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Pan-Islamism (Arabic: الوحدة الإسلامية, romanized: al-Waḥdat al-Islāmiyya) is a political movement which advocates the unity of Muslims under one Islamic state, often a caliphate[1] or an international organization with Islamic principles. Historically, after Ottomanism, which aimed at the unity of all Ottoman citizens, Pan-Islamism was promoted in the Ottoman Empire during the last quarter of the 19th century by Sultan Abdul Hamid II[2] for the purpose of preventing secession movements of the Muslim peoples in the empire.

Pan-Islamism differentiates itself from pan-nationalistic ideologies, for example Pan-Arabism, by focusing on religion and not ethnicity and race. It sees the ummah (Muslim community) as the focus of allegiance and mobilization, including the Tawhid belief by the guidance of Quran and Sunnah's teachings.

The major leaders of the Pan-Islamist movement were the triad of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935), who were active in anti-colonial efforts to confront European penetration of Muslim lands. They also sought to strengthen Islamic unity, which they believed to be the strongest force to mobilize Muslims against imperial domination.[3] Following Ibn Saud's conquest of the Arabian Peninsula, pan-Islamism would be bolstered across the Islamic world. During the second half of the 20th century, pan-Islamists competed against left-wing nationalist ideologies in the Arab world such as Nasserism and Ba'athism.[4][5] At the height of the Cold War in the 1960s and 1970s, Saudi Arabia and allied countries in the Muslim world led the Pan-Islamist struggle to fight the spread of communist ideology and curtail the rising Soviet influence in the world.[6]

Classical doctrines

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The Arabic term Ummah, which is found in the Quran[7] and Islamic tradition,[8][9] has historically been used to denote the Muslims as a whole, regardless of race, ethnicity, etc.[10][9] This term has been used in a political sense by classical Islamic scholars e.g. such as al-Mawardi in Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, where he discusses the contract of Imamate of the Ummah, "prescribed to succeed Prophethood" in protection of the religion and of managing the affairs of the world.[11][12][13][14] Al-Ghazali also talks about Ummah in a political sense[15][16] e.g. in his work, "Fadiah al-Batinyah wa Fadail al-Mustazhariyah".[17][18]

Fakhruddin al-Razi, who also talks about Ummah in a political sense, is quoted as saying the following:[19][15]

The world is a garden, whose waterer is the dynasty, which is the authority. The guardian of this authority is the Shari'ah and Shari'ah is also the policy which preserves the kingdom; the kingdom is the city which the army brings into existence; the army is guaranteed by wealth; wealth is acquired by the subjects (Ummah) who are made servants via justice; justice is the axis of well being of the world.

— al-Razi in his Jami al-'Ulum[19][15]

The ideology takes as its model the early years of Islam – the reign of Muhammad and the early caliphate – especially during Islamic golden age, as it is commonly held that during these years the Muslim world was strong, unified, and free from corruption.[20]

History

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Origins

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Many scholars assert that the doctrines of pan-Islamism could be observed as early as during the era of Islamic Iberia, Emirate of Sicily, the Gunpowder Empires (Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires) and several Muslim sultanates and kingdoms, despite the presence and employment of non-Muslim subjects by Muslim powers.[21] During the 18th century, multiple movements for puritanical Islamic renewal would emerge. Amongst these, the revivalist movements of three leading religious reformers – Shah Wali Allah of Delhi (1702–1763), the Arabian Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792), and the Nigerian Uthman dan Fodio (1755–1816) – are widely regarded as the precursors of the modern-era Pan-Islamist thought. Despite their calls for puritanical reform, these movements were not politically concerned with the international situation of the Muslim world, and had not elaborated comprehensive pan-Islamist programmes to combat the Western threat. Since they did not call for the revival of an international Islamic entity, their ideas and impact were limited to the local regional contexts of West Africa, Arabia, and South Asia.[22]

In spite of their diversity, these 18th century Muslim reformers were united in their condemnation of declining morality and calls for the revival of scripture-based piety. Inspired by these movements, Islamic reformers at the turn of the 19th century adopted novel strategies for overcoming the crisis faced by the Muslim world by adapting to the fast-paced transformation of its era. Their proposed approaches now oscillated between an open admiration for the technology-mediated Western ideology of societal progress and a clear rejection of it on the grounds of the axiomatic superiority of an idealized Islamic culture, rooted in Scripturalist injunctions. Two major scholars of early colonial Egypt 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti (d. 1825) and Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (d. 1872) represented these intellectual trends. While Rifa'a al-Tahtawi exemplified the former, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti represented the latter, Scriptural-oriented approach.[23]

Modern era

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Late 19th century

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Further information: Muhammad Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani

In the modern era, Pan-Islamism was championed by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who sought unity among Muslims to resist colonial occupation of Muslim lands. Afghani feared that nationalism would divide the Muslim world and believed that Muslim unity was more important than ethnic identity.[24] Although sometimes described as "liberal",[25] al-Afghani did not advocate constitutional government but simply envisioned "the overthrow of individual rulers who were lax or subservient to foreigners, and their replacement by strong and patriotic men."[26] In a review of the theoretical articles of his Paris-based newspaper there was nothing "favoring political democracy or parliamentarianism," according to his biographer.[26]

While Afghani was an advocate of revolution from above, his student 'Abduh believed in revolution from below, through religious and educational reforms. Despite al-Afghani's tremendous influence on 'Abduh, the latter eventually would distance himself from Afghani's political path. He instead focused on gradual efforts in the field of education, which he viewed as more effective instruments for reform. He criticised Afghani and pan-Islamist intellectuals for their political activities. Afghani had bitter arguments with Abduh and regularly accused him of timidity and dispiritedness.[27]

Early 20th century

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Further information: Sayyid Rashid Rida and Salafiyya Movement

Islamic jurist Muhammad Rashid Rida – a student of Abduh and Afghani – on the other hand, was an avowed anti-imperialist and an exponent of a puritanical revolution, inspired by his nostalgia for the early eras of Islam. According to Rida, the state-sponsored scholars neglected the revival of early Islamic traditions in the Muslim Ummah. He believed that the unification of the Islamic community would only be possible through the restoration of an Islamic caliphate which implements the Sharia (Islamic law). His influential Islamic journal Al-Manar promoted anti-British revolt, as well as Islamic revivalism based on the tenets of Salafiyya. Positioning himself as the successor to the pan-Islamist activism of Afghani and 'Abduh; Rida called for a pan-Islamic project based on revival of the Islamic caliphate led by Arabs and the reformation of Muslims.[28] During the 1920s, Rida formulated the comprehensive Islamic state doctrine in his famous treatise al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-'Uzma ("The Caliphate or the Exalted Imamate") in which he called upon Muslims to strive to build a political system based on faith; rather than nationalism. He opposed the rising embracal of Western ideas amongst Muslims, arguing that only a return to Islam would restore the rightful position of Muslims in the modern age. Pan-Islamic networks, led by Rashid Rida and his associates, played a central role in later development of Islamist movements.[29][30][31]

Rida's Salafiyya movement advocated for pan-Islamist solidarity which involved socio-political campaigning to establish Sharia (Islamic laws). Following World War I, Rida and his disciples became the biggest adversaries of secularists and nationalists; and vehemently attacked all forms of democratic ideas.[32] Articulating his Pan-Islamist vision, Rashid Rida wrote in Al-Manar in 1902:

