Hubbry Logo
Pan-European nationalismPan-European nationalismMain
Open search
Pan-European nationalism
Community hub
Pan-European nationalism
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Pan-European nationalism
Pan-European nationalism
Pan-European nationalism
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

European nationalism (sometimes called pan-European nationalism or Euro-nationalism) is a form of pan-nationalism based on a pan-European identity. It has been only a minor far-right tendency since the National Party of Europe disintegrated in the 1970s.

It is distinct from Pro-Europeanism and European Federalism in being a chiefly neo-fascist ideology, as opposed to support of the European Union and European integration.[1]

History

[edit]

The former British Union of Fascists leader, Oswald Mosley, led the Union Movement and advocated its "Europe a Nation" policy from 1948 to 1973. In 1950, Mosley co-founded the European Social Movement and collaborated with comparable groups on the Continent. The organisation was mostly defunct by 1957 and was succeeded by the National Party of Europe, which was formed in 1962 by Mosley and the leaders of the German nationalist Deutsche Reichspartei, the Italian Social Movement, Jeune Europe and the Mouvement d'Action Civique.[2] The movement remained active during the 1960s but was mostly disbanded in the 1970s.

Besides Oswald Mosley, Francis Parker Yockey was another major supporter of European transnationalism. Both Mosley and Yockey were influenced by the German philosopher Oswald Spengler but diverged both from him and each other on the issue of whether the Western civilization's collapse was inevitable or avoidable. Another major point of contention between Yockey and Mosley was their attitude towards the United States and the Soviet Union. Mosley was favoring the US as an ally against the project of the world communism, while Yockey favored the Soviet Union as an ally against the "Jewish-American hegemony". Initially Yockey and Mosley worked together, but after their split Yockey founded the European Liberation Front and denounced Mosley as an "American agent". Yockey elaborated that the aftermath of the Second World War saw Europe being divided and occupied by the "extra-European powers" — the United States and the Soviet Union, and that it would be impossible for Europe to liberate itself and reassert its sovereignty without acting in concert. However, Yockey saw the American occupation of Europe as more harmful and spiritually perverting the Europe, unlike the Soviets who mostly relied on crude force to establish their control, which Yockey perceived as less harmful and effective than spiritual perversion. Therefore, Yockey worked with the Arab nationalists and Soviets against the American hegemony.[3]

In 1949, Yockey published the Proclamation of London as the ELF manifesto, which stated "two great tasks" of the organization: "(1) the complete expulsion of everything alien from the soul and from the soil of Europe, the cleansing of the European soul of the dross of 19th century materialism and rationalism with its money-worship, liberal-democracy, social degeneration, parliamentarism, class-war, feminism, vertical nationalism, finance-capitalism, petty-statism, chauvinism, the Bolshevism of Moscow and Washington, the ethical syphilis of Hollywood, and the spiritual leprosy of New York; (2) the construction of the Imperium of Europe and the actualizing of the divinely-emanated European will to unlimited political Imperialism".[4]

1962 European Declaration

[edit]

In their "European Declaration" of 1 March 1962, the National Party of Europe called for the creation of a European nation-state through a common European government, an elected European parliament, the withdrawal of American and Soviet forces from Europe and the dissolution of the United Nations, which would be replaced by an international body led by the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe as three equals. The territory of the European state was to be that of all European nations outside the Soviet Union, including the British Isles, and their overseas possessions.[5]

Current situation

[edit]

Romanian-French writer Jean Parvulesco argued for a “great Eurasian pan-European empire” uniting “Western Europe and Eastern Europe, Russia and Greater Siberia, India and Japan”, against the United Kingdom and the United States.[6] He was one of the proponents of a Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axis to counter "Anglo-Saxon hegemony" since at least the 1960s.[7]

In 2014, Raphael Schlembach describes the existence of "a form of pan-European nationalism — a 'Europe for the Europeans' — that is based upon anti-Americanism and ethno-pluralism" within "some sections" of European neo-fascism.[8] European nationalist organisations continued to exist on a minor scale after the disintegration of the National Party of Europe in the 1970s, but no group advocates a "European nation state".[citation needed]

According to scholars, former European nationalist groups now propose a European ethnic federalism based on an ideology of "European culturalism"[9] or, according to Dimitri Almeida, they underwent a "Eurosceptic turn", the ideology of European nationalism being largely replaced by hard Euroscepticism by the 2010s.[10]

European Parliament

[edit]

Identity and Democracy grouping was a far-right[11][12][13] political group of the European Parliament launched on 13 June 2019 for the Ninth European Parliament. It was composed of nationalist, right-wing populist and eurosceptic national parties from nine European nations. It was the successor to the Europe of Nations and Freedom group, which was formed during the Eighth European Parliament. Its members were the Freedom Party of Austria, Flemish Interest (Belgium), Freedom and Direct Democracy (Czechia), the Danish People's Party, the Conservative People's Party of Estonia, the Finns Party, National Rally (France), Lega Nord (Italy) and the Party for Freedom (Netherlands). Other nationalist parties included the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which also included nationalist, right-wing populist and eurosceptic national parties from 12 countries.

List of European nationalist organisations

[edit]

Identitarian Movement · Jeune Europe (Belgium) · Comité de liaison des européens révolutionnaires (France) · Parti Communautaire National-Européen (Belgium) · Nouvelle Droite (France) · Réseau Radical · Bloc Identitaire · Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen (France) · Imperium Europa (Malta) · le parti des européens (France) · Reconquista Europa (Ukraine)

Arendt's warning

[edit]

Hannah Arendt warned in 1954 that a "pan-European nationalism" might arise from the cultivation of anti-American sentiment in Europe.[14] Her warning has been deemed obsolete by the 1990s:[citation needed]

  • Gerard Delanty argued, "Europe could never constitute a coherent identity because there is 'no external opposition' to it" (a role foreseen by Arendt as to be taken by America).
  • In the opinion of the scholar Anton Speekenbrink in 2014, nationalism was replaced by a "postmodern world order" in the postwar period ("Nationalism was dead, but it was not replaced by pan-European nationalism or by a pan-European identity"). It instead invoked a "European idea", which was said to be transformed into an "idea of diversity of identity" combined with a "commonality of values".[15]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Pan-European nationalism

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Pan-European nationalism is a political that seeks to foster a unified continental identity rooted in the shared ethnic, cultural, and historical heritage of Europe's , promoting solidarity among nations to preserve and defend this civilization against perceived threats such as mass , , and globalist institutions that erode . Emerging as a response to post-World War II fragmentation and later to the European Union's supranational model, it contrasts with both narrow ethno-nationalism and liberal by envisioning " as a " while respecting subsidiary national distinctions. The ideology traces its modern origins to figures like , the former leader, who after 1945 advocated for a federated Europe transcending individual states to counter Soviet and American influences, culminating in the 1962 formation of the . Intellectual development came through the French , led by thinkers such as , which emphasized —a doctrine of distinct cultural homelands—and a pan-European resistance to "universalism" and demographic shifts, influencing broader identitarian currents. These ideas gained traction amid the 2015 migration crisis, manifesting in activist groups like Generation Identity, which conducted high-profile actions such as maritime patrols against migrant smuggling to highlight civilizational preservation. In contemporary politics, pan-European nationalism has achieved notable coordination among nationalist parties, exemplified by the group in the , which by 2019 included 73 members from parties opposing EU centralization and prioritizing border security. Leaders like , , and have invoked shared European defenses against Islamization and elite-driven policies, contributing to electoral gains in 2024 that shifted the Parliament rightward. Controversies arise from its critics' associations with , yet proponents argue it represents a pragmatic realism grounded in demographic data—such as Europe's fertility rates below replacement levels and net migration altering population compositions—urging proactive cultural defense over passive integration. This framework prioritizes causal factors like unchecked borders and ideological as drivers of identity dilution, fostering cross-border alliances without subsuming national .

