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Neocolonialism is the control by a state (usually, a former colonial power) over another nominally independent state (usually, a former colony) through indirect means.[1][2][3] The term neocolonialism was first used after World War II to refer to the continuing dependence of former colonies on foreign countries, but its meaning soon broadened to apply, more generally, to places where the power of developed countries was used to produce a colonial-like exploitation.[3]

Neocolonialism takes the form of economic imperialism, globalization, cultural imperialism and conditional aid to influence or control a developing country instead of the previous colonial methods of direct military control or indirect political control (hegemony). Neocolonialism differs from standard globalisation and development aid in that it typically results in a relationship of dependence, subservience, or financial obligation towards the neocolonialist nation.

Coined by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in 1956,[4][5] it was first used by Kwame Nkrumah in the context of African countries undergoing decolonisation in the 1960s. Neocolonialism is discussed in Sartre's works such as Colonialism and Neocolonialism, 1964)[6] and Noam Chomsky's The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, 1979.[7]

Term

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Origins

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When first proposed, the term neocolonialism was applied to European countries' continued economic and cultural relationships with their former colonies, those African countries that had been liberated in the aftermath of Second World War. At the 1962 National Union of Popular Forces conference, Mehdi Ben Barka, the Moroccan political organizer and later chair of the Tricontinental Conference 1966, used the term al-isti'mar al-jadid (Arabic: الاستعمار الجديد "the new colonialism") to describe the political trends in Africa in the early sixties.[8]

الاستعمار الجديد عبارة عن سياسة تعمل من جهة على منح الاستقلال السياسي، وعند الاقتضاء إنشاء دول مصطنعة لا حظ لها في وجود ذاتي، ومن جهة أخرى، تعمل على تقديم مساعدات مصحوبة بوعود تحقيق رفاهية تكون قواعدها في الحقيقة خارج القارة الإفريقية.

"Neo-colonialism is a policy that functions on one hand through granting political independence and, when necessary, creating artificial states that have no chance of sovereignty, and on the other hand, through providing 'assistance' accompanied by promises of achieving prosperity, though its bases are in fact outside the African continent."

Mehdi Ben Barka, The Revolutionary Option in Morocco (May 1963)
Kwame Nkrumah (pictured on a Soviet postage stamp), president of Ghana (1960–1966), coined the term "neocolonialism".

Kwame Nkrumah, president of Ghana from 1960 to 1966, is credited with coining the term, which appeared in the 1963 preamble of the Organisation of African Unity Charter, and was the title of his 1965 book, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism.[9] In his book the President of Ghana exposes the workings of International monopoly capitalism in Africa. For him Neo-colonialism, insidious and complex, is even more dangerous than the old colonialism and shows how meaningless political freedom can be without economic independence. Nkrumah theoretically developed and extended to the post–World War II 20th century the socio-economic and political arguments presented by Lenin in the pamphlet Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917). The pamphlet frames 19th-century imperialism as the logical extension of geopolitical power, to meet the financial investment needs of the political economy of capitalism.[10]

In Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism, Kwame Nkrumah wrote:

In place of colonialism, as the main instrument of imperialism, we have today neo-colonialism ... [which] like colonialism, is an attempt to export the social conflicts of the capitalist countries. ...

The result of neo-colonialism is that foreign capital is used for the exploitation of labour, rather than for the development of the less developed parts of the world. Investment, under neo-colonialism, increases, rather than decreases, the gap between the rich and the poor countries of the world. The struggle against neo-colonialism is not aimed at excluding the capital of the developed world from operating in less developed countries. It is also dubious in consideration of the name given being strongly related to the concept of colonialism itself. It is aimed at preventing the financial power of the developed countries being used in such a way as to impoverish the less developed.[11]

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.

Neocolonial economic dominance

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People in Brisbane protesting Australia's claim on East Timorese oil, in May 2017

In 1961, regarding the economic mechanism of neocolonial control, in the speech Cuba: Historical Exception or Vanguard in the Anti-colonial Struggle?, Argentine revolutionary Che Guevara said:

We, politely referred to as "underdeveloped", in truth, are colonial, semi-colonial or dependent countries. We are countries whose economies have been distorted by imperialism, which has abnormally developed those branches of industry or agriculture needed to complement its complex economy. "Underdevelopment", or distorted development, brings a dangerous specialisation in raw materials, inherent in which is the threat of hunger for all our peoples. We, the "underdeveloped", are also those with the single crop, the single product, the single market. A single product whose uncertain sale depends on a single market imposing and fixing conditions. That is the great formula for imperialist economic domination.[12]

Dependency theory

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Main article: Dependency theory

Dependency theory is the theoretical description of economic neocolonialism. It proposes that the global economic system comprises wealthy countries at the centre, and poor countries at the periphery. Economic neocolonialism extracts the human and natural resources of a poor country to flow to the economies of the wealthy countries. It claims that the poverty of the peripheral countries is the result of how they are integrated in the global economic system. Dependency theory derives from the Marxist analysis of economic inequalities within the world's system of economies, thus, under-development of the periphery is a direct result of development in the centre. It includes the concept of the late 19th century semi-colony.[13]

Cold War

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Main article: Cold War

During the mid-to-late 20th century, in the course of the ideological conflict between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., each country and its satellite states accused each other of practising neocolonialism in their imperial and hegemonic pursuits.[14][15][16][17][18][19][20] The struggle included proxy wars, fought by client states in the decolonised countries. Cuba, the Warsaw Pact bloc, Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–1970) et al. accused the U.S. of sponsoring anti-democratic governments whose regimes did not represent the interests of their people and of overthrowing elected governments (African, Asian, Latin American) that did not support U.S. geopolitical interests.[citation needed]

In the 1960s, under the leadership of Chairman Mehdi Ben Barka, the Cuban Tricontinental Conference (Organisation of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America) recognised and supported the validity of revolutionary anti-colonialism as a means for colonised peoples of the Third World to achieve self-determination, a policy which angered the U.S. and France. Moreover, Chairman Barka headed the Commission on Neocolonialism, which dealt with the work to resolve the neocolonial involvement of colonial powers in decolonised counties; and said that the U.S., as the leading capitalist country of the world, was, in practise, the principal neocolonialist political actor.[citation needed]

Multinational corporations

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Main article: Multinational corporation

Critics of the practice of neocolonialism also argue that investment by multinational corporations enriches few in underdeveloped countries and causes humanitarian, environmental and ecological damage to their populations. They argue that this results in unsustainable development and perpetual underdevelopment. These countries remain reservoirs of cheap labor and raw materials, while restricting access to advanced production techniques to develop their own economies. In some countries, monopolization of natural resources, while initially leading to an influx of investment, is often followed by increases in unemployment, poverty and a decline in per-capita income.[21]

In the West African nations of Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Mauritania, fishing was historically central to the economy. Beginning in 1979, the European Union began negotiating contracts with governments for fishing off the coast of West Africa. Unsustainable commercial over-fishing by foreign fleets played a significant role in large-scale unemployment and migration of people across the region.[22] This violates the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which recognises the importance of fishing to local communities and insists that government fishing agreements with foreign companies should target only surplus stocks.[23]

Oxfam's 2024 report "Inequality, Inc" concludes that multinational corporations located in the Global North are "perpetuating a colonial style 'extractivist' model" across the Global South as the economies of the latter "are locked into exporting primary commodities, from copper to coffee" to these multinationals.[24]

International borrowing

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See also: Criticism of the International Monetary Fund

American economist Jeffrey Sachs recommended that the entire African debt (c. US$200 billion) be dismissed, and recommended that African nations not repay either the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF):[25]

The time has come to end this charade. The debts are unaffordable. If they won't cancel the debts, I would suggest obstruction; you do it, yourselves. Africa should say: "Thank you very much, but we need this money to meet the needs of children who are dying, right now, so, we will put the debt-servicing payments into urgent social investment in health, education, drinking water, the control of AIDS, and other needs".