"In sum, what I mean by Islamic unity is that the leaders (ahl al-Hal wal-'aqd) among the scholars and notables should meet and compile a book of ordinances which is based on the deeply-rooted fundamentals of the Divine Law, agrees with the needs of the time, is easy to use, and is free of disagreement (khilaf). The Supreme Imam then orders the rulers of Muslims to apply it (al-'amal bihi)"[33]

In order to judge the rising importance of the Pan-Islamist movement during these years, Lothrop Stoddard in his 1921 book The New World of Islam looked at the growth in the Pan-Islamic press, writing that "in 1900 there were in the whole Islamic world not more than 200 propagandist journals", as he puts it, but "by 1906 there were 500, while in 1914 there were well over 1000."[34]

Post-Ottoman era

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See also: Abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate

After the Abolition of Caliphate in 1924, Pan-Islamism mobilized Muslim masses of both traditionalist and reform movements in Islam, inspired by the ideas of Rashid Rida. The Reformist movements led by Rida, would become more fundamentalist and literalist; emphasizing adherence to the idealised era of the Salaf and attempt to revive lost traditions.[35] Rashid Rida's socio-political views symbolised the convergence of the doctrines of the reformist, Salafist and pan-Islamist movements.[36] During the 1920s, Rida and his Salafi disciples established the Young Men's Muslim Association (YMMA); an influential Islamist youth organisation that spearheaded attacks against liberal trends and Western culture. This provided favourable conditions for the growth of various Islamist revolutionary movements.[32]

The evolution of the early Pan-Islamist movement in the post-colonial world was strongly associated with Islamism. Leading Islamists such as Sayyid Qutb,[37] Abul Ala Maududi, and Ayatollah Khomeini all stressed their belief that a return to traditional Sharia law would make Islam united and strong again. Extremism within Islam goes back to the 7th century to the Kharijites.[better source needed] From their essentially political position, they developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shiʿa Muslims. The Kharijites were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to Takfir, whereby they declared other Muslims to be unbelievers and therefore deemed them worthy of death.[38][39][40]

In the period of de-colonialism following World War II, Arab nationalism overshadowed Islamism which denounced nationalism as un-Islamic. In the Arab world secular pan-Arab parties – Baath and Nasserist parties – had offshoots in almost every Arab country, and took power in Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria. Islamists suffered severe repression; its major thinker Sayyid Qutb, was imprisoned, underwent torture and was later executed.[41] Egyptian president Nasser considered the idea of Muslim unity as a threat to Arab nationalism.[42] [better source needed]

In the 1950s, Pakistan's government championed Muslim cooperation like many other Muslim countries however Pakistan's efforts were complicated with its involvement in Baghdad pact and pro-western foreign diplomacy in light of the Palestine-Israel conflict, however later relations would be much better. Many Muslim countries suspected that Pakistan was aspiring to leadership of the Muslim world to in foreword help western powers in relations with other Muslim states.[43][better source needed]

Six-Day War

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See also: Six-Day War

Following the defeat of Arab armies in the Six-Day War, Islamism and Pan-Islam began to reverse their relative position of popularity with nationalism and pan-Arabism. Political events in the Muslim world in the late 1960s convinced many Muslim states to shift their earlier ideas and respond favourably to Pakistan's goal of Muslim unity. Nasser abandoned his opposition to a pan-Islamic platform and such developments facilitated the first summit conference of Muslim heads of state in Rabat in 1969. This conference was eventually transformed into a permanent body called Organisation of Islamic Conference.[44]

Post 1979: Iranian Revolution and Afghan jihad

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Further information: Iranian Revolution and Afghan jihad

In 1979 the Iranian Revolution ousted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from power. Ten years later in 1989; the Afghan mujahideen, with major support from the United States, would successfully force the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. Pan-Islamic Sunni Muslims such as Maududi and the Muslim Brotherhood, embraced the creation of a new caliphate, at least as a long-term project.[45] Shia leader Ruhollah Khomeini[Note 1] also embraced a united Islamic supra-state[Note 2] but saw it led by a (Shia) religious scholar of fiqh (a faqih).[52]

These events galvanised Islamists the world over and heightened their popularity with the Muslim public. Throughout the Middle-East, and in particular Egypt, the various branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have significantly challenged the secular nationalist or monarchical Muslim governments. In Pakistan the Jamaat-e-Islami enjoyed popular support especially since the formation of the MMA, and in Algeria the FIS was expected to win the cancelled elections in 1992. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has emerged as a Pan-Islamist force in Central Asia and in the last five years has developed some support from the Arab world.[53]

A recent advocate for Pan-Islamism was late Turkish prime minister and founder of Millî Görüş movement Necmettin Erbakan, who championed the Pan-Islamic Union (İslam Birliği) idea and took steps in his government toward that goal by establishing the Developing 8 Countries (or D8, as opposed to G8) in 1996 with Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Bangladesh. His vision was gradual unity of Muslim nations through economic and technologic collaboration similar to the EU with a single monetary unit (İslam Dinarı),[54] joint aerospace and defense projects, petrochemical technology development, regional civil aviation network and a gradual agreement to democratic values. Although the organization met at presidential and cabinet levels and moderate collaboration projects continue to date, the momentum was instantly lost when the so-called Post-Modern Coup of February 28, 1997, eventually took down Erbakan's government.[55]

See also

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International organisations:

History:

References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Pan-Islamism

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Pan-Islamism is a political and movement seeking the unification of the global Muslim community, or , under a single Islamic , often conceptualized as a , to transcend national, ethnic, and sectarian divisions while fostering collective strength against perceived external threats. Emerging in the late amid European colonial expansion, it was pioneered by , who advocated Muslim solidarity and reform to counter Western dominance and revive Islamic political power. Ottoman Sultan instrumentalized pan-Islamism as a diplomatic strategy, leveraging the caliphate's symbolic authority to rally Muslim loyalty and extend imperial influence across and . The ideology's defining characteristics include emphasis on the caliphate's restoration post-1924 abolition, anti-imperialist mobilization, and aspirations for supranational governance, though its pursuit has frequently intersected with jihadist declarations and state propaganda, yielding limited empirical success amid persistent intra-Muslim conflicts and modern .

Definition and Principles

Core Ideology

Pan-Islamism constitutes a political centered on the unification of the global Muslim community, known as , under a singular Islamic polity, typically envisioned as a that enforces law and transcends national, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural boundaries. This unification draws from the Islamic tenet of *, the absolute oneness of God, which proponents extend to mandate a cohesive community of believers bound by shared faith rather than territorial or secular affiliations. The ideology posits that fragmentation along national lines, as imposed by colonial powers, dilutes Islamic and invites subjugation, necessitating a supranational to restore dignity and power. At its foundation, Pan-Islamism prioritizes collective solidarity (ummah-wide cooperation) over individualistic or nationalist pursuits, advocating for the mobilization of Muslims through religious symbols, rituals like the hajj pilgrimage, and doctrinal appeals to defend against external threats, particularly Western imperialism. It rejects secular governance models, insisting that political legitimacy derives solely from adherence to Quranic principles and prophetic tradition, with the caliph serving as both spiritual and temporal leader. Proponents argue this structure fosters transnational alliances, economic interdependence, and defensive jihad if required, viewing disunity as a causal factor in historical Muslim decline since the 19th century. Influential formulations by figures such as emphasized intellectual revival (tajdid) alongside political unity to counter colonial domination, portraying the as a pragmatic bulwark against fragmentation. His disciple and successor refined this by integrating scriptural exegesis with calls for institutional reform, arguing that true Islamic progress demands shedding imported nationalisms for a revived caliphal system. While varying in modernist leanings, these strands converge on the imperative of primacy, critiquing intra-Muslim divisions as deviations from divine ordinance that empirically weakened resistance to non-Muslim encroachments, as evidenced by the Ottoman Empire's late-19th-century appeals to global Muslims.