Definition and Principles

Core Concept and Identity Basis

Pan-European nationalism posits Europe as a cohesive geopolitical and civilizational entity, "," requiring supranational unity in defense, , and to achieve independent of extra-European powers. This core concept emerged post-World War II as a response to and bipolar superpower dominance, advocating transcendence of nation-state rivalries for collective strength while maintaining internal cultural distinctions. The 1962 European Declaration, issued by the in on March 1, outlined ten principles, including the formation of a common European government, parliament, and currency to enable unified action against and American influence, with explicit preservation of national languages and traditions as subordinate to continental imperatives. The identity basis derives from a shared European heritage, encompassing Indo-European linguistic roots, Greco-Roman philosophical and legal foundations, Christian moral and institutional frameworks, and subsequent intellectual developments like the and scientific revolutions, which proponents view as uniquely continental achievements distinguishing from other world regions. This civilizational continuum, argued in his post-1945 formulations, fosters a fraternal "brotherhood of nations" capable of as a third global force, predicated on historical interdependence evidenced by centuries of migration, , and warfare binding European peoples. Empirical underpinnings include genetic clustering among European populations, reflecting millennia of endogamous intermixing from ancient migrations, which ideologues interpret as substantiating ethnic unity against external demographic pressures. Jean-François , a key theorist, synthesized this into "European national communism," emphasizing an from the Atlantic to the Urals, grounded in revolutionary solidarity against both Atlanticist and Soviet , with identity anchored in Europe's strategic and historical resilience. Unlike cosmopolitan universalism, this framework prioritizes causal preservation of European particularism—rooted in empirical patterns of and resistance to assimilation—over multicultural dilution, viewing unity as a defensive imperative for survival amid global power asymmetries. Pan-European distinguishes itself from traditional nation-state by transcending the boundaries of individual countries, positing as a singular civilizational entity requiring collective defense rather than prioritizing the discrete sovereignty of states like or . Whereas traditional , as seen in 19th-century movements such as Italian Risorgimento or German unification under Bismarck in 1871, focused on consolidating ethnic or linguistic groups within fixed territorial limits, pan-European variants emphasize supranational solidarity against perceived existential threats like non-European and cultural dilution. This shift reflects a hierarchical view where national identities are subsumed under a broader European one, critiquing parochial nationalisms as insufficient for contemporary geopolitical challenges. In opposition to European federalism, which advocates institutional integration through bodies like the —established by the in 1992 and emphasizing , , and —pan-European nationalism rejects supranational bureaucracy as a vehicle for liberal that erodes ethnic homogeneity. , exemplified by proposals for a from figures like in his 1946 Zurich speech, seeks to pool for prosperity and peace, often accommodating diverse identities within a post-national framework. Pan-European nationalism, conversely, demands a fortress-like prioritizing ' preservation over open borders or global trade liberalization, viewing EU policies on migration—such as the 2015-2016 crisis that saw over 1 million arrivals—as antithetical to civilizational survival. Unlike interwar , which fused with expansionist under a single dominant state—Italian Fascism's invasion of in 1935 or Nazi Germany's doctrine targeting Slavic territories—pan-European nationalism eschews hierarchical domination by any one nation, advocating instead for ethno-pluralist alliances where European states maintain autonomy while coordinating against common foes. Post-World War II iterations, influenced by thinkers like those in the , explicitly distance from biological racism and totalitarian centralization, framing unity as defensive rather than aggressive conquest. This contrasts with fascism's revolutionary vanguardism, positioning pan-Europeanism as a pragmatic identitarian response to rather than a mythic rebirth of empire. Pan-European nationalism stands in direct antagonism to , which promotes universal and borderless solidarity transcending ethnic or civilizational lines, as articulated in Kant's 1795 essay Perpetual Peace envisioning a of republics. , underpinning institutions like the founded in 1945, prioritizes individual global citizenship over collective particularism, often endorsing as ethical progress. In contrast, pan-European nationalism asserts the primacy of Europe's Indo-European heritage and demographic continuity, rejecting cosmopolitan erosion of distinctions as naive or subversive, and arguing that loyalty to "humanity" dilutes effective resistance to and demographic shifts.

Historical Development

Precursors in European Thought

The , established under and crowned Holy Roman Emperor in 800 AD, represented an early attempt at political unification across much of , encompassing territories from the to the and fostering a shared Christian cultural framework that delineated from external threats like Islamic expansion. This empire's administrative reforms, including standardized coinage, legal codes, and revival of Latin learning during the , promoted a rudimentary supranational identity rooted in Frankish overlordship and ecclesiastical authority, influencing later conceptions of as a singular civilizational space. In the Enlightenment era, rationalist thinkers advanced structured proposals for perpetual peace through European confederation, emphasizing institutional mechanisms over dynastic conflicts. Charles-Irénée Castel, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, outlined in his 1713 Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe a voluntary alliance of sovereign states bound by a permanent European diet in a neutral city like Utrecht, where disputes would be arbitrated collectively, with collective defense against non-members and renunciation of conquests to prevent recurring wars like the ongoing War of the Spanish Succession. Building on this, Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch advocated a "pacific federation" of republican states—beginning regionally in Europe—as a pathway to cosmopolitan right, arguing that representative governments aligned with public reason would inherently avoid aggressive wars, with trade interdependence reinforcing stability. Nineteenth-century Romantic and republican visions further popularized the notion of Europe as a federated transcending national boundaries, driven by post-Napoleonic aspirations for continental harmony. , addressing the 1849 International Peace Congress in , proclaimed a future "United States of Europe" as the embodiment of universal peace, where nations would unite under a common republican banner, arbitrated by a , to supplant fratricidal conflicts with fraternal solidarity and collective moral authority. These ideas, while primarily federalist and pacifist, provided intellectual scaffolding for later pan-European conceptions by framing the continent as a potential entity capable of against external powers, though they prioritized institutional harmony over ethnic homogenization.

Post-World War II Formation

Following the devastation of , which discredited ethno-nationalism through its association with Axis aggression and defeat, a fringe strand of pan-European nationalism emerged among former fascists and right-wing dissidents seeking to reframe continental unity as a power bloc amid the Cold War's dominance. This shift prioritized a culturally homogeneous "" over fragmented nation-states deemed too weak for geopolitical rivalry with the and . A pivotal early articulation came from , the pre-war leader, who founded the in 1948 and championed its "" policy. Mosley envisioned a unitary European state stretching from to the Urals, self-sufficient in resources and defense, to preserve European racial and civilizational identity against perceived threats from American materialism and Soviet communism. His emphasized transcending intra-European conflicts via a common , drawing on wartime experiences of Allied disunity while explicitly rejecting liberal supranationalism. Parallel developments occurred on the continent, where neo-fascist networks coalesced around similar supranational nationalist visions. In 1951, the (ESM) was established at a in , , uniting around 50 delegates from ex-fascist groups in , , , and elsewhere to advocate a politically integrated grounded in shared heritage rather than mere economic ties. The ESM, led by figures like German neo-Nazi Karl-Heinz Priester, promoted anti-Atlanticist solidarity and cultural preservation, influencing later alliances despite internal divisions over inclusion of Britain or . In , the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) adopted the "Europa Nazione" slogan by the mid-1950s, framing as a singular nation-state to counter decolonization's dilution of Western power and NATO's subordination. These initiatives remained marginal, with memberships numbering in the low thousands and subject to bans or surveillance in countries like and due to their ties to defeated regimes. Nonetheless, they laid the ideological groundwork for pan-European nationalism by reorienting pre-war völkisch and fascist toward a defensive continental identity, distinct from the emerging European Coal and Steel Community's focus on Franco-German and .

The 1962 European Declaration and Early Organizations

The Venice Conference of March 1962, convened by Belgian activist Jean Thiriart's Mouvement d'Action Civique and Jeune Europe, brought together representatives from various European nationalist groups to advocate for continental political unity. Participants included of the UK's , delegates from Italy's (MSI), Germany's (DRP), and figures like , reflecting a of far-right elements seeking to transcend national divisions in favor of a federated European state. The conference produced the European Declaration, released on March 1, 1962, which proclaimed "" as an immediate reality and outlined ten core principles for achieving it. The declaration's aims emphasized a centralized European authority responsible for , defense, and economic coordination to counter both American and Soviet influence, while rejecting supra-national bodies like the as insufficiently sovereign. Specific provisions called for Europe's borders to extend from Reykjavik to , incorporating Britain and potentially ; the establishment of a single ; opposition to racial intermixing through rejection of multi-racial in former colonies; and the promotion of a common European overriding national passports. Signatories committed to forming a supranational political apparatus, with serving as a foundational text for pan-European nationalists who viewed national fragmentation as a exploited by superpowers. This event catalyzed the creation of early organizational structures, most notably the (NPE), launched shortly after as an umbrella alliance coordinating nationalist parties across borders. The NPE, involving Mosley's , Thiriart's Jeune Europe (formalized in 1963), the MSI, and German and French counterparts, aimed to field unified electoral campaigns and propagate "" through joint manifestos and propaganda. Thiriart's Jeune Europe, active from 1962 in , the Netherlands, , and beyond, functioned as a promoting federalist via publications like Nouvelle Europe and cross-border . These groups, though limited in mass appeal due to their associations with pre-war , marked the initial institutionalization of pan-European as a distinct ideological current, prioritizing geopolitical self-assertion over ethnic particularism. Internal divisions over tactics and leadership soon hampered longevity, with the NPE dissolving by the late 1960s amid national rivalries.

Ideological Foundations

Cultural and Civilizational Unity

Pan-European nationalists maintain that Europe's diverse nations are unified by a shared civilizational heritage originating in the of and , which provided foundational contributions in , , , and that permeated continental development over millennia. This legacy, spanning approximately 3,000 years, is cited as evidence of a continuous of intellectual and aesthetic achievement, from Homeric epics and Platonic inquiry to Roman engineering and imperial administration, which proponents argue fostered a collective European genius superior in its innovative output compared to contemporaneous non-European societies. The 1962 European Declaration, issued at the Conference by figures including and representatives from nascent pan-European groups, explicitly invoked this heritage to justify supranational unity, declaring participants "conscious of a tradition which stretches from the birth of our civilisation to the present day" and emphasizing a "communion of blood and spirit" that transcends while necessitating defense against "alien values" that threaten continental cohesion. , in advancing his "" vision from onward, framed this cultural bond as essential for resisting division by external powers, portraying Europe as a singular entity with interdependent economic, defensive, and spiritual interests rooted in historical solidarity rather than mere geographic proximity. Subsequent thinkers within the tradition, such as of the , extend this analysis by rooting European identity in Indo-European ethnolinguistic origins and pre-Christian pagan archetypes, arguing that true civilizational vitality arises from organic, differential cultural forms—preserving national particularities within a macro-European framework—rather than imposed , which they contend erodes distinct ethno-cultural morphologies shaped by millennia of adaptation. De Benoist critiques egalitarian ideologies for ignoring these differential realities, positing instead a identity where Europe's shared roots in heroic myths, stratified social orders, and territorial consciousness enable resistance to globalization's homogenizing effects. Guillaume Faye's archeofuturist paradigm complements this by advocating a synthesis of archaic European values—, , and rejection of egalitarian —with post-catastrophic technological convergence, warning that without reclaiming these civilizational archetypes, Europe faces demographic and cultural collapse under and ideological decay. Faye, drawing on empirical trends in fertility rates and identity erosion documented in European demographics since the , urges a radical break from modernity's "decadent" phase to restore a unified continental ethos capable of geopolitical . Collectively, these arguments prioritize causal preservation of historical patterns—evident in linguistic Indo-European convergence (covering 95% of European languages) and architectural motifs from Gothic cathedrals to neoclassical revivals—over multicultural narratives, which are dismissed as empirically unsubstantiated impositions that ignore Europe's proven trajectory of internal cultural synthesis amid external pressures.

Geopolitical and Security Imperatives

Proponents of pan-European nationalism identify mass immigration as a primary security threat, framing it as a form of demographic colonization that undermines native European populations and fosters parallel societies prone to . This perspective gained urgency following the , during which over 1.8 million asylum seekers, predominantly from Muslim-majority countries in the and , entered the , leading to heightened incidences of and social unrest. Advocates such as those in the assert that such inflows, if unchecked, result in irreversible cultural dilution and increased vulnerability to Islamist extremism, evidenced by attacks like the November 2015 Paris bombings that claimed 130 lives, many linked to networks exploiting migration routes. They prescribe pan-European cooperation on strict border controls, deportation policies, and "remigration" initiatives to repatriate non-assimilated populations, viewing these as essential to preserving ethnopluralist homogeneity across nations. Geopolitically, pan-European nationalists critique reliance on the Organization (NATO) as subordinating European sovereignty to U.S. interests, particularly amid doubts over American commitment post-2022 , which exposed Europe's energy vulnerabilities after the cutoff of Russian gas supplies that previously accounted for 40% of EU imports. Thinkers like , in works such as Archeofuturism (1999), envision a fortified "Eurosiberian" continental bloc—encompassing and parts of —to achieve , deterring threats from a multipolar world including Chinese economic penetration and Islamic expansionism. This necessitates a confederated European defense force, decoupled from supranational EU structures, to counter , cyber threats, and territorial encroachments without diluting national identities. Security imperatives also extend to countering internal ideological subversion, where is seen as eroding civilizational cohesion, facilitating jihadist networks that have conducted over 30 major attacks in since 2001, killing more than 500. and the tradition emphasize de-globalization to reclaim geopolitical agency, arguing that 's post-Cold War pacifism has invited predatory influences from both Atlanticist hegemony and Eurasian autocracies. Empirical data on rising correlated with migrant demographics—such as Germany's 2023 statistics showing non-citizens committing 41% of offenses despite comprising 15% of the population—bolster calls for identity-based solidarity over liberal universalism. Ultimately, these imperatives prioritize causal preservation of European peoples through unified yet decentralized action, rejecting federalist integration as a vector for accelerated decline.

Economic and Sovereignty Aspects

Pan-European nationalists posit that true economic requires a continental-scale to insulate from dependence on extra-European powers such as the and , arguing that fragmented national economies render individual states vulnerable to external manipulation through trade imbalances and resource scarcity. , a key proponent, asserted in that "economic allows a to be independent," maintaining that only a unified —from to potentially —could harness sufficient resources, including Siberian raw materials, to achieve self-sufficiency and counterbalance global hegemons. This vision rejects both unbridled free-market , which erodes local industries, and supranational structures like the [European Union](/page/European Union) that impose uniform policies diluting national control over fiscal and trade decisions. In practice, such economic frameworks draw from third-position ideologies, favoring corporatist or dirigiste models where state-guided coordination prioritizes intra-European production chains, protective tariffs on non-European imports, and investment in strategic sectors like and to foster resilience against sanctions or supply disruptions. , advocating "" from 1947 onward, extended pre-war systems into a pan-European , emphasizing closed economic circuits to prevent welfare systems from subsidizing mass and external labor . These approaches aim to reclaim productive capacity lost to , with proponents citing Europe's post-2008 debt crises and vulnerabilities—exacerbated by reliance on Russian gas until 2022 and Chinese —as empirical validation for prioritizing autarkic integration over liberalized markets. On sovereignty, pan-European nationalism seeks a confederative pooling of competencies in defense, , and to elevate the as a third geopolitical pole, while preserving national vetoes on cultural and internal affairs to avoid federal overreach. Thiriart contended that "there are no really independent small nations" and "only the big ones are really free," advocating a "Euro-Soviet " or vast continental entity to secure against atomic-era threats and Atlanticist alliances like , which he viewed as subordinating European interests to American hegemony. This contrasts with intergovernmental critiques of the , where sovereignty erosion stems from unelected bureaucracies; instead, nationalists propose opt-in mechanisms for and , as evidenced by informal alliances like the Party of the European Right in the , to enable autonomous responses to migration pressures and without ceding legislative primacy to nations. Empirical support includes Europe's fragmented defense spending—averaging 1.5% of GDP pre-2022 Ukraine conflict, below —highlighting how disunity invites exploitation by rivals.

Key Figures and Movements

Influential Thinkers

Jean-François Thiriart (1922–1992), a Belgian political theorist, emerged as a central figure in post-World War II pan-European nationalism by advocating a unitary European state as a sovereign superpower rivaling the United States and the Soviet Union. Initially involved in leftist activism, Thiriart shifted toward nationalism during the 1950s, founding the Jeune Europe organization in 1962 to promote a "national-communist" synthesis that prioritized European federalism under a strong executive authority, encompassing territories from Brest to Vladivostok. His vision rejected both Atlanticist integration and Soviet domination, emphasizing military self-sufficiency and cultural homogeneity as prerequisites for geopolitical independence; by 1968, he had outlined this in publications like L'Europe: un État fédéral de Brest à Vladivostok. Thiriart's ideas influenced later Eurasianist and identitarian currents, though his movement waned amid internal divisions and legal challenges in the late 1960s. Oswald Mosley (1896–1980), British politician and founder of the , redefined his nationalism after 1945 to champion "," positing a racially and culturally unified European confederation as a "third force" insulated from Anglo-American and Soviet . In his 1947 book The Alternative, Mosley argued that national sovereignties must yield to continental solidarity for economic vitality and defense, proposing a common market, currency, and army while preserving local autonomies. He operationalized this through the , launched in 1947 at a congress in , , and the in 1962, which sought to coordinate far-right parties across the continent; attendance at early gatherings numbered in the hundreds, reflecting limited but persistent appeal among nationalists. Mosley's framework critiqued the emerging as insufficiently sovereign and overly liberal, influencing British Euroskepticism and continental alliances. Francis Parker Yockey (1917–1960), an American attorney and esoteric thinker, provided an ideological foundation for pan-European nationalism in Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics (1948), a 600-page manifesto pseudonymously authored as Ulick Varange and inspired by Oswald Spengler's cyclical view of civilizations. Yockey depicted Europe as a declining "High Culture" threatened by liberalism, rationalism, and what he termed "the 19th-century ideology" of Jewish influence, prescribing an authoritarian imperium uniting the continent's peoples in spiritual and racial renewal to extend Western destiny. Circulated underground with print runs exceeding 10,000 by the 1950s via networks like Willis Carto's Liberty Lobby, the text shaped postwar far-right intellectuals by framing pan-Europeanism as a metaphysical imperative rather than mere pragmatism; Yockey's covert activities, including advising nationalist groups in Europe, underscored his commitment until his 1960 suicide in FBI custody amid espionage suspicions. These thinkers, operating amid constraints, prioritized Europe's civilizational self-assertion over supranational bureaucracy, their works cited in subsequent manifestos by groups like the , though mainstream dismissal as extremist limited institutional impact. Their emphasis on anti-globalism and cultural preservation prefigured debates in 21st-century identitarian circles, where Thiriart's , Mosley's organizational efforts, and Yockey's intersect with critiques of EU .

Major Organizations and Alliances

The (APF), founded on February 4, 2015, in , serves as a pan-European political alliance uniting nationalist parties and movements from across the to promote cooperation among sovereign nation-states while opposing supranational integration and mass . Its platform emphasizes a confederated addressing shared challenges like demographic shifts and cultural preservation through voluntary interstate collaboration, rather than centralized authority. Member organizations include parties such as Spain's National Democracy and Greece's Golden Dawn, reflecting a focus on ethno-cultural identity and national . In the European Parliament, the Patriots for Europe group, established in July 2024 following the elections, emerged as the third-largest political formation, comprising 84 members from 12 countries, including Hungary's , France's affiliates, and Austria's Freedom Party. This alliance prioritizes national sovereignty, repatriation of powers from institutions, and resistance to globalist policies, positioning itself as a defender of European nations' independence within a looser framework. It absorbed elements of the prior (ID) group, which operated from June 2019 to 2024 with up to 73 seats, advocating similar priorities like strict border controls and opposition to . Earlier efforts include the (AENM), formed on October 24, 2009, in , which coordinated ultranationalist parties such as Sweden's National Democrats and Germany's NPD to foster cross-border solidarity against perceived threats to European heritage, though its activities waned after 2018. These organizations collectively represent attempts to build transnational networks grounded in shared civilizational defense, distinct from federalist visions, often facing scrutiny from authorities over ideological alignment with foundational values.

Political Manifestations

National-Level Expressions

In various European countries, pan-European nationalism at the national level emphasizes the defense of distinct national identities as integral components of a broader European civilizational heritage, often framed as opposition to supranational , mass , and cultural dilution. This approach advocates for among sovereign states to preserve shared roots, demographic continuity, and geopolitical autonomy, rather than dissolving nations into a homogenized entity. Proponents argue that national enables authentic , as evidenced by rhetorical appeals to historical continuity from and through . Hungary: The party, under since 2010, exemplifies this by positioning as a vanguard for European self-preservation. During the 2015 , constructed fences and rejected quotas for over 1.3 million arrivals, citing threats to national and continental demographics; Orbán declared this action safeguarded "Europe's s" and against "replacement" by non-European populations. In a speech, Orbán asserted that could only be saved by reverting to its "real values: its ," framing Hungarian policies like family incentives (e.g., tax exemptions for mothers of four children since ) as models for continental revival. secured 54% of the vote in the 2022 national elections, enabling constitutional reforms prioritizing national over integration. Italy: Giorgia Meloni's (Fratelli d'Italia), in power since October 2022, promotes a "Eurorealist" stance that reconciles national primacy with selective European alliances. Meloni has critiqued bureaucracy while advocating cooperation among "sovereign nations" to counter external threats, as in her 2023 migration where hosted deals with and to curb Mediterranean crossings (reducing arrivals by 60% in 2023 compared to 2022). The party's platform envisions as a defending , reflected in policies restoring national control over ports and rejecting "green madness" mandates that undermine sovereignty. won 26% in the 2022 elections, forming a that has prioritized Italian identity rooted in Roman and Christian legacies. France: The Rassemblement National (RN), led by and , integrates pan-European rhetoric by portraying French sovereignty as essential to resisting globalist erosion of Occidental civilization. RN policies target "" of non-assimilated immigrants, arguing that unchecked inflows (e.g., 300,000+ net migrants annually in recent years) threaten both national and European vitality; Bardella has called for alliances of "free nations" to reform the into a looser pact. In the 2024 elections, RN captured 31.4% of the French vote, advocating "" if federalism persists, while emphasizing France's role in a " of homelands." Germany: The (AfD), founded in 2013, champions "Dexit" and cultural preservation, viewing national as the bulwark for Western-European identity against and EU centralization. AfD's program stresses protecting "our homeland and Europe" through strict border controls and opposition to the Eurozone's fiscal transfers, which it claims exacerbate demographic decline (Germany's fertility rate at 1.5 in 2023). The party achieved 15.9% in the 2024 EU elections, strongest in eastern states like (32.8%), where it mobilizes voters on and energy post-Russia sanctions. AfD co-founded the 2024 Europe of Sovereign Nations parliamentary group, underscoring national expressions feeding into pan-European coordination. These manifestations often intersect with the Identitarian movement's national chapters, such as Génération Identitaire in France (dissolved in 2021 but influential) and Germany's Identitäre Bewegung, which propagate "ethnopluralism"—preserving distinct peoples within a fortified European remit—through grassroots actions like anti-migrant patrols and cultural festivals. Such efforts have correlated with rising support amid crises, though mainstream sources frequently label them extremist without addressing underlying causal factors like fertility declines (EU average 1.5 in 2023) and integration failures.

European Parliament Representation

In the 2024 European Parliament elections, nationalist parties advocating elements of pan-European nationalism—emphasizing the defense of shared European civilizational identity, strict border controls, and resistance to supranational —gained significant representation, collectively holding over 180 seats across major groups. These MEPs prioritize among nations to counter mass , cultural dilution, and external geopolitical pressures, framing as a unified cultural entity rather than a centralized . The Patriots for Europe group, established on July 8, 2024, emerged as the third-largest parliamentary force with 84 MEPs from 12 member states, including 31 from France's , 11 from Hungary's , and representatives from Austria's Freedom Party and the Netherlands' . This alliance promotes the repatriation of competences to national levels, opposes EU-wide migration redistribution, and calls for prioritizing "European peoples" in policy-making, reflecting a coordinated nationalist stance on preserving continental demographic and cultural integrity. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, with 78 MEPs post-elections, includes Italy's (24 seats under Prime Minister ), Poland's party, and , advocating an "Eurorealist" reform agenda that seeks to limit EU overreach while fostering intergovernmental collaboration on and economic . ECR MEPs have influenced debates on and migration, voting against the EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum in April 2024 to uphold national border controls. A smaller but ideologically aligned contingent operates within the Europe of Sovereign Nations group, formed in July 2024 with 25 MEPs from eight states, prominently featuring Germany's (15 seats). This group stresses unyielding national sovereignty and opposes integration, yet aligns with broader nationalist efforts to protect European heritage against globalist policies, as seen in joint criticisms of and support for stricter external borders. These groups have demonstrated pan-European nationalist coordination by uniting against the EU's 2024 migration framework, which they argue undermines national , and by advancing resolutions to reinforce external frontiers and cultural preservation, amassing influence in committees on and . Despite internal divergences—such as varying stances on —their shared emphasis on European identity as a bulwark against non-European migration and ideological threats has solidified a de facto transnational bloc.

Transnational Cooperation Efforts

Transnational cooperation among pan-European nationalists has primarily manifested through coordinated parliamentary groupings in the European Parliament and informal summits of party leaders. The Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF) group, established in 2015, united nationalist parties such as France's National Rally (then Front National), Italy's Lega, and the Netherlands' Party for Freedom, emphasizing opposition to EU federalism and mass immigration while advocating for repatriation policies and national veto rights. This was succeeded by the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, launched on June 13, 2019, which expanded to include Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Austria's Freedom Party (FPÖ), with 73 members initially focused on a "Europe of cooperation" that prioritizes sovereign nations over centralized EU authority. Following the 2024 European Parliament elections, ID fragmented due to internal divisions, including the expulsion of AfD over perceived extremism, leading to the formation of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group on June 30, 2024, which by July 8 had 84-86 members from 12 countries, incorporating National Rally, Hungary's Fidesz, Austria's FPÖ, and Czechia’s ANO, positioning it as the third-largest bloc committed to dismantling supranational structures and enforcing strict border controls. Beyond parliamentary alliances, nationalist leaders have pursued ad hoc summits to align strategies on shared threats like irregular migration and EU overreach. In July 2021, Hungarian Prime Minister , , , and Poland's met to forge a pact influencing EU policy toward greater national , culminating in vows for coordinated voting in the . A December 2021 Warsaw summit reinforced commitments to joint positions on , though full merger eluded them due to geopolitical divergences, such as attitudes toward . In January 2022, a gathering produced a joint declaration by over a dozen parties, including Vox and Lega, announcing a "grand alliance" to defend European identity against and fiscal transfers. These efforts persisted into 2025, with a February 8 Patriots for Europe rally in drawing Orbán, Le Pen, and Salvini to hail aligned victories and pledge unified resistance to EU migration pacts. Such collaborations have yielded tactical gains, including amplified opposition to the EU's New Pact on Migration and Asylum, but face persistent hurdles from ideological fractures—evident in PfE's exclusion of more Russia-sympathetic elements—and national priorities that limit supranational loyalty. Despite these, the groups' statutes and declarations consistently prioritize empirical , citing over 1 million irregular entries in 2023 as justification for over integration.

Achievements and Impacts

Policy and Electoral Successes

Pan-European nationalist parties have achieved notable electoral gains at national levels, enabling governments or influential coalitions that prioritize national sovereignty and cultural preservation. In , Giorgia Meloni's secured 26% of the vote in the September 2022 general election, forming a with Lega and Forza Italia, marking the first right-wing administration since . In , Viktor Orbán's party won a with 54% in the April 2022 parliamentary elections, extending its rule and implementing policies resistant to EU migration mandates. Similar advances occurred in , where the gained 20.5% in the 2022 election, supporting a center-right , and in , where the Freedom Party (FPÖ) obtained 29% in the September 2024 parliamentary vote, though it failed to form a . At the European Parliament level, these parties consolidated influence through transnational alliances post-2024 elections. The Patriots for Europe group, comprising parties like France's National Rally, Hungary's Fidesz, and Italy's Lega, emerged as the third-largest bloc with 86 seats out of 720, facilitating coordinated opposition to federalist policies. The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, including Meloni's Brothers of Italy and Poland's Law and Justice, held around 78 seats, contributing to a rightward shift where nationalist factions collectively approached 200 seats, amplifying demands for reformed EU structures favoring sovereign cooperation. Policy implementations reflect shared priorities, particularly in curbing irregular migration through border security and external partnerships. In , Meloni's administration negotiated agreements with and , resulting in a 60% reduction in irregular sea arrivals from 2023 to 2024, dropping to a three-year low. Hungary's 2015 with and deterred crossings, reducing attempts from over 411,000 in 2015 to negligible levels, sustaining low inflows despite regional pressures. In , policies influenced by the —such as asset confiscation from asylum seekers and "ghetto" integration plans—hardened under successive governments, leading to asylum approval rates below 30% and positioning among Europe's strictest regimes. These measures, echoed across nations via alliances like the , have pressured EU-wide reforms, including resistance to mandatory relocation quotas.

Contributions to Cultural Preservation

Pan-European nationalists have advanced cultural preservation by developing ideological frameworks that prioritize the maintenance of Europe's ethno-cultural diversity over supranational homogenization. Through the , thinkers like have articulated , advocating for the mutual respect and bordered separation of distinct cultural identities to safeguard against erosion from and demographic shifts. This approach emphasizes reviving Indo-European heritage, including pagan traditions and regional , as foundational to European identity, influencing publications and think tanks like since the 1960s. Grassroots movements with pan-European orientations, such as Identitarianism, contribute practically by organizing youth-oriented events and media campaigns that highlight historical narratives of European civilization's defense. These efforts frame cultural continuity as requiring active resistance to , invoking ancestral examples of protecting heritage against external threats. Proponents argue such initiatives foster renewed engagement with native languages, arts, and customs, countering perceived institutional neglect in mainstream academia and media, where left-leaning biases often downplay ethnic-specific preservation. These contributions extend to critiquing EU policies that prioritize over heritage protection, promoting instead a confederated of sovereign nations preserving local traditions. While critics from progressive outlets label these as exclusionary, empirical trends like rising participation in folk festivals and heritage societies in correlate with nationalist resurgence, suggesting causal links to heightened cultural awareness amid migration pressures since the .

Geopolitical Influences

Pan-European nationalism has shaped European geopolitical responses to migration crises stemming from regional instabilities, such as the 2011 Libyan civil war and subsequent North African turmoil, by amplifying demands for fortified external borders and repatriation mechanisms over open internal mobility. Nationalist-led governments, including under since 2022, have pursued offshore processing agreements with countries like and , reducing Mediterranean crossings by over 60% in 2023 compared to peak years, and influencing the 's 2024 Migration and Asylum Pact to incorporate mandatory solidarity in returns and screening. This approach reflects a causal prioritization of demographic preservation amid empirically linked surges in arrivals—over 1 million in 2015 alone—over supranational redistribution, compelling mainstream EU institutions to adopt hybrid enforcement models previously dismissed as exclusionary. Regarding great-power competition, adherents of pan-European nationalism often advocate Atlanticist alignments to safeguard continental interests against Russian revanchism, with surveys across nine states in 2022 showing stronger European identity correlating positively with preferences for U.S. partnership and reinforcement, mediated by perceived ideological affinity. Meloni's , for example, committed €1 billion in military aid to by mid-2024 and hosted summits emphasizing transatlantic unity, countering more accommodationist voices like Viktor Orbán's , which delayed sanctions on in 2022 over concerns. These divergences have moderated , fostering debates on —evident in accelerated LNG diversification reducing Russian gas imports from 40% to under 10% by 2024—while highlighting nationalists' role in injecting realist caution against overextension in proxy conflicts. The movement's transnational networks, such as the group in the , have further impacted stances on Indo-Pacific tensions by critiquing uncritical deference to Chinese infrastructure investments, contributing to the 2023 de-risking that screened over €18 billion in deals for security risks. This reflects a broader geopolitical reorientation towards civilizational-scale threat assessment, prioritizing European technological sovereignty—e.g., via the Chips Act's €43 billion allocation—over globalist interdependence, with empirical backing from heightened cases tied to non-European actors.

Criticisms and Debates

Charges of Extremism and Exclusion

Critics, including European security agencies, have accused pan-European nationalist groups such as the Identitarian movement of promoting extremism through ethno-nationalist ideologies that prioritize a homogeneous European cultural identity over multicultural integration. In July 2019, Germany's Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classified the Identitarian movement as a right-wing extremist organization, citing its "xenophobic" worldview and advocacy for policies that allegedly undermine the constitutional principle of human dignity by framing non-European immigrants as existential threats to European civilization. Similar designations have followed in other countries; for instance, Austria's intelligence services have monitored Identitarian leaders like Martin Sellner for ties to neo-Nazi networks and propagation of anti-Islamic rhetoric, leading to his permanent exclusion from the United Kingdom in 2019 on grounds of promoting extremism. A core charge of exclusion centers on the movement's endorsement of "," a policy framework advanced by figures like Sellner that calls for the large-scale of non-European immigrants and their descendants deemed unassimilated, often framed as a response to demographic shifts but decried by opponents as veiled . Proponents present as voluntary and incentive-based, yet events like the May 2025 " Summit" in , , attended by around 400 far-right activists, explicitly discussed deporting foreigners including second-generation migrants, drawing accusations of discriminatory exclusion from organizations. In , the dissolution of Generation Identity in 2021 by government decree highlighted alleged activities and incitement to racial hatred, with authorities pointing to actions like maritime patrols blocking migrant boats as evidence of exclusionary that escalates tensions rather than addressing root causes through policy. These charges often emanate from institutions like bodies and national intelligence services, which pan-European nationalists counter as biased toward globalist agendas that downplay empirical data on immigration's cultural impacts, such as higher rates among certain migrant cohorts documented in . Nonetheless, documented associations with — including Identitarian members' links to the 2019 Christchurch shooter's —have fueled perceptions of , even as the movement publicly disavows in favor of "metapolitical" cultural advocacy. Critics argue this normalizes exclusion by rejecting universal in favor of particularist European preservation, potentially eroding democratic pluralism, though empirical counterevidence includes the movement's non-violent record compared to Islamist , per security reports.

Philosophical Critiques like Arendt's Warning

Hannah Arendt, in her 1954 essay "Dream and Nightmare: Anti-American Feeling in Europe," cautioned that burgeoning anti-American sentiment across Europe could foster a "pan-European nationalism," potentially replicating the aggressive of prior nationalisms on a continental scale. She argued this development might undermine the nascent federated Europe's potential for genuine political renewal, as nationalism historically prioritizes ethnic or cultural homogeneity over pluralistic action, leading to where the "nation" seeks boundless growth beyond sovereign borders. In (1951), Arendt traced how 19th-century "pan-movements"—such as and —emerged from tribal nationalisms, fueling by dissolving state boundaries into racial or ethnic ideologies that paved the way for totalitarian regimes through and loss of individual agency. This critique extends to pan-European nationalism by analogy: elevating a shared "European" identity above national sovereignties risks homogenizing diverse polities into a supra-ethnic entity, eroding the political space for and plurality that Arendt deemed essential to human freedom. Unlike supranational , which she tentatively endorsed as a pragmatic to interwar national rivalries (e.g., supporting the 1951 as a sovereignty-sharing mechanism), pan-European nationalism embodies an "organic" that subordinates politics to or , potentially breeding exclusionary policies against non-Europeans and internal minorities. Arendt's analysis highlights causal mechanisms: nationalism's inherent drive for expansion, unchecked by federal restraints, historically correlated with genocidal violence, as seen in the breakdown of nation-states during , where minorities were deemed "superfluous" outside the national body. Philosophers echoing Arendt's concerns, such as those examining post-national identities, warn that movements promoting pan-European ethno-cultural unity—often framed against or migration—revive these imperialist logics under identitarian guises, prioritizing al defense over institutional pluralism. For instance, critics contend that such ideologies, by positing as a besieged "remnant" , foster a zero-sum akin to the "" of late imperial pan-movements, where economic or demographic anxieties justify coercive unity, sidelining Arendt's emphasis on natal beginnings through collective remembrance of totalitarianism's ruptures. Empirical observations of early , including surveys showing widespread resentment toward U.S. influence post-1945, lent urgency to her 1954 prognosis, though the European Union's economic focus largely averted the nationalist pivot she dreaded. Nonetheless, her framework persists as a caution against supranational projects devolving into ethnic absolutism, where the allure of continental solidarity masks the totalitarian potential of unmoored national passions.

Responses and Empirical Counterarguments

Proponents of pan-European nationalism argue that accusations of overlook the movements' adherence to democratic processes and lack of systemic . Unlike historical fascist regimes, contemporary nationalist parties in Europe have achieved electoral gains primarily through ballot-box successes rather than or armed conflict, with data indicating minimal involvement in compared to past ideologies. For instance, radical right parties have not typically targeted competitors violently, distinguishing them from interwar movements, and their rise correlates more with voter mobilization on issues like than with actions. Empirical evidence further counters claims of inherent exclusionary harm by highlighting the documented challenges of in eroding social trust and cohesion. Leaders such as German Chancellor in 2010 and British Prime Minister in 2011 publicly stated that state-sponsored had failed, citing parallel societies and integration deficits in their countries. Studies and analyses corroborate this, showing reduced interpersonal trust and heightened ethnic tensions in high- contexts without strong assimilation policies, whereas nations enforcing cultural homogeneity—such as Denmark's tightened post-2015—report stabilized social metrics like rates and welfare participation among natives. Regarding philosophical critiques like Hannah Arendt's warnings in —which linked unchecked nationalism to imperial excess and totalitarian inversion—defenders emphasize key distinctions in the modern context. Arendt herself differentiated nationalism from , viewing the former as tied to bounded nation-states rather than the rootless, expansionist ideologies that enabled 20th-century horrors. Pan-European nationalism, in this view, operates defensively to reinforce sovereign cultural identities against supranational erosion, fostering voluntary confederations rather than centralized domination, with no empirical trajectory toward the mass-mobilizing terror Arendt described. Electoral patterns since the 2010s, including coalition formations in governments like Italy's under since 2022, demonstrate pragmatic governance within pluralistic systems, absent the ideological purity tests or leader cults characteristic of .

Recent Developments

Rise Amid Migration and EU Crises (2010s)

The 2015 European migrant crisis marked a pivotal escalation in irregular migration to the continent, with over 1 million sea arrivals by boat and a record 1.3 million asylum applications registered in the plus and , primarily from , , and amid ongoing conflicts. This influx, coupled with the earlier sovereign from 2009–2012 that exposed EU institutional fractures through events like the Greek bailout negotiations, amplified public discontent with supranational policies perceived as eroding national control over borders and economies. Nationalist movements framed these developments as existential threats to European demographic and cultural cohesion, prompting a surge in support for parties advocating , border fortifications, and resistance to EU-mandated migrant relocation quotas. In response, nationalist parties across member states intensified transnational coordination, exemplified by the formation of the Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF) political group in the on June 15, 2015, initiated by France's National Front (led by ), the ' Party for Freedom (), and delegations from Italy's , Austria's Freedom Party, Belgium's , and others. Comprising 36 to 37 MEPs from seven countries in the 2014–2019 parliamentary term, the ENF opposed EU federalism, open-border policies under the , and the migrant redistribution mechanism proposed by the , which allocated quotas based on GDP and population—measures rejected by eastern European states like and . This grouping enabled joint parliamentary actions, such as voting blocs against asylum reforms and funding for integration programs, while fostering ideological alignment on preserving a unified "European civilization" against multiculturalism and Islamization narratives prevalent in party platforms. The crises catalyzed electoral breakthroughs for these parties, correlating with heightened voter turnout on immigration issues; for instance, Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) expanded from marginal status in 2013 to securing 24 seats in the 2014 European elections and influencing national discourse post-2015. Similar gains occurred in Sweden (Sweden Democrats reaching 17.6% in municipal elections by 2014, rising further) and Denmark (Danish People's Party's role in tightening policies), where shared opposition to EU-wide solutions spurred informal alliances like the Visegrád Group's unified stance against compulsory quotas in 2015. These developments underscored a pan-European nationalist pivot toward collective defense mechanisms, prioritizing causal links between unchecked migration, welfare strain, and security risks—evidenced by incidents like the Cologne New Year's Eve assaults in 2015 involving migrants—over integrationist ideals promoted by mainstream institutions.

2024 European Parliament Shifts and Beyond

The 2024 European Parliament elections, held from June 6 to 9, resulted in notable gains for right-wing nationalist and sovereignist parties, reflecting voter concerns over migration, economic pressures, and centralization. Collectively, parties aligned with eurosceptic and nationalist platforms secured approximately 25% of the 720 seats, up from previous terms, with strong performances in , , , and . In , Marine Le Pen's achieved 31% of the vote, translating to 30 seats, while 's (AfD) captured 16%, gaining 15 seats. These outcomes signaled a fragmentation of the center-left and liberal blocs, with the (ID) precursors and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) expanding their influence, though the center-right retained the largest bloc at 189 seats. Post-election, nationalist MEPs coalesced into new parliamentary groups emphasizing national sovereignty and a shared European civilizational defense, marking a step toward pan-European nationalist coordination. The Patriots for Europe (PfE) group, formed on July 8, 2024, emerged as the third-largest with 86 MEPs from parties including Hungary's , France's , Austria's Freedom Party, and the Czech ANO, advocating for repatriation of powers from , border security, and opposition to federalist integration. Simultaneously, the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group, established around July 10 with 25 MEPs primarily from AfD and Polish, Bulgarian, and Czech nationalists, prioritized "Europe of free nations" principles, rejecting EU supranationalism while promoting intergovernmental cooperation on security and culture. These formations, distinct from the more Atlanticist ECR (78 seats), highlighted ideological tensions within the broader right but enabled cross-national advocacy for policies like stricter migration controls and revisions to the EU's Green Deal. Into 2025, these groups have exerted procedural and agenda-setting pressure, though lacking a blocking minority. PfE and ESN MEPs have coordinated to challenge the EU Migration Pact's implementation, pushing amendments for external border fortifications and incentives, amid ongoing debates in plenary sessions. In September 2024, PfE lodged appeals against exclusion from key committee bureaus, underscoring efforts to institutionalize influence. Empirical data from national polls post-elections indicate sustained nationalist momentum, with PfE-aligned parties polling competitively in upcoming referenda and elections, potentially amplifying pan-European themes of cultural preservation against demographic shifts. However, internal divisions—such as PfE's exclusion of AfD over extremism allegations—limit unified action, preserving centrist majorities on fiscal and foreign policy.

References

  1. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/30/how-europes-nationalists-became-internationalists/
  2. https://unherd.com/newsroom/the-nationalist-right-has-created-a-pan-european-identity/
  3. https://www.academia.edu/5445248/Oswald_Mosley_s_Concept_of_a_United_Europe_A_Contribution_to_the_Study_of_Pan_European_Nationalism
  4. https://www.bpb.de/themen/rechtsextremismus/entgrenzter-rechtsextremismus-2015/202693/graham-macklin-europe-a-nation-the-geo-political-ideas-of-sir-oswald-mosley-after-1945/
  5. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782800802500981
  6. http://www.europeanaction.com/id5.html
  7. https://www.oswaldmosley.com/europe-a-nation/
  8. https://www.oswaldmosley.net/europe-a-nation-1948.php
  9. https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/europe-empire-400-million
  10. https://bip.us.edu.pl/sites/default/files/2022-10/Summary%2520%25283%2529.pdf
  11. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13537113.2021.2004767
  12. https://www.thefederalist.eu/site/index.php/en/thirty-years-ago/2672-europe-between-federalism-and-nationalism
  13. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/a-pan-european-radical-right-contradiction-in-terms/
  14. https://www.e-ir.info/2010/11/25/are-nationalism-and-cosmopolitanism-compatible/
  15. https://calhoun.faculty.asu.edu/sites/g/files/litvpz3321/files/publications/articles/calhouncosmopolitanismandnationalism.pdf
  16. https://peterturchin.com/the-first-european-union/
  17. https://www.charlemagne-icon.ac.uk/2016/10/05/an-earlier-european-union-and-a-european-foundation-myth/
  18. https://www.unicaen.fr/puc/sources/castel/Paix/intro_casabianca.xml/focus/paix_intro_casabianca_2_1_p5.html
  19. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/50922/50922-h/50922-h.htm
  20. https://www.gavroche.org/vhugo/peacecongress.shtml
  21. https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/victor-hugos-ideal-of-europe/
  22. https://publicseminar.org/2017/05/europes-nationalist-international/
  23. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/can-europe-make-it/lines-of-tradition-europe-and-far-right-concepts-after-wwii/
  24. https://academic.oup.com/book/56301/chapter/445339549
  25. https://www.eurasia-rivista.com/the-struggle-of-jean-thiriart/
  26. https://counter-currents.com/2010/11/the-european-declaration/
  27. http://www.europeanaction.com/id11.html
  28. https://www.toqonline.com/archives/v5n3/53-bs-debenoist.pdf
  29. https://arktos.com/2023/05/10/what-is-identity/
  30. https://arktos.com/product/archeofuturism/
  31. https://ecologyviewedfromtheright.files.wordpress.com/2019/03/guillam-faye-archeofuturism.pdf
  32. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650045.2022.2078709
  33. https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/archeofuturism-guillaume-faye/1147413951
  34. https://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/alain-de-benoist-de-globalization
  35. https://academic.oup.com/book/25370/chapter/192452090
  36. https://www.oswaldmosley.com/mosleys-policies/
  37. https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/americas-mein-kampf-francis-parker-yockey-imperium
  38. https://www.amazon.com/Imperium-Philosophy-Francis-Parker-Yockey/dp/061550597X
  39. https://apfeurope.eu/
  40. https://www.patriotsforeurope.eu/
  41. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/en/organisation-and-rules/organisation/political-groups
  42. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/politicalparties/index_en.xml
  43. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20160512IPR27173/ep-to-check-alliance-for-peace-and-freedom-s-compliance-with-eu-basic-principles
  44. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/special-series/orban-le-pen-international-nationalism.html
  45. https://lossi36.com/2018/08/29/orban-europhile-far-right/
  46. https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-turtle-and-the-pilot-fish-how-the-eu-and-italy-can-help-each-other-in-the-mediterranean/
  47. https://defence24.com/legislation/enough-green-madness-italys-meloni-has-three-conditions-for-european-green-deal
  48. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2025/10/22/the-giorgia-meloni-method-italy-nationalism-pragmatism/
  49. https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/critical-thinking-frances-far-right-renaissance-a-new-era-of-political-upheaval-in-europe/
  50. https://personal.lse.ac.uk/lorimer/documents/legitimacy_through_europe_preprint.pdf
  51. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/2/22/alice-weidel-the-far-right-leader-shaping-germanys-afd
  52. https://www.fondapol.org/en/study/afd-the-german-far-right-at-a-dead-end/
  53. https://www.politico.eu/article/new-far-right-group-european-parliament-germany-afd/
  54. https://www.counterextremism.com/content/european-ethno-nationalist-and-white-supremacy-groups
  55. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01916599.2019.1703853
  56. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/06/how-will-gains-far-right-affect-european-parliament-and-eu
  57. https://www.politico.eu/article/patriots-for-europe-jordan-bardella-viktor-orban-marine-le-pen/
  58. https://www.eunews.it/en/2024/07/08/the-patriots-for-europe-group-springs-up-in-the-eu-parliament-it-is-the-third-largest-the-league-is-also-a-part/
  59. https://ecrgroup.eu/article/ecr_grows_to_77_seats_after_first_parliamentary_group_meeting
  60. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13572334.2024.2448933
  61. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/07/10/afd-and-allies-form-new-far-right-group-in-brussels-called-europe-of-sovereign-nations
  62. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/advanced?euPoliticalGroupBodyRefNum=7151
  63. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-far-right-could-shape-the-future-of-the-european-parliament/
  64. https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/kantodev/pages/102/attachments/original/1582196570/EN_Statutes_of_the_ID_Group.pdf?1582196570
  65. https://www.euractiv.com/news/orban-le-pen-salvini-kaczynski-join-forces-to-impact-on-the-future-of-eu/
  66. https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/04/europe-s-nationalist-leaders-meet-in-warsaw-in-bid-to-change-politics-of-brussels
  67. https://www.rfi.fr/en/far-right-nationalist-leaders-to-meet-in-madrid-friday
  68. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/orban-le-pen-hail-trump-far-right-patriots-summit-madrid-2025-02-08/
  69. https://www.gmfus.org/news/unexpected-shake-european-far-right
  70. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006
  71. https://www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/patriots-for-europe-pfe-anniversary-european-parliament-eu-orban-le-pen-salvini/
  72. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/seats-political-group-country/2024-2029/
  73. https://ine.org.pl/en/italys-evolving-approach-to-illegal-immigration-under-giorgia-meloni/
  74. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/62273/italy-drop-in-irregular-arrivals-thanks-to-our-efforts-says-meloni
  75. https://www.facebook.com/Reuters/posts/-viktor-orb%25C3%25A1ns-border-fence-built-in-2015-was-seen-as-one-of-his-flagship-polici/1364888388835223/
  76. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1mgkd93r4yo
  77. https://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/state-secretary-hungary-rejects-eu-s-migration-pact-because-it-goes-against-national-interests
  78. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356470629_Alain_de_Benoist_Ethnopluralism_and_the_Cultural_Turn_in_Racism
  79. https://journal-redescriptions.org/articles/125/files/submission/proof/125-1-246-1-10-20190829.pdf
  80. https://intersections.tk.mta.hu/index.php/intersections/article/view/572/334
  81. https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/identitarians/
  82. https://evangelicalfocus.com/vista-journal/27030/nationalism-in-europe-disambiguation-from-romanticism-to-revulsion-to-revolt
  83. https://pfe-foundation.eu/en/europe-of-nations-preserving-identity-and-sovereignty/
  84. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-europes-turn-on-migration/
  85. https://www.carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/charting-the-radical-rights-influence-on-eu-foreign-policy?lang=en
  86. https://ceias.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Identarian-Atlanticism-and-foreign-policy-implications-a-study-of-European-public-attitudes.pdf
  87. https://ecfr.eu/publication/rise-to-the-challengers-europes-populist-parties-and-its-foreign-policy-future/
  88. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-identitarian-movement-classified-as-right-wing-extremist/a-49550414
  89. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/identitarian-movement-of-germany-labelled-extreme-right-as-nationalist-group-spreads-in-us-and-europe/
  90. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/26/anti-muslim-extremist-martin-sellner-permanently-excluded-from-entering-uk
  91. https://www.politico.eu/article/who-are-europe-far-right-identitarians-austria-generation-identity-martin-sellner/
  92. https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/64660/farright-activists-call-for-remigration-at-controversial-european-summit
  93. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/03/how-remigration-became-a-buzzword-for-europes-far-right
  94. https://globalextremism.org/reports/generation-identity/
  95. https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2021-04/ran_adhoc_cont_manif_vrwe_eu_overv_pcve_pract_2021_en.pdf
  96. https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/dream-and-nightmare
  97. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-politics/article/unexpected-support-for-european-integration-memory-rupture-and-totalitarianism-in-arendts-political-theory/A70A51257DD2B164A95C374DD3DBE77F
  98. https://www.eurozine.com/what-hannah-arendt-can-tell-us-about-european-integration/
  99. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24590825
  100. https://direct.mit.edu/euso/article/21/4/447/127122/The-far-right-as-social-movement
  101. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/debate-over-multiculturalism-philosophy-politics-and-policy
  102. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338185714_Multiculturalism_in_the_European_Union_A_Failure_beyond_Redemption
  103. https://polish-sociological-review.eu/pdf-129997-57396?filename=The%20Failure%20of%20British.pdf
  104. https://medium.com/amor-mundi/the-cynicism-of-paraphrasing-a-review-of-vita-activa-the-spirit-of-hannah-arendt-43b319826128
  105. https://rozenbergquarterly.com/hannah-arendts-theory-of-totalitarinism-part-one/
  106. https://www.unhcr.org/node/17361
  107. https://www.pewresearch.org/global-migration-and-demography/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/
  108. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/europes-migration-crisis
  109. https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1824758/europes-responses-to-the-migration-crisis-implications-for-european-integration/
  110. https://www.dw.com/en/le-pens-fn-to-form-far-right-group-in-eu-parliament/a-18519278
  111. https://eu.boell.org/en/2016/01/14/enf-new-right-wing-force-european-parliament-and-how-deal-it
  112. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugee-crisis-deepens-political-polarization-west
  113. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/
  114. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/06/10/2024-european-elections-eu-parliament-slides-to-the-right_6674342_4.html
  115. https://apnews.com/article/eu-election-results-european-parliament-acd0ceef91d198cf5e9ee695f394b28c
  116. https://esn-group.eu/
  117. https://www.patriotsforeurope.eu/posts
  118. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/divided-but-dangerous-the-fragmented-far-rights-push-for-power-in-the-eu-after-the-2024-elections
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.