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United Armenia
United Armenia
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The modern concept of United Armenia as claimed by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF). The total area will be 182,119 km2 (70,317 sq mi).[1][2]
Orange: areas overwhelmingly populated by Armenians (Republic of Armenia: 98%;[3] Javakheti: 95%[4]).
Yellow: Historically Armenian areas with presently no or insignificant Armenian population (Western Armenia, Nakhchivan and recently Nagorno-Karabakh).
Note: Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) is shown in pre-2020 de facto borders.
Mount Ararat, today located in Turkey, as seen from Armenia's capital Yerevan. The mountain is a symbol of Western Armenia for many Armenians.[a]

United Armenia (Armenian: Միացեալ Հայաստան, romanizedMiats'eal Hayastan),[b] also known as Greater Armenia or Great Armenia, is an Armenian ethno-nationalist irredentist concept referring to areas within the traditional Armenian homeland—the Armenian Highlands—which are currently or have historically been mostly populated by Armenians. The idea of what Armenians see as unification of their historical lands was prevalent throughout the 20th century and has been advocated by individuals, various organizations and institutions, including the nationalist parties Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF or Dashnaktsutyun) and Heritage, the ASALA and others. The Republic of Armenia comprises 10%-15% of the Armenian homeland.[8][9][10]

The ARF idea of "United Armenia" incorporates claims to Western Armenia (eastern Turkey), Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), the landlocked exclave Nakhchivan (Nakhichevan) of Azerbaijan and the Javakheti (Javakhk) region of Georgia.[1][2] Javakheti is overwhelmingly inhabited by Armenians. Western Armenia and Nakhchivan had significant Armenian populations until the early 20th century, and Nagorno-Karabakh until 2023, but no longer do. The Armenian population of Western Armenia was almost completely exterminated during the 1915 Armenian genocide, when the millennia-long Armenian presence in this region largely ended and Armenian cultural heritage was mainly destroyed by the Ottoman government.[11][12] In 1919, the ARF-dominated government of the First Republic of Armenia declared the formal unification of Armenian lands.[citation needed]

The ARF bases its claims to Western Armenia, now controlled by Turkey, on the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which was effectively negated by subsequent historical events. These territorial claims are often seen as the ultimate goal of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and as part of Armenian genocide reparations.[13][14]

The most recent Armenian irredentist movement, the Karabakh movement which began in 1988, sought to unify Nagorno-Karabakh with then-Soviet Armenia. As a result of the subsequent war with Azerbaijan, Armenian forces established effective control over most of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts, thus succeeding in the de facto unification of Armenia and Karabakh.[15][16] Some Armenian nationalists consider Nagorno-Karabakh "the first stage of a United Armenia."[17]

History of the claims

[edit]
An ethnographic map of the Armenian Highland (and the wider Asia Minor and the Caucasus), made by Richard Andree in 1905. Armenians are labeled in blue.[18]

Origins

[edit]

In its current meaning, the term "United Armenia" was coined during the Armenian national awakening in the second half of the 19th century. During this period, the Armenian-populated areas were divided between the Russian Empire (Eastern Armenia) and the Ottoman Empire (Western Armenia).[19] One of the earliest uses of the phrase "United Armenia" is by the English Society of Friends of Russian Freedom in an 1899 edition of Free Russia monthly. It quotes a confidential report of Grigory Golitsin (the Russian governor of the Caucasus) sent to Tsar Nicholas II "containing suggestions for a future policy." Golitsin writes of a nationalist movement which "aims at the restoration of the independent Armenia of the past", and that "their ideal is one great and united Armenia."[20]

The idea of an independent and united Armenia was the main goal of the Armenian national liberation movement during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[21] By the 1890s, a low-intensity armed conflict developed between the three major Armenian parties—the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnak), Hnchak and Armenakan— and the Ottoman government.[22] Calls from the great powers for reforms in the Armenian provinces and Armenian aspirations to independence resulted in the Hamidian massacres between 1894 and 1896, during which up to 300,000 Armenian civilians were slaughtered by the order of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, after whom the massacres were named.[23][24] After the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, some Armenians felt that the situation would improve; however, a year later the Adana massacre took place and Turkish-Armenian relations deteriorated further.[25] After the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, the Ottoman government was pressured to accept the Armenian reform package concerning the Armenian provinces in early 1914.[26]

World War I and the Armenian genocide

[edit]
Map of the 1915 Armenian genocide

The Armenians of eastern Ottoman Empire were exterminated by the Ottoman government in 1915 and the following years. An estimated 1.5 million Armenians were killed,[27][28] while the survivors found refuge in other countries. These events, which are known as the Armenian genocide, are officially denied by the Turkish state, which falsely claims the killings were a result of a "civil war."[29] The Ottoman government successfully ended the over two thousand year Armenian presence in Western Armenia.[30][31]

By 1916, most of Western Armenia was occupied by the Russian Empire as part of the Caucasian Campaign of World War I. In parts of the occupied areas, especially around Van, an Armenian autonomy was briefly set up. The Russian army left the region due to the Revolution of 1917. The Ottoman Empire quickly regained the territories from the small number of irregular Armenian units. In the Caucasus, the Special Transcaucasian Committee was set up after the February Revolution.[32]

The Bolsheviks took power in Russia through the October Revolution and soon signed the Armistice of Erzincan to stop the combat in Turkish Armenia. Russian forces abandoned their positions and left the area under weak Armenian control. The Bolsheviks set up the Transcaucasian Commissariat in the Caucasus. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed on 3 March 1918 and the Ottoman army started to regain the lost territories, taking over Kars by 25 April.[33] Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with the Ottoman Empire and by April 1918 the Transcaucasian Federation proclaimed its independence from Russia. This fragile federation of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan collapsed when the Turks invaded the Caucasus region. The Armenian units defeated the Turks at the Battle of Sardarabad, just 40 kilometers away from Armenia's future capital Yerevan, preventing the complete destruction of the Armenian nation.[34]

A map presented by the Armenian National Delegation (representing Ottoman Armenians)[35] to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.[36]

A 1918 book by American scholars Lothrop Stoddard and Glenn Frank, titled Stakes of the War listed 8 solutions to the Armenian Question as proposed by different parties. The second proposal, titled "United Armenia", is described as follows:[37]

A union of territories of Turkish, Russian, and Persian Armenia would result in enough area to constitute an independent state, but in no considerable section of this area would the Armenians form a clear majority of the population. To be sure, the Armenians would be the most intelligent and progressive element; but their numbers and their vitality has been greatly reduced by the long series of persecutions and massacres, and there has been such extensive destruction of property in these territories, that their potential force has been reduced as to form a serious bar to their gaining the ascendancy over the more numerous racial elements in the territory.

First Republic of Armenia: 1918–1920

[edit]
Armenia's Prime Minister Alexander Khatisian declared the formal unification of the Armenian lands in 1919.

The Armenian National Council declared the independence of the Armenian provinces on 28 May 1918.[38] It was recognized by the Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Batum on 4 June 1918.[39] After its defeat in World War I, the Ottoman Empire and the Allies signed the Armistice of Mudros by which the Turkish troops left the Caucasus and by 1919 the Republic of Armenia established control over the former Kars Oblast, the city of Iğdır and its surrounding territory, including Mount Ararat.[40][41]

On 28 May 1919, on the first anniversary of the Republic of Armenia, the government of the newly founded country symbolically declared the union of Eastern and Western Armenia, the latter of which was still under the full control of the Turks.[42] Alexander Khatisian, the Armenian Prime Minister, read the declaration:[43][44]

To restore the integrity of Armenia and to secure the complete freedom and prosperity of its people, the Government of Armenia, abiding by the solid will and desire of the entire Armenian people, declares that from this day forward the separated parts of Armenia are everlastingly combined as an independent political entity.

Now in promulgating this act of unification and independence of the ancestral Armenian lands located in Transcaucasia and the Ottoman Empire, the Government of Armenia declares that the political system of United Armenia is a democratic republic and that it has become the Government of the United Republic of Armenia.

Thus, the people of Armenia are henceforth the supreme lord and master of their consolidated fatherland, and the Parliament and Government of Armenia stand as the supreme legislative and executive authority conjoining the free people of United Armenia.

Treaty of Sèvres

[edit]
The Armenian-Turkish border by the Treaty of Sèvres

Almost two years after the Republic of Armenia was established, on 23 April 1920, the United States officially recognized it. Its frontiers were to be determined later. On 26 April 1920, the Supreme Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in Paris (British Prime Minister Lloyd George, French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau and Italian Prime Minister Francesco Saverio Nitti) requested that the United States accept the mandate over Armenia and to make an Arbitral Decision to determine the boundaries of Armenia with what is now Turkey.[45] President Woodrow Wilson agreed to act as arbitrator and draw a mutually acceptable border between the two nations. In July 1920, the US State Department founded the Committee upon the Arbitration of the Boundary between Turkey and Armenia, headed by William Westermann. The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers. On 28 September 1920, the Committee submitted a report that defined the border between the two countries. It guaranteed access to the Mediterranean sea for Armenia via Trebizond and proclaimed present-day Turkey's border regions demilitarization frontier line.[46]

A territory of 100,000 square kilometres (40,000 sq mi), formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, was given to Armenia. Based on the calculations the committee made, the ethnic structure of the 3,570,000 population would have been: 49% Muslims (Turks, Kurds, Tartar Azerbaijanis, and others), 40% Armenians, 5% Laz, 4% Greeks, and 1% others. It was expected that in the case Armenian refugees' return, they would make up to 50% of the population.[47] Two months after the committee submitted the report to the State Department, President Woodrow Wilson received it on 12 November 1920. Ten days later, Wilson signed the report entitled "Decision of the President of the United States of America respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Armenia, Access for Armenia to the Sea, and the Demilitarization of Turkish Territory adjacent to the Armenian Frontier."[48] The report was sent to the US ambassador in Paris Hugh Campbell Wallace on 24 November 1920.[49] On 6 December 1920, Wallace delivered the documents to the secretary-general of the peace conference for submission to the Allied Supreme Council.[49]

Treaty of Sèvres was later annulled following the successful Turkish War of Independence against Allied Powers and affiliated forces, which led to the abolition of the empire and founding of the modern Republic of Turkey with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Fall of the First Republic

[edit]

In late September 1920, a war erupted between Armenia and the Mustafa Kemal-led Turkish nationalists (Government of the Grand National Assembly) led by Kâzım Karabekir took place. Turks captured Kars on 30 October 1920.[50] With the Turkish army in Alexandropol, the Bolsheviks invaded the country from the north east, and on 29 November 1920, they proclaimed Armenia a Soviet state. On 2 December 1920, Armenia became a Soviet state according to a joint proclamation of Armenia's Defence Minister Dro and Soviet representative Boris Legran in Yerevan. Armenia was forced to sign the Treaty of Alexandropol with the Government of the Grand National Assembly on the night of 2–3 December 1920.[51][52][53] The Treaty of Sèvres and Wilson's award remained "dead letters."[54]

Just after the Soviet invasion of Armenia in November 1920, the Soviet Azerbaijani leader Nariman Narimanov declared that "the old borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan are declared null and void. Mountainous Karabagh, Zangezur, and Nakhichevan are recognized as integral parts of the Socialist Republic of Armenia."[55] Despite these assurances, both Nakhichevan and Karabakh were kept under Azerbaijani control for another eight months.[56] On 16 March 1921, Soviet Russia and the Government of the Grand National Assembly signed the Treaty of Moscow. By this treaty, Kars and Ardahan were ceded to Turkey, and Nakhichevan was put under "protectorate" of Azerbaijan.[57] The Treaty of Kars was signed between the Grand National Assembly Government on one side and Armenian SSR, Georgian SSR and Azerbaijan SSR on the other, reaffirming the Treaty of Moscow.[58]

Post-World War II: 1945–1953

[edit]
Armenian and Georgian claims to Turkish Territory, British Foreign Office, May 1946

After the end of World War II in Europe, the Soviet Union made territorial claims to Turkey. Joseph Stalin pushed Turkey to cede Kars and Ardahan, thus returning the pre-World War I boundary between the Russian and Ottoman empires. Besides these provinces, the Soviet Union also claimed the Straits (see Turkish Straits crisis). "Stalin, perhaps, expected that the Turks, shocked by the Red Army's triumph, would give up, and Washington and London accept it as a fait accompli," writes Jamil Hasanli.[59] Athena Leoussi added, "While Stalin's motives can be debated, for Armenians at home and abroad the re-emergence of the Armenian Question revived hopes for territorial unification".[60] On 7 June 1945 Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov informed the Turkish ambassador in Moscow that the USSR demanded a revision of its border with Turkey.[61]

To repopulate the claimed areas with Armenians, the Soviet government organized a repatriation of Armenians living abroad, mostly survivors of the Armenian Genocide.[62][60] Between 1946 and 1948, 90,000 to 100,000 Armenians from Lebanon, Syria, Greece, Iran, Romania, France, and elsewhere moved to Soviet Armenia.[63][61]

An Office of Strategic Services (predecessor of the CIA) document dated 31 July 1944 reported that the Armenian Revolutionary Federation changed its extreme anti-Soviet sentiment due to the rise of the Soviet power at the end of the war.[64] In a memorandum sent to the Moscow Conference, Head of the Armenian Church Gevorg VI expressed hope that "justice will finally be rendered" to the Armenians by the "liberation of Turkish Armenia and its annexation to Soviet Armenia."[65] Armenia's Communist leader Grigor Harutunian defended the claims, describing Kars and Ardahan "of vital importance for the Armenian people as a whole." The Soviet Armenian élite suggested that the Armenians have earned the right to Kars and Ardahan by their contribution in the Soviet struggle against fascism.[66] Armenian diaspora organizations also supported the idea.[61]

As the relations between the West and the Soviet Union deteriorated with the US and the UK backing Turkey,[67][61] Soviet claims were out of the agenda by 1947. However, it was not until 1953, after Stalin's death, that they officially abandoned their claims,[59] thus ending the dispute.[68]

Late Cold War: 1965–1987

[edit]

A wave of Armenian nationalism started in the mid-1960s in the Soviet Union after Nikita Khrushchev came to power and granted relative freedom to the Soviet people during the De-Stalinization era. On 24 April 1965, the 50th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, a mass demonstration took place in Yerevan.[69] Thousands of Armenians poured into the streets of Yerevan to commemorate the victims of the genocide; however, their goal was not to "challenge the authority of the Soviet government", but "draw the government's attention" to the genocide and persuade the "Soviet government to assist them in reclaiming their lost lands."[70] The Kremlin, taking into account the demands of the demonstrators, commissioned a memorial for the genocide. The memorial, which was built on Tsitsernakaberd hill, was completed in 1967.[70]

The logo of ASALA, depicted here on a memorial at the Yerablur cemetery, was the outline map of United Armenia.