Relation to Broader Islamist Thought

Pan-Islamism occupies a distinct position within broader Islamist ideologies, which encompass diverse efforts to enforce Sharia-based and revive Islamic primacy in and society. Unlike ethno-nationalist or state-centric variants of that adapt to modern borders, Pan-Islamism insists on transcending them through the unification of under a singular , reviving classical notions of a universal to counter fragmentation and external threats. This emphasis on supranational positions it as a radical extension of Islamist revivalism, prioritizing faith-based collectivism over secular or territorial divisions, though it has historically intersected with anti-colonial resistance rather than purely doctrinal purity. In Salafi-jihadist thought, Pan-Islamism manifests as an aggressive call for global to establish rule, with groups like and exemplifying its militant application by rejecting nation-states as un-Islamic innovations and seeking allegiance from worldwide. Jihadi Salafists, a subset of Salafism focused on purifying through violence against perceived apostates and infidels, adopt pan-Islamist rhetoric to legitimize territorial conquests, such as 's self-proclaimed on June 29, 2014, which aimed to absorb all irrespective of ethnicity or geography. Yet, this strand reveals tensions within Islamist thought: while promoting unity, Salafi-jihadists often fracture over , doctrines, and the primacy of statehood versus perpetual insurgency, limiting pan-Islamism's practical cohesion. Mainstream Islamist organizations, such as the founded in on March 22, 1928, incorporate pan-Islamist elements as aspirational ideals—endorsing caliphal restoration and solidarity—while pragmatically engaging national politics and rejecting secularism over nationalism. Influential figures like of and Brotherhood affiliates viewed pan-Islamism as complementary to local implementation, fostering ideological convergence on anti-Western and Islamic supremacy, though divergences emerge in prioritizing grassroots da'wa (proselytization) against immediate global unification. These relations highlight Pan-Islamism's role as a unifying motif in Islamist discourse, tempered by real-world sectarian and strategic constraints that favor hybrid national-transnational approaches.

Historical Roots

Pre-Modern Islamic Unity Concepts

The concept of , the supranational community of believers united by adherence to , underpinned pre-modern notions of Islamic unity, transcending tribal, ethnic, and regional divisions to foster collective solidarity. Emerging in the 7th century CE following the Hijra in 622 CE, which marked the establishment of the first Muslim polity in , the ummah emphasized shared faith as the basis for cohesion, as articulated in early Islamic sources promoting brotherhood among believers irrespective of background. This ideal countered pre-Islamic Arabian fragmentation, where feuding tribes often disrupted social order, by prioritizing religious loyalty over kinship ties. Politically, the (khilafah) institutionalized this unity as the successor to prophetic leadership, established in 632 CE by to combat the and preserve communal integrity against apostasy and rebellion. The (632–661 CE) exemplified early unification efforts, consolidating disparate Arab tribes under centralized Islamic authority and enabling rapid conquests that incorporated diverse populations from the to Persia, thereby expanding the ummah's territorial scope while maintaining doctrinal uniformity through application. Successor dynasties, such as the Umayyads (661–750 CE), extended this framework across an empire spanning over 11 million square kilometers by 720 CE, though ethnic Arab favoritism sowed seeds of discord; the Abbasids (750–1258 CE) shifted toward broader Muslim universalism, appointing non-Arabs to high offices and integrating Persian administrative traditions to sustain unity amid growing cultural pluralism. Despite recurrent schisms—such as the Sunni-Shia divergence post-661 CE or the after the —the symbolized enduring aspirations for a singular authority to avert fitna (civil strife) and defend Dar al-Islam against external threats, as theorized in classical juristic texts advocating one caliph for the entire . The Mongol destruction of in 1258 CE disrupted this structure, relocating a nominal to until 1517 CE, yet the underlying principle of religious-political oneness persisted as a normative ideal, influencing later Ottoman claims to universal leadership without evolving into the transnational mobilization characteristic of 19th-century pan-Islamism.

19th-Century Emergence

Pan-Islamism began to coalesce as a distinct ideological movement in the late amid the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses, such as those formalized at the in 1878 following the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, and the broader advance of European into Muslim-majority regions including and . This context fostered calls for transcending ethnic and national divisions in favor of supranational Islamic solidarity to preserve sovereignty and counter Western dominance. A central proponent was (c. 1838–1897), an itinerant Persian thinker who, during his residence in from 1866 to 1871 and later in until 1879, critiqued colonial rule and advocated revivalist reforms emphasizing Muslim unity through (independent reasoning) and resistance to . His writings and lectures, including refutations of materialist philosophy in works like al-Radd 'ala al-Dahriyyin (Refutation of the Materialists, c. 1881), framed disunity as the root cause of Muslim decline, urging a return to core Islamic tenets for collective strength. In exile in from 1883, al-Afghani collaborated with Egyptian reformer to publish the short-lived journal Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Bond) from March 13 to October 1884, which explicitly promoted pan-Islamic cooperation, caliphal authority, and anti-colonial agitation across borders, influencing readers in the , , and despite its brief run of 18 issues. Parallel to these intellectual efforts, Ottoman Sultan (r. 1876–1909) adopted pan-Islamism as state policy shortly after his accession, suspending the 1876 constitution in 1878 amid internal unrest and external pressures, while leveraging his caliphal title to appeal to beyond Ottoman borders for loyalty and support against European encroachments. This approach, evident in diplomatic overtures to Muslim communities in British India and by the 1880s, aimed to offset secularist reforms of the era and nationalist separatisms among Arab, Armenian, and Balkan subjects.

