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Osama bin Laden
Osama bin Laden
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Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden[a] (10 March 1957 – 2 May 2011) was the founder and first general emir of al-Qaeda. Ideologically a pan-Islamist, Bin Laden participated in the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet–Afghan War of the 1980s, and supported the Bosnian mujahideen during the Bosnian War of the 1990s. Opposed to American foreign policy in the Middle East, Bin Laden declared war on the United States in 1996 and supervised numerous terrorist attacks in various countries, including the September 11 attacks in 2001 in the U.S.

Born in Riyadh to the aristocratic bin Laden family, he studied at Saudi and foreign universities until 1979, when he joined the mujahideen fighting against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1984, he co-founded Maktab al-Khidamat, which recruited foreign mujahideen into the war. As the Soviet war in Afghanistan came to an end, Bin Laden founded al-Qaeda in 1988 to carry out worldwide jihad. In the Gulf War, Bin Laden's offer of support to Saudi Arabia against Iraq was rejected by the Saudi royal family, which instead sought American aid.

Bin Laden's views on pan-Islamism and anti-Americanism resulted in his expulsion from Saudi Arabia in 1991. He shifted his headquarters to Sudan until 1996, when he established a new base in Afghanistan, where he was supported by the Taliban. Bin Laden declared two fatāwā in August 1996 and February 1998, declaring holy war against the U.S. After al-Qaeda's bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa, which killed hundreds of civilians, he was indicted by a U.S. district court and listed on the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorists and Most Wanted Fugitives lists. In October 1999, the United Nations designated al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization.

Bin Laden organized the September 11 attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people. This resulted in the U.S. invading Afghanistan and launching the war on terror. Bin Laden became the subject of a nearly decade-long international manhunt led by the U.S. During this period, he hid in the mountains of Afghanistan and later escaped to neighboring Pakistan. On 2 May 2011, Bin Laden was killed by U.S. special operations forces at his compound in Abbottabad. His corpse was buried in the Arabian Sea and he was succeeded by his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri on 16 June 2011. During his lifetime, Bin Laden was considered a war hero by many within the Islamist movement due to his role in opposing the Soviet and American interventions in Afghanistan. In the West and elsewhere, he is widely seen as a global symbol of terrorism and reviled as a mass murderer due to his orchestration of numerous terrorist attacks.

Name

[edit]

Bin Laden's name is most frequently rendered as "Osama bin Laden". The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as other U.S. governmental agencies, have used either "Usama bin Laden" or the accepted transliteration "Usama bin Ladin".[citation needed]

Osama bin Laden's full name, Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden, means "Osama, son of Mohammed, son of Awad, son of Laden".[6] "Mohammed" refers to Bin Laden's father Mohammed bin Laden; "Awad" refers to his grandfather, Awad bin Aboud bin Laden, a Kindite Hadhrami tribesman. Aboud's father was Ali, whose father was Omar. The family includes many individuals over a number of generations.[citation needed]

He was named Usama, meaning "lion", after Usama ibn Zayd, one of the companions of Muhammad.[7] Osama bin Laden had assumed the kunya (teknonym) Abū ʿAbdallāh, meaning "father of Abdallah" The Arabic linguistic convention would be to refer to him as "Osama" or "Osama bin Laden", not "Bin Laden" alone, as "Bin Laden" is a patronymic, not a surname in the Western manner. According to one of his sons Omar, the family's hereditary surname is āl-Qaḥṭānī, but Bin Laden's father, Muhammad bin Ladin, never officially registered the name.[8]

Early life and education

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The bin Laden family, who run the Saudi Binladin Group (Saudi Arabian headquarters pictured), has connections to the Saudi royal family.

Osama bin Laden was born on 10 March 1957 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.[9][10] His father was Muhammad bin Ladin,[11][12] a Yemeni-born billionaire construction magnate with close ties to the Saudi royal family,[13] and his mother was Mohammed bin Laden's tenth wife, Syrian Hamida al-Attas (then called Alia Ghanem).[14][15] Despite it being generally accepted that Bin Laden was born in Riyadh, his birthplace was listed as Jeddah in the initial FBI and Interpol documents.[16]

Mohammed bin Laden divorced Hamida soon after Osama bin Laden was born. Mohammed recommended Hamida to Mohammed al-Attas, an associate. Al-Attas married Hamida in the late 1950s or early 1960s.[17] The couple had four children, and Bin Laden lived in the new household with three half-brothers and one half-sister.[14] The Bin Laden family made $5 billion in the construction industry, of which Osama later inherited around $25–30 million.[18]

Bin Laden was raised as a devout Sunni Muslim.[19] From 1968 to 1976, he attended the elite Al-Thager Model School.[14][20] Bin Laden attended an English-language course in Oxford, England, during 1971.[21] He studied economics and business administration[22] at King Abdulaziz University. Some reports suggest he earned a degree in civil engineering in 1979,[23] or a degree in public administration in 1981.[24] One source described him as "hard working";[25] another said he left university during his third year without completing a college degree.[26]

At university, Bin Laden's main interest was religion, where he was involved in both "interpreting the Quran and jihad" and charitable work.[27] Other interests included writing poetry; reading, with the works of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and Charles de Gaulle said to be among his favorites; black stallions; and association football, in which he enjoyed playing at centre forward and followed the English club Arsenal.[28][29] During his studies in Jeddah, Bin Laden became a pupil of the influential Islamist scholar Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and avidly read his treatises. He also read the writings of several Muslim Brotherhood leaders and was highly influenced by the Islamic revolutionary ideas advocated by Sayyid Qutb.[30]

Personal life

[edit]
Osama Bin Laden's wives and children

At age 17 in 1974, Bin Laden married Najwa Ghanem at Latakia, Syria;[31] however, they were later separated and she left Afghanistan on 9 September 2001, two days before the 9/11 attacks.[32] His other known wives were Khadijah Sharif (married 1983, divorced 1993); Khairiah Sabir (married 1985); Siham Sabir (married 1987); and Amal al-Sadah (married 2000). Some sources also list a sixth wife, name unknown, whose marriage to Bin Laden was annulled soon after the ceremony.[33] Bin Laden fathered 24 children with his wives.[34] Many of Bin Laden's children fled to Iran following the September 11 attacks, and as of 2010 Iranian authorities closely controlled them there.[35]

Nasser al-Bahri, who was Bin Laden's personal bodyguard from 1997 to 2001, details Bin Laden's personal life in his memoir. He describes him as a frugal man and strict father, who enjoyed taking his large family on shooting trips and picnics in the desert.[36]

Bin Laden's father Mohammed died in 1967 in an airplane crash in Saudi Arabia when his American pilot Jim Harrington[37] misjudged a landing.[38] Bin Laden's eldest half-brother, Salem bin Laden, the subsequent head of the Bin Laden family, was killed in 1988 near San Antonio, Texas, in the U.S., when he accidentally flew a plane into power lines.[39]

The FBI described Bin Laden as an adult as tall and thin, between 1.93 m (6 ft 4 in) and 1.98 m (6 ft 6 in) in height and weighing about 73 kilograms (160 lb),[40] although author Lawrence Wright, in his book on al-Qaeda, The Looming Tower, writes that a number of Bin Laden's close friends confirmed that reports of his height were greatly exaggerated, and that he was actually "just over 6 feet (1.8 m) tall".[41] After his death, he was measured to be roughly 1.93 m (6 ft 4 in).[42] Bin Laden had an olive complexion and was left-handed, usually walking with a cane. He wore a plain white keffiyeh. At one point, he stopped wearing the traditional Saudi male keffiyeh and instead wore the traditional Yemeni male keffiyeh.[43] He was described as soft-spoken and mild-mannered in demeanor.[44]

Political views

[edit]

According to former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, who led the CIA's hunt for Bin Laden, Bin Laden was motivated by a belief that U.S. foreign policy has oppressed, killed, or otherwise harmed Muslims in the Middle East.[45] As such, the threat to U.S. national security arises not from al-Qaeda being offended by what the U.S. is but rather by what the U.S. does, or in the words of Scheuer, "They (al-Qaeda) hate us (Americans) for what we do, not who we are."[46] Nonetheless, Bin Laden criticized the U.S. for its secular form of governance, calling upon Americans to convert to Islam and reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling, and usury, in a letter published in late 2002.[47]

Bin Laden believed that the Islamic world was in crisis and that the complete restoration of Sharia law would be the only way to set things right in the Muslim world. He opposed such alternatives as secular government,[47] as well as pan-Arabism, socialism, communism, and democracy.[48] He subscribed to the Athari (literalist) school of Islamic theology.[49]

These beliefs, in conjunction with violent jihad, have sometimes been called Qutbism after being promoted by Sayyid Qutb.[50] Bin Laden believed that Afghanistan, under the rule of Mullah Omar's Taliban, was "the only Islamic country" in the Muslim world.[51] Bin Laden consistently dwelt on the need for violent jihad to right what he believed were injustices against Muslims perpetrated by the U.S. and sometimes by other non-Muslim states.[52] In his Letter to the American People published in 2002, Bin Laden described the formation of the Israeli state as "a crime which must be erased" and demanded that the United States withdraw all of its civilians and military personnel from the Arabian Peninsula, as well as from all Muslim lands.[53][54]

His viewpoints and methods of achieving them had led to him being designated as a terrorist by scholars;[55][56] journalists from The New York Times,[57][58] the BBC,[59] and Qatari news station Al Jazeera;[60] and analysts such as Peter Bergen,[61] Michael Scheuer,[62] Marc Sageman,[63] and Bruce Hoffman.[64][65] He was indicted on terrorism charges by law enforcement agencies in Madrid, New York City, and Tripoli.[66]

Bin Laden supported the targeting of American civilians, in retaliation against U.S. troops indiscriminately attacking Muslims. He asserted that this policy could deter U.S. troops from targeting Muslim women and children. Furthermore, he argued that all Americans were complicit in the crimes of their government due to majority of them electing it to power and paying taxes that fund the U.S. military.[67] According to Noah Feldman, Bin Laden's assertion was that "since the United States is a democracy, all citizens bear responsibility for its government's actions, and civilians are therefore fair targets."[68]

Two months after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Bin Laden stated during an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir:

"According to my information, if the enemy occupies an Islamic land and uses its people as human shields, a person has the right to attack the enemy. ... The targets of September 11 were not women and children. The main targets were the symbol of the United States: their economic and military power. Our Prophet Muhammad was against the killing of women and children. When he saw the body of a non-Muslim woman during a war, he asked what the reason for killing her was. If a child is older than thirteen and bears arms against Muslims, killing him is permissible."[69]

Bin Laden's overall strategy for achieving his goals against much larger enemies such as the Soviet Union and U.S. was to lure them into a long war of attrition in Muslim countries, attracting large numbers of jihadists who would never surrender. He believed this would lead to economic collapse of the enemy countries, by "bleeding" them dry.[70] Al-Qaeda manuals express this strategy. In a 2004 tape broadcast by Al Jazeera, Bin Laden spoke of "bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy".[71]

A number of errors and inconsistencies in Bin Laden's arguments have been alleged by authors such as Max Rodenbeck and Noah Feldman. He invoked democracy both as an example of the deceit and fraudulence of Western political system—American law being "the law of the rich and wealthy"[72]—and as the reason civilians are responsible for their government's actions and so can be lawfully punished by death.[73] He denounced democracy as a "religion of ignorance" that violates Islam by issuing man-made laws, but in a later statement compares the Western democracy of Spain favorably to the Muslim world in which the ruler is accountable. Rodenbeck states, "Evidently, [Bin Laden] has never heard theological justifications for democracy, based on the notion that the will of the people must necessarily reflect the will of an all-knowing God."[74]

Bin Laden was heavily anti-Semitic, stating that most of the negative events that occurred in the world were the direct result of Jewish actions. In a December 1998 interview with Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, Bin Laden stated that Operation Desert Fox was proof that Israeli Jews controlled the governments of the U.S. and the United Kingdom, directing them to kill as many Muslims as they could.[75] In a letter released in late 2002, he stated that Jews controlled the civilian media outlets, politics, and economic institutions of the United States.[47] In a May 1998 interview with ABC News, Bin Laden claimed that the Israeli state's ultimate goal was to annex the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle East into its territory and enslave its peoples, as part of what he called a "Greater Israel".[76] He stated that Jews and Muslims could never get along, that war was "inevitable" between them, and accusing the U.S. of stirring up anti-Islamic sentiment.[76] He claimed that the U.S. State Department and U.S. Department of Defense were controlled by Jews, for the sole purpose of serving the Israeli state's goals.[76] He often delivered warnings against alleged Jewish conspiracies: "These Jews are masters of usury and leaders in treachery. They will leave you nothing, either in this world or the next."[77] Shia Muslims have been listed along with heretics, the United States, and Israel as the four principal enemies of Islam at ideology classes of Bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization.[78]

Bin Laden was opposed to music on religious grounds,[79] and his attitude towards technology was mixed. He was interested in earth-moving machinery and genetic engineering of plants, while rejecting the use of chilled water.[80] He also believed climate change to be a serious threat and penned a letter urging Americans to work with U.S. president Barack Obama to make a rational decision to "save humanity from the harmful gases that threaten its destiny".[81][82]

Militant and political career

[edit]

Soviet–Afghan War

[edit]