Conservation and neocolonialism

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Wallerstein, and separately Frank, claim that the modern conservation movement, as practiced by international organisations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature, inadvertently developed a neocolonial relationship with underdeveloped nations.[26]

Science

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This section is an excerpt from Neo-colonial science.[edit]

Neo-colonial research or neo-colonial science,[27][28] frequently described as helicopter research,[27] parachute science[29][30] or research,[31] parasitic research,[32][33] or safari study,[34] is when researchers from wealthier countries go to a developing country, collect information, travel back to their country, analyze the data and samples, and publish the results with no or little involvement of local researchers. A 2003 study by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences found that 70% of articles in a random sample of publications about least-developed countries did not include a local research co-author.[28]

Frequently, during this kind of research, the local colleagues might be used to provide logistics support as fixers but are not engaged for their expertise or given credit for their participation in the research. Scientific publications resulting from parachute science frequently only contribute to the career of the scientists from rich countries, thus limiting the development of local science capacity (such as funded research centers) and the careers of local scientists.[27] This form of "colonial" science has reverberations of 19th century scientific practices of treating non-Western participants as "others" in order to advance colonialism—and critics call for the end of these extractivist practices in order to decolonize knowledge.[35][36]

This kind of research approach reduces the quality of research because international researchers may not ask the right questions or draw connections to local issues.[37] The result of this approach is that local communities are unable to leverage the research to their own advantage.[30] Ultimately, especially for fields dealing with global issues like conservation biology which rely on local communities to implement solutions, neo-colonial science prevents institutionalization of the findings in local communities in order to address issues being studied by scientists.[30][35]

By area

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Françafrique

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See also: CFA franc
Usage of (in 2009):
  West African CFA franc
  Central African CFA franc[38]

The representative example of European neocolonialism is Françafrique, the "France-Africa" constituted by the continued close relationships between France and its former African colonies.[citation needed]

In 1955, the initial usage of the term "French Africa", by President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Ivory Coast, denoted positive social, cultural and economic Franco–African relations. It was later applied by neocolonialism critics to describe an imbalanced international relation.[citation needed]

Neocolonialism was used to describe a type of foreign intervention in countries belonging to the Pan-Africanist movement, as well as the Asian–African Conference of Bandung (1955), which led to the Non-Aligned Movement (1961). Neocolonialism was formally defined by the All-African Peoples' Conference (AAPC) and published in the Resolution on Neo-colonialism. At both the Tunis conference (1960) and the Cairo conference (1961), AAPC described the actions of the French Community of independent states, organised by France, as neocolonial.[39][40]

The politician Jacques Foccart, the principal adviser for African matters to French presidents Charles de Gaulle (1958–1969) and Georges Pompidou (1969–1974), was the principal proponent of Françafrique.[41]

The works of Verschave and Beti reported a forty-year, post-independence relationship with France's former colonial peoples, which featured colonial garrisons in situ and monopolies by French multinational corporations, usually for the exploitation of mineral resources. It was argued that the African leaders with close ties to France—especially during the Soviet–American Cold War (1945–1992)—acted more as agents of French business and geopolitical interests than as the national leaders of sovereign states. Cited examples are Omar Bongo (Gabon), Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Gnassingbé Eyadéma (Togo), Denis Sassou-Nguesso (Republic of the Congo), Idriss Déby (Chad), and Hamani Diori (Niger).[citation needed]

The Defense Agreements between France and French-speaking African countries established close cooperation, particularly in defense and security matters. Often accompanied by secret clauses, they allowed France to intervene militarily: to rescue regimes in order to establish the legitimacy of political powers favorable to its interests, to fight jihadism, particularly in the Sahel, or to put an end to civil wars. The departure of French troops from the African continent signals the end of a world, that of interventions in Chad, Togo, Gabon, Rwanda, Djibouti, Zaire, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Mali, Libya, and Cameroon. It also marks the end of Françafrique.[42]

Belgian Congo

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Belgium's approach to Belgian Congo has been characterized as a quintessential example of neocolonialism, as the Belgians embraced rapid decolonization of the Congo with the expectation that the newly independent state would become dependent on Belgium. This dependence would allow the Belgians to exert control over Congo, even though Congo was formally independent.[1]

After the decolonisation of Belgian Congo, Belgium continued to control, through the Société Générale de Belgique, an estimated 70% of the Congolese economy following the decolonisation process. The most contested part was in the province of Katanga where the Union Minière du Haut Katanga, part of the Société, controlled the mineral-resource-rich province. After a failed attempt to nationalise the mining industry in the 1960s, it was reopened to foreign investment.[citation needed]

Uganda

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Ugandan activists trying to stop EACOP argue that it is "an example of typical neo-colonial extraction". EACOP is majority owned by the French multinational fossil fuel company TotalEnergies. The pipeline which as of 2025 is half finished is to export crude oil to the Pacific coast, from where it will be shipped abroad for oil refining. As with other raw materials like cacao, most accumulation of economic value will occur abroad.[43]

United States

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Main articles: American imperialism and Criticism of United States foreign policy

There is an ongoing debate about whether certain actions by the United States should be considered neocolonialism.[44] Nayna J. Jhaveri, writing in Antipode, views the 2003 invasion of Iraq as a form of "petroimperialism", believing that the U.S. was motivated to go to war to attain vital oil reserves, rather than to pursue the U.S. government's official rationale for the Iraq War.[45]

Noam Chomsky has been a prominent critic of "American imperialism";[46] he believes that the basic principle of the foreign policy of the United States is the establishment of "open societies" that are economically and politically controlled by the United States and where U.S.-based businesses can prosper.[47] He argues that the U.S. seeks to suppress any movements within these countries that are not compliant with U.S. interests and to ensure that U.S.-friendly governments are placed in power.[48] He believes that official accounts of U.S. operations abroad have consistently whitewashed U.S. actions in order to present them as having benevolent motives in spreading democracy.[49] Examples he regularly cites are the actions of the United States in Vietnam, the Philippines, Latin America, and the Middle East.[49]

Chalmers Johnson argued in 2004 that America's version of the colony is the military base.[50] Johnson wrote numerous books, including three examinations of the consequences of what he called the "American Empire".[51] Chip Pitts argued similarly in 2006 that enduring United States bases in Iraq suggested a vision of "Iraq as a colony".[52]

David Vine, author of Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Overseas Harm America and the World (2015), said the US had bases in 45 "less-than-democratic" countries and territories. He quotes political scientist Kent Calder: "The United States tends to support dictators [and other undemocratic regimes] in nations where it enjoys basing facilities".[53]

China

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See also: Sino-African relations, Belt and Road Initiative, and Sinicization

The People's Republic of China has built increasingly strong ties with some African, Asian, European and Latin American nations which has led to accusations of colonialism,[54][55] As of August 2007, an estimated 750,000 Chinese nationals were working or living for extended periods in Africa.[56][57] In the 1980s and 90s, China continued to purchase natural resources—petroleum and minerals—from Africa to fuel the Chinese economy and to finance international business enterprises.[58][59] In 2006, trade had increased to $50 billion expanding to $500 billion by 2016.[60]

In Africa, China has loaned $95.5 billion to various countries between 2000 and 2015, the majority being spent on power generation and infrastructure.[61] Cases in which this has ended with China acquiring foreign land have led to accusations of "debt-trap diplomacy".[62][63][64] Other analysts say that China's activities "are goodwill for later investment opportunities or an effort to stockpile international support for contentious political issues".[65]

In 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad cancelled two China-funded projects. He also talked about fears of Malaysia becoming "indebted" and of a "new version of colonialism".[66][67] He later clarified that he did not refer to the Belt and Road Initiative or China with this.[68][69]

According to Mark Langan in 2017, China, Western actors, and other emerging powers pursue their own interests at the expense of African interests. Western actors depict China as a threat to Africa, while depicting European and American involvement in Africa as being virtuous.[70]