Early Modern Development

Ottoman Promotion and Abdul Hamid II

Sultan , who ascended the Ottoman throne on August 31, 1876, increasingly promoted Pan-Islamism as a state ideology to counteract the disintegrative effects of and Western imperialism within the multi-ethnic . Facing the erosion of Ottoman authority following the reforms (1839–1876), which had emphasized secular over religious unity, Abdul Hamid leveraged his dual role as sultan and —claimed by Ottomans since 1517—to rally Muslims globally under a shared Islamic identity, positioning the as the protector of all believers against colonial powers. This policy shift was pragmatic, aimed at bolstering loyalty among the empire's Muslim subjects and eliciting support from extraterritorial Muslim communities in regions like and , where British and Russian influences threatened Islamic solidarity. Key initiatives included the construction of the , initiated in 1900 and extending from to by 1908, which facilitated pilgrimage to and symbolized caliphal patronage while being funded through donations from Muslims worldwide, thereby fostering a sense of transnational unity. Abdul Hamid dispatched Islamic missionaries to Ottoman provinces and beyond starting in the 1880s to propagate adherence to caliphal authority and counter missionary activities by European powers. He also engaged influential Muslim intellectuals, such as , inviting him to in 1892 to mobilize anti-colonial sentiment, though Afghani's radicalism was later curtailed to align with state-controlled Pan-Islamism. These efforts extended to diplomatic overtures, including appeals to Muslim rulers in and Persia for allegiance to the as a bulwark against infidel encroachment. Domestically, Pan-Islamism manifested in policies privileging Muslim institutions, such as expanding and censoring secular or nationalist publications that undermined caliphal unity, while externally it sought to exploit tensions like the 1894–1896 Armenian massacres to frame Ottoman actions as defense of against Christian minorities. Hamid's irades (decrees) explicitly enjoined obedience to the caliph as a religious , producing that reinforced his spiritual leadership over all . Despite these measures, the policy's effectiveness was limited by internal divisions, including Kurdish and Arab intellectual critiques, and it ultimately failed to prevent the of 1908, which curtailed Hamid's autocracy. Nonetheless, this era marked the Ottoman state's most systematic institutionalization of Pan-Islamism as a tool for imperial preservation.

World War I and Interwar Period

During World War I, the Ottoman Empire instrumentalized pan-Islamism through a declaration of jihad to rally global Muslim support against the Entente powers, particularly Britain, France, and Russia, which controlled vast Muslim populations in colonies like India, North Africa, and Central Asia. On November 14, 1914, the Sheikh ul-Islam issued a fatwa urging Muslims to engage in holy war against these enemies, framing the conflict as a defense of the caliphate and Islamic unity; German allies amplified this via propaganda networks targeting 300 million Muslims. The campaign aimed to provoke uprisings, such as in British India where 70 million Muslims resided, but achieved minimal success: loyalty to colonial rulers prevailed in most areas, with only sporadic unrest like the 1915 Singapore Mutiny involving 850 Indian Muslim troops. Instead, the Sharifian Arab Revolt of June 1916, backed by Britain, fractured Muslim solidarity by targeting Ottoman rule, highlighting pan-Islamism's vulnerability to local ethnic and tribal divisions. In the (1918–1939), pan-Islamism shifted toward defensive efforts to preserve the amid Allied partition plans under the 1920 , which envisioned dismantling Turkish sovereignty and reducing the sultan's authority. The in British India, launched in 1919 by leaders Muhammad Ali Jauhar and Shaukat Ali, mobilized over 500 local committees and 18 million supporters to petition against abolition, viewing it as a pan-Islamic imperative against Western dismemberment of Muslim lands. %20PDF/1.From%20Pan-Islamism%20to%20Muslim%20Nationalism%2C%20Ishtiaq-Butt%20Article.pdf) Temporarily allied with Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation campaign from 1920–1922, it fused anti-colonialism with caliphal loyalty, including a 1920 hijra of 18,000 Muslims to , but dissolved after Turkey's Grand National Assembly abolished the on March 3, 1924, prioritizing secular nationalism under .%20PDF/1.From%20Pan-Islamism%20to%20Muslim%20Nationalism%2C%20Ishtiaq-Butt%20Article.pdf) Syrian reformer sustained pan-Islamist discourse through his journal , advocating a decentralized reformed via (independent reasoning) to counter European mandates and , influencing up to 100,000 readers across the Muslim world. critiqued as divisive, proposing Arab leadership in a revived to resist , though his ideas competed with emerging in mandates like and . This period saw pan-Islamism's ideological persistence in groups like Egypt's , founded in 1928 by with 500 initial members, which echoed Rida's calls for Islamic unity against Western cultural penetration, enrolling 2,000 by 1938. Despite territorial nationalisms gaining traction post-Lausanne Treaty (1923), pan-Islamism endured as an anti-imperial framework, fostering transnational networks amid 200,000 Muslim pilgrims annually to reinforcing caliphal symbolism until its formal end.

Post-Colonial Evolution

Abolition of the Caliphate

The Ottoman Caliphate, which had served as a symbol of nominal Muslim unity since 1517, faced existential challenges following the empire's defeat in World War I and the subsequent Turkish War of Independence. On November 1, 1922, the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the sultanate, separating temporal authority from the religious caliphal role held by Mehmed VI, though Abdulmejid II retained the caliphate as a ceremonial figurehead. This move reflected Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Kemalist agenda to forge a secular nation-state, viewing Ottoman Islamic institutions as barriers to modernization and Western-oriented reforms. On March 3, 1924, the Assembly decisively abolished the caliphate itself through three interconnected laws: deposing Abdulmejid II as the 101st caliph, dissolving the Ottoman dynasty's privileges, and closing religious schools while transferring their assets to the state. Atatürk justified this by arguing that the caliphate, tied to dynastic and pan-Islamic pretensions, undermined Turkish and perpetuated feudal backwardness; he prioritized national over supranational Islamic , enacting further secular measures like banning the fez and courts in subsequent years. The Ottoman family was stripped of citizenship and exiled, with Abdulmejid II departing that day, effectively ending the institution's political and symbolic continuity. The abolition reverberated across the Muslim world, fracturing pan-Islamist aspirations for a centralized caliphal authority as a bulwark against colonial fragmentation. In regions like India, the Khilafat Movement—led by figures such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Abul Kalam Azad, which had allied with Indian nationalists to preserve the caliphate—collapsed amid disillusionment, as the move deprived pan-Islamism of its primary institutional anchor. Egyptian intellectuals and ulema debated relocating the caliphate to Cairo, but proposals faltered due to local nationalist rivalries and British influence, highlighting the causal shift from dynastic unity to decentralized ideological mobilization. Pan-Islamists interpreted the event as a Western-orchestrated rupture of the ummah's cohesion, spurring reformist calls for caliphal restoration through grassroots networks rather than imperial revival, though immediate efforts yielded no unified successor. This caesura intensified tensions between secular nationalism and pan-Islamic transnationalism in the , as emerging states like and pursued localized Islamic models without supranational claims. While Atatürk's reforms stabilized as a secular republic by 1928—declaring no longer the —the caliphate's void fueled latent pan-Islamist grievances, later manifesting in movements seeking ideological or militant alternatives to Ottoman-style unity.