After leaving college in 1979, Bin Laden went to Pakistan, joined Abdullah Yusuf Azzam and used money and machinery from his own construction company to help the mujahideen resistance in the Soviet–Afghan War.[83] He later told a journalist: "I felt outraged that an injustice had been committed against the people of Afghanistan."[84] From 1979 to 1992, the U.S. (as part of CIA activities in Afghanistan, specifically Operation Cyclone), Saudi Arabia, and China provided between $6–12 billion worth of financial aid and weapons to tens of thousands of mujahideen through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[85]

British journalist Jason Burke wrote: "[Bin Laden] did not receive any direct funding or training from the U.S. during the 1980s. Nor did his followers. The Afghan mujahideen, via Pakistan's ISI intelligence agency, received large amounts of both. Some bled to the Arabs fighting the Soviets but nothing significant."[86] Bin Laden met and built relations with Hamid Gul, who was a three-star general in the Pakistani Army and head of the ISI agency. Although the United States provided the money and weapons, the training of militant groups was entirely done by the Pakistan Armed Forces and the ISI.[87] According to Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, the person in charge of the ISI's Afghan operations at the time, it was a strict policy of Pakistan to prevent any American involvement in the distribution of funds or weapons or in the training of the mujahideen, and the CIA officials stayed in the embassy in Islamabad, never entering Afghanistan or meeting with the Afghan resistance leaders themselves.[88] According to some CIA officers, beginning in early 1980, Bin Laden acted as a liaison between the Saudi General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) and Afghan warlords; no evidence of contact between the CIA and Bin Laden exists in the CIA archives. Steve Coll states that although Bin Laden may not have been a formal, salaried GIP agent, "it seems clear that Bin Laden did have a substantial relationship with Saudi intelligence."[89] Bin Laden's first trainer was U.S. Special Forces commando Ali Mohamed.[90]

By 1984, Bin Laden and Azzam established Maktab al-Khidamat, which funneled money, arms, and fighters from around the Arab world into Afghanistan. Through al-Khadamat, Bin Laden's inherited family fortune[91] paid for air tickets and accommodation, paid for paperwork with Pakistani authorities and provided other such services for the jihadi fighters. Bin Laden established camps inside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan and trained volunteers from across the Muslim world to fight against the Soviet-backed regime, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Between 1986 and 1987, Bin Laden set up a base in eastern Afghanistan for several dozen of his own Arab soldiers.[92] From this base, Bin Laden participated in some combat activity against the Soviets, such as the Battle of Jaji in 1987.[92] Despite its little strategic significance, the battle was lionized in the mainstream Arab press.[92] It was during this time that he became idolized by many Arabs.[93]

Allegation of involvement in 1988 Gilgit massacre

[edit]

In May 1988, responding to rumours of a massacre of Sunnis by Shias, large numbers of Shias from in and around Gilgit, Pakistan were killed in a massacre.[94] Shia civilians were also subjected to rape.[95] The massacre is alleged by B. Raman, a founder of India's Research and Analysis Wing,[96] to have been in response to a revolt by the Shias of Gilgit during the rule of military dictator Zia-ul Haq.[97] He alleged that the Pakistan Army induced Osama bin Laden to lead an armed group of Sunni tribals, from Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier Province, into Gilgit and its surrounding areas to suppress the revolt.[98]

Formation and structuring of al-Qaeda

[edit]
The flag used by various al-Qaeda factions

By 1988,[99] Bin Laden had split from Maktab al-Khidamat. While Azzam acted as support for Afghan fighters, Bin Laden wanted a more military role. One of the main points leading to the split and the creation of al-Qaeda was Azzam's insistence that Arab fighters be integrated among the Afghan fighting groups instead of forming a separate fighting force.[100] Notes of a meeting of Bin Laden and others on 20 August 1988, indicate that al-Qaeda was a formal group by that time: "Basically an organized Islamic faction, its goal is to lift the word of God, to make his religion victorious." A list of requirements for membership itemized the following: listening ability, good manners, obedience, and making a pledge (bayat) to follow one's superiors.[101]

According to Wright, the group's real name was not used in public pronouncements because its existence was still a closely held secret.[102] His research suggests that al-Qaeda was formed at an 11 August 1988, meeting between several senior leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), Azzam, and Bin Laden, where it was agreed to join Bin Laden's money with the expertise of the EIJ and take up the jihadist cause elsewhere after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.[103] Others argue that the organization was founded earlier and already existed when the leaders met on 11 August 1988.[104][105]

Following the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a hero of jihad.[106] Along with his Arab legion, he was thought to have brought down the mighty superpower of the Soviet Union.[107] After his return to Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden engaged in opposition movements to the Saudi monarchy while working for his family business.[106] He offered to send al-Qaeda to overthrow the Soviet-aligned Yemeni Socialist Party government in South Yemen, but was rebuffed by Prince Turki bin Faisal. He then tried to disrupt the Yemeni unification process by assassinating YSP leaders, but was halted by Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz after President Ali Abdullah Saleh complained to King Fahd.[108] He was also angered by the internecine tribal fighting among the Afghans.[93] However, he continued working with the Saudi GID and the Pakistani ISI. In March 1989, Bin Laden led 800 Arab foreign fighters during the unsuccessful Battle of Jalalabad.[109][110][111] Bin Laden led his men in person to immobilize the 7th Sarandoy Regiment but failed doing so leading to massive casualties. He funded the 1990 Afghan coup d'état attempt led by hardcore communist General Shahnawaz Tanai.[111] He also lobbied the Parliament of Pakistan to carry out an unsuccessful motion of no confidence against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.[110]

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Gulf war

[edit]

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait under Saddam Hussein on 2 August 1990, put the Saudi kingdom and the royal family at risk. With Iraqi forces on the Saudi border, Saddam's appeal to pan-Arabism was potentially inciting internal dissent. One week after King Fahd agreed to U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's offer of American military assistance, Bin Laden met with King Fahd and Saudi Defense Minister Sultan bin Abdulaziz, telling them not to depend on non-Muslim assistance from the U.S. and others and offering to help defend Saudi Arabia with his Arab legion. When Sultan asked how Bin Laden would defend the fighters if Saddam used Iraqi chemical and biological weapons against them, he replied, "We will fight him with faith."[112] Bin Laden's offer was rebuffed, and the Saudi monarchy invited the deployment of U.S. forces in Saudi territory.[113]

Bin Laden publicly denounced Saudi dependence on the U.S. forces, arguing that it was indignity that the kingdom was being defended by an army of American unbelievers.[114] Bin Laden tried to convince the Saudi ulama to issue a fatwa condemning the American military deployment but senior clerics refused out of fear of repression.[115] Bin Laden's continued criticism of the Saudi monarchy led them to put him under house arrest, under which he remained until he was ultimately forced to leave the country in 1991.[116] The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division landed in the north-eastern Saudi city of Dhahran and was deployed in the desert barely 400 miles from Medina.[93]

The aftermath of al-Qaeda's 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City

Meanwhile, on 8 November 1990, the FBI raided the New Jersey home of El Sayyid Nosair, an associate of al-Qaeda operative Ali Mohamed. They discovered copious evidence of terrorist plots, including plans to blow up New York City skyscrapers. This marked the earliest discovery of al-Qaeda terrorist plans outside of Muslim countries.[117] Nosair was eventually convicted in connection to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and, years later, admitted guilt for the murder of Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York City on 5 November 1990.

Move to Sudan

[edit]

In 1991, Bin Laden was expelled from Saudi Arabia by its government after repeatedly criticizing the Saudi alliance with the United States.[106][118] He and his followers moved first to Afghanistan and then relocated to Sudan by 1992,[106][118] in a deal brokered by Ali Mohamed.[119] Bin Laden's personal security detail consisted of bodyguards personally selected by him. Their arsenal included SA-7, Stinger missiles, AK-47s, RPGs, and PK machine guns.[120] Meanwhile, in March–April 1992, Bin Laden tried to play a pacifying role in the escalating civil war in Afghanistan, by urging warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to join the other mujahideen leaders negotiating a coalition government instead of trying to conquer Kabul for himself.[121]

It is believed that the first bombing attack involving Bin Laden was the 29 December 1992, bombing of the Gold Mohur Hotel in Aden in which two people were killed.[106]

In the 1990s, Bin Laden's al-Qaeda assisted jihadis financially, and sometimes militarily, in Algeria, Egypt, and Afghanistan. In 1992 or 1993, Bin Laden sent an emissary, Qari el-Said, with $40,000 to Algeria to aid the Islamists and urge war rather than negotiation with the government. Their advice was heeded. The war that followed caused the deaths of 150,000 to 200,000 Algerians and ended with the Islamists surrendering to the government.[122]

In Sudan, Bin Laden established a new base for mujahideen operations in Khartoum. He bought a house on Al-Mashtal Street in the affluent Al-Riyadh quarter and a retreat at Soba on the Blue Nile.[123][124] During his time in Sudan, he heavily invested in the infrastructure, in agriculture and businesses.[125] He was the Sudan agent for the British firm Hunting Surveys,[126] and built roads using the same bulldozers he had employed to construct mountain tracks in Afghanistan. Many of his labourers were the same fighters who had been his comrades in the war against the Soviet Union. He was generous to the poor and popular with the people.[127][128] He continued to criticize King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. In response, in 1994, Fahd stripped Bin Laden of his Saudi citizenship and persuaded his family to cut off his $7 million a year stipend.[11][129][130]

By that time, Bin Laden was being linked with EIJ, which made up the core of al-Qaeda. In 1995, the EIJ attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. The attempt failed, and Sudan expelled the EIJ. After this bombing, al-Qaeda was reported to have developed its justification for the killing of innocent people. According to a fatwa issued by Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, the killing of someone standing near the enemy is justified because any innocent bystander will find a proper reward in death, going to Jannah (paradise) if they were good Muslims and to Jahannam (hell) if they were bad or non-believers.[131] The fatwa was issued to al-Qaeda members but not the general public.

The U.S. State Department accused Sudan of being a sponsor of international terrorism and Bin Laden of operating terrorist training camps in the Sudanese desert. However, according to Sudan officials, this stance became obsolete as the Islamist political leader Hassan al-Turabi lost influence in their country. The Sudanese wanted to engage with the U.S., but American officials refused to meet with them even after they had expelled Bin Laden. It was not until 2000 that the State Department authorized U.S. intelligence officials to visit Sudan.[126]

The 9/11 Commission Report states:

In late 1995, when Bin Laden was still in Sudan, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) learned that Sudanese officials were discussing with the Saudi government the possibility of expelling Bin Laden. CIA paramilitary officer Billy Waugh tracked down Bin Ladin in Sudan and prepared an operation to apprehend him, but was denied authorization.[132] US Ambassador Timothy Carney encouraged the Sudanese to pursue this course. The Saudis, however, did not want Bin Laden, giving as their reason their revocation of his citizenship. Sudan's minister of defense, Fatih Erwa, has claimed that Sudan offered to hand Bin Laden over to the United States. The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so. Ambassador Carney had instructions only to push the Sudanese to expel Bin Laden. Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment outstanding against Bin Laden in any country.[133]

In January 1996, the CIA launched a new unit of its Counterterrorism Center (CTC) called the Bin Laden Issue Station, code-named "Alec Station", to track and to carry out operations against his activities. Bin Laden Issue Station was headed by Michael Scheuer, a veteran of the Islamic Extremism Branch of the CTC.[122] U.S. intelligence monitored Bin Laden in Sudan using operatives to run by daily and to photograph activities at his compound, and using an intelligence safe house and signals intelligence to surveil him and to record his moves.[134]

Return to Afghanistan

[edit]

The 9/11 Commission Report states:

In February 1996, Sudanese officials began approaching officials from the United States and other governments, asking what actions of theirs might ease foreign pressure. In secret meetings with Saudi officials, Sudan offered to expel Bin Laden to Saudi Arabia and asked the Saudis to pardon him. US officials became aware of these secret discussions, certainly by March. Saudi officials apparently wanted Bin Laden expelled from Sudan. They had already revoked his citizenship, however, and would not tolerate his presence in their country. Also Bin Laden may have no longer felt safe in Sudan, where he had already escaped at least one assassination attempt that he believed to have been the work of the Egyptian or Saudi regimes, and paid for by the CIA.

Due to the increasing pressure on Sudan from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States, Bin Laden was permitted to leave for a country of his choice. He chose to return to Jalalabad, Afghanistan aboard a chartered flight on 18 May 1996; there he forged a close relationship with Mullah Omar.[135][136] The expulsion from Sudan significantly weakened Bin Laden and his organization.[137] Some African intelligence sources have argued that the expulsion left Bin Laden without an option other than becoming a full-time radical, and that most of the 300 Afghan Arabs who left with him subsequently became terrorists.[126] Various sources report that he lost between $20 million[138] and $300 million[139] in Sudan; the government seized his construction equipment, and he was forced to liquidate his businesses, land, and even his horses.