Russia

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Russia currently occupies parts of neighboring states. These occupied territories are Transnistria (part of Moldova); Abkhazia and South Ossetia (part of Georgia); and five provinces of Ukraine, which it has illegally annexed. Russia has also established effective political domination over Belarus, through the Union State.[71] Historian Timothy Snyder defines Russia's war against Ukraine as "a colonial war, in the sense that Russia meant to conquer, dominate, displace and exploit" the country and its people.[72] Russia has been accused of colonialism in Crimea, which it annexed in 2014, by enforced Russification, passportization, and by settling Russian citizens on the peninsula and forcing out Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars.[73]

Russian mercenaries standing guard near an armored vehicle in the Central African Republic

The Wagner Group, a Russian state-funded[74] private military company (PMC), has provided military support, security and protection for several autocratic regimes in Africa since 2017. In return, Russian and Wagner-linked companies have been given privileged access to those countries' natural resources, such as rights to gold and diamond mines, while the Russian military has been given access to strategic locations such as airbases and ports.[75][76] This has been described as a neo-colonial and neo-imperialist kind of state capture, whereby Russia gains sway over countries by helping to keep the ruling regime in power and making them reliant on its protection, while generating economic and political benefits for Russia, without benefitting the local population.[77][78][79] Russia has also gained geopolitical influence in Africa through election interference and spreading pro-Russian propaganda and anti-Western disinformation.[80][81] Russian PMCs have been active in the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mozambique, among other countries. They have been accused of human rights abuses and killing civilians.[75] In 2024, the Wagner Group in Africa was merged into a new 'Africa Corps' under the direct control of Russia's Ministry of Defense.[82] Analysts for the Russian government have privately acknowledged the neo-colonial nature of Russia's policy towards Africa.[83]

The "Russian world" is a term used by the Russian government and Russian nationalists for territories and communities with a historical, cultural, or spiritual tie to Russia.[71] The Kremlin meanwhile refers to the Russian diaspora and Russian-speakers in other countries as "Russian compatriots". In her book Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (2016), Agnia Grigas highlights how ideas like the "Russian world" and "Russian compatriots" have become an "instrument of Russian neo-imperial aims".[84] The Kremlin has sought influence over its "compatriots" by offering them Russian citizenship and passports (passportization), and in some cases eventually calling for their military protection.[84] Grigas writes that the Kremlin uses the existence of these "compatriots" to "gain influence over and challenge the sovereignty of foreign states and at times even take over territories".[84]

Iran

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The Iranian government has been called an example of neocolonialism.[85] The motivation for Iran is not economic, but religious.[86] After its establishment in 1979, Iran sought to export Shia Islam globally and position itself as a force in world political structures.[86] Africa's Muslims present a unique opportunity in Iran's dominance in the Muslim world.[86] Iran is able to use these African communities to circumvent economic sanctions and move arms, man power, and nuclear technology.[86]

Iran exerts its influence through humanitarian initiatives, such as those seen in Ghana.[87] Through the building of hospitals, schools, and agricultural projects Iran uses "soft power" to assert its influence in Western Africa.[87]

Niue

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The government of Niue has been trying to get back access to its domain name, .nu.[88] The country signed a deal with a Massachusetts-based non-profit in 1999 that gave away rights to the domain name. Management of the domain name has since shifted to a Swedish organisation. The Niue government is currently fighting on two fronts to get back control on its domain name, including with the ICANN.[89] Toke Talagi, the long-serving Premier of Niue who died in 2020, called it a form of neocolonialism.[90]

South Korea

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To ensure a reliable, long-term supply of food, the South Korean government and powerful Korean multinationals bought farming rights to millions of hectares of agricultural land in under-developed countries.[91]

South Korea's RG Energy Resources Asset Management CEO Park Yong-soo stressed that "the nation does not produce a single drop of crude oil and other key industrial minerals. To power economic growth and support people's livelihoods, we cannot emphasise too much that securing natural resources in foreign countries is a must for our future survival."[92] The head of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Jacques Diouf, stated that the rise in land deals could create a form of "neocolonialism", with poor states producing food for the rich at the expense of their own hungry people.[93]

In 2008, South Korean multinational Daewoo Logistics secured 1.3 million hectares of farmland in Madagascar to grow maize and crops for biofuels. Roughly half of the country's arable land, as well as rainforests were to be converted into palm and corn monocultures, producing food for export from a country where a third of the population and 50 percent of children under five are malnourished, using South African workers instead of locals. Local residents were not consulted or informed, despite being dependent on the land for food and income. The controversial deal played a major part in prolonged anti-government protests that resulted in over a hundred deaths.[91] This was a source of popular resentment that contributed to the fall of then-President Marc Ravalomanana. The new president, Andry Rajoelina, cancelled the deal.[94] Tanzania later announced that South Korea was in talks to develop 100,000 hectares for food production and processing for 700 to 800 billion won. Scheduled to be completed in 2010, it was to be the largest single piece of overseas South Korean agricultural infrastructure ever built.[91]

In 2009, Hyundai Heavy Industries acquired a majority stake in a company cultivating 10,000 hectares of farmland in the Russian Far East and a South Korean provincial government secured 95,000 hectares of farmland in Oriental Mindoro, central Philippines, to grow corn. The South Jeolla province became the first provincial government to benefit from a new central government fund to develop farmland overseas, receiving a loan of $1.9 million. The project was expected to produce 10,000 tonnes of feed in the first year.[95] South Korean multinationals and provincial governments purchased land in Sulawesi, Indonesia, Cambodia and Bulgan, Mongolia. The national South Korean government announced its intention to invest 30 billion won in land in Paraguay and Uruguay. As of 2009 discussions with Laos, Myanmar and Senegal were underway.[91]

Cultural approaches

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Although the concept of neocolonialism was originally developed within a Marxist theoretical framework and is generally employed by the political left, the term "neocolonialism" is found in other theoretical frameworks.

Coloniality

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"Coloniality" claims that knowledge production is strongly influenced by the context of the person producing the knowledge and that this has further disadvantaged developing countries with limited knowledge production infrastructure. It originated among critics of subaltern theories, which, although strongly de-colonial, are less concerned with the source of knowledge.[96]

Cultural theory

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Map of the European Union in the world, with Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) in green and Outermost Regions (OMR) in blue

One variant of neocolonialism theory critiques cultural colonialism, the desire of wealthy nations to control other nations' values and perceptions through cultural means such as media, language, education[97] and religion, ultimately for economic reasons.

Neocolonialism and gender construction

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Concepts of neocolonialism can be found in theoretical works investigating gender outside the global north. Often these conceptions can be seen as erasing gender norms within communities in the global south[98] to create conceptions of gender that align with the global north. Gerise Herndon argues that applying feminism or other theoretical frameworks around gender must look at the relationship between the individual subject, their home country or culture, and the country and culture that exerts neocolonial control over the country. In her piece "Gender Construction and Neocolonialism", Herndon presents the writings of Maryse Condé as an example of grappling with what it means to have your identity constructed by neocolonial powers. Her work explores how women in burgeoning nations rebuilt their identities in the postcolonial period. The task of creating new identities was met with challenges from not only an internal view of what the culture was in these places but also from the external expectations of ex-colonial powers.[99]

An example of the construction of gender norms and conceptions by neocolonial interests is made clear in the Ugandan Anti-Homosexuality Act introduced in 2009 and passed in 2014. The act expanded upon previously existing laws against sodomy to make gay relationships punishable by life imprisonment. The call for this bill came from Ugandans who claimed traditional African values that did not include homosexuality. This act faced backlash from western countries, citing human rights violations. The United States imposed economic sanctions against Uganda in June 2014 in response to the law, the World Bank indefinitely postponed a $90 million aid loan to Uganda and the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway halted aid to Uganda in opposition to the law; the Ugandan government defended the bill and rejected condemnation of it, with the country's authorities stating President Museveni wanted "to demonstrate Uganda's independence in the face of Western pressure and provocation".[100] The Ugandan response was to claim that this was a neocolonialist attack on their culture. Kristen Cheney argued that this is a misrepresentation of neocolonialism at work and that this conception of gender and anti-homosexuality erased historically diverse gender identities in Africa. To Cheney, neocolonialism was found in accepting conservative gender identity politics, specifically those of U.S.-based Evangelical Christians. Before the introduction of this act, conservative Christian groups in the United States had put African religious leaders and politicians on their payroll, reflecting the talking points of U.S.-based Christian evangelism. Cheney argues that this adoption and bankrolling of U.S. conservative Christian evangelist thought in Uganda is the real neocolonialism and effectively erodes any historical gender diversity in Africa.[98]