Mid-20th-Century Nationalism Conflicts

In the decades following , Pan-Islamist advocates encountered significant opposition from emergent nationalist ideologies in newly independent Muslim-majority states, which prioritized territorial sovereignty, secular governance, and ethnic or pan-ethnic unity over transnational Islamic solidarity. , exemplified by Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime in from 1954 to 1970, framed the nation-state as the primary vehicle for anti-colonial resistance and modernization, often marginalizing religious transnationalism as a relic of Ottoman imperialism or a threat to state control. This tension manifested in direct confrontations, as Pan-Islamist groups like the sought to subordinate national boundaries to the ummah's unity under , viewing secular as a form of jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance). A pivotal conflict unfolded in , where the , founded in 1928 with aspirations for Islamic governance transcending national lines, initially aligned with Nasser's 1952 revolution against monarchy but soon clashed over ideology. On October 26, 1954, a Brotherhood member, Mahmoud Abdel-Latif, attempted to assassinate Nasser during a public speech in , prompting a severe : the group was banned, thousands arrested, and six leaders executed in December 1954 for alleged involvement in subversive activities. By the mid-1960s, Nasser's security apparatus targeted Brotherhood intellectuals, culminating in the 1965 arrest of over 20,000 members on charges of plotting against the state and the 1966 public execution of , whose writings like Milestones (1964) critiqued as idolatrous and advocated global . These suppressions forced Brotherhood networks underground, yet reinforced their Pan-Islamist narrative by portraying nationalist regimes as apostate enforcers dividing Muslims. Similar dynamics played out in Ba'athist Syria and Iraq, where secular Arab nationalist parties seized power in the 1960s—Michel Aflaq's Ba'ath in Syria via 1963 coup and in Iraq in 1968—systematically purging Islamist elements perceived as obstacles to pan-Arab unification. Pan-Islamists, including offshoots of the Brotherhood, faced imprisonment and execution for promoting caliphal unity over Ba'athist socialism, with events like the 1963 Hama uprising in Syria suppressed violently, killing hundreds. In South Asia, Abul A'la Maududi's Jamaat-e-Islami, established in 1941, explicitly rejected nationalism as incompatible with Islam's universalism; Maududi argued in works like Nationalism and Islam (1940s editions) that territorial loyalties fragmented the ummah and echoed Western imperialism, opposing Pakistan's 1947 founding as a mere ethnic state rather than a theocratic vanguard for global jihad. Jamaat's campaigns against secular laws, such as family legislation in the 1950s-1960s, highlighted this rift, though it gained limited traction amid state favoritism toward national consolidation. These conflicts underscored Pan-Islamism's marginalization under nationalist dominance until the 1967 Arab-Israeli War's humiliations eroded faith in secular models, subtly bolstering Islamist alternatives.

Late 20th-Century Revival

Iranian Revolution Influence

The 1979 , culminating in the establishment of an under on February 1, 1979, following the Shah's exile on January 16, demonstrated the feasibility of mobilizing masses under Islamic banners to dismantle a U.S.-backed secular monarchy, thereby invigorating pan-Islamist ideologies that emphasized transnational Muslim solidarity against . Khomeini framed the upheaval not merely as a national event but as a prototype for liberating the global , advocating the "export of the revolution" to unify Muslims irrespective of sectarian lines in opposition to superpowers like the and the . This rhetoric resonated with pan-Islamist principles by portraying as a comprehensive capable of transcending nation-states, echoing earlier calls for caliphal revival while adapting them to revolutionary praxis. Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), enshrined in Iran's 1979 constitution, intertwined Shia jurisprudence with pan-Islamic appeals, urging worldwide to overthrow "oppressive regimes" and establish governance rooted in to achieve collective freedom and unity. He explicitly promoted intra-Muslim brotherhood, declaring in sermons and writings that "all are brothers" and that Islamic must triumph over external threats by actualizing shared ordinances, initiatives that included founding bodies like the Organization of Islamic Conference to foster coordination. This approach influenced Sunni Islamist thinkers and groups, who initially overlooked sectarian disparities to draw inspiration from Iran's success in toppling a 2,500-year-old through clerical and popular , viewing it as validation of Islam's political efficacy over secular . Despite its Shia core, the revolution catalyzed a broader resurgence in , prompting Sunni movements in regions like and the to accelerate anti-Western postures and incorporate tactics, such as mass protests and ideological framing of local grievances as part of a global against arrogance (istekbar). In , for instance, Islamist factions adopted Khomeini's pan-Islamist emphasis on the ummah's primacy, shifting perceptions of U.S. influence and bolstering domestic mobilization against secular Kemalist structures. However, the influence waned over time due to inherent Shia-Sunni frictions, as Iran's post-revolutionary policies— including support for Shia militias—exacerbated sectarian divides, leading many Sunni pan-Islamists to critique Tehran's ambitions as hegemonic rather than genuinely unifying, thus highlighting the causal limits of cross-sectarian appeal in practice.

Soviet-Afghan War and Jihad Networks

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, deploying approximately 100,000 troops to prop up the communist government amid internal instability, sparking a decade-long insurgency by Afghan mujahideen fighters backed by diverse international patrons including the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This conflict rapidly evolved into a focal point for transnational jihad, drawing foreign Muslim volunteers who framed their participation as a defensive struggle to defend the ummah against atheistic communism, thereby amplifying pan-Islamic sentiments of solidarity across national borders. Estimates indicate that 20,000 to 35,000 foreign fighters, primarily "Afghan Arabs" from over 40 Muslim-majority countries, joined the mujahideen, with recruitment emphasizing Islamic unity over ethnic or state loyalties. Central to these jihad networks was the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK, or Afghan Services Bureau), established in 1984 by Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar, Pakistan, to coordinate logistics, funding, and recruitment for non-Afghan volunteers. Azzam, a key ideologue, propagated the concept of obligatory jihad against Soviet occupation through publications and sermons, portraying Afghanistan as a testing ground for global Muslim revival and unity, which resonated with pan-Islamic ideals by transcending local grievances. Osama bin Laden, a Saudi financier who arrived in Pakistan in 1980, contributed millions from his family's wealth and personal networks to MAK, establishing guesthouses, supply lines, and rudimentary training facilities for fighters, while his experiences reinforced a vision of enduring transnational Islamist struggle. These efforts, supported indirectly by U.S. aid funneled through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under Operation Cyclone—totaling over $3 billion in arms and training—professionalized disparate volunteers into cohesive units, forging personal ties among militants from Egypt, Algeria, and beyond. The war's conclusion in , with Soviet withdrawal following over 1 million Afghan deaths and massive displacement, did not dismantle these networks; instead, battle-hardened veterans repatriated with skills, ideology, and contacts, seeding pan-Islamic groups in subsequent conflicts from Bosnia to . This diffusion promoted a interpretation of pan-Islamism, prioritizing ist to restore caliphal against perceived Western and secular threats, though internal fractures—such as Azzam's focus on defensive versus bin Laden's shift toward offensive global operations—highlighted tensions within the ummah's purported cohesion. Pakistani and Saudi funding, alongside ideological mobilization, sustained these links, but the absence of centralized authority post-victory underscored the improvised, rhizomatic nature of the resulting ist infrastructure over formalized pan-Islamic governance.

21st-Century Manifestations

Al-Qaeda's Global Vision

Al-Qaeda's ideological framework, as articulated by founder , envisioned a transnational jihadist movement to unite Muslims against Western powers and apostate regimes, ultimately restoring a global governed by . Emerging from the Soviet-Afghan War networks in 1988, the group positioned itself as the vanguard of defensive jihad, obligatory for all able Muslims to repel occupations of Islamic lands such as the and . This vision drew on Salafi interpretations emphasizing the ummah's primacy over nation-states, rejecting secular borders imposed by colonial powers as artificial divisions hindering . Central to this global ambition was bin Laden's 1998 fatwa, co-signed by allied clerics, which declared killing Americans—civilian and military—and their allies an individual religious duty wherever possible, to liberate holy sites and dismantle U.S.-backed governments. The fatwa framed these actions as prerequisites for broader unification, arguing that foreign presence and support for perpetuated Muslim disunity and subjugation. Al-Qaeda's strategy prioritized the "far enemy" (the and its allies) over immediate local confrontations, believing that weakening Western influence would topple "near enemies" like Saudi Arabia's monarchy and enable Sharia-based emirates as stepping stones to restoration. Under Ayman al-Zawahiri's influence after bin Laden's 2011 death, the vision evolved to emphasize decentralized affiliates inspiring worldwide attacks while building governance in ungoverned spaces, such as and , to demonstrate viable Islamic rule. This approach contrasted with ISIS's territorial immediacy by advocating phased escalation: expel occupiers, purify regimes, then consolidate under a single authority echoing historical caliphates. Al-Qaeda's propaganda, disseminated via videos and manifestos, sought to mobilize the global Muslim diaspora, portraying as a unifying force against perceived crusader-Zionist conspiracies eroding Islamic . Despite tactical setbacks, this enduring narrative sustained across continents, with affiliates pledging allegiance to a central council for coordinated efforts toward pan-Islamic .