1996 Declaration of war and 1998 fatwa

[edit]

In August 1996, Bin Laden issued a fatawā titled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places", which was published by Al-Quds Al-Arabi, a London-based newspaper. Saudi Arabia is sometimes called "The Land of the Two Holy Mosques" in reference to Mecca and Medina. The reference to occupation in the fatwā referred to U.S. forces based in Saudi Arabia for the purpose of controlling air space in Iraq, known as Operation Southern Watch.[140] Despite the assurance of President George H. W. Bush to King Fahd in 1990, that all U.S. forces based in Saudi Arabia would be withdrawn once the Iraqi threat had been dealt with, by 1996 the Americans were still there. Bush cited the necessity of dealing with the remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime (which Bush had chosen not to destroy). Bin Laden's view was that "the 'evils' of the Middle East arose from America's attempt to take over the region and from its support for Israel. Saudi Arabia had been turned into an American colony".[141]

Fervently attacking American support for Israel and Saudi Arabia as well as its sanctions on Iraq, Bin Laden declared in the fatwa:

"Terrorising you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate and morally demanded duty. It is a legitimate right well known to all humans and other creatures... [our] youths are different from your soldiers. Your problem will be how to convince your troops to fight, while our problem will be how to restrain our youths.. The youths hold you responsible for all of the killings and evictions of the Muslims and the violation of the sanctities, carried out by your Zionist brothers in Lebanon; you openly supplied them with arms and finance. More than 600,000 Iraqi children have died due to lack of food and medicine and as a result of the unjustifiable aggression (sanction) imposed on Iraq and its nation. The children of Iraq are our children. You, the USA, together with the Saudi regime are responsible for the shedding of the blood of these innocent children. Due to all of that, what ever treaty you have with our country is now null and void."[142]

Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir interviewing Bin Laden, c. 1997–1998. The AKS-74U in the background is a symbol of the mujahideen's victory over the Soviets, since these weapons were captured from Spetsnaz forces.

On 23 February 1998; Bin Laden, alongside Ayman al-Zawahiri, Ahmad Refai Taha, Shaykh Mir Hamzah and Maulana Fazlur Rahman; issued another fatwā against the U.S., calling upon Muslims to attack the country and its allies. It was entitled "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders".[143] After listing numerous acts of aggression committed by the U.S., such as the presence of American forces in the Arabian Peninsula, sanctions against Iraq, Israeli repression of Palestinians, among other things. The fatwa stated:

"All these American crimes and sins are a clear proclamation of war against God, his Messenger, and the Muslims. Religious scholars throughout Islamic history have agreed that jihad is an individual duty when an enemy attacks Muslim countries. This was related by the Imam ibn Qudama in "The Resource," by Imam al-Kisa'i in "The Marvels," by al-Qurtubi in his exegesis, and by the Sheikh of Islam when he states in his chronicles that "As for fighting to repel an enemy, which is the strongest way to defend freedom and religion, it is agreed that this is a duty. After faith, there is no greater duty than fighting an enemy who is corrupting religion and the world.""[144][143]

At the public announcement, Bin Laden said that North Americans are "very easy targets". He told the attending journalists, "You will see the results of this in a very short time."[145] It also claimed the "individual duty for every Muslim "was to liberate Al-Aqsa in Jerusalem and the Grand Mosque in Mecca from their grip.[146][147]

Late 1990s attacks

[edit]

In Afghanistan, Bin Laden and al-Qaeda raised money from donors from the days of the Afghan jihad, and from the Pakistani ISI to establish more training camps for mujahideen fighters.[148] Bin Laden effectively took over Ariana Afghan Airlines, which ferried Islamic militants, arms, cash, and opium through the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan, as well as provided false identifications to members of Bin Laden's terrorist network.[149] The arms smuggler Viktor Bout helped to run the airline, maintaining planes and loading cargo. Michael Scheuer, head of the CIA's Bin Laden unit, concluded that Ariana was being used as a terrorist taxi service.[150]

It has been claimed that Bin Laden funded the Luxor massacre of 17 November 1997,[151][152][153] which killed 62 civilians, and outraged the Egyptian public. The Swiss Federal Police later determined that bin Laden had financed the operation.[154] In mid-1997, the Northern Alliance threatened to overrun Jalalabad, causing him to abandon his Najim Jihad compound and move his operations to Tarnak Farms in the south.[155]

The aftermath of the 1998 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya

Another successful attack was carried out in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan. Bin Laden helped cement his alliance with the Taliban by sending several hundred Afghan Arab fighters along to help the Taliban kill between five and six thousand Hazaras overrunning the city.[156]

Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri organized an al-Qaeda congress on 24 June 1998.[157] The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings were a series of attacks that occurred on 7 August 1998, in which hundreds of people were killed in simultaneous truck bomb explosions at the U.S. embassies in the major East African cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya.[158] The attacks were linked to local members of the EIJ, and brought Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri to the attention of the U.S. public for the first time. Al-Qaeda later claimed responsibility for the bombings.[158]

The two locations targeted in Operation Infinite Reach, the U.S.' 1998 bombing of al-Qaeda targets in Khartoum, Sudan, and Khost, Afghanistan

In retaliation for the embassy bombings, U.S. president Bill Clinton ordered a series of cruise missile strikes on Bin Laden-related targets in Sudan and Afghanistan on 20 August 1998.[158] In December 1998, the CIA reported to Clinton that al-Qaeda was preparing for attacks in the U.S., including the training of personnel to hijack aircraft.[159] On 7 June 1999, the FBI placed Bin Laden on its Ten Most Wanted list.[160][161][162][163][141] On October 15, 1999, the United Nations designated al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization through UN Security Council Resolution 1267. This resolution aimed to impose sanctions on individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda, including freezing assets and imposing travel bans.[164]

In late 2000, Richard Clarke revealed that Islamic militants headed by Bin Laden had planned a triple attack on 3 January 2000, which would have included bombings in Jordan of the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, tourists at Mount Nebo, and a site on the Jordan River, as well as the sinking of the destroyer USS The Sullivans in Yemen, and an attack on a target within the United States. The plan was foiled by the arrest of the Jordanian terrorist cell, the sinking of the explosive-filled skiff intended to target the destroyer, and the arrest of Ahmed Ressam.[165]

Yugoslav Wars

[edit]

A former U.S. State Department official in October 2001 described Bosnia and Herzegovina as a safe haven for terrorists, and asserted that militant elements of the former Sarajevo government were protecting extremists, some with ties to Bin Laden.[166]

According to Middle East intelligence reports, Bin Laden financed small convoys of recruits from the Arab world through his businesses in Sudan. Among them was Karim Said Atmani, who was identified by authorities as the document forger for a group of Algerians accused of plotting the bombings in the United States.[167] He is a former roommate of Ahmed Ressam, the man arrested at the Canada–United States border in mid-December 1999 with a car full of nitroglycerin and bomb-making materials.[168][169] He was convicted of colluding with Bin Laden by a French court.[170]

A Bosnian government search of passport and residency records, conducted at the urging of the United States, revealed other former mujahideen who were linked to the same Algerian group or to other groups of suspected terrorists, and had lived in the area 100 km (60 mi) north of Sarajevo, the capital, in the past few years. Khalil al-Deek was arrested in Jordan in late December 1999 on suspicion of involvement in a plot to blow up tourist sites. A second man with Bosnian citizenship, Hamid Aich, lived in Canada at the same time as Atmani and worked for a charity associated with Bin Laden. In its 26 June 1997 report on the bombing of the Al Khobar building in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, The New York Times noted that those arrested confessed to serving with Bosnian Muslim forces. Further, the captured men also admitted to ties with Bin Laden.[171][172][verification needed]

In 1999, the press reported that Bin Laden and his Tunisian assistant Mehrez Aodouni were granted citizenship and Bosnian passports in 1993 by the government in Sarajevo. The Bosnian government denied this information following the September 11 attacks, but it was later found that Aodouni was arrested in Turkey and that at that time he possessed the Bosnian passport. Following this revelation, a new explanation was given that Bin Laden did not personally collect his Bosnian passport and that officials at the Bosnian embassy in Vienna, which issued the passport, could not have known who he was at the time.[171][172][verification needed]

The head of Albania's State Intelligence Service (SHISH), Fatos Klosi, said that Bin Laden was running a terror network in Albania to take part in the Kosovo War under the guise of a humanitarian organization and it was reported to have been started in 1994. Claude Kader, who was a member, testified its existence during his trial.[173] By 1998, four members of EIJ were arrested in Albania and extradited to Egypt.[174] The mujahideen fighters were organized by Islamic leaders in Western Europe allied to him and al-Zawahiri.[175]

During his trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, former Serbian president Slobodan Milošević quoted from a purported FBI report that al-Qaeda had a presence in the Balkans and aided the Kosovo Liberation Army. He claimed Bin Laden had used Albania as a launchpad for violence in the region and Europe. He claimed that they had informed Richard Holbrooke that KLA was being aided by al-Qaeda but the US decided to cooperate with the KLA and thus indirectly with Osama despite the U.S. embassy bombings earlier. Milošević had argued that the U.S. aided the terrorists, which culminated in its backing of the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo War.[176][177][178][179]

Criminal charges

[edit]

On 16 March 1998, Libya issued the first official Interpol arrest warrant against Bin Laden and three other people. They were charged for killing Silvan Becker, agent of Germany's domestic intelligence service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in the Terrorism Department, and his wife Vera in Libya on 10 March 1994.[66][180] Bin Laden was still wanted by the Libyan government at the time of his death.[181][182] He was first indicted by a grand jury of the U.S. on 8 June 1998, on a charges of conspiracy to attack defense utilities of the U.S. and prosecutors further charged that Bin Laden was the head of the terrorist organization called al-Qaeda, and that he was a major financial backer of Islamic fighters worldwide.[183]

During the Clinton administration, capturing Bin Laden had been an objective of the U.S. government.[184] Shortly after the September 11 attacks, it was revealed that Clinton had signed a directive authorizing the CIA (specifically, their elite Special Activities Division) to apprehend Bin Laden and bring him to the U.S. to stand trial for the 1998 embassy attacks; if taking him alive was deemed impossible, then deadly force was authorized.[185] On 20 August 1998, 66 cruise missiles launched by U.S. Navy ships in the Arabian Sea struck Bin Laden's training camps near Khost in Afghanistan, missing him by a few hours.[186]

On 4 November 1998, Bin Laden was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on charges of Murder of US Nationals Outside the United States, Conspiracy to Murder US Nationals Outside the United States, and Attacks on a Federal Facility Resulting in Death[187] for his alleged role in the 1998 embassy attacks. The evidence against Bin Laden included courtroom testimony by former al-Qaeda members and satellite phone records, from a phone purchased for him by al-Qaeda procurement agent Ziyad Khaleel in the U.S.[188][189] However, the Taliban ruled not to extradite Bin Laden on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence published in the indictments and that non-Muslim courts lacked standing to try Muslims.[190]

Bin Laden became the 456th person listed on the FBI Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list, when he was added on 7 June 1999, following his indictment along with others for capital crimes in the 1998 embassy attacks. Attempts at assassination and requests for the extradition of Bin Laden from the Taliban of Afghanistan were met with failure before the bombing of Afghanistan in October 2001.[191] In 1999, US president Bill Clinton convinced the United Nations to impose sanctions against Afghanistan in an attempt to force the Taliban to extradite him.[192]

In 1999, the CIA, together with Pakistani military intelligence, had prepared a team of approximately 60 Pakistani commandos to infiltrate Afghanistan to capture or kill Bin Laden, but the plan was aborted by the 1999 Pakistani coup d'état;[186] in 2000, foreign operatives working on behalf of the CIA had fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a convoy of vehicles in which Bin Laden was traveling through the mountains of Afghanistan, hitting one of the vehicles but not the one in which Bin Laden was riding.[185]

In 2000, before the September 11 attacks, Paul Bremer characterized the Clinton administration as correctly focused on Bin Laden, while Robert Oakley criticized their obsession with Osama.[165]

September 11 attacks

[edit]

God knows it did not cross our minds to attack the Towers, but after the situation became unbearable—and we witnessed the injustice and tyranny of the American-Israeli alliance against our people in Palestine and Lebanon—I thought about it. And the events that affected me directly were that of 1982 and the events that followed—when America allowed the Israelis to invade Lebanon, helped by the US Sixth Fleet. As I watched the destroyed towers in Lebanon, it occurred to me punish the unjust the same way: to destroy towers in America so it could taste some of what we are tasting and to stop killing our children and women.

— Osama bin Laden, 2004[193]

United Airlines Flight 175 crashes into the World Trade Center's South Tower on 9/11.

U.S. president George W. Bush received an intelligence report on 6 August 2001, titled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S."[194] On 11 September 2001 (the "September 11 attacks" or "9/11"), the U.S. was attacked by al-Qaeda, who used four commercial airplanes as missiles against various targets. Two planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, were crashed into the North and South Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. American Airlines Flight 77 was crashed into the Pentagon. United Airlines Flight 93 did not reach its intended destination, as its passengers overtook the plane, which crashed in Pennsylvania. The Twin Towers eventually collapsed. At least 2,750 people died from the attacks.[195] On the day of the attacks, the National Security Agency intercepted communications that pointed to Bin Laden's responsibility,[196] as did German intelligence agencies.[197] At 11:30 p.m., Bush wrote in his diary: "The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today... We think it's Osama bin Laden."[198] The Federal Bureau of Investigation has stated that classified[199] evidence linking al-Qaeda and Bin Laden to the September 11 attacks is clear and irrefutable.[200] The UK Government reached a similar conclusion regarding al-Qaeda and Bin Laden's culpability for the September 11 attacks, although the government report noted that the evidence presented is not necessarily sufficient to prosecute the case.[201] Identified motivations of the September 11 attacks include the support of Israel by the United States, presence of the U.S. military in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the U.S. enforcement of sanctions against Iraq.

