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Operation Flipper
Operation Flipper
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Operation Flipper or the 'Rommel Raid'
Part of Operation Crusader during the Second World War

Geoffrey Keyes VC
Date10–18 November 1941
Location32°55′59″N 21°44′30″E / 32.93306°N 21.74167°E / 32.93306; 21.74167
Result Axis victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom  Germany
 Italy
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom Robert Laycock
United Kingdom Geoffrey Keyes 
Nazi Germany Erwin Rommel
Fascist Italy Alfredo Mercuro
Casualties and losses
2 killed
28 captured (incl. 3 wounded)
4 killed
3 wounded
Map

Operation Flipper (also called the Rommel Raid) was a British commando raid during the Second World War, mainly by men from No. 11 (Scottish) Commando. The operation included an attack on the headquarters of Erwin Rommel, the commander of Panzergruppe Afrika in North Africa. It was timed for the night of 17/18 November 1941, just before the start of Operation Crusader. The operation failed as Rommel had left the target house weeks earlier and all but two of the commandos who landed were killed or captured. One member of the Special Boat Section team, who had secured the beach for the commando party, also escaped.

Planning

[edit]

From October to November 1941, a plan was formulated at Eighth Army headquarters to attack: (data from Jones 2006 unless indicated)[1]

  • Rommel's presumed headquarters near Beda Littoria, some 18 mi (29 km) inland from Apollonia, Libya
  • a wireless station and intelligence centre at Apollonia
  • an Italian headquarters and communications cable mast at Cyrene
  • the headquarters of the Italian Trieste Division near Slonta

Although not specified in the orders, the goal of the raid was to kill or capture Rommel, to disrupt German organisation before the start of Crusader. Rommel's headquarters was believed to be at Beda Littoria, because Captain John Haselden had reconnoitred the area disguised as an Arab and reported that Rommel's staff car came and went from the former Prefecture. The operation was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Laycock; Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Keyes, present throughout the planning stage, selected the most hazardous task of the attack on Rommel's headquarters for himself. Unbeknownst to the planners, Beda Littoria had only briefly been Rommel's headquarters and had been taken over by the chief quartermaster of Panzergruppe Afrika, General Schleusener. Some weeks earlier, Rommel had moved his headquarters nearer to Tobruk to be close to the action. Rommel was not even in North Africa during Flipper, having gone to Rome to request replacements for supply ships sunk by the British.[2]

Raid

[edit]

10–14/15 November

[edit]
Submarine HMS Torbay

On 10 November, HMS Torbay carried Keyes, Captain Robin Campbell, Lieutenant Roy Cooke and 25 men. HMS Talisman transported Laycock, Captain Glennie, Lieutenant David Macbeth Sutherland and 25 men from Alexandria. On the night of 14/15 November 1941, Keyes' detachment landed on the beach of Khashm al-Kalb (The Dog's Nose), guided by two-man Special Boat Section (SBS) teams in folboats (folding canoes).[3] The beach lay near a place known as Hamama, some 250 mi (400 km) behind Axis lines. Once ashore, they made contact with Haselden, delivered earlier by the Long Range Desert Group for reconnaissance. The weather deteriorated and Laycock's group had a much more difficult time getting ashore. Laycock and seven men landed but the rest were stranded on Talisman. With only 34 of the 59 men available, instead of four detachments attacking the targets, there were only to be three.[4] Laycock remained at the rendezvous with three men to secure the beach, Keyes led his detachment of 25 men for the attack on Rommel's supposed headquarters, while Lieutenant Cooke took six men to destroy the communications facilities near Cyrene. Haselden's detachment completed its mission and was picked up by the LRDG.

15–18 November

[edit]

Shortly before first light, Keyes' men moved to a wadi, where they sheltered until dark on the second night then moved off. Their Arab guide refused to accompany the party in the deteriorating weather. Keyes then led his men on a 1,800 ft (550 m) climb, followed by an approach march of 18 mi (29 km) in pitch dark and torrential rain. Hiding in a cave during the day, the detachment advanced to within a few hundred yards of the objective by 22:00 on the third night. At 23:59, Keyes led his party past sentries and other defences up to the house. Unable to find an open window or door, Keyes took advantage of Campbell's excellent German by having him pound on the front door and demand entrance. They set upon the sentry who opened the door. Campbell shot him and Keyes might have been wounded in the scuffle. The official version [which?] is that Keyes opened the door to a nearby room, found Germans inside, closed it again abruptly, reopened it to hurl in a grenade and was shot by one of the Germans. Only one round was fired by the Germans during the raid on the HQ.[5]

Keyes was taken outside but quickly died. Shortly afterwards, Campbell was accidentally shot in the leg by one of his own men. He passed command to Sergeant Jack Terry and remained behind. Terry gathered the raiding team and retreated with 17 men to rejoin Laycock at the beach. An Italian source, not explicit in naming the British names, points that Cooke's men encountered a platoon of Italian police paratroopers. The Italians had been searching for the British raiders close to the village Mansura (about 9 mi (15 km) north of Cyrene).