The 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in underground political and armed struggle against the Soviet Union and the Turkish state in and outside of Armenia. In 1966, an underground nationalist party called the National United Party was founded by Haykaz Khachatryan in Yerevan. It secretly operated in Soviet Armenia from 1966 to the late 1980s and, after the imprisonment of its founding members in 1968, it was led by Paruyr Hayrikyan. It advocated for the creation of United Armenia through self-determination.[71] Most of its members were arrested and the party was banned. Though the NUP was blamed for the 1977 Moscow bombings,[72] according to historian Jay Bergman it the mastermind of the bombing has "never been determined conclusively."[73]

According to Gerard Libaridian, "by the 1970s, the recognition of the Armenian genocide became a very important objective of the Armenian cause and diaspora political parties linked the recognition of the genocide and the dream of a greater Armenia because Turkey's recognition of the genocide would constitute the legal basis for the Armenian claims on Western Armenia."[74] From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, several Armenian militant (often considered terrorist) groups operated in the Middle East and Western Europe. Most notably the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) carried out armed attacks on Turkish diplomatic missions around the world.[75][76] Two ARF-affiliated groups—the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) and the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)—also carried out similar attacks, mainly in Western Europe.[77] David C. Rapoport argues that these organizations were inspired by Gourgen Yanikian, a 77-year-old Armenian genocide survivor, who assassinated two Turkish consular officials in California in 1973 as an act of revenge against Turkey.[78]

The ASALA was the largest of the three and was mostly composed of Lebanese Armenian young adults, who claimed revenge for the Armenian genocide, which the Turkish state denies. The concept of United Armenia was one of the ultimate goals of ASALA.[79][80] William Dalrymple and Olivier Roy claim that Armenian Genocide became internationalized as a result of the activities of the Armenian militant groups in the Western European countries.[81][82]

Nagorno-Karabakh Wars: 1988–2023

[edit]

In February 1988 a popular nationalist movement emerged in Soviet Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), a small Armenian-populated enclave under the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan since 1923.[83] The movement demanded the unification of the two entities, reviving the idea of a united Armenia.[84]

On 20 February 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh Supreme Council (the regional legislature) issued a request to transfer the region from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia.[85][86] The Moscow government declined the claims, while hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated in Yerevan in support of the idea.[87] Few days later, on 26 February, an anti-Armenian pogrom broke out in the Azerbaijani seaside industrial city Sumgait, forcing thousands of Armenians to leave Azerbaijan en masse.[88]

On 15 June 1988, the Supreme Council of Soviet Armenia voted to accept Nagorno-Karabakh into Armenia.[89] On 17 June 1988, the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet refused to transfer the area to Armenia, saying that it was part of Azerbaijan.[89] The leading members of the Karabakh Committee, a group of intellectuals leading the demonstrations, were arrested in December 1988, but were freed in May 1989.[85] On 1 December 1989, the Soviet Armenian Supreme Council and NKAO Supreme Council declared the unification of the two entities (օրենք «Հայկական ԽՍՀ-ի և Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի վերամիավորման մասին»).[90] In January 1990, another pogrom took place against Armenians, this time in Baku. In the meantime, most Azerbaijanis of Armenia and Armenians of Azerbaijan left their homes and moved to their respective countries.

Pro-independence members were elected in the majority to the Armenian parliament in the 1990 election.[91] On 23 August 1990, the Armenian parliament passed a resolution on sovereignty.[91] The tensions grew even larger after the Soviet and Azeri forces deported thousands of Armenian from Shahumyan during Operation Ring in April and May 1991. After the unsuccessful August Putsch, more Soviet republics declared independence. On 2 September 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic proclaimed independence.[92] On 21 September 1991, the Armenian independence referendum was held with the overwhelming majority voting for the independence of Armenia from the Soviet Union. On 26 November 1991, the Azerbaijani parliament abolished the autonomy of Nagorno-Karabakh.[93] On 10 December 1991, an independence referendum was held in Nagorno-Karabakh, boycotted by the Azeri minority, and gained a vote of 99% in favor of independence.[93]

The conflict escalated into a full-scale war with the captured Shusha by Armenian forces on 9 May 1992. By 1993, the Armenian forces took control over not only the originally disputed Nagorno-Karabakh, but also several districts surrounding the region.[94] A ceasefire agreement was eventually signed on 5 May 1994 in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. According to Thomas de Waal, three factors contributed to the victory of the Armenian side: "Azerbaijan's political and military chaos, greater Russian support for the Armenians, and the Armenians' superior fighting skills."[95] Since the 1994 ceasefire until 2020, the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (later Artsakh) had de facto control of the territories taken over in the war.[96]

In the wake of Armenia's defeat in 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Armenian forces lost control of the occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as Shusha and Hadrut in Nagorno-Karabakh. In accordance with Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement, Russian peacekeepers were deployed in the Lachin corridor connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Following the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh from 19 to 20 September, which ended in the total defeat and collapse of Artsakh, Azerbaijan secured full control over the region. Unable to provide further resistance, the government of Artsakh announced its surrender and formal dissolution on 1 January 2024.[97] Nearly all Armenians in the region fled into Armenia after Azerbaijan's victory.

Proponents

[edit]

Armenian Revolutionary Federation

[edit]

Since its foundation in 1890, the left-wing nationalist Armenian Revolutionary Federation (also known as Dashnaktsutyun or Dashnak/Tashnag) has been known as the main advocate for United Armenia.[98] Having affiliated organizations throughout the Armenian communities abroad, the ARF is regarded as one of the most influential Armenian institutions in the world, especially in the diaspora.[99][100] According to researcher Arus Harutyunyan, the party has "made it abundantly clear that historical justice will be achieved once ethnic Armenian repatriate to united Armenia, which in addition to its existing political boundaries would include" Western Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nakhichevan and Javakheti.[2] In the 1998 party program, it states that the ARF's first goal is "The creation of a Free, Independent and United Armenia. United Armenia should include inside its borders the Armenian lands [given to Armenia] by the Sevres Treaty, as well as Artsakh, Javakheti and Nakhichevan provinces."[101] "Free, Independent and United Armenia" is the party's main slogan,[102][103] and was adopted as its "supreme objective" in the 10th Party Congress in Paris (1924–25).[104] Hrant Markarian, ARF Bureau Chairman, stated at the 2004 party congress:[105]

We are against any relations between Armenia and Turkey that would mean acceptance of any preconditions by us, that would require us to give up our rights or any part of them. We will keep up pressure on Turkey until we achieve full victory, until international recognition of the fact of genocide, until the creation of a United Armenia.

Heritage Party

[edit]

Although the platform of the national liberal Heritage party makes no explicit reference to territorial claims, its leader and some its members have expressed their support for them. Heritage supports the formal recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by Armenia and has introduced bills for the recognition of the NKR to the Armenian National Assembly in 2007, 2010, and 2012. Although all three attempts were voted down by the ruling Republican Party.[106] Its leader, Raffi Hovannisian (post-Soviet Armenia's first foreign minister), has hinted at Western Armenia, Javakheti and Nakhichevan with "vague formulations."[107] For instance, during a 2013 speech about his future plans Hovannisian stated that "only with [the existence of a] government belonging to the people will we have awareness of our national interest—with Artsakh, Javakhk, Western Armenia—and future for our children."[108] In 2011, a leading party member, Zaruhi Postanjyan, stated in an open letter to presidents of Armenia and NKR that by organizing a repatriation of diaspora Armenians to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, "we will [create a] base for the liberation of our entire homeland."[109]

In an April 2015 conference on the Armenian Genocide centenary Postanjyan stated that Armenia should "restore its territorial integrity" by claiming the "territory of its historic homeland." When asked about how realistic Armenian claims to its historic lands are, Heritage leader Hovannisian responded: "Today's romantic will become tomorrow's realist."[110] In an opinion piece published in The Jerusalem Post on 11 April 2015 Hovannisian wrote that Turkey occupies Western Armenia and called for "the creation of an Armenian national hearth in historic Western Armenia." He added, "negotiations between the republics of Turkey and Armenia triggering the first-ever sovereign reciprocal demarcation of the official frontier, including but not limited to provisions for an Armenian easement to the Black Sea."[111]

Other

[edit]
Posters of the nationalist National Democratic Pole party in Freedom Square, Yerevan featuring a map of United Armenia, November 2022.

The Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADL, Ramgavar), a diaspora bourgeois conservative party, is also an advocate of Armenian territorial claims to historical territories. In August 1990, Edmond Azadian, a leader of the ADL told the Armenian parliament:[112]

We have always maintained that the territory of this Republic of Armenia is the nucleus of tomorrow's Greater Armenia. In this respect, we expect the newly formed government to commit itself to the restoration of our historic rights. More specifically, the new Republic must include in its on-going agenda the recognition of the Armenian genocide and our historic territorial claims by the international community.

Territories claimed

[edit]

The modern use of United Armenia by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) encompasses the following areas:[101][1][2]

Name Part of Area Population Armenians % Armenian Source Notes
Provinces (Gavarrner) Armenia 29,743 km2 (11,484 sq mi) 3,018,854 2,961,514 98.1 2011[113]
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) Azerbaijan 11,458 km2 (4,424 sq mi) 7,000 0
Javakheti (Javakhk) Georgia (Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda districts) 2,588 km2 (999 sq mi) 69,561 65,132 93.6 2014[4]
Nakhchivan (Nakhichevan) Azerbaijan (Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic) 5,363 km2 (2,071 sq mi) 398,323 6 ~0 2009[116]
Eastern Turkey (Western Armenia) Turkey 132,967 km2 (51,339 sq mi) 6,461,400 60,000 0.09 2009[118]

Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh)

[edit]
The territory controlled by the Armenian forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic until 2020 shown in brown

In the aftermath of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, supported by the Republic of Armenia, took control over the territory of some 11,500 km2,[119] including several districts outside of the originally claimed borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijani SSR, creating a "buffer zone".[120][96] Kelbajar and Lachin districts guarantee solid land corridor between Armenia proper and Nagorno-Karabakh.[121][96] Between 500,000 and 600,000 Azerbaijanis were displaced from the area.[122][123] In the meantime, almost all Armenians from Azerbaijan (between 300,000 and 400,000)[124][125] and Azerbaijanis from Armenia (over 150,000) were forced to move to their respective countries as remaining in their homes became nearly impossible since tensions between the two groups have grown worse since the start of the conflict in 1988.[126][127][128]

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic or the Republic of Artsakh remained internationally unrecognized. Until 2023, the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh were de facto functioning as one entity,[16][129][130][131][132][133][134] although the Nagorno-Karabakh region was internationally recognized as de jure part of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh was more monoethnic than the Republic of Armenia, with 99.7% of its population being Armenian. The Azerbaijani minority was forced to leave during the war. The areas outside the original NKAO borders taken over by the Armenian forces during the war are mostly uninhabited or very sparsely inhabited, with the city of Lachin being an exception. Between 2000 and 2011, 25,000 to 30,000 people settled in NKR.[135]

The 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh ended with the defeat and collapse of Artsakh, which formally dissolved on 1 January 2024. It also resulted in the mass flight of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians into Armenia. These developments appear to have effectively ended the "United Armenia" aspirations with regards to Nagorno-Karabakh.[citation needed]

Javakheti (Javakhk)

[edit]
Javakheti (Javakhk) shown in red on the map of Georgia with Samtskhe-Javakheti provincial borders outlined.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both areas are not under the control of the central government of Georgia,[136] shown in light grey.

The region of Javakheti or Javakhk as known to Armenians comprises the districts of Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda, both part of Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia.[137][138][139] It is overwhelmingly Armenian-populated (around 95%).[140] The area is geographically isolated from the rest of Georgia and remains economically and socially isolated from Georgia.[141] According to Svante Cornell, Javakheti enjoys "wide cultural autonomy" and "certain Georgian analysts observe that the region is in practice as much 'Armenia' as 'Georgia'. It is distinctively easier to get around using Armenian than Georgian in this region; indeed, foreign visitors claim that at first they had difficulties determining which country they are in."[140] Generally, Javakheti Armenians live in "reasonable inter-ethnic harmony" within Georgia, although there is a "fairly strong fear for the future, a sense of insecurity."[140] Javakheti, along with Lori and Borchali, was disputed by Armenia and Georgia from 1918 to 1920. A brief armed conflict took place between the two nations in December 1918, mostly over Lori.[142]

United Javakhk Democratic Alliance, a local civil organization, is the main organization advocating for an Armenian autonomy in the region.[143] It was founded in 1988, during the disintegration of the Soviet Union.[144] It campaigns for a referendum in Javakheti on autonomy.[145][146] It is believed that the organization has close links with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation.[146][145] Although the ARF claims Javakheti as part of United Armenia, the ARF World Congresses "have agreed with the demands raised by the Armenians of Javakheti that a Javakheti with a high degree of self-government within a federal Georgia would be able to sustain itself and would become a strong link in Georgian-Armenian relations."[147] ARF Bureau Chairman Hrant Markarian declared in the 2004 party congress: "We want a strong, stable and autonomous Javakheti that is part of Georgia and enjoys state care."[105] The leader of the United Javakhk Democratic Alliance, Vahagn Chakhalian, was arrested in 2008 and freed in 2013. A 2014 article suggested that the alliance has little influence today.[148]

During Zviad Gamsakhurdia's presidency (1991), Javakheti remained de facto semi-independent and only in November 1991 was the Tbilisi-appointed governor able to take power.[c] The issue of Javakheti was in the 1990s "clearly been perceived as the most dangerous potential ethnic conflict in Georgia", however, no actual armed conflict ever occurred.[149] Taking into account the importance of the bilateral relations, the governments of Armenia and Georgia have pursued a careful and calming policy to avoid tension.[150] The Armenian government has not made territorial claims to Georgia, nor has called for an autonomy in Javakheti.[151] Armenia–Georgia relations have traditionally been friendly,[152][153] however, from time to time tensions arise between the two countries. In recent years, the status of Armenian churches in Georgia[154][155] and the status of the Armenian language in Georgian public schools had been a matter of dispute.[156] Svante Cornell argues that "Armenia seems to have had a calming influence on Javakhk" as it is highly dependent on Georgia for imports.[146] This viewpoint is shared by Georgian analysts.[157]

Armenian nationalist activist Alexander Yenikomshian has suggested that there are three long-term solutions to the Javakheti issue: 1) the region remains part of a Georgia, where the rights of the Armenian population are protected 2) "Artsakhization", i.e. de facto unification with the Republic of Armenia 3) "Nakhichevanization", i.e. Javakheti loses its Armenian population.[158]

Eastern Turkey (Western Armenia)

[edit]
The Turkish area claimed by the ARF (based on the Treaty of Sèvres, 1920)[1]

Western Armenia refers to an undefined area, now in eastern Turkey, that had significant Armenian population prior to the Armenian genocide of 1915.[159][160] As a result of the genocide, officially no Armenians live in the area today.[161] However, at least two distinct groups of Armenian origin reside in the area. Hemshin peoples, an Islamisized group with Armenian ethnic origin,[162][163] live in the Black Sea coast, particularity in the Rize province.[164] Another group, "Hidden Armenians", live throughout Turkey, especially the eastern parts of the country. Many of them have been assimilated by Kurds. It is impossible to determine how many there are due to the fact that they keep their identity hidden, but estimates range from below 100,000 to millions.[165] Since the Armenian Genocide, the area has been mostly settled by Kurds and Turks,[166] with smaller numbers of Azerbaijanis (near the Turkish-Armenian border)[167] and Georgians and Laz people in the northeastern provinces of Turkey.[168][169]

Generally, the Armenian nationalist groups claim the area east of the boundary drawn by US President Woodrow Wilson for the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation and groups supporting the concept of United Armenia claim that the Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 10 August 1920 between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies, including Armenia is the only legal document determining the border between Armenia and Turkey.[170][171][172] Armenia's Former Deputy Foreign Minister Ara Papian claims that "Wilsonian Armenia," the territory granted to the Republic of Armenia in 1920 by Wilson in the scope of the Treaty of Sèvres, is still de jure part of Armenia today.[173] According to him the Treaty of Kars, which determined the current Turkish-Armenian border, has no legal value because it was signed between two internationally unrecognized subjects: Bolshevik Russia and Kemalist Turkey.[174] Papian has suggested that the Armenian government can file a suit at the International Court of Justice to dispute the border between Armenia and Turkey.[172]

22 November is celebrated by some Armenians as the anniversary of the Arbitral Award.[175][176] In 2010 and 2011, posters with maps of the Treaty of Sèvres were hung throughout Yerevan.[177]

On 10 August 2020 the three traditional Armenian parties—the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnaks), Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (Hunchaks) and the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramgavars)—issued a joint statement on the centenary of the Sèvres Treaty, stating that the treaty is the only international document defining the border between Armenia and Turkey. "The Treaty of Sevres is a valid international treaty, although it has not been ratified by all signatories, but it has not been legally replaced by any other international instrument. At least from the point of view of the rights of the Armenian Cause, the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian nation, it remains a promissory note based on international law."[178]

Official position of Armenia

[edit]

Since Armenia's independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Armenian government has not officially made any territorial claims to Turkey.[179][180][181] However, the Armenian government has avoided "an explicit and formal recognition of the existing Turkish-Armenian border."[182] In 2001, Armenian president Robert Kocharyan stated that the "genocide recognition will not lead to legal consequences or territorial claims."[183]

In 2010, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan addressed the Conference Dedicated to the 90th Anniversary of Woodrow Wilson's Arbitral Award:

It was probably one of the most momentous events for our nation in the 20th century which was called up to reestablish historic justice and eliminate consequences of the Armenian Genocide perpetrated in the Ottoman Empire. The Arbitral Award defined and recognized internationally Armenia's borders within which the Armenian people, who had gone through hell of Mets Eghern, were to build their statehood.[184]

On 23 July 2011, during a meeting of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan with students in Tsaghkadzor resort city, a student asked Sargsyan if Turkey "will return Western Armenia" in the future.[182] Sargsyan responded:

It depends on you and your generation. I believe, my generation has fulfilled the task in front of us; when it was necessary in the beginning of the 1990s to defend part of our fatherland—Karabakh—from the enemy, we did it. I am not telling this to embarrass anyone: my point is that each generation has its responsibilities and they have to be carried out, with honor. If you, boys and girls of your generation spare no effort, if those older and younger than you act the same way, we will have one of the best countries in the world. Trust me, in many cases the country's standing is not conditioned by its territory: the country should be modern, it should be secure and prosperous, and these are conditions which allow any nation to sit next to the respectable, powerful and reputed nations of the world. We simply must fulfill our duty, must be active, industrious, must be able to create bounty. And we can do that, we very easily can do that, and we have done it more than once in our history. I am certain about it, and I want you to be certain too. We are a nation that always rises from the ashes like phoenix—again and again.[185]

Sargsyan's statements "were considered by Turkish officials an encouragement for young students to fulfill the task of their generation and occupy eastern Turkey."[186] During his visit to Baku a few days later, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan denounced Sargsyan's statements and described them as "provocation" and claimed that Sargsyan this "told young Armenians to be ready for a future war with Turkey."[182] Erdoğan demanded apology from Sargsyan calling his statements a "blunder".[187] In response, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan stated that Sargsyan's words were "interpreted out of context."[186]

On 5 July 2013,[188] during a forum of Armenian lawyers in Yerevan on the 100th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide organized by the Ministry of Diaspora, Armenia's Prosecutor General Aghvan Hovsepyan made a "sensational statement".[172][189] Hovsepyan particularly stated:

Indeed, the Republic of Armenia should have its lost territories returned and the victims of the Armenian Genocide should receive material compensation. But all these claims must have perfect legal grounds. I strongly believe that the descendants of the genocide must receive material compensation, churches miraculously preserved in Turkey's territory and church lands must be returned to the Armenian Church, and the Republic of Armenia must get back its lost lands.[188]

According to ArmeniaNow news agency "this was seen as the first territorial claim of Armenia to Turkey made on an official level. The prosecutor general is the carrier of the highest legal authority in the country, and his statement is equivalent to an official statement."[172] In response, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement on 12 July 2013 denouncing Hovsepyan's statements. According to the Turkish side his statements reflect the "prevailing problematic mentality in Armenia as to the territorial integrity of its neighbor Turkey." The statement said that "one should be well aware that no one can presume to claim land from Turkey."[190]

On 10 August 2020 Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, President Armen Sarkissian and parliament speaker Ararat Mirzoyan issued statements on the centenary of the Sèvres Treaty. Pashinyan noted that although it was never implemented, "it continues to be a historical fact, which reflects our long journey to restore our independent statehood. We are bound by duty to remember it, realize its importance and follow its message."[191] Sarkissian stated that the treaty "even today remains an essential document for the right of the Armenian people to achieve a fair resolution of the Armenian issue."[192] Mirzoyan called the treaty an expression of "dreamy naivety."[193]

Nakhchivan

[edit]
Nakhichevan shown in brown. The area formerly held by the dissolved Nagorno-Karabakh Republic until 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and 2023 offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh shown in yellow and red respectively.

Up until the Great Surgun (1604) and Azerbaijan's ethnic cleansing policies in the 20th century, Armenians had comprised a significant demographic group in the region. Armenian tradition says that Nakhichevan (Նախիջևան Naxidjevan in Armenian and Naxçıvan in Azerbaijani) was founded by Noah.[194] Armenians have been living in Nakhichevan since ancient times. It was one of gavars of Vaspurakan province of the Kingdom of Armenia. In 189 BC, Nakhchivan became part of the new Kingdom of Armenia established by Artaxias I.[195] Within the kingdom, the region of present-day Nakhichevan was part of the Ayrarat, Vaspurakan and Syunik provinces.[196]

By the 16th century, control of Nakhichevan passed to the Safavid dynasty of Persia. Because of its geographic position, it frequently suffered during the earlier wars between Persia and the Ottoman Empire in the 14th to 18th centuries. In 1604–1605, Shah Abbas I, concerned that the lands of Nakhichevan and the surrounding areas could potentially pass into Ottoman hands, decided to institute a scorched earth policy. In what is called the Great Surgun, he forced 300,000 Armenians,[197] including those from Nakhichevan to leave their homes and move to the Persian provinces south of the Aras River.[198] After the last 1826-1828 Russo-Persian War, Nakhichevan became part of Russia per the Treaty of Turkmenchay after Persia's forced ceding. Alexandr Griboyedov, the Russian envoy to Persia, reported that 1,228 Armenian families from Persia migrated to Nakhichevan, while prior to their migration there were 2,024 Muslim and 404 Armenian families living in the province.[199]

According to the 1897 Russian Empire census, the Nakhichevan uyezd of the Erivan Governorate had a population of 100,771, of which 34,672 were Armenian (34.4%), while Caucasian Tatars (Azerbaijanis) numbered 64,151 or 63.7% of the total population.[200] The proportion of Armenian was around 40% prior to World War I.[201][202] Nakhichevan was disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1918 to 1920 during the countries' brief independence. Due to the Ottoman invasion in 1918, 100,000 Armenians fled from Nakhichevan.[203] By June 1919, after the British troops left the area, Armenia succeeded in establishing control over Nakhichevan. Some of the Nakhichevan Armenians returned to their homes in summer 1919.[204] Again, more violence erupted in 1919 leaving some 10,000 Armenians dead and some 45 Armenian villages destroyed.[205]

After the Soviet takeover of the Caucasus region in 1920 and 1921, the Treaty of Moscow, also known as the Treaty of Brotherhood, was signed between the Government of the Grand National Assembly and Soviet Russia on 16 March 1921. According to this treaty Nakhichevan became "an autonomous territory under the auspices of Azerbaijan, under the condition that Azerbaijan will not relinquish the protectorate to any third party."[206] The Treaty of Kars was signed between the Grand National Assembly and Armenian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Georgian SSR on 13 October 1921. The treaty reaffirmed that the "Turkish Government and the Soviet Governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan are agreed that the region of Nakhichevan ... constitutes an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan."[207] By the mid-1920s, the number of Armenians in Nakhichevan dwindled significantly and according to the 1926 Soviet census the 11,276 Armenians made up only 10.7% of the autonomous republic.[208] During the Soviet period, the Armenians of Nakhichevan felt "pressured to leave"[201] According to the Soviet census of 1979, only 3,406 Armenians resided in Nakhichevan or 1.4% of the total population.[209] The last few thousand Armenians left Nakhichevan in 1988 amid the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[210]

In August 1987, the Armenian National Academy of Sciences started a petition to transfer Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh under jurisdiction of Armenia.[211] In the nationalist movement to unite Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, Armenians "used the example of the slow "de-Armenianization" of Nakhichevan in the course of the twentieth century as an example of what they feared would happen to them."[212][201] During the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, clashes occurred between Armenian and Azeri forces in the Nakhichevan-Armenia border, however, the war did not spill over into Nakhichevan. Turkey, Azerbaijan's close ally, threatened to intervene if Armenia invaded Nakhichevan.[213][214] Nakhichevan was in center of attention during the destruction of the Armenian cemetery in Julfa in the 2000s.[215][216][217] According to the Research on Armenian Architecture, most of the Armenian churches, monasteries and cemeteries were destroyed by Azerbaijan in the 1990s.[218]

The Armenian government has never made any claims to Nakhichevan, although there have been calls by nationalist circles (including Hayazn,[219] Heritage youth wing[220] and prominent First Nagorno-Karabakh War veteran Jirair Sefilian)[221] to forcibly annex Nakhichevan in case Azerbaijan attacks Nagorno-Karabakh.[222] Rəfael Hüseynov, the director of the Nizami Museum of Azerbaijani Literature, in his written question to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2007 claimed that the "seizure Nakhichevan is one of the main military goals of Armenia."[223] Writing in the Harvard International Review in 2011 US-based Azerbaijani historian Alec Rasizade suggested that "Armenian ideologues have lately started to talk about the return of Nakhichevan."[224]

"Kura-Arax Republic"

[edit]

A potential military advancement toward central Azerbaijan, especially up to the Kura river, has become part of the Armenian political discourse in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. A maximalist and expansionist option, advancing up to the Kura river is seen by analysts and military figures as a method of forcing Azerbaijan to surrender and give up its claims to Karabakh. For others, it is a realistic policy which should be persuaded by the government of Armenia to take control of territories that are, according to its advocates, historical or natural part of Armenia.[225][226][227][228][229]

The phrase "Kura-Arax Republic" was coined in 2016 by Levon Shirinyan,[230] a political science professor and a former member of the ARF,[231] to advocate Armenian military advancement into the territory of Azerbaijan west of the Kura river (including Nakhichevan) to achieve complete surrender of Azerbaijan.[230] Following the April 2016 war in Karabakh with Azerbaijan, he stated that Armenia should "transfer the military operations" into Yevlakh and the confluence of the rivers Kura and Arax (Aras or Araxes). The explained the importance of the two as follows: Yevlakh is a major hub of the Baku-Tbilisi railway and the oil and gas pipelines, while the second would give Armenia an opportunity to assist the Talysh in reviving an independent state in the south of Azerbaijan.[232] He argues that Armenia cannot have peace "unless we get to Kura-Araks" and "destroy Azerbaijan as a Turkic state."[233] Shirinyan set up the Christian-Democratic Rebirth Party[234] prior to the 2018 parliamentary election, which proclaimed "Kura-Araxian Armenia" as one of its main objectives.[235]

The idea was adopted by the hard-line nationalist group led by Jirair Sefilian that took over a police base in Yerevan in July 2016. Varuzhan Avetisyan, leader of the armed group, explicitly supported the idea from prison in 2017.[236][237] Sefilian did so in April 2018.[238][239] Following their release from prison after the 2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution, members of the armed group formed the Sasna Tsrer Pan-Armenian Party, which officially adopted "Kura-Arax Republic" as one of its objectives. Their party program stated Nakhichevan and the areas of Azerbaijan west of the Kura should become part of Armenia and, thus, establish the Kura-Araxian Republic.[240][241] Sefilian stated:[242]

The goal should be to include in the Armenian state at least Nakhichevan, other territories of the artificial state of Azerbaijan to the right bank of the Kura. With the creation on the official territory of today's Armenia and Artsakh of the New Republic, the process of the collapse of the Russian-Turkish regional architecture will begin, which will be accompanied by the formation of the regional architecture consistent with the interests of Armenia. Staying within the existing territories, we will have to allocate for elementary survival much more of the resources we need so much for development. In other words, the attitude to the project of the Kura-Arax Republic proceeds from a very, very pragmatic issue. Whether we want or do not want to find our place, a free, dignified life under the sun, to have a future, a real hope for the re-acquisition of our entire homeland and the return of home Armenians.

Public opinion

[edit]
Lebanese Armenians holding a poster during Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Beirut in November 2010.[243] The text reads "[Mount] Ararat is and remains Armenian".
A graffiti in Yerevan of the map outline of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The text reads "Liberated, not occupied."

There are no public opinion data concerning the United Armenia concept, however, it is popular among Armenians according to Hürriyet Daily News.[244] Moshe Gammer of the Tel Aviv University and Emil Souleimanov of the Charles University in Prague both suggest that the concept is popular in the Armenian diaspora.[245][246] Gerard Libaridian wrote in 2007:[247]

While it is true that not all Armenians in the Diaspora share the vision of a united Armenia as a political program, territorial aspirations were sustained, nonetheless, by the deep sense of injustice that Armenians generally felt [by the Turkish denial of the genocide and lack of any kind of compensation for the genocide losses].

A 2014 survey in Armenia asked what kind of demands should Armenia make to Turkey. Some 80% agreed that Armenia should make territorial claims (30% said only territorial claims, while another 50% said territorial, moral, financial, and proprietary). Only 5.5% said no demands should be made.[248] According to a 2012 survey, 36% of Armenians asked agree or somewhat agree that Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide will result in territorial compensation, while 45% believe it will not.[249] The online publication Barometer.am wrote: "It appears that our pragmatic population believes that all possible demands should be forwarded to Turkey [...] but a relative majority consider the practival realization of territorial claims to Turkey is unrealistic."[248]

On Artsakh

[edit]

One Istanbul-based researcher wrote in the Jacobin magazine in 2016 that "[f]ew in Armenia support [the] pleas to use Karabakh as a springboard to recreate 'Greater Armenia.' But the idea that Karabakh must be held no matter the cost is widespread."[250] According to a 2017 survey in Armenia 86.4% of respondents opposed any territorial concessions in the Karabakh conflict, while 8.2% accepted concessions for the sake of settlement.[251]

According to a 2013 Caucasus Barometer survey, when asked about having Nagorno-Karabakh as a formal part of Armenia, 77% of respondents "definitely favor" such a status, 13% would be "accepting under certain circumstances", and 7% oppose it.[252]

In culture

[edit]

The concept of creating a united state that would include all Armenian-populated areas has been the main theme of the Armenian revolutionary songs. Nersik Ispiryan and Harout Pamboukjian are among the most famous performers of such songs. One of the most widely known examples of these songs is "We must go" (Պիտի գնանք, Piti gnank) by gusan Haykazun written in 1989:[253]

Ախ էն երկրի հողին մատաղ, պիտի՛ գնանք վաղ թե ուշ,
Սիրով լինի, սրով լինի, պիտի՛ գնանք վաղ թե ուշ,
Արարատի գլխին դրոշ պիտի՛ դնենք վաղ թե ուշ,
Հերթով լինի, երթով լինի, պիտի՛ գնանք վաղ թե ուշ:
Թեկուզ անանց պարիսպներով մեզ բաժանեն մեր երկրից,
Հրով լինի, սրով լինի, պիտի՛ գնանք վաղ թե ուշ:
Oh, God bless that country, that we must go to sooner or later,
With love it will be or with sword, we must go sooner or later,
We must put a flag on Ararat sooner or later,
With line it will be or with march, we must go sooner or later.
Even if impassable fences separate us from our country,
With fire it will be or sword, we must go sooner or later.
The map of Armenia as seen in 2005 animated film Road home.

From 2005 to 2008, four short animated cartoons were released by the National Cinema Center of Armenia called Road home (Ճանապարհ դեպի տուն) produced by Armenian animator Robert Sahakyants. It tells a story of a group of school children from Karin (Erzurum) in 2050 taking a trip throughout the "liberated from enemy" territories: Tigranakert, Baghesh (Bitlis), Mush and Akdamar Island. The country they live in is called Hayk' (Հայք) after the historical name of Armenia. The series was aired by the Public Television of Armenia.[254] In one of his last interviews, Sahakyants stated: "If today I'm shooting a film about how we are going to return Western Armenia, then I'm convinced that it will definitely take place."[255]

Reactions

[edit]

In Armenia

[edit]

Leading Armenian communist Anastas Mikoyan stated in 1919 that "Armenian chauvinists relying on the allies of imperialism push forward a criminal idea—the creation of a 'Great Armenia' on the borders of Historic Armenia. The absence of Armenians and the presence of an absolute Muslim population there does not concern them... our party cannot support the idea of either a 'Great' or 'Small' Turkish Armenia."[256]

Armenia's first president Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991–98), in a widely publicized 1997 essay on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict titled "War or Peace? Time to Get Serious", argued that if Armenia was to officially demand "the return of Armenian lands" from Turkey and cancellation of the Treaty of Kars, it would only play into the hands of Turkey. He argued that it would "provide Turkey with more evidence of Armenia's expansionist ambitions" and direct more negative international opinion towards Armenia.[257] Petrosyan has called the idea of "Kura-Arax republic" a "fairy tale."[258][259]

Gerard Libaridian, a former adviser to President Ter-Petrosyan, criticized August 2020 statements by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Armen Sarkissian on the 100th anniversary of the Sèvres Treaty as being "equivalent to a declaration of at least diplomatic war against Turkey." According to Libaridian, "Adopting the Treaty of Sevres as an instrument of foreign policy Armenia placed the demand of territories from Turkey on its agenda."[260]

In Azerbaijan

[edit]

Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev in 1998 stated in his "Decree of President of Republic of Azerbaijan about genocide of Azerbaijani people" that the "artificial territorial division in essence created the preconditions for implementing the policy of expelling Azerbaijanis from their lands and annihilating them. The concept of 'greater Armenia' began to be propagated."[261]

In 2012, President of Azerbaijan and son of Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev, who has made several statements toward Armenia and Armenians in past such as "our main enemies are Armenians of the world",[262] stated that "Over the past two centuries, Armenian bigots, in an effort to materialize their 'Great Armenia' obsession at the expense of historically Azerbaijani lands, have repeatedly committed crimes against humanity such as terrorism, mass extermination, deportation and ethnic cleansing of our people."[263]

In Turkey

[edit]
Some Turkish sources have speculated that the coat of arms of Armenia, which features Mount Ararat, currently located in Turkey, is part of the Armenian claims.[264][265][266]

In December 1991, Turkey became one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Armenia from the Soviet Union.[267] Armenia–Turkey relations deteriorated during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, during which Turkey aligned itself with Azerbaijan. Turkey shares its Turkic heritage with Azerbaijan and the two countries are generally seen as allies in the region. The expression "one nation, two states" has been often used to describe the relations of the two countries.[268]

In Turkey, "many believe that Armenia's territorial claims are the main reason why the Armenian administration and lobbyists are pushing for global recognition" of the Armenian Genocide.[264][265] The Turkish Ministry of Culture and Tourism credits the idea of "Great Armenia" to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan.[269] According to Prof. İdris Bal "Turkey considers Armenian policy (and the activities of its powerful diaspora groups) since 1989 to be against its national security interests and territorial integrity. Armenia's failure to recognize the Kars Agreement, along with the frequent public references to eastern Turkey as 'Western Armenia,' provides a serious irritant to Turkey. The Turkish Mount Ararat is pictured in the official Armenian state emblem, which Turkey interprets as a sign that the 'greater Armenia' vision is still very much alive."[266]

According to Hürriyet Daily News some "foreign policy experts draw attention to the fact that Armenia has territorial claims over Turkey, citing certain phrases in the Armenian Constitution and Declaration of Independence."[265] The Armenia Declaration of Independence was passed on 23 August 1990 officially declaring "the beginning of the process of establishing of independent statehood positioning the question of the creation of a democratic society." It was signed by Levon Ter-Petrosyan, the President of the Supreme Council, who became the first President of Armenia in 1991.[270] Article 11 of the declaration read:

"The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."[270]

Turkish historian and political scientist Umut Uzer characterized Armenian territorials claims to eastern Turkey as "a racist and irredentist demand with regard to a territory which has never in history had an Armenian majority population. And these demands are buttressed with genocide claims which in fact deny the very existence of Turkey in its current borders."[271]

See also

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Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
United Armenia denotes an irredentist vision in for a single consolidating territories historically associated with Armenian settlement, including regions in modern-day eastern (), ( and Nakhchivan), Georgia (Javakhk), and . This concept, advanced prominently by the since the late , envisioned unification of these areas with the core Armenian highland to form a greater homeland free from Ottoman, Russian, or Persian dominion. The idea gained international traction post-World War I through the (1920), which allocated substantial eastern Anatolian territories to an independent Armenia, further specified by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's arbitration award defining borders incorporating , , and provinces. However, Turkish forces under Mustafa Kemal rejected these provisions, defeating Armenian and Allied-backed positions, leading to the Treaty's nullification and replacement by the (1923), which omitted any Armenian state beyond Soviet borders. Empirically, the failure stemmed from Allied disunity, Britain's withdrawal, and Armenia's military incapacity against resurgent , rendering the Wilsonian boundaries—spanning over 100,000 square kilometers—a legal artifact without enforcement. In the Soviet era, the concept subsided but reemerged post-1991 independence, manifesting in claims over and Nakhchivan, contributing to armed conflicts with in 1988–1994 and 2020–2023, where Armenian forces initially seized but ultimately lost these enclaves. Defining characteristics include its basis in ethnographic maps of early 20th-century Armenian density rather than continuous political control, often invoking ancient kingdoms like Tigranes the Great's empire as cultural precedent, though causal analysis reveals such analogies overlook millennia of fragmentation and non-Armenian majorities in peripheral zones per Ottoman censuses. Controversies arise from its incompatibility with neighboring states' , fostering that has isolated Armenia diplomatically and economically, as evidenced by Turkey's closed borders and Azerbaijan's reclamation of lost regions through superior military modernization. While advocacy sustains the ideal through commemorations and , its realization remains implausible absent radical geopolitical shifts, prioritizing historical grievance over pragmatic .

Conceptual Foundations

Historical and Cultural Basis

The historical foundations of United Armenia rest on the ancient polities of the Armenian Highlands, a plateau spanning eastern Anatolia, the South Caucasus, and northwestern Iran, where early states exerted control over territories now divided among multiple nations. The Kingdom of Urartu, emerging around 860 BC and peaking in the 8th-7th centuries BC, established a centralized Iron Age power centered near Lake Van, with fortifications, canals, and bronze production rivaling Assyria, against which it waged repeated wars. Following Urartu's collapse circa 590 BC amid Median and Scythian incursions, Indo-European-speaking Proto-Armenians migrated into the region during the 6th century BC, supplanting or assimilating remnants and forming the basis for subsequent Armenian ethnogenesis, though Urartian culture influenced local architecture and toponymy without direct linguistic continuity, as Urartian belonged to the Hurro-Urartian family distinct from Armenian's Indo-European roots. By the late 6th century BC, the area fell under Achaemenid Persian rule as the , which gained autonomy after Alexander the Great's conquests around 331 BC, evolving into the Orontid Kingdom of Armenia that persisted until circa 200 BC. The (189 BC-12 AD) marked expansion, culminating under Tigranes II the Great (r. 95-55 BC), whose realm stretched from the to the Mediterranean, incorporating , , , and through conquests and alliances, briefly rivaling and before Lucullus's campaigns curtailed it after 69 BC. This maximal extent, while ephemeral and reliant on vassals rather than homogeneous settlement, symbolizes peak Armenian sovereignty over diverse ethnic lands, informing later irredentist narratives despite the core highlands remaining the consistent ethnic and political heartland amid fluctuating borders and partitions, such as the 387 AD division between and Sassanid Persia. Culturally, Armenian identity solidified through linguistic and religious milestones anchoring claims to the highlands as an enduring homeland. The , an independent Indo-European branch with ties to Greek and Iranian, received its 36-letter alphabet in 405 AD, devised by to translate Christian scriptures, enabling vernacular liturgy and literature that preserved ethnic cohesion amid foreign dominations. Armenia's adoption of as the in 301 AD under Tiridates III—preceding Rome's by 80 years—fostered early church institutions, monastic centers, and apocalyptic traditions emphasizing territorial restoration, with biblical toponyms like Ararat reinforcing symbolic ties to and the highlands. These elements, evidenced in medieval manuscripts and chronicles, underpin the cultural rationale for unification, positing a continuous civilizational presence despite demographic shifts, Turkic migrations from the , and later Ottoman-Safavid contests that fragmented the region without erasing Armenian highland roots.

Definition and Scope of Claims

United Armenia denotes an irredentist ideal in Armenian ethno-nationalism seeking to consolidate into one sovereign entity the lands historically inhabited by or governed by Armenian states, which were fragmented by 19th- and 20th-century imperial partitions, genocidal events, and border delineations. This vision contrasts with the current Republic of Armenia's internationally recognized borders, established post-Soviet independence in 1991, by positing a broader patria that revives pre-modern Armenian highland extents or interwar proposals. Proponents frame it as rectification of historical injustices, particularly the 1915-1923 and subsequent territorial losses, though implementation remains aspirational rather than a stated policy of the Armenian government. The core territorial scope centers on , referring to eastern Anatolian regions under Ottoman control until , including the vilayets of , , , Diyarbakir, and parts of Trebizond and Mamuret-ul-Aziz, where comprised significant populations per data showing over 1.5 million in these areas. These claims draw legitimacy from the , signed on August 10, 1920, which in Articles 88-93 and the annexed Wilsonian arbitration of November 22, 1920, allocated approximately 155,000 square kilometers of eastern to an independent , incorporating access to the and majorities in key districts based on ethnographic surveys. The treaty's nullification by the and the 1923 , which omitted Armenian provisions, rendered these boundaries unratified, yet they persist as a symbolic benchmark in irredentist . Further claims encompass Artsakh () and adjacent Azerbaijani territories like the and parts of , motivated by the region's 76.9% ethnic Armenian population in the and precedents of medieval Armenian principalities there. The 1988 explicitly sought unification with Soviet , escalating into the (1988-1994), where Armenian forces controlled the enclave until Azerbaijan's 2020-2023 offensives reclaimed it, dissolving the on January 1, 2024. Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, ceded to Azerbaijan under the 1921 despite historical Armenian ties, features intermittently in broader visions. The Samtskhe-Javakheti province in Georgia, particularly the districts of and Ninotsminda, where form over 90% of the population per Georgia's 2014 census (approximately 100,000 ), rounds out peripheral claims, rooted in 19th-century Russian imperial migrations and demands for amid perceived cultural marginalization. These areas, totaling under 5,000 square kilometers, invoke unification to address but have not sparked armed conflict, unlike . Iranian Azerbaijan and trace enclaves are rarely emphasized in modern discourse due to geopolitical constraints. Overall, the concept's feasibility is constrained by demographic shifts—e.g., near-total Armenian exodus from post-1923—and international norms favoring borders from Soviet dissolution.

Historical Evolution

Ancient and Medieval Precedents

The earliest precedents for a unified Armenian polity trace to antiquity, where emerged as a distinct Indo-European group by the late BCE amid the decline of the Urartian kingdom, a centered in the from the 9th to 6th centuries BCE that influenced subsequent Armenian ethnogenesis through cultural and linguistic continuity. By the 2nd century BCE, the established the Kingdom of , achieving independence from Seleucid overlordship around 190 BCE and consolidating control over core territories in the , including regions now in eastern , , and northwestern . Under Tigranes II (r. 95–55 BCE), Armenia attained its maximal ancient extent, forming an empire that spanned from the Black Sea's Pontus region in the north to the Mediterranean's Phoenician coast in the south, encompassing eastern Anatolia, northern Mesopotamia, Cilicia, Syria, and vassal states in Iberia and Albania. This expansion, fueled by conquests against Parthia, Seleucids, and others, unified diverse Armenian principalities under a centralized monarchy, with Tigranes founding cities like Tigranocerta as administrative centers; however, Roman intervention from 69 BCE onward dismantled much of this domain, partitioning Armenia into spheres of influence by 66 BCE. In the medieval period, after centuries of Persian, Byzantine, and Arab suzerainty—including Umayyad and Abbasid caliphate rule from the 7th to 9th centuries—the Bagratuni dynasty restored indigenous sovereignty. Ashot I Bagratuni was recognized as king by the Abbasid caliph in 884 or 885 CE, inaugurating the Bagratid Kingdom that endured until 1045 CE, governing a territory centered on the Armenian Highlands with capital at Ani, extending from Lake Van to the Kura River and including modern eastern Turkey, Armenia, and adjacent areas in Georgia and Azerbaijan. This realm fostered a cultural renaissance, with Ani emerging as a fortified metropolis of over 100,000 inhabitants by the 11th century, though internal divisions and Byzantine-Seljuk pressures precipitated its fragmentation after the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 CE. Seljuk Turkic invasions prompted Armenian nobles to migrate southward, establishing the Kingdom of Cilician Armenia by the late 11th century. Formalized as a kingdom in 1198 CE under Leo I of the Rubenid dynasty (later succeeded by the Lusignans in 1342 CE), it persisted until conquest in 1375 CE, controlling the Cilician plain and Taurus foothills in southern , with Sis (modern Kozan) as capital. This polity, oriented toward Mediterranean trade and alliances with and European monarchies, integrated Armenian feudal structures with Frankish influences while preserving Orthodox Christianity amid Muslim surroundings, representing a diaspora-based continuity of Armenian statehood distinct from the highland core. These ancient and medieval formations, though transient and variably centralized, exemplified Armenian capacity for dynastic unification across highland and coastal domains, informing later conceptions of .

19th-Century Nationalist Awakening

The Armenian nationalist awakening in the arose from a confluence of internal cultural revival and external influences within communities fragmented across the Ottoman, Russian, and Persian empires, where numbered approximately 2.5 million by mid-century, predominantly in Ottoman . This period saw the transition from a primarily religious identity centered on the to a secular , driven by exposure to European , Enlightenment ideals, and Russian liberal thought via diaspora merchants, missionaries, and educational exchanges. Intellectuals critiqued feudal structures and clerical dominance, advocating for , modern schooling, and administrative reforms to foster unity among divided populations. In Russian-controlled , acquired through the Russo-Persian (1828), the establishment of secular schools and printing presses accelerated the revival; by 1830, hosted the first Armenian periodical, Ararat, promoting historical consciousness and linguistic standardization in the ashkharhbare (spoken Armenian) dialect over classical grabar. Pioneering figures included (1809–1848), whose 1841 novel Wounds of Armenia exposed social ailments like landlord exploitation and called for enlightenment, drawing parallels to Russian reformist and laying groundwork for envisioning a cohesive national polity transcending imperial boundaries. Similarly, Mikayel Nalbandian (1831–1866), influenced by Russian radicals, penned poetic manifestos like "" (1859) urging self-reliance and meritocracy, though his arrest and exile by tsarist authorities in 1865 underscored tensions between awakening aspirations and autocratic suppression. Under Ottoman rule, where over 80% of Armenians resided in eastern Anatolia's six vilayets, the Tanzimat reforms of 1839–1856 granted nominal equality but failed to curb Kurdish tribal raids or tax farming abuses, prompting communal self-organization. The 1863 Armenian National Constitution formalized millet governance, enabling elected assemblies and schools that numbered over 800 by 1880, disseminating ideas of collective rights and historical continuity from ancient kingdoms to contemporary partitions. Patriarch Nerses Varjabedyan's appeals at the 1878 Congress of Berlin secured Article 61, mandating reforms and security in Armenian-inhabited provinces, yet its non-implementation fueled disillusionment and early irredentist sentiments envisioning administrative autonomy encompassing both Ottoman "Western Armenia" and Russian "Eastern Armenia" as precursors to unification. This ferment crystallized into organized politics by the 1880s, with clandestine groups like the Armenakan Party (founded 1887 in ) advocating armed self-defense and against Ottoman centralization, marking the shift from cultural renaissance to proto-revolutionary . Early nationalists, often anti-clerical and socialist-leaning, prioritized liberation from multi-ethnic empires over religious orthodoxy, though their visions of a "United Armenia" remained aspirational, rooted in medieval precedents but constrained by geopolitical realities until the century's close.

World War I and Immediate Aftermath

During World War I, Armenians within the Ottoman Empire faced suspicions of disloyalty due to reported collaborations with invading Russian forces, prompting the Committee of Union and Progress government to order the deportation of Armenian populations from eastern Anatolia starting on April 24, 1915. These measures involved forced marches into the Syrian desert, accompanied by widespread killings, starvation, and exposure, resulting in an estimated 1 to 1.5 million Armenian deaths by 1917, according to records from contemporary observers and demographic analyses. Ottoman authorities justified the actions as necessary for military security near the Caucasus front, citing Armenian uprisings and fifth-column activities, though evidence from Ottoman military telegrams indicates systematic intent to eliminate the Armenian population. In contrast, Armenians in the mobilized approximately 4 combat and 1 reserve volunteer units by 1914, participating in Russian offensives against Ottoman forces and contributing to captures in regions like in 1915-1916. The Bolshevik Revolution and subsequent in March 1918 allowed Ottoman armies to reoccupy eastern Anatolian territories, advancing toward and endangering the surviving Armenian communities swollen with refugees. Armenian forces, comprising regular units and militias, halted the Ottoman push through decisive victories in the Battles of Sardarabad (May 21-29, 1918), Bash-Aparan (May 23-28, 1918), and Karkilisa (May 24-28, 1918), preventing the conquest of the remaining Armenian heartland despite numerical disadvantages. These engagements, fought with limited resources amid chaos from the collapsing , directly prompted the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Armenia on May 28, 1918, marking the first modern independent Armenian state since the . The nascent republic immediately contended with territorial disputes and wars against neighboring states: clashes with the over Nakhchivan, , and regions from 1918 onward involved mutual atrocities and population displacements; conflicts with centered on Lori and Borchali districts; and escalating tensions with emerging Turkish Nationalist forces culminated in the of September-October 1920. In the latter, Turkish forces under captured on October 30, 1920, and advanced to Alexandropol, forcing to sign the on December 2, 1920, ceding significant eastern territories. Exhausted by over 300,000 refugees, economic collapse, and multi-front warfare, the republic succumbed to Bolshevik invasion on November 29, 1920, transitioning into Soviet Armenia and curtailing irredentist ambitions for a united territory encompassing historic .

Treaty of Sèvres and Republican Era

The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on August 10, 1920, between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire, included provisions in Articles 88–93 requiring Ottoman recognition of an independent Armenia encompassing Armenian-inhabited regions of eastern Anatolia, with boundaries to be arbitrated by the United States president. The First Republic of Armenia, declared independent on May 28, 1918, following the collapse of Russian and Ottoman imperial control in the region, actively participated in the Paris Peace Conference from January 1919 and endorsed the treaty as a foundation for securing its sovereignty and historic territories. On November 22, 1920, U.S. President issued an arbitral award delineating the Turkey- boundary, allocating to approximately 42,000 square miles of territory, including the western portions of the Ottoman vilayets of , , and , access to the via , and , based on ethnographic data indicating Armenian majorities in those areas. This "" represented the maximal extent of internationally proposed Armenian statehood at the time, aligning with First Republic leaders' visions of unifying dispersed Armenian populations under a single polity. However, the treaty's implementation hinged on Allied military enforcement, which faltered amid post-World War I exhaustion and diverging priorities among Britain, , and the . Turkish nationalists, organized under Mustafa Kemal Pasha's Grand National Assembly established on April 23, 1920, repudiated as a capitulation imposed on the defeated Ottoman government, launching the to reclaim territories. In September 1920, Kemalist forces initiated an offensive into eastern , capturing key cities like Oltu, , and , exploiting the First Republic's depleted military—reduced to about 30,000 ill-equipped troops after prior conflicts with Ottoman remnants and neighboring states. By early December, Armenian defenses collapsed, leading to the on December 2, 1920, in which ceded over half its claimed territory, including Alexandropol (modern ) and surrounding districts, to , effectively nullifying Wilsonian boundaries in practice. Compounding these reversals, the Bolshevik advanced into in late November 1920, capitalizing on the Turkish incursions to install a Soviet regime, which proclaimed the on December 2, 1920, following the resignation of First Republic Prime Minister . The Soviet government promptly renounced and ceded additional territories to Turkey via the on March 16, 1921, prioritizing ideological expansion over Armenian nationalist aims. The , signed July 24, 1923, formalized the Republic of Turkey's borders without reference to , erasing ' provisions and confining the Armenian state to Soviet-defined limits excluding eastern Anatolian claims. Within the framework of United Armenia ideology, the Sèvres period epitomized a brief alignment of international diplomacy with Armenian irredentist aspirations for a contiguous homeland incorporating , yet its failure underscored causal factors including insufficient great-power commitment, the resilience of Turkish nationalist mobilization—bolstered by 100,000–150,000 troops by 1921—and Armenia's geopolitical isolation amid Bolshevik ascendancy. Armenian sources maintain ' legal validity as the sole signed by an Armenian state and Ottoman successor, while Turkish perspectives frame it as an illegitimate diktat superseded by in .

Soviet Period Assertions

During the immediate post-World War II period, the Soviet Union asserted territorial claims against Turkey specifically targeting the provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and surrounding areas in eastern Anatolia, which were viewed by Armenian nationalists as core components of Western Armenia. In March 1945, the Soviet government issued diplomatic notes to Turkey demanding the revision of the 1921 Treaty of Kars, under which those territories had been ceded to the nascent Turkish Republic by Bolshevik Russia; the USSR argued that the treaty was invalid due to the lack of sovereign authority of the signatory Transcaucasian governments and sought their annexation to the Armenian and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics. These demands were explicitly supported by Armenian SSR authorities and the Armenian Apostolic Church, with Catholicos George VI publicly endorsing the claims as a restoration of historic Armenian lands lost after World War I. Armenian collaboration with Soviet policy intensified through propaganda campaigns and petitions from the Armenian diaspora, which mobilized to portray the territories as ethnically Armenian and economically integrated with Soviet Transcaucasia via the Aras River basin. Soviet media and Armenian SSR outlets amplified narratives of Turkish "aggression" in the region, drawing on pre-1921 demographics where Armenians formed significant populations before the 1915-1923 upheavals; for instance, Kars province had hosted over 100,000 Armenians in the late Ottoman era per Russian imperial censuses. The claims aligned with broader Stalinist expansionism, including demands for military bases in the Turkish Straits, but were framed domestically in the Armenian SSR as steps toward reunifying "divided" Armenian territories, echoing irredentist sentiments suppressed since the 1920 Sovietization of Armenia. However, these assertions lacked formal legal basis beyond Soviet reinterpretation of wartime gains and were not recognized internationally. By 1947, amid Turkey's alignment with the West and U.S. aid under the , the USSR de-escalated, effectively abandoning the demands after Turkish refusal and NATO's formation; official Soviet renunciation came implicitly by 1953 following Stalin's death, with no further diplomatic pursuit. Throughout the remainder of the Soviet era, overt territorial assertions for a "United Armenia" encompassing Western territories were curtailed under centralized control to avoid destabilizing relations with , though Armenian SSR educational curricula and cultural publications continued to emphasize historical maps of Greater Armenia—including and —fostering latent without explicit policy endorsement. Internal Soviet military maps occasionally depicted contested border interpretations, such as a 1975 General Staff document extending Armenian delineation westward across the Hakari River, but these did not translate to official claims. Petitions for adjusting internal Soviet borders, such as unifying with the Armenian SSR, emerged sporadically—e.g., a 1940s proposal under briefly considered but rejected—yet these were framed as administrative efficiencies rather than expansive , reflecting Moscow's prioritization of ethnic stability over Armenian maximalism. By the Brezhnev era, any public discourse on reuniting was confined to outlets or unofficial , as Soviet doctrine deemed such nationalism counterproductive to .

Post-Soviet Revanchism and Conflicts

Following the in 1991, declared independence amid escalating ethnic tensions over , a predominantly Armenian-populated enclave within that had sought unification with since 1988. The ensuing from 1988 to 1994 resulted in Armenian forces seizing control of and seven adjacent districts, comprising approximately 20% of 's territory, in violation of recognizing 's . A was brokered in May 1994 by , leaving the regions under Armenian administration despite UN Security Council resolutions demanding withdrawal. Post-independence Armenian nationalism, embodied in movements like the (Dashnaktsutyun), sustained irredentist aspirations for a "United Armenia" encompassing not only but also historical claims to Nakhchivan, in Georgia, and eastern Anatolia in . These claims fueled revanchist rhetoric, with some Armenian groups viewing the Soviet-era borders as artificial divisions imposed by , particularly regarding Nakhchivan, where Armenian heritage sites faced systematic destruction documented as early as the late Soviet period and intensifying post-1991. In , ethnic , comprising over 90% of the population in districts like , pursued cultural autonomy demands rather than outright , though irredentist undercurrents persisted without erupting into major conflict. The thawed in 2020 with Azerbaijan's , a 44-day offensive from September 27 to November 10, where Azerbaijani forces, aided by Turkish drones and advanced weaponry, recaptured significant territories including , reversing Armenian gains from 1994. Armenia's defeat sparked domestic protests and revanchist calls for retaliation, with opposition figures decrying territorial concessions and invoking historical grievances to rally support against . A Russia-brokered on November 9, 2020, established a 1,960-strong Russian peacekeeping contingent in remaining Armenian-held areas of , but sporadic clashes continued, underscoring unresolved revanchist tensions. Revanchism intensified after Azerbaijan's September 19-20, 2023, offensive, which swiftly reasserted control over all of , prompting the exodus of approximately 100,000 to proper amid fears of persecution. Azerbaijani authorities framed the operation as anti-terrorist, targeting remaining Armenian separatist forces, while accused of ; independent analyses highlight Azerbaijan's reclamation of internationally recognized territory but note humanitarian concerns over the mass displacement. In response, and nationalist groups amplified calls for revenge, with polls indicating persistent public resistance to constitutional changes abandoning claims to and adjacent areas, perpetuating a cycle of irredentist ideology despite military realities. These events strained 's relations with neighbors, complicating peace talks as of 2025, where demands 's explicit renunciation of territorial ambitions.

Specific Territories in Dispute

Western Armenia (Eastern )

refers to the western portions of the , encompassing regions now within eastern , including the historical vilayets of , , , and Trebizond. These areas formed the core of pre-modern Armenian settlement, with maintaining cultural and demographic presence amid intermixed populations of , Turks, and others. Prior to , estimates of the Armenian population in the varied, with official Ottoman censuses recording approximately 1.2 million empire-wide by 1914, concentrated heavily in eastern but not forming majorities in any specific province. Armenian Patriarchate figures, often cited by advocacy groups, claimed higher numbers exceeding 1.9 million, though these have been critiqued for potential inflation to bolster political demands. The Ottoman policy of deportations and massacres from 1915 to 1923, known as the , drastically altered demographics, resulting in the death or expulsion of nearly the entire Armenian population from , with survivors fleeing to , , or diaspora communities. By 1923, the Armenian presence in eastern had been reduced to negligible levels, paving the way for Turkish settlement and integration into the Republic of Turkey established that year. Today, the region—spanning provinces like , , and —hosts a population dominated by Turks (70-75% nationally, with higher Kurdish concentrations in the east at around 19%) and virtually no indigenous Armenians, with Turkey's total Armenian community estimated at 40,000-50,000, primarily in . In the context of United Armenia irredentism, proponents, particularly the (ARF), assert claims to these territories based on the 1920 , which allocated significant eastern Anatolian lands to an independent under U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's arbitration, defining "" to include the vilayets of Erzurum, Van, and Bitlis, totaling about 160,000 square kilometers. This treaty envisioned restoring Armenian sovereignty over historic homelands but was never ratified or implemented, superseded by the 1923 , which confirmed Turkish control without Armenian provisions. Advocates frame these claims as rectification of historical injustice, invoking sites like and (now in Turkey) as symbolic Armenian heartlands, though practical realization remains infeasible given entrenched Turkish sovereignty and demographic realities. Some fringe groups, such as the self-proclaimed Republic of Western Armenia established in 2017, continue symbolic assertions of sovereignty, citing Sèvres as lingering legal basis, but these lack international recognition. Critics of such claims, including Turkish perspectives, emphasize the post-genocide population transfers and wars that solidified Turkish control, arguing that ignores over a century of stable borders and multi-ethnic integration under modern . Armenian domestic opposition often views focus on as distracting from security threats like those from , prioritizing realistic diplomacy over revanchist goals.

Nagorno-Karabakh and Surrounding Areas

, referred to by as Artsakh, constitutes a core element of territorial claims within United Armenia , predicated on its longstanding ethnic Armenian majority and historical ties to Armenian polities dating to antiquity. The region features mountainous terrain and was designated the within the in 1923, despite comprising roughly 95% ethnic based on contemporaneous demographics. Soviet policy, influenced by Joseph Stalin's decisions, subordinated the oblast to to balance ethnic influences in the , fostering latent grievances that resurfaced during . By the late Soviet era, the Armenian population had declined to about 77% by from 89% in 1926, amid Azerbaijanization efforts, yet remained predominant at over 145,000 individuals. In February 1988, the oblast's legislative council petitioned for unification with Soviet , igniting pogroms against Armenians in Azerbaijani cities like and the (1988–1994), which claimed approximately 30,000 lives across both sides. Armenian forces secured control of the oblast and seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts—including (providing a vital corridor to ), Kalbajar, Agdam, Fuzuli, , Qubadli, and —displacing over 600,000 and establishing a de facto buffer zone. This configuration aligned with United Armenia visions by linking the enclave to proper and incorporating adjacent Armenian-populated areas like Shahumyan to the north. A 1994 ceasefire brokered by left the self-proclaimed (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic) in effective independence, though unrecognized internationally and subject to mediation efforts that yielded no resolution. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in autumn 2020 reversed much of the prior status quo, with reclaiming all seven districts and portions of the enclave, resulting in over 6,000 military fatalities and reinforcing 's commitment to under principles like . A September 19–20, 2023, Azerbaijani offensive, termed an "anti-terrorist operation" by , overwhelmed remaining Armenian defenses in hours, prompting the capitulation of Artsakh authorities and the flight of nearly 100,000 ethnic Armenians—virtually the entire residual population—to amid reports of humanitarian crises, including a fuel depot explosion killing at least 68. The Republic formally dissolved on January 1, 2024, extinguishing organized Armenian governance and integrating the territory, now renamed Khankendi and surrounding areas, under Azerbaijani administration. These developments, driven by Azerbaijan's military superiority bolstered by Turkish support and drone technology, have nullified practical Armenian control over and its environs, posing a profound challenge to United Armenia proponents who view the region as inalienably Armenian based on demographic and cultural precedents rather than post-Soviet borders. Azerbaijani authorities have since initiated reconstruction and invited refugee returns, though ethnic Armenians cite security fears and cultural erasure risks as barriers.

Javakheti and Meskheti Regions

The Javakheti and Meskheti regions, collectively part of Georgia's Samtskhe-Javakheti province, encompass areas with significant Armenian populations and historical ties invoked in Armenian irredentist narratives. Javakheti, often called Javakhk by Armenians, features districts like Akhalkalaki and Ninotsminda where ethnic Armenians constitute approximately 95% of residents, totaling around 100,000 individuals across roughly 100 settlements. Meskheti, historically Meskhetia, borders Javakheti to the west and was predominantly inhabited by Meskhetian Muslims—classified as ethnic Turks or Muslim Georgians—until their mass deportation by Soviet authorities in 1944, after which Armenian settlement increased in the depopulated areas. Between 92,307 and 94,955 Meskhetians were removed from 212 villages, enabling subsequent demographic shifts favoring Armenians. Armenian proponents of portray as an integral historical component, tracing its inclusion to the ancient Armenian kingdom's Gugark province from at least 428 AD under the Arsacid dynasty, positioning it as the "third " alongside the Republic of Armenia and the lost Artsakh. However, demographic records indicate substantial Armenian influx occurred in the under Russian imperial policy, which resettled Armenians from Ottoman territories while displacing local Muslim populations, including and Turks, resulting in Armenians comprising 72.7% of 's by 1886. Meskheti's pre-deportation inhabitants were primarily non-Armenian, with Armenian claims there relying more on post-1944 expansions than ancient precedents, though some narratives extend historical Armenian influence to the broader Samtskhe- area. In the context of United Armenia ideology, irredentist elements among Armenians advocate for greater autonomy or potential unification with , citing cultural and linguistic isolation—Georgian is rarely spoken locally—and perceived discrimination, such as restrictions on Armenian-language education and repatriation hurdles for Meskhetians that indirectly affect Armenian demographics. Organizations like the United Javakhk Democratic Alliance, comprising ethnic Armenians, push for regional and preservation of Armenian identity, though their demands focus more on rights within Georgia than territorial . Ultranationalist fringes explicitly link to revanchist visions of a greater Armenia, but the Armenian government maintains no official territorial claims, viewing the region as Georgian sovereign territory despite shared ethnic ties. Tensions persist, exacerbated by Georgia's EU aspirations and repatriation policies favoring Meskhetian returnees, which could dilute Armenian majorities, prompting local protests and appeals to for support. Georgian perspectives emphasize the region's pre-19th-century indigenous Georgian-Muslim character, framing Armenian presence as a product of imperial engineering rather than primordial entitlement.

Nakhchivan and Adjara Claims

Armenian irredentist claims to the , an exclave of bordering , , and , are rooted in historical Armenian settlement and administrative control dating to antiquity. Archaeological evidence and medieval records indicate Armenian presence in the region since the (circa 6th-2nd century BCE), with Nakhchivan serving as a provincial center under subsequent Armenian kingdoms, including the Arsacid (1st-5th centuries CE) and Bagratid (9th-11th centuries CE) eras. By the , Russian imperial censuses recorded comprising up to 40% of Nakhchivan's population, bolstered by resettlement policies favoring over local Muslim groups. Following , the asserted sovereignty over Nakhchivan, briefly administering it under British oversight from 1918 to 1920 before Soviet forces intervened. In 1920-1921, Armenian Bolshevik leaders proposed incorporating Nakhchivan into Soviet alongside and , but reassigned it to Soviet in 1924 as a concession to , despite demographic majorities of in some districts at the time. Modern proponents of United Armenia, including (ARF) affiliates, revive these claims, arguing Nakhchivan's cultural heritage—such as ancient khachkars (cross-stones) and churches—evidences its inseparability from Armenian territory, though post-1920s policies reduced the Armenian population to near zero through attrition and displacement. Azerbaijani sources dismiss such assertions as fabricated, emphasizing Turkic-Albanian historical precedence and Soviet-era demographics favoring . Claims to , Georgia's autonomous republic centered on , are more limited and primarily strategic rather than ethno-historical, emerging during the short-lived republics' era (1918-1921). Landlocked sought control or joint administration of 's port for vital sea access, viewing 's Ottoman-era territories as contested amid post-World War I chaos; Armenian forces briefly advanced toward the area in 1918 before Georgian consolidation. The 1921 , ratified by , Soviet , , and Georgia, formalized 's transfer to Georgia in exchange for autonomy guarantees, foreclosing Armenian pretensions despite protests from over lost maritime outlets. Contemporary Armenian nationalist discourse rarely emphasizes , where number around 5,000 (less than 1% of the ), focusing instead on nearby Javakheti's larger ethnic Armenian communities; occasional irredentist rhetoric frames 's Muslim Georgian majority and strategic ports as historically Armenian-adjacent due to medieval Bagratid influences in the broader region, though lacking demographic substantiation. Georgian and analysts interpret any lingering Armenian interest as expansionist, potentially destabilizing regional corridors like the prospective route. These claims persist in fringe political platforms and diaspora advocacy but lack mainstream Armenian governmental endorsement post-1991, constrained by international recognition of post-Soviet borders and Armenia's 2023 peace overtures with , which explicitly renounce territorial ambitions beyond recognized lines. Empirical data on pre-20th-century demographics supports partial historical validity for Nakhchivan but undermines 's case, where Armenian ties were incidental to trade routes rather than settlement cores.

Proponents and Ideological Support

Political Parties and Movements

![National Democratic Pole posters in Yerevan][float-right] The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), known as Dashnaktsutyun, stands as the foremost political party linked to the United Armenia ideology, emphasizing nationalist objectives rooted in historical territorial claims. Established in 1890 in Tiflis (now Tbilisi), the ARF has long championed the liberation and unification of Armenian-populated regions, including those specified in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's arbitral boundaries. Its official program asserts that the current Republic of Armenia occupies merely a portion of these delineated lands, underscoring a commitment to broader national restoration through revolutionary means. In post-Soviet , the ARF functions primarily as an extra-parliamentary opposition entity, integrating into alliances like the Hayastan bloc to contest perceived erosions of Armenian . It has mobilized against border delimitation agreements, particularly following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and 2023 Azerbaijani offensive, viewing such steps as forfeitures of rightful territories. On August 21, 2025, ARF leaders publicly charged Prime Minister with intending additional unilateral concessions to , framing these as threats to national integrity. Complementing the ARF, the National Democratic Pole (NDP), also termed the , represents an ultranationalist coalition of parties and activists opposing territorial adjustments. Formed around 2020–2021, the NDP unites forces such as and promotes democratic nationalism while rejecting government policies seen as capitulatory, including 2024 border handovers in the . Supporters rallied in Yerevan's Freedom Square with posters decrying concessions, aligning with revanchist undercurrents post-Karabakh displacement. Revanchist movements, often intersecting with these parties, surged after Armenia's 2023 territorial setbacks, manifesting in protests like the Tavush for the Homeland initiative led by Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan. These actions, drawing thousands to block roads and encamp near in 2024, demanded rejection of delimitation pacts and Pashinyan's ouster, evoking irredentist resistance to permanent losses. While not formalized parties, such mobilizations amplify United Armenia sentiments, prioritizing historical claims over pragmatic normalization.

Key Figures and Organizations

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, or Dashnaktsutyun), founded in 1890 in Tiflis (now Tbilisi), has been a central organization in Armenian nationalism, participating in the establishment of the First Republic of Armenia in 1918 and advocating for the recovery of historic Armenian lands through political and armed means during periods of conflict with neighboring states. The party's platform has included calls for reparations and recognition tied to territorial aspirations encompassing eastern Anatolia and parts of the Caucasus, though practical focus has shifted over time toward independence and defense. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), operational from 1975 to the early 1990s, was a Marxist-Leninist group that carried out over 100 attacks, primarily against Turkish diplomats and facilities, to compel acknowledgment of the 1915 Ottoman massacres and advance the cause of Armenian territorial liberation, including "" in modern . ASALA's actions resulted in approximately 40 deaths and were linked to broader irredentist goals, though the group desisted by the late 1980s amid declining support and internal factors. Garegin Nzhdeh (1886–1955), a military commander and ideologue, led Armenian forces in key defenses such as the 1918 against Ottoman advances and resisted Bolshevik control in (now Syunik), securing it for against Azerbaijani claims. He founded Tseghakronism, an ethno-nationalist doctrine emphasizing Armenian racial and cultural renewal, which has inspired revanchist sentiments; Nzhdeh is officially recognized as a national hero in , with monuments erected in and Syunik. The Karabakh Movement's Miatsum (unification) campaign, emerging in 1988, was led by the Karabakh Committee, including intellectuals and activists who mobilized protests for merging with , framing it as part of historic Armenian continuity amid Soviet nationalities policies. Figures like , an early proponent before becoming 's president, helped transform local grievances into a mass irredentist drive that escalated into the (1988–1994). Diaspora-based groups such as the (ANCA), established in 1918, have lobbied for U.S. recognition of Armenian claims, including support for Nagorno-Karabakh's as contiguous to broader narratives.

Diaspora and Transnational Advocacy

The , comprising an estimated 5 to 9 million individuals dispersed across countries including the (with around 500,000 to 1.5 million), (approximately 500,000), and (over 1 million), maintains strong cultural and political ties to and has historically mobilized for causes tied to national unity and historical grievances. These communities, shaped by events like the 1915 and Soviet-era displacements, channel resources into transnational networks that amplify advocacy beyond 's borders, including financial remittances exceeding $1 billion annually to support homeland initiatives. Prominent organizations such as the (ANCA), operating since 1918 with chapters across the U.S. and influencing policy in over 30 states, prioritize a "free, united, and independent " as a core objective, framing to encompass disputed regions like (Artsakh). has lobbied U.S. Congress for measures blocking military aid to , securing amendments in the FY2026 to bolster 's defense capabilities and demand the return of Artsakh refugees displaced by 's September 2023 offensive, which forced the exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians. The group rejects peace deals that concede Artsakh's status, advocating instead for the release of Armenian hostages and preservation of Armenian cultural sites there, while criticizing U.S.-backed agreements as rewarding 's actions. Diaspora efforts extend to Western Armenia through campaigns for Armenian Genocide recognition, which ANCA and allied groups position as foundational to reparations claims on territories in eastern Anatolia lost post-World War I. These initiatives have yielded partial successes, such as U.S. congressional resolutions affirming the Genocide since 2019, but diaspora lobbying often intertwines historical restitution with irredentist undertones, as seen in coalitions pushing host governments for sanctions on Turkey over denialism and cultural erasure. In Europe and North America, transnational bodies like ANCA's international affiliates coordinate protests, petitions, and electoral influence—such as endorsing candidates committed to Armenian causes—to sustain pressure, though explicit endorsements of reconquest remain confined to fringe nationalist rhetoric rather than mainstream organizational platforms.

Criticisms and Counterarguments

Domestic Opposition in Armenia

Prime Minister and his Civil Contract party have emerged as leading domestic critics of United Armenia , promoting a "Real Armenia" doctrine that prioritizes the security, economic development, and territorial integrity of 's internationally recognized borders over historical claims to regions like , , , and Nakhchivan. This shift intensified after Azerbaijan's military offensives in 2020 and September 2023, which resulted in the dissolution of the self-declared and the exodus of over 100,000 ethnic Armenians from . Pashinyan has argued that pursuing revanchist goals diverts resources from rebuilding 's military and economy, stating in June 2025 that the "loss" of enabled to refocus on strengthening the Republic of itself rather than illusory expansions. Government efforts to amend Armenia's exemplify this opposition, as Article 11 and the 1990 contain references to unifying "historic " with , which cites as an obstacle to . Pashinyan's administration has proposed revisions to these provisions, viewing them as relics that fuel endless conflict and deter foreign investment; as of , these changes remain stalled amid broader political debates but signal a rejection of pan-Armenian in favor of bilateral normalization. Public sentiment reflects growing pragmatism, with a May 2025 survey by the finding that 90% of desire peace with , though only 50% believe it likely due to lingering distrust and unaddressed border enclaves. Analysts within , including those from think tanks like the Arar Foundation, contend that irredentist rhetoric sustains militarization at the expense of diversification, noting Armenia's GDP contraction of 7.1% in 2020 amid war preparations and persistent reliance on remittances (comprising 12.8% of GDP in 2023). This critique posits that United Armenia advocacy, often amplified by funding and opposition media, undermines deterrence by provoking stronger neighbors; for instance, post-2023 military analyses highlight Armenia's troop shortages (estimated at 20-30% below pre-war levels) and outdated equipment, rendering offensive territorial pursuits infeasible without massive external aid. Civil society voices, including economists and former diplomats aligned with Pashinyan's pivot toward the and reduced Russian dependence, argue that isolates geopolitically, as evidenced by stalled CSTO support during 2022-2023 border clashes where provided no intervention despite treaty obligations. These critics emphasize causal links between revanchist posturing and vulnerability, citing the 2023 (lasting 6 months) as a direct consequence of unresolved claims, and advocate border delimitation based on 1991 Soviet maps to enable infrastructure projects like the Zangezur corridor alternative via . Overall, this domestic opposition frames United Armenia as a maximalist divorced from 's demographic realities— a of 2.96 million in 2024, down from 3.5 million in 1990 due to —and military asymmetries, urging a realist focus on internal reforms to avert further losses.

Azerbaijani and Turkish Perspectives

Azerbaijan views the United Armenia concept as an existential threat to its territorial integrity, encompassing irredentist demands on Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) and the Nakhchivan exclave, which Baku asserts are inalienable parts of its sovereign territory as recognized under international law, including UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874, and 884 adopted between 1993 and 1994. Azerbaijani officials, including President Ilham Aliyev, have conditioned any peace treaty on Armenia's explicit renunciation of such claims, citing Article 11 of Armenia's constitution—which references Nagorno-Karabakh's right to self-determination—as an implicit territorial assertion that perpetuates aggression and hinders normalization. Following Azerbaijan's military restoration of control over Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023, which displaced nearly 100,000 ethnic Armenians, Baku has framed persistent Armenian advocacy for United Armenia as revanchist ideology incompatible with regional stability, often linking it to alleged Armenian militarization and diaspora-funded separatism. From Azerbaijan's standpoint, these claims originate in Soviet-era manipulations that detached Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923 despite its Azerbaijani-majority districts and Turkic historical presence, fueling a conflict that cost Azerbaijan over 13,000 lives and an estimated $20 billion in damages since the 1988-1994 war. Azerbaijani state media and policy documents portray United Armenia proponents as ideological holdouts rejecting the 2020 ceasefire and 2023 outcomes, which affirmed Azerbaijan's borders per the 1991 Alma-Ata Protocol. While Azerbaijan has reciprocally promoted "Western Azerbaijan" narratives asserting historical ties to modern Armenia's northwest, its core critique of United Armenia emphasizes mutual recognition of inviolable borders to enable economic corridors like the Zangezur route, bypassing any revisionism. Turkey similarly rejects United Armenia as a baseless irredentist fantasy rooted in distorted Ottoman history, particularly claims to eastern Anatolia (Western Armenia), which Ankara maintains were legitimately integrated through conquests predating modern nationalism and affirmed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, ratified by 53 states including Armenia's precursors. Turkish officials argue that Armenian territorial assertions conflate legitimate self-defense against World War I-era rebellions—where Armenian militias allied with Russia, disrupting supply lines and causing up to 2.5 million Muslim civilian deaths from 1914-1922—with fabricated genocide narratives, estimating Armenian losses at 300,000-600,000 from wartime hardships rather than systematic extermination. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs contends that such claims ignore the relocation of 1.2-1.5 million Armenians to Syria in 1915 for security reasons, with returns permitted post-war, and dismiss Treaty of Sèvres (1920) proposals for Armenian autonomy as unenforceable impositions by defeated Allies, superseded by Lausanne's final borders. In Turkish discourse, United Armenia advocacy sustains hostility by tying recognition demands to , undermining bilateral normalization protocols signed in 2009 (later frozen) that required mutual border recognition without preconditions. Allied with under the "one nation, two states" doctrine, has provided military support, including drones pivotal in the 2020 Second War, viewing Armenian as a shared regional peril that justifies bolstering Baku's against perceived pan-Armenian . Turkish public and official sentiment, as reflected in parliamentary debates, frames these perspectives as defenses of historical truth against propagandistic relativization of Ottoman loyalist suffering and multi-ethnic coexistence until separatist uprisings. The concept of United Armenia, which seeks to incorporate territories currently within , , and Georgia based on historical and ethnic Armenian presence, has been critiqued under for contravening the principle of , a of the post-World War II order. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, a norm reinforced by subsequent instruments like the , which emphasizes the inviolability of frontiers. Irredentist claims inherent to United Armenia are viewed as incompatible with this framework, as they advocate redrawing borders through unilateral assertion rather than mutual consent, potentially destabilizing recognized sovereign entities. Historical treaties invoked by proponents, such as the 1920 —which proposed an Armenian state in eastern —hold no legal force today, having been superseded by the 1923 , which definitively established Turkey's borders and was ratified by the Allied powers without provisions for Armenian territorial revisions. Lausanne's enduring validity, affirmed through decades of and absence of successful challenges before bodies like the (ICJ), underscores that revanchist appeals to pre-Lausanne arrangements violate and the stability of treaty-based borders. Legal scholars argue that such claims ignore the principle, which preserves administrative boundaries at independence to prevent irredentist cascades. In the context of Azerbaijan, United Armenia's extension to regions like Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan directly conflicts with UN Security Council resolutions (e.g., 822 of 1993, 853 of 1993), which reaffirm Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and demand the unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from occupied districts. The European Court of Human Rights has held Armenia responsible for effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh, implying breaches of Azerbaijan's sovereignty under the European Convention on Human Rights, further eroding claims grounded in remedial self-determination. Self-determination, while applicable in decolonization, does not extend to ethnic secessionism that fragments viable states absent genocide-level oppression, as clarified in ICJ advisory opinions like Kosovo (2010), prioritizing integrity to avert anarchy. Normatively, United Armenia is faulted for fostering over civic pluralism, contravening the (R2P) doctrine by risking population displacements and perpetual low-intensity conflicts, as evidenced in the Armenia-Azerbaijan wars. International bodies, including the , have consistently subordinated rhetoric to territorial compromise, warning that undermines confidence-building and commitments to peaceful border resolution. These critiques emphasize that endorsing such visions would erode the global norm against forcible border changes, established to preclude repeats of early 20th-century upheavals.

Feasibility and Realpolitik

Geopolitical Constraints

The borders of modern Armenia, established following the 1920 and subsequent Soviet delineations, are internationally recognized under principles of , with no major state endorsing revisions favoring Armenian irredentist claims to territories in , , or Georgia. The 1923 , which superseded the unratified , affirmed 's sovereignty over eastern Anatolia without provisions for an independent Armenia or restitution of claimed "" lands, a framework upheld in global diplomacy despite Armenian advocacy. Pursuing unification would require overturning these treaties, inviting legal challenges under international norms against territorial revisionism, as evidenced by the lack of support in UN resolutions or bilateral recognitions. Turkey's geopolitical stance poses a primary barrier, with its —ranked among NATO's strongest, boasting over 350,000 active personnel and advanced capabilities—far outmatching Armenia's forces of approximately 45,000. Borders closed since 1993 in solidarity with remain a flashpoint, though 2025 normalization talks signal conditional reopening tied to mutual non-aggression, explicitly rejecting any territorial concessions. Ankara's alliances, including with via defense pacts and energy corridors, reinforce deterrence against , while domestic Turkish politics frame such claims as existential threats, limiting diplomatic leverage. Azerbaijan's post-2023 military successes, including the recapture of on September 19-20, 2023, which displaced over 100,000 ethnic , underscore Armenia's vulnerabilities, with now demanding constitutional amendments in to excise irredentist preambles before finalizing peace. Negotiations as of October 2025 hinge on Azerbaijan's access corridor to Nakhchivan, a 32-kilometer route through , which Armenia resists as infringement, yet refusal perpetuates risks given Azerbaijan's oil revenues exceeding $20 billion annually and Turkish-backed drone superiority. This dynamic, coupled with 's insistence on border delimitation per 1991 Soviet lines, renders claims to Nakhchivan or Artsakh infeasible without capitulation. Russia's waning reliability as Armenia's security guarantor exacerbates isolation; despite CSTO obligations, Moscow abstained from intervening in the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive, prompting Yerevan to freeze membership in February 2024 and pivot toward EU and U.S. partnerships. With Russian forces now limited to border observation roles post-2023, Armenia lacks a credible deterrent against multi-front threats, while Moscow's Ukraine commitments dilute its Caucasian influence. Broader constraints include Georgia's rejection of Javakheti claims amid EU aspirations and Iran's opposition to Zangezur alterations disrupting its access, leaving United Armenia pursuits diplomatically untenable amid global emphasis on border stability over ethnic unification.

Economic and Military Realities

Armenia's nominal GDP stood at approximately $27.9 billion in , dwarfed by Azerbaijan's $76.4 billion and Turkey's exceeding $1.1 trillion in comparable estimates. This disparity underscores the economic infeasibility of territorial expansionism, as Armenia's landlocked position, heavy reliance on Russian trade (around 25-30% of exports pre-2022 disruptions), and remittances (contributing over 10% of GDP annually) leave it vulnerable to blockades and sanctions that neighbors could impose. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war already strained Armenia's finances through military costs and lost output, while the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive triggered a with over 100,000 refugees, depressing growth and increasing fiscal deficits to 4-5% of GDP. Militarily, Armenia's 2023 defense expenditure reached $1.33 billion, or 5.5% of GDP, yet this remains a fraction of Azerbaijan's $3.56 billion investment, bolstered by oil revenues exceeding $20 billion annually. Turkey's , estimated at over $15 billion in recent years, supports a force with advanced NATO-compatible equipment and production capabilities. Armenia fields around 42,000 active personnel, compared to Azerbaijan's 66,000 and Turkey's 355,000, with Global Firepower ranking Armenia 90th globally in 2025 versus Azerbaijan's 60th and Turkey's 9th. The 2020 and 2023 conflicts exposed Armenia's deficiencies in , air defense, and , where Azerbaijani forces, aided by Turkish , inflicted decisive losses despite Russia's nominal failing to materialize. Claims encompassing Nakhchivan, , or eastern would necessitate sustained multi-front warfare against economically resilient adversaries capable of prolonged attrition, rendering such pursuits causally implausible without external great-power intervention, which empirical history—from Wilson's arbitration to post-Soviet dynamics—shows absent. Armenia's pivot toward Western partnerships post-2023 has yielded limited , insufficient to bridge these gaps, while escalating tensions risks total economic isolation.

Potential Consequences of Pursuit

Pursuit of a "United Armenia," involving territorial claims to regions such as (Artsakh), Nakhchivan, eastern in , and in Georgia, carries substantial risks of military escalation given Armenia's inferior position relative to its adversaries. In confrontations with , Armenia faces a militarily stronger opponent; Azerbaijan ranks 60th globally in military power for 2025 with a Power Index score of 1.2531, bolstered by higher defense spending (projected at $5.12 billion for 2026) and advanced equipment acquired post-2020 war victories. Armenia remains in relative inferiority despite recent procurements from and , as evidenced by the rapid dissolution of Artsakh defenses in September 2023, which displaced over 100,000 ethnic and ended the self-declared republic. Such aggression could invite Azerbaijani advances into southern Armenia, including the Syunik corridor, potentially securing an uncontested route to Nakhchivan under Turkish influence. Claims against Turkey would exacerbate these dangers, provoking a power with one of the world's largest armies and a of firm border policies since closing the Armenia- frontier in 1993 over . 's strategic alliance with , including military aid during the 2020 war, positions it to support counteroffensives, rendering Armenian advances into historical Wilsonian territories (as delimited in 1920 but never implemented) militarily infeasible and likely to result in disproportionate retaliation. Irredentist rhetoric has already sustained the , forgoing potential normalization benefits like reopened trade routes. Economic fallout would compound military setbacks, perpetuating Armenia's isolation from regional corridors essential for diversification beyond Russian dependence. Closed borders with and since the early have stifled growth, with Armenia's economy vulnerable to disruptions and limited transit; pursuit of claims delays integration into projects like the Middle Corridor, risking sanctions or investor flight amid instability. Diplomatically, Western mediators such as the U.S. and prioritize Azerbaijan's exports to over Armenian revisionism, viewing as a barrier to peace and potentially eroding Armenia's post-2023 pivot from . Claims on Georgia's , home to an Armenian minority, pose lesser but nonzero risks of bilateral friction and ethnic spillover tensions, as seen in past minority unrest, without altering the broader asymmetry. Humanitarian consequences mirror recent precedents, including mass displacement and casualties; the 2020-2023 conflicts caused thousands of deaths and flows, with renewed pursuit threatening core Armenian populations through risks or forced migrations. Internally, such a policy could deepen divisions, undermining leaders like Pashinyan who advocate constitutional reforms to excise territorial references for , potentially sparking protests or coups amid economic strain. Overall, empirical outcomes from prior engagements indicate that irredentist escalation favors adversaries' consolidation of gains, entrenching Armenia's vulnerabilities rather than achieving unification.

Public Opinion and Cultural Dimensions

Surveys and Attitudes in Armenia

A 2024 Caucasus Barometer survey by the , conducted between July and October, found that 90% of desire with , yet only about half believe it is likely to occur, with 30% expecting no peace at all and two-thirds rejecting the idea that the is resolved, compared to just 20% who view it as settled. This reflects persistent attachment to as integral to Armenian identity, despite its 2023 integration into Azerbaijan, with 86% of respondents unable to envision a future for Karabakh Armenians under Azerbaijani sovereignty in a separate Foreign Policy Analytics survey. International Republican Institute (IRI) polls indicate mixed support for peace initiatives tied to territorial compromises. A September 2024 IRI survey of 1,503 residents, including displaced persons, showed 56% backing a peace deal with , though 38% saw it as desirable yet unattainable and 33% as both undesirable and unattainable, highlighting skepticism amid irredentist undercurrents. By June 2025, support for the ongoing dipped to a plurality of 47%, with 62.8% believing it impossible without first addressing the Artsakh () issue, underscoring unresolved revanchist sentiments over lost territories. Pre-2020 surveys captured stronger irredentist aspirations, with a 2020 study showing a majority in and favoring expansion of to encompass broader historical Armenian lands, beyond 2011 levels. Post-2023 attitudes have shifted toward security priorities, with 90% opposing further territorial concessions to in a November 2024 poll and low trust in normalization prospects—68.5% deeming with impossible per a June 2025 Arar Foundation survey—though explicit support for pursuing a "United Armenia" encompassing distant claims like remains unquantified in recent data, likely subdued by military defeats and integration challenges. Broader attitudes reveal entrenched : a 2021 survey indicated 30% prioritizing full recovery of territories as Armenia's goal, while hardening views against concessions predate recent losses. IRI data consistently prioritize security and refugee aid over , with positive views of government efforts on displacement but wariness of deals ceding . These polls, drawn from representative samples of 1,500+ adults, suggest cultural resonance with historical but pragmatic resignation, impeding compromise without guarantees on ethnic Armenian rights in disputed areas.

Representations in Media and Culture

serves as a profound in Armenian culture, representing the historic homeland encompassing territories now in eastern Turkey, often termed . Visible from , the mountain features prominently in , poetry, and as an emblem of and resilience following the Armenian Genocide. It is depicted in paintings by artists such as , who portrayed the Ararat valley and the mountain to evoke Armenia's ancient landscapes. In post-1915 cultural consciousness, Ararat embodies the longing for lost lands, appearing on coats of arms, stamps, and official imagery despite its location across the border. Armenian folk music preserves references to regions through songs originating from areas like Moush, Sassoun, and Tigranakert, which lament displacement or celebrate pre-genocide life. Composers like Vardapet collected and notated these melodies, ensuring their transmission in communities and modern performances. Such pieces, often performed in altered meters adapted from 10/8 folk rhythms, reinforce cultural ties to historic territories. In literature, works evoke the unity of Armenian lands, with poets drawing on ancient kingdoms like that of to symbolize past grandeur and future aspirations. Documentaries such as "The Hidden Map" explore buried Armenian heritage in , uncovering evidence of pre-1915 presence amid contested narratives. These representations in media sustain but have drawn criticism for perpetuating irredentist claims unsubstantiated by contemporary international borders. Artistic depictions, including maps of expansive historical empires, illustrate cultural idealization of a "Greater Armenia" spanning modern neighbors' territories. While rooted in verifiable ancient history, such imagery in modern contexts often aligns with ethno-nationalist sentiments rather than empirical geopolitical realities.

Recent Developments

Nagorno-Karabakh Resolution and Aftermath

On September 19, 2023, Azerbaijani forces initiated a large-scale offensive against the self-proclaimed (), an ethnic Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders, citing it as an "anti-terrorist operation" to restore constitutional control. The operation, involving artillery barrages, drone strikes, and ground advances, overwhelmed Armenian defenses in approximately 24 hours, resulting in Azerbaijan's recapture of key positions including the regional capital, (Khankendi). Casualties included around 200 Armenian fighters killed or wounded and at least 208 Azerbaijani soldiers killed, per official reports from both sides. A Russia-brokered took effect on September 20, 2023, under which Artsakh authorities agreed to disarm and integrate into Azerbaijani administration, though implementation faltered amid escalating fears among the ethnic Armenian population. This triggered a rapid mass exodus, with over 100,000 ethnic —nearly the entire pre-offensive population of approximately 120,000—fleeing to via the by early October 2023, citing concerns over safety, cultural erasure, and reprisals following Azerbaijan's prior blockades and military gains. Armenian described the departure as amounting to "," while maintained that residents were free to remain as citizens and that flight was voluntary amid separatist capitulation. By late 2023, fewer than 1,000 remained, with reporting minimal returns as of 2024. On September 28, 2023, Artsakh President signed a decree dissolving the republic's institutions effective January 1, 2024, formally ending its three-decade independence and paving the way for Azerbaijani . subsequently asserted full administrative control, launching reconstruction efforts valued at around $2.4 billion in 2024, focused on , , and resettlement of Azerbaijani IDPs displaced in prior conflicts. The resolution exacerbated Armenia's domestic political instability, fueling protests against Pashinyan's government for perceived inaction and concessions, while underscoring the unviability of maintaining Armenian claims to the territory amid Azerbaijan's military superiority—bolstered by Turkish drones and post-2020 reforms—and waning Russian support via CSTO obligations. Over 100,000 displaced strained 's resources, with from the , , and others addressing immediate needs like and healthcare, though integration challenges persist, including and cultural preservation efforts. Internationally, the event prompted EU-mediated border delimitation talks, with ceding four villages to in 2024 as a step toward broader , but without reversing the loss of Artsakh.

Peace Negotiations and Constitutional Shifts

Following the 2023 Azerbaijani military operation that led to the dissolution of the Republic, and intensified bilateral negotiations aimed at a comprehensive , with talks mediated intermittently by the , , and . By early 2025, the sides had finalized the draft text of a agreement, which included commitments to mutual recognition of territorial integrity within Soviet-era borders, cessation of hostilities, establishment of diplomatic relations, and unblocking of regional transport corridors. Progress included 's handover of four border villages to in 2024 and a bilateral agreement on state commission activities for border delimitation in August 2024. However, conditioned signing on 's constitutional reforms to eliminate perceived territorial claims, particularly references implying sovereignty over (Artsakh). Azerbaijani President repeatedly stated that 's , through its invoking the 1990 —which called for unification of the and the —constitutes an implicit challenge to Azerbaijan's borders. Armenian Prime Minister countered that no article of 's directly references and that does not demand reciprocal amendments to Azerbaijan's , which explicitly claims southern territories of in its . Despite this, Pashinyan initiated a constitutional process in 2024, shifting from amendments to drafting an entirely new by late 2026, with a slated for 2027, explicitly to align with post-2023 realities and facilitate peace. Critics in , including opposition groups, argued this represented a concession eroding national and historical claims, potentially undermining support for broader Armenian territorial aspirations. As of October 2025, partial agreements like the August 2025 Joint Declaration on Future Relations advanced , such as border restrictions easing, but the full treaty remained unsigned pending constitutional resolution. These developments marked a pragmatic pivot in Armenian policy from de facto pursuit of integration—evident in pre-2020 military postures—to border-aligned realism, though continued to demand explicit renunciations of any irredentist interpretations. This shift has fueled domestic debate, with Pashinyan's government framing it as essential for economic normalization and security against further Azerbaijani incursions, while detractors viewed it as abandoning core elements of Armenian tied to historical unification goals.

References

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