Image from the video of Bin Laden released on 13 December 2001

Bin Laden initially denied involvement in the attacks. On 16 September 2001, he read a statement, later broadcast by Al Jazeera, denying responsibility for the attack.[202] In a videotape recovered by U.S. forces in November 2001 in Jalalabad, Bin Laden was seen discussing the attack with Khaled al-Harbi in a way that indicates foreknowledge.[203] The tape was broadcast on various news networks on 13 December 2001. The merits of this translation have been disputed. Arabist Dr. Abdel El M. Husseini stated: "This translation is very problematic. At the most important places where it is held to prove the guilt of Bin Laden, it is not identical with the Arabic."[204]

In the 2004 video, Bin Laden abandoned his denials without retracting past statements. In it, he said he had personally directed the nineteen hijackers.[205][206] In the 18-minute tape, played on Al-Jazeera, four days before the American presidential election, Bin Laden accused George W. Bush of negligence in the hijacking of the planes on September 11.[205] He said he was inspired to destroy the World Trade Center after watching the destruction of towers in Lebanon by Israel during the 1982 Lebanon War.[207] Through two other tapes aired by Al Jazeera in 2006, Bin Laden announced, "I am the one in charge of the nineteen brothers. ... I was responsible for entrusting the nineteen brothers ... with the raids" (23 May 2006).[208] In the tapes, he was seen with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, as well as two of the 9/11 hijackers, Hamza al-Ghamdi and Wail al-Shehri, as they made preparations for the attacks (videotape broadcast 7 September 2006).[209]

Manhunt and activities after the September 11 attacks

[edit]

Bush administration

[edit]
A leaflet made by the Central Intelligence Agency which was distributed in Afghanistan, showing a bounty for Bin Laden

In response to the attacks, the United States launched the war on terror to depose the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and capture al-Qaeda operatives, and several countries strengthened their anti-terrorism legislation to preclude future attacks. The CIA's Special Activities Division was given the lead in tracking down and killing or capturing Bin Laden.[210] U.S. officials named Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization as the prime suspects and offered a reward of $25 million for information leading to his capture or death.[211][212] On 13 July 2007, the Senate voted to double the reward to $50 million, although the amount was never changed.[213] The Airline Pilots Association and the Air Transport Association offered an additional $2 million reward.[214]

While referring to Bin Laden in a CNN film clip on 17 September 2001, then-president George W. Bush stated, "I want justice. There is an old poster out west, as I recall, that said, 'Wanted: Dead or alive'".[215] Subsequently, Bin Laden retreated further from public contact to avoid capture. Numerous speculative press reports were issued about his whereabouts or even death; some placed Bin Laden in different locations during overlapping time periods.

On 10 October 2001, Bin Laden appeared as well on the initial list of the top 22 FBI Most Wanted Terrorists, which was released to the public by the George W. Bush administration and based on the indictment for the 1998 embassy attack. Bin Laden was among a group of 13 fugitive terrorists wanted on that latter list for questioning about the 1998 attack. He remains the only fugitive ever to be listed on both FBI fugitive lists.[citation needed] Despite these multiple indictments, the Taliban refused to extradite Osama bin Laden. However, they did offer to try him before an Islamic court if evidence of Osama bin Laden's involvement in the September 11 attacks was provided. It was not until eight days after the bombing of Afghanistan began in October 2001 that the Taliban finally did offer to turn over Osama bin Laden to a third-party country for trial, in return for the U.S. ending the bombing. This offer was rejected by George W. Bush, stating that this was no longer negotiable: "there's no need to discuss innocence or guilt. We know he's guilty."[216]

Delta Force GIs disguised as Afghan civilians, while they searched for Bin Laden in November 2001
Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul, Afghanistan, in November 2001

Bin Laden was believed to be hiding in the White Mountains (Spin Ghar) in Afghanistan's east, near the Pakistani border.[217][218] According to The Washington Post, the US government concluded that Bin Laden was present during the Battle of Tora Bora, Afghanistan, in late 2001, and according to civilian and military officials with first-hand knowledge, failure by the U.S. to commit enough U.S. ground troops to hunt him led to his escape and was the gravest failure by the U.S. in the war against al-Qaeda. Intelligence officials assembled what they believed to be decisive evidence, from contemporary and subsequent interrogations and intercepted communications, that Bin Laden began the Battle of Tora Bora inside the cave complex along Afghanistan's mountainous eastern border.[219]

On 11 December 2005, a letter from Atiyah Abd al-Rahman to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi indicated that Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership were based in the Waziristan region of Pakistan at the time. In the letter, translated by the United States military's Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Atiyah instructs al-Zarqawi to send messengers to Waziristan so that they meet with the brothers of the leadership. Al-Rahman also indicates that Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are weak and have many of their own problems. The letter has been deemed authentic by military and counterterrorism officials, according to The Washington Post.[220][221]

The Washington Post also reported that the CIA unit composed of special operations paramilitary forces dedicated to capturing Bin Laden was shut down in late 2005.[222]

U.S. and Afghanistan forces raided the mountain caves in Tora Bora between 14 and 16 August 2007. The military was drawn to the area after receiving intelligence of a pre-Ramadan meeting held by al-Qaeda members. After killing dozens of al-Qaeda and Taliban members, they did not find either Bin Laden or al-Zawahiri.[223]

Al-Qaeda continued to release time-sensitive and professionally verified videos demonstrating Bin Laden's continued survival, including in August 2007.[224] He claimed sole responsibility for the September 11 attacks and specifically denied any prior knowledge of them by the Taliban or the Afghan people.[225]

Obama administration

[edit]

On 7 October 2008, in the second debate of that year's U.S. presidential election, then-presidential candidate Barack Obama pledged, "We will kill Bin Laden. We will crush al-Qaeda. That has to be our biggest national security priority."[226] Upon being elected, Obama expressed his plans to renew and ramp up the U.S. search for Bin Laden.[226] Obama rejected the Bush administration's policy on Bin Laden that conflated all terror threats from al-Qaeda to Hamas to Hezbollah, replacing it with a covert, narrow focus on al-Qaeda and its direct affiliates.[227][228]

A diagram of the compound

In 2009, a research team led by Thomas Gillespie and John A. Agnew of UCLA used satellite-aided geographical analysis to pinpoint three compounds in Parachinar as Bin Laden's likely hideouts.[229] In March 2009, the New York Daily News reported that the hunt for Bin Laden had centered in the Chitral District of Pakistan, including the Kalam Valley. Author Rohan Gunaratna stated that captured al-Qaeda leaders had confirmed that Bin Laden was hiding in Chitral.[230] Pakistan's prime minister Gillani rejected claims that Osama bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan.[231]

Early in December 2009, a Taliban detainee in Pakistan said he had information that Bin Laden was in Afghanistan that year; he said that in January or February 2009, he met a trusted contact who had seen Bin Laden in Afghanistan about 15 to 20 days earlier.[232] However, on 6 December 2009, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the United States had had no reliable information on the whereabouts of Bin Laden in years.[232][233] On 9 December, General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said that al-Qaeda would not be defeated unless Bin Laden were captured or killed, thus indicating that the U.S. high command believed that he was still alive. Testifying to the U.S. Congress, he said that Bin Laden had become an iconic figure, whose survival emboldens al-Qaeda as a franchising organization across the world, and that Obama's deployment of 30,000 extra troops to Afghanistan meant that success would be possible. He said killing or capturing Bin Laden would not spell the end of al-Qaeda, but the movement could not be eradicated while he remained at large.[233][234]

In a 2010 letter, Bin Laden chastised followers who had reinterpreted al-tatarrus—an Islamic doctrine meant to excuse the unintended killing of non-combatants in unusual circumstances—to justify routine massacres of Muslim civilians, which had turned Muslims against the extremist movement. Of the groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, Bin Laden condemned Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan for an attack on members of a hostile tribe, declaring that the operation is not justified, as there were casualties of noncombatants. Bin Laden wrote that the tatarrus doctrine needs to be revisited based on the modern-day context and clear boundaries established. He asked a subordinate to draw up a jihadist code of conduct that would constrain military operations in order to avoid civilian casualties. In Yemen, Bin Laden urged his allies to seek a truce that would bring the country stability, or would at least show the people that they were careful in keeping Muslims safe on the basis of peace. In Somalia, he called attention to the extreme poverty caused by constant warfare, and he advised al-Shabab to pursue economic development. He instructed his followers around the world to focus on education and persuasion rather than entering into confrontations with Islamic political parties.[235]

On 2 February 2010, Afghan president Hamid Karzai arrived in Saudi Arabia for an official visit. The agenda included a discussion of a possible Saudi role in Karzai's plan to reintegrate Taliban militants. During the visit, an anonymous official of the Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry declared that the kingdom had no intention of getting involved in peacemaking in Afghanistan unless the Taliban severed ties with extremists and expelled Osama bin Laden.[236] On 7 June 2010, the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Seyassah reported that Bin Laden was hiding out in the mountainous town of Sabzevar, in northeastern Iran.[237] On 9 June, The Australian's online edition repeated the claim.[238] This report turned out to be false.

On 18 October 2010, an unnamed NATO official suggested that Bin Laden was alive, well, and living comfortably in Pakistan, protected by elements of the country's intelligence services. A senior Pakistani official denied the allegations and said that the accusations were designed to put pressure on the Pakistani government ahead of talks aimed at strengthening ties between Pakistan and the U.S.[239]

In April 2011, various U.S. intelligence outlets traced Bin Laden to Abbottabad, Pakistan. It was previously believed that he was hiding near the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but he was found 160 km (100 mi) away in a three-story mansion in Abbottabad at 34°10′9.51″N 73°14′32.78″E / 34.1693083°N 73.2424389°E / 34.1693083; 73.2424389,[240][241][242] 1.3 km (0.8 mi) southwest of the Pakistan Military Academy.[243][244][245][246] Imagery from Google Earth indicates that the compound was built between 2001 and 2005.[247]

Death and aftermath

[edit]
Map showing the US operation from its bases in Afghanistan to Pakistan that killed Bin Laden, and the subsequent burial of his body at sea

Osama bin Laden was shot and killed by Navy Seal operatives in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on 2 May 2011,[248][249] shortly after 1:00 AM local time (4:00 PM Eastern Time on 1 May 2011)[b][250][251] by a U.S. military special operations unit.[252][253] The operation, code-named Operation Neptune Spear, was ordered by Barack Obama in April 2011 and carried out in a CIA operation by a team of U.S. Navy SEALs from the United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group (also known as DEVGRU or informally by its former name, SEAL Team Six) of the Joint Special Operations Command,[254] with support from CIA operatives on the ground.[255][256][257]

Members of the Obama administration in the Situation Room, tracking the mission that killed Bin Laden

The raid on Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad was launched from Afghanistan.[258] After the raid, reports at the time stated that U.S. forces had taken Bin Laden's body to Afghanistan for positive identification, then buried it at sea, in accordance with Islamic law, within 24 hours of his death.[259] Subsequent reporting has called this account into question—citing, for example, the absence of evidence that there was an imam on board the USS Carl Vinson, where the burial was said to have taken place.[260] On 15 June 2011, U.S. federal prosecutors officially dropped all criminal charges against Bin Laden.[261]

Pakistani authorities later demolished the compound in February 2012[262] to prevent it from becoming a neo-Islamist shrine.[263] In February 2013, Pakistan announced plans to build a PKR 265 million (US$30 million) amusement park in the area, including the property of the former hideout.[264] In an interview in 2019, Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan claimed that Pakistani intelligence led the CIA to Osama bin Laden.[265]

It was widely reported by the press that Bin Laden was fatally wounded by Robert J. O'Neill; however, it has also been widely discredited by witnesses, who claim that Bin Laden was possibly already dead by the time O'Neill arrived, having been injured by an anonymous SEAL Team Six member referred to under the pseudonym "Red".[266][267] According to Navy SEAL Matt Bissonnette, Bin Laden was struck by two suppressed shots to the side of the head from around ten feet away after leaning out of his bedroom doorway to survey Bissonnette and a point man. Once the Navy SEALs entered the bedroom, his body began convulsing and Bissonnette along with another SEAL responded by firing multiple shots into his chest.[268]

On 29 March 2012, Pakistani newspaper Dawn acquired a report produced by Pakistani security officials, based on interrogation of his three surviving wives, that detailed his movements while living underground in Pakistan.[269]

Allegations of Pakistan support and protection of Bin Laden

[edit]

Bin Laden was killed within the fortified complex of buildings that were probably built for him,[270] and had reportedly been his home for at least five years.[271][272] The compound was located less than 2 kilometres (1 mi) from the Pakistan Military Academy and less than 100 kilometres (62 mi) from Pakistan's capital.[255][273] While the United States and Pakistan governments both claimed, and later maintained, that no Pakistani officials, including senior military leaders, knew Bin Laden's whereabouts or had prior knowledge of the U.S. strike,[274][275] Carlotta Gall, writing in The New York Times Magazine in 2014, reported that ISI Director General Ahmad Shuja Pasha knew of Bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad.[276] In a 2015 London Review of Books article, investigative reporter Seymour M. Hersh asserted—citing U.S. sources—that Bin Laden had been a prisoner of the ISI at the Abbottabad compound since 2006; that Pasha knew of the U.S. mission in advance, and authorized the helicopters delivering the SEALs to enter Pakistani airspace; and that the CIA learned of Bin Laden's whereabouts from a former senior Pakistani intelligence of Ahmad Shuja Pasha, who was paid an estimated $25 million for the information.[260] Both stories were denied by U.S. and Pakistani officials.