19 November

[edit]

According to the source, 2nd Lieutenant Alfredo Sandulli Mercuro and the 3rd Platoon, 2nd Company, 1° Battaglione Paracadutisti Carabinieri Reali encountered what he thought was a band of Arabs hiding along a mountain ridge on 19 November. When Mercuro's Arabic interpreter called out to them, the Italians were fired on and the paratroopers engaged what they now knew were British commandos, who withdrew to a cave. With no way out, the wounded commandos surrendered after Mercuro threatened to use flamethrowers on them. The paratroops took prisoner a group consisting of an officer, one NCO and three other ranks. Except for the officer, all the British were wounded and received medical treatment from the Italians. Mercuro searched the cave and found small arms and three demolition charges. The Italians suffered three wounded during the fight.[6]

It proved impossible for the Laycock party to re-embark on the submarines and they waited for the weather to improve. They were discovered and exchanged fire with local Italian gendarmes (and German troops by some accounts). Aware that they could not hope to stand off the large force that was surely being organised, Laycock ordered the men to scatter. Laycock and Terry made it to safety after 37 days in the desert and Bombardier John Brittlebank, one of the SBS team who had guided the commandos in the folbots, escaped and survived alone in the desert for forty days until picked up by Allied troops. The rest of the raiding force was captured, some of them wounded. Contrary to some reports, only Keyes was killed by the Germans; one man had drowned during the landing.

Nominal roll

[edit]

Reconstructed by Michael Asher (2004), based on a list by Hans Edelmaier, amended from documentary and witness evidence, with the assistance of the Commando Association [now defunct]. It might contain errors.[7]

Captured, unless otherwise noted.
  • Beach party
    • Lt. Col. Robert Laycock, Royal Horse Guards (escaped)
    • Sgt. Charles Nicol, Gordon Highlanders
    • Bdr. George Dunn, Royal Artillery
    • L/Cpl. Larry Codd, Royal Corps of Signals
    • Pte. E.C. Atkins, Beds & Herts Regt
    • Lt. John Pryor, Beds & Herts Regt & SBS (wounded and captured)
    • Bdr. John Brittlebank, Royal Artillery & SBS (escaped)
    • Pte. Robert Fowler, Cameron Highlanders
  • German HQ assault party
    • Lt. Col Geoffrey Keyes, Royal Scots Greys (killed)
    • Capt. Robin Campbell, General List (wounded and captured)
    • Sgt. Jack Terry, Royal Artillery (escaped)
    • L/Cpl. Dennis Coulthread, Royal Scots
    • L/Bdr. A. Brodie, Royal Artillery
    • Cpl/Interpreter Avishalom Drori (Palestine), 51 ME Commando
  • German HQ covering party
    • L/Cpl. William Pryde, Cameron Highlanders
    • Cpl. A.E. Radcliffe, RASC, (wounded and captured)
    • Pte. John Phiminster, Cameron Highlanders
    • L/Cpl. Frank Varney, Sherwood Foresters
    • Bdr. Joseph Kearney, (Newfoundland) Royal Artillery
    • L/Cpl. Malcolm Hughes, Manchester Regt
    • Cpl. William Heavyside, Yorks & Lancs Regt
  • German HQ outside covering party
    • Sgt. Charles Bruce, Black Watch [Royal Highland Regt]
    • Cpl. Charles Lock, London Scottish [Gordon Highlanders]
    • Pte. James Bogle, Gordon Highlanders
    • Pte. Robert Murray, Highland Light Infantry
  • Cyrene crossroads party
    • Lt. Roy Cooke, Royal W. Kent Regt
    • Sgt. Frederick Birch, Liverpool Scottish [Cameron Highlanders]
    • Cpl. John Kerr, Cameron Highlanders
    • Gnr. James Gornall, Royal Artillery
    • L/Bdr. Terence O'Hagen, Royal Artillery
    • Gnr. P. Macrae, Royal Artillery
    • Pte. Charles Paxton, Cameron Highlanders