ISIS Caliphate and Sectarian Dimensions

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) declared a caliphate on June 29, 2014, renaming itself simply the Islamic State and designating Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its caliph, thereby claiming supreme religious and political authority over Muslims globally. This proclamation, delivered via audio message from Mosul's Great Mosque, invoked classical Islamic jurisprudence on the caliphate as an obligatory institution for unifying the ummah under Sharia law, positioning ISIS as the vanguard of pan-Islamist revival amid perceived failures of nation-states and rival jihadist groups like al-Qaeda. At its zenith in late 2014 to mid-2015, the entity controlled roughly 110,000 square kilometers across Iraq and Syria, including key cities such as Raqqa, Mosul, and Fallujah, while extracting revenue from oil sales, taxation, and extortion to sustain governance structures like courts, police, and propaganda apparatuses. Foreign fighters from over 80 countries flocked to its ranks, totaling up to 40,000 at peak, drawn by the territorial realization of a borderless Islamic polity that echoed pan-Islamist aspirations for transcending colonial borders. Despite this universalist rhetoric, ISIS's implementation was marred by acute sectarian exclusivity, rooted in a takfiri Salafi-jihadist ideology that excommunicated not only Shia Muslims but also Sufis, moderate Sunnis, and other Muslims deemed insufficiently puritanical. The group systematically targeted Shia communities, viewing them as rafidah (rejectors) and primary enemies in an apocalyptic sectarian war, with documented atrocities including the 2014 Camp Speicher massacre of over 1,700 Shia Iraqi cadets and suicide bombings in Shia-majority areas like Baghdad's Sadr City, which killed thousands. This violence extended to non-Muslim minorities, such as the August 2014 genocide against Yazidis in Sinjar, where ISIS enslaved thousands of women and executed males, framing such acts as revival of early Islamic conquests against polytheists. The sectarian lens amplified ISIS's appeal in disenfranchised Sunni regions of Iraq and Syria, where grievances against Shia-dominated governments in Baghdad and the Alawite-led Assad regime fueled recruitment, but it simultaneously provoked unified opposition from Shia militias (e.g., Popular Mobilization Forces), Iran, and Hezbollah, alongside Sunni tribal coalitions and Kurdish forces. Baghdadi's doctrine rejected al-Qaeda's relative tolerance for tactical alliances with non-Salafis, insisting on immediate purification of the ummah, which alienated broader pan-Islamist sympathizers and contributed to the caliphate's military defeat by March 2019, when it lost its last territorial holdouts in Baghuz amid a U.S.-led coalition campaign. Post-territorial ISIS affiliates have perpetuated this sectarianism through insurgencies in Iraq, Syria, and affiliates like ISIS-K in Afghanistan, sustaining ideological fragmentation over unity.

Current Regional and Transnational Efforts

In Syria, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Salafi-jihadist group formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda, has consolidated control over significant territories including Idlib province and, following its role in the December 2024 overthrow of the Assad regime, expanded influence toward Damascus, implementing governance structures based on Islamic law while retaining ideological commitments to broader jihadist unity. Despite public shifts toward localized Syrian administration, HTS's core doctrine emphasizes transnational Salafi-jihadism, with leaders invoking pan-Islamic solidarity against perceived apostate regimes and Western influence. The U.S. State Department announced in July 2025 an intent to revoke HTS's Foreign Terrorist Organization designation, citing pragmatic governance efforts, though critics argue this overlooks persistent caliphate-oriented rhetoric. Transnationally, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), a non-violent pan-Islamist organization advocating caliphate restoration through ideological mobilization, intensified digital propaganda in 2024-2025, leveraging platforms for recruitment and caliphate narratives despite bans in countries like the UK (effective January 2024) and ongoing suppression elsewhere. HT's activities surged in South Asia, particularly Bangladesh, where post-August 2024 political upheaval enabled rapid youth recruitment via social media, with the group framing regional instability as opportunities for Islamic unification. In Central and South Asia, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) escalated attacks in 2025, aligning with pan-Islamist rhetoric by pledging allegiance to Afghan Taliban models of emirate governance while criticizing national borders as colonial relics. The Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates maintain decentralized efforts toward global caliphate revival, conducting 1,805 attacks worldwide in 2024—primarily in Syria, Iraq, and Africa—despite territorial losses, with propaganda emphasizing transnational recruitment and sectarian warfare against Shia and secular states. In Africa's Sahel region, IS Sahel Province claimed over 1,200 deaths in 2024 through coordinated assaults, promoting pan-Islamic governance as an alternative to failed nation-states, though internal fractures limit unified caliphate advances. In Afghanistan, the Taliban regime since 2021 has hosted or tolerated IS-Khorasan operations, rejecting explicit caliphate claims in favor of an emirate but enabling jihadist networks that invoke pan-Islamist solidarity against regional adversaries. These efforts collectively face counterterrorism pressures, with IS's global threat persisting through affiliates rather than centralized control.

Key Figures and Organizations

Intellectual Pioneers

Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), an Iranian-born Islamic activist and scholar, emerged as the foremost pioneer of modern Pan-Islamism by promoting the political unification of Muslims to resist European imperialism. Traveling through Persia, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, and Europe from the 1860s onward, al-Afghani argued that disunity among Muslim states enabled colonial domination, advocating ittihad al-Islam (Islamic unity) as a defensive strategy rooted in shared religious identity and revival of Islamic governance. His 1870s lectures in Cairo and publications, such as critiques of Western materialism, emphasized rational reinterpretation of Islam (ijtihad) to foster collective strength, influencing anti-colonial movements across the Ottoman Empire and British India. Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), al-Afghani's Egyptian disciple and Grand Mufti of al-Azhar from 1899, advanced Pan-Islamist thought through Islamic modernism, seeking to harmonize Quranic principles with scientific progress to empower Muslim solidarity. Collaborating with al-Afghani in exile during the 1870s–1880s, Abduh co-founded the Urwa al-Wuthqa journal in 1884, which serialized calls for pan-Islamic revival against British occupation in Egypt. His works, including Risalat al-Tawhid (1884), posited that theological reform and unity under a caliphate could restore Muslim agency, though he prioritized ethical and educational renewal over immediate political centralization. Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a Syrian reformer and editor of the journal from 1898 to 1935, systematized Pan-Islamism by linking Salafi revivalism to caliphal restoration amid Ottoman decline. Influenced by Abduh, whom he met in 1897, Rida critiqued as divisive, urging in post-World War I writings a unified Islamic state governed by to counter Western partition of Muslim lands, as seen in his support for the 1924 . His al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-Uzma (1923) outlined a consultative caliphate transcending ethnic lines, blending with scriptural literalism.