Mosharraf Zia, a leading Pakistani columnist, stated, "It seems deeply improbable that Bin Laden could have been where he was killed without the knowledge of some parts of the Pakistani state."[277] Pakistan's U.S. envoy, Ambassador Husain Haqqani, promised a "full inquiry" into how Pakistani intelligence services could have failed to find Bin Laden in a fortified compound so close to Islamabad. "Obviously Bin Laden did have a support system", he said. "The issue is, was that support system within the government and the state of Pakistan, or within the society of Pakistan?"[278]

Others argued that Bin Laden lived in the compound with a local family, and never used the internet or a mobile phone, which would have made him much easier to locate.[279] Pakistan's president Asif Ali Zardari denied that his country's security forces sheltered Bin Laden, and called any supposed support for Bin Laden by the Pakistani government baseless speculation.[280][281] Government officials said that the country's limited resources had been committed to its war against the Pakistan Taliban, and other insurgents who posed an active threat to it, rather than to finding or sheltering Bin Laden.[282] Coll states that as of 2019 there is no direct evidence showing Pakistani knowledge of Bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad. Documents captured from the Abbottabad compound generally show that Bin Laden was wary of contact with Pakistani intelligence and police, especially in light of Pakistan's role in the arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.[283]

The U.S. Military, utilizing one of Palantir Technologies' core software platforms, Gotham, described as an "Operating System for Defense Decision Making," successfully located Osama bin Laden in his hideout in 2011.[284] [285]

Reception and legacy

[edit]
The FBI Most Wanted webpage for Bin Laden in late 2011

During the early 2000s, despite condemnations from U.S-allied governments in the Arab world, anti-American protestors from Pakistan to Palestinian territories used his portraits during their protests, speeches and public campaigns.[286] His popularity in the Muslim world reached its apex through the course of the Iraq War; during which opinion polls conducted in some countries gave him 50% – 60% favourable ratings.[287][286][288][289] However, at his death, Arab reaction was described as "muted", overshadowed by the beginning of the Arab Spring.[290] The Pew Research Center found in 2011 that support for Bin Laden and al-Qaeda had declined steadily across a number of Muslim countries, and was as low as 1% in Lebanon, describing him as "discredited".[291] Latin American political leaders expressed opposition to Bin Laden, with Peruvian president Alan García calling him "demonic"; however, at his death, some leftist Latin American leaders also denounced the United States for violating Pakistani sovereignty to target Bin Laden.[292] His death was celebrated in India, and the fact that he was found in Pakistan was regarded as cause for concern due to the complex Indo-Pakistani relationship.[293] During a June 2020 Pakistani parliament session, Prime Minister Imran Khan denounced Bin Laden's killing, labelling it as "an embarrassing moment" in their country's history, and also praised Bin Laden as a Shaheed (martyr).[294][295][296]

Bin Laden is a reviled figure in the Western world, where he is regarded as a terrorist and mass murderer.[297][298] His obituary in the New York Times referred to him as "the North Star" of global terrorism, seen by Americans as equivalent to "Hitler or Stalin."[298] Mark Hosenball wrote:

In history's long list of villains, bin Laden will find a special place. He ha[d] no throne, no armies, not even any real territory, aside from the rocky wastes of Afghanistan. But he ha[d] the power to make men willingly go to their deaths for the sole purpose of indiscriminately killing Americans—men, women and children. He [was] an unusual combination in the annals of hate, at once mystical and fanatical—and deliberate and efficient.

— Mark Hosenball, 2001[299]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Osama bin Laden (1957 – 2 May 2011) was a -born militant and the founder of , an Islamist terrorist organization established in 1988 to wage jihad against perceived enemies of Islam, particularly the United States and its allies. Bin Laden gained prominence by recruiting and funding Arab volunteers during the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, framing the conflict as a religious duty to expel Soviet forces from Muslim lands. Following the Soviet withdrawal, he redirected 's focus toward expelling American military presence from —home to Islam's holiest sites—issuing fatwas in 1996 and 1998 that declared it the duty of Muslims to kill Americans and their allies, civilians and military alike, in pursuit of this goal. Under his leadership, carried out high-profile attacks, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in and , the 2000 , and most notably the , 2001, hijackings and crashes into the World Trade Center, , and a field in , which bin Laden publicly admitted to orchestrating and which killed nearly 3,000 people. After the U.S. invasion of in response to 9/11, bin Laden evaded capture for nearly a decade before U.S. Navy SEALs killed him on 2 May 2011 in a compound in , , during Operation Neptune Spear. His death marked the end of al-Qaeda's founding era, though the group and its affiliates persisted in promoting global jihadist ideology rooted in bin Laden's vision of confronting Western influence through asymmetric violence.

Early Life and Background

Birth, Family, and Upbringing

Osama bin Laden was born on March 10, 1957, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden and his tenth wife, Alia Ghanem, a Syrian from Latakia. His Yemeni-born father immigrated to Saudi Arabia in the 1920s, founded the Saudi Binladin Group, and built vast wealth through royal contracts for Mecca and Medina mosque expansions, aided by state ties. With around 11 wives, Mohammed fathered at least 54 children, placing Osama among his younger sons and many half-siblings across households. His parents divorced near age three; Ghanem then married Mohammed al-Attas, a paternal associate, who co-raised Osama in amid family business relocations. In 1967, when Osama was 10, his father perished in a plane crash near , ; the estate divided under Islamic law, with elder brothers overseeing shares. The clan's opulence—private jets, palaces, global investments—contrasted Osama's secluded life in this polygamous Sunni family. His mother recalled a shy, obedient boy closely bonded to her, with scant contact among half-siblings due to divided maternal lines and paternal travels. Jeddah life mixed elite modernity with Wahhabi conservatism, as bin Laden-Al Saud links emphasized business duty over indulgence.

Education and Initial Influences

Bin Laden received his primary and secondary education in , , within an environment that emphasized strict adherence to Islamic religious and social codes. He enrolled at in in the mid-1970s, pursuing studies in , economics, and business administration. Accounts differ on completion of a degree, with some reporting graduation circa 1981 prior to his involvement in . At the university, bin Laden engaged with Islamist currents linked to the and came under the influence of scholars including Mohammed Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist philosopher and brother of the executed ideologue , as well as Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian academic who promoted as a religious duty against perceived threats to Muslims. These academic encounters built on familial foundations, as bin Laden grew up under his father's enforcement of pious routines—including daily prayers and avoidance of Western media—and through family-hosted visits by Islamic figures during pilgrimages. Such exposures fostered an early commitment to pan-Islamic solidarity and opposition to secular influences.

Personal Life and Character

Marriages, Children, and Family Dynamics

Osama bin Laden practiced , marrying six women over his lifetime, though one was annulled shortly after. His first wife was , a Syrian whom he married in 1974 at age 17; they separated before the in 2001. He wed Khadijah Sharif in 1983, divorcing her in 1995; Khairiah Sabar in 1985; and Siham bint Ouf in 1987. A brief to an unidentified woman occurred in 1996 and was annulled within days. His final wife, Amal Ahmed Abdul al-Sadah, a Yemeni, married him in 2000. At the time of his death in 2011, three wives—Amal, Khairiah, and Siham—resided with him in the compound in , where household tensions arose, particularly after Khairiah's arrival in early 2011 following her release from Iranian custody. Bin Laden fathered 24 children across his wives, with birth years spanning 1976 to 2008. Najwa bore 11: sons Abdullah (1976), Abdul Rahman (1978), Sa'ad (1979), Omar (1981), Osman (1983), and Muhammad (1985), and daughters Fatima (1987), Iman (1990), Ladin (1993), Rukhaiya (1997), and Nour (1999–2000). Khadijah had three: sons Ali (1984–1986) and Amer (1990), and daughter Aisha (1992). Khairiah gave birth to one son, Hamza (1989–1991). Siham had four: daughter Kadhija (1988) and sons Khalid (1989), Miriam (1990), and Sumaiya (1992). Amal bore five: daughters Safiyah (2001) and Aasia (2003), and sons Ibrahim (2004), Zainab (2006), and Hussain (2008).
WifeNumber of ChildrenNotable Children
Najwa Ghanem11Abdullah, Sa'ad, Omar
Khadijah Sharif3Ali, Amer, Aisha
Khairiah Sabar1Hamza
Siham bint Ouf4Kadhija, Khalid, Miriam, Sumaiya
Amal al-Sadah5Safiyah, Aasia, Ibrahim, Zainab, Hussain
Family dynamics reflected bin Laden's commitment to strict Salafi interpretations of amid frequent relocations from militant activities. In and , wives and children faced austere isolation, with home-schooling in , self-sufficiency via gardening and livestock like cows and chickens, and rare outings from compounds—for example, the nine children in had not left for years. Polygamous tensions sparked wife quarrels, intensified by his operational absences and post-2001 nomadism, as Amal bore four children across five Pakistani safe houses. While some children like Omar rejected militancy, detailing rigid survival training and indoctrination in memoirs, others such as Hamza joined . His extended family disowned him in 1994 over anti-Saudi views, though he retained ties with his mother.

Lifestyle, Habits, and Daily Routines

Bin Laden followed a strictly ascetic lifestyle, rejecting his family's vast wealth and emulating the simplicity of early Islamic prophets. He lived in modest dwellings, such as village-like houses in Sudan and basic compounds or caves in Afghanistan, prioritizing religious devotion over material comfort. His daily routine centered on Islamic observances, including the five daily prayers and Quran study, integrated with reflection and planning. His diet reflected this austerity: primarily simple halal foods like bread, yogurt, honey, and dates, with meat consumed rarely, especially during resource shortages in Afghanistan. He avoided tobacco, alcohol, and other Sharia-prohibited indulgences, maintaining discipline in exile. Journalist Robert Fisk, who met him multiple times, described him as ascetic, insisting on prayer before meals in the mountains. From 2005 to 2011 in the Abbottabad compound, bin Laden emphasized isolation and family oversight. He rarely left, spending time walking in the garden—often in a cowboy hat to evade satellite surveillance—and homeschooling his children with his wives' assistance. He rigorously managed security, limiting communications and outings while using hair dye for a younger video appearance. This cloistered routine, shared with three wives, numerous children, and grandchildren, underscored his patriarchal role amid constant capture threats.

Ideological Formation and Core Beliefs

Radicalization Triggers and Grievances

Bin Laden's radicalization began with the Soviet invasion of on December 24, 1979, viewed as an attack on Muslim lands demanding defensive . Meeting Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam in , , around 1980–1984, he adopted Azzam's doctrine of obligatory jihad against occupiers, mobilizing Arab fighters for the Afghan mujahideen. Azzam's teachings stressed ummah unity in battle, framing the Afghan conflict as a border-transcending religious duty that advanced bin Laden beyond his earlier Muslim Brotherhood activism in during university. His engagement deepened in the early via trips to , supplying financial and logistical aid before fighting in battles like the 1987 siege of Jaji. These reinforced his conviction that mujahideen could overcome superpowers. Bin Laden saw the Afghan as debunking the "myth of the ," proven by the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, which showed Muslim resolve could defeat modern forces. This, alongside Azzam's , shifted him from to armed mobilization, evolving his outlook from passive faith to militant prioritization of jihad. Post-Soviet grievances evolved toward the United States following the 1990–1991 Gulf War, when American troops remained stationed in Saudi Arabia, which bin Laden decried as an occupation of Islam's holiest lands—Mecca and Medina—constituting a defilement by "Crusaders." In his August 23, 1996, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holiest Sites," he enumerated U.S. military bases as the "greatest danger" to the Arabian Peninsula's oil reserves and Muslim sovereignty, accusing the Saudi regime of complicity as an "American colony" for permitting this presence and squandering national wealth. Additional complaints included U.S. support for Israel, portrayed as enabling aggression against Palestinians and Lebanon, and post-Gulf War sanctions on Iraq, which bin Laden claimed had caused over 600,000 child deaths—a figure drawn from contested UNICEF estimates he invoked to justify retaliation. These triggers coalesced into a broader anti-Western stance, articulated in bin Laden's February 23, 1998, fatwa co-signed with allies, declaring the killing of Americans and their allies—civilian or military—an "individual duty for every Muslim" to liberate Muslim lands from perceived Zionist-Crusader domination. He framed U.S. actions as systematic humiliation of the ummah, including interventions in Somalia, support for secular Muslim regimes, and economic exploitation, urging plunder of American assets as reciprocal justice. While bin Laden attributed these views to Quranic imperatives and historical precedents, analysts note their selective interpretation to rationalize offensive violence beyond traditional defensive jihad boundaries established by figures like Azzam.

Political and Religious Views, Including Anti-Western Stance

Osama bin Laden adhered to Salafi-jihadism, a militant strain of Sunni Islam emphasizing tawhid (the oneness of God) and sharia as the sole legitimate governance, with deviations seen as idolatry or apostasy. Drawing from Wahhabi puritanism, his views endorsed offensive jihad beyond defense, shaped by Abdullah Azzam's calls for global Muslim mobilization against aggressors in the Soviet-Afghan War. Sayyid Qutb's Milestones further influenced his support for takfir—declaring Muslim rulers apostates for non-Muslim alliances—and a vanguard to violently overthrow ignorant regimes. These concepts depicted Islam under perpetual siege, requiring armed struggle to restore a caliphate. Politically, bin Laden rejected as a Western system elevating human laws over divine sovereignty, advocating (consultation) within Islamic limits to enable caliphal rule. He condemned secular and monarchies like Saudi Arabia's for corruption and infidel subservience, calling for emirates that enforce penalties such as for and for . His aims included expelling non-Muslims from the , adapting Muhammad's Medina pacts to modern geopolitics. Bin Laden's anti-Western stance centered on perceived crusader-Zionist aggression, outlined in his August 1996 "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places." This condemned U.S. troops in since the 1990-1991 for defiling and . Grievances encompassed U.S. backing of Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands, sanctions tied to over 500,000 Iraqi child deaths (citing reports), and bases supporting attacks on Muslims in and beyond. The co-signed February 1998 intensified this by obligating Muslims to kill and allies—civilian or military, anywhere—as retaliation for over 800,000 Muslim deaths since 1982 in , , and elsewhere. These statements cast the West, especially the U.S., as existential threats to , warranting to exhaust economies and prompt withdrawal.

Role in the Afghan-Soviet War

Arrival in Afghanistan and Recruitment Efforts

Osama bin Laden first traveled to , —the logistical hub for Afghan mujahideen operations—in 1979, shortly after the Soviet Union's invasion of on December 24. Motivated by emerging Islamist convictions and resources from the bin Laden construction empire, he connected with resistance leaders, distributed aid, assessed support opportunities, and observed the conflict without direct combat. By 1984, bin Laden co-founded the al-Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK, or Services Bureau) with Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam to recruit Arab volunteers systematically. MAK built a network of offices across the Muslim world—including , , and the (e.g., , New York)—to promote , manage logistics, and direct fighters to training camps near . Bin Laden funded operations with his inheritance and appeals to Gulf donors, highlighting the religious obligation to back against Soviet . MAK targeted educated youth and professionals from countries, portraying involvement as defensive to protect Muslim lands, rooted in Salafi-jihadist . It offered , basic weapons and tactics training, and transportation for recruits—known as "" to differentiate them from locals—with estimates of several thousand arrivals despite imprecise records. Bin Laden transitioned from financier to recruiter, using charisma, speeches, and networks in Saudi mosques and universities to secure pledges. These efforts fostered a transnational jihadist cadre, independent of Afghan groups and focused on ideological purity.

Funding Sources, Arab Fighters, and Combat Involvement

Bin Laden funded his initial Afghan operations from his personal fortune, derived from shares in the family-owned , a construction conglomerate with billions in contracts including Saudi royal projects. Starting around 1982, he invested several million dollars in logistics, supply-line road-building, and guesthouses for volunteers in , . Private donations from wealthy Saudis and Gulf benefactors, channeled through Islamic charities, supplemented this, as did indirect Saudi government subsidies via groups like the Muslim World League's office, which bin Laden helped finance to support Arab fighters. No evidence shows direct from U.S. sources to his network; American aid to mujahideen went mainly through Pakistani intermediaries to Afghan factions, bypassing Arab volunteers. To mobilize non-Afghan support, bin Laden partnered with Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam in 1984 to found (MAK), or Afghan Services Bureau, in for recruiting, , and deploying Arab fighters against Soviet forces. MAK's outreach to mosques and universities across the and beyond drew 4,000–5,000 volunteers by the war's end, who formed separate units from local Afghan mujahideen. Bin Laden covered their travel, weapons, and stipends while promoting global against and perceived Western influence. Group , including Azzam's writings backed by bin Laden's resources, cast the conflict as a religious duty, attracting fighters from , , , and elsewhere despite their limited combat effectiveness relative to Afghan forces. Bin Laden's combat role was limited: no evidence exists of formal hand-to-hand training, and basic firearms familiarity remains disputed, based on Jaji participation and videos of him firing weapons. Primarily a financier and leader rather than a trained fighter or marksman, he emphasized command and morale-boosting presence over sustained frontline combat, yet led Arab contingents in key engagements to show commitment. In 1987, during the in , his small force repelled a Soviet assault, earning jihadist acclaim despite heavy losses. More prominently, in early 1989, he commanded Arab fighters in the siege of after Soviet withdrawal, coordinating attacks on the Soviet-backed garrison to capture the city; the effort failed due to poor planning and Afghan rivalries. Documented in jihadist accounts and analyses, these actions solidified his stature but exposed tactical flaws, with Arab units incurring high casualties and contributing little to overall gains.

Establishment of al-Qaeda

Origins, Organizational Structure, and Initial Goals

was founded by Osama bin Laden in August 1988 during a meeting in , , as the Soviet-Afghan War ended. It evolved from bin Laden's logistical operations through the al-Islamiya (Islamic Services Bureau, or MAK), co-established with Abdullah Azzam around to recruit, fund, and supply 10,000–20,000 Arab fighters against the Soviet occupation of . Following Azzam's assassination in a car bombing on November 24, 1989—attributed to the CIA, , or internal rivals—bin Laden took control, redirecting the network from temporary Afghan aid to a standing jihadist force. The name "al-Qaeda" ("the base" or "foundation") originally referred to a database of veteran Arab fighters for recruitment. Al-Qaeda started as a centralized but flexible group under bin Laden's command as amir, with Muhammad Atef (Abu Hafs al-Masri) handling operations. A core leadership team oversaw committees for , —using bin Laden's $25–30 million inheritance from the late —and intelligence, operating via guesthouses and camps in and . It used cellular units of 5–10 operatives to limit damage from captures, with bin Laden seeking advice informally before a formal council emerged in the . By 1990, it had trained hundreds in small arms, explosives, and guerrilla tactics, using Pakistan's border areas as bases. Al-Qaeda's initial objectives focused on sustaining Islamist insurgency post-Soviet withdrawal, positioning itself as a "base" to export jihad to Muslim-majority regions under "un-Islamic" governance or foreign occupation. Bin Laden articulated this in 1988 planning sessions as preparing an elite cadre to target Soviet holdouts in Afghanistan, then extend operations to South Yemen (following tensions with North Yemen), Saudi Arabia's monarchy (viewed as corrupt and overly reliant on Western alliances), and other apostate regimes. The core aim was ideological purification: uniting Salafi-jihadists to overthrow secular nationalists and restore sharia-based governance, with early rhetoric emphasizing defensive jihad against perceived crusader-Soviet aggression rather than immediate global confrontation. This mission drew funding from private Gulf donors via hawala networks and zakat contributions, amassing millions annually by 1989, though bin Laden rejected direct state sponsorship to maintain operational independence. These goals crystallized amid the 1989 Soviet pullout, as bin Laden rejected reintegration into Saudi society, foreshadowing al-Qaeda's pivot toward anti-Western grievances after U.S. troops deployed to Saudi Arabia in August 1990 for Operation Desert Shield.

Expansion and Training Networks

Following its formalization in late 1988 as a vanguard for ongoing , al-Qaeda under bin Laden's leadership expanded from a core of Afghan-Soviet war veterans—estimated at several hundred fighters—into a decentralized network. It recruited globally via ideological fatwas, propaganda, and personal oaths of loyalty (). This drew on support structures, including recruitment offices in , , and , targeting militants disillusioned with secular regimes and Western interventions. By the early , al-Qaeda formed loose affiliations with groups like , incorporating their operatives under its umbrella while allowing operational autonomy. Bin Laden's 1991 relocation to spurred infrastructural growth. He invested personal wealth from firms like Wadi al-Aqiq into farms, roads, and training sites near and . Operational by 1992, these camps trained up to 500 militants yearly in , RPGs, techniques, and basic explosives, led by Afghan veterans or allies like the . Sudanese tolerance facilitated this, with funding from agricultural exports and expatriate donations. U.S. intelligence linked the camps to preparations for attacks like the . Sudan's expulsion of bin Laden on May 18, 1996, shifted operations to . control from 1996 provided safe havens in eastern provinces like Nangarhar. Al-Qaeda then expanded its training network, creating over a dozen specialized camps by 1998—including Darunta for chemicals and poisons, and sites near for —hosting 2,000–3,000 recruits annually from 40 countries. Bin Laden's estimated $30 million yearly budget supported them, with training focused on asymmetric tactics and anti-Western ideology for deployable operatives. This enabled al-Qaeda's transition to global operations, sending units to , , and .

Exile in Sudan and Relocation to Afghanistan

Sudanese Operations and Economic Activities

After departing Saudi Arabia in 1991, Osama bin Laden relocated to at the invitation of the Islamist government under and , who sought foreign investment and ideological alignment. He invested an estimated $50 million of his fortune in construction, , and ventures to generate revenue, build infrastructure, employ hundreds—including Arab from the Afghan jihad—and provide cover while laundering funds for al-Qaeda precursors. Key entities included Al-Hijra Construction, which built roads, bridges, and projects like the 800-kilometer Thaadi Road from to , shortening the prior 1,200-kilometer route and easing oil transport; it acquired explosives for land-clearing, later alleged by U.S. authorities to support terrorism. Wadi al-Aqiq, a founded in 1991, exported , , sunflowers, , and other crops via Blessed Fruits, using profits to fund militant training and logistics. Further investments covered tanneries like the Khartoum Tannery and Taba Investments for currency exchange, converting Sudanese dinars to U.S. dollars and British pounds to bypass scrutiny. These ventures supported al-Qaeda's expansion in Sudan, including training camps near and for foreign fighters in weapons handling, explosives, and urban combat. By 1993, al-Qaeda operated an administrative office there, recruiting for Bosnia, , and while planning U.S. attacks; annual business profits of several million dollars funded operations and arms. Sudanese authorities aided with passports and banking via al-Shamal Islamic Bank, but 's 1994 revocation of bin Laden's citizenship for subversive acts triggered U.S. sanctions and pressure. Facing UN resolutions and U.S. demands, Sudan expelled bin Laden and roughly 600 associates in May 1996, prompting relocation to ; he abandoned tens of millions in frozen assets, later pursuing recovery through proxies. This phase entrenched al-Qaeda's self-funding approach, mixing legal trade with illicit streams, countering Sudanese portrayals of bin Laden's role as purely developmental amid evidence of jihadist-enabling infrastructure.

Return Under Taliban Protection and Strategic Alliances

Following expulsion from amid pressure from the and , bin Laden left on May 18, 1996, and arrived in eastern later that month, basing himself initially in , . Yunus Khalis, a Pashtun commander controlling the area, provided shelter due to shared Salafi-jihadist affinities. This move allowed bin Laden to reestablish al-Qaeda's base, drawing on anti-Soviet ties to rebuild training facilities and recruit Arab fighters. The Taliban's advances created a secure haven; after taking on September 27, 1996, they held 90% of by early 1997 and declared an Islamic under Mohammed Omar. Bin Laden forged ties with Omar, shifting al- headquarters to —the Taliban's base—in mid-1997 for protection from extradition. He formalized this by pledging to Omar as , placing Afghan operations under Taliban authority while preserving global independence. The partnership benefited both: Taliban granted safe haven and autonomy to al-Qaeda's 20-30 camps, training thousands yearly, in return for aid. Bin Laden directed millions in funds from donations and businesses to Taliban forces, sent 1,000-3,000 Arab fighters (the "") against the [Northern Alliance](/page/Northern Alliance), and provided expertise in explosives, logistics, and . U.S. pressure tested Taliban resolve after al-Qaeda's 1998 embassy bombings in and , which killed 224; UN demands for bin Laden's surrender on October 15, 1999, brought sanctions, but Omar rejected them, invoking insufficient evidence and hospitality. Omar's refusal endured U.S. strikes on Afghan camps, cementing the alliance against Western demands until the 2001 invasion.

Declarations of Jihad and Pre-9/11 Operations

1996-1998 Fatwas and Rationales

On August 23, 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a declaration titled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," presented as a fatwa from his base in Afghanistan's Hindu Kush mountains. This 12-page Arabic document, faxed out and later translated into English, called on Muslims to wage jihad to expel U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula, especially Saudi Arabia—the site of Mecca and Medina. Bin Laden's grievances targeted the ongoing U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia since the 1990-1991 Gulf War, with 5,000-10,000 troops at bases like Prince Sultan Air Base. He viewed this as desecrating sacred lands under Sharia, exploiting oil, and backing an apostate monarchy that ceded sovereignty. He also condemned U.S. sanctions on Iraq for causing over 600,000 child deaths from malnutrition and disease, plus billions in annual aid to Israel that supported Palestinian occupation. The fatwa justified violence through defensive jihad as a personal duty (fard 'ayn) against invading Muslim lands, citing Quranic verses like Surah Al-Baqarah 2:191 and Muhammad's expulsion of polytheists from Arabia. It promoted guerrilla warfare, assassinations of Americans, and attacks on U.S. interests, while faulting inert Muslim leaders. Lacking formal clerical authority or support from scholars like those at Al-Azhar, it sought to rally Salafi-jihadists for al-Qaeda's global efforts. On February 23, 1998, bin Laden escalated his rhetoric with the "World Islamic Front Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," co-signed by four other jihadist leaders: Ayman al-Zawahiri of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Rifa'i Ahmad Taha of the Egyptian Islamic Group, Mir Hamzah of Pakistan's Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan, and Fazlur Rahman of Bangladesh's Jihad Movement. Published in the Arabic newspaper Al-Quds Al-Arabi and translated widely, the shorter fatwa declared the killing of Americans and their allies—both civilians and military—in any location as an individual duty for every able Muslim, broadening the target beyond combatants. Its rationales reiterated and intensified prior complaints, citing the U.S. occupation of the Arabian Peninsula for over seven years as a base for aggression against Iraq and other Muslim states, the devastation of Iraq through the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent sanctions resulting in over 1 million deaths (predominantly civilians), and U.S. efforts to fragment Arab countries like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan to perpetuate Israeli dominance. Bin Laden framed these as a Crusader-Zionist conspiracy declaring war on Allah, Islam, and Muslims, obligating retaliation to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the holy sites in Mecca. Justifications rested on Islamic jurisprudence permitting offensive jihad against aggressors, supported by fatwas from medieval scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and Quranic injunctions against those who "fight you, slay them wherever you find them" (Surah Al-Baqarah 2:191). Like the 1996 declaration, it lacked broad scholarly consensus but served to unify disparate jihadist factions under al-Qaeda's umbrella for transnational operations.

Key Attacks: 1998 Embassy Bombings and USS Cole

On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda detonated truck bombs nearly simultaneously outside the U.S. embassies in , , and , . The Nairobi explosion killed 213 people, including 12 Americans, and injured over 4,500; the Dar es Salaam blast killed 11 and wounded 74. These suicide attacks involved trucks loaded with explosives driven by al-Qaeda members. Bin Laden approved the operation as part of his jihad against the following the February 1998 calling for killing Americans and allies. U.S. indictments charged him with conspiracy, citing 's Afghan camps for training and logistics. coordinated the cells. Motivated by U.S. forces in and support for , the strikes showcased al-Qaeda's ability for coordinated, high-casualty attacks abroad. The U.S. responded with on August 20, launching cruise missiles at al-Qaeda camps in and a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant suspected of chemical weapons production. Bin Laden escaped and later praised the bombings as valid resistance. On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda suicide bombers detonated an explosive-laden boat alongside the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer refueling in Aden Harbor, Yemen. The blast, using about 1,000 pounds of explosives, killed 17 American sailors, wounded 39, and tore a 40-foot hole in the hull. Bin Laden oversaw the plot, which trained operatives in Afghanistan and exploited Yemen's port vulnerabilities; al-Qaeda claimed responsibility to target naval assets, provoke U.S. overreaction, and impair regional power projection. U.S. investigations verified al-Qaeda's role through plotters' confessions and explosives traced to prior attacks, signaling emerging maritime threats before larger operations.

Orchestration of the September 11 Attacks

Planning, Execution, and Attribution Evidence

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed proposed using hijacked commercial aircraft as weapons against U.S. targets to Osama bin Laden in 1996, but bin Laden approved the operation in spring 1999 and pledged al-Qaeda support. He selected key operatives, naming Mohamed Atta as tactical commander, and specified targets like the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Capitol or White House. Planning accelerated in 1999-2000: 15 Saudi "muscle" hijackers trained in Afghan al-Qaeda camps for combat and hijacking, while pilots including Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi started U.S. flight training in July 2000 to handle large jetliners without takeoff or landing skills. On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers in four teams boarded , , , and from East Coast airports between 7:59 and 8:42 a.m. ET. Using box cutters and knives, they overpowered crews; Atta on AA11 stabbed flight attendants and slit the captain's throat to enter the cockpit by 8:14 a.m., with parallel seizures on other flights. AA11 and UA175 struck the World Trade Center's North and South Towers at 8:46 and 9:03 a.m., triggering collapses by 10:28 a.m.; hit at 9:37 a.m., breaching its west side; crashed in , at 10:03 a.m. after passenger resistance foiled a Washington target. Attribution to bin Laden and was established through multiple lines of evidence, including pre-9/11 intelligence linking hijackers like and to al-Qaeda summits in and , and post-attack documents and confirming the plot's al-Qaeda orchestration. Bin Laden initially denied involvement on September 16, 2001, but praised the attacks; al-Qaeda's military chief claimed responsibility in early October, corroborated by U.S. intercepts. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's 2007 under interrogation admitted directing the operation for bin Laden, while bin Laden explicitly claimed responsibility in a 2004 video, stating he personally approved the targets and timing. The detailed bin Laden's strategic oversight, including resource allocation from al-Qaeda's treasury, supported by financial trails like wire transfers to hijackers.

Strategic Intent and Claim of Responsibility

Osama bin Laden described the September 11 attacks as retaliation against U.S. policies harming Muslim populations, seeking to inflict equivalent suffering and economic damage. In his October 29, 2004, Al Jazeera video, he highlighted al-Qaeda's $500,000 cost against U.S. losses over $500 billion, as a strategy to bleed America through asymmetric warfare. This built on his fatwas demanding U.S. withdrawal from the Arabian Peninsula and an end to support for Israel, using the strikes to expose American vulnerability and deter interventions in Muslim lands. He framed World Trade Center targeting as punishment for U.S.-backed actions in Palestine and Lebanon, citing the 1982 Israeli invasion's civilian toll of "blood and severed limbs, women and children sprawled everywhere." Bin Laden stated, "We decided to destroy towers in America so it tastes some of what we are tasting, and to stop killing our women and children." The attacks also aimed to provoke U.S. overreaction, expecting invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to drain resources and spur jihadist recruitment, as shown in al-Qaeda's post-9/11 directives urging endurance. Bin Laden initially denied direct involvement in the September 11 attacks days after they occurred, while praising the perpetrators. He later claimed responsibility in the 2004 video, stating the idea to strike the towers arose from "unbearable" injustice and confirming agreement with Mohamed Atta to execute all phases within 20 minutes before collapse. U.S. intelligence authenticated the tape via voice analysis and contextual consistency with prior communications. This aligned with intercepted al-Qaeda messages and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's confession detailing bin Laden's approval of the plot's scale and targets.

Post-9/11 Evasion and Continued Influence

Escape from Tora Bora and Hideouts

Following the U.S.-led invasion of in October 2001, Osama bin Laden withdrew to the mountain complex in eastern 's Spin Ghar range—a network of over 20 caves and tunnels fortified during the Soviet-Afghan War. U.S. airstrikes began on December 6, 2001, targeting al- positions, as about 100 U.S. Forces coordinated with 2,000-3,000 Afghan militias to assault the area. Bin Laden's radio broadcasts urged fighters to battle and promised martyrdom, but U.S. intelligence estimated 200-300 hardcore al- defenders, with intercepts and local reports indicating his presence. By December 12, 2001, Afghan forces claimed to have cleared parts of , but bin Laden escaped between December 12 and 16. He likely crossed unpoliced mountain passes into 's (FATA) with family and loyalists, aided by Pashtun tribesmen who provided guides and may have taken bribes up to $500,000. His escape stemmed from limited U.S. ground troops—Rumsfeld denied requests for 800-1,000 more Rangers or to seal routes—dependence on defect-prone tribal militias, and 's refusal to close the 100-mile border despite U.S. pleas. A 2009 U.S. Foreign Relations deemed the Tora Bora evasion a lost chance to capture or kill him, allowing regrouping in . After escaping, bin Laden set up hideouts in Pakistan's tribal borderlands, starting in FATA areas like North and South Waziristan. There, relied on networks among Pashtun militants and elements in Pakistan's (ISI). He enforced tight security by shunning electronics and using couriers such as , which thwarted detection in the harsh terrain protected by Pashtunwali hospitality codes. U.S. intelligence followed sporadic bin Laden audio and video tapes from these regions through 2004, confirming his survival and role. By mid-2000s, fearing intensified drone strikes in FATA—over 300 by 2010—bin Laden relocated to less militarized areas, including a compound in , where at least two of his children were born around 2003-2005. Documents seized from his final residence later confirmed multiple moves within Pakistan, including stays in Swat Valley and Peshawar suburbs, totaling at least six known locations over nine years, enabled by a support network of donors and couriers while evading Pakistan's security apparatus. These relocations reflected a strategy of blending into urban peripheries rather than remote wilds, prioritizing family safety and operational continuity over high-profile activity.

Communications, Directives, and al-Qaeda Leadership

From late 2001 onward, while evading U.S. forces in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, tribal areas, and urban compounds, Osama bin Laden minimized electronic communications to avoid detection. He relied on trusted couriers for handwritten letters, instructions, and pre-recorded audio or video messages delivered to intermediaries and disseminated via Al Jazeera or militant websites. This approach preserved his ideological influence and operational oversight without direct tactical involvement, using physical transport of thumb drives or tapes to evade while limiting real-time coordination and aiding decentralization. Bin Laden released at least 20 authenticated audio and video messages from 2001 to 2011, timed to events like U.S. elections or attack anniversaries, to rally supporters, critique enemies, and claim operations. Key examples include an October 2001 Al Jazeera video praising hijackers as martyrs; a November 2002 audio taking responsibility for 9/11 as retaliation for U.S. policies; an October 29, 2004, video warning voters of more strikes unless changed; and a September 7, 2006, video offering truce if the West withdrew from Muslim lands. Later messages, such as a January 19, 2006, audio honoring and a , 2007, tape urging attacks on "crusaders," sustained appeals and exploited Western divisions. U.S. intelligence confirmed these via voice analysis, affirming his symbolic authority despite isolation. Declassified documents from bin Laden's compound reveal directives to deputies and affiliates from 2006 to 2011, emphasizing strategic restraint, media operations, and priorities. Letters instructed to avoid excessive Muslim casualties from indiscriminate bombings to maintain support, criticized i affiliates for alienating Muslims via brutality, and mandated polished videos for 's against perceptions. He proposed 2010 train attacks on U.S. economic targets during holidays, urged strikes on Pakistan's U.S.-aligned government, and voiced frustration over financial shortages and disunity. These over 6,000 pages highlight his ideological micromanagement and long-term planning as operations shifted to and franchises. As al-Qaeda's self-proclaimed , bin Laden held ultimate post-2001 authority, delegating tactics to Zawahiri while retaining veto over major decisions like mergers with or drone responses. He positioned himself as ideological architect, issuing fatwas and arbitrating affiliate disputes, though evasion fostered regional and resource tensions with Zawahiri. This preserved anti-Western amid his isolation, reliant on couriers like . Despite U.S. degradation claims, the Abbottabad archive demonstrates his adaptive directives sustaining network resilience against marginalization narratives.

Capture and Death

Intelligence Lead to Abbottabad Compound

The intelligence breakthrough stemmed from interrogations of al-Qaeda detainees in the early 2000s, identifying a trusted courier known by the kunya as potentially linked to Osama bin Laden. In 2002, Mohamedou Ould Salahi first mentioned the pseudonym to U.S. authorities. , captured in March 2003, initially denied knowledge but later acknowledged al-Kuwaiti while downplaying his importance. Hassan Ghul, detained in January 2004, corroborated this by describing al-Kuwaiti as a close associate who delivered bin Laden's messages and connected to operational chief Abu Faraj al-Libi. Al-Libi, captured in May 2005, admitted al-Kuwaiti transported messages roughly every two months; his initial denial, like Mohammed's, heightened suspicions. By 2007, CIA analysts linked the kunya to Ibrahim Saeed Ahmed, a Pakistani from a Kuwaiti family fluent in and , narrowing operations to . In 2009, Pakistani (ISI) shared data on the compound, matching U.S. tracking of al-Kuwaiti's movements. By July 2010, the intercepted his calls, allowing CIA to spot him driving near . This traced to the Abbottabad compound in August 2010: a fortified residence built around 2005, featuring 12- to 18-foot walls with , no telephone or lines, and trash burning for —atypical for its affluent setting near a Pakistani . CIA surveillance, including flyover and ground observations, revealed a routine of high-security isolation. Analysts saw the site's anomalies and al-Kuwaiti's role as indicators of bin Laden's presence, despite no direct confirmation. Al-Kuwaiti, bin Laden's primary and aide, managed communications, hosted operatives, and posed as a from Pakistan's tribal areas. This multi-year integration of human reporting, signals intercepts, and geospatial analysis supported targeting the compound and operational planning by late 2010.

U.S. Raid Details and Body Disposal

![Map of Operation Neptune Spear locations](./assets/Operation_Neptune_Spear_map_of_locations_22 On May 2, 2011, around 1:00 a.m. local time in , , U.S. forces launched Operation Neptune Spear—a helicopter assault on Osama bin Laden's compound using two modified Black Hawks from , . The team comprised 23 Navy SEALs from (DEVGRU), a CIA translator, and a Belgian Malinois dog named , with CIA and military backup nearby. One helicopter hit a , hard-landing in the courtyard; operators fast-roped down and secured the perimeter without crew injuries. In the 40-minute raid, SEALs breached outer walls, clashed with armed resistance from bin Laden's courier and associates, and killed al-Kuwaiti, his brother, bin Laden's son , and bin Laden on the third floor after his resistance. Shot in the head and chest, bin Laden caused no U.S. fatalities; the downed helicopter later needed explosive extraction. SEALs seized intelligence—including computers, hard drives, and documents—containing al-Qaeda operational documents and correspondence, personal letters and diaries, family videos (e.g., son Hamza's wedding), documentaries about himself, books and articles on diverse topics, and pornographic videos—before exfiltrating on the second helicopter, joined by a backup Chinook that destroyed the damaged craft with explosives. Bin Laden's body went by helicopter to in for facial recognition, biometric scans, and DNA testing—a 99.9% match to his sister's samples. Flown to USS Carl Vinson in the northern , it received an Islamic funeral on May 2, 2011 (U.S. time): ritual washing and lead-weighted shrouding. Buried at sea to avert a for extremists, it sank swiftly under minimal U.S. observation. No public images emerged, but military emails noted few witnesses and guideline compliance amid constraints.

Pakistani Involvement Allegations and Diplomatic Fallout

On May 2, 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs conducted a unilateral raid on a compound in , , approximately 0.8 miles from the , killing Osama bin Laden. The operation's secrecy arose from U.S. suspicions of Pakistani complicity, given intelligence showing bin Laden had lived there undetected for years near military sites. The compound's high walls and limited internet access evaded surveillance in this garrison town, fueling allegations of (ISI) involvement. U.S. officials, including CIA Director , questioned Pakistan's ignorance based on ISI's past ties to Afghan militants and during the Soviet era and post-9/11. A leaked 2013 called the harboring "state failure" due to incompetence rather than intent, while noting ISI monitoring lapses. U.S. sources later reported a retired Pakistani officer's tips but found no public proof of high-level sheltering. Pakistan's government decried the raid as a breach, with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani saying it eroded trust. Public disapproval ran high, with 2011 Pew polls indicating over 75% negative views of the U.S. action, intensifying anti-American sentiment. Pakistan arrested , the doctor who aided the CIA through a drive to verify bin Laden's presence, and sentenced him to 33 years for in 2012, worsening relations. The fallout prompted U.S. review of billions in annual aid to amid double-dealing charges. It influenced the 2011 Raymond Davis incident resolution and NATO supply halts, yet U.S. drone operations persisted. Pakistan razed in 2012 to move past the embarrassment, but lingering ISI knowledge doubts spurred U.S. congressional demands to tie aid to greater transparency.

Controversies and Alternative Interpretations

Alleged CIA Ties and Soviet-Era Funding Myths

Claims of direct ties between Osama bin Laden and the (CIA) during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) lack verifiable evidence, arising from conflation of U.S. support for Afghan mujahideen with bin Laden's independent Arab network. The CIA's , launched in 1979, delivered about $3 billion in aid through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to native Afghan groups countering Soviet forces, bypassing Arab factions. Bin Laden arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1980 with personal family funds and co-founded (MAK) in 1984 alongside Abdullah Azzam to recruit and equip Arab volunteers outside CIA-ISI channels. Portrayals of bin Laden as a CIA-paid asset or trained "freedom fighter" stem from post-9/11 conspiracies and prior media speculation, yet declassified records, eyewitnesses, and bin Laden's statements refute them. In a 1993 interview, he denied U.S. aid: "Personally neither I nor my brothers saw evidence of American help." CIA officials like former Pakistan station chief Milton Bearden labeled such claims an "urban myth," noting policy avoided aiding foreign volunteers. Journalist Peter Bergen, who met bin Laden in 1997, verified the CIA knew nothing of him before 1993 and supplied no funds or arms. The myth of Soviet-era U.S. funding for bin Laden misattributes his operations' financial backing, which derived from private Gulf Arab donations, Saudi government contributions, and bin Laden's estimated $25–30 million personal inheritance. MAK raised nearly $25 million monthly from wealthy Arab donors for recruitment, logistics, and humanitarian aid, operating parallel to but independent of U.S.-backed efforts. Saudi Arabia, a key U.S. ally, funneled over $3 billion to mujahideen causes during the war, but these funds targeted Afghan groups via official channels, not bin Laden's Arab contingent, which bin Laden himself described as self-reliant to maintain ideological purity against "infidel" influence. The persistence of these myths, amplified in outlets skeptical of U.S. foreign policy, ignores primary evidence from Afghan war participants and overlooks how bin Laden's disdain for American involvement—evident in his 1980s fatwas criticizing U.S. presence in the region—precluded any collaborative relationship.

Disputes Over Attack Attributions and Motives

Bin Laden initially denied direct responsibility for the September 11, 2001, attacks, stating on September 28, 2001, that an independent group of radicals carried them out and speculating that the U.S. government or might have orchestrated them to provoke conflict. U.S. intelligence quickly attributed the plot to , citing surveillance of operatives like , financial trails, and training camp records linking hijackers to bin Laden's Afghan network. In a October 29, 2004, video, bin Laden praised the attacks as retaliation against U.S. policies but avoided claiming operational command. Analysts debate whether his initial denials were tactical evasion or genuine distance from execution; interrogations of captured figures later confirmed his approval. Earlier attacks revealed attribution ambiguities. The on February 26, killing six and injuring over 1,000, involved and a cell led by , with bomb designs resembling prior operations rather than al-Qaeda patterns. Though shared Afghan mujahideen ties existed, bin Laden faced no charges, and U.S. investigations found no evidence of his funding or orders, unlike later al-Qaeda operations. By contrast, the August 7, 1998, U.S. embassy bombings in and , killing 224, led to bin Laden's indictment for conspiracy, supported by evidence of his financial backing and endorsements. The October 12, 2000, USS Cole bombing in , killing 17 sailors, was conducted by al-Qaeda suicide bombers under Abd al-Rahiri al-Nashiri, with bin Laden supplying sanctuary and resources; he praised it publicly as ideal but did not claim direct orchestration, sparking debate over command versus inspiration. Bin Laden's motives derived from his fatwas: the August 23, 1996, demand for U.S. withdrawal from the and the February 23, 1998, call for against "Jews and Crusaders" over holy site occupations, support, and Iraqi sanctions affecting over a million civilians. He framed attacks as defensive jihad under Salafi interpretations, citing Quranic prohibitions on non-Muslim alliances, rather than unprovoked aggression. Although some Western analysts cite Soviet-Afghan vendettas or as drivers, bin Laden's statements emphasize ideological fatwas that predated and aligned with attack patterns. Al-Qaeda recruitment data further shows recruits responded primarily to religious appeals, not socioeconomic factors.

Debates on bin Laden's Strategic Successes vs. Failures

Bin Laden pursued asymmetric warfare to provoke U.S. overextension in Muslim-majority countries, draining its resources while inspiring global jihad against Western influence and for Islamic governance. His 1996 declaration and 1998 fatwa urged attacks on Americans to secure U.S. withdrawal from the , halt support for , and surmount the main barrier to Muslim unity against apostate regimes. He cited the 1989 , which he attributed to attrition, as precedent. Proponents claim al-Qaeda's September 11, 2001, attacks—killing 2,977—drew U.S. invasions of (October 2001) and (March 2003), yielding wars that cost $6-8 trillion and over 900,000 deaths, including civilians and combatants. U.S. debt rose from $5.8 trillion in 2001 to over $30 trillion by 2021, fueling polarization, military fatigue, and the 2021 withdrawal that reinstated control—jihadists' proof of bin Laden's attrition model. Australian Institute of International Affairs analysts argue this achieved bin Laden's aim of eroding the "far enemy" through overreaction, which bred , regional instability in and , and the indirect rise of . Conversely, evaluations of failure emphasize al-Qaeda's organizational collapse: U.S. drone strikes and from 2004 onward killed key leaders, including bin Laden on May 2, 2011, slashing core capacity by over 80% and restricting affiliates to localized insurgencies rather than global efforts. argues the strategy backfired ideologically, as attacks like the 2004 and 2005 bombings alienated Muslim publics—polls showed majority rejection of al-Qaeda tactics by 2009, given civilian Muslim casualties exceeded 80% of post-9/11 jihadist victims. observes bin Laden's unified vision failed to emerge; infighting with rejected his authority, no al-Qaeda formed, and influence faded to irrelevance in core areas by the mid-2010s. Although U.S. engagement eroded prestige in certain respects, dismantled al-Qaeda's command without the mass mobilization bin Laden expected, as regional governments and Muslim societies favored stability over transnational . This debate reveals tensions between tactical impact and strategic sustainability: bin Laden's approach imposed costs but secured no decisive ideological or territorial victories. Al-Qaeda evolved from central force to fragmented network by 2021, with affiliates like AQAP and AQIM limited to sporadic strikes without toppling U.S.-backed systems. Post-2011 jihadist recruitment leveled off, and foreign fighter inflows to al-Qaeda declined, signaling stagnation against bin Laden's forecasts of Western downfall.

Reception and Enduring Legacy

Views in the Muslim World: Heroism vs. Extremism

Views of Osama bin Laden in the Muslim world have divided between perceived heroism against foreign powers and condemnation of his methods as extremist deviations from Islamic . A minority, especially in anti-Western regions like parts of and , viewed him as a mujahid for his Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) role and resistance to U.S. presence in Muslim lands, seeing al-Qaeda attacks as retaliation against imperialism. Yet polling data indicates consistently low support, with favorability dropping after al-Qaeda's attacks on Muslim civilians and governments alienated publics who valued stability over ideology. Pew Research Center surveys (2005–2011) in , , , , , and showed minimal confidence in bin Laden. In early 2011, positive views were 1% in , 2% among Sunnis in , 5% in , and 13% in , signaling broad rejection of al-Qaeda's global as disproportionate and damaging to Muslims. In , where he hid for years, approval fell from 20–25% (mid-2000s) to single digits by 2010, eroded by al-Qaeda-linked bombings that killed thousands, including the 2007 and Shia procession attacks. Gallup polls in 2011 found most Pakistanis opposed the U.S. raid killing him on May 2, 2011, due to concerns rather than support for bin Laden, whose popularity stayed low amid Islamist conflicts. Prominent Muslim scholars and institutions have issued repeated fatwas denouncing bin Laden's ideology and tactics as (innovation) and fisq (transgression), emphasizing Islam's prohibition on targeting non-combatants and suicide operations; over 50 ulema from , Egypt's Al-Azhar, and Pakistan's Deobandi seminaries rejected his 1996 and 1998 fatwas urging indiscriminate attacks on Americans and Jews, arguing they violated rules of war derived from the (e.g., 5:32 equating unjust killing to killing all humanity). The Saudi government, bin Laden's birthplace, revoked his citizenship in 1994 and condemned him as a terrorist post-9/11, while Gulf states like the UAE and aligned with counterterrorism efforts, viewing al-Qaeda as a threat to monarchies rather than liberators. Reactions to bin Laden's death highlighted the extremism critique's dominance; while small protests mourning him as a occurred in pockets of Pakistan (e.g., and , drawing hundreds) and Afghanistan's tribal areas, major cities like , , and saw no mass outpourings, with many Muslims expressing relief at the removal of a figure whose campaigns exacerbated and foreign interventions. In Palestinian territories, initial post-9/11 sympathy (around 60% approval in 2001 polls) waned due to al-Qaeda's irrelevance to local conflicts and its global focus, dropping below 20% by 2005 amid intra-Muslim attacks. This empirical pattern underscores causal links: bin Laden's heroism narrative persists in echo chambers of radicalized youth via online and select madrassas teaching his anti-U.S. tracts, but mainstream Muslim opinion, informed by lived costs of extremism (e.g., over 100,000 Muslim deaths attributed to al-Qaeda-linked by 2011), frames him as a catalyst for division rather than unity.

Western and Global Assessments: Terrorism Icon and Policy Catalyst

In Western nations, especially the , Osama bin Laden epitomized modern , representing 's ability to conduct mass-casualty attacks on civilians. After the September 11, 2001, hijackings that killed 2,977 people, U.S. officials and intelligence agencies depicted him as the architect of a shift in jihadist tactics toward high-profile strikes on symbols of Western power. This perception placed him on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list from 1998 onward, with a bounty rising to $50 million by 2001, underscoring his role in global threats. Congressional testimonies described him as the "personification of " for Americans, fostering national unity against . His actions spurred major Western counterterrorism reforms, launching the Global War on Terror. Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force on September 18, 2001, against 9/11 perpetrators and affiliates, enabling Afghanistan operations from October 7 to dismantle and oust the regime sheltering him. NATO invoked Article 5 on September 12, 2001—the first time for terrorism—prompting allied support. At home, the USA PATRIOT Act of October 26, 2001, broadened surveillance and financial oversight, citing bin Laden's global attack networks. Global views aligned with Western assessments in multilateral forums. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, passed September 28, 2001, required nations to curb terrorist financing and safe havens in response to al-Qaeda's approach. The UN's Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee noted his 2011 death prevented further acts, highlighting his influence on jihadism. By early 2002, over 140 countries froze assets, per U.S. reports, due to threats to . members embedded in , improving intelligence sharing based on lapses against his operations.

Long-Term Impact on Jihadism and Counterterrorism

Bin Laden's death on May 2, 2011, disrupted al-Qaeda's central command but failed to eradicate the global jihadist ideology he propagated. This spurred decentralization into regional affiliates and successor organizations. Al-Qaeda's core in Pakistan and Afghanistan lost operational capacity, marked by losses like Ayman al-Zawahiri's 2022 killing, yet affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Shabaab gained ground in Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, with attacks killing hundreds yearly over the next decade. The shift aligned with bin Laden's networked jihad concept, as local groups embraced his anti-Western fatwas alongside territorial aims—evident in the Islamic State (ISIS)'s 2014 split from al-Qaeda, which revived his caliphate and anti-Western calls, drawing over 30,000 foreign fighters by 2016. Post-bin Laden exposed limits of leadership decapitation, as the movement pivoted to inspirational from rigid hierarchy, driving lone-actor strikes in and the U.S.—including the 2015 Paris attacks that killed 130. While al-Qaeda's global strikes fell below pre-2001 highs, jihadist violence rose in ungoverned regions like and the , with groups citing bin Laden's legacy to recruit amid local disputes. Such durability arose from online ideological spread, which bin Laden advanced, allowing narratives to endure beyond him despite pushback from moderate Muslim voices. In , bin Laden's elimination validated as a core tactic. It expanded U.S. drone and campaigns, eliminating over 3,000 militants by 2020—including key figures—and built international intelligence-sharing s that disrupted plots like the 2010 underwear bomber attempt. Yet it also locked in ongoing global engagement, with trillions spent on and wars, plus expansions under the , criticized for undermining without matching reductions in ideological threats. Strategies after 2011 targeted affiliates, securing tactical wins—like averting another 9/11-scale U.S. attack—but struggled with jihadism's spread, exemplified by ISIS's reaching 100,000 square kilometers in 2015 before action. Bin Laden's death thus advanced proactive, tech-reliant , but jihadist resilience stressed tackling root causes, such as governance shortfalls in Muslim-majority states, beyond military strikes.

References

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