Aftermath

[edit]

On 17 November 1941, the day of the raid, Rommel was in Italy, having left for Rome on 1 November, which became known to British military intelligence via Ultra on 17 November and that he was due back in Africa on 18 November. An emergency signal was sent to Middle East Command but was too late to stop the operation. On 15 November, a decrypt of an Italian C 38m machine cipher had revealed that the Italians knew from diverse sources that a British landing was imminent near Apollonia.[8]

The German historian Hans Edelmaier suggests that Rommel was not the objective of the raid and his name not featuring in the plan supports this. There is no proof that Haselden reported Rommel's presence at the house in Beda and it has never been explained how Rommel was to be found or recognised by the commando unit.[9][page needed] The only extant evidence that Rommel was the object of the raid came from a witness, Gunner Jim Gornall, who related that Keyes briefed the men on board the Torbay that their objective was to "get Rommel".[10] When news of the raid reached him, Rommel was said to be indignant that the British should believe his headquarters was 250 mi (400 km) behind the front; Rommel preferred to be near the front line with his troops.

Casualties

[edit]

The British suffered two men killed, 28 captured (three wounded) and three men escaped; German casualties were four killed and three wounded. Keyes' body and those of the four dead Germans were buried with military honours on Rommel's orders in a local Catholic cemetery.[11] For his actions Keyes was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The citation for the award was written by Robert Laycock, who contrary to British military custom, was not a witness to Keyes' actions on the night in which he was killed. Almost none of the statements in the citation are verifiable and some contradict witness accounts.[12]

Sergeant Jack Terry was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) and Bombardier John Brittlebank (SBS) later received the DCM for actions including the Rommel Raid. Gunner Jim Gornall was awarded the Military Medal (MM). (Another attempt, this time by an SAS group, was made to kidnap or assassinate Rommel in Operation Gaff in July 1944 but Rommel had suffered skull fractures in an RAF attack eleven days earlier.)[13]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Operation Flipper was a British raid conducted during on 17–18 November 1941, targeting the headquarters of German General in Sidi Rafa, near Beda Littoria on the coast of , . The operation's primary objective was to capture or assassinate Rommel, the commander of the , to disrupt Axis command and create confusion ahead of the British Eighth Army's upcoming offensive. Secondary goals included destroying the nearby Italian headquarters, sabotaging communications networks between key Axis positions, and conducting general disruption in the Axis rear areas. The raid was planned and led by Lieutenant Colonel of No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, with Colonel serving as the overall commander and observer from Combined Operations. A force of approximately 56 commandos, supported by local guide Captain John "Jock" Haselden, was transported from , , aboard the submarines HMS Torbay and HMS Talisman, departing on 10 November 1941. The commandos landed via folboats (collapsible canoes) on the night of 13–14 November but encountered severe weather, including a that capsized several boats, resulting in the loss of three officers, nine other ranks, and much of their equipment. The survivors, reduced to about 40 men under Keyes' immediate command, marched approximately 13 miles inland over rugged terrain to approach the target villa, the Prefettura, which intelligence indicated was Rommel's residence. Execution of the assault began around midnight on 17 , with the commandos achieving complete surprise on the lightly guarded headquarters. Keyes personally led the attack on the main building, where he was fatally wounded—possibly by —while attempting to breach a door; he died shortly after and was buried nearby by the Germans. The raid party killed three German staff officers (one of whom was initially mistaken for Rommel) and one enlisted man, destroyed a small fuel dump, and damaged a generator, but discovered too late that Rommel was not present—he had relocated to for consultations. British intelligence had learned of his absence by early via signals intercepts, but an urgent cancellation message arrived too late after the submarines had departed. Laycock and a few others escaped the immediate aftermath, but most of the force was soon captured by pursuing Italian troops; only Laycock and Sergeant Jack Terry evaded capture for 37 days before reaching British lines. Despite its failure to achieve the primary goal, Operation Flipper demonstrated the audacity and resilience of British in the North African campaign. Keyes was posthumously awarded the for his leadership, becoming the only VC recipient for the North African theater at that time. Remarkably, Rommel himself praised the operation's boldness, reportedly stating it was executed "with great audacity," and ordered a for Keyes with full honors. The raid, though based on faulty intelligence, highlighted the risks of and contributed to Allied morale amid the seesaw battles of the desert war.

Background

Strategic Situation in North Africa

In February 1941, dispatched the Deutsches Afrikakorps under Major-General to to bolster faltering Italian forces following their defeats in . This intervention, codenamed , enabled a swift Axis counteroffensive beginning in late March, during which Rommel's forces recaptured , seized on 3 April, and drove British Commonwealth troops into a disorganized retreat toward the Egyptian border by mid-April. The rapid advance, covering over 300 miles in two weeks, exposed the vulnerabilities of the British , which suffered from depleted equipment after diverting resources to and , leaving it unable to mount effective resistance. The Axis push isolated the Allied garrison at Tobruk, the key deep-water port in eastern Libya, initiating the Siege of Tobruk on 10 April 1941. Approximately 35,000 Australian, British, and Indian troops, primarily the 9th Australian Division, fortified the defenses and repelled initial assaults by the 15th Panzer Division, enduring constant artillery and air bombardment while maintaining supply via precarious naval routes. Rommel's aggressive tactics tied down significant Axis resources in fruitless attacks, but the siege highlighted the British Eighth Army's logistical strains, with extended lines vulnerable to interdiction and insufficient armored support to counter German panzers. By August, the Australians were relieved by British and Polish units, yet the prolonged defense prevented Rommel from advancing further into Egypt. An attempt to break the siege, from 15–17 June 1941, aimed to secure , , and Hafid Ridge to enable a link-up with but ended in failure due to superior German anti-tank defenses, including 88mm guns, and poor Allied tank-infantry coordination. The British lost 91 of their 200 tanks, while inflicting minimal damage on Axis armor, forcing General Wavell to withdraw and reinforcing Rommel's control over the frontier. From to October 1941, a tense persisted as the Eighth Army under General reorganized, while Allied intelligence emphasized the fragility of Axis supply lines—dependent on Mediterranean convoys that suffered heavy losses to and RAF attacks, delivering only about half the required fuel and munitions. This vulnerability underscored the strategic value of targeting German command structures in to exacerbate shortages ahead of the Eighth Army's upcoming offensive launched on 18 November.

Rationale for Targeting Rommel

, the commander of the German , had achieved remarkable tactical successes in the , earning him the nickname "Desert Fox" for his bold and unpredictable maneuvers. By early 1941, his forces had rapidly advanced over 500 miles across , besieging the key port of and occupying much of , thereby posing a direct threat to British control of and the . These victories not only stalled Allied offensives but also demonstrated Rommel's personal leadership in mobile warfare, making him a pivotal figure whose elimination could disrupt Axis momentum. Allied , including reconnaissance by Captain John Haselden and reports from local Arab sources, pinpointed Rommel's forward headquarters at Beda Littoria, approximately 18 miles inland from the Libyan coast, as a central command hub for coordinating operations. Although this proved faulty regarding Rommel's presence at the time of the raid, pre-raid assessments confirmed the site's strategic importance, with the building serving as a key logistical and operational center. This underscored the opportunity for a targeted strike to sever command lines at a vulnerable location. The decision to target Rommel carried significant implications, aiming to demoralize Axis troops and elevate Allied morale in the lead-up to , the major British offensive planned for late November 1941. Rommel's reputation as an invincible leader had boosted German confidence and intimidated British forces; his death or capture was expected to create confusion and hesitation among subordinates, potentially tipping the balance in the desert theater. This decapitation strategy aligned with broader British efforts to undermine enemy cohesion through high-profile actions. The rationale drew from precedents in commando operations, particularly those conducted by Layforce under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Laycock, which had executed daring raids against Axis targets in North Africa earlier in 1941. These earlier missions, including assaults on coastal installations, highlighted the effectiveness of small, elite teams in achieving disproportionate impact by striking at high-value personnel and facilities, influencing the adoption of a similar "decapitation" approach for Operation Flipper. Such tactics emphasized surprise and precision over large-scale engagements, reflecting evolving British special operations doctrine.

Planning

Conception and Objectives

Operation Flipper originated in early October 1941 as a daring commando raid proposed by Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes, commander of No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, amid British preparations for the larger Operation Crusader offensive against Axis forces in North Africa. Keyes envisioned the operation as a means to decapitate German command by targeting General Erwin Rommel, whose leadership had proven pivotal to Axis successes in the desert campaign. The plan received swift approval from General Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of British Forces in the Middle East, who saw it as a critical precursor to bolstering the Eighth Army's upcoming assault by disrupting enemy coordination. The primary objective of the raid was the assassination or capture of Rommel at his forward headquarters, aimed at sowing chaos within the and potentially stalling German momentum in . Secondary goals focused on to amplify the disruption, including the destruction of fuel dumps, motor transport vehicles, and communications infrastructure in the vicinity of the target site, as well as severing telephone and telegraph lines linking to . Intelligence for the operation drew from a combination of and on-the-ground reports by British agents, with Captain John E. Haselden conducting two weeks of covert behind enemy lines, supported by local guides and input from the General Staff's branch (G(R)). These efforts pinpointed potential headquarters locations in the Cyrene region, such as near Beda Littoria, Gazala, or Timimi, though uncertainties persisted regarding Rommel's exact movements. Anticipated logistical challenges were formidable, centered on clandestine insertion via —primarily HMS Torbay and HMS Talisman—followed by a grueling overland march of 15 to 20 miles through rugged terrain to reach the inland targets. Planners recognized risks from adverse weather conditions, which could hinder sea landings and exacerbate the physical demands on the small raiding party, while evacuation options remained severely limited, relying on the same submarines or overland evasion.

Personnel Selection and Preparation

No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, from which the raiding party for Operation Flipper was drawn, was formed on 23 June 1940 in , , before undergoing initial amphibious training on the Isle of Arran and deploying to the in March 1941 as part of , a unit comprising Nos. 7, 8, and 11 Commandos along with elements of . For the raid, a force of approximately 59 men, including six officers, were selected from these Layforce veterans, chosen for their prior experience in sabotage operations such as the raid, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel , the 24-year-old son of Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. Training for the mission commenced in early October 1941 in near , emphasizing amphibious landings from submarines, beach assaults, and rapid disembarkation drills along the Egyptian coast to ensure the team could exit each vessel in under an hour despite rough seas. The regimen also incorporated elements of desert navigation and close-quarters combat, building on the unit's established expertise in . The team was equipped with specialized gear for covert insertion and , including two folding kayaks (folbots) crewed by officers and sailors for initial beach reconnaissance, 14 rubber dinghies to ferry the main party ashore, explosives for demolishing headquarters and communications, Colt .45 automatic pistols, service revolvers, and grenades; Bren light machine guns provided capability, while wireless sets enabled coordination with the support HMS Talisman. Key roles were assigned based on individual skills: Keyes personally led the assault group targeting Rommel's , while Robin Campbell, fluent in German and serving as second-in-command, was responsible for demolition tasks at secondary sites like the Italian . Preparations included rehearsals such as practice landings and two reconnaissance missions to the Beda Littoria area—one by Thomas Macpherson (who was captured) and another by John Haselden, who confirmed Rommel's presence but provided only partial details on the layout due to incomplete intelligence on the site's defenses and Rommel's exact routines. Briefings on this intelligence occurred prior to departure aboard the submarines Torbay and Talisman on 10 November 1941.

Execution

Infiltration and Landing

The raiding party departed from Alexandria, Egypt, on 10 November 1941, aboard the submarines HMS Torbay and HMS Talisman, carrying a total of approximately 56 commandos from No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, along with limited support personnel. HMS Torbay transported Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes and his group of 28 men, while HMS Talisman carried Lieutenant Colonel Robert Laycock with 28 others, including officers and enlisted personnel selected for the mission. The submarines proceeded under cover of darkness across the Mediterranean, aiming for a landing site near Beda Littoria in Cyrenaica, Libya, approximately 250 miles behind Axis lines. On the evening of 14 1941, the submarines surfaced about 10 miles offshore to launch the commandos in folbots—collapsible two-man kayaks—and rubber dinghies, but the operation immediately encountered severe navigational difficulties. Strong currents, high swells from a sudden , poor weather including , and unreliable compasses—exacerbated by the loss of an Arab guide who deserted during the approach—caused the small craft to drift and become scattered. As a result, landings were dispersed along the coast near Apollonia and Cyrene rather than at the intended precise point, with HMS Torbay successfully disembarking most of its contingent by on 14/15 , while HMS Talisman suffered heavier losses: seven dinghies capsized in the rough seas, drowning 11 men and leaving only four boats to reach shore with Laycock and seven survivors. Overall, the force was reduced to about 36 men ashore, forcing an immediate reorganization. With the survivors regrouped on the beach during the night of 14/15 , the commandos began a grueling approximately 18-mile (29 km) overland march inland toward the suspected headquarters at Sidi Rafa, navigating through wadis and rugged terrain under constant threat of detection. The teams split into an assault group led by Keyes targeting the main objective and sabotage groups under Captain Richard Cooke and Captain John Haselden assigned to disrupt nearby communications facilities, all while avoiding Italian patrols amid intermittent rain that both aided concealment and hindered progress. En route, the groups made initial contacts with isolated Italian sentries, silently eliminating at least one on 17 to maintain , and carefully skirted known minefields that dotted the approaches to the target area. Despite these hazards, the commandos pressed on, covering the distance over several days while foraging for limited supplies and relying on local Arab assistance for guidance where possible.

Assault on Headquarters

On the evening of 17 November 1941, the commando force under Lieutenant Colonel arrived at Sidi Rafa, approximately five miles from the target site at Beda Littoria, after enduring heavy rain and difficult terrain during their inland approach. They established a temporary base in a nearby cave and conducted of the suspected headquarters, identifying a large known as the Prefettura as the primary target based on reports from local and a Libyan youth who provided details on its layout and guards. At around midnight on 17/18 , Keyes led a small assault team of three—himself, Richard Campbell, and Jack Terry—toward the villa, while the rest of the force provided covering fire and handled secondary objectives. The team cut through perimeter wire, approached the front door, and gained entry after Campbell demanded admittance in German, prompting a sentry to open it. Once inside, intense hand-to-hand combat erupted with the guards; Keyes and his men engaged in close-quarters fighting, using knives, pistols, and guns to subdue sentries and occupants amid shouts and gunfire. As the raiders searched the building room by room, they quickly discovered that was not present at the headquarters, having departed the area prior to the assault. In the confusion, an Italian officer was killed after being mistaken for a German major, and several German personnel were also eliminated during the skirmishes. Simultaneously, Campbell's supporting team targeted external assets, destroying several staff vehicles with incendiary devices and detonating a fuel dump, though they abandoned plans for further on deeper targets like the communications center after alarms sounded and enemy reinforcements approached. A was also thrown into the villa's generator room, causing additional disruption and fires. During the breach of an upper room where Keyes believed Rommel might be, the commander was fatally wounded by a shot to the chest—possibly from a German defender or in the chaos of the firefight—and died shortly after being carried outside by his men. His death created immediate command fragmentation among the raiders, with the assault devolving into disorganized withdrawal signals amid ongoing exchanges of fire, grenade blasts, and fleeing occupants.

Withdrawal and Pursuit

Following the assault on the night of 17–18 1941, the surviving commandos from Operation Flipper broke out from the vicinity of Sidi Rafa and scattered into the , attempting to reach pre-designated pickup points along the coast for exfiltration by . The 22 survivors, including Colonel and Sergeant Jack Terry, made their way back to the beach rendezvous near Apollonia, but rough seas and unacknowledged signal flares prevented immediate evacuation by HMS Talisman, which had surfaced to provide limited supplies of food and water before withdrawing on the evening of 18 . The Axis response was swift, with Italian and German forces alerted by the raid's gunfire and explosions, launching a coordinated manhunt involving ground patrols from Arab , pro-Axis irregulars, and regular Italian troops, supported by over the coastal area. On 19 , a mixed force of and discovered the commandos' position near the beach at midday, initiating a firefight that forced the group to split into smaller parties and flee inland to evade encirclement. ' body, recovered from the assault site, was identified by and buried with full honors on Rommel's orders in a local Catholic near Rafa, with a conducted by German Rudolf Dalmrath on 19 . The scattered survivors faced severe endurance challenges during their evasion, including acute shortages of water in the arid terrain, injuries from the raid and subsequent clashes, and harsh weather conditions marked by cold rain and gales that turned wadis into mud traps. Attempts to navigate using local guides failed when several were lost or turned unreliable amid the chaos, contributing to disorientation and exposure to pursuing patrols; for instance, Captain Robin Campbell, severely wounded, was left hidden but later captured. A failed rendezvous attempt with HMS on the night of 19 November further dashed hopes of organized extraction, as the submarine could not approach due to deteriorating seas and heightened enemy activity. By 26 November, most of the commandos had been captured through the intensifying manhunt, with only Laycock, Terry, and one other— John Brittlebank—successfully evading detection by hiding in ravines and caves before linking up with advancing British forces after 37 to 41 days in the desert.

Participants

Command Structure

Operation Flipper was authorized and overseen by General Claude Auchinleck, Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command, as part of broader efforts to disrupt Axis leadership in North Africa. The raid's operational leadership fell to Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes of No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, who served as the direct raid leader and was responsible for planning and executing the assault on Rommel's headquarters. Keyes reported to Colonel Robert E. D. "Lucky" Laycock, commander of Layforce and the overall supervisor of commando operations, who accompanied the raid as an observer but remained at the landing site to coordinate extraction. Within the assault team, Captain Robin Campbell acted as Keyes' second-in-command and served as the primary demolition expert, leveraging his German language skills to support the infiltration and elements of the mission. The command hierarchy included specialized roles for communication and guidance, with signals personnel from the Royal Corps of Signals ensuring coordination during the land phase. Naval support was provided by two T-class submarines: HMS Torbay, commanded by A. C. C. Miers, and HMS Talisman, under Michael Willmott, which handled the insertion and attempted extraction of the commando force across approximately 250 miles of enemy-held territory. Intelligence liaison was managed by Captain John "Jock" Haselden of the , who conducted pre-raid reconnaissance and provided on-ground guidance to direct the team to the target at Beda Littoria. The chain of command faced severe disruptions during execution when Keyes was fatally wounded early in the assault on the , and Campbell was accidentally shot in the leg by one of his own men shortly thereafter. Command then devolved to Sergeant Jack Terry, who organized the withdrawal of the surviving raiders amid intensifying enemy pursuit.

Key Personnel

Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Charles Tasker Keyes commanded the assault force targeting Erwin Rommel's headquarters during Operation Flipper. The 24-year-old officer, son of Sir , brought significant prior commando experience to the mission, having earned the for gallant leadership as captain of No. 11 Commando's 2 Troop during the Litani River raid in , where he assumed command after the unit's previous leader was killed. On the night of 17–18 November , Keyes personally led a small team to infiltrate the headquarters at Beda Littoria, forcing entry through a window and clearing rooms in search of Rommel despite intense resistance. Shot dead while attempting to open a suspected command room door, Keyes demonstrated "complete disregard of his own safety" in pressing the attack alone after his men were repelled. Posthumously awarded the on 19 June 1942—the first for a British commando—his citation praised his "fearless leadership" and "supreme self-sacrifice" in inspiring the team amid overwhelming odds. Captain Robin Campbell served as Keyes' and language specialist for the headquarters raid, selected for his fluency in German to interrogate or identify targets swiftly. After Keyes' death, Campbell assumed leadership of the assault group, directing the of documents, maps, and equipment within the building to deny intelligence to Axis forces. In the ensuing confusion and darkness, he was accidentally shot in the leg by one of his own men, who mistook him for an enemy sentry. Unable to withdraw, Campbell was captured by Italian troops shortly after and held as a ; the severe wound necessitated amputation of his leg in captivity. He endured imprisonment until liberation in 1945, later reflecting on the raid's chaos in postwar accounts. Sergeant Jack Terry acted as Keyes' bodyguard and close protection during the infiltration, accompanying him into the headquarters and providing covering fire amid the close-quarters fighting. Following the commander's death and Campbell's wounding, Terry rallied the remaining 17 raiders, organizing their retreat under fire to evade pursuing Axis patrols. He successfully escaped capture alongside overall operation commander Colonel Robert Laycock, navigating 250 miles of desert for 37 days on minimal supplies before rejoining Allied forces on Christmas Day 1941. Battery Sergeant Major John Brittlebank, from the supporting Special Boat Section detachment, also distinguished himself by evading alone for 40 days post-landing to safety; he received the Distinguished Conduct Medal for his initiative and endurance. During the headquarters assault, the team killed three German staff officers and one enlisted man, highlighting the raid's tactical surprises, though no specific honors were recorded for Axis personnel involved. Survivors like Terry and Brittlebank saw postwar recognition through unit citations, with Terry later joining the Special Air Service.

Aftermath

Immediate Results

Operation Flipper achieved limited tactical successes despite its overarching failure to eliminate its primary target. The raiding parties sabotaged a fuel supply depot along with the main electrical generator by dropping explosives into its exhaust, and cut enemy communication wires and demolished masts to disrupt telephone and telegraph lines at nearby sites. These actions temporarily interrupted local Axis logistics and routines, fostering increased nervousness and confusion among German forces in the rear areas. The operation's central objective failed due to Erwin Rommel's absence from the targeted headquarters. Rommel had departed for on 1 November 1941, to attend meetings and his 50th birthday celebrations on 15 November, arriving back in only on 18 November, after proceeding directly to his forward command post at Gazala rather than returning to Beda Littoria. Post-war analysis of Rommel's personal diaries confirmed that he had used the Beda Littoria site only sporadically and never as a primary residence, having relocated his operational base earlier to better oversee frontline activities. This intelligence shortfall, unknown to British planners at the time, rendered the assassination attempt impossible. The raid yielded some intelligence value by exposing vulnerabilities in Axis headquarters security and confirming the layout and usage patterns of Rommel's facilities, though this came at a prohibitively high cost in terms of the operation's execution. In the immediate aftermath, Axis forces responded by deploying additional troops to Beda Littoria and heightening alert levels across rear echelons, anticipating further incursions; however, this reaction remained localized and did not precipitate any significant strategic redeployments prior to the launch of on November 18, 1941. British command evaluated Operation Flipper as a tactical and strategic failure, primarily attributing it to inadequate pre-raid intelligence that failed to account for Rommel's movements, resulting in no elimination or substantial disruption to Axis command structures. Nonetheless, the raid was praised for the exceptional valor and determination displayed by the commandos, who pressed forward under adverse conditions to achieve what partial objectives they could.

Casualties and Captures

The raid resulted in significant losses for the Allied commandos. Of the 34 personnel who successfully landed on the Libyan coast, Lieutenant Colonel , the deputy commander, was mortally wounded during the assault on the Axis headquarters, shot while attempting to enter a room; accounts differ on whether by enemy fire from a German sentry or possibly . One , P. Barrand, drowned during the initial landing from the . Captain Robert Campbell was severely wounded in the leg while aiding Keyes and was captured; his injury later required . Additionally, Corporal D. M. MacQuarrie died of wounds while in on December 31, 1941. In total, 28 raiders were captured shortly after the operation. Three commandos managed to escape capture. Colonel , the overall commander, and Sergeant Jack Terry evaded Axis patrols for 37 days, traveling overland with minimal supplies before linking up with the British Eighth Army near Cyrene. Bombardier John Brittlebank, part of the Special Boat Section support team, survived alone in the desert for 40 days, relying on local resources until rescued by Allied forces. Axis casualties included three German officers and one soldier killed during the brief firefight at the headquarters villa. The raiders inflicted only minor property damage, including the destruction of a nearby fuel depot. The captured commandos were interrogated by Axis intelligence before being transported to prisoner-of-war camps in and , where some later attempted escapes during forced marches. Keyes received an honorable burial arranged by Rommel himself, with a ceremony conducted by German chaplain Rudolf Dalmrath, including salutes and wreaths; photographs of the grave were sent to Keyes' family. This high rate of captures—over 80% of the landing force—contrasted with other commando raids like St. Nazaire, where the isolated hindered evasion and increased vulnerability to local Arab and Italian pursuers.

Strategic Impact

Operation Flipper exerted minimal direct influence on the broader , failing to assassinate —who was absent from the targeted headquarters at the time—and thus causing no disruption to Axis command structure ahead of the impending Allied offensive. commenced as planned on 18 November 1941, lifting the without any attributable delay from the raid, though Rommel preserved most of his forces during the ensuing battles. The operation nonetheless underscored the inherent dangers of commando raids involving deep infiltration into enemy territory, revealing vulnerabilities in execution amid harsh desert conditions and uncertain enemy dispositions. The raid provided a significant psychological boost to British morale during a period of setbacks in the desert war, affirming the military's capacity for bold, initiative-taking actions against German forces when conventional efforts faltered. Lieutenant Colonel Geoffrey Keyes' posthumous award for gallantry in leading the assault served as an emblem of sacrifice and resolve, motivating subsequent special operations by units such as the (SAS) and (LRDG). This recognition also reinforced Prime Minister Winston Churchill's advocacy for capabilities, solidifying political backing for the expansion of commando and special forces roles within Combined Operations. From the Axis viewpoint, Rommel expressed admiration for the commandos' audacity in his postwar accounts, arranging full military honors—including a personal for Keyes' —and ensuring captured raiders received prisoner-of-war treatment rather than . While Rommel minimized the raid's tactical threat in his writings, it prompted enhanced security protocols at forward headquarters across to counter future incursions. These measures reflected a broader Axis recognition of the evolving threat posed by British in the theater. Post-2000 historical reassessments have reevaluated Operation Flipper beyond its tactical shortcomings, emphasizing its incidental contributions from the commandos' infiltration, which yielded insights into Axis defensive layouts and headquarters routines despite the mission's failure. The operation illuminated critical planning deficiencies, particularly the overdependence on outdated or static sources, which informed refinements in British special forces doctrine for subsequent attempts. Overall, Flipper contributed to the maturation of targeted leadership strikes as a strategic tool in , balancing high-risk potential against the need for robust reconnaissance and adaptability.
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