Political and Militant Leaders

(1903–1979), founder of in 1941, advanced pan-Islamist ideology by advocating the establishment of sovereign Islamic states governed by law as a prerequisite for Muslim unity, influencing Islamist movements across and beyond. His writings emphasized transcending national boundaries through theocratic governance, rejecting secular nationalism in favor of a global Islamic order. Hassan al-Turabi (1932–2016), a Sudanese Islamist scholar and politician, wielded significant influence behind Omar al-Bashir's 1989 coup, institutionalizing in while fostering pan-Islamist networks by hosting global jihadists, including , and promoting cross-border Islamist alliances during the 1990s. As leader of the , Turabi's vision integrated Sudanese governance with broader Muslim solidarity, though it later fractured amid power struggles. Necmettin Erbakan (1926–2011), Turkey's Islamist prime minister from 1996 to 1997, pursued pan-Islamist foreign policy by founding the in 1997, linking eight Muslim-majority nations to counter Western dominance and revive Ottoman-era Muslim unity. His rhetoric emphasized Islamic economic and political integration over secular alliances, influencing subsequent Turkish Islamist strategies. On the militant front, (1957–2011), founder of in 1988, framed global as a means to liberate from non-Muslim influence and restore a , as articulated in his 1996 and 1998 fatwas calling for attacks on U.S. targets to unite Muslims transnationally. Bin Laden's operations, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and 2001 World Trade Center attacks, aimed to spark widespread uprising for pan-Islamic governance, though they primarily sowed division. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (1971–2019), leader of the Islamic State from 2010 until his death, declared a caliphate on June 29, 2014, in Mosul, Iraq, claiming authority over all Muslims and expanding territory across Iraq and Syria by 2015 to enforce a supranational Islamic polity. His group's Salafi-jihadist doctrine rejected national borders, attracting foreign fighters for a unified ummah under strict Sharia, but relied on brutal enforcement that alienated many Muslims. Ayman al-Zawahiri (1951–2022), Al-Qaeda's operational chief and bin Laden's successor from 2011, sustained pan-Islamist militancy by directing affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, and the Maghreb toward eroding apostate regimes and Western presence to pave for caliphal restoration, as outlined in his post-9/11 ideological tracts. These efforts, however, fragmented amid intra-jihadist rivalries with groups like ISIS.

Criticisms and Internal Debates

Sectarian and Nationalist Objections

Shia Muslims have historically objected to pan-Islamist visions predicated on reviving the caliphate, a Sunni-dominated institution they regard as illegitimate from its inception following the Prophet Muhammad's death in 632 CE. Shia doctrine asserts that rightful succession belonged to Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants as divinely appointed Imams, rendering subsequent caliphs as usurpers who deviated from true Islamic governance. This rejection extends to modern pan-Islamist calls for ummah-wide unity under a caliphal framework, which Shias perceive as entrenching Sunni primacy and marginalizing their imamate tradition. For instance, Twelver Shia eschatology anticipates the return of the Hidden Imam as the sole legitimate leader, incompatible with interim caliphal authority. Sectarian tensions intensified in the 20th and 21st centuries as pan-Islamist movements, often Sunni-led like those inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood or Salafism, clashed with Shia geopolitical strategies. Iran's post-1979 revolutionary leadership, while invoking Islamic unity against Western imperialism, prioritized Shia crescent alliances—spanning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—over Sunni-centric pan-Islamism, accusing Sunni states of fostering extremism that threatens Shia communities. This dynamic has fueled mutual suspicions, with Shia actors viewing pan-Islamist rhetoric as a veil for Sunni hegemony, exacerbating conflicts like those in Syria since 2011 where pan-Islamist groups targeted Shia-linked forces. Nationalist objections to pan-Islamism emphasize the primacy of sovereign nation-states and ethnic or regional identities over supranational religious unity, often portraying it as a utopian ideal that undermines local autonomy and development. In the Arab world, mid-20th-century leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser advanced pan-Arabism as a secular alternative, criticizing pan-Islamism for its perceived inefficiency in confronting colonialism and Israel, as evidenced by Nasser's 1950s-1960s rivalry with Saudi-backed Islamists. Ba'athist regimes in Iraq and Syria similarly subordinated Islamic appeals to Arab nationalist agendas, viewing pan-Islamist transcendence of borders as a threat to centralized state power. Turkey's secular nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk abolished the Ottoman caliphate on March 3, 1924, explicitly rejecting pan-Islamic ties to forge a Turkish nation-state insulated from transnational religious loyalties that could invite foreign interference. Such nationalist critiques persist in contexts like pre-1979 Iran, where the Pahlavi dynasty's secular policies clashed with pan-Islamist agitation, prioritizing Persian nationalism over broader Muslim solidarity on issues like Palestine. Critics argue pan-Islamism fosters instability by eroding national cohesion, as seen in the failure of pan-Arab unity experiments that gave way to state-centric priorities amid power struggles. In Pakistan, while the state has invoked pan-Islamic rhetoric via the Organization of Islamic Cooperation since 1969, domestic nationalists have resisted full subsumption into ummah-wide agendas that dilute Pakistani sovereignty. These objections highlight pan-Islamism's tension with modern state-building, where national interests often prevail over ideological unity.

Secular Critiques of Theocratic Ambitions

Secular analysts contend that Pan-Islamist aspirations for a unified or sharia-based governance inherently conflict with principles of individual liberty and pluralistic , as they subordinate human legislation to interpreted divine commands, often resulting in enforced religious conformity over personal autonomy. This critique posits that theocratic systems derived from pan-Islamist ideologies prioritize communal religious obligations, such as punishments—including for and for —over secular standards of proportionality and rehabilitation in . Furthermore, sharia's provisions on , such as unequal shares favoring males and the reduced evidentiary weight of female testimony in certain cases, are viewed as systematically discriminatory, undermining enshrined in international covenants like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Critics from human rights perspectives highlight the suppression of dissent inherent in theocratic ambitions, where blasphemy and apostasy laws—punishable by death in several interpretations of sharia—stifle free expression and religious freedom, creating environments hostile to intellectual diversity and scientific inquiry. In pan-Islamist visions, this extends transnationally, potentially overriding national boundaries and cultural variances among Muslim-majority societies, which secular nationalists argue fosters intolerance toward non-Muslims, including dhimmis subjected to jizya taxes or restricted rights. Such systems are faulted for lacking mechanisms for peaceful power transitions, as rulers derive legitimacy from religious authority rather than electoral accountability, leading to entrenched clerical elites resistant to reform. Historical secular leaders in Muslim-majority states actively opposed pan-Islamist theocratic pushes to preserve national sovereignty and modernization. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, upon founding the Republic of Turkey in 1923, abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924, viewing it as a retrograde force that perpetuated feudalism and hindered secular progress, instead enacting reforms like the 1926 civil code modeled on Swiss law to separate religion from state affairs. Similarly, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, in the 1950s and 1960s, suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood—key proponents of pan-Islamist governance—labeling their ideology as divisive and accusing them of deeming fellow Egyptians as disbelievers, while mocking their calls for mandatory veiling as outmoded and incompatible with Arab nationalist development. These actions reflected a broader secular conviction that theocratic unification under Islamism exacerbates sectarian divides and economic underperformance by diverting resources to ideological enforcement rather than infrastructure and education. Empirically, states pursuing pan-Islamist theocratic models, such as Iran's post-1979 Islamic Republic, have exhibited governance failures including chronic economic mismanagement, with GDP per capita stagnating relative to secularizing peers, alongside widespread protests like those in 2022 following Mahsa Amini's death in custody, underscoring public rejection of enforced moral policing. Indicators from organizations like Freedom House consistently rate such regimes as "not free," with Iran's 2023 score at 11/100, attributing low marks to restrictions on assembly, media, and rule of law under theocratic oversight. Secular critiques thus emphasize that these ambitions causally contribute to instability by alienating diverse populations and impeding adaptation to global norms of innovation and trade, as evidenced by brain drain and lower patent outputs in rigidly theocratic contexts compared to more pluralistic Muslim societies.

Associations with Violence and Terrorism

Pan-Islamist ideology, particularly in its Salafi-jihadist interpretations, has been linked to terrorist organizations that pursue a unified Islamic caliphate through armed jihad, viewing national borders and secular governments as illegitimate barriers to Muslim unity. Groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) have explicitly framed their violent campaigns as efforts to restore a global Islamic polity, mobilizing fighters across borders by invoking the ummah's collective defense against perceived apostate regimes and external aggressors. This association stems from pan-Islamism's emphasis on transcending ethnic and national divisions, which radicals interpret as mandating offensive violence to overthrow obstacles to caliphal restoration. Al-Qaeda, established in 1988, exemplifies this linkage by promoting transnational jihad to unite Muslims under Sharia governance, targeting the "far enemy" (Western powers) to collapse support for local tyrants. Its leaders, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, articulated a pan-Islamist strategy in works like Zawahiri's 1996 treatise, prioritizing issues such as Palestine to rally the global ummah against common foes, while justifying civilian-targeted terrorism under doctrines of necessity and collective responsibility. The group's 1998 fatwa by Osama bin Laden declared it a religious duty to kill Americans and allies—civilian and military—anywhere, framing such acts as defensive jihad to liberate Muslim lands and foster unity, which underpinned attacks like the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and the September 11, 2001, assaults. Al-Qaeda's ideology, blending political Islamization with violence, has inspired affiliates worldwide, extending pan-Islamist militancy beyond core Arab contexts. The Islamic State, evolving from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, intensified these associations by declaring a caliphate on June 29, 2014, in territory spanning Iraq and Syria, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed caliph to lead a purportedly borderless Islamic state. ISIS employed systematic brutality— including mass executions, beheadings, and sectarian pogroms against Shiites, Yazidis, and others—to consolidate control and attract global recruits under a pan-Islamist banner of immediate caliphal revival, diverging from Al-Qaeda's phased approach by prioritizing territorial governance through terror. This violence, rationalized as purifying the ummah and enforcing divine law, included public spectacles to instill fear and loyalty, contributing to widespread instability even after territorial losses by 2019. Other jihadist entities, such as Boko Haram (later ISIS-aligned) and Al-Shabaab, have echoed pan-Islamist calls for caliphal unity while perpetrating local and transnational attacks, illustrating how the ideology's supranational appeal facilitates radical mobilization and violence against diverse targets. Non-violent pan-Islamist groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir, which advocate caliphate restoration peacefully, have faced scrutiny for ideologically endorsing or tolerating allied terrorism, providing a doctrinal foundation that blurs into militancy. In regions like Kashmir, pan-Islamist narratives have radicalized youth toward groups like Hizbul Mujahideen, framing local insurgencies as part of broader jihad for Muslim solidarity. These patterns underscore a causal thread where pan-Islamism's rejection of the nation-state system incentivizes extremists to employ terrorism as a tool for enforced unity, though mainstream variants disavow such methods.

Achievements, Failures, and Legacy

Contributions to Muslim Identity and Resistance

Pan-Islamism reinforced Muslim identity by emphasizing —the global community of believers—as a transcendent bond superior to ethnic, linguistic, or national divisions, countering the fragmenting effects of European colonial borders and secular nationalisms imposed in the 19th and early 20th centuries. This ideological revival, spurred by figures like (1838–1897), portrayed as a cohesive civilizational force capable of withstanding Western material and cultural dominance, drawing on Quranic and historical precedents of unity under caliphal authority to instill collective self-awareness amid imperial encroachments. In resistance efforts, Pan-Islamism mobilized anti-colonial sentiment by framing European powers as aggressors against the dar al-Islam, prompting transnational solidarity networks facilitated by steamships, print media, and telegraphs from the late 19th century onward. The Ottoman Empire, under Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876–1909), actively propagated Pan-Islamic appeals, including a 1914 fatwa declaring jihad against Britain, France, and Russia during World War I, which aimed to incite uprisings in British India, French North Africa, and Russian Central Asia, though it yielded limited military success but heightened Muslim consciousness of shared subjugation. In British India, Pan-Islamic networks among ulama and reformers addressed local Muslim vulnerabilities under colonial rule, fostering petitions and migrations (hijrah) to Ottoman territories as acts of defiance, while in Morocco, early 20th-century activists organized urban protests against French occupation by invoking Islamic unity. Post-World War I, despite the Ottoman Caliphate's abolition in 1924, Pan-Islamism influenced organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood (founded 1928 in Egypt), which integrated anti-imperialist rhetoric with calls for ummah revival, inspiring resistance in contexts such as the 1956 Suez Crisis against British and French forces. These efforts, while often co-opted by imperial actors like the Ottomans for geopolitical gain, undeniably galvanized identity formation by linking personal piety to collective opposition, evidenced in sustained fatwa traditions and solidarity campaigns that persisted into decolonization eras across Asia and Africa.

Causal Factors in Divisions and Instability

Pan-Islamism's emphasis on transcending national boundaries has frequently clashed with entrenched nationalist sentiments, particularly following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, which fragmented the Muslim world into sovereign nation-states prioritizing ethnic and territorial loyalties over religious unity. This tension manifested in movements like the Khilafat in India (1919–1924), where initial pan-Islamic solidarity against British colonialism dissolved amid competing Hindu-Muslim nationalisms, contributing to the 1924 abolition of the caliphate and subsequent disillusionment. In the post-colonial era, secular pan-Arabism further exacerbated divisions by framing Arab identity as superior to broader Islamic solidarity, leading to ideological rivalries that undermined joint Islamist efforts, as seen in the 1960s Ba'athist regimes' suppression of transnational religious networks. Sectarian fissures, primarily between Sunni and Shia communities, have persistently undermined pan-Islamic ambitions, as the movement's historical Ottoman roots and modern Sunni-dominant organizations like the often marginalize Shia perspectives, fostering mutual suspicion rather than cohesion. For instance, attempts by figures like in the late to bridge Sunni-Shia divides through anti-colonial pan-Islamism faltered against entrenched theological differences and political manipulations by rulers, resulting in fragmented alliances. Contemporary examples include Iran's Shia promoting its own regional alliances, which clash with Sunni pan-Islamist groups, intensifying proxy conflicts in and since 2011 and perpetuating instability through ideologically charged sectarian violence. Ethnic, linguistic, and cultural heterogeneