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Fula people
Fula people
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Key Information

PersonPullo 𞤆𞤵𞤤𞥆𞤮
PeopleFulɓe 𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫
LanguagePulaar (𞤆𞤵𞤤𞤢𞥄𞤪, West),
Fulfulde (𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤬𞤵𞤤𞤣𞤫, East)

The Fula, Fulani, or Fulɓe people[a] are an ethnic group in the Sahara, Sahel, and West Africa, widely dispersed across the region.[22] Inhabiting many countries, they live mainly in West Africa and northern parts of Central Africa, South Sudan, Darfur, and regions near the Red Sea coast in Sudan. The approximate number of Fula people is unknown, due to clashing definitions regarding Fula ethnicity. Various estimates put the figure between 25[23][24] and 40 million people worldwide.[25]

A significant proportion of the Fula—a third, or an estimated 7 to 10 million[26]—are pastoralists, and their ethnic group has the largest nomadic pastoral community in the world.[27][28] The majority of the Fula ethnic group consist of semi-sedentary people,[28] as well as sedentary settled farmers, scholars, artisans, merchants, and nobility.[29][30] As an ethnic group, they are bound together by the Fula language, their history[31][32][33] and their culture. The Fula are almost completely Muslims, with a small minority being Christians[34] and Animists.[35][36]

Many West African leaders are of Fulani descent, including the former President of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari; the first president of Cameroon Ahmadou Ahidjo; the former President of Senegal, Macky Sall; the President of Gambia, Adama Barrow; the President of Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló; the prime minister of Guinea, Bah Oury; and the Prime Minister of Mali, Boubou Cissé. They also occupy positions in major international institutions, such as the Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, Amina J. Mohammed; the 74th President of the United Nations General Assembly, Tijjani Muhammad-Bande; and the Secretary-General of OPEC, Mohammed Sanusi Barkindo.

Names

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Ethnonyms

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There are many names (and spellings of the names) used in other languages to refer to the Fulɓe. Fulani in English is borrowed from the Hausa term.[37] Fula, from the Manding languages, is also used in English, and sometimes spelled Fulah or Fullah. Fula and Fulani are commonly used in English, including within Africa. The French borrowed the Wolof term Pël, which is variously spelled: Peul, Peulh, and even Peuhl. More recently the Fulfulde / Pulaar term Fulɓe, which is a plural noun (singular, Pullo) has been Anglicised as Fulbe,[38] which is gaining popularity in use. In Portuguese, the terms Fula or Futafula are used. The terms Fallata, Fallatah, or Fellata are of Arabic origins, and are often the ethnonyms by which Fulani people are identified by in parts of Chad and Sudan.

The Toucouleur people of the central Senegal River valley speak Fulfulde / Pulaar and refer to themselves as Haalpulaaren, or those who speak Pulaar. The supposed distinction between them was invented by French ethnographers in the 19th century who differentiated between supposedly sedentary, agricultural, fanatical, and anti-European Toucouleurs on one hand and nomadic, pastoralist, docile and cooperative Peulhs on the other, but the dichotomy is false.[39]

Surnames

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Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal

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Common Fulani family names in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Southern Senegal are: Diallo (French speaking regions), Jallow or Jalloh (English speaking regions), Djalo (Cap Verde and Guinea-Bissau), Sow, Barry, Bah or Ba, Baldé, and Diouldé.[40] Other Fulani (Toucouleur) family names in Guinea and northern Senegal are: Tall, Sall, Diengue, Sy, Anne, Ly, Wann, Dia and others.

Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon

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Although most Fulbe of Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon use their father's given name as surnames, there are some common Fulani last names such as Bello (likely from the Fulfulde word Ballo meaning "helper or assistant", this name is spread across several ethnic groups in Nigeria),[41][42] Tukur (from Takrur), Gidado, Barkindo, Jallo, Ahidjo and Dikko.

Mali, Burkina Faso

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In Mali, the most common Fulani family names are Diallo, Diakité, Dia, Sow, Sidibé, Sangaré, Bah, Dicko, Tall, etc. These names can be found among the Fulani populations of the following Malian regions and areas of Mopti, Macina, Nioro, Kidal, Tomboctou, Gao, Sikasso, and others.[43][44] These names are also found among the Fula population of Burkina Faso, along with other names like Barry and Sankara (derived from Sangaré).[45]

Bocoum, Niangadou, Bassoum, Daff, Djigué, and Lah are some family names that can be found among the Diawambe/Jawambe (Singular: Dianwando/Jawando and Diokoramé/Jokorameh in Bambara) of Mali.[46] The Jawambe are a sub-group of Fulanis in Mali who are primarily known for trading.[46]

In some parts of Mali, like Mopti, apart from the common Fula surnames like those previously mentioned, you will find surnames like Cissé and Touré. Though these names are commonly associated with the Manding tribes, some in Mali have adopted the Fula culture and language through centuries of coexistence, and thus now consider themselves as part of the Fula ethnic group. A notable example of this is Amadou Toumani Touré, the former president of Mali.

Geographic distribution

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A distribution map of Fula people. Dark green: a major ethnic group; Medium: significant; Light: minor.[22][47]

The Fula people are widely distributed, across the Sahel from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea, particularly in West Africa. In addition, many also speak other languages of the countries they inhabit, making many Fulani bilingual or even trilingual. Such languages include French, Hausa, Bambara, Wolof, Soninke, and Arabic.

Major concentrations of Fulani people exist in the Fouta Djallon highlands of central Guinea and south into the northernmost reaches of Sierra Leone; the Futa Tooro savannah grasslands of Senegal and southern Mauritania; the Macina inland Niger river delta system around Central Mali; and especially in the regions around Mopti and the Nioro Du Sahel in the Kayes region; the Borgu settlements of Benin, Togo, and west-central Nigeria; the northern parts of Burkina Faso in the Sahel region's provinces of Seno, Wadalan, and Soum; and the areas occupied by the Sokoto Caliphate, which includes what is now southern Niger and northern Nigeria (such as Adamawa, Tahoua, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Zinder, Bauchi, Diffa, Yobe, Gombe, and further east, into the Benue River valley systems of north eastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon).

This is the area known as the Fombina/Hombina, literally meaning 'the south' in Adamawa Fulfulde, because it represented the most southern and eastern reaches of Fulɓe hegemonic dominance in West Africa. In this area, Fulfulde is the local lingua franca, and language of cross cultural communication. Further east of this area, Fulani communities become predominantly nomadic, and exist at less organized social systems. These are the areas of the Chari-Baguirmi region and its river systems, in Chad and the Central African Republic, the Ouaddaï highlands of Eastern Chad, the areas around Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile, Sennar, Kassala regions of Sudan,[48] as well as the Red Sea coastal city of Port Sudan. The Fulani on their way to or back from the pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia, settled in many parts of eastern Sudan, today representing a distinct community of over two million people referred to as the Fellata.[49][50][51]

Bodaado (singular of Wodaabe) Fula man with the typical Fulani hat above a turban

While their early settlements in West Africa were in the vicinity of the tri-border point of present-day Mali, Senegal, and Mauritania, they are now, after centuries of gradual migrations and conquests, spread throughout a wide band of West and Central Africa. The Fulani People occupy a vast geographical expanse located roughly in a longitudinal east–west band immediately south of the Sahara, and just north of the coastal rain forest and swamps. There are estimates of more than 25 million Fulani people.[24]

There are generally three different types of Fulani based on settlement patterns, viz: the nomadic-pastoral or Mbororo, the semi-nomadic, and the settled or "town" Fulani. The pastoral Fulani move around with their cattle throughout the year. Typically, they do not stay around for long stretches (not more than 2–4 months at a time). The semi-nomadic Fulani can either be Fulɓe families who happen to settle down temporarily at particular times of the year or Fulɓe families who do not "browse" around past their immediate surroundings, and even though they possess livestock, they do not wander away from a fixed or settled homestead not too far away, they are basically "in-betweeners".[52]

Settled Fulani live in villages, towns, and cities permanently and have given up nomadic life completely, in favor of an urban one. These processes of settlement, concentration, and military conquest led to the existence of organized and long-established communities of Fulani, varying in size from small villages to towns. Today, some major Fulani towns include: Labé, Pita, Mamou, and Dalaba in Guinea; Kaedi, Matam and Podor, Kolda in Senegal and Mauritania; Bandiagara, Mopti, Dori, Gorom-Gorom, and Djibo in Mali and Burkina Faso, on the bend of the Niger; and Birnin Kebbi, Katsina, Gombe, Yola, Digil, Jalingo, Bauchi, Misau, Jama'are, Mayo Belwa, Mubi, Maroua, Ngaoundere, Azare ,Dukku, Kumo, Girei, Damaturu, Bertoua, and Garoua in the countries of Cameroon and Nigeria. In most of these communities, the Fulani are usually perceived as a ruling class[citation needed].

Fulani communities are sometimes grouped and named based on the areas they occupy. Although within each region, there are even further divisions and sub-groupings as well. Below is a list of the main Fulɓe groups.

Main Fulani sub-groups, national and subnational locations, cluster group and dialectal variety
Fulbe Adamawa
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤀𞤣𞤢𞤥𞤢𞤱𞤢
Fulfulde Adamawa (Fombinaare) Eastern
Fulbe Bagirmi
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤄𞤢𞤺𞤭𞤪𞤥𞤭
Fulbe Sokoto
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤅𞤮𞤳𞤮𞤼𞤮
Fulfulde Sokoto (Woylaare)
Fulbe Gombe
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤘𞤮𞤲'𞤦𞤫
Nigeria: Gombe State, Bauchi State, Yobe State, Borno State, Plateau State Fulfulde Woylaare-Fombinaare transitional
Fulbe Mbororo
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤐'𞤄𞤮𞤪𞤮𞤪𞤮
  • Nigeria: All across the northern, central and some southern states of the country as transient herders
  • Cameroon: All over the country in 9 of the country's 10 regions/provinces as transient herders
  • Chad: All across southern and central Chad as herders
  • Central African Republic: Ubiquitous across the countryside
  • Niger: All across the country south of the Sahara as herders and nomads. Note that the Woɗaaɓe are themselves an even smaller subgroup of the Mbororo'en. Thus: All Woɗaaɓe are Bororos, but not every Bororo is a Boɗaaɗo (Woɗaaɓe person)
  • Sudan
Fulfulde Sokoto (Woylaare) & Adamawa (Fombinaare)
Fulbe Borgu
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤄𞤮𞤪𞤺𞤵
Fulfulde Borgu & Jelgoore Central
Fulbe Jelgooji
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤔𞤫𞤤𞤺𞤮𞥅𞤶𞤭
Fulfulde Jelgoore & (Massinakoore)
Fulbe Massina
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤃𞤢𞤧𞥆𞤭𞤲𞤢
Fulfulde Massinakoore
Fulbe Nioro
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤻𞤮𞥅𞤪𞤮
Pulaar – Fulfulde

Fuua Tooro -Massinakoore transitional

Western
Fulbe Futa Jallon
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤊𞤵𞥅𞤼𞤢 𞤔𞤢𞤤𞤮𞥅
Pular Fuuta Jallon
Fulbe Futa Tooro
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤊𞤵𞥅𞤼𞤢 𞤚𞤮𞥅𞤪𞤮
Pulaar Fuuta Tooro
Fulbe Fuladu
𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫 𞤊𞤵𞤤𞤢𞤣𞤵
Pulaar – Pular

Fuuta Tooro – Fuuta Jallon transitional

In Ghana, the exact number of Fulani is unknown due to systematic oppression that includes not counting the Fulani in the Ghanaian census. This reflects widespread discrimination and negative stereotypes about the Fulani.[53]

History

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Origins

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The origins of the Fulani people are unclear and various theories have been postulated. As a nomadic herding people, they have moved through and among many cultures, making it difficult to trace their relationships and history with other peoples. Speculations about their origins started in the era of European conquest and colonization because of their oftentimes fair skin, wavy long hair and facial features.[54]: 25 

Some Fulani oral histories, like other Muslim groups, suggest that their origins lie in Egypt or the Middle East.[55] Others hold Futa Tooro as their homeland, which is supported by linguistic evidence.[56]

Early Kingdoms

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Tassili n'Ajjer rock art

The precursors of the Fulani likely migrated out of the Sahara desert (likely from Western Sahara),[57] at the time much wetter than today, as it progressively dried beginning in the 7th century BC.[54]: 56  They migrated into the Senegal river valley from the east, pushed by Berber raids and desertification.[58][59] The kingdom of Tekrur in what is now Futa Toro was formed through the interaction of the Fula (and perhaps Berber) migrants with the native "Negro agricultural peoples" of the valley who were "essentially Serer".[60][54]: 56  Dominated first by Wagadu and later by the Lamtuna, the Mali Empire, and the Jolof Empire, in the early 16th century the area was conquered by Koli Tenguella, who founded the Empire of Great Fulo.[61][62]

Migration

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The Fulani were cattle-keeping farmers who shared their lands with other nearby groups, like the Soninke, who contributed to the rise of ancient Ghana, with eastward and westward expansion being led by nomadic groups of cattle breeders or the Fulɓe ladde. While the initial expansionist groups were small, they soon increased in size due to the availability of grazing lands in the Sahel and the lands that bordered it to the immediate south.

Ghanaian Fulani wedding bride

Agricultural expansions led to a division among the Fulani, where individuals were classified as belonging either to the group of expansionist nomadic agriculturalists or the group of Fulani who found it more comfortable to abandon traditional nomadic ways and settle in towns or the Fulɓe Wuro. Fulani towns were a direct result of nomadic heritage and were often founded by individuals who had simply chosen to settle in a given area instead of continuing on their way.

Evidence of Fulani migration as a whole, from the Western to Eastern Sudan is very fragmentary. Delafosse, one of the earliest enquirers into Fulani history and customs, principally relying on oral tradition, estimated that Fulani migrants left Fuuta-Tooro heading east between the eleventh and the fourteenth centuries. By the 15th century, there was a steady flow of Fulɓe immigrants into Hausaland and, later on, Bornu. Their presence in Baghirmi was recorded early in the 16th century. By the end of the 18th century, Fulani settlements were dotted all along the Benue River valley and its tributaries. They spread eastwards towards Garoua and Rey Bouba, and southwards towards the Faro River, to the foot of the Mambilla Plateau, which they would later ascend in subsequent years. The heaviest concentrations of their settlements were at Gurin, Chamba territory, Cheboa, Turua and Bundang.

Today, Fula oral historians recognize three different Fuuta, or Fula lands: Fuuta Kingi, meaning 'Old Fuuta', encompassing the Tagant Plateau, the Assaba Region, the Hodh, Futa Toro and the area around Nioro du Sahel; Fuuta Keyri, 'New Fuuta', includes Futa Djallon, Massina, Sokoto, and the Adamawa Region; Fuuta Jula is the diaspora of Fula traders and emigrants in other regions.[54]: 26 

Islam and the Fula Jihads

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Fulani woman from Niger
Nigerian Fulani man with traditional marks

The Fula, living on the edge of the Sahara, were among the first sub-Saharan groups to adopt Islam. According to David Levison, adopting Islam made the Fulani feel a "cultural and religious superiority to surrounding peoples, and that adoption became a major ethnic boundary marker" between them and other African ethnic groups in the Sahel and West Africa.[63]

Armed with horses and weapons from the north and inspired by Fula, Berber and Arab clerics, Fulani political units would play a central role in promoting Islam in West Africa through peaceful and violent means. These jihads targeted other ethnic groups but also other Fulani who had not yet adopted Islam or who follows it too loosely.[61][64] These wars helped the Fula dominate much of the Sahel region of West Africa during the medieval and pre-colonial era, establishing them not only as a religious group but also as a political and economic force.[65][66] From the 18th century onwards, the frequency of jihads increased and the Fulani became politically dominant in many areas.[61]

While establishing their hegemony, the Fulbe defined a strict social hierarchy and imposed limitations on economic and trading activities, the purpose of which was to ensure a constant flow of tax revenue and commodities to the state apparatus and the standing army, especially for the cavalry. The freedom for pastoralists to move around was curtailed to ensure the smooth functioning of other production activities, such as cereal cultivation and, in the case of Maasina, of fishing activities. There was considerable resistance to the forced acceptance of Islam. Conversion to Islam meant not only changing one's religion but also submitting to rules dealing with every aspect of social, political and cultural life, intrusions with which many nomadic Fulbe were not comfortable.[67]: 53 

Bundu

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In 1690, Torodbe cleric Malick Sy[68] came to Bundu, in what is now eastern Senegal, from his home near Podor. Sy settled the lands with relatives from his native Futa Toro and Muslim immigrants from as far west as the Djolof Empire and as far east as Nioro du Sahel.[69]

Under Sy, Bundu became a refuge for Muslims and Islamic scholars persecuted by traditional rulers in other kingdoms.[70] Sy was killed in 1699 caught in an ambush by the army of Gajaaga.[71]: 192  Still, Bundu's growth that would set a precedent for later, larger, and more disruptive Fula jihads.[71]: 192 

Imamate of Futa Jallon

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The Emirate / Imamate of Timbo in the Fuuta Jallon developed from a revolt by Islamic Fulɓe against their oppression by the pagan Pulli (فُلِی or 𞤆𞤵𞤤𞥆𞤭, non-Islamic Fulɓe), and the Jallonke (the original Mande inhabitants of the Fuuta-Jallon), during the first half of the 18th century. The first ruler took the title of Almaami and resided in Timbo, near the modern-day town of Mamou.[67]: 53  The town became the political capital of the newly formed Imamate, with the religious capital was located in Fugumba. The Council of Elders of the Futa Jallon state were also based in Fugumba, acting as a brake on the Almami's powers.[citation needed]

The newly formed imamate was mostly located mainly in present-day Guinea, but also spanned parts of modern-day Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. This emirate was, in fact, a federal state of nine provinces: Timbo, Fugumbaa, Ɓuuriya, Koyin, Kollaaɗe, Keebaali, Labe, Fode-Hajji, and Timbi. After the Muslim Fulɓe victory, other ethnic groups who had resisted the jihad were deprived of their rights to land except for a small piece for their subsistence and were reduced to servitude. The nomad Pulli Fulɓe lost all freedom of movement, and thus, began to settle en-masse. The Jalonke lost their noble status and became slaves (maccuɓe).[67]: 53 

Later, due to strife between two branches of the Seediayanke royal lineage, (the Soriya and the Alphaya),[72] a system for the rotation of office between these branches was set up. This led to an almost permanent state of civil strife since none of the parties was inclined to respect the system, which considerably weakened the power of the political centre.[67]: 54 

Imamate of Futa Toro

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A jihad in Futa Toro between 1769 and 1776 led by Sulayman Bal threw out the ruling Denianke Dynasty.[73]: 541–2  Sulayman died in 1776 and was succeeded by Abdul Kader ('Abd al-Qadir), a learned teacher and judge who had studied in Cayor.[74]: 419 

Abdul Kader became the first Almamy of the theocratic Almamyate of Futa Toro.[73]: 541–2  He encouraged construction of mosques, and pursued an aggressive policy towards his neighbors.[74]: 419  The Torodbe prohibited the trade in slaves on the river. In 1785 they obtained an agreement from the French to stop trading in Muslim slaves and to pay customs duties to the state. Abdul Kader defeated the emirates of Trarza and Brakna to the north, but was defeated and captured when he attacked the Wolof states of Cayor and Waalo around 1797. After his release the jihad impetus had been lost. By the time of Abdul Kader's death in 1806 the state was dominated by a few elite Torodbe families.[73]: 541–2 

Sokoto Caliphate and its various emirates

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The Sokoto Caliphate was by far the largest and most successful legacy of Fulani power in Western Africa. It was the largest, as well as the most well-organized, of the Fulani Jihad states. Throughout the 19th century, Sokoto was one of the largest and most powerful empires in West Africa until 1903, when defeated by European colonial forces. The Sokoto Caliphate included several emirates, the largest of which was Adamawa, although the Kano Emirate was the most populated. Others included, but are not limited to: Gombe Emirate, Gwandu Emirate, Bauchi Emirate, Katsina Emirate, Zazzau Emirate, Hadejia Emirate, and Muri Emirate.[75]

Depiction of a Fulani man from the Sokoto Caliphate by G.T. Bettany (1888)

Empire of Massina

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Fula people have helped form several historic Islamic theocracies and led many Jihad states such as the 19th-century Masina.[65][66]

The Maasina Emirate was established by the Fulbe jihad led by Seku Amadu in 1818, rebelling against the Bamana Empire, a political power that controlled the region from Segou. This jihad was inspired by Usman Dan Fodio and his jihad in Sokoto.[67]: 56  This state appears to have had tight control over its core area, as evidenced by the fact that its political and economic organization is still manifested today in the organization of agricultural production in the Inland Delta. Despite its power and omnipresence, the hegemony of the emirate was constantly threatened. During the reign of Aamadu Aamadu, the grandson of Sheeku Aamadu, internal contradictions weakened the emirate until it fell to the Toucouleur in 1862.[67]: 56 

Toucouleur Empire

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The founder of the Toucouleur Empire, El Hadj Umar Tall, was an Islamic reformer originating from Fuuta Tooro. Beginning in Futa Jallon, he led an army that conquered Massina, Segou, and Kaarta, but he died fighting against rebels in 1864. At that point the emirate was divided into three states, each ruled by one of his sons. These three states had their capitals respectively in the towns of Nioro, Segou and Bandiagara. Within 30 years, all three had been conquered and colonized by the French.[67]: 63 

Timeline of Fulani history

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Time Events
4th century The Ghana Empire emerges in modern-day southeastern Mauritania and western Mali, as the first large-scale Sudano-Sahelian empire
5th century The Ghana Empire becomes the most important power in West Africa
5th century (?) The Fulbe migrate southwards and Eastwards from present-day Morocco and Mauritania[dubiousdiscuss]
9th century Takrur founded on the lower Senegal River (present-day Senegal) upon the influx of Fulani from the east and north settling in the Senegal River valley
11th century Kingdoms of Tekruur and the Gao Empire flourish in West Africa due to gold trade
1042 Almoravids, Berber Muslims from southern Morocco and Mauritania, attack Takrur, after defeating the Sanhaja in 1039
1050s Islam gains a strong foothold in West Africa
1050–1146 Almoravids take over Morocco, Algeria, and part of al-Andalus; they invade Ghana in 1076 and establish power there.
1062 Almoravids found capital at Marrakesh
1100 The Empire of Ghana starts to decline in influence and importance
1147 The Almohad Caliphate, ruled by Berber Muslims opposed to the Almoravids, seize Marrakesh and go on to conquer Almoravid Spain, Algeria, and Tripoli
1150 An unprecedented resurgence of the Ghana Empire sees it reach its height, controlling vast areas of western Africa as well as Saharan trade routes in gold and salt
1200 Empire and themselves set out on a road of conquest, they take its capital Koumbi Saleh in 1203
1235 Great warrior leader Sundiata Keita of the Mandinka people founds the Mali Empire in present-day Mali, West Africa; it expands under his rule
1240–1250 Mali absorbs Ghana, Tekruur
1324 10th Emperor of Mali, Musa I of Mali regarded as the richest individual in recorded history, goes on his famous pilgrimage to Mecca, Saudi Arabia. his procession reported to include 18,000 workers who each carried 4 pounds (1.8 kg) gold bars, heralds dressed in silks who bore gold staffs, organized horses and handled bags. Musa provided all necessities for the procession, feeding the entire company of men and animals. Also in the train were 80 camels, which varying reports claim carried between 50 and 300 pounds (23 and 136 kg) of gold dust each
1325 The Empire of Mali reaches its height of power, covering much of Northern West Africa.
1352 Ibn Battuta, Berber scholar, travels across Africa and writes an account of all he sees
1462 Sonni Ali becomes ruler of the Songhai people and goes on to build the Songhai Empire
1490 The Mali empire is overshadowed by the Songhai Empire
16th century Songhai Empire enters a period of massive expansion and power under Askia Mohammad I. Askia Mohammad strengthened his country and made it the largest contiguous territory ever in West African history. At its peak, the Empire encompassed the Hausa states as far as Kano (in present-day Nigeria) and much of the territory that had belonged to the Songhai empire in the west neighbouring Bornu Empire of the Kanuri
1515 The Songhai Empire reaches its zenith and pinnacle of power
1590 Songhai Empire is defeated by invading Moroccans from further North
1650 Another wave of Fulbe migrations sees them penetrate even further in the Southern Senegal and Fouta Jallon highlands of middle Guinea
1670 Fulani people gain control of Bhundu in Senegal with Malick Sy, and the Sissibhe
1673 First unsuccessful Fulani jihad in the Fuuta Tooro
1808 Bornu successfully repel Fulani forces
1893 The French conquer the Fouta-Toro
1903 The British conquer the Sokoto Caliphate[76]

Society

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Fulbe woman at the Sangha market, Mali 1992
Fulbe woman at the Sangha market, Mali 1992

The Fulani, migrant Arabs and Hausa people have taken some influences from each other's cultures. Upon the success recorded in the 1804 Fulani War of Usman dan Fodio, many formerly nomadic Fulɓe subsequently joined the ruling classes of the many emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate. The Fulɓe of Hausaland dress in the clothing and speak the language of their Hausa neighbours (see Hausa–Fulani). Because they became the dominant ethnic group in these lands, the Fulɓe in the emirates outside Hausaland, like parts of Kanem-Bornu, Adamawa and Gombe, still retain much of their Fulani culture even still speaking Fulfulde as their first language. The Fulɓe who didn't settle during this period and their descendants, however, still keep an obvious distinct identity from that of the Hausa and other surrounding groups of the region. This Hausa–Fulani interaction is uncommon outside the eastern subregion of West Africa.[77][75]

In Mali, Burkina Faso and Senegal for instance, those within the Fulɓe cultural sphere, but who are not ethnically Fula, are referred to as yimɓe pulaaku (𞤴𞤭𞤥𞤩𞤫 𞤆𞤵𞤤𞤢𞥄𞤳𞤵, "people of the Fula culture"). As such, Fulani culture includes people who may or may not be ethnic Fulani.[78] Although slavery is now illegal, memories of the past relationship between Fulɓbe and Rimayɓe are still very much alive in both groups. Paul Riesman, an American ethnographer who resided among the Jelgooji Fulɓbe of Burkina Faso in the 1980s, states that the Fulɓe are tall, slim, and light-skinned; they have thin straight noses, and their hair tends to be long and curly. In contrast, the Rimayɓe are stocky, tending towards corpulence, dark-skinned with flat 'squashed' noses, and short kinky hair.[79][80][81]

Slavery and caste system

[edit]

The first Fulani people who were forcibly expatriated to America during the Atlantic slave trade came from several parts of West and Central Africa. Many Fulani slaves came from places such as Guinea, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Cameroon. Most of the slaves who came from Senegal belonged to Fula and Mandinga peoples.[82][83] Some of the most common names found on the Registry of Liberated Africans were Fulani in origin.[84][85] Many of the captors and perpetrators of raids providing sources for the European slave merchants were also Fulani.[86]

Samuel Gamble, Log of the slaver-ship Sandown: Africans being brought to the coast at Sierra Leone by the Fulani people.

Fula society features the caste divisions typical of the West African region.[87][88] The fairly rigid caste system of the Fula people has medieval roots,[87] had become well established by the 15th-century, and has survived into modern age.[22] The four major castes, states Martin Kich, in their order of status are "nobility, traders, tradesmen (such as blacksmith) and descendants of slaves".[22] According to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Fulani people have held on to "a strict caste system".[89]

There are the Fulani proper, also referred to as the Fulɓe, including the Pullo (also called the Rimɓe (singular)) and the Dimo, meaning "noble". There is the artisan caste,[88] including blacksmiths, potters, griots,[90] genealogists, woodworkers, and dressmakers. They belong to castes but are considered free people. Then there are those castes of captive, slave or serf ancestry: the Maccuɗo, Rimmayɓe, Dimaajo, and less often Ɓaleeɓe, the Fulani equivalent of the Tuareg Ikelan known as Bouzou (Buzu) or Bella in the Hausa and Songhay languages respectively.[91][92][93] The Fulani rulers and merchants were, like many other ruling ethnic groups of Africa, also involved in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, sourcing the enslaved people through raids and from captives they took by waging war.[29][61][94] Many Fulani were enslaved and raided by ethnic groups who adhered to traditional African religions.[95]

The Fulani castes are endogamous in nature, meaning individuals marry only within their caste. This caste system, however, wasn't as elaborate in places like northern Nigeria, Eastern Niger or Cameroon. According to some estimates, by the late 19th century, slaves constituted about 50% of the population of the Fulɓe-ruled Adamawa Emirate, where they were referred to as jeyaɓe (singular jeyado). Though very high, these figures are representative of many other emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, of which Adamawa formed a part.[96] The castes-based social stratification among the Fula people was widespread and seen across the Sahel, such as Burkina Faso,[97] Niger,[98] Senegal,[99] Guinea,[88] Mali,[98][100] Nigeria,[101] Sudan,[102] and others.[103]

Culture

[edit]

Traditional livelihood

[edit]

The Fulani are traditionally a nomadic, pastoralist trading people. They herd cattle, goats and sheep across the vast dry hinterlands of their domain, keeping somewhat separate from the local agricultural populations. They are the largest nomadic ethnic group in the world and inhabit several territories over an area larger in size than the continental United States. The pastoral lifestyle of the herders' tribe makes it complicated for a non-member to date or marry a Fulani woman.[104]

The Fulani follow a code of behaviour known as pulaaku, which consists of the qualities of patience, self-control, discipline, prudence, modesty, respect for others (including foes), wisdom, forethought, personal responsibility, hospitality, courage, and hard work. Among the nomadic Fulani, women in their spare time make handicrafts including engraved gourds, weavings, knitting, beautifully made covers for calabashes known as mbeedu, and baskets. The Fulani men are less involved in the production of crafts such as pottery, iron-working, and dyeing, unlike males from neighbouring ethnic groups around them.

Fulani pastoralists in Niger

In virtually every area of West Africa, where the nomadic Fulɓe reside, there has been an increasing trend of conflicts between farmers (sedentary) and grazier (pastoral nomadic). There have been numerous such cases on the Jos Plateau, the Western High Plateau, the Central/Middle Belt regions of Nigeria,[105] Northern Burkina Faso, and Southern Chad. The rearing of cattle is a principal activity in four of Cameroon's ten administrative regions as well as three other provinces with herding on a lesser scale, throughout the North and Central regions of Nigeria, as well as the entire Sahel and Sudan region.[106]

For decades there have been intermittent skirmishes between the Woɗaaɓe Bororo (graziers) and sedentary farmers such as the Jukun, Tiv, Chamba, Bamileke, Wurkum, Bachama, Jenjo, Mbula, Berom, Mumuye, Kare Kare, and sometimes even the Hausa. Such conflicts usually begin when cattle have strayed into farmlands and destroyed crops. Thousands of Fulani have been forced to migrate from their traditional homelands in the Sahel, to areas further south, because of increasing encroachment of Saharan desertification. Nigeria alone loses 2,168 square kilometres (837 sq mi) of cattle rangeland and cropland every year to desertification, posing serious threats to the livelihoods of about 20 million people.[106]

Recurrent droughts have meant that a lot of traditional herding families have been forced to give up their nomadic way of life, losing a sense of their identity in the process.[107] Increasing urbanization has also meant that a lot of traditional Fulani grazing lands have been taken for developmental purposes, or forcefully converted into farmlands.[108] These actions often result in violent attacks and reprisal counterattacks being exchanged between the Fulani, who feel their way of life and survival are being threatened, and other populations who often feel aggrieved from loss of farm produce even if the lands they farm on were initially barren and uncultivated.[105]

Several Wodaabe clans in Niger have gathered for a Guérewol festival

Fulani in Nigeria have often requested for the development of exclusive grazing reserves, to curb conflicts.[109] All the leading presidential aspirants of previous elections seeking Fulɓe votes have made several of such failed promises in their campaigns. Discussions among government officials, traditional rulers, and Fulani leaders on the welfare of the pastoralists have always centred on requests and pledges for protecting grazing spaces and cattle passages. The growing pressure from Ardo'en (the Fulani community leaders) for the salvation of what is left of the customary grazing land has caused some state governments with large populations of herders (such as Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Taraba, Plateau, and Kaduna) to include in their development plans the reactivation and preservation of grazing reserves. Quick to grasp the desperation of cattle-keepers for land, the administrators have instituted a Grazing Reserve Committee to find a lasting solution to the rapid depletion of grazing land resources in Nigeria.[110]

Henri Allouard (1844–1929) – Young Fulani woman

The Fulani believe that the expansion of the grazing reserves will boost livestock population, lessen the difficulty of herding, reduce seasonal migration, and enhance the interaction among farmers, pastoralists, and rural dwellers. Despite these expectations, grazing reserves are not within the reach of about three-quarters of the nomadic Fulani in Nigeria, who number in the millions, and about sixty per cent of migrant pastoralists who use the existing grazing reserves keep to the same reserves every year. The number and the distribution of the grazing reserves in Nigeria range from insufficient to severely insufficient for Fulani livestock. In countries like Nigeria, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso where some cow supplies are dependent on the Fulani, such conflicts lead to hikes in beef prices. In recent times, the Nigerian senate and other lawmakers have been bitterly divided in attempts to pass bills on grazing lands and migration "corridors" for Fulani Herdsmen. This was mainly due to Southern and Central Nigerian lawmakers opposing the proposal, and Northern Lawmakers being in support.[110] Fulani extremists are involved in herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria.[111][105][112][113][114][115] According to the Global Terrorism Index, a continuous sequence of Fulani attacks across West Africa have occurred in Mali,[116][117][118] Central African Republic,[112] Democratic Republic of Congo,[119] and Cameroon.[120] The cumulative fatalities in these attacks is in the thousands.[112]

Language

[edit]

The language of the Fulani is "Pulaar" 𞤆𞤵𞤤𞤢𞥄𞤪, which is also the language of the Toucouleurs. All Senegalese and Mauritanians who speak the language natively are known as the Halpulaar (𞤖𞤢𞤤𞤨𞤵𞤤𞤢𞥄𞤪) or Haalpulaar'en (𞤖𞤢𞥄𞤤𞤵𞤤𞤢𞥄𞤪𞥇𞤫𞤲), which means "speakers of Pulaar" ("hal" is the root of the Pulaar verb haalugol 𞤖𞤢𞥄𞤤𞤵𞤺𞤮𞤤, meaning "to speak"). In some areas, e.g. in northern Cameroon, Fulfulde is a local lingua franca.

There are three writing systems used to write this language: an Arabic derived one called Ajami, a Latin derived system with 6 sets, and a native phonetic-faithful system called Adlam recently invented in 1989; the third one is the most increasingly popular not only learnt by hundreds of thousands of people among the diaspora worldwide but has also apps and computer programs created to assist in the script's adoption.[121]

Moral code

[edit]

Central to the Fulani people's lifestyle is a code of behavior known as pulaaku (Fulfulde: 𞤆𞤵𞤤𞤢𞥄𞤳𞤵) or laawol Fulɓe (𞤂𞤢𞥄𞤱𞤮𞤤 𞤆𞤵𞤤𞤩𞤫) literally meaning the "Fulani pathways" which are passed on by each generation as high moral values of the Fulbe, which enable them to maintain their identity across boundaries and changes of lifestyle. Essentially viewed as what makes a person Fulani, or "Fulaniness", pulaaku includes:

  • Munyal: Patience, self-control, discipline, prudence
  • Gacce / Semteende: Modesty, respect for others (including foes)
  • Hakkille: Wisdom, forethought, personal responsibility, hospitality
  • Sagata / Tiinaade: Courage, hard work

Dress

[edit]
The traditional hat (Tengaade) of the Fulani people worn in diverse slightly different variations among every Fula subgroup

There are no particular outfits for all Fulani sub-groups; dressing and clothing accessories such as ornaments mostly depend on the particular region. The traditional dress of the Fulbe Wodaabe consists of long colourful flowing robes, modestly embroidered or otherwise decorated. In the Futa Jallon highlands of central Guinea, it is common to see men wearing a distinctive hat with colorful embroidery. In Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger, men wear a hat that tapers off at three angular tips, known as a noppiire. Both men and women wear a characteristic white or black cotton fabric gown, adorned with intricate blue, red and green thread embroidery work, with styles differing according to region and sex.

Antique Fulani Blanket, Mali, estimated to be from the 1920s courtesy the WOVENSOULS collection

It is not uncommon to see the women decorate their hair with bead hair accessories as well as cowrie shells. Fula women often use henna for hand, arm and feet decorations. Their long hair is put into five long braids that either hang or are sometimes looped on the sides. It is common for women and girls to have silver coins and amber attached to their braids. Some of these coins are very old and have been passed down in the family. The women often wear many bracelets on their wrists. The women can also be seen wearing a colorful cloth (modjaare) around, the waist, head or over one shoulder.[122]

Like the men, the women have markings on their faces around their eyes and mouths that they were given as children. The Western Fulbe in countries like Mali, Senegal and Mauritania use indigo inks around the mouth, resulting in a blackening around the lips and gums.

Fulani men are often seen wearing solid-colored shirt and pants which go down to their lower calves, made from locally grown cotton, a long cloth wrapped around their faces, and a conical hat made from straw and leather on their turbans, and carrying their walking sticks across their shoulders with their arms resting on top of it. Often the men have markings on either side of their faces and/or on their foreheads. They received these markings as children. Fula ethics are strictly governed by the notion of pulaaku. Women wear long robes with flowery shawls. They decorate themselves with necklaces, earrings, nose rings and anklets.[123]

Herding

[edit]

Fula are primarily known to be pastoralists, but are also traders in some areas. Most Fula in the countryside spend long times alone on foot, and can be seen frequently parading with their cattle throughout the west African hinterland, moving their herds in search of water and better pasture. They were, and still are, the only major migratory people group of West Africa, although the Tuareg people, another nomadic tribe of North African origin, live just immediately north of Fula territory, and sometimes live alongside the Fulani in countries such as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. The Fulani, as a result of their constant wandering of the past, can be seen in every climatic zone and habitat of West Africa, from the deserts of the north, to the derived savannah and forests of the south.

From the 16th to 20th centuries many Fulani communities settled in the highlands of the Jos Plateau, the Western High Plateau of Bamenda, and Adamawa Plateau of Nigeria and the Cameroons. These are the highest elevated places in West Africa, and their altitude can reach up to 8,700 feet above sea level. The highland plateaus have a more temperate climate conducive for cattle herding activities, which allowed Fulbe populations to settle there in waves of migrations from further west. Though most Fula now live in towns or villages, a large proportion of the population is still either fully nomadic, or semi-nomadic in nature.

Wealth is counted by how large the herd of cattle is. Long ago Fulani tribes and clans used to fight over cattle and grazing rights. Being the most treasured animal that the Fulanis herd, the cows are very special. Many people say that a person cannot speak Fulfulde if he does not own a cow. The Fulani have a tradition of giving a habbanaya – a cow which is loaned to another until she calves. Once the calf is weaned it is retained and the cow is returned to its owner. This habbanaya is a highly prized animal. Upon receipt of this gift, there is a special ceremony in honor of the gift. The recipient buys special treats and invites his neighbors for this event in which the habbanaya is given a name. The habbanaya is never to be struck under any circumstance.

An N'Dama herd in West Africa

Fulani nomads keep various species of cattle, but the zebu is the most common in the West African hinterland, due to its drought resistant traits. In the wetter areas of Fouta Djallon and Casamance, the dwarf N'Dama is more common, as they are highly resistant to trypanosomiasis and other conditions directly associated with high humidity. Subspecies of zebu include the White Fulani cattle, locally known as the Aku, Akuji, Bororoji, White Kano, Yakanaji or Bunaji, which are an important beef breed of cattle found throughout the area owned by both Fulani and Hausa people and beyond in the Sahel zone of Africa.[124]

The Red Fulani cattle, which are called the Jafun French: Djafoun in Nigeria and Cameroon, and Fellata in Chad, as well as other names such as the M'Bororo, Red Bororo, or Bodaadi, another subspecies is the Sokoto Gudali and the Adamawa Gudali or simply Gudali, which means "horned and short legged" in the Hausa language. The widely accepted theory for the origin of present-day zebu cattle in West Africa is that they came from the westward spread of the early zebu populations in East Africa through the Sudan. Other breeds of zebu are found mainly in the drier regions. Their body conformation resembles the zebu cattle of eastern Africa. The zebu did not appear in West Africa until about 1800.[124] The increasing aridity of the climate and the deterioration of the environment in the Sahel appear to have favoured the introduction and spread of the zebu, as they are superior to longhorn and shorthorn cattle in withstanding drought conditions.

The origins and classification of the Fulani remains controversial; one school of thought is of the opinion that the Fulani cattle are truly long-horned zebus that first arrived in Africa from Asia on the east coast; these are believed to have been introduced into West Africa by Arab invaders during the seventh century, roughly about the same time that the short-horned zebus arrived into East Africa. This theory is supported by the appearance of the skull as well as the thoracic hump of the Fulani cattle.[124]

Another school of thought contends that these cattle originated from the Horn of Africa, present-day Ethiopia and Somalia, and that interbreeding between the short-horned zebu (which arrived in the Horn around the first millennium BC) and the ancient Hamitic Longhorn and/or B. taurus brachyceros shorthorn (which had arrived much earlier) occurred in the Horn about 2000–1500 BCE. The subsequent successive introductions of the short-horned zebu are believed to have displaced most sanga cattle into southern Africa.[124]

Fulani herders in Mali

During this period of constant movement of people and animals within Africa, some of these sanga cattle probably intermixed with the short-horned, thoracic-humped cattle to produce the thoracic-humped sanga. The latter may have migrated, most probably along with the spread of Islam, westerly to constitute what are today the lyre-horned cattle of West and Central Africa, including the Fulani cattle. Originally the White Fulani were indigenous to north Nigeria, southeast Niger and northeast Cameroon, owned by both Fulani and Hausa people. They then spread to southern Chad and western Sudan.[124]

Every year, in the Malian town of Diafarabé, Fulani men cross the Niger River with their cattle, in an annual cycle of transhumance. This annual festival is known in the local Fulfulde as the Dewgal. Since the founding of the village in 1818, it has always been the most important Fulani festival. It takes place on a Saturday in November or December; the day is carefully chosen based on the state of pastures and the water levels in the river Niger. During the rainy season, the river swells, and the areas around the village are inundated in water, as the level of the river Niger rises, and turns Diafarabe into an island. The cattle are kept on the lush fields up north or south, but when the West African Monsoon subsides and the drier season returns, the water level drops and the cattle can return home again.[125][126][127]

The crossing is more than a search for pastures; it is also a competition to show craftsmanship as a herdsmen. The cattle are driven into the river, and each herder, with no help from others, loudly encourages the animals to move forward as he stands or swims between them, holding on to the horns of the bulls. The smaller animals don't have to swim, but are lifted into pirogues. When all the cattle are back, they are judged by a panel, which decides whose animals are the "fattest". That herder is awarded "best caretaker", and he is awarded by the community.[125][126][127] The worst caretaker ends up with a shameful "prize" – a peanut.

Besides being a competition of herdsmanship, it is also a social event; the herdsmen return after having been away for the most part of the year and they meet their family and friends again. It is a time for celebration. The women decorate their house with woven mats and paint the floor with white and black clay, braid their hair with very intricate patterns, and dress up for their husbands and loved ones. Impressed by the cultural significance attached to the annual event, UNESCO included it on its list of world cultural heritage events.[125][126][127]

Music

[edit]
Fulani dancers in their full traditional regalia.

The Fula have a rich musical culture and play a variety of traditional instruments including drums, hoddu (a plucked skin-covered lute similar to a banjo), and riti or riiti (a one-string bowed instrument similar to a violin), in addition to vocal music. The well-known Senegalese Fula musician Baaba Maal sings in Pulaar on his recordings. Zaghareet or ululation is a popular form of vocal music formed by rapidly moving the tongue sideways and making a sharp, high sound.

Fulani music is as varied as its people. The numerous sub-groups all maintain unique repertoires of music and dance. Songs and dances reflect traditional life and are specifically designed for each individual occasion. Music is played at any occasion: when herding cattle, working in the fields, preparing food, or at the temple. Music is extremely important to the village life cycle, with field cultivation, harvest and winnowing of millet performed to the rhythm of the songs and drums.

Fulani herders have a special affinity for the flute and violin nianioru. The young Fulani shepherd like to whistle and sing softly as they wander the silent savannah with cattle and goats. The truly Fulani instruments are the one-string viola of the Fulani (nianioru), the flute, the two to five string lute hoddu or molo, and the buuba and bawdi set of drums. But they are also influenced by the other instruments of the region such as the beautiful West African harp, the kora, and the balafon. Entertainment is the role of certain casts. The performance of music is the realm of specialized casts. The Griots or Awlube recite the history of the people, places and events of the community.

Food

[edit]
Fulani calabashes used for butter and milk storage and as containers for hawking

Kossam can be the general term for both fresh milk miraɗam and yoghurt known as pendidan in Fulfulde. It is central to Fulbe identity and revered as a drink or in one of its various processed forms, such as yoghurt and cheese. Kettugol and lébol are derived from milk fat, are used in light cooking and hair weaving. It is common to see Fulani women hawking milk products in characteristic beautifully decorated calabashes balanced on their heads. Other meals include a heavy porridge (nyiiri) made of flour from such grains as millet, sorghum, or corn which is eaten in combination with soup (takai, haako) made from tomatoes, onions, spices, peppers, and other vegetables.[128] Also, in addition to rice, which is a staple crop for the Fulani people, their main vegetables and staples are yams, corn, beans, and red pepper. The Fulani people eat cassava roots and fruits like plantains as well.[129]

Another popular meal eaten by almost all Fulani communities is made from fermenting milk into yoghurt and eaten with corn couscous known as latchiiri or dakkere, either in the same bowl or separately, also a fluid or porridge called gāri made of flour cereals such as millet, sorghum or corn and milk. The Wodaabe traditionally eat millet, milk and meat as staples. Millet is eaten in the morning, noon and night as a grease with a sauce or stew which usually contains tomatoes, peppers, bone, meat, onion, and other vegetables. On special occasions they eat meat such as goat or beef. A thick beverage similar to the Tuareg eghajira is made by pounding goat cheese, milk, dates and millet.[citation needed]

Ceramics

[edit]

The Fulani people are not as engaged in artistic endeavors like ceramics and pottery as other nearby cultures because they feel that these pursuits "violate their code of conduct and bring shame upon them". That being said, the Fulani women do produce handicrafts including knitting, weaving, and basketry. Seldom do Fulani men work in crafts.[129]

Houses

[edit]
Fulani "grass house" in Mali

Traditionally, nomadic Fula live in domed houses known as a Bukkaru or suudu hudo, literally "grass house". During the dry season, the characteristically hemisphere-shaped domed houses are supported by compact millet stalk pillars, and by reed mats held together and tied against wood poles, in the wet or rainy season. These mobile houses are very easy to set up, and dismantle, as typical of houses from nomadic societies. When it is time to move, the houses are easily disassembled and loaded onto donkeys, horses or camels for transport. With recent trends however, many Fula now live in mud or concrete block houses.[citation needed]

Once they are set up, the room is divided into a sleeping compartment, and another compartment where calabashes and guards of all sizes are intricately arranged in a stack according to their sizes and functions. Spoons made from gourda are hung from the rooftop, with others meant for grain storage.[citation needed]

Religion

[edit]

The Fula were one of the first ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa to convert to Islam, maintaining it as an intrinsic part of their cultural identity, although in some cases elements of traditional African faiths are mixed in a predominantly Muslim religious syncretism.[130] The vast majority of Fula people are Muslims, with some religious minorities — largely Fula Christians, a small minority group (1-2%) present in parts of northern Nigeria. Nearly all Fula Christians are recent converts from Islam, or descendants of recent converts. The group faces severe persecution from both Fulani Muslims due to their faith and other Nigerian Christians due to their ethnicity.[131][132]

Rites of passage

[edit]

Marriage

[edit]

In the Fulani society, marriage is considered endogamy rather than exogamy. Marriage is permitted amongst people of the same lineage. Marriage is generally between cross-cousins and parallel cousins. Even before their birth, the children were betrothed. The caste system and political stratification have a role in their conventional marriage. Marriage exists to maintain wealth and the royal dynasty. They practice early marriage, which is typically arranged by relatives. The men marry in their twenties, while the women marry in their teens. A man is permitted to marry more than one woman so long as he can meet his wives' requirements equally.[133]

The traditional Fulani marriage system consists of three phases: the Kabbal, Koowgal, and Sharo stages.

In the Sharo stage of the marriage process, the man is publicly flogged by other men to assess his strength, discipline, and bravery. If the prospective groom cries, the bride's family may reject him and view him as a coward. Not every ethnic group adheres to this tradition. The groom's people support him during the painful flogging process.[133]

Genetics

[edit]

The Fulani people are genetically an admixture of West and East African ancestries, specifically Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan components, but also display varying degrees of West Eurasian admixture through contact with groups from North Africa.[134] The Fulani are the most wide-spread pastoralist group in the Sahel/Savannah belt.[135]

Paternal lineages (Y-DNA)

[edit]

The paternal lineages of the Fula/Fulɓe/Fulani tend to vary depending on geographic location. According to a study by Cruciani et al. (2002), around 90% of Fulani individuals from Burkina Faso carried haplotype 24, which corresponds with the E-M2 (E1b1a) that is common in West Africa. The remainder belonged to haplotype 42/haplogroup E-M132. Both of these clades are today most frequent among Niger–Congo-speaking populations, particularly those inhabiting Senegal. Similarly, 53% of the Fulani in northern Cameroon bore haplogroup E-M132, with the rest mainly carrying other African clades (12% haplogroup A and 6% haplogroup E1b1a). A significant minority carried the West Eurasian haplogroups T (18%) and R1 (12%), making up together around ~30% of the total haplogroup variation.[136] Mulcare et al. (2004) observed a similar frequency of haplogroup R1 subclades in their Fulani samples from Cameroon (18%).[137]

A study by Hassan et al. (2008) on a Fulani subgroup in Sudan observed a significantly higher occurrence of the West-Eurasian haplogroup R1 (53.8%). The remainder belonged to E-M215 subclades, including 34.62% E-M78 and 27.2% E-V22.[138] Bučková et al. (2013) analyzed various Fulani subgroups, and observed R1b among the Fulani Zinder grouping with a frequency of ~31%. This was in sharp contrast to most of the other Fulani pastoralist groups elsewhere, including those from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Chad, which instead had nearly exclusive West African paternal haplogroups.[139]

Maternal lineages (mtDNA)

[edit]
mtDNA Haplogroups of Fula Groups [140]
Population African Sub-Saharan mtDNA Eurasian mtDNA (%)
Fulani Abalak (Niger) 70% 30%
Fulani Ader (Niger) 80% 20%
Fulani Balatungur (Niger) 91% 9%
Fulani Banfora (Burkina Faso) 76% 24%
Fulani Bongor (Chad) 90% 10%
Fulani Diffa (Niger) 90% 10%
Fulani Diafarabe (Mali) 74% 26%
Fulani Fouta Djallon (Guinea) 83% 17%
Fulani Ferlo (Senegal) 98% 2%
Fulani Linia (Chad) 90% 10%
Fulani Tcheboua (Cameroon) 86% 14%
Fulani Tindangou (Burkina Faso) 80% 20%
Fulani Zinder (Niger) 90% 10%
Fulani Ziniare (Burkina Faso) 90% 10%

A study of four Fulani nomad populations (n = 186) in three Sahelian countries (Chad, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso), found that the only group of nomadic Fulani that manifests some similarities with geographically related agricultural populations (from Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria) comes from Tcheboua in northern Cameroon.[141][142]

Autosomal DNA (overall)

[edit]

According to Tishkoff et al. (2009), the Fulani's genomic ancestry clusters near that of Chadic and Central Sudanic speaking populations, with genetic affinities observed to the Hausa people. Based on this, the researchers suggest that the Fulani may have adopted a Niger-Congo language at some point in their history, while intermarrying with local populations. Additionally, moderate levels of West Eurasian admixture was also observed among the Fulani samples, which the authors propose may have been introduced via the Iberian Peninsula and Northern Africa.[143] Dobon et al. (2015), found that the Sudanese Fulani have largely ancestry from Niger-Kordofanian and Nilo-Saharan (Sudanic) speaking groups, with lower amounts of West-Eurasian ancestry.[144]

Young Fulani men at Cure Salee festival, Niger.

Triska, Petr et al. (2015) showed that there is extensive admixture across the Sahel Belt, with the Fula carrying West African and East African components, as well as a Mozabite/North African component. These results support the hypothesis of a North African origin and a Western to Central Africa past migration for Fulani.[145]

A full genome analysis was conducted by Vicente et al. in 2019, analyzing several different Fulani subgroups from various geographic regions. They found that the Fulani people are characterized by the admixture of local West African and East African components, but also display West-Eurasian admixture, mediated through historical North African groups. The West-Eurasian ancestry among Fulani was estimated to a mean average of 21,4% among the 53 samples from Ziniaré in Burkina Faso. According to the authors, there were two admixture events, the first being about 2000 years ago, with the second being more recent at around 300 years ago. This Eurasian ancestry was observed in the ancestry components of Mozabite people. They found that: "Our findings suggest that Eurasian admixture and the European LP allele was introduced into the Fulani through contact with a North African population/s. We furthermore confirm the link between the lactose digestion phenotype in the Fulani to the MCM6/LCT locus by reporting the first GWAS of the lactase persistence trait. e observed a T-13910 allele frequency of 48.0%, while the genome-wide European admixture fraction in the Fulani is 21.4% at K = 3. The notable European admixture fraction in the Fulani coupled with the high frequencies of the LP T-13910 allele suggests the possibility of adaptive gene flow into the Fulani gene pool".[135] Another study in 2020 by Priehodová et al., suggest an older date for the introduction of one variant of the LP allele in the Sahel, about ~8.5 ka.[146]

A study in 2019 by Fan et al., found that the Fulani sampled from Cameroon, clustered with Afro-Asiatic speakers from East Africa in the phylogenetic analysis, which the authors said indicates a potential shift in language to Niger-Congo. The analysis on autosomal markers found traces of West Eurasian-related ancestry in this population, which suggests a North African or East African origin (as North and East Africans also have such ancestry likely related to expansions of farmers and herders from the Near East) and is consistent with the presence at moderate frequency of the −13,910T variant associated with lactose tolerance in European populations.[147]

In 2020, a study inferred that the Fulani of western Cameroon have 48% Mende-related, 23% East African-related, and 29% non-African-related ancestry.[148]

In 2023, whole genomes of Fulani individuals from various Sahelian samples were analyzed, and the researches said the non-Sub-Saharan genetic ancestry within the Fulani cannot be solely explained by recent admixture events. Fulani may be descendants of Saharan cattle herders during the last Green Sahara, who had some genomic similarities to Late Neolithic Moroccans based on ancient samples.[149]

Another 2023 study inferred that "The Fulani derived 50% of their ancestry from a population related to the Amhara and 50% from a population related to the Tikari (consistent with TreeMix results with 3 migration events)."[150]

Notable Fulanis

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
The Fula people, also known as Fulani or Fulɓe, constitute 's largest pastoralist ethnic group, numbering between 25 and 40 million individuals primarily inhabiting the and savanna belts from to . Their defining characteristic is a semi-nomadic centered on , which has sustained their mobility and economic independence across diverse ecological zones in West and . Genetic studies reveal a complex ancestry involving admixture between West African populations and groups bearing approximately 20% North African or Western Eurasian components, likely resulting from ancient migrations during the Green period and subsequent interactions. This heritage has equipped them with unique adaptations, such as enhanced metabolic efficiency for dairy consumption, facilitating their pastoral dominance. Historically, the Fula expanded through routes and, from the 18th century onward, spearheaded Islamic reformist jihads that established enduring theocratic states, including the in present-day and the in , thereby influencing regional governance and the spread of . Predominantly Muslim since at least the , they integrate pastoral rituals with orthodox practices, though subgroups like the maintain distinctive courtship festivals such as Gerewol amid broader cultural homogeneity tied to the , an Atlantic branch of Niger-Congo. In contemporary times, escalating resource scarcity in the has intensified farmer-herder clashes, where Fula pastoralists often face marginalization despite their contributions to economies, underscoring tensions between sedentary and mobile under climatic pressures. These dynamics highlight the Fula's resilience amid demographic growth and land competition, with their dispersed settlements spanning over 20 countries.

Nomenclature

Ethnonyms and self-identification

The Fula people designate themselves collectively as Fulɓe (or Fulbe in anglicized form) and individually as Pullo (or Pullo). This endonym reflects their core ethnic identity and is used across diverse subgroups, emphasizing internal cohesion amid pastoral or sedentary lifestyles. Exonyms vary by linguistic and regional contexts, often arising from phonetic adaptations by neighboring groups. In Hausa-speaking areas of and , they are termed Fulani, a Hausa-derived pluralization of Fulbe, widely adopted in English but not universally embraced by the group itself. In Francophone , Peul or Peulh predominates, borrowed from the Wolof term Pël, reflecting colonial-era French administrative usage. Manding languages yield Fula or Fulah, while Arabic-influenced regions like employ Fallata or Fellata, denoting the same population through interactions with Arabized or Kanuri communities. Regional nuances include Fulbe in Cameroon, aligning closely with the endonym, and avoidance of terms implying subordination or otherness. Among subgroups, Bororo (or Bororo'e) specifically identifies nomadic pastoralists, a Hausa term rooted in Fulbe nomenclature for a distinct social stratum focused on cattle herding; however, settled Fulbe sometimes apply it pejoratively to connote bush-dwelling or lack of hygiene, highlighting internal tensions over lifestyle purity. These preferences underscore debates wherein some Fulbe advocate exclusive use of endonyms to preserve autonomy from external impositions, viewing exonyms as artifacts of historical contact rather than intrinsic descriptors of nomadic heritage or superiority.

Surnames and regional naming conventions

Among the Fula people, surnames frequently originate from patrilineal affiliations, serving to denote lineage descent and historical social roles, such as noble herders (pullo) or artisans (rimɓe), with passing through male lines to preserve identity. In western Sahelian regions like , , and , prevalent surnames include , linked to a specific Fulani of pastoralist heritage, and Barry, similarly tied to -based lineages emphasizing mobility and herding. These names reflect endogamous practices within clans, where surnames encode ancestral ties to founding lineages rather than individual achievements. Regional divergences in naming emerge from linguistic and cultural interactions; in and , former French colonies, surnames often retain Fula phonetic forms with minimal orthographic alteration, prioritizing fidelity over external influences. Conversely, in and , particularly Hausaland-influenced zones, surnames like Bello—derived from Fulani origins as an altered form of Ballo—and Dikko incorporate Hausa-Arabic elements, adapting to sedentary Islamic scholarly networks established during 19th-century jihads. Bello, for instance, traces to Fulani noble s but has diffused across ethnic boundaries in northern due to intermarriage and political dominance. Such surnames facilitate tracing social status distinctions, as noble clans (e.g., those bearing or Bello) historically monopolized and , while artisan clans adopted specialized markers inherited patrilineally to signal occupational roles like blacksmithing or leatherworking, though inter-clan mobility has blurred some lines over time. This clan-surname linkage underscores Fula emphasis on genealogical purity, with variations by geography reinforcing adaptive identities amid migrations across .

Geographic distribution and demographics

Historical range and migration patterns

The Fula people's earliest documented historical range centers on the Fuuta Tooro region along the middle Senegal River valley, where pastoralist communities were established by the 11th century, as referenced in medieval Arabic geographic accounts of the Takrur polity. From this Senegambian base, gradual expansions occurred southward toward the Futa Jallon massif in present-day Guinea and eastward across the Sahel, following riverine and savanna corridors suitable for transhumant cattle herding. These pre-jihad movements, spanning the 11th to 16th centuries, were primarily propelled by ecological pressures on pastoral resources, including seasonal migrations for grazing lands amid fluctuating Sahelian climates and competition with sedentary agriculturalists. By the 17th and 18th centuries, intensified migrations linked Fuuta Tooro to Futa Jallon via established trade and herding routes like the Falémé valley, enabling Fulani clerical and nomadic groups to infiltrate highland areas dominated by Jallonke and Malinke rulers. The Futa Jallon emerged from these dynamics through a initiated in the late , culminating in the overthrow of non-Muslim and syncretic Muslim elites by approximately 1750, thereby solidifying Fulani political control over the highlands and facilitating denser pastoral settlements. Concurrently, eastward shifts reached the , setting the stage for further consolidation. In the early 19th century, jihadist expansions accelerated: Seku Amadu's campaign, launched around 1818, defeated Bambara forces at the Battle of Noukouma and founded the Massina Caliphate (also known as Hamdallahi) in central Mali's floodplains, extending Fulani authority over flood-recession farming zones and pastoral corridors previously held by the Ségou Empire. The parallel Sokoto jihad, begun in 1804 under , overthrew Hausa city-states and propelled migrations into the Central Sudan, establishing a caliphate whose boundaries by the 1830s encompassed roughly 500,000 square kilometers across northern , southern , northern , and eastern , marking the easternmost historical extent of Fulani political and demographic influence. These jihad-driven shifts not only redefined imperial frontiers but also integrated Fulani pastoralists into administrative hierarchies, with emirs overseeing tribute from conquered territories estimated to support populations exceeding 10 million within Sokoto's core domains.

Current populations across countries

The Fula people total an estimated 25 to 40 million individuals dispersed across West and , with population figures derived from varying national censuses and ethnographic surveys that often undercount nomadic groups. hosts the largest , approximately 16.8 million Fula as of 2019 estimates adjusted for national growth rates exceeding 200 million total inhabitants. follows with around 4.9 million, comprising a significant portion of its 13 million residents, while and each support 3 to 4 million, concentrated in Sahelian regions. Smaller minorities, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, reside in countries like (about 7.6% of the ), , , and the .
CountryEstimated Fula Population
16.8 million (2019)
4.9 million (2019)
3-4 million
3-4 million
~1.5 million (7.6%)
Urbanization has accelerated among Fula communities since the early 2000s, with many transitioning from to semi-sedentary or urban livelihoods due to land pressures and economic opportunities, leading to concentrations in cities like , , and , . This shift is evident in sedentarization trends observed in and broader regions, where over 90% traditionally pastoralist Fula increasingly integrate into urban economies while retaining livestock rearing. Rural Fula remain predominant in pastoral zones, but urban populations have grown, comprising up to 20-30% in some national subgroups based on 2020s migration patterns. Diaspora communities of Fula origin exist in and the , formed primarily through migrations starting in the 1990s and continuing into the 2020s, often integrating into Muslim enclaves in cities like New York and , though exact numbers remain unquantified in official statistics. These groups maintain cultural ties through language and associations, with recent inflows linked to African instability but totaling under 1% of the global Fula population.

Origins and genetic history

Linguistic and archaeological hypotheses

Fulfulde, the language of the Fula people, is classified within the Atlantic subgroup of the Niger-Congo phylum, sharing structural features such as nominal classes with relatives like Wolof and Serer, which situates its proto-form in the coastal and Senegambian zones of West Africa, potentially emerging around 3000–2000 BCE amid early Bantu expansions. This phylogeny underscores autochthonous West African roots, with core lexicon and grammar showing no substantive ties to Afro-Asiatic families despite occasional claims otherwise. Documented loanwords from in Fulfulde, numbering over 50 nouns and including verbs derived from terms for implements like (miqaṣṣ > meksa), reflect lexical borrowing tied to trans-Saharan and Islamic dissemination post-8th century CE, when Arab-Berber alliances facilitated southward exchanges. Berber substrates are hypothesized in terminology, suggesting pre-Islamic Saharan contacts circa 1000 BCE–500 CE, though systematic inventories remain limited; these overlays do not alter the language's Niger-Congo foundation, countering diffusionist models positing wholesale North African derivation. Archaeological evidence from the Dhar Tichitt-Walata escarpments in southeastern reveals proto-urban pastoral complexes dating 4000–2300 BCE, with dry-stone enclosures, millet cultivation, and cattle remains indicating sedentary herding economies that prefigure Sahelian nomadism. These sites, spanning up to 500 settlements by 2000 BCE, evince via enclosure sizes and artifact densities, posited as ancestral templates for Fula mobility, though artifactual continuity is absent, with later Fula aligning more closely to medieval Sahelian ironworking phases. Broader hypotheses invoke the "Green " (ca. 10,000–5000 BP), when monsoonal shifts enabled lacustrine evidenced by of humped and herders, as a dispersal vector for proto-Fula groups southward into aridifying fringes. Such models emphasize adaptive migrations over static homelands, critiquing ethnonationalist interpretations that romanticize unadulterated descent from isolated oases; empirical gaps in linking specific motifs to Fula ethnonyms highlight reliance on circumstantial ecological parallels rather than diagnostic artifacts.

Paternal, maternal, and autosomal genetic profiles

The paternal genetic profile of the Fula people is marked by elevated frequencies of Y-chromosome haplogroup R1b-V88, a of West Eurasian origin found at rates of 20-54% across sampled Fula populations in the and , suggesting historical male-mediated migrations of pastoralists into . E1b1b, associated with North African and Near Eastern lineages, also appears prominently, comprising 10-35% in various Fula groups, further indicating male-biased admixture from northern sources rather than local sub-Saharan origins. These uniparental markers contrast with the Fula's Niger-Congo affiliation, pointing to elite dominance or asymmetric in ancestral populations. Maternal lineages, traced via , are overwhelmingly sub-Saharan, with over 75-80% belonging to L haplogroups such as L1b, L2a/c/d, and L3b/d, which predominate in West African sedentary groups and reflect limited external female contributions. Minor Eurasian-derived haplogroups like M1 or U5 occur at low frequencies (under 10-20%), underscoring patrilineal asymmetry where incoming male lineages integrated into local female gene pools with minimal reciprocal flow. Autosomal DNA analyses reveal an overall ancestry composition of approximately 70-85% sub-Saharan West African, with 15-25% input from North African and West Eurasian sources, aligning with the uniparental patterns and supporting admixture events tied to expansions rather than wholesale replacement. This intermediate Eurasian component, higher than in neighboring non-ist groups, correlates with the disproportionate paternal signals and is estimated to date back several millennia based on decay.

Recent genomic admixture studies

A 2025 study analyzing whole-genome sequences from Fulani populations across the identified a uniform genetic component shared among diverse Fulani groups, interpreted as deriving from ancient Sahelian pastoralists during the Green Sahara period approximately 12,000–5,000 years ago. This "Fulani component" reflects a deep pastoralist ancestry, distinct from surrounding West African sedentary groups, and persists despite geographic dispersion from to . Uppsala University-led analyses corroborated this uniformity, linking it to prehistoric and early herder adaptations in the region, with minimal variation attributable to local drift rather than separate origins. Admixture modeling in the same 2025 research estimated approximately 20% West Eurasian ancestry in Fulani genomes, primarily from medieval North African sources such as Berber populations, dated to events between 1,000–1,500 years ago via shared segments. This input likely facilitated innovations, including dairy tolerance alleles, but does not indicate recent or dominant Eurasian origins, as the core ancestry remains sub-Saharan with layered Sahelian signals. A 2023 genomic survey further traced this to echoes of Green Sahara dynamics, where Fulani ancestors admixed with northward-migrating herders carrying North African elements. Select Fulani subgroups, particularly in eastern extensions like , exhibit trace East Eurasian ancestry (under 5%), potentially from indirect via East African intermediaries or ancient dispersals, though not central to the primary Fulani profile. These findings challenge narratives emphasizing unadmixed sub-Saharan homogeneity for Fulani, revealing instead a shaped by millennia of mobility; ongoing intermarriage with host populations sustains low-level , evident in clinal variation and elevated heterozygosity compared to isolated neighbors. Such dynamics underscore causal links between pastoral nomadism and admixture, rather than isolation.

Historical developments

Pre-Islamic era and early kingdoms

The Fula (also known as Fulɓe or Peul) in the pre-Islamic era were predominantly nomadic pastoralists scattered across the western , from the valley to the fringes of the upper , engaging in with large herds that formed the core of their economy and social prestige. Their subsistence relied on seasonal migrations between dry-season riverine pastures and wet-season grasslands, supplemented by limited , gathering, and opportunistic in products. Social organization centered on patrilineal clans (e.g., the aristocratic Rimɓe lineages) governed by councils of elders and age-grade systems, with wealth measured in holdings that determined status and alliances. Religious practices involved animistic beliefs centered on , nature spirits, and sacrifices, without centralized priesthoods. 14th-century Arabic geographers, including , described the Fula as pagan () herders inhabiting the borderlands of sedentary empires, often portraying them as mobile groups resistant to urban authority due to their dispersed lifestyle. These accounts note their presence in the Senegal-Mauritania region by at least the 11th-12th centuries, coinciding with the decline of the (c. 1076–1240 CE), where Fula groups likely served as peripheral suppliers of animals and hides to networks while avoiding direct incorporation. By the rise of the (c. 1235–1600 CE), Fula pastoralists maintained symbiotic ties with Mandinka and Soninke farmers, providing dairy, manure for fields, and mounted warriors for defense in exchange for millet, access to wells, and protection from desert raiders; however, tensions arose from disputes and raids on settled villages. Political structures remained decentralized, with no evidence of expansive kingdoms; instead, loose chiefdoms emerged through alliances between noble Fula herders and local agriculturalists, as seen in the upper valley where small polities balanced mobility with territorial claims to grazing lands. These entities, numbering perhaps a few dozen by the 13th-14th centuries, lacked stone architecture or written records, relying on oral genealogies preserved in traditions. Interactions with Mali's rulers involved tributary payments in or participation in imperial campaigns, but Fula autonomy persisted due to their mobility, foreshadowing later expansions without religious conquest motifs. Archaeological traces, such as bones and iron tools from Sahelian sites dated 1000–1400 CE, corroborate this pastoral adaptation amid empire peripheries.

18th-19th century jihads and empire-building

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Fulani (Fula) Muslim scholars and pastoralists launched a series of jihads across , aiming to purify Islamic practice from local and establish theocratic states governed by . These movements, often led by cleric-warriors, exploited Fulani mobility and horsemanship to overthrow sedentary kingdoms like the Hausa states and Bambara empires, resulting in expansive polities that integrated Fulani nobility into ruling hierarchies. While these jihads fostered administrative centralization through emirates loyal to a caliph and promoted literacy in scholarship, they relied on conquest's spoils, including used for labor and , which sustained military campaigns but imposed heavy human costs on conquered populations. One of the earliest successes occurred in Futa Jallon (modern ), where Fulani cleric Karamokho Alfa initiated a around 1725 against local Dialonke rulers, establishing the by 1750 as a theocratic of clans under clerical oversight. Similarly, in Futa Toro (modern ), Sulayman Bal's insurgency from the 1760s culminated in victory by 1776 under Abdul Qadir Kan, who formalized an enforcing strict Islamic codes and resisting external slave traders, though internal divisions later weakened it. These highland theocracies demonstrated Fulani statecraft by balancing pastoral autonomy with centralized religious authority, yet their expansions involved raiding non-Muslim villages for slaves to bolster armies and economies. The most expansive jihad unfolded in 1804 under Usman dan Fodio, a Fulani scholar in (northern ), who declared holy war against Hausa sultans accused of corruption and un-Islamic taxation, rapidly conquering states like Kano and Katsina by 1810 to found the with its capital at Sokoto in 1809. Fulani cavalry, leveraging superior horse breeding and mobility across terrain, overwhelmed Hausa infantry, installing Fulani emirs over vassal territories spanning modern northern and beyond. Concurrently, in 1818, Seku Amadu (Ahmadu Lobbo) launched a in Massina (central ), defeating Bambara forces at Noukouma and establishing the Caliphate of Hamdullahi, a rigid emphasizing Quranic education and moral reform. These empires funded growth through slave raids into pagan frontiers, capturing tens of thousands annually for domestic servitude, , and to North African markets, which demographic analyses link to population displacements and coerced Islamization among non-Fulani groups. While jihadi ideology framed such raids as extensions of holy war against , empirical records indicate they prioritized economic viability over voluntary conversion, entrenching as a pillar of Fulani dominance despite caliphal edicts nominally protecting free . This dual legacy—innovative governance amid extractive violence—shaped Sahelian polities until European incursions.

Colonial encounters and resistance

The Fula imamate of Futa Jallon mounted sustained resistance against French expansion from 1889 to 1896, employing diplomatic duplicity and military opposition while France pursued a policy of initially peaceful penetration. This culminated in the Battle of Porédaka on November 13, 1896, where French colonial forces decisively defeated the remaining Fula-led troops, incorporating the theocratic state into French West Africa and ending its independence established since the 1725 jihad. In northern Nigeria, British forces conquered the in , defeating Fulani-led emirates that had dominated the region since Usman dan Fodio's early 19th-century , yet implemented that preserved Fulani emirs as local administrators under colonial oversight. This system transformed caliphal officials into instruments of British governance, allowing many Fulani elites to accommodate colonial authority while maintaining social hierarchies, though it sowed tensions with non-Fulani subjects. Localized Fula resistance persisted, exemplified by Hamman Ruwa, a Fulani leader in the Muri region of northeastern , who organized revolts against British encroachment around 1900–1902, targeting areas like the western Wurkun territories before his death in 1902. Some Fula groups formed adaptive alliances with colonizers, leveraging British or French support to counter rival ethnic factions or internal competitors, as seen in Fulani intermediaries aiding colonial pacification in Adamawa and Sokoto provinces. Colonial taxation regimes, including head taxes and cattle levies, eroded traditional Fula nomadism by imposing fiscal burdens incompatible with mobile , prompting displacements and partial sedentarization; in northern , this fueled the 1920s Jangali uprising against such impositions, where Fulani herders viewed taxation as an assault on their economic autonomy.

Post-colonial trajectory

In , following in , the Fulani-dominated system in the northern region persisted as a cornerstone of local governance, with emirs retaining advisory and judicial roles under the federal structure, reflecting the British indirect rule legacy that privileged Hausa-Fulani elites. This continuity enabled Fulani nobility to influence state politics, as seen in the , which drew heavily from Fulani-Hausa leadership during the First Republic (1960-1966). The Sahelian droughts of the and early , which reduced availability by up to 80% in some areas, accelerated southward migrations of Fulani pastoralists from the into coastal zones of countries like , , and , intensifying sedentarization pressures and cultural adaptations. Recurrent dry spells in the and further disrupted routes, prompting integration into urban economies and national institutions, including armies where Fulani recruits, valued for mobility and equestrian skills, bolstered post-colonial militaries in nations such as and . Post-independence education initiatives yielded modest gains in among settled Fulani populations, with programs targeting nomadic groups emerging in the to teach in Fulfulde and promote formal schooling, though overall rates remained low at around 20-30% for pastoralists by the due to mobility constraints and limited . This disparity underscored ongoing marginalization of traditional herders, who prioritized cattle-based livelihoods over state-driven sedentarization, even as urban Fulani elites advanced in and . In , Fulani communities experienced political repression under the Malinke-led regime of (1958-1984), including purges that targeted their economic influence, hindering broader integration.

Sociopolitical structures

Caste hierarchy and nobility

The Fula social structure features a , with occupying the apex and asserting superiority rooted in patrilineal descent from lineages associated with independence and Islamic . The primary noble categories include the rimɓe (freeborn herders, also termed dimo in singular), who traditionally manage and embody the ideal of , and the torodɓe (clerics or scholarly elites), who derive authority from religious learning and administrative roles. These groups maintain strict , prohibiting marriage outside their to preserve purity of bloodlines and status, a practice reinforced by cultural norms that view inter-caste unions as degrading to noble identity. This nobility's self-conception of superiority stems from historical narratives emphasizing descent from pre-Islamic pastoral ancestors, often mythologized as originating from North African Berber or stock to underscore their distinction from subservient agriculturalists or artisans. The torodɓe, in particular, trace their prestige to clerical lineages that integrated Fulfulde-speaking pastoralists with sedentary scholarly traditions, positioning themselves as guardians of . Lower strata, such as artisans (ñ ñaamɓe) and praise-singers (awluɓe), are excluded from noble circles, confined to hereditary occupations that bar them from or leadership, thereby institutionalizing economic and ritual disparities. The caste framework solidified during the 18th- and 19th-century jihads, where torodɓe-led movements, such as those under in the (established 1804), elevated victorious Fulani warriors and clerics as rightful rulers over conquered Hausa and other groups. Jihad leaders invoked claims of sharifian (descended from the Prophet Muhammad) or Berber heritage to legitimize their dominance, framing the as divinely ordained and essential for Islamic , which in turn perpetuated noble privileges like tribute extraction and land control. This structure, while providing cohesion among elites, has historically fostered tensions through enforced and resource by nobles, evident in accounts of from dependent groups toward aristocratic exactions.

Slavery, servitude, and social stratification

The Maccuɓe, a hereditary servile caste within Fula society, primarily descended from captives seized during the 19th-century jihads led by Usman dan Fodio (1804–1808) and subsequent raids, as well as from purchases in trans-Saharan and Atlantic slave markets. These individuals were integrated as domestic laborers, agricultural workers, and cattle tenders, with their status passed down matrilineally, perpetuating social subordination independent of formal manumission. In Fula-dominated emirates like those of the , slaves comprised 30–50% of the population during the , according to estimates by historians analyzing contemporary accounts; for instance, explorer reported near equality between slaves and free persons in Kano province around 1851, while later observers like C.H. Robinson pegged the figure at about one-third in and Kano. Captives, mainly non-Muslim Hausa, Nupe, and other groups, were acquired through systematic raids justified under ideology, with excess slaves exported northward via trans-Saharan caravans to North African markets in exchange for horses, cloth, and arms, sustaining elite consumption and military expansion. Some were also funneled southward to coastal Atlantic ports, contributing to broader West African slave exports estimated at thousands annually from the region. Slavery directly supported Fula pastoralism by assigning servile labor to farming, , and household tasks, freeing noble Fulɓe to prioritize mobility and the leisure valorized in the Pulaaku , which emphasizes from manual toil. This division was not incidental but structurally enabled the nomadic elite's lifestyle, as rimaiɓe (serfs) managed sedentary or semi-sedentary duties, allowing overlords to avoid the vulnerabilities of crop dependence amid arid Sahelian . Empirical records from the contradict apologetic views minimizing Fula raiding agency—often framed in some Islamic historiographies as mere purification of prior "pagan" bondage—by documenting proactive conquests that escalated enslavement scale, with jihads alone yielding hundreds of thousands of captives resettled or traded to consolidate power. British colonial intervention in Northern Nigeria, culminating in the 1900 conquest of Sokoto and formal abolition decrees by 1901, curtailed overt raids and markets, with offending emirs imprisoned for slave-trading activities. Yet, servitude endured, as emancipated Maccuɓe and other slaves transitioned into client-patron ties (barani relationships), remaining economically bound to former masters for land access and protection, a pattern persisting into the mid-20th century despite legal prohibitions. This gradual erosion reflected enforcement challenges in rural emirates, where social norms and resistance preserved stratification.

Traditional authority and governance

Among nomadic Fulani groups, governance is decentralized and segmentary, organized around patrilineal lineages and territorial units led by an ardo (chief), who coordinates migration, resolves internal disputes, and negotiates with external authorities such as farmers or rulers for grazing rights. The ardo's authority derives from lineage seniority and demonstrated competence in herding and conflict mediation, rather than hereditary absolutism, with decisions often reached through consensus among lineage elders to preserve group cohesion and mobility. This structure reflects the adaptive needs of pastoralism, where rigid centralization would hinder seasonal movements across vast Sahelian landscapes. In settled Fulani polities, such as the emirates formed after the 19th-century jihads, authority became more hierarchical, with lamidos or appointed by scholarly consensus exercising oversight over territories, while qadis (Islamic judges) administered law in civil and criminal matters, drawing on Hanafi or Maliki adapted to local customs. These systems integrated nomadic elements by delegating camp-level affairs to subordinate ardos, ensuring pastoral subgroups retained in daily herding while pledging allegiance to the for protection and dispute arbitration. Griots and praise-singers, functioning as oral historians and advisors, facilitated consensus in councils by invoking genealogies and precedents, though their influence was advisory rather than decisional. Women are generally excluded from formal roles, confined to informal influence within households and lineages, consistent with patrilineal and Islamic norms prevalent among Fulani elites post-jihad. Following jihadist expansions, such as Usman dan Fodio's established by 1810, Fulani rulers adapted extraction—levied as cattle, grain, or labor from sedentary subjects—to finance military mobility and scholarly networks, enabling pastoral Fulani to sustain without full sedentarization. This symbiotic model balanced with ecological imperatives, as overlords granted herders passage rights in exchange for nominal , though it often strained relations with tributary communities over resource allocation.

Economy and subsistence

Pastoral herding and cattle economy

The Fula people, known for their nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyles, center their subsistence economy on the herding of zebu cattle, which dominate their livestock holdings alongside smaller numbers of sheep and goats. This pastoral system operates within a narrow ecological niche spanning the Sahel-savanna transition zone, where transhumance—seasonal migrations of herds—facilitates access to water and forage amid variable rainfall patterns. Herders typically move northward during the wet season (June to October) to exploit ephemeral pastures and southward in the dry season toward riverine corridors, such as those of the Niger River, covering distances that can exceed 10 kilometers daily to manage water sources and prevent exhaustion of local resources. Key breeds include the White Fulani (Bunaji), a medium-sized zebu variety with long horns (81-107 cm) and adaptations for endurance trekking, dewlaps for heat dissipation, and multi-purpose utility yielding approximately 2,300 kg of milk per lactation alongside meat and traction potential. Cattle accumulation measures wealth and social status, serving as a form of currency in exchanges; notably, bridewealth payments in marriages often consist of livestock transfers from the groom's family to secure alliances, reinforcing kinship ties and economic reciprocity. Oral transmission of specialized veterinary knowledge further sustains herds, employing ethnobotanical treatments—such as herbal remedies for trypanosomiasis and wounds—derived from centuries of observation, which herders integrate with behavioral management to mitigate disease and injury risks in remote settings. Critiques of Fula frequently cite as a degradation driver, particularly in zones of herd concentration during migrations; however, empirical assessments reveal the system's inherent resilience, as rotational mobility permits recovery in arid low-productivity landscapes where fixed farming yields diminish. This adaptive strategy, honed over generations, enhances and efficiency compared to sedentary cultivation in marginal Sahelian soils, underscoring 's viability for ecological and absent modern inputs.

Trade, agriculture, and economic adaptations

The Fulani have historically supplemented through involvement in regional caravan , particularly after establishing empires such as the 19th-century , which controlled key routes facilitating the exchange of salt from Saharan mines and kola nuts from southern forest zones for textiles, leather goods, and grains. This , often mediated by Fulani elites and allied merchants, integrated nomadic groups into broader West African commercial networks, though direct caravan participation by herders remained secondary to exchanges. Among Fulani social strata, the rimaybe (or subordinate castes) undertook limited sedentary agriculture, cultivating staple crops like millet, , and in riverine or settled areas, providing and trade goods to noble pastoralists. In contemporary settings, Fulani economic adaptations increasingly emphasize diversification beyond , including milk processing and sales by women, who transform into , cheese, and butter for local markets, generating supplementary income in regions like northern . Off-farm activities, crop cultivation during dry seasons, and remittances from urban migrant labor have become critical, with studies in north-central showing that only 30% of Fulani households rely solely on sales, while diversified strategies enhance resilience amid land scarcity. The sector, dominated by Fulani (owning over 90% of 's ), contributes approximately one-third of the country's agricultural GDP and about 5% of national GDP, underscoring its economic weight but highlighting dependencies on pastoral outputs. Critiques of Fulani over-reliance on mobile emphasize its role in perpetuating vulnerability to climate variability, resource conflicts, and limited modernization, with advocating transitions to agro-pastoralism or ranching for sustainable income growth and reduced exposure to droughts and land disputes. In northern , extensification of without diversification correlates with impoverishment, as pressures erode lands and hinder integration into formal economies, prompting calls for support in sedentary farming and value-added dairy processing.

Cultural elements

Fulfulde language and oral traditions

Fulfulde belongs to the branch of the Niger-Congo and serves as the primary language of the Fula people across West and . It encompasses a continuum of dialects, with western varieties often termed Pulaar—prevalent in and —and eastern forms designated Fulfulde, spoken in regions like , , and . These dialects exhibit to varying degrees but differ in , vocabulary, and syntax; for instance, Pulaar retains certain archaic features absent in Fulfulde. Historically, Fulfulde was transcribed using Ajami, an adaptation of the introduced via Islamic scholarship, enabling the recording of , genealogies, and local histories from at least the . In the 20th century, colonial administrations and post-independence linguists developed Roman-based orthographies, such as the innovated by Fula scholars in the 1980s for broader literacy, though Ajami persists in religious and traditional contexts. Fula oral traditions rely on specialized narrators, comparable to griots in neighboring cultures, who preserve through recited epics, praise songs, and genealogical chants performed at ceremonies. Prominent examples include the Silamaka and Satouma , which recounts heroic quests, ties, and migrations, embedding verifiable lineages and pre-colonial events within rhythmic verse to aid memorization and transmission across generations. These performances encode social norms and historical contingencies, such as inter-ethnic alliances, without written mediation until recent transcriptions. Among urbanizing Fula youth, Fulfulde faces intergenerational transmission challenges, with speakers shifting toward dominant national languages like French or Hausa for socioeconomic mobility, contributing to dialectal erosion in cities. Revitalization efforts include community-led centers promoting and digital resources; for example, initiatives since 2023 have digitized Fulfulde content via platforms like to engage younger demographics and document variants. These programs emphasize orthographic and oral recording to counter urban attrition while adapting traditions to modern media.

Religious practices and Islam's role

The Fula, or Fulani, adopted gradually from the , with the providing a framework for cultural distinction and among pastoralist communities in . This adoption aligned with broader trans-Saharan influences, emphasizing Sunni orthodoxy under the of , which remains dominant due to its prevalence in the region and historical endorsements by Fulani scholars like in the 19th century. Empirical surveys indicate that over 99% of Fulani populations identify as Muslim, reflecting deep integration into Islamic networks across Sahelian states. Despite this orthodoxy, syncretic elements from pre-Islamic animist traditions persist, particularly among nomadic subgroups, where beliefs in spirits and the use of protective amulets—often inscribed with Quranic verses but rooted in older protective rituals—coexist with core Islamic tenets. These practices, such as invoking barki (blessings) and kuddi (curses) in daily life, blend causal interpretations of misfortune with Islamic fatalism, though clerical reforms have periodically sought to purify observances. Female participation in religious life shows variation; while urban or settled Fulani women may adopt veiling in line with Maliki norms, nomadic groups exhibit lower adherence, with women often forgoing in favor of practical attire suited to mobility and herding duties. Revivals of jihadist ideologies in recent decades, drawing on historical Fulani-led expansions, have been critiqued by analysts as serving expansionist agendas masked in religious , exploiting pastoral grievances rather than purely theological purity—evident in alliances with groups like , where ethnic mobilization overshadows doctrinal adherence. This tension underscores Islam's role as both a unifying force and a contested space, where empirical adherence rates contrast with localized adaptations that resist full .

Pulaaku moral code and values

Pulaaku constitutes the core ethical framework of the Fula (Fulɓe) people, serving as an unwritten that defines personal and social behavior, distinct from religious prescriptions. It emphasizes virtues essential for maintaining dignity, autonomy, and resilience in nomadic life, such as semteende (, reserve, and avoidance of through public propriety), munyal (, , , and perseverance in adversity), and hakkilo (, foresight, and practical knowledge derived from experience). These pillars foster individual independence, discouraging reliance on others and promoting measured responses to challenges, which historically supported the Fula's mobility and cattle-based economy across Sahelian environments. Gendered dimensions of pulaaku reinforce complementary roles, with ngorgu (manliness, , and ) idealized for men as a marker of protective strength and in and defense, while women are held to stricter standards of semteende, prioritizing , restraint in speech, and familial honor to preserve social cohesion. Proverbs transmit these values intergenerationally, encapsulating principles like "A Fulɓe without is like a man without munyal" to underscore , or admonitions against overt displays of to avoid semteende violations. Observance manifests in deliberate conflict de-escalation, where verbal restraint and withdrawal preserve face over escalation, though rigid adherence can perpetuate isolation from external systems. Critics, including anthropological analyses, argue that pulaaku's emphasis on stoic autonomy sometimes impedes adaptation, as seen in nomadic Fula communities' low engagement with formal —perceived as eroding self-taught hakkilo—with surveys in northern indicating over 80% non-participation rates linked to these cultural priors as of 2017. This framework, while adaptive for historical survival, faces tensions in modern contexts where demands flexibility beyond traditional virtues.

Material and performing arts

Fulani material arts emphasize functionality tied to nomadic pastoralism, with decorative elements in personal adornment and limited industrial crafts. Women produce utilitarian items such as engraved gourds, woven baskets, and knitted goods, while men generally refrain from pottery, ironworking, and dyeing in adherence to the Pulaaku code of conduct. Specialized artisan castes, known as nyenybe, handle leatherworking and other fabrications, producing items like fringed leather panels for tents and portable ornaments. Embroidery adorns traditional gowns or boubous, particularly among settled groups, featuring vibrant patterns in colors such as red, blue, and green. Traditional dress reflects Islamic modesty and mobility: men wear flowing gowns, , and caps, while women don wraps, blouses, and sometimes , with nomadic women often forgoing veils for practicality. Body modifications include tattoos, especially among subgroups, used for ornamentation and identity, alongside jewelry and braided hairstyles. Housing for nomads consists of temporary, dismantlable camps with tents made from mats or skins, designed for easy transport during migrations; settled Fulani use village compounds or mud structures. Performing arts center on music and integral to social gatherings, work, and rituals. Instruments include the , , flutes, and bawdi , and shakers, often played by griots who preserve oral traditions through rhythmic performances. Drumming, flutes, and horns accompany court and praise-singing at weddings and holidays. Among the , the Gerewol festival features elaborate male s with percussive chants, stomping, and costume displays to attract partners, highlighting aesthetic competition and communal celebration at season's end. Children's s occur at communal events, underscoring 's role in daily life and . The reliance on castes for may constrain broader creative expression among noble Fulani, who prioritize pastoral values over artisanal pursuits.

Social rituals

Initiation and coming-of-age

Among Fulani males, the Sharo ritual serves as the central coming-of-age ceremony, involving public flogging to demonstrate physical and mental fortitude. Typically performed by unmarried youths in their late teens or early twenties during annual festivals in northern and parts of , participants endure repeated lashes from whips or sticks wielded by peers or rivals, without flinching, crying, or seeking mercy. This ordeal, rooted in pastoral traditions, tests adherence to Pulaaku—the Fulani emphasizing (hakkille), (semteende), and stoic (munyal)—qualities deemed essential for manhood and social standing within nomadic or semi-nomadic communities. Successful completion signifies transition to adulthood, granting eligibility for full participation in , , and roles, though failure can lead to . To withstand the pain, initiates often ingest herbal concoctions, including seeds of prepared as porridge, which induce analgesia via effects but pose significant health risks such as , , and potential organ toxicity from atropine-like alkaloids. The flogging itself inflicts acute trauma, including deep lacerations, bruising, fractures, and hemorrhage, with documented cases of , permanent scarring, and rare fatalities from uncontrolled beatings or secondary complications like in resource-limited settings. These empirical hazards underscore the ritual's high-stakes nature, where survival reinforces communal validation but causal evidence from ethnographic studies highlights disproportionate injury rates among participants lacking modern medical access. Fulani female initiation rites are generally less public and standardized than Sharo, often entailing (killingal) in a compound during for instruction in Pulaaku values, domestic skills, and reproductive roles. In traditional rural groups, this may include ritual scarification on the face, arms, or torso to mark maturity and ethnic identity, though such practices are not ubiquitous and have declined sharply in urban or educated households due to Islamic influences, formal schooling, and of risks from unsterile incisions. Health documentation links these to complications like scarring, bacterial s, and delayed , particularly where tools are shared, contributing to broader patterns of traditional waning under modernization pressures.

Marriage customs and kinship

Marriage among the Fula (also known as Fulani) is predominantly , with a strong preference for unions within the ethnic group to preserve lineage purity and social cohesion. The ideal partner is a , reflecting patrilineal descent where traces through male lines and favors sons. If such a match is unavailable, other relatives or members of the same or social stratum are selected, reinforcing caste-like endogamy among nobles (rimɓe), artisans, and former slaves, while prohibiting marriage within the immediate paternal to avoid excessive . Polygyny is widespread, particularly among noble men who can afford multiple wives through wealth, with Islamic permitting up to four wives provided they are treated equitably; the average man maintains two to four wives over his lifetime. Marriages are typically arranged by families, often in childhood, and formalized through bridewealth payments in or other , symbolizing the groom's economic capacity and the bride's value in networks; , involving labor for the bride's family, may supplement this in some subgroups. Post-marriage residence is patrilocal, with wives residing in separate compounds or huts near the husband's kin, fostering structures centered on male authority and herding responsibilities. Divorce is relatively accessible, primarily through talaq, the Islamic repudiation by the husband, which requires no formal court and allows quick dissolution if the wife is deemed incompatible or barren, though women may seek via religious authorities. Kinship obligations extend beyond the , with clans providing mutual support in disputes or migrations, but rigid limits alliances across castes, maintaining hierarchical divisions inherited patrilineally. In contemporary settings, urbanization and state laws in countries like and have introduced civil registration requirements for legal recognition, blending customary practices with bureaucratic formalities and occasionally leading to monogamous unions under civil codes. Interethnic marriages are rising modestly among educated youth in cities, driven by and exposure, though they remain rare due to cultural resistance and parental oversight, with data from northern indicating consanguineous rates above 50% persist in rural areas.

Contemporary dynamics and debates

Herder-farmer resource conflicts

Herder-farmer conflicts involving Fulani pastoralists primarily arise from competition over land and water resources in regions like Nigeria's Middle Belt, where nomadic cattle herding intersects with sedentary crop farming. A core trigger is livestock straying into cultivated fields, damaging crops such as maize and yams, which disrupts farmers' livelihoods and prompts retaliatory actions. Concurrently, Fulani herders' southward migration—driven by desertification in the Sahel, which has reduced northern grazing lands by up to 20-30% since the 1970s—pushes herds into more fertile southern areas increasingly converted to farmland. This expansion of arable land, fueled by population growth and agricultural intensification, has blocked traditional transhumance corridors, once used seasonally for grazing without permanent settlement. From the Fulani perspective, these clashes infringe on longstanding customary rights to traverse and graze on communal lands, viewing farmer encroachments and barriers as violations of historical access patterns that sustained economies for centuries. Herders argue that their mobile herding is an adaptive response to , not deliberate aggression, and that mutual accommodations—like compensation for damages—have eroded due to weak enforcement of grazing reserves established in the and . Farmers, conversely, perceive incursions as direct assaults on their investments, with unrestrained herd sizes exacerbating and soil degradation, leading to demands for restrictions on open grazing to protect fixed farm plots essential for . Violence has escalated sharply, with over 15,000 deaths across West and since 2010, more than half occurring after , and accounting for the majority; annual fatalities in alone reached peaks of over 2,000 in years like amid coordinated attacks. Empirical analysis reveals behavioral factors amplifying ecological pressures: armed Fulani vigilante groups, often responding to cattle theft which claims thousands of animals yearly, have adopted offensive tactics including proliferation, shifting from disputes to killings. Reports link some of these networks to and sporadic alliances with jihadist elements in the , where rustled livestock funds insurgencies, introducing ideological and criminal dimensions that transcend resource scarcity alone—though such ties affect only subsets of herders, not the broader population.

Political power and ethnic rivalries

The Fula (also known as Fulani or Peul) have exerted enduring political influence in West African states, rooted in the 19th-century jihads led by figures like , which established the and subordinate emirates that centralized power under Fulani rulers across northern and parts of the . These structures granted emirs executive, legislative, and judicial authority, a legacy that persists in 's northern traditional institutions, where Fulani emirs advise governors and influence local governance despite colonial and post-independence modifications. In , this emirate system reinforces Fulani elites' role in mediating between federal authority and local Muslim communities, often prioritizing Islamic law enforcement and pastoral interests. In Sahelian nations like , Fula overrepresentation in political elites is evident, with Fulani individuals holding the presidency for much of the post-independence era despite comprising roughly 8-10% of the population; examples include (1960–1974) and (1974–1987), both Fulani military and civilian leaders who consolidated power through coups and centralized rule. This pattern extends to recent events, such as the 2023 coup led by , a general from a Fulani-influenced background in eastern , highlighting Fula presence in the military despite ethnic quotas intended to promote balance. Critics attribute such dominance to historical advantages and networks rather than proportional merit, though proponents cite Fula adaptability in nomadic and administrative roles as a causal factor. Ethnic rivalries have intensified perceptions of Fulani , particularly in , where southeastern groups like the Igbo view Fulani-led presidencies—such as Muhammadu Buhari's (2015–2023)—as entrenching northern control via appointments to agencies, with over 70% of service chiefs from northern states during his tenure. The (IPOB), a pro-secessionist movement, has framed this as systemic marginalization fueling Biafran revivalism, accusing Fulani elites of nepotistic quotas that sideline southern competence in favor of ethnic loyalty. 's federal character principle, mandating ethnic proportionality in since 1979, aims to mitigate such tensions but has drawn critiques for enabling underqualified placements, as seen in northern-dominated bureaucracies where Fulani networks allegedly prioritize over expertise. These dynamics underscore causal rivalries between pastoral Fulani elites and sedentary farming majorities, with southern narratives often portraying Fulani ascent as conquest-driven rather than earned, though empirical data on military coups (e.g., four in since 1960 involving northern officers) suggests institutional inertia over deliberate exclusion.

Modern jihadism and security implications

The Front de Libération du Macina (FLM), founded in January 2015 by Fulani preacher Hamadoun Koufa in Mali's Mopti region, exemplifies Fulani-led jihadist activity, with the group conducting ambushes and assassinations against state forces and Dogon militias to establish Islamic governance. FLM allied with Ansar Dine in May 2016 before splitting in early 2017 amid ideological tensions, including overtures to the Islamic State. Similarly, Ansarul Islam, emerging in late 2016 under Fulani cleric Malam Ibrahim Dicko in Burkina Faso's Soum province, targeted security posts and schools, reflecting recruitment from marginalized herder communities facing land pressures and state reprisals. Fulani pastoral mobility has facilitated jihadist logistics across borders, enabling incursions like those by in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), which incorporates Fulani fighters from and for cross-border raids into and since 2017. In Nigeria's northeast, grievances over perceived marginalization have drawn some Fulani herders into and its (ISWAP) splinter, with reports of herder recruits bolstering ranks amid rural isolation, though exact numbers remain unquantified in open sources. Incidents such as the July 19, 2016, Nampala base attack in by the Fulani-dominated Alliance nationale pour la sauvegarde de l’identité peule (ANSIPRJ) and , killing 17 soldiers, underscore tactical integration of herder networks for rapid strikes. In the 2020s, Fulani-linked militias have amplified insecurity, with JNIM and ISGS affiliates launching over 1,000 attacks annually in and by 2023, per incident tracking, exploiting herder corridors for supply lines and evasion. saw jihadist violence escalate post-2019, with groups like Ansarul Islam's successors killing hundreds in coordinated assaults on villages and convoys, as Fulani fighters provided via routes. This has strained regional security, displacing over 2 million in the central by 2022 and prompting juntas to form ethnic self-defense units, which in turn fuel cycles of reprisals. Contrary to portrayals emphasizing Fulani as mere victims of jihadist , evidence indicates proactive , as seen in Koufa's ideological of herders for FLM expansions and claims of responsibility for urban attacks like the November 20, 2015, (killing 19) by FLM-affiliated al-Murabitoun. Allegations of jihadist revivals of slave raids in controlled areas, echoing 19th-century Fulani jihads, persist in reports from central , where captives are used for labor and , though systematic data is limited by access constraints. Such participation heightens risks of jihadist entrenchment, as herder demographics—spanning 25 million across 21 countries—offer scalable recruitment pools absent targeted .

Urbanization, development, and cultural preservation

A growing segment of the Fula population has transitioned from to semi-sedentary or urban lifestyles, driven by land pressures, climate variability, and economic opportunities, though the majority—estimated at over 70%—remains tied to rural zones as of the . In countries like and , urban migration among younger Fula has increased access to formal employment in trading, , and small-scale commerce, with settled Fula communities integrating into cities such as Kano and . Socioeconomic development shows mixed progress: nomadic education programs in Nigeria and Ghana have boosted literacy rates among Fula children to around 30-40% in targeted areas by integrating mobile learning and community-directed interventions, while health initiatives have reduced infant mortality through vaccination drives and pastoralist outreach. However, poverty persists at high levels, with over 70% of households in Sahelian pastoral zones falling below national lines due to livestock losses and limited diversification, exacerbating vulnerabilities in regions like northern Nigeria where Fula-dominated states report rates exceeding 70%. Cultural preservation efforts counter urbanization's assimilative pull, with annual festivals such as the Gerewol among the subgroup maintaining traditional dances, attire, and social norms that embody Pulaaku values of dignity and resilience. Non-governmental organizations, including photographic documentation projects and community funds, support heritage initiatives like dairy cooperatives that blend economic aid with cultural education, though critics argue aid dependency undermines the self-reliant ethos central to Fula identity. Looking ahead, climate adaptation strategies increasingly favor sedentary ranching over , as Fula herders in and the invest in fenced enclosures and cultivation to counter erratic rainfall and feed , potentially stabilizing incomes but risking of nomadic networks and Pulaaku-defined mobility. This shift, evident in self-initiated transitions without widespread state support, highlights a pragmatic response to environmental constraints, yet it poses challenges to intergenerational transmission of oral traditions and expertise.

References

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