted 3,500 Allied vessel losses through coordinated empirical adaptation rather than ideological fervor. Balanced reassessments, drawing from primary records, posit the Kriegsmarine as less penetrated by SS-style extremism than the Heer, with failures rooted in material scarcity (e.g., only 1,162 U-boats completed versus 1,100 sunk) over systemic evil, offering lessons in constrained asymmetric naval . This causal lens prioritizes verifiable production data and sortie metrics over narrative overlays, revealing a force that, absent Hitler's diversions, might have prolonged Allied supply vulnerabilities into 1944.

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