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Neocolonialism

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from Grokipedia
Neocolonialism denotes the indirect exercise of control by developed nations over formerly colonized countries via economic dependencies, political pressures, and cultural mechanisms, rather than overt territorial administration. The concept gained prominence through Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah's 1965 treatise Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of , which portrayed it as an advanced form of wherein sovereign states retain nominal independence but remain subordinated to external powers through unequal trade, foreign aid conditionalities, and multinational corporate dominance. Nkrumah argued that this system fragments viable economic units into small, non-viable entities reliant on metropolitan economies, ensuring resource extraction and market access without the costs of . Central to neocolonialism are instruments like imposing programs that prioritize debt repayment and liberalization, often exacerbating inequality and limiting policy autonomy in and beyond. Examples include the currency zones, where fourteen West and Central African nations peg their money to the under French oversight, requiring 50% of foreign reserves to be held in , which critics contend facilitates capital outflows and economic subservience. Similarly, in resource sectors frequently yields repatriated profits surpassing local benefits, while flows entangle recipients in donor agendas. These dynamics are alleged to perpetuate by fostering dependency rather than self-sustaining growth. The theory has faced substantial critique for overattributing Africa's developmental shortfalls to external forces while downplaying endogenous causes such as institutional frailty, elite corruption, and policy missteps that hinder effective resource management and . Empirical variations in post-colonial outcomes—evident in resource-rich nations like achieving sustained growth through prudent governance versus others mired in stagnation—underscore that internal factors often dominate causal chains in economic divergence. Proponents of neocolonialism, frequently rooted in dependency paradigms, encounter challenges from data showing that and can catalyze industrialization when aligned with sound domestic reforms, rather than invariably entrenching exploitation. This highlights tensions between structural critiques and agency-based explanations, with source biases in academia often amplifying external culpability at the expense of rigorous .

Definition and Conceptual Origins

Etymology and Early Usage

The term neocolonialism originated in the post-World War II period as a of the enduring dependencies faced by newly independent states on their former colonial overlords, marking a shift from direct territorial rule to subtler forms of influence, primarily economic. Its earliest documented appearances trace to the late , with the first known use recorded in , though it gained wider intellectual currency in the early , as evidenced by its employment in academic journals like Pacific Affairs in 1952. Unlike classical , which relied on and administrative control, neocolonialism denoted indirect dominance through mechanisms such as unequal agreements, foreign , and obligations that preserved external leverage without formal . The concept emerged prominently within anti-imperialist discourse amid the decolonization wave of the 1950s, reflecting anxieties over the incomplete nature of political when economic remained compromised. French philosopher advanced its early usage in his 1961 preface to Frantz Fanon's , portraying neocolonialism as a deceptive "idle dream" of European powers seeking to retain colonial benefits via proxy influences rather than outright reconquest. Sartre's invocation, drawn from existentialist and Marxist critiques of , underscored the term's role in highlighting how superficial masked ongoing exploitation, influencing subsequent debates on global power asymmetries. This linguistic framing distinguished neocolonialism as a descriptor for structural continuities in , rather than mere rhetorical flourish.

Nkrumah's Formulation and Influence

, Ghana's first president, articulated the concept of neocolonialism in his 1965 book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of , framing it as a continuation of through indirect economic and political dominance over formally states. He defined neocolonialism as the practice whereby powerful foreign nations grant political to colonies while maintaining control via economic leverage, including multinational corporations, conditional foreign aid, and monetary policies that foster dependency. Nkrumah argued that this system fragments larger colonial territories into small, non-viable states unable to achieve self-sufficiency, thereby ensuring external powers dictate , , and development. In the book, Nkrumah detailed mechanisms of control, such as Western monopolies manipulating prices—evidenced by post-independence surges in and that benefited exporters more than producers—and programs that imposed fiscal or aligned recipient economies with donor interests. He contended that neocolonialism yields profits akin to direct but evades responsibility, with foreign capital dominating key sectors like and without equivalent local benefits. This formulation emerged amid Ghana's post-1957 independence economic strains, including rising debt from ambitious state-led industrialization projects, which Nkrumah attributed to deliberate external rather than solely domestic policy flaws. The book's publication coincided with the October 21–26, 1965, Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in , where Nkrumah distributed copies to attending heads of state, urging Pan-African unity as a bulwark against neocolonial encroachments. At the conference, he advocated collective and over resources to counter fragmented state vulnerabilities. Nkrumah's ideas resonated in Pan-African circles, influencing calls for to mitigate "strings-attached" , such as loans from institutions like the World Bank that prioritized creditor repayment over local needs. Nkrumah's work gained traction within the (NAM), where he positioned non-alignment not as neutrality but as active resistance to both Western and Soviet influence, enabling economic cooperation across blocs to evade neocolonial traps. Leaders in NAM nations, facing similar post-colonial aid dependencies—such as U.S. and European investments in African infrastructure tied to —adopted Nkrumah's lens to critique such arrangements as veiled , fostering solidarity at forums like the 1966 Tricontinental Conference. This immediate reception amplified neocolonialism as a diagnostic framework for analyzing foreign aid's role in perpetuating inequality, with empirical examples like Ghana's 1960s cocoa price volatility underscoring claims of manipulated global markets.

Theoretical Frameworks

Dependency Theory and Structuralist Views

posits that the economic of peripheral nations stems from their structural integration into the global capitalist system dominated by core industrialized countries, where trade, investment, and financial flows systematically extract , perpetuating dependency rather than fostering autonomous growth. This framework, developed primarily by Latin American economists in the mid-20th century, views neocolonialism as embedded in these core-periphery dynamics, with former colonies remaining subordinated through mechanisms that hinder industrialization and self-sustaining development. André Gunder Frank, a key proponent in the , articulated the "development of underdevelopment" thesis, arguing that metropolitan centers actively underdeveloped satellites by channeling economic surplus outward via mechanisms like profit repatriation and resource extraction, as evidenced in historical patterns of Latin American commodity dependence dating back to colonial eras. Similarly, , collaborating with Enzo Faletto in works like Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina (), refined this into "associated-dependent development," contending that foreign investment in peripheral economies generates limited local growth but reinforces reliance on core markets and technologies, extracting value through unequal terms that favor advanced industrial exports over primary goods. These structuralist views emphasize causal chains where peripheral specialization in raw materials—enforced by core demand and control over pricing—locks economies into low-value cycles, inhibiting technological transfer and domestic capacity. The empirical foundation draws heavily from the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, formulated in the 1950s by of the UN Economic Commission for (ECLA) and Hans Singer, which analyzed historical price data from 1870 to showing a secular deterioration in for primary commodity exporters relative to manufactured goods importers, with primary product prices falling by approximately 0.6% annually against a 2% rise in manufactures. This , rooted in wage disparities and limited in periphery labor markets versus core productivity gains, purportedly transfers surplus to centers, as peripheral nations must export more to import equivalent industrial inputs. Efforts to counter this through (ISI) in during the 1950s–1970s, such as Brazil's protectionist policies yielding initial GDP growth rates of 6–8% annually, ultimately faltered by the late 1970s due to inefficiencies like overvalued currencies, balance-of-payments crises, and failure to achieve export competitiveness, culminating in the 1980s where external debt-to-GDP ratios exceeded 50% in countries like and . In this lens, ISI's shortcomings illustrate how peripheral structures, shaped by core dominance, constrain diversification, as capital-intensive industries remained import-dependent and raw export reliance persisted, with commodity shares in total exports hovering above 60% in many cases.

Marxist and Imperialist Interpretations

Marxist theorists extend Vladimir Lenin's 1917 analysis in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, which characterized as the monopolistic phase of involving the export of capital to divide the world among finance oligarchies, to the post-colonial era by arguing that formal merely shifted exploitation from territorial control to indirect economic dominance. Paul and Paul , in their 1966 work , adapted this framework to explain how advanced capitalist economies, facing stagnation from surplus absorption issues, perpetuate underdevelopment in the periphery through and the absorption of via multinational corporations, thereby sustaining global class relations without direct political rule. This interpretation posits neocolonialism as the evolution of , where core nations maintain by integrating former colonies into the world market on terms that reinforce dependency and prevent independent accumulation. In this view, (FDI) serves as a primary mechanism for surplus extraction, with multinational corporations repatriating profits that exceed reinvestments, draining resources from developing economies. For instance, between 2005 and 2020, transnational corporations repatriated an average of $1 trillion annually in dividends generated from FDI-financed activities abroad, often leaving host countries with limited net gains after accounting for profit outflows. Marxists like Baran argued that such dynamics hinder balanced growth in the periphery, as monopolistic pricing and technology transfers favor core accumulation, framing not as mutual benefit but as veiled imperialist expansion that reproduces uneven development. International financial institutions are critiqued as instruments enforcing this structure through conditional lending that imposes neoliberal reforms, compelling debtor nations to prioritize debt servicing over social investment. The International Monetary Fund's programs, formalized in the 1980s but rooted in earlier conditionality practices, required fiscal , , and market liberalization in exchange for loans, which Marxist analysts see as perpetuating subordination by aligning peripheral economies with core interests. Sweezy and others contended that these policies, ostensibly for stabilization, instead deepened dependency by eroding state capacities and opening markets to foreign capital dominance. The 1973–1975 global crisis, triggered by oil price shocks, exemplified this process in Marxist interpretations, as developing countries borrowed heavily in petrodollars to offset import costs, accumulating that by the late 1970s trapped them in cycles where interest payments—often exceeding new lending—siphoned resources to Western banks and perpetuated . Theorists viewed this as monopoly capital's response to its internal contradictions, using recycled petrodollars to expand influence while ensuring peripheral economies remained export-oriented suppliers of cheap raw materials, thus sustaining imperialism's logic amid formal .

Critiques of Theoretical Assumptions

Neocolonial theories, particularly those rooted in dependency and structuralist frameworks, have been critiqued for overemphasizing external economic dependencies and power asymmetries while understating the causal primacy of domestic institutions and governance failures in perpetuating . Economists , Simon Johnson, and contend that inclusive institutions—which protect property rights, encourage broad participation, and incentivize —drive , whereas extractive institutions, often inherited or sustained post-independence, concentrate rents among elites and stifle growth, irrespective of foreign influence. This institutional lens reveals logical flaws in neocolonial assumptions, as countries with comparable histories of foreign domination exhibit divergent outcomes based on internal political choices rather than ongoing extraction; for example, settler colonies developed more inclusive frameworks conducive to sustained development, challenging the narrative of perpetual external victimhood. Empirical data further undermines neocolonial portrayals of (FDI) as a mechanism of systemic exploitation, with World Bank analyses from the 1990s through the 2020s demonstrating FDI's role in fostering growth and alleviation when paired with enabling policies. In , FDI inflows during the 1990s-2010s correlated with rapid reductions—such as halving rates in from 58% in 1993 to 14% by 2014—through spillovers, generation, and . In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa's more limited FDI benefits stem not from inherent dependency but from institutional barriers like weak and , which deter spillovers; successful African cases, however, mirror East Asian gains, indicating that domestic factors mediate investment outcomes rather than foreign capital itself perpetuating underdevelopment. Critics also highlight neocolonialism's rhetorical deployment as a shield for and policy mismanagement, allowing leaders to attribute domestic collapses to while evading accountability for behaviors. In , invocations of neocolonial resistance justified , including the 2007-2010s of oil sectors previously managed under joint ventures, yet this led to production declines from 3.5 million barrels per day in 1998 to under 500,000 by 2020, exacerbated by siphoning billions in state funds rather than external interference. Such examples expose how the framework can rationalize extractive , where elites monopolize resource revenues—evidenced by Venezuela's $300 billion in oil windfalls from 1999-2014 largely uninvested in diversification—perpetuating cycles of through internal predation, not foreign design.

Historical Development

Post-World War II Decolonization

The wave of decolonization accelerated after , with over three dozen territories in and achieving independence between 1945 and 1960, fundamentally altering global colonial structures. in August 1947 marked an early milestone, followed by Indonesia's recognition of sovereignty in 1949 after conflict with the , and a surge in African independences including in 1957 and sixteen French colonies in 1960. These transitions often involved negotiated transfers of power amid nationalist pressures and weakened European empires exhausted by war, yet new states frequently retained pre-existing administrative frameworks and economic ties to former metropoles. The 1955 Bandung Conference in , attended by delegates from 29 Asian and African nations, highlighted emerging apprehensions about sustained external influence despite formal sovereignty, promoting Afro-Asian cooperation to counter both and its potential successor forms. Leaders like 's emphasized and economic , framing the gathering as a platform for newly independent states to assert autonomy amid fears that might not sever dependencies on Western powers for technology, markets, and security. Many post-colonial states inherited fragile institutions shaped by colonial extractive priorities, such as arbitrary borders and limited local administrative capacity, which fostered ongoing reliance on ex-colonizers for technical expertise, trade outlets, and models. This structural weakness—rooted in historical patterns where colonizers prioritized resource extraction over robust local institutions—impeded rapid self-sufficiency, perpetuating economic orientations toward primary commodity exports and vulnerability to metropolitan policy shifts. includes the initiation of U.S. foreign programs like the 1949 Point Four initiative, which provided technical assistance to underdeveloped regions as a low-cost strategy to build capacity while maintaining influence, disbursing expertise through on-site advisors in host nations. Aid flows to these countries rose in the , with U.S. programs emphasizing and to stabilize new governments, often channeling resources through bilateral ties that echoed pre-independence patterns.

Cold War Proxy Dynamics

The era (1947–1991) intensified neocolonial accusations against both superpowers as their proxy interventions in prioritized geopolitical over local , channeling arms, advisors, and funding to aligned factions amid . The sought to counter Soviet expansion by backing anti-communist regimes, often through covert operations, while the USSR positioned itself as an anti-imperialist ally, supplying liberation movements with materiel that entrenched dependency on Moscow. Empirical analyses link such external —totaling billions in arms transfers—to heightened civil strife, as recipients prioritized superpower agendas, prolonging conflicts like those in and the Congo where aid inflows correlated with fragmented governance and resource exploitation rather than stabilization. A pivotal U.S. intervention occurred in the of 1960, where the CIA, under President Eisenhower's authorization, pursued the assassination of Prime Minister after his overtures to the post-independence, fearing a communist foothold in mineral-rich . Lumumba's execution by pro-Western Congolese forces, with CIA logistical support, paved the way for Mobutu Sese Seko's 32-year dictatorship, sustained by over $1 billion in U.S. aid by the , which critics argue perpetuated extractive patronage networks under the guise of . Soviet responses mirrored this pattern in Angola's 1975 , where airlifted 30,000 tons of arms to the Marxist , enabling its victory over U.S.- and South Africa-backed rivals like and FNLA, and forging a client state reliant on annual Soviet subsidies exceeding $1 billion in the for military and economic survival. Western alliances yielded tangible infrastructure gains, such as the U.S.-backed Project in , which received a $30 million in 1961 to construct the , generating hydroelectric power that boosted aluminum smelting and national output by 20% initially, yet faced charges of embedding U.S. influence through tied and strategic basing access, including overflight rights in to monitor Soviet naval movements. Soviet "anti-imperialist" engagements, however, imposed parallel dependencies; in after the 1974 revolution, Moscow's $9 billion in from 1977–1991 propped up the regime's famines and purges, creating a Marxist that subordinated local policy to directives on collectivization and alliances. These dynamics underscore how both powers' proxy strategies, rationalized as ideological necessities, empirically fostered and instability, with flows inversely tied to in recipient states.

Mechanisms of Alleged Influence

Economic Instruments: Aid, Debt, and Investment

Foreign aid to post-colonial developing countries, particularly in Africa, has frequently been conditioned on policy reforms imposed by multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. During the 1980s debt crisis, which affected numerous African and Latin American nations following oil shocks and rising interest rates, the IMF introduced structural adjustment programs (SAPs) requiring recipient governments to implement austerity measures, currency devaluation, trade liberalization, and privatization of state assets in exchange for loans or debt relief. These programs, applied in over 30 sub-Saharan African countries by the late 1980s, aimed to enhance fiscal discipline and export competitiveness but often resulted in reduced public spending, higher unemployment, and social unrest, as evidenced by increased poverty rates in adjusted economies during the decade. While SAPs contributed to short-term macroeconomic stabilization in some cases, empirical analyses indicate they exacerbated inequality without consistently fostering sustained growth, prompting critiques that such conditionality perpetuated external influence over domestic economic sovereignty. Debt accumulation has compounded these dynamics, with many governments prioritizing servicing over in recent decades. According to World Bank data, developing countries collectively paid a record $1.4 trillion in foreign debt obligations in 2023, including $406 billion in interest, which constrained budgets for and amid rising borrowing costs post-COVID-19. In specifically, more than 30 countries allocated greater expenditures to service than to healthcare even before the , a pattern persisting into the where 34 nations spent over $85 billion on repayments in 2023 alone—exceeding combined and outlays in several cases. This fiscal strain, rooted in loans from official creditors like the IMF and commercial lenders, has led to arguments of debt trap mechanisms, though causal factors also include domestic mismanagement and commodity price volatility, as higher service ratios correlate with governance quality rather than creditor intent alone. Foreign direct investment (FDI) represents another instrument, promising capital inflows and but often yielding enclave economies with limited broader benefits. In , Chinese FDI in —totaling significant shares of the sector since the 2000s—has generated for tens of thousands, with firms like China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group employing over 10,000 locals by 2016 and contributing to GDP via exports. However, critics highlight enclave characteristics, where investments concentrate in resource extraction with minimal spillovers to local industries, poor labor conditions (e.g., 2006 wage disputes at Collum Mine), and , fostering dependency on volatile commodity prices rather than diversified growth. Empirical evidence tempers claims of inherent exploitation: outcomes vary by host policies, as seen in the Asian Tigers (, , , ), which from the to leveraged FDI for , achieving average annual GDP growth of 7-10% through selective integration, skill development, and state-guided markets—demonstrating that voluntary contracts and institutional reforms can yield mutual gains absent . This contrasts with uniform neocolonial narratives, underscoring domestic agency in determining whether FDI entrenches dependency or catalyzes development.

Political and Military Interventions

The engaged in covert operations to undermine Salvador Allende's presidency in following his 1970 election, including Track I diplomatic efforts to block his ratification and Track II attempts to foment a military coup, as detailed in declassified CIA documents from the . These actions, motivated by fears of Allende's socialist policies aligning with Soviet interests, involved funding opposition media and , though a U.S. investigation in 1975 found no direct evidence of U.S. orchestration of the 1973 coup that installed . Post-coup, the U.S. provided economic and military aid to the Pinochet regime, stabilizing it against leftist insurgencies but enabling widespread abuses, with declassified State Department records confirming awareness of these violations by 1976. France conducted in September 1979 to overthrow Central African Republic Emperor , deploying paratroopers to install former president in a swift coup that restored French-aligned governance amid concerns over Bokassa's erratic rule and Libyan influence. This intervention exemplified France's post-independence strategy of military support to Francophone African leaders, often justified as stabilizing against external threats, as seen in the 1978 operation in where French and Belgian forces repelled Cuban-backed rebels invading from , rescuing expatriates and bolstering Mobutu Sese Seko's pro-Western regime against communist expansion. Such actions, while criticized as neocolonial for perpetuating elite dependencies, empirically contained Soviet proxy incursions during the , preventing broader destabilization in resource-rich regions per analyses of proxy dynamics. In 2007, the U.S. established Africa Command (AFRICOM) as a to coordinate engagements across the , headquartered in , , with stated goals of building partner capacities, countering post-9/11, and preventing crises through training and aid rather than large-scale basing. Critics, including African governments wary of militarization, argued it prioritized securing access to minerals and oil over development, yet AFRICOM's operations have focused on non-combat roles like countering al-Shabaab in and Ebola response logistics, with empirical data showing over 20 partner nations receiving security assistance by 2010 to enhance domestic stability against jihadist threats. These interventions reflect causal priorities of resource security intertwined with ideological , though declassified assessments indicate they averted ungoverned spaces exploitable by adversaries, contrasting with domestic governance failures in intervened states.

Cultural and Soft Power Projections

Western media exports, particularly from Hollywood, command a substantial portion of the international film market, estimated at 60% to 75% of global shares outside domestic markets. This prevalence is amplified by English-language dominance in , where approximately 58% of content is in English, despite native speakers comprising only about 25.9% of online users. Proponents of neocolonial interpretations contend that such projections embed Western ideals of , , and into recipient societies, fostering and diluting indigenous traditions, as observed in studies of media flows toward developing regions. Educational initiatives funded by Western NGOs parallel historical missionary activities by disseminating curricula centered on English proficiency and Western analytical frameworks, often shaping national policies in former colonies. & Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, allocated over $478 million from 2009 to 2011 toward African agricultural and educational development, extending influence into schooling via partnerships that prioritize standardized testing and tech-integrated learning aligned with global standards. Critics, including African scholars, describe these as mechanisms of "" that impose external priorities, potentially sidelining local knowledge systems and reinforcing dependency on foreign expertise. Empirical assessments reveal tangible gains from these projections, including literacy rate increases in from roughly 52% in 1990 to 66% by 2020, correlated with expanded school access and book donations from Western sources that enhanced reading outcomes in targeted programs. facilitates technology adoption and labor market integration, as proficiency correlates with higher in globalized sectors, countering claims of unmitigated cultural loss by demonstrating causal links to socioeconomic mobility absent in isolationist models.

Empirical Case Studies

Western European and American Examples

France's post-colonial influence in , often termed , has been exemplified by the currency system established on December 26, 1945, which pegs the currencies of 14 nations to the and requires 50% of their to be held in the French Treasury. This arrangement, maintained through bilateral agreements, ensures French monetary oversight and guarantees convertibility, with proponents arguing it provides stability while critics contend it limits monetary sovereignty and facilitates capital outflows benefiting French interests. In 2020, reforms shifted reserve requirements to regional central banks but retained the euro peg and French board representation, reflecting ongoing economic ties. French military engagements underscore this influence, such as launched on January 11, 2013, in response to a Malian request amid an Islamist rebel advance toward , involving 4,000 French troops that recaptured northern territories within months. Similar interventions occurred in d'Ivoire (2002-2015) and the (2013-2016), often justified as stabilizing former colonies against insurgencies, with maintaining permanent bases in seven African countries as of 2023. These actions, while addressing immediate security threats, have been linked to protecting French economic stakes, including in and oil in . In the Americas, United States policy extended the —originally proclaimed in 1823 to oppose European recolonization—through the of 1904, asserting U.S. intervention rights to preempt European action in debt-ridden Latin American states, leading to occupations in (1915-1934), the (1916-1924), and (1912-1933). Corporate influence amplified this, as seen in the 1954 Guatemalan coup orchestrated by the CIA against President Jacobo Árbenz, whose land reforms expropriated uncultivated holdings of the , which controlled 42% of Guatemala's and lobbied U.S. officials with familial ties to the firm. The operation, codenamed PBSUCCESS, installed a pro-business regime, preserving U.S. commercial interests amid fears of . Empirical analyses of aid dependency reveal mixed outcomes, with studies finding foreign often correlates negatively with GDP growth in aid-reliant African economies due to reduced incentives for domestic reforms and distortions, though effects vary by aid type and recipient policies. For instance, total aid inflows show insignificant or minimal positive growth impacts in sub-Saharan panels from 1990-2017, contrasted with Botswana's post-1966 trajectory, where prudent —accounting for 80% of exports by 2023—fueled sustained 5-7% annual GDP growth through diversified investments and low corruption, without heavy aid reliance. This case highlights how internal institutions, rather than external dependencies, drive resource-led development success.

Non-Western Actors: China and Russia

Non-Western powers such as and have expanded their influence in and other developing regions through infrastructure financing, direct investments, and security assistance, prompting debates over whether these engagements constitute neocolonialism by mirroring extractive patterns or offer distinct alternatives emphasizing non-interference and mutual benefit. 's , launched in 2013, has facilitated over $930 billion in global investments, with substantial portions directed toward African infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity but raise concerns about debt sustainability and strategic asset concessions. In , for instance, the government leased the Hambantota Port to Holdings on a 99-year term in July 2017 after failing to repay loans tied to its construction, granting China operational control over the facility in exchange for $1.12 billion in . Chinese foreign direct investment in has supported economic transformation by fostering growth in productive sectors and creating new industries, though empirical studies indicate mixed outcomes including elevated industrial carbon emissions from expansions between 2003 and 2014. These investments have yielded gains and positive socioeconomic effects, such as improved access to and roads, yet they have also been linked to in fragile ecosystems and criticisms of opaque lending practices that prioritize resource access over local development priorities. Proponents argue that China's model differs from Western approaches by adhering to principles of non-interference in domestic , allowing recipient states greater , while critics contend that debt-financed projects enable long-term economic leverage akin to historical concessions. Russia's engagements, primarily through the from the 2010s until its effective dismantling in 2023 following a and leadership changes, involved deploying mercenaries to provide in exchange for resource extraction rights, as seen in the where forces secured mining concessions for gold, diamonds, and timber. In , Wagner operatives protected interests against rebels while exploiting natural resources to fund operations, a model that transitioned to state-controlled entities like the Africa Corps post-2023, maintaining Moscow's access to strategic minerals. Following its 2022 invasion of , Russian discourse has intensified accusations of Western neocolonialism, portraying interventions in as anti-imperialist partnerships that counter hegemonic dominance and promote multipolar sovereignty. Analyses of these activities reveal empirical ambiguities: Russian security pacts have stabilized fragile regimes and enabled resource swaps benefiting local elites, yet they have coincided with abuses and limited broad-based economic gains, echoing debates on whether such arrangements replicate colonial-era resource-for-protection dynamics or provide pragmatic alternatives to Western conditional . Overall, both nations' strategies prioritize securing commodities and geopolitical footholds, with outcomes varying by host country governance; while infrastructure from has demonstrably boosted , Russia's model emphasizes military leverage, complicating assessments of neocolonial intent versus opportunistic .

African Resistance and Regional Variations

In the of , military coups since 2020 have exemplified resistance to perceived French neocolonial influence, with juntas in (August 2020 and May 2021), (September 2022), and (July 2023) demanding the expulsion of French troops and an end to resource exploitation tied to networks. These actions, justified by leaders as reclaiming sovereignty over and resources, led to the withdrawal of French forces from Mali by December 2022 and by 2023, alongside public protests besieging French bases. Such moves highlight regional agency, though they have coincided with heightened jihadist violence and economic isolation from bodies like , underscoring trade-offs between anti-external control and internal stability. In contrast, Nigeria's in the 1990s illustrated dependency dynamics through Ogoni resistance against Shell's operations, where the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), led by , protested environmental degradation from oil extraction since the 1950s, demanding resource control and revenue sharing. Mass marches, including 300,000 participants in January 1993, faced state repression, culminating in Saro-Wiwa's execution with eight others on November 10, 1995, by a military tribunal amid allegations of Shell's for crackdowns. Persistent spills—over 1,000 sites unrehabilitated as of 2020—have fueled claims of extractive neocolonialism, yet local corruption in revenue allocation has compounded losses, with ranking high in domestic graft indices. Mauritius demonstrates successful local agency through post-independence trade liberalization, establishing export processing zones in 1970 that boosted manufacturing exports from 11% of merchandise in 1975 to 80% by 2000, driving average annual GDP growth of over 5% from 1970-2010 via diversification beyond sugar . This pragmatic openness, including competitive exchange rates and WTO-aligned policies, contrasts with resource-dependent traps elsewhere, attributing success to institutional reforms rather than victimhood narratives. Regional variations persist, with Francophone West and Central Africa—tied to the pegged to the since 1945—facing ongoing economic critiques for limited monetary sovereignty, as 14 nations deposit 50% of reserves with the French Treasury, facilitating capital outflows estimated at $88.6 billion continent-wide annually via illicit financial flows (IFFs) like profit-shifting. Yet IFFs encompass domestic , which AU analyses identify as intertwined with external mechanisms, while East African states like those in the EAC have pursued intra-regional trade integration, yielding higher non-resource growth rates (e.g., 6% average 2010-2020) through diversified exports and less direct colonial currency ties. These differences debunk uniform neocolonial causality, as East Asian post-1960s industrialization via land reforms and export incentives shows policy choices, not perpetual external dominance, determine trajectories—lessons echoed in but unevenly applied across Africa's governance spectrum.

Debates on Validity and Causality

Evidence Supporting Neocolonial Claims

Empirical analyses indicate a long-term deterioration in the for primary exporters in , where prices have failed to keep pace with prices from manufactured , exacerbating economic vulnerabilities from the mid-20th century onward. This pattern aligns with the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, supported by UNCTAD data showing African reliance on two to three primary commodities for the bulk of foreign exchange earnings, rendering economies susceptible to price volatility and hindering diversification. Recent assessments confirm persistent commodity dependence, with 46 African nations trapped in this cycle as of 2025, contributing to a $25 billion drop in earnings over the prior decade despite agricultural volume growth. Multinational corporations further entrench unequal economic relations through profit shifting to tax havens, with estimates indicating that such practices resulted in over $850 billion in global profits redirected in 2017, implying $200–300 billion in foregone for source countries, including African states. In , mining sectors alone see annual losses of $450–730 million due to avoidance strategies, underscoring how extractive industries repatriate value while local development lags. The system exemplifies institutionalized monetary dependency, where 14 West and Central African countries peg their currency to the via French guarantees, requiring 50% of foreign reserves to be held in France's Treasury, facilitating capital outflows estimated in billions annually and limiting autonomous . Foreign aid has been critiqued for perpetuating dependency rather than fostering self-sufficiency, with over $1 trillion disbursed to since the yielding minimal sustainable growth and instead correlating with entrenched and distorted markets, as argued by Dambisa Moyo based on post-colonial data. In the military domain, the region's coups in (August 2020 and May 2021), (January and September 2022), and (July 2023) coincided with junta demands to terminate French military presence, including bases established for that had operated since , highlighting perceived foreign interference as a destabilizing factor amid ongoing insurgencies. These events reflect a where external arrangements, involving thousands of troops and operations, have been linked by local actors to sovereignty erosions and instability.

Counterarguments: Domestic Governance and Market Benefits

Critics of neocolonialism argue that persistent in many former colonies stems primarily from domestic failures rather than external exploitation, as evidenced by high corruption levels correlating strongly with economic stagnation. According to the 2023 by , sub-Saharan African countries averaged scores below 33 out of 100, with nations like (11) and (13) ranking among the world's most corrupt, diverting resources from public services and deterring investment far more than foreign aid or debt dynamics. These internal institutional weaknesses, including for officials and restricted civic space, create causal barriers to growth that outweigh alleged neocolonial influences, as robust enables effective regardless of external ties. A stark illustration is Zimbabwe's fast-track land reforms initiated in , which seized commercial farms without compensation, leading to a collapse in agricultural output and broader economic contraction at an average annual rate of -6.09% from to 2008, with plummeting from $1,640 to $661. This policy, driven by domestic political motivations under Robert Mugabe's government, disrupted property rights and expertise, causing exceeding 89 sextillion percent by 2008 and food insecurity, independent of foreign corporate extraction. Such self-inflicted disruptions highlight how authoritarian and erratic reforms perpetuate cycles more than any purported neocolonial hold. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and market liberalization, conversely, have demonstrably spurred growth in developing economies when paired with sound domestic policies, challenging zero-sum narratives of exploitation by fostering capital inflows, , and development. IMF analysis indicates FDI boosts through increased total and productivity spillovers, particularly in sectors where host countries absorb skills and . Chile's 1980s liberalization under military rule, including and trade openness, achieved the region's fastest growth for three decades, slashing from 45% to 15% by 2010, in contrast to Venezuela's statist policies post-1999, which triggered GDP contraction of over 75% by amid oil dependency and expropriations. Similarly, East Asian economies like and realized their "miracle" growth rates exceeding 7% annually from the to via secure property rights, land reforms distributing assets to smallholders, and export-oriented policies that attracted FDI without relying on traps. These cases underscore that enforceable property rights and enable mutually beneficial investments, generating wealth creation over extraction when governments prioritize stability over .

Alternative Explanations for Underdevelopment

Institutional economists, notably and , contend that the quality of domestic institutions—particularly whether they are inclusive or extractive—fundamentally drives long-term economic outcomes, independent of colonial legacies. Inclusive institutions, characterized by secure property rights, impartial , and broad political participation, incentivize investment, innovation, and , leading to sustained . In contrast, extractive institutions concentrate power and wealth among elites, stifling productivity and perpetuating . This framework explains divergences among former colonies: post-independence , under Lee Kuan Yew's leadership from 1959, established inclusive economic policies emphasizing anti-corruption enforcement (via the , founded 1952) and merit-based governance, resulting in GDP per capita rising from approximately $500 in 1960 to over $20,000 by 1990. Conversely, the (DRC), inheriting extractive structures post-1960 independence, has seen persistent and weak property rights, with GDP per capita stagnating around 300−300-600 from 1960 to 1990 amid resource curses and civil strife. Cultural factors also contribute to underdevelopment variances, as argued by scholars extending Max Weber's analysis of to non-Western contexts. Weber posited that Protestant values emphasizing disciplined labor and deferred gratification fostered in , a dynamic echoed in Asia's Confucian-influenced societies where familial duty and education prioritization correlated with higher savings rates (e.g., East Asia's household savings exceeding 30% of GDP in the 1970s-1980s versus sub-Saharan Africa's under 10%). further emphasizes culture's role in economic disparities, highlighting traits like punctuality, literacy emphasis, and entrepreneurial risk-taking as portable advantages explaining why groups with similar colonial histories diverge: for instance, communities in achieved disproportionate wealth through cultural norms favoring commerce over subsistence, while some African societies prioritized communal redistribution, impeding . Empirical cross-country studies link stronger s—measured via surveys on effort justification—to higher growth, with Protestant or Confucian cultural zones outperforming others in productivity metrics from 1960-1990. Post-colonial policy choices amplified these institutional and cultural effects, with (ISI) often yielding inferior results compared to export-led strategies. In and during the 1960s-1980s, ISI policies—featuring high tariffs (averaging 50-100% on manufactures) and state subsidies for domestic industries—led to inefficient, uncompetitive sectors, balance-of-payments crises, and average annual GDP growth of 1-2% in from 1960-1990. East Asian tigers like and , shifting to export promotion by the mid-1960s (e.g., Korea's export share rising from 3% of GDP in 1960 to 35% by 1980), achieved 7-10% annual growth through incentives tying subsidies to performance and global , fostering technological upgrading. This contrast underscores how distortions, rather than external dependencies, explain much of the growth gap, as ISI shielded firms from efficiency pressures while export-led models enforced discipline.

Contemporary Manifestations and Responses

Recent African Sovereignty Movements (2010s-2025)

A series of military coups in the from 2020 to 2023 marked a concerted push for sovereignty against perceived French neocolonial influence and regional bodies like . In , the August 2020 coup ousted President , viewed as overly aligned with , amid public resentment toward French military operations failing to curb jihadist threats. A second coup in May 2021 consolidated junta control, leading to demands for French troop withdrawal, which occurred in 2022. experienced coups in January and September 2022, installing Captain , who expelled French forces in 2023 and emphasized from Western partnerships. The July 2023 coup prompted the junta to order the French ambassador's expulsion and troop withdrawal by year's end, rejecting sanctions and intervention threats as externally imposed. In response to ECOWAS pressure, including a potential military invasion of , the juntas of , , and formed the (AES) on September 16, 2023, via the Liptako-Gourma Charter, establishing a mutual focused on regional autonomy and security cooperation outside Western frameworks. By July 2024, AES evolved into a with a joint military force to counter shared threats, signaling a break from ECOWAS membership and its perceived alignment with French interests. Parallel movements targeted economic dependencies, exemplified by ongoing anti-CFA franc protests since the , which intensified in the amid coups, decrying the currency's ties to the French Treasury as a barrier to monetary for 14 West and Central African nations. In , the 2023 debt restructuring agreement with bondholders reduced obligations by approximately $840 million and extended maturities, enabling greater control over resources—Africa's second-largest producer—and reducing leverage of foreign creditors. French economic influence in West and Central has measurably declined in the , with trade shares dropping faster than in prior decades, particularly in African exports to France, as states pivot to non-Western partners. AES members have deepened ties with nations, including Russian security assistance and Chinese infrastructure deals, to diversify away from traditional French dominance. These shifts, while fostering claims, have coincided with heightened jihadist activity and humanitarian strains in the region.

Globalization Versus Neo-Imperial Narratives

, characterized by expanded , investment, and technology diffusion under multilateral frameworks like the (WTO), has empirically driven substantial in developing economies, contrasting with neocolonial narratives that depict it as exploitative dominance. Between 1990 and 2015, the global rate fell from approximately 36% to 10%, lifting over 1 billion people out of destitution, with enabling access to larger markets and efficiency gains that boosted incomes in export-oriented sectors. This progress stemmed from causal mechanisms such as exploitation and integration, rather than coercive extraction, as evidenced by rising developing-country shares in world from 33% in 2000 to 48% by the mid-2010s. Technological transfers facilitated by global markets exemplify mutual gains, independent of imperial intent. In , the system, launched in 2007 and scaled through private amid open financial flows, increased household consumption by 2% on average and lifted about 194,000 households—roughly 2% of the —out of by 2016, primarily via enhanced remittances and entrepreneurial access. Such innovations, diffused through competitive global ecosystems rather than top-down mandates, demonstrate how rule-based openness fosters local adaptation and resilience, countering claims of dependency by enabling economic agency. In the 2020s, neo-imperial framings have intensified in geopolitical rhetoric, particularly from and , portraying Western-led as a tool of financial subjugation. At the 2025 BRICS summit prelude, Russian President denounced "financial neo-colonialism" by institutions like the World Bank and IMF, advocating alternatives to the "outdated" liberal model in favor of multipolar emerging-market dominance. These statements, issued via state channels amid sanctions and rivalry, align with broader anti-Western narratives at forums like the 2022-2024 gatherings, yet overlook empirical sovereignty enhancements from trade integration, such as diversified revenue streams reducing vulnerability to bilateral pressures. The rule-based trade order underpins development by providing predictable and non-discriminatory access, benefits disproportionately aiding resource-constrained nations. WTO membership correlates with trade , cutting transaction costs and stimulating growth through enforced commitments that curb arbitrary barriers, as seen in streamlined yielding higher gains for least-developed countries. This framework mitigates power asymmetries via , unlike opaque prone to , enabling causal pathways to industrialization without reverting to . Protectionist alternatives, often romanticized in neo-imperial critiques as assertions, empirically inflict self-harm by distorting incentives and stifling productivity. Historical analyses of import-substitution policies in developing economies reveal persistent failures, with high tariffs fostering inefficiency, , and stagnant growth, as few nations scaled such models successfully compared to export-oriented peers. Empirical studies confirm elevates costs, reduces output, and exacerbates inequality without improving trade balances, underscoring globalization's superior causal logic for sustained development over insular narratives.

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  192. https://hbr.org/1987/05/why-protectionism-doesnt-pay
  193. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2019/03/why-tariffs-spell-trouble-for-economic-growth/
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