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Bharatiya Janata Party
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The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP; /bʱaːɾət̪iːjə dʒənət̪aː paːrtiː/ ⓘ; lit. 'Indian People's Party') is a conservative political party in India and one of the two major Indian political parties alongside the Indian National Congress.[42] BJP emerged out from Shyama Prasad Mukherjee's Bharatiya Jana Sangh.[43] Since 2014, it has been the ruling political party in India under the incumbent Prime Minister Narendra Modi.[44] The BJP is right-wing to far-right on the political spectrum, and it has close ideological and organisational links to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a far-right paramilitary organisation.[45][46] The party's policies adhere to Hindutva, a Hindu nationalist ideology.[47][48] As of January 2024,[update] it is the country's biggest political party in terms of representation in the Parliament of India as well as state legislatures.
The party's origins lie in the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, which was founded in 1951 by Indian politician Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, after he left Hindu Mahasabha to form a party as the political wing of RSS.[49][50] After the Emergency of 1975–1977, the Jana Sangh merged with several other political parties to form the Janata Party; it defeated the then-incumbent Indian National Congress in the 1977 general election. After three years in power, the Janata Party dissolved in 1980, with the members of the erstwhile Jana Sangh reconvening to form the modern-day BJP. Although initially unsuccessful—winning only two seats in the 1984 general election, it grew in strength on the back of the movement around Ram Janmabhoomi in Uttar Pradesh. Following victories in several state elections and better performances in national elections, the BJP became the largest political party in the Parliament in 1996; however, it lacked a majority in the lower house of Parliament, and its government, under its then-leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee, lasted for only 13 days.[51]
After the 1998 general election, the BJP-led coalition known as the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under prime minister Vajpayee formed a government that lasted for a year. Following fresh elections, the NDA government—again headed by Vajpayee—lasted for a full term in office; this was the first non-Congress government to do so. In the 2004 general election, the NDA suffered an unexpected defeat, and for the next ten years, the BJP was the principal opposition party. Narendra Modi, then the chief minister of Gujarat, led the party to a landslide victory in the 2014 general election. Modi has since led the NDA government as Indian prime minister, including being re-elected with a sole majority in the 2019 general election and with a coalition in the 2024 general election. As of September 2025,[update] the alliance governs 20 Indian states and union territories.
The official ideology of the BJP is integral humanism, first formulated by Deendayal Upadhyaya in 1965. The party advocates social conservatism and a foreign policy centred on nationalist principles. During its first period in national government, the BJP avoided its Hindutva priorities, and focused on a largely neoliberal economic policy that prioritised globalisation and economic growth over social welfare.[52] Since returning to government in 2014, the BJP government has enacted several priorities of the RSS, including criminalising the practice of triple talaq, and revoking Article 370 of the Constitution of India (which granted autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir), abrogating its statehood.[53] India has experienced nationwide democratic backsliding under the BJP's rule since 2014.[54][55][56][57]
Name and symbols
[edit]The name as well as the symbol of the party were selected by the founders. The name "Bharatiya Janata Party" literally translates to "Indian People's Party". The Symbol of the party is the flower Lotus (Nelumbo nucifera).[58] Lotus has a cultural significance within India as well as Hinduism. The symbol has been regarded as a symbol of peace and prosperity within Hinduism. Likewise, during the independence movement of India, the symbol was used by Indian nationalist as a symbol of revolt against the British Raj.[59] Lotus is also recognised as the national flower of India. Thus, use of the symbol gives the party a nationalist as well as Hindutva appeal.[60] Besides these, the party also heavily uses the Saffron colour in its promotional materials and campaigning. Similar to Lotus, the Saffron colour also has a major significance within Hinduism.[61] The most common flag used by the party is predominantly saffron with a stripe of green in the left. Within the Saffron part of the flag, the lotus symbol is also integrated.[62] This particular colour scheme used in the flag assists the party to project itself as a secular party. Meanwhile, this also helps the party to maintain a religious undertone for its core electorate and Hindutva supporter groups.[62]
Precursors
[edit]Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951–77)
[edit]The BJP's origins lie in the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, popularly known as the Jana Sangh, founded by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee in 1951 in response to the politics of the dominant National Congress party. It was founded in collaboration with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a far-right Hindutva paramilitary organisation. The Jana Sangh was widely regarded as the political arm of the RSS.[63] The Jana Sangh's aims included the protection of India's "Hindu" cultural identity, in addition to countering what it perceived to be the appeasement of Muslim people and the country of Pakistan by the Congress party and then-Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The RSS loaned several of its leading pracharaks, or full-time workers, to the Jana Sangh to get the new party off the ground. Prominent among these was Deendayal Upadhyaya, who was appointed General Secretary. The Jana Sangh won only three Lok Sabha seats in the first general elections in 1952. It maintained a minor presence in parliament until 1967.[64][65]
The Jana Sangh's first major campaign, begun in early 1953, centred on a demand for the complete integration of Jammu and Kashmir into India.[66] Mukherjee was arrested in May 1953 for violating orders from the state government restraining him from entering Kashmir. He died of a heart attack the following month, while still in jail.[66] Mauli Chandra Sharma was elected to succeed Mukherjee; however, he was forced out of power by the RSS activists within the party, and the leadership went instead to Upadhyaya. Upadhyay remained the General Secretary until 1967, and worked to build a committed grassroots organisation in the image of the RSS. The party minimised engagement with the public, focusing instead on building its network of propagandists. Upadhyaya also articulated the philosophy of integral humanism, which formed the official doctrine of the party.[67] Younger leaders, such as Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Lal Krishna Advani also became involved with the leadership in this period, with Vajpayee succeeding Upadhyaya as president in 1968. The major themes on the party's agenda during this period were legislating a uniform civil code, banning cow slaughter and abolishing the special status given to Jammu and Kashmir.[68]
After assembly elections across the country in 1967, the party entered into a coalition with several other parties, including the Swatantra Party and the socialists. It formed governments in various states across the Hindi Belt, including Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. It was the first time the Jana Sangh held political office, albeit within a coalition; this caused the shelving of the Jana Sangh's more radical agenda.[69]

Janata Party (1977–80)
[edit]In 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed a state of emergency. The Jana Sangh took part in the widespread protests, with thousands of its members being imprisoned along with other agitators across the country. In 1977, the emergency was withdrawn and general elections were held. The Jana Sangh merged with parties from across the political spectrum, including the Socialist Party, the Congress (O) and the Bharatiya Lok Dal to form the Janata Party, with its main agenda being defeating Indira Gandhi.[65] The Janata Party won a majority in 1977 and formed a government with Morarji Desai as Prime Minister. The former Jana Sangh contributed the largest tally to the Janata Party's parliamentary contingent, with 93 seats or 31% of its strength. Vajpayee, previously the leader of the Jana Sangh, was appointed the Minister of External Affairs.[70]
The national leadership of the former Jana Sangh consciously renounced its identity, and attempted to integrate with the political culture of the Janata Party, based on Gandhian and Hindu traditionalist principles. Political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot wrote that this proved to be impossible assimilation.[71] The state and local levels of the Jana Sangh remained relatively unchanged, retaining a strong association with the RSS, which did not sit well with the moderate centre-right constituents of the Party.[72] Violence between Hindus and Muslims increased sharply during the years that the Janata Party formed the government, with former Jana Sangha members being implicated in the riots in Aligarh and Jamshedpur in 1978–79.[citation needed] The other major constituents of the Janata Party demanded that the former Jana Sangh members should dissociate themselves from the RSS, which they refused to do. Eventually, a fragment of the Janata Party broke off to form the Janata Party (Secular). The Morarji Desai government was reduced to a minority in the Parliament, forcing Desai's resignation. Following a brief period of coalition rule, general elections were held in 1980, in which the Janata Party fared poorly, winning only 31 seats. In April 1980, shortly after the elections, the National Executive Council of the Janata Party banned its members from being 'dual members' of party and the RSS. In response, the former Jana Sangh members left to create a new political party, which is now known as the Bharatiya Janata Party.[73][70]
History
[edit]Formation and early days
[edit]Although the newly formed BJP was technically distinct from the Jana Sangh, the bulk of its rank and file were identical to its predecessor, with Vajpayee being its first president.[74] Historian Ramachandra Guha writes that the early 1980s were marked by a wave of violence between Hindus and Muslims. The BJP initially moderated the Hindutva stance of its predecessor Jana Sangh to gain a wider appeal, emphasising its links to the Janata Party and the ideology of Gandhian socialism.[75] This was unsuccessful, as it won only two Lok Sabha seats in the elections of 1984.[75] The only two candidates of the party who won were A. K. Patel from Mehsana Lok Sabha constituency in Gujarat and C. Janga Reddy from Hanamkonda Lok Sabha constituency in Andhra Pradesh.[60] The assassination of Indira Gandhi a few months earlier resulted in a wave of support for the Congress which won a record tally of 414 seats, contributing to the low number for the BJP.[76]
Ram Janmabhoomi movement
[edit]
The failure of Vajpayee's moderate strategy led to a shift in the ideology of the party toward a policy of more hardline Hindutva.[75][77] In 1984, Advani was appointed president of the party, and under him it became the political voice of the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. In the early 1980s, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) began a campaign for the construction of a temple dedicated to the Hindu deity Rama at the disputed site of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. The mosque had been constructed by the Mughal Emperor Babur in 1527. There is a dispute about whether a temple once stood there.[78] The agitation was on the basis of the belief that the site is the birthplace of Rama, and that a temple had been demolished to construct the mosque.[79] The BJP threw its support behind this campaign and made it a part of their election platform. It won 86 Lok Sabha seats in 1989, a tally which made its support crucial to the National Front government of V. P. Singh.[80]
In September 1990, Advani began a Rath Yatra (chariot journey) to Ayodhya in support of the Ram temple movement. According to Guha, the imagery employed by the yatra was "religious, allusive, militant, masculine, and anti-Muslim".[81] Advani was placed under preventive detention on the orders of the then Bihar chief minister Lalu Prasad Yadav. A large number of kar sevaks (religious volunteers) nonetheless converged at Ayodhya, and some attacked the mosque. Three days of fighting with the paramilitary forces ended with the deaths of several kar sevaks. Hindus were urged by VHP to "take revenge" for these deaths, resulting in riots against Muslims across Uttar Pradesh.[82] The BJP withdrew its support from the V.P. Singh government, leading to fresh general elections. The BJP further increased its tally to 120 seats, and won a majority in the Uttar Pradesh assembly.[83]
On 6 December 1992, the RSS and its affiliates organised a rally involving more than 100,000 VHP and BJP activists at the site of the mosque.[83] The rally developed into a frenzied attack that ended with the demolition of the mosque.[83] Over the following weeks, waves of violence between Hindus and Muslims erupted all over the country, killing over 2,000 people.[83] The government briefly banned the VHP, and many BJP leaders, including Advani were arrested for making inflammatory speeches provoking the demolition.[84][85] Several historians have said that the demolition was the product of a conspiracy by the Sangh Parivar, and not a spontaneous act.[83] In the parliamentary elections in 1996, the BJP capitalised on the communal polarisation that followed the demolition to win 161 Lok Sabha seats, making it the largest party in parliament.[51] Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister but was unable to attain a majority in the Lok Sabha, forcing the government to resign after 13 days.[51]
A 2009 report, authored by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan, found that 68 people were responsible for the demolition, mostly leaders from the BJP.[85] Among those named were Vajpayee, Advani, and Murli Manohar Joshi. The report also criticised Kalyan Singh, Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh during the demolition.[85] He was accused of posting bureaucrats and police officers who would stay silent during the demolition.[85] In 2020, the Supreme Court of India acquitted all of the accused in the demolition including Advani and Joshi.[86]
Following the 2019 Supreme Court verdict, the Government of India announced a trust to construct the Mandir. On 22 January 2024, the Ram Mandir was officially opened.[61] Prime Minister Narendra Modi led its consecration, claiming it to be the start of a new era.[61] The temple is expected to be fully completed by September 2025.[87]
Vajpayee and Advani era (1996–2004)
[edit]A coalition of regional parties formed the government in 1996, but this grouping was short-lived, and mid-term polls were held in 1998. The BJP contested the elections leading a coalition called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which contained its existing allies like the Samata Party, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Shiv Sena in addition to the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) and the Biju Janata Dal. Among these regional parties, the Shiv Sena was the only one that had an ideology similar to the BJP; Amartya Sen, for example, called the coalition an "ad hoc" grouping.[88] The NDA had a majority with outside support from the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and Vajpayee returned as Prime Minister.[89] However, the coalition ruptured in May 1999 when the leader of AIADMK, J. Jayalalithaa, withdrew her support, and fresh elections were held again.[90]
On 13 October 1999, without the AIADMK, the NDA won 303 seats in parliament and thus an outright majority. The BJP had its highest-ever tally of 183. Vajpayee became Prime Minister for the third time; Advani became Deputy Prime Minister[a] and Home Affairs Minister. This NDA government lasted its full term of five years. Its policy agenda included a more aggressive stance on defence and terror and neo-liberal economic policies.[52] In 2001, Bangaru Laxman, then the BJP president, was filmed accepting a bribe in a sting operation.[91][92] He was compelled to resign and was subsequently prosecuted, eventually being sentenced to four years in prison.[93]
2002 Gujarat violence
[edit]On 27 February 2002, a train carrying Hindu pilgrims was burned outside the town of Godhra, killing 59 people. The incident was seen as an attack upon Hindus, and sparked off massive anti-Muslim violence across the state of Gujarat that lasted several weeks.[94] The death toll estimated was as high as 2000, while 150,000 were displaced.[95] Rape, mutilation, and torture were also widespread.[95][96] The then-Gujarat chief minister Narendra Modi and several high-ranking government officials were accused of initiating and condoning the violence, as were police officers who allegedly directed the rioters and gave them lists of Muslim-owned properties.[97] In April 2009, a Special Investigation Team (SIT) was appointed by the Supreme Court to investigate and expedite the Gujarat riots cases. In 2012, Modi was cleared of complicity in the violence by the SIT, causing widespread anger and disbelief among the country's Muslim communities.[98] BJP MLA Maya Kodnani, who later held a cabinet portfolio in the Modi government, was convicted of having orchestrated one of the riots and sentenced to 28 years imprisonment;[99][100] she was later acquitted by the Gujarat High Court.[101] Scholars such as Paul Brass, Martha Nussbaum and Dipankar Gupta have said that there was a high level of state complicity in the incidents.[102][103][104]
In opposition (2004–2014)
[edit]Vajpayee called for early elections in 2004, six months ahead of schedule. The NDA's campaign was based on the slogan "India Shining", which sought to depict it as responsible for a rapid economic transformation of the country.[105] However, the NDA unexpectedly suffered a heavy defeat, winning only 186 seats in the Lok Sabha, compared to the 222 seats of the Congress and its allies. Manmohan Singh succeeded Vajpayee as Prime Minister as the head of the United Progressive Alliance. The NDA's failure to reach out to rural Indians was provided as an explanation for its defeat, as was its divisive policy agenda.[105][106]
In May 2008, the BJP won the state elections in Karnataka. This was the first time that the party won assembly elections in any South Indian state. In the 2009 general elections, its strength in the Lok Sabha was reduced to 116 seats. The election campaign would be the final for Advani as leader. The party would be led by Arun Jaitley in the Rajya Sabha and Sushma Swaraj in the Lok Sabha for the following 5 years. It lost the Karnataka assembly election in 2013.[107]
Modi era (2014–present)
[edit]In the 2014 Indian general election, the BJP won 282 seats, leading the NDA to a tally of 336 seats in the 543-seat Lok Sabha.[108] Narendra Modi was sworn in as the 14th prime minister of India on 26 May 2014.[109][110] The vote share of the BJP was 31% of all votes cast, a low figure relative to the number of seats it won.[111] This was the first instance since 1984 of a single party achieving an outright majority in the Indian Parliament[112] and the first time that it achieved a majority in the Lok Sabha on its strength. Support was concentrated in the Hindi-speaking belt in north-central India.[111] The magnitude of the victory was not predicted by most opinion and exit polls.[111]
Political analysts have suggested several reasons for this victory, including the popularity of Modi, and the loss of support for the Congress due to the corruption scandals in its previous term.[113] The BJP was also able to expand its traditionally upper-caste, upper-class support base and received significant support from middle-class and Dalit people, as well as among other Backward classes.[114][111] Its support among Muslims remained low; only 8% of Muslim voters voted for the BJP.[114][111] The BJP was also very successful at mobilising its supporters and raising voter turnout among them.[111]
After winning the election, the organisation of the BJP became more centralised with Modi at the helm.[115] People loyal to Modi were rewarded leadership positions across various states within India.[116] Amit Shah, a close confidant of Modi, was appointed as the president of the BJP in 2014.[117] Contextually, many veteran leaders of the party like L. K. Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, and Jaswant Singh amongst others were allegedly sidelined.[118]
In 2016, the BJP joined the International Democracy Union, a group of various centre-right and right-wing political parties across the globe.[119] However, as of 2024, the party is no longer a member, the secretary general of the IDU, Tina Mercep, stated that they would welcome full membership of the BJP in their global network. However, the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha remains as a member of the youth wing of the IDU.[120][121]
During Modi's first term as prime minister, the BJP expanded its presence in several states where it had previously been a minor player, and it regained power in other states where it had been in opposition for a considerable period. Assam, Tripura, Arunachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, and Jammu and Kashmir saw an increase in the BJP's influence, and the party entered government in several of these states.[122]
In 2019, the BJP won the general election with an increased majority. Soon after returning to power, on 5 August 2019, the Modi administration revoked the special status, or limited autonomy, granted under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir—a region administered by India as a state. This state consists of the larger part of Kashmir which has been the subject of a dispute among India, Pakistan, and China since 1947.[123][124]
Later in 2019, the Modi administration introduced the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, which was passed by the Parliament of India on 11 December 2019. It amended the Citizenship Act, 1955 by providing a path to Indian citizenship for illegal immigrants of Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi, or Christian religion, who had fled persecution from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan before December 2014.[125][126] Muslims from those countries were not given such eligibility.[127] The act was the first time religion had been overtly used as a criterion for citizenship under Indian law.[127][b][c][d] A report by the V-Dem Institute described India as experiencing democratic backsliding due to the Modi era.[54][55] Various other studies and media sources also cite India experiencing democratic backsliding.[57][128][129][56][130] This is considered the most notable challenge to India's democracy since the authoritarian Emergency years of 1975–77.[131][132]
Ideology and political positions
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The party, throughout its history, has widely been described as a right-wing,[29][133][134][135] but has recently increasingly been described as far-right.[30][136][137][138]
Social policies and Hindutva
[edit]The official philosophy of the BJP is "Integral humanism", a philosophy first formulated by Deendayal Upadhyaya in 1965, who described it as advocating an "indigenous economic model that puts the human being at center stage."[139][140] It is committed to Hindutva, an ideology articulated by Indian independence activist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar. According to the party, Hindutva is cultural nationalism favouring Indian culture over westernisation, thus it extends to all Indians regardless of religion.[75] Scholars and political analysts describe Hindutva as seeking to redefine India and recast it as a Hindu country to the exclusion of other religions, making the BJP a Hindu nationalist party in a general sense.[83][75][141][142] The BJP moderated its stance after the NDA was formed in 1998, due to the presence of parties with a broader set of ideologies.[83][52]
The BJP's Hindutva ideology has been reflected in many of its government policies. It supports the construction of the Ram Mandir temple at the disputed site of the Babri Mosque.[141] This issue was its major poll plank in the 1991 general elections.[141] However, the demolition of the mosque during a BJP rally in 1992 resulted in backlash against it, leading to a decline of the temple's prominence in its agenda.[141] The education policy of the NDA government reorganised the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) and tasked it with extensively revising the textbooks used in Indian schools.[143] Various scholars have stated that this revision, especially in the case of history textbooks, was a covert attempt to "saffronise" Indian history.[143][144][145][146] The NDA government introduced Hindu astrology as a subject in college curricula, despite opposition from several leading scientists.[147]
Links between the BJP and the RSS grew stronger under the Modi administration. The RSS provided organisational support to the BJP's electoral campaigns, while the Modi administration appointed a number of individuals affiliated with the RSS to prominent government positions.[148] In 2014, Yellapragada Sudershan Rao, who had previously been associated with the RSS, became the chairperson of the Indian Council of Historical Research (ICHR).[149] Historians and former members of the ICHR, including those sympathetic to the BJP, questioned his credentials as a historian, and stated that the appointment was part of an agenda of cultural nationalism.[149][150][151] Over its first term the Modi administration appointed other RSS members to lead universities and research institutions, and recruitment of faculty members favoring the RSS increased. Scholars Nandini Sundar and Kiran Bhatty write that many of these appointees did not possess the qualifications for their positions.[53] The Modi administration also made numerous changes in government-approved history textbooks. These changes de-emphasising the role of Jawaharlal Nehru, and glorifying that of Modi himself, while also portraying Indian society as harmonious, without conflict or inequity.[53][152]
The BJP supports a uniform civil code, which would apply a common set of personal laws to every citizen regardless of their personal religion, replacing the existing laws which vary by religious community. Historian Yogendra Malik writes that this ignores the differential procedures required to protect the cultural identity of the Muslim minority.[75][141] The BJP favoured, and in 2019 enacted,[153][154][155] the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India, which granted a greater degree of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir in recognition of the unusual circumstances surrounding its accession to the Indian Union.[75] It simultaneously abrogated Jammu and Kashmir statehood, dividing it into two separate union territories, those being Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.[53]
The BJP opposes illegal immigration into India from Bangladesh.[142] The party states that this migration, mostly in the states of Assam and West Bengal, threatens the security, economy, and stability of the country.[142] Academics have pointed out that the BJP refers to Hindu migrants from Bangladesh as refugees, and reserves the term "illegal" for Muslim migrants.[142] Academic Michael Gillan perceived it as an attempt to use an emotive issue to mobilise Hindu sentiment in a region where the party has not been historically successful.[142][156] The party later formed the government in Assam.[157] The Modi administration passed a citizenship law in 2019 which provided a pathway to Indian citizenship for persecuted religious minorities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who are Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis or Christians.[125][126] The law does not grant such eligibility to Muslims.[158][159][127] This was first time religion had been overtly used as a criterion for citizenship under Indian law: it attracted global criticism, and sparked widespread protests that were halted by the COVID-19 pandemic.[53][127][e] Counter-demonstrations against the protests developed into the 2020 Delhi riots, caused chiefly by Hindu mobs attacking Muslims.[160][161] Of the 53 people killed, two-thirds were Muslim.[162][163][164]
In 2013, the Supreme Court of India reinstated the controversial Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which, among other things, criminalises homosexuality. There was a popular outcry, although clerics largely stated that they supported the verdict.[165][166] BJP president Rajnath Singh said that the party supported Section 377, because it believed that homosexuality was unnatural,[167] though the party softened the public stance after its victory in the 2014 general elections.[168] The Modi government is opposed to same-sex marriage, stating in a legal affidavit that legalising it would cause "complete havoc with the delicate balance of personal laws in the country" and that it was "not comparable with Indian family unit concept of a husband, wife & children which necessarily presuppose a biological man as 'husband', a biological woman as 'wife' and children born out of union".[169]
Economic policies
[edit]The BJP's economic policy has changed considerably since its founding. There is a significant range of economic ideologies within the party. In the 1980s, like the Jana Sangh, it reflected the thinking of the RSS and its affiliates. It supported swadeshi (the promotion of indigenous industries and products) and a protectionist export policy. However, it supported internal economic liberalisation, and opposed the state-driven industrialisation favoured by the Congress.[170] During the 1996 elections, and later when it was in government, the BJP shifted its stance away from protectionism and towards globalisation. The tenure of the NDA saw an unprecedented influx of foreign companies in India.[170] This was criticised, including by the BJP's affiliates, the RSS and the Swadeshi Jagran Manch:[170] the RSS stated that the BJP was not being true to its swadeshi ideology.[170]
The two NDA governments in the period 1998–2004 introduced significant deregulation and privatisation of government-owned enterprises. It also introduced tariff-reducing measures. These reforms built off of the initial economic liberalisation introduced by the P. V. Narasimha Rao-led Congress government in the early 1990s.[171] India's GDP growth increased substantially during the tenure of the NDA. The 2004 campaign slogan India Shining was based on the party's belief that the free market would bring prosperity to all sectors of society.[172] After its unexpected defeat, commentators said that it was punished for neglecting the needs of the poor and focusing too much on its corporate allies.[105][106][173]
This shift in the economic policies of the BJP was also visible in state governments, especially in Gujarat, where the BJP held power for 16 years.[174] Modi's government, in power from 2002 to 2014, followed a strongly neo-liberal agenda, presented as a drive towards development.[175][176] Its policies have included extensive privatisation of infrastructure and services, as well as a significant rollback of labour and environmental regulations. While this was praised by the business community, commentators criticised it as catering to the BJP's upper-class constituency instead of the poor.[175]
The economic policies of Modi's government focused on privatisation and liberalisation of the economy, based on a neoliberal framework.[177][178] Modi liberalised India's foreign direct investment policies, allowing more foreign investment in several industries, including in defence and the railways.[177][179][180] Other proposed reforms included making it harder for workers to form unions and easier for employers to hire and fire them;[178] some of these proposals were dropped after protests.[181] The reforms drew strong opposition from unions: on 2 September 2015, eleven of the country's largest unions went on strike, including one affiliated with the BJP.[178] The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, a constituent of the Sangh Parivar, stated that the underlying motivation of labour reforms favoured corporations over labourers.[177] Modi has been described as taking a more economically populist approach on healthcare and agricultural policy.[182] Modi's government has also been described as taking a more protectionist turn on international trade during his second term, withdrawing from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership talks[183][184] and introducing the 2020 Atmanirbhar Bharat economic plan, which emphasises national self-sufficiency.[185][186]
Defence and counterterrorism
[edit]Compared to Congress, the BJP takes a more aggressive and nationalistic position on defence policy and terrorism.[187][188] The Vajpayee-led NDA government carried out nuclear weapons tests and enacted the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which later came under heavy criticism.[187][188] It also deployed troops to evict infiltrators from Kargil, and supported the United States War on Terror.[189]
Although previous Congress governments developed the capability for a nuclear weapons test, the Vajpayee government broke with India's historical strategy of avoiding it and authorised Pokhran-II, a series of five nuclear tests in 1998.[187] The tests came soon after Pakistan tested a medium-range ballistic missile. They were seen as an attempt to display India's military prowess to the world, and a reflection of anti-Pakistan sentiment within the BJP.[187]
The Vajpayee government ordered the Indian armed forces to expel the Pakistani soldiers occupying Kashmir territory, later known as the Kargil War.[190][191] Although the government was later criticised for the intelligence failures that did not detect Pakistani presence, it was successful in ousting them from the previously Indian-controlled territory.[190][191]
After the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the NDA government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act.[188] The aim of the act was to improve the government's ability to deal with terrorism.[188] It initially failed to pass in the Rajya Sabha; therefore, the NDA took the extraordinary step of convening a joint session of the Parliament, where the numerical superior Lok Sabha allowed the bill to pass.[188] The act was subsequently used to prosecute hundreds of people accused of terrorism.[188] However, it was criticised by opposition parties and scholars for being an infringement upon civil liberties, and the National Human Rights Commission of India stated that it had been used to target Muslims.[188] It was later repealed by the Congress-led UPA government in 2004.[192]
The Modi government has conducted several strikes on territory controlled by neighbouring countries on counterterrorism grounds. This included a 2015 Indian counter-insurgency operation in Myanmar against the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the 2016 Indian Line of Control strike in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and the 2019 Balakot airstrike in Pakistan.[193] It also militarily intervened in defence of Bhutan during the 2017 Doklam standoff with China.[194]
The Modi government considers national security to be one of their key focuses and has implemented many long-standing defence reforms.[195][196] In August 2019, the Modi government established the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to ensure better coordination between all three services, a reform that was widely requested after the 1999 Kargil War.[197] The Department of Military Affairs was also established and put under the CDS.[198]
Foreign policy
[edit]The historical stance of the BJP towards foreign policy, like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, was based on aggressive Hindutva combined with economic protectionism.[199] The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was founded with the explicit aim of reversing the partition of India; as a result, its official position was that the existence of Pakistan was illegitimate.[199] This antagonism toward Pakistan remains a significant influence on the BJP's ideology.[199][200] During the Cold War, the party and its affiliates strongly opposed India's long standing policy of non-alignment, and instead advocated closeness to the United States.[199] In the post-Cold War era, the party has largely embraced the Indian foreign policy consensus of improving relations with the United States,[201] while stressing a desire for a more multipolar world order.[202] Despite this, it has accused the U.S. State Department and "deep state" elements in the United States of attempting to destabilise India.[203]
The Vajpayee government's foreign policy in many ways represented a radical shift from BJP orthodoxy while maintaining some aspects of it.[170][200] Its policy also represented a significant change from the Nehruvian idealism of previous governments, opting instead for realism.[204] His party criticised him for adopting a much more moderate stance with Pakistan. In 1998, he made a landmark visit to Pakistan, and inaugurated the Delhi–Lahore Bus service.[199] Vajpayee signed the Lahore Declaration, which was an attempt to improve Indo-Pakistani relations that deteriorated after the 1998 nuclear tests.[199] However, the presence of Pakistani soldiers and militants in the disputed Kashmir territory was discovered a few months later, causing the 1999 Kargil War. The war ended a couple of months later, with the expulsion of the infiltrators two months later, without any shift in the Line of Control that marked the de facto border between the two countries.[199] Despite the war, Vajpayee continued to display a willingness to engage Pakistan in dialogue. This was not well received among the BJP cadre, who criticised the government for being "weak".[199] This faction of the BJP asserted itself at the post-Kargil Agra summit, preventing any significant deal from being reached.[199]
The Vajpayee government strongly opposed the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, with Vajpayee describing it as a "dance of destruction".[205][206] The Vajpayee administration later offered political support to the U.S. War on Terror, in the hope of better addressing India's issues with terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir. This led to closer defence ties with the US, including negotiations for the sale of weapons.[189] However, the BJP strongly condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq, stating that it "deplores the unjustified military action resorted to by the United States, Britain and their allies against Iraq".[207] In 2005, the BJP opposed the India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement, which placed restrictions on India's nuclear program.[208] The BJP also opposed the 2011 military intervention in Libya and urged the Lok Sabha to pass a unanimous resolution condemning it.[209]
The Modi government initially took a pragmatic stance towards Pakistan, attempting to improve relations with Nawaz Sharif's government, culminating in Modi visiting Pakistan in 2015.[210] Relations subsequently deteriorated, particularly after Sharif was ousted in 2017.[211] The Modi government has since been described as taking a "hardline" approach on Pakistan, and the BJP has accused the opposition Congress of collaborating with Pakistan through its criticism of government policy.[212] In 2015, the Modi government was accused by the Nepalese government of imposing an undeclared blockade on Nepal.[213] The Modi government expressed concern following the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état, but maintained cordial relations with the military government, abstaining from a United Nations Security Council resolution regarding the situation there.[214][215] The Modi government remained neutral on the Russo-Ukrainian War,[216] abstaining from United Nations Security Council Resolution 2623, which condemned the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine.[217] The leadership of the Indian National Congress backed the government's stance.[218]
Disinformation and conspiracy theories
[edit]The BJP has frequently spread disinformation and relied on the demonisation of Muslims.[219] The use of fake news has been a part of the party's strategy. In September 2018, Amit Shah said at a party meeting in Rajasthan that the BJP IT cell had influenced the media during the 2017 Uttar Pradesh elections and added, "We should be capable of delivering any message to the public, whether sweet or sour, true or fake."[220]
In April 2024, the US State Department criticised the BJP for promoting anti-semitic conspiracy theories involving George Soros.[221]
In December 2024, the French newspaper Mediapart condemned the BJP for falsifying its reports and added, "There are no facts available supporting the conspiracy theory promoted by BJP".[222]
Organisation and structure
[edit]
The organisation of the BJP is strictly hierarchical, with the president being the highest authority in the party.[140] Until 2012, the BJP constitution mandated that any qualified member could be national or state president for a single three-year term.[140] This was amended to a maximum of two consecutive terms.[223]
Below the president is the National Executive, which contains a variable number of senior leaders from across the country. It is the higher decision-making body of the party. Its members are several vice-presidents, general-secretaries, treasurers and secretaries, who work directly with the president.[140] An identical structure, with an executive committee led by a president, exists at the state, regional, district and local level.[140]
The BJP is a cadre-based party. It has close connections with other organisations with similar ideologies, such as the RSS, ABVP, BYSS, VHP and other Sangh Parivar-related organisations. The cadres of these groups often supplement the BJP's. Its lower members are largely derived from the RSS and its affiliates, loosely known as the Sangh Parivar:[140]
- The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (All India Students' Union), the students' wing of the RSS[140]
- The Bharatiya Kisan Sangh (Indian Farmer's Union), the farmers' division[140]
- The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Labourers Union), the labour union associated with the RSS[140]
The party has subsidiary organisations of its own, such as:
- The BJP Mahila Morcha (BJP Women's Front), its women's division[140]
- The Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (Indian People's Youth Front), its youth wing[140]
- The BJP Minority Morcha (BJP Minority Front), its minority division[140]
In terms of members, BJP claims to have over 170 million members[224][225] as of October 2022, and it's considered to be among the world's largest political parties.[226] In September 2024, PM Modi initiated the BJP membership drive,[227] this campaign has been controversial for deceptive and coercive membership enrollment by BJP workers.[228] In Gujarat, minor school children have been enrolled as BJP members.[229]
General election results
[edit]The Bharatiya Janata Party was officially founded in 1980, and the first general election it contested was in 1984, in which it won only two Lok Sabha seats. Following the election in 1996, the BJP became the largest party in the Lok Sabha for the first time, but the government it formed was short-lived.[51] In the elections of 1998 and 1999, it remained the largest party, and headed the ruling coalition on both occasions.[52] In the 2014 general election, it won an outright majority in parliament. From 1991 onwards, a BJP member has led the Opposition whenever the party was not in power.[230][f]

| Year | Legislature | Party leader | Seats contested | Seats won | Change in seats | Percentage of votes |
Vote swing | Outcome | Ref. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1984 | 8th Lok Sabha | Atal Bihari Vajpayee | 229 | 2 / 543
|
7.74% | New | Opposition | [231] | |
| 1989 | 9th Lok Sabha | Lal Krishna Advani | 225 | 85 / 543
|
11.36% | Outside support for NF | [232] | ||
| 1991 | 10th Lok Sabha | 477 | 120 / 543
|
20.11% | Official Opposition | [233] | |||
| 1996 | 11th Lok Sabha | Atal Bihari Vajpayee | 471 | 161 / 543
|
20.29% | Coalition (1996) | [234] | ||
| Official Opposition (1996–97) | [234] | ||||||||
| 1998 | 12th Lok Sabha | 388 | 182 / 543
|
25.59% | Coalition | [235] | |||
| 1999 | 13th Lok Sabha | 339 | 182 / 543
|
23.75% | Coalition | [236] | |||
| 2004 | 14th Lok Sabha | Lal Krishna Advani | 364 | 138 / 543
|
22.16% | Official Opposition | [237] | ||
| 2009 | 15th Lok Sabha | 433 | 116 / 543
|
18.80% | Official Opposition | [238] | |||
| 2014 | 16th Lok Sabha | Narendra Modi | 428 | 282 / 543
|
31.34% | Majority | [239] | ||
| 2019 | 17th Lok Sabha | 436 | 303 / 543
|
37.46% | Majority | [240][241] | |||
| 2024 | 18th Lok Sabha | 441 | 240 / 543
|
36.56% | Coalition |
| All time-BJP Lok Sabha seat count |
![]() |
Presence in states and Union Territories
[edit]
The BJP has previously held power in Karnataka, Jharkhand and Himachal Pradesh. Also it has been the junior coalition partner in governments in Jammu and Kashmir (with the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party), Punjab (with the Shiromani Akali Dal), and Tamil Nadu (with the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam). It has never held power in Kerala, Telangana, and West Bengal.[242][243][244]
In addition to the NDA, the BJP is also a part of a regional political alliance in Northeast India named the North-East Democratic Alliance.[245][246][247]
| Upper House | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Legislature | Seats | Legislative leader | Status |
| Rajya Sabha | 102 / 245
|
J. P. Nadda | Government |
| Andhra Pradesh | 1 / 58
|
Somu Veerraju | Coalition |
| Bihar | 24 / 75
|
Hari Sahni | Government |
30 / 75
|
Chalavadi Narayanaswamy | Opposition | |
22 / 78
|
Pravin Darekar | Government | |
3 / 40
|
A.Venkata Narayana Reddy | Others | |
79 / 100
|
Keshav Prasad Maurya | Government | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 8 / 175
|
Penmetsa Vishnu Kumar Raju | Coalition |
| Arunachal Pradesh | 46 / 60
|
Pema Khandu | Government |
| Assam | 64 / 126
|
Himanta Biswa Sarma | Government |
| Bihar | 82 / 243
|
Samrat Choudhary | Coalition |
| Chhattisgarh | 54 / 90
|
Vishnu Deo Sai | Government |
| Goa | 27 / 40
|
Pramod Sawant | Government |
| Gujarat | 162 / 182
|
Bhupendrabhai Patel | Government |
| Haryana | 48 / 90
|
Nayab Singh Saini | Government |
28 / 68
|
Jai Ram Thakur | Opposition | |
21 / 81
|
Babulal Marandi | Opposition | |
63 / 224
|
R. Ashoka | Opposition | |
0 / 140
|
No Representation | ||
165 / 230
|
Mohan Yadav | Government | |
131 / 288
|
Devendra Fadnavis | Government | |
37 / 60
|
TBD | President Rule | |
2 / 60
|
Sanbor Shullai | Coalition | |
2 / 40
|
K. Beichhua | Others | |
12 / 60
|
Y. Patton | Coalition | |
78 / 147
|
Mohan Charan Majhi | Government | |
2 / 117
|
Ashwani Kumar Sharma | Others | |
118 / 200
|
Bhajan Lal Sharma | Government | |
0 / 32
|
No Representation | Alliance | |
4 / 234
|
Nainar Nagendran | Opposition | |
8 / 119
|
Alleti Maheshwar Reddy | Others | |
33 / 60
|
Manik Saha | Government | |
258 / 403
|
Yogi Adityanath | Government | |
47 / 70
|
Pushkar Singh Dhami | Government | |
65 / 294
|
Suvendu Adhikari | Opposition | |
| Delhi | 48 / 70
|
Rekha Gupta | Government |
28 / 90
|
Sunil Kumar Sharma | Opposition | |
9 / 33
|
A. Namassivayam | Coalition | |
List of heads of government
[edit]List of prime ministers
[edit]| No. | Portrait | Prime minister | Constituency | Term in office | Lok Sabha | Cabinet | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Start | End | Tenure | ||||||
| 1 | Atal Bihari Vajpayee | Lucknow | 16 May 1996 | 1 June 1996 | 16 days | 11th | Vajpayee I | |
| 19 March 1998 | 13 October 1999 | 6 years, 64 days | 12th | Vajpayee II | ||||
| 14 October 1999 | 22 May 2004 | 13th | Vajpayee III | |||||
| 2 | Narendra Modi | Varanasi | 26 May 2014 | 30 May 2019 | 11 years, 168 days | 16th | Modi I | |
| 30 May 2019 | 9 June 2024 | 17th | Modi II | |||||
| 9 June 2024 | Incumbent | 18th | Modi III | |||||
List of incumbent chief ministers
[edit]
As of 22 February 2025[update], 55 people from Bharatiya Janata Party have held the position of a chief minister, 14 of whom are incumbent.
| No. | State | Portrait | Name | Cabinet | Governing coalition | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Arunachal Pradesh | Pema Khandu | Khandu V | BJP | ||
| NPP | ||||||
| 2 | Assam | Himanta Biswa Sarma | Sarma I | BJP | ||
| AGP | ||||||
| UPPL | ||||||
| 3 | Chhattisgarh | Vishnudeo Sai | Sai I | BJP | ||
| 4 | Goa | Pramod Sawant | Sawant II | BJP | ||
| MGP | ||||||
| IND | ||||||
| 5 | Gujarat | Bhupendrabhai Patel | Patel II | BJP | ||
| 6 | Haryana | Nayab Singh Saini | Saini II | BJP | ||
| 7 | Madhya Pradesh | Mohan Yadav | Yadav I | BJP | ||
| 8 | Maharashtra | Devendra Fadnavis | Fadnavis III | BJP | ||
| SHS | ||||||
| NCP | ||||||
| JSS | ||||||
| RSP | ||||||
| RYSP | ||||||
| RSVA | ||||||
| IND | ||||||
| 9 | Manipur | - | - | - | BJP | |
| NPP | ||||||
| NPF | ||||||
| IND | ||||||
| 10 | Odisha | Mohan Charan Majhi | Majhi I | BJP | ||
| 11 | Rajasthan | Bhajan Lal Sharma | Sharma I | BJP | ||
| 12 | Tripura | Manik Saha | Saha II | BJP | ||
| IPFT | ||||||
| 13 | Uttar Pradesh | Yogi Adityanath | Adityanath II | BJP | ||
| AD(S) | ||||||
| RLD | ||||||
| NP | ||||||
| 14 | Uttarakhand | Pushkar Singh Dhami | Dhami II | BJP | ||
| 15 | Delhi | Rekha Gupta | Gupta | - | ||
See also
[edit]- Leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the Parliament of India
- List of political parties in India
- List of national presidents of the Bharatiya Janata Party
- List of state presidents of the Bharatiya Janata Party
- Organisation of the Bharatiya Janata Party
- Politics of India
- List of ruling political parties by country
References
[edit]Explanatory notes
[edit]- ^ in 2002
- ^ Sharma (2019), p. 523: "First, citizenship status biased towards religious identity is by no means a new idea.... A careful study of the policies and laws related to citizenship, adopted since independence, substantiates the assertion that citizenship in India has always been based on an implicit belief that India is for Hindus."
- ^ Sen (2018), pp. 10–11: "Nehru's response [to Patel's warning] made it clear that Muslim migrants from Pakistan could not join the ranks of refugees in India... Thus, despite broad public statements promising citizenship to all displaced persons from Pakistan, Hindu migrants alone counted as citizen-refugees in post-partition India."
- ^ Jayal (2019), pp. 34–35: "While some elements of religious difference had... been covertly smuggled in earlier, this bill seeks to do so overtly."
- ^ Jayal (2019), pp. 33–50: "While some elements of religious difference had... been covertly smuggled in earlier, this bill seeks to do so overtly."
- ^ For the electoral results of the BJP's predecessors, see the JP and BJS articles.
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Further reading
[edit]- Ahuja, Gurdas M. (2004). Bharatiya Janata Party and Resurgent India. Ram Company.
- Andersen, Walter K.; Damle, Shridhar D. (1987) [Originally published by Westview Press]. The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism. Delhi: Vistaar Publications.
- Bhambhri, C.P. (2001). Bharatiya Janata Party : Periphery to Centre. Delhi: Shipra. ISBN 978-81-7541-078-7.
- Baxter, Craig (1971) [first published by University of Pennsylvania Press 1969]. The Jana Sangh — A Biography of an Indian Political Party. Oxford University Press, Bombay. ISBN 978-0-8122-7583-4.
- Chadha, Kalyani; Guha, Pallavi (2016). "The Bharatiya Janata Party's online campaign and citizen involvement in India's 2014 election". International Journal of Communication. 10. Archived from the original on 16 May 2021. Retrieved 16 May 2021.
- Ganguly, Sumit (2015). "Hindu nationalism and the foreign policy of India's Bharatiya Janata Party" (PDF). Transatlantic Academy Paper Series. 2: 1–15. ISBN 978-1-5292-0460-5. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 March 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
- Graham, B. D. (1990). Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-38348-6.
- Harriss, John (2015). "Hindu Nationalism in Action: The Bharatiya Janata Party and Indian Politics". South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies. 38 (4): 712–718. doi:10.1080/00856401.2015.1089826. S2CID 147615034.
- Malik, Yogendra K.; Singh, V.B. (1994). Hindu Nationalists in India : The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. ISBN 978-0-8133-8810-6.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe (1996). The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN 978-1-85065-301-1.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe (July 2003). "Communal Riots in Gujarat: The State at Risk?" (PDF). Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics: 16. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 December 2013. Retrieved 5 November 2013.
- Jain, Varsha; B.E., Ganesh (2020). "Understanding the Magic of Credibility for Political Leaders: A Case of India and Narendra Modi". Journal of Political Marketing. 19 (1–2): 15–33. doi:10.1080/15377857.2019.1652222. S2CID 202247610.
- Mishra, Madhusudan (1997). Bharatiya Janata Party and India's Foreign Policy. New Delhi: Uppal Pub. House. ISBN 978-81-85565-79-8.
- Nag, Kingshuk (2014). The Saffron Tide: The Rise of the BJP. Rupa Publications. ISBN 978-8129134295.
- Nag, Kingshuk. Atal Bihari Vajpayee (Rupa Publications, 2016).
- Palshikar, Suhas, Sanjay Kumar, and Sanjay Lodha, eds. Electoral Politics in India: The Resurgence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Taylor & Francis, 2017).
- Raghavan, G.N.S. New Era in the Indian Polity, A Study of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the BJP (1996).
- Sanjeev Kr, H. M. (2007). "Foreign Policy Position of Bharatiya Janata Party Towards Issues of India Pakistan Relations". The Indian Journal of Political Science. 68 (2): 275–291. JSTOR 41856327. Archived from the original on 13 January 2021. Retrieved 11 January 2021.
- Devendra P. Sharma; C.P. Thakur (1999). India under Atal Behari Vajpayee : The BJP Era. New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors. ISBN 978-81-7476-250-4.
- Stein, Burton (2010). A history of India (edited by David Arnold. 2nd ed.). Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-9509-6.
- Rao, Ramesh (2001). Coalition conundrum: the BJP's trials, tribulations, and triumphs. Har Anand. ISBN 9788124108093.
External links
[edit]- BJP web resources provided by GovPubs at the University of Colorado Boulder Libraries
- Works by or about Bharatiya Janata Party at the Internet Archive
- Bharatiya Janata Party at the Encyclopædia Britannica
Bharatiya Janata Party
View on GrokipediaThe Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is India's dominant political party, formally established on 6 April 1980 following a split from the Janata Party, as the successor to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh founded in 1951 by Syama Prasad Mukherjee to advance Indian cultural nationalism against prevailing socialist influences. [1] [2] Its foundational ideology centers on integral humanism, propounded by Deendayal Upadhyaya, which prioritizes holistic national development over Western materialism or communism, alongside Hindutva as a framework for unifying India's diverse populace under shared civilizational values. [3] [4] The party commits to five core principles—probity in governance, national security, economic self-reliance (swadeshi), social harmony, and value-oriented politics—positioning itself as a proponent of cultural revival, market-oriented reforms, and strong defense. [2] Emerging from ideological roots in opposition to Nehruvian secularism, Nehruvian socialism and Nehru-Gandhi family lead one-party dominance, the BJP achieved breakthrough national governance in 1998 under Atal Bihari Vajpayee, overseeing economic liberalization, nuclear tests, and infrastructure initiatives before electoral setbacks in 2004 and 2009. [5] Its resurgence culminated in 2014 with Narendra Modi's leadership, yielding absolute majorities in the Lok Sabha (282 seats in 2014, 303 in 2019) through campaigns emphasizing anti-corruption, development, and security, followed by a coalition-dependent win (240 seats) in 2024 via the National Democratic Alliance. [6] [7] Key achievements include poverty reduction via direct benefit transfers, expanded access to banking and sanitation, GST implementation for fiscal unification, and assertive foreign policy measures like surgical strikes against terrorism and the abrogation of Article 370 to integrate Jammu and Kashmir fully. [8] These reforms have correlated with sustained GDP growth averaging over 6% annually pre-COVID, rising foreign direct investment, and digital infrastructure expansion. [9] Controversies often center on policies advancing Hindu cultural assertions, such as the Ram Temple construction and citizenship laws prioritizing non-Muslim refugees, which critics—frequently from academia and legacy media with documented ideological skews toward secular-left narratives—label as majoritarian, though empirical indicators show declining communal violence rates and rising minority welfare enrollment under BJP rule. [10] The party's organizational strength, with over 180 million members, stems from grassroots mobilization via ideological training and welfare delivery, enabling dominance in 20+ states and a shift from peripheral to central force in Indian politics. [11]
Name, Symbolism, and Core Themes
Etymology and Emblem
The name Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) translates directly from Hindi to "Indian People's Party," with "Bharatiya" denoting "of India" or "Indian" (from Bharat, the traditional Sanskrit term for the Indian subcontinent) and "Janata" signifying "people" or "public." This nomenclature was adopted upon the party's formal establishment on 6 April 1980, reflecting an intent to invoke a pan-Indian civic nationalism rooted in cultural continuity rather than parochial divisions.[12] The BJP's official election symbol is the lotus (kamala or padma in Sanskrit), a blooming flower allotted by the Election Commission of India at the party's inception in 1980 and retained thereafter.[13] In Hindu iconography and broader Indian tradition, the lotus embodies purity, prosperity, and detachment, as its pristine petals rise above muddy waters—a metaphor the party employs to denote its purported endurance and ethical steadfastness amid political turbulence.[14] The party's flag design incorporates the lotus emblem centered on a saffron field with a vertical green stripe, in a 2:1 ratio of saffron to green. Saffron (kesari), drawn from its prominence in Hindu asceticism and the attire of independence-era revolutionaries like those in the Bhagwa Dhvaj tradition, symbolizes renunciation, courage, and selfless sacrifice for the nation.[15][16] This color palette aligns with the BJP's visual representation of cultural heritage and resolve, distinct from the tricolor but echoing national motifs of valor.[17]Recurring Motifs and Slogans
The Bharatiya Janata Party employs the slogan Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas ("Together with All, Development for All"), introduced prominently during the 2014 Lok Sabha campaign under Narendra Modi's leadership, to articulate a vision of inclusive economic progress that transcends caste, creed, and region.[18] This motif evolved to incorporate Sabka Vishwas ("Trust of All") and Sabka Prayas ("Effort of All") by 2019, reinforcing collective participation in nation-building while prioritizing empirical metrics like infrastructure expansion and poverty alleviation as hallmarks of governance.[19] Patriotic refrains such as Vande Mataram ("I Bow to Thee, Mother") and Bharat Mata ki Jai ("Victory to Mother India") recur in BJP communications, invoking the anthropomorphic depiction of the nation as a maternal entity derived from Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's 1882 hymn, which galvanized anti-colonial resistance.[5] These elements embody cultural nationalism by linking modern Indian identity to pre-independence fervor, where devotion to Bharat Mata symbolized unified resistance against foreign rule, and are routinely integrated into party oaths and public assemblies to foster national cohesion.[20] Campaign motifs drawing from ancient heritage, particularly the Ramayana epic, emphasize archetypes of ethical governance and territorial integrity, portraying Rama's exile and return as metaphors for reclaiming civilizational continuity amid historical disruptions.[21] This recurring narrative framework aligns with the party's integral humanism, positing India's scriptural traditions—such as dharma from Vedic and epic sources—as foundational to contemporary statecraft, distinct from secular universalism by prioritizing endogenous cultural realism over imported ideologies.[10]Historical Precursors
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951–1977)
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh was established on 21 October 1951 in Delhi under the leadership of Syama Prasad Mookerjee, who served as its first president, with the aim of providing a nationalist alternative to the Indian National Congress's dominance in post-independence politics.[1] Drawing ideological inspiration from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the party advocated for akhand Bharat—an undivided India—rejecting the lingering divisions from the 1947 Partition and emphasizing cultural and territorial integrity over Nehruvian policies perceived as conciliatory toward separatism.[22] It positioned itself against the Congress's socialist economic framework and secularism, which it critiqued for prioritizing minority appeasement at the expense of Hindu cultural assertions and national unity. Central to the Jana Sangh's platform was staunch opposition to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir; the party viewed this provision as a violation of India's sovereignty and launched agitations demanding its abrogation shortly after its inception.[23] Mookerjee personally led a campaign against the permit system restricting entry into Kashmir, crossing the border without one on 11 May 1953, resulting in his immediate arrest by state authorities.[24] He died under mysterious circumstances on 23 June 1953 while in detention in Srinagar, an event the party commemorated as martyrdom symbolizing resistance to perceived constitutional dilutions of national integration.[24] The Jana Sangh also championed cow protection as a cultural imperative, integrating it into electoral appeals, and supported the promotion of Hindi as the primary national language to foster linguistic unity amid resistance to English dominance.[25] In electoral politics, the party achieved modest gains, securing 3 seats in the 1952 Lok Sabha elections and steadily expanding its base through persistent advocacy on nationalistic issues.[26] By the 1967 elections, its representation had grown to 35 seats, reflecting increasing appeal among voters disillusioned with Congress governance, though it remained a regional force concentrated in northern India. The Jana Sangh opposed Indira Gandhi's socialist policies, including bank nationalizations and curbs on private enterprise, framing them as deviations from self-reliant economic principles. Facing the authoritarian Emergency imposed by the Congress government from 1975 to 1977, which suspended civil liberties and censored dissent, the Jana Sangh dissolved itself to merge with other anti-Emergency opposition groups, forming the Janata Party on 23 March 1977.[1] This coalition capitalized on public outrage against the regime's excesses, marking the Jana Sangh's temporary subsumption into a broader united front while preserving its core ideological commitments to cultural nationalism and opposition to statist overreach.[1]Janata Party Era (1977–1980)
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, a precursor to the Bharatiya Janata Party, played a pivotal role in the formation of the Janata Party coalition in 1977, uniting various opposition groups against Indira Gandhi's Congress regime following the imposition of Emergency rule from 1975 to 1977. Insisting on the condition of dual membership, which allowed its cadres to maintain affiliations with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Jana Sangh ensured its ideological distinctiveness within the alliance. This stipulation was accepted to broaden the anti-Emergency front, enabling the coalition to contest the March 1977 general elections under a unified banner. The Janata Party achieved a decisive victory, capturing a majority in the Lok Sabha and ousting the Congress, which had dominated Indian politics for three decades.[27][28] Under Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the Janata government prioritized restoring democratic institutions, repealing Emergency-era laws, and initiating probes into abuses of power during that period. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, a senior Jana Sangh leader, served as Foreign Minister from 1977 to 1979, marking an early assertion of independent foreign policy. Notably, Vajpayee addressed the United Nations General Assembly in Hindi in 1977, symbolizing cultural confidence, and pursued diplomatic engagements that emphasized national sovereignty, including firm stances on border issues with neighbors. The administration's efforts to normalize relations while safeguarding interests laid groundwork for non-Congress governance, though hampered by coalition frailties.[29][30] Internal discord soon eroded the government's stability, fueled by ideological clashes over RSS linkages and divergent economic visions. Socialist factions, wary of the Jana Sangh's Hindu nationalist ties, pushed for severing dual memberships, viewing RSS influence as incompatible with secularism. Economic policies under Desai emphasized austerity and decentralization, yet faced resistance from pro-business elements within the coalition, exacerbating factionalism. These tensions, compounded by leadership rivalries, led to Desai's resignation in July 1979 and the coalition's fracture, paving the way for fresh elections despite initial successes in democratic restoration.[31][32]Formation and Expansion (1980–1990s)
Founding and Initial Challenges
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was established on 6 April 1980 in Delhi by former Bharatiya Jana Sangh members who resigned en masse from the Janata Party following its collapse in 1979 amid internal infighting, its electoral defeat in January 1980 that returned Indira Gandhi's Congress to power, and the subsequent insistence by socialist factions on enforcing a ban on dual membership with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which the ex-Jana Sangh bloc rejected in favor of their ideological commitments.[33][34] Atal Bihari Vajpayee became its first president, with L.K. Advani in a key leadership role; the name shifted from "Sangh" to "Janata" to project a more mainstream, people's party image while preserving the core ex-BJS cadre and RSS ideological foundation.[1] The formation drew support from the RSS, reflecting continuity with the nationalist ethos of its predecessor, though the party initially lacked a robust independent organizational base, relying on defecting Janata members numbering fewer than 100 in the Lok Sabha at inception.[1] To appeal beyond its core Hindu nationalist constituency and counter perceptions of extremism, the BJP adopted "Gandhian socialism" as its guiding economic ideology at its founding convention, emphasizing decentralized planning, rural self-reliance, and moral governance while upholding integral humanism and cultural nationalism as foundational principles.[35][36] This moderation aimed to facilitate alliances with secular-leaning groups but faced internal resistance from hardliners, complicating early efforts to unify disparate anti-Congress elements fragmented by the Janata era's egos and policy rifts.[37] The party's inaugural national challenge came in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections, held amid a massive sympathy surge for the Indian National Congress after Indira Gandhi's assassination on 31 October 1984, which enabled Congress to secure 414 of 543 seats through consolidated voter polarization.[38] Despite fielding candidates nationwide, the BJP garnered only 2 seats—won by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in Gwalior and S.S. Bhandari in New Delhi—translating to 7.74% of the vote share but underscoring organizational infancy, limited cadre mobilization, and failure to disrupt Congress's dominance in a landscape where opposition unity had already eroded post-1977.[38][39] This outcome highlighted the hurdles of rebranding from a Janata splinter while navigating a political ecosystem favoring incumbency and regional satraps.Rise Through Electoral Gains
 The Bharatiya Janata Party achieved its first major electoral breakthrough in the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, securing 85 seats in the 543-member house amid a nationwide anti-corruption sentiment directed against the Congress party, particularly over the Bofors scandal. This marked a sharp increase from just 2 seats in 1984, reflecting growing dissatisfaction with single-party dominance and positioning the BJP as the largest opposition force outside Congress. The party's performance enabled it to provide external support to the National Front coalition government headed by V. P. Singh, which assumed power in December 1989 without BJP ministers but relied on its backing to pass key legislation.[40][41] In response to Prime Minister V. P. Singh's decision to implement the Mandal Commission's recommendations for 27% reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government jobs and education in August 1990, the BJP opposed the caste-based approach, arguing it perpetuated division rather than addressing root causes of inequality through economic growth and merit-based opportunities. Party leaders contended that such quotas would undermine efficiency and national unity, advocating instead for development-oriented policies to uplift marginalized communities without rigid caste classifications. This stance, while alienating some OBC voters initially, reinforced the BJP's appeal among upper-caste and urban constituencies wary of quota expansions, contributing to its consolidation as an alternative to Congress's patronage politics.[42][43] Building on national visibility, the BJP translated its momentum into state-level successes during the 1990s, forming governments in Himachal Pradesh in 1990 under Chief Minister Shanta Kumar, Madhya Pradesh in 1990 under Sunder Lal Patwa (though short-lived until stabilization efforts), and Rajasthan in 1993 under Bhairon Singh Shekhawat. These administrations allowed the party to experiment with governance models emphasizing infrastructure development, fiscal prudence, and anti-corruption measures, such as streamlining bureaucracy and promoting small-scale industries, which honed policies later scaled nationally. By the late 1990s, control over these Hindi heartland states solidified the BJP's organizational base and demonstrated its administrative viability beyond opposition rhetoric.[44][34]Pivotal Movements and Campaigns
Ram Janmabhoomi Mobilization
The Ram Janmabhoomi mobilization emerged in the mid-1980s as a grassroots campaign led by the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) to assert Hindu claims over the Ayodhya site, traditionally regarded as the birthplace of Lord Rama, where the 16th-century Babri Masjid stood.[45] In 1984, the VHP's Dharma Sansad resolved to prioritize the site's liberation, establishing the Ram Janmabhoomi Mukti Yagna Samiti to organize the effort.[46] The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), initially cautious, shifted under L.K. Advani's presidency from 1986 onward, aligning with the VHP to channel Hindu cultural aspirations into political action, viewing the movement as a revival of neglected historical heritage rather than communal agitation.[47] By 1989, the campaign gained momentum through the Ram Shila Pujan initiative, where volunteers collected over 200,000 bricks consecrated across India for the proposed temple, symbolizing nationwide participation.[48] On November 9, 1989, the VHP laid the foundation stone (shilanyas) for the temple near the disputed structure, an event permitted by the Congress-led central government and endorsed by the BJP ahead of the general elections, which boosted the party's visibility among Hindu voters.[49] Advani, as BJP president, participated in promoting this ceremonial step, framing it as a non-violent assertion of faith against prolonged legal inertia.[50] The 1990 Rath Yatra, spearheaded by Advani, marked the mobilization's peak, launching on September 25 from Somnath Temple in Gujarat and traversing approximately 10,000 kilometers toward Ayodhya by late October, with the custom-built chariot rally drawing lakhs of supporters and highlighting demands for temple construction at the site over the mosque.[51] Advani's arrest on October 23 in Samastipur, Bihar, by state authorities under Chief Minister Lalu Prasad Yadav, halted the procession but ignited a national discourse on historical evidence of Rama's birthplace versus the structure's status, amplifying BJP's narrative of democratic mobilization against perceived minority appeasement.[52] [53] The event spurred further kar sevak gatherings, with over 150,000 converging in Ayodhya by December 1992 amid stalled negotiations and court delays. On December 6, 1992, a massive assembly of kar sevaks breached security perimeters and demolished the Babri Masjid in what BJP described as an unplanned surge of popular sentiment, despite prior assurances from party leaders to respect judicial processes. The BJP leadership, including Advani and Murli Manohar Joshi, who were present, condemned the act as regrettable, with Atal Bihari Vajpayee labeling it a "black chapter" and distancing the party from the violence, attributing it to crowd dynamics beyond control.[54] This response led to the dismissal of the BJP-led Uttar Pradesh government and temporary bans on the party, yet the mobilization had already transformed its electoral fortunes by consolidating Hindu support around cultural restitution claims.[55]Ayodhya Legal Resolution and Temple Construction
On September 30, 2010, a three-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered a 2:1 majority verdict in the Ayodhya land title suits, partitioning the 2.77-acre disputed site into three equal portions: one-third to the idol of Ram Lalla Virajman, one-third to the Nirmohi Akhara, and one-third to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, while ruling that no party had conclusively proven exclusive title but affirming joint possession historically.[56][57] The decision, which included directives for status quo on existing structures like makeshift temples, faced immediate appeals to the Supreme Court and was stayed pending further review, amid heightened security to avert unrest.[57] The Supreme Court, in a unanimous judgment on November 9, 2019, by a five-judge constitution bench led by then-Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, overturned the High Court's partition and awarded possession of the entire 2.77-acre site to a government-formed trust for constructing the Ram Janmabhoomi temple, citing Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) excavations from 2003 that evidenced a pre-existing 12th-century non-Islamic temple structure beneath the Babri Masjid, demolished in 1992.[57] The court acknowledged the 1992 demolition as illegal but prioritized title based on continuous Hindu worship and possession evidence over the Waqf Board's claim, directing allocation of an alternative five-acre plot elsewhere in Ayodhya for a new mosque to uphold equity under Article 25 of the Constitution.[57] This ruling, grounded in empirical archaeological data rather than solely historical narratives, resolved the protracted litigation originating from suits filed since 1950, with the bench emphasizing the site's unique religious significance to Hindus as Ram's birthplace while critiquing prior administrative failures in protecting the mosque.[57] Following the verdict, Prime Minister Narendra Modi performed the ceremonial groundbreaking for the temple on August 5, 2020, at the site, marking the initiation of construction under the Shri Ram Janmabhoomi Teerth Kshetra Trust, with the event conducted amid stringent security protocols that prevented major disruptions.[58] Construction progressed steadily, incorporating traditional Nagara-style architecture with the main sanctum housing the Ram idol, and culminated in the pran pratishtha (consecration) ceremony on January 22, 2024, led by Modi, which symbolized the legal and cultural closure of the dispute without reported large-scale violence in Ayodhya itself, despite isolated communal clashes elsewhere during celebratory processions.[59][60] The temple's completion has spurred significant economic development in Ayodhya, with Uttar Pradesh government investments exceeding ₹85,000 crore in infrastructure including a new international airport operational since December 2023, upgraded railway stations, and expanded road networks to accommodate projected annual tourist influxes of 50 million visitors, generating employment in hospitality, transport, and ancillary sectors while boosting local GDP through pilgrimage-driven commerce.[61][62] This transformation, facilitated by the BJP-led state administration, underscores causal links between resolved religious sites and tourism-led growth, with minimal displacement reported and security measures ensuring sustained peace post-inauguration.[61][63]National Governments Under BJP Leadership
Vajpayee-Advani Administrations (1996–2004)
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the single largest party in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, securing 161 seats, which prompted President Shankar Dayal Sharma to invite Atal Bihari Vajpayee to form the government.[64] Vajpayee was sworn in as Prime Minister on May 16, 1996, but the administration lasted only 13 days, collapsing on May 28, 1996, after failing to muster a majority in the Lok Sabha amid coalition instability.[65] This brief tenure underscored the BJP's growing electoral strength post-Ram Janmabhoomi mobilization but highlighted challenges in forging stable alliances without compromising core ideological positions. In March 1998, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a coalition of 13 parties, formed government after securing 182 seats, with Vajpayee again becoming Prime Minister and L.K. Advani serving as Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister.[66] The government conducted Pokhran-II nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, detonating five devices to affirm India's nuclear capabilities amid perceived threats from Pakistan and China, enhancing strategic deterrence.[67] Vajpayee's emphasis on consensus-building moderated coalition tensions, allowing passage of key reforms despite ideological diversity, though the government fell after 13 months due to the withdrawal of support by the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam.[68] Following the 1999 Kargil War, where Indian forces recaptured Pakistani-infiltrated positions along the Line of Control, culminating in victory declared on July 14, 1999, the NDA won 303 seats in snap elections, enabling Vajpayee's full-term government until 2004.[69] Economic initiatives included the Golden Quadrilateral highway project, initiated in 2001 to connect major cities over 5,846 km, which spurred manufacturing growth and regional development by reducing transport costs.[70] The 1999 New Telecom Policy shifted from fixed license fees to revenue sharing, catalyzing a telecom boom with subscriber growth from millions to hundreds of millions by enabling private investment and competition.[71] Despite robust GDP growth averaging around 6% and infrastructure advances, the NDA lost the 2004 elections, securing 226 seats against the United Progressive Alliance's 218, due to the "India Shining" campaign's urban bias overlooking rural distress, farmer suicides, and employment concerns, compounded by early polls and alliance erosion in states like Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.[72] Vajpayee and Advani's leadership sustained the coalition through pragmatic governance, prioritizing national security and liberalization while navigating regional partners' demands.[68]1998–2004 Coalition Government
Following the Bharatiya Janata Party's victory in the 1999 general elections, Atal Bihari Vajpayee returned as Prime Minister, leading a stable National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government that lasted until 2004.[73] This administration prioritized economic liberalization, implementing the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act in 2003 to enforce fiscal discipline by targeting reductions in revenue deficits and public debt.[74] Disinvestment policies advanced privatization, with the government articulating a strategy to reduce stakes in public sector undertakings beyond minority sales, raising significant revenues through sales in sectors like oil and telecom.[75] Infrastructure development accelerated under the NDA, including the Golden Quadrilateral highway project initiated in 2001 to connect major cities, alongside telecom liberalization that boosted sector growth. The information technology sector expanded rapidly, contributing approximately 5% to GDP by 2004 from 1.2% in 1998, driven by export-oriented policies and the Y2K compliance boom that positioned India as a global IT hub.[76] In foreign policy, Vajpayee pursued pragmatic engagement, exemplified by the February 1999 Delhi-Lahore bus diplomacy, where he traveled to Pakistan for talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, culminating in the Lahore Declaration committing both nations to nuclear restraint and peaceful dispute resolution.[77] Relations with the United States improved post-Pokhran sanctions, highlighted by President Bill Clinton's March 2000 visit to India, which focused on economic ties and strategic dialogue, laying groundwork for post-9/11 cooperation.[78] Social initiatives included the launch of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan in 2001, a flagship program to universalize elementary education through community involvement, school infrastructure upgrades, and enrollment drives targeting disadvantaged groups.[79] The BJP maintained opposition to separate reservations for religious minorities, advocating instead for caste-based quotas within existing frameworks to avoid what it viewed as divisive identity politics, though this drew criticism from minority advocacy groups for potentially marginalizing Muslim OBCs.[80][36]2002 Gujarat Riots: Context and Outcomes
The riots were precipitated by the arson of the Sabarmati Express train at Godhra railway station on February 27, 2002, in which 59 Hindu pilgrims, known as kar sevaks returning from Ayodhya, were burned alive in coach S-6. The Justice Nanavati-Mehta Commission, established by the Gujarat Legislative Assembly, determined in its 2008 interim report that the fire was a premeditated act of conspiracy by a Muslim mob, rejecting claims of accident and citing evidence of external fuel poured into the coach. A special court in 2011 convicted 31 individuals, including key conspirators, of murder and arson in connection with the incident, upholding the commission's findings on premeditation.[81][82] Violence erupted across Gujarat starting February 28, 2002, lasting primarily through early March, with official records documenting 790 Muslim deaths and 254 Hindu deaths, alongside approximately 2,500 injuries and the destruction of over 20,000 Muslim-owned properties. The state government under Chief Minister Narendra Modi responded by imposing indefinite curfews in riot-hit districts on February 28 and requesting central assistance, deploying the Indian Army by March 1 after transport logistics were arranged, which helped restore order faster than in comparable historical riots like those in 1984 or 1992-93.[83] Investigations into allegations of administrative failure or complicity found no evidence against Modi. A Supreme Court-appointed Special Investigation Team (SIT) concluded in its February 2012 closure report that there was no prosecutable evidence implicating Modi or senior officials in orchestrating or abetting the violence, attributing the scale to spontaneous public outrage following Godhra. The Supreme Court upheld this clearance in June 2022, dismissing a related petition as an abuse of process while noting the SIT's thorough examination of over 1,000 documents and witness statements.[84][85] In the aftermath, Gujarat's economy rebounded through proactive measures, including the inaugural Vibrant Gujarat Global Investors' Summit in 2003, which attracted commitments worth over ₹65,000 crore (approximately $15 billion at the time) despite the riots' disruptions, laying foundations for sustained double-digit growth averaging 10.3% annually from 2002-2012 and positioning the state as an investment hub via policy reforms and infrastructure focus.[86]Modi Era Central Governments (2014–Present)
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), under Narendra Modi's leadership, formed the central government following its victory in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, marking the first time since 1984 that a single party achieved an absolute majority independently of coalitions. The 16th Lok Sabha was constituted with BJP securing 282 seats out of 543, enabling the formation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government without reliance on external support for a majority. This mandate was renewed and expanded in the 2019 elections, where BJP won 303 seats, consolidating power amid campaigns emphasizing economic development, national security, and cultural nationalism. The governments pursued structural reforms, including demonetization in 2016, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) implementation in 2017, and abrogation of special status provisions for Jammu and Kashmir in 2019.[87][6][88] Subsequent terms emphasized infrastructure expansion, digital initiatives like Digital India, and welfare schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana for financial inclusion. Economic policies focused on liberalization, with initiatives like Make in India launched in 2014 to boost manufacturing. National security measures included surgical strikes following the 2016 Uri attack and the 2019 Balakot airstrike. The COVID-19 pandemic response involved large-scale vaccination drives and economic stimulus packages. By 2024, the government's tenure faced scrutiny over unemployment rates and agrarian distress, influencing electoral outcomes.[89][90]2014 and 2019 Mandate
The 2014 elections, held from April 7 to May 12, resulted in BJP's historic win of 282 seats, with the NDA alliance totaling 336 seats, decisively defeating the incumbent United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by Congress, which secured only 44 seats. Narendra Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister on May 26, 2014, heading a council of ministers focused on governance efficiency and anti-corruption measures. Key early actions included the launch of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan on October 2, 2014, for sanitation, and establishment of the National Institution for Transforming India (NITI Aayog) replacing the Planning Commission.[87][6] In 2019, elections from April 11 to May 19 yielded BJP 303 seats and NDA 353, reflecting strong voter approval amid narratives of stability and development post-Pulwama attack. Modi began his second term on May 30, 2019, with an expanded cabinet emphasizing continuity in economic reforms and social welfare. Policies advanced included the abolition of triple talaq via the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, and farm laws introduced in 2020, later withdrawn amid protests.[88][91]Third Term Post-2024 Elections
The 2024 Lok Sabha elections, conducted in seven phases from April 19 to June 1, saw BJP win 240 seats, falling short of the 272 majority mark, while NDA secured 293 seats overall. This outcome necessitated coalition governance, with support from allies like Janata Dal (United) and Telugu Desam Party, leading to Modi's third swearing-in on June 9, 2024. The reduced mandate was attributed to losses in key states like Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra, amid opposition INDIA alliance gains to 234 seats. Priorities shifted toward consensus-building, with cabinet allocations reflecting ally demands, such as key portfolios to TDP and JD(U).[92][93][94]Abrogation of Article 370 and Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization
On August 5, 2019, the Modi government abrogated Article 370 through a presidential order, revoking Jammu and Kashmir's special autonomy status, following a resolution passed by both houses of Parliament. This was accompanied by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, bifurcating the state into two union territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, effective October 31, 2019. The move aimed to integrate the region fully under Indian laws, enabling land reforms and domicile extensions, amid imposition of communications blackout and security measures. The Supreme Court upheld the abrogation's constitutionality on December 11, 2023, directing assembly elections by September 2024. Critics, including regional parties, argued it undermined federalism, while proponents cited enhanced development and security.[95][96][97][95]2014 and 2019 Mandate
The Bharatiya Janata Party achieved a landmark victory in the 2014 Indian general elections, held from April 7 to May 12, with results declared on May 16, securing 282 seats in the 543-member Lok Sabha, marking the first absolute majority for a single party since 1984.[98][99] The party's vote share stood at approximately 31 percent, translating to strong performance in key states like Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra, driven by anti-incumbency against the incumbent United Progressive Alliance government amid corruption scandals and economic slowdown.[100] Narendra Modi, projected as the prime ministerial candidate, campaigned on themes of development (Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas), good governance, and economic reforms outlined in the BJP's manifesto, which emphasized anti-corruption measures, infrastructure expansion including 100 new cities, and universal healthcare access.[101] The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), led by BJP, amassed 336 seats, enabling government formation without reliance on external support.[87] Modi was sworn in as Prime Minister on May 26, 2014, at Rashtrapati Bhavan, heading a 45-member council of ministers.[102] Building on this momentum, the BJP consolidated its position in the 2019 general elections, conducted from April 11 to May 19 with results on May 23, winning 303 seats and increasing its vote share to 37.36 percent.[103][88] The campaign, under the slogan Phir Ek Baar Modi Sarkar, highlighted national security following the Pulwama attack and Balakot airstrikes, Modi's personal leadership, and continuity of reforms like GST and digital initiatives, while addressing economic nationalism and welfare schemes such as PM-KISAN for farmers.[104] The NDA secured 353 seats overall, reinforcing the mandate for BJP's Hindu nationalist and pro-business agenda amid opposition disunity.[105] Modi took oath for his second term on May 30, 2019, with a larger 71-member cabinet reflecting broader coalition inclusion.[106] These mandates enabled decisive policy actions, including economic liberalization and security enhancements, though critics from opposition quarters attributed wins partly to media amplification and Hindu consolidation, claims BJP countered as reflective of voter preference for governance over identity politics alone.[107] The absolute majorities allowed BJP to pursue legislative priorities without coalition compromises that had constrained prior non-Congress governments.Third Term Post-2024 Elections
In the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, held in seven phases from April 19 to June 1 with results announced on June 4, the Bharatiya Janata Party obtained 240 seats, below the 272 needed for a majority.[92] The National Democratic Alliance, comprising BJP and allies, achieved 293 seats overall, sufficient to form the government. Narendra Modi took oath as Prime Minister on June 9, 2024, leading a coalition cabinet that included representatives from key partners such as the Telugu Desam Party (16 seats) and Janata Dal (United) (12 seats).[108][109] The BJP's reduced tally stemmed from rural economic distress, including unemployment and inflation, which eroded support in northern strongholds like Uttar Pradesh, where seats dropped from 62 in 2019 to 33.[110][111] Efforts to expand in southern states yielded limited direct gains for BJP but bolstered the NDA through allies like TDP in Andhra Pradesh.[109] Continuity in welfare schemes, such as direct benefit transfers and infrastructure projects, mitigated further losses by reinforcing voter loyalty among beneficiaries.[110] Post-election coalition management focused on stabilizing the NDA by conceding cabinet portfolios to allies, including home ministry influence for JD(U) and civil aviation for TDP, to secure parliamentary support and policy alignment.[112] This approach addressed initial tensions over special status demands from regional partners.[109] State-level successes reinforced central stability: in October 2024, BJP retained Haryana with 48 of 90 assembly seats, defying predictions amid anti-incumbency.[113] The February 5, 2025, Delhi assembly polls saw BJP win 48 of 70 seats, ousting the Aam Aadmi Party after a decade and countering opposition claims of governance erosion.[114] These outcomes underscored BJP's organizational resilience and rebutted narratives of a post-2024 decline.[115]Abrogation of Article 370 and Jammu & Kashmir Reorganization
On August 5, 2019, President Ram Nath Kovind issued a proclamation under Article 370(3) of the Indian Constitution, effectively revoking the special autonomous status previously granted to Jammu and Kashmir, thereby applying all provisions of the Indian Constitution to the region in full.[116] This was accompanied by the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, enacted by Parliament on August 6, which reorganized the former state into two union territories: the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir (with a legislature) and the Union Territory of Ladakh (without a legislature), marking the complete legal integration of the region with the rest of India.[117] The move fulfilled a long-standing pledge of the Bharatiya Janata Party to eliminate what it described as discriminatory provisions that hindered national unity and development.[95] The abrogation faced legal challenges, culminating in a Supreme Court verdict on December 11, 2023, where a five-judge constitution bench unanimously upheld the presidential order and reorganization, ruling that the President's powers under Article 370 were not extinguished after the dissolution of Jammu and Kashmir's Constituent Assembly in 1957, and that Parliament could amend the status through the prescribed procedure.[116] [118] Post-abrogation security measures, including a zero-tolerance policy toward terrorism, correlated with measurable declines in violence: terrorist-initiated attacks fell to 46 in 2023 from 228 in 2018, while stone-pelting incidents—previously numbering over 1,000 annually—dropped by more than 90% by 2020, with near cessation reported thereafter due to enhanced law enforcement and dismantling of terror financing networks.[119] [120] Overall terrorist incidents reduced by over 70% compared to pre-2019 levels, attributed to targeted operations against overground workers and outlawed groups.[121] Land reforms under the new framework ended restrictions on non-residents acquiring property, enabling industrial incentives and attracting investments; tourism arrivals surged to over 2 crore visitors in 2023, boosting local employment, while horticulture and infrastructure projects expanded economic opportunities previously limited by Article 35A's domicile barriers.[122] The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly elections in September-October 2024, the first since reorganization, proceeded peacefully with a voter turnout exceeding 63%, signaling enhanced stability; the BJP secured 29 seats, predominantly in the Jammu region, reflecting targeted organizational gains amid a regional divide where the National Conference-led alliance dominated the Kashmir Valley.[123] [124] This electoral process underscored the normalization of democratic functioning without the disruptions characteristic of prior decades.[125]Periods in Opposition
2004–2014: Policy Critiques and Reorganization
Following the Bharatiya Janata Party's defeat in the 2004 general elections, where it secured 138 seats compared to the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance's (UPA) 218, the party shifted to opposition tactics emphasizing scrutiny of UPA governance failures, particularly in economic management and corruption. BJP leaders, including L.K. Advani, repeatedly highlighted policy missteps such as fiscal profligacy and inadequate infrastructure investment, attributing India's slowing GDP growth from 8.5% in 2003-04 to around 6% by 2011-12 to UPA's "policy paralysis."[126] The party advocated for enhanced transparency mechanisms, pushing for expansions in the Right to Information (RTI) Act's application to expose administrative opacity, while leveraging Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) reports to demand accountability.[127] A cornerstone of BJP's opposition strategy involved amplifying major corruption scandals under UPA. In the 2G spectrum allocation case, revealed through a 2010 CAG report estimating a presumptive loss of ₹1.76 lakh crore, BJP demanded a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) probe and stalled parliamentary proceedings to press for investigations into allocations by Telecom Minister A. Raja.[128] Similarly, in the coal block allocation scam, exposed by BJP MP Hansraj Ahir's persistent queries and a 2012 CAG audit flagging ₹1.86 lakh crore in losses due to non-competitive bidding, the party called for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's resignation, accusing the UPA of systemic cronyism in resource distribution.[129][130] These efforts positioned BJP as a watchdog against UPA's alleged rent-seeking, though critics noted selective outrage amid prior NDA-era irregularities. On law and order, BJP critiqued UPA's central failures in curbing communal violence, exemplified by the 2013 Muzaffarnagar riots that displaced over 50,000 people and resulted in 62 deaths amid Jat-Muslim clashes. While state-level lapses under the Samajwadi Party were highlighted, BJP leaders argued UPA's broader policy neglect— including delayed security force deployments and inadequate rehabilitation—reflected national governance deficits, contrasting it with their emphasis on proactive policing.[131] Internally, BJP undertook reorganization to rebuild cadre strength, aligning closely with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) after assuring the parent organization in 2004 of a return to core ideological mobilization.[132] This involved leadership transitions, including the marginalization of Advani's influence by 2013 in favor of RSS-nominated figures, and grassroots revitalization through membership drives that expanded the base from 3.5 crore in 2004 to over 10 crore by 2014.[133] The party promoted Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi's governance model—characterized by investor summits like Vibrant Gujarat (initiated 2003) and infrastructure-led growth averaging 10% state GDP annually—as a scalable alternative to UPA's central planning, positioning Modi as the 2014 prime ministerial candidate to unify disparate factions.[134] This restructuring culminated in enhanced electoral machinery, contributing to the party's 2014 resurgence.Post-2024 Coalition Dynamics
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), having secured 240 seats in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections while the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) totaled 293, formed a minority government on June 9, 2024, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, marking a return to coalition dependence after a decade of single-party majorities.[92] Key partners included the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) with 16 seats, led by N. Chandrababu Naidu, and Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)) with 12 seats, led by Nitish Kumar, whose support was crucial to surpass the 272-seat threshold. Cabinet allocations granted allies portfolios such as civil aviation to TDP and railways to JD(U), but the BJP retained dominance over finance, home affairs, and external affairs, reflecting strategic control amid negotiations.[135] Coalition dynamics emphasized policy continuity, particularly in economic management, with the July 2024 Union Budget prioritizing infrastructure spending at ₹11.11 lakh crore and fiscal consolidation targeting a 4.9% deficit for FY25, without yielding to ally demands for special packages that could alter core reforms.[136] Allies like TDP and JD(U), wary of internal splits and reliant on central patronage, aligned with BJP priorities rather than extracting major concessions, as evidenced by their endorsement of ongoing privatization and disinvestment agendas.[137] This approach mitigated risks of instability, though it introduced negotiation frictions over regional development funds. The BJP's victory in the February 5, 2025, Delhi assembly elections, capturing 48 of 70 seats and ending 27 years of non-BJP rule, reinforced central leverage within the NDA by demonstrating electoral resilience and reducing ally bargaining power.[114][138] This outcome, alongside sustained NDA cohesion, underscored the coalition's adaptability without diluting BJP-led governance. Critics, often from opposition-aligned sources, have raised concerns over federalism, alleging preferential treatment for NDA states in fund releases, yet fiscal transfers adhere to the 15th Finance Commission's formula, devolving 41% of the divisible tax pool equitably across states based on population, income distance, and area criteria.[139] Data from 2024-25 budgets show central transfers totaling ₹12.19 lakh crore in grants and devolution, maintaining balance despite political rhetoric, with non-NDA states receiving proportionate shares via statutory mechanisms.[140] This structure has preserved devolution trends initiated in prior terms, countering claims of systemic bias through verifiable apportionment.Ideology and Policy Positions
Hindutva as Cultural Nationalism
Hindutva, as conceptualized by V.D. Savarkar in his 1923 pamphlet Essentials of Hindutva, defines a Hindu as an individual for whom India constitutes both fatherland (pitribhumi) and holy land (punyabhumi), encompassing a broad civilizational identity that integrates cultural, historical, and territorial elements rather than mere religious practice.[141] The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) frames Hindutva as cultural nationalism, promoting unity among India's diverse groups through shared civilizational roots in Hindu traditions, distinct from religious supremacism or exclusionary theocracy.[5] This interpretation emphasizes collective identity and national cohesion, viewing fragmentation along communal lines as a threat to India's organic wholeness.[142] Complementing Savarkar's framework, Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya's philosophy of Integral Humanism, adopted by the BJP at its 1965 Vijayawada conference, advocates harmonizing ancient dharma—understood as righteous order—with modern socio-economic needs, prioritizing individual dignity within societal and national contexts over atomistic individualism or class conflict.[3] Upadhyaya critiqued Western ideologies for their materialistic excesses, proposing instead a Bharatiya model of self-reliant development rooted in cultural ethos.[5] The BJP decries "pseudo-secularism" as vote-bank politics that privileges minority appeasement at the expense of equitable governance, arguing it undermines true secularism by fostering division rather than uniform application of law.[5] The party's push for a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) stems from this worldview, aiming to replace disparate personal laws with a common framework to ensure gender justice, such as equal inheritance and divorce rights, without targeting specific communities but addressing discriminatory practices across all groups.[143] BJP manifestos since 1996 have linked UCC to constitutional equality under Article 44, contending that gender parity cannot prevail amid religion-specific codes that often disadvantage women.[144] Empirically, BJP-led administrations have expanded minority welfare allocations, with the Ministry of Minority Affairs budget rising from approximately ₹1,447 crore in 2013–14 (UPA era) to ₹5,020 crore by 2023–24, funding scholarships, skill development, and infrastructure.[145] Pre-matric and post-matric scholarships for minorities reached 2.37 crore Muslim beneficiaries under the Modi government by 2019, surpassing UPA-2 figures, reflecting implementation over mere rhetoric despite criticisms of prior underutilization in Congress regimes.[146] This approach aligns with Integral Humanism's emphasis on inclusive upliftment, countering narratives of exclusion by prioritizing measurable outcomes over symbolic concessions.[3]Economic Reforms and Development Agenda
The Bharatiya Janata Party has pursued an economic agenda emphasizing structural liberalization, infrastructure development, and targeted self-reliance initiatives to foster sustainable growth, building on partial privatizations during its 1998–2004 tenure under Atal Bihari Vajpayee while accelerating reforms since 2014 under Narendra Modi. This approach contrasts with the pre-1991 socialist policies inherited from Congress-led governments, incorporating market incentives alongside nationalist goals like reducing import dependence, though critics argue it has not fully reversed protectionist impulses in sectors like agriculture.[147][148] A cornerstone reform was the Goods and Services Tax (GST), rolled out on July 1, 2017, which consolidated over a dozen central and state indirect taxes into a unified system to create a common national market and curb cascading taxation.[149][150] The GST regime, despite initial implementation challenges like compliance disruptions for small businesses, has broadened the tax base and increased collections from ₹7.4 lakh crore in FY 2017–18 to over ₹20 lakh crore annually by FY 2024–25, facilitating fiscal consolidation.[151] In banking, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) of 2016 addressed the non-performing assets (NPAs) crisis, which had escalated to 11.5% of advances by 2018 largely due to lending irregularities under the prior United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government.[152] The IBC enabled time-bound resolutions, recovering over ₹3 lakh crore by 2024 through creditor-led processes and reducing gross NPAs to 3.9% of advances by March 2024, though recovery rates averaged 32% amid judicial delays.[153][154] The Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) campaign, launched in May 2020 amid the COVID-19 downturn, integrated liberalization with production incentives via the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes across 14 sectors, attracting ₹1.76 lakh crore in investments and creating over 1.2 million jobs by FY 2024–25.[155] These schemes aim to elevate manufacturing's GDP share from 15% in 2014 to 25% by 2025, prioritizing electronics and pharmaceuticals to cut imports and boost exports, with mobile manufacturing turnover surging 146% to ₹5.25 lakh crore in FY 2024–25.[156][157] Economic outcomes under BJP-led governments include average real GDP growth of 6.5% from 2014–15 to 2023–24, recovering from a UPA-era slowdown where growth dipped below 5% in the final years amid policy paralysis and NPA buildup.[158] NITI Aayog estimates 248 million people escaped multidimensional poverty between 2013–14 and 2022–23, driven by direct benefit transfers and infrastructure spending, though independent analyses question the methodology's reliance on non-income indicators and note persistent income inequality.[159][160][161]National Security and Counter-Terrorism
The Bharatiya Janata Party-led government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi adopted a proactive defense doctrine following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, emphasizing cross-border retaliation against terrorist infrastructure to deter future aggression. In response to the Uri army base attack on September 18, 2016, which killed 19 Indian soldiers, Indian special forces conducted surgical strikes on September 29, 2016, targeting terrorist launch pads across the Line of Control in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, neutralizing several militants. Similarly, after the Pulwama suicide bombing on February 14, 2019, that claimed 40 Central Reserve Police Force personnel, the Indian Air Force executed airstrikes on February 26, 2019, against a Jaish-e-Mohammed training camp in Balakot, Pakistan, marking the first aerial action deep inside Pakistani territory since 1971. These operations, articulated by government spokespersons as calibrated responses to state-sponsored terrorism, aimed to impose costs on perpetrators rather than passive restraint.[162][163][164] This shift correlated with a marked reduction in major terrorist incidents, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, where government data indicate a significant decline in terror-related events under the BJP regime compared to the preceding decade. BJP leaders attribute this deterrence to the abandonment of prior non-retaliatory approaches, noting fewer large-scale urban attacks post-2014 and over 70% fewer infiltrations along the Line of Control by 2023. Empirical trends support claims of diminished frequency, with Jammu and Kashmir witnessing a drop from hundreds of annual incidents in the 2000s to under 100 by the early 2020s, though isolated attacks persist.[119] To enhance military agility, the BJP introduced the Agnipath scheme in June 2022, recruiting personnel for a four-year term to lower the average age of forces from 32 to 26 years, fostering a leaner, tech-savvy army amid rising threats. Complementing this, border infrastructure investments surged, with annual allocations for strategic roads along the China frontier rising from ₹3,500 crore pre-2014 to ₹14,500 crore by 2024, enabling faster troop mobilization and over 10,000 km of new roads constructed since 2014.[165][166] BJP critiques of pre-2014 policies highlight empirical links between perceived appeasement—such as avoiding retaliation after attacks like Mumbai 2008—and sustained high terror incidents, with over 7,000 fatalities from Islamist terrorism during 2004-2014 versus a fraction thereafter. Party figures argue that earlier governments' restraint emboldened adversaries, contrasting with BJP's "new normal" of decisive action that has empirically curbed escalation.[167][168]Foreign Relations and Strategic Autonomy
The Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has pursued a foreign policy emphasizing strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, enabling India to engage multiple global powers without exclusive alliances, while prioritizing national interests in a multipolar world.[169][170] This approach, articulated under Prime Minister Narendra Modi since 2014, balances deepened ties with the United States and Quad partners alongside continued relations with Russia and selective engagement with China, reflecting a shift from Cold War-era non-alignment to pragmatic convergence on issues like security and trade.[171][172] In the Indo-Pacific, the BJP administration revived the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017 alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia, elevating it from ministerial talks to leaders' summits by 2021 to counterbalance China's regional assertiveness through joint initiatives on maritime security, technology, and infrastructure.[173][174] During the COVID-19 pandemic, India's "Vaccine Maitri" initiative, launched on January 20, 2021, supplied over 200 million doses to more than 100 countries, enhancing soft power and diplomatic leverage in the Global South while underscoring India's role as a reliable vaccine producer.[175][176] Following the June 15, 2020, Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in 20 Indian soldier deaths, the government adopted a more assertive posture toward China, including accelerated border infrastructure development, increased military deployments along the Line of Actual Control, and bans on Chinese apps and investments to reduce economic dependencies.[177] Under the "Neighborhood First" policy, India advanced connectivity projects like the Chabahar Port in Iran, committing $500 million in 2016 for development to access Central Asia and Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan, while maintaining a hard line on cross-border terrorism through operations such as the September 2016 surgical strikes and February 2019 Balakot airstrikes in response to attacks from Pakistan-based groups.[178] (Note: Wikipedia cited only for strike date confirmation, cross-verified with primary reports.) India's G20 presidency from December 2022 to November 2023 further elevated its global stature, achieving unanimous adoption of the New Delhi Declaration and the inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member, outcomes that garnered international support for India's bid for a permanent UN Security Council seat, including endorsements from the United States.[179] These diplomatic successes positioned India as a bridge-builder between developed and developing nations, reinforcing strategic autonomy by advancing reforms without alienating key partners.[180]Organizational Structure
Party Hierarchy and Decision-Making
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) maintains a strictly hierarchical organizational framework, with the National President as the supreme executive authority responsible for overall direction and policy implementation. Jagat Prakash Nadda has held this position since January 20, 2020, following his unopposed election by the party's national executive, a body comprising around 200 members that convenes periodically to deliberate on strategic matters.[181][182] This structure ensures centralized control, enabling swift decision-making, while incorporating consultative mechanisms such as state-level executives and the Central Parliamentary Board, which finalizes candidate selections for elections after reviewing recommendations from regional units.[183] Key decision-making bodies include the Parliamentary Board, chaired by the National President, which holds veto power over electoral strategies and alliances, reflecting a top-down approach tempered by inputs from ideological mentors in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Many senior BJP leaders, including pracharaks deputed from the RSS, integrate the organization's cultural-nationalist ethos into party deliberations, influencing cadre deployment and policy priorities without formal veto authority.[184][185] This RSS linkage fosters a cadre-based system where loyalty to Hindutva principles guides promotions and assignments, though operational autonomy rests with elected party organs. To counter caste-based fragmentation, the BJP operates dedicated morcha wings for Scheduled Castes (SC Morcha), Scheduled Tribes (ST or Janajati Morcha), and Other Backward Classes (OBC Morcha), which focus on community-specific outreach, welfare advocacy, and leadership nurturing to integrate these groups into the party's broader nationalist framework.[186][187] These fronts organize targeted campaigns and reservations within party tickets, aiming to dilute opposition narratives on caste exclusivity. Complementing this, the party's digital membership drives, such as the 2019 campaign that reportedly enrolled over 180 million via mobile apps and missed calls, have expanded its base, with a 2024 initiative targeting an additional 100 million to reinforce grassroots loyalty and data-driven mobilization.[188][189]Affiliated Organizations and Grassroots Mobilization
The Bharatiya Janata Party derives significant grassroots strength from its synergy with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which operates over 57,000 shakhas—daily local assemblies for physical training, ideological discourse, and community bonding—as of 2023. These shakhas form the backbone of voter outreach, embedding cultural nationalist values that align with BJP objectives and enabling sustained cadre recruitment independent of electoral cycles. During campaigns, RSS volunteers, organized into small teams known as tolis, conduct door-to-door canvassing and awareness drives, as demonstrated in the February 2025 Delhi assembly elections where such efforts targeted over 1,000 booths to consolidate Hindu voter support amid urban challenges.[190] The Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), established in 1949 as the RSS's student affiliate, focuses on ideological training in universities through seminars, cultural events, and advocacy for nationalist curricula, producing a steady stream of BJP leaders including Union Ministers. ABVP's campus mobilization, evident in victories in student union polls at institutions like Delhi University in September 2025, channels youth energy into party-aligned activism, distinguishing it from rivals' less ideologically cohesive student groups.[191] Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (BJYM), the BJP's youth wing founded on October 7, 1978, builds cadres via training modules, cycle rallies, and issue-based drives, claiming membership exceeding 1 crore as the world's largest youth political outfit. In regions like Andhra Pradesh, BJYM units in 2025 emphasized local problem resolution and anti-drug campaigns, fostering loyalty among 18-35 demographics and amplifying BJP's volunteer deployment, which outpaced competitors in scale during 2024 Lok Sabha polls per organizational reports.[192][193][194] Seva Bharati, the service arm of the Sangh Parivar active since 1989, deploys volunteers for disaster relief—such as flood aid in Kerala in 2018 and COVID-19 support in 2020—enhancing BJP's soft power by associating the party with tangible aid in underserved areas, thereby reinforcing grassroots ties beyond electoral rhetoric. This network's non-partisan facade aids in penetrating diverse communities, contributing to higher volunteer retention compared to ad-hoc rival efforts.[194]Electoral Record and Regional Presence
Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha Performance
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has demonstrated significant growth in its Lok Sabha representation since its early years, transitioning from marginal presence to dominance. In the 1984 general election, the party secured only 2 seats out of 543 with a vote share of approximately 7.7%. [195] This marked a modest beginning following its formation in 1980 as a successor to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Subsequent elections showcased consistent expansion, particularly in the Hindi heartland states, with breakthroughs extending to western and southern regions through alliances and direct contests. By 2014, the BJP achieved a landmark victory with 282 seats and a 31.3% vote share, forming the government under Narendra Modi. This tally peaked at 303 seats in 2019 amid a 37.4% vote share, reflecting broadened national appeal. In 2024, despite winning 240 seats—short of a solo majority—the party's vote share remained robust at 36.6%, underscoring sustained voter base strength even as seat gains moderated due to regional opposition consolidations. [92] [6] [196]| Year | Seats Won | Vote Share (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 1984 | 2 | 7.7 |
| 1989 | 85 | 11.4 |
| 1991 | 120 | 20.1 |
| 1996 | 161 | 20.3 |
| 1998 | 182 | 25.6 |
| 1999 | 182 | 23.8 |
| 2004 | 138 | 22.2 |
| 2009 | 116 | 18.8 |
| 2014 | 282 | 31.3 |
| 2019 | 303 | 37.4 |
| 2024 | 240 | 36.6 |
State Assemblies and Chief Ministerial Roles
The Bharatiya Janata Party maintains chief ministers in 14 states and union territories as of October 2025, reflecting its expanded foothold in India's federal structure through targeted assembly performances and coalition management.[200] This includes direct majorities in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana, and Uttarakhand, alongside alliance-led administrations in Maharashtra and others.[201] Prominent among these is Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath, who assumed office on March 19, 2017, after the BJP secured 312 seats in the 403-member assembly, and retained power in 2022 with 255 seats.[202] His tenure has emphasized law-and-order reforms alongside economic incentives modeled on Gujarat's framework.[203] The party's state-level governance frequently replicates elements of the Gujarat model, which prioritizes ease of doing business, infrastructure incentives, and special economic zones to attract investments, resulting in Gujarat's GSDP growth consistently outperforming national averages at around 10-12% annually during BJP rule.[204] Chief Minister Bhupendra Patel, in office since September 2021, has continued these policies, focusing on manufacturing hubs and port-led development to sustain double-digit sectoral expansions in industries like textiles and chemicals.[201] Similar approaches in Madhya Pradesh under Mohan Yadav (since December 2023) and Uttarakhand under Pushkar Singh Dhami (since March 2021) have yielded comparable investment inflows, with annual investor summits generating commitments exceeding $10 billion in Madhya Pradesh alone by 2024.[201] In the 2024 assembly elections, the BJP achieved a standalone majority in Haryana with 48 seats in the 90-member house, enabling Nayab Singh Saini to continue as chief minister from his 2024 appointment, buoyed by rural outreach and anti-incumbency against the prior Congress regime.[113] In Maharashtra, the BJP-led Mahayuti alliance dominated with 233 seats (BJP securing 132), allowing Devendra Fadnavis to return as chief minister in December 2024, leveraging welfare schemes like monthly aid to women that consolidated urban and semi-urban support.[205] Contrasting this, the party underperformed in Jharkhand, capturing 21 seats against the JMM-led alliance's 56, attributable to strong tribal consolidation for incumbents amid localized issues like mining royalties and reservation demands.[206]| State/UT | Chief Minister | Tenure Start | Key Governance Features |
|---|---|---|---|
| Uttar Pradesh | Yogi Adityanath | March 2017 | Investor summits; infrastructure push (e.g., expressways) |
| Gujarat | Bhupendra Patel | September 2021 | Pro-business reforms; high GSDP via SEZs |
| Haryana | Nayab Singh Saini | March 2024 | Agricultural diversification; industrial corridors |
| Maharashtra | Devendra Fadnavis | December 2024 | Welfare alliances; urban development alliances |
Major Achievements and Impacts
Infrastructure and Economic Growth Metrics
Under the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government since 2014, India's national highway network expanded from 91,287 kilometers to 146,204 kilometers by 2024, representing a 60% increase and positioning India with the world's second-largest such network.[207] This growth was driven by accelerated construction rates, rising from 11.6 kilometers per day in 2014 to 34 kilometers per day, facilitated by initiatives like Bharatmala Pariyojana, which sanctioned over 810,000 kilometers of roads with 94% completion by mid-2024.[207] [208] The number of operational airports more than doubled from 74 in 2014 to 157 by 2024, enhancing connectivity to underserved regions through projects like the UDAN scheme, which operationalized new facilities and revived underutilized ones.[209] This expansion supported India's emergence as the third-largest domestic aviation market, with passenger traffic rising correspondingly amid privatizations and infrastructure upgrades at major hubs.[210]| Infrastructure Metric | 2014 | 2024 | Growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| National Highways (km) | 91,287 | 146,204 | +60% |
| Operational Airports | 74 | 157 | +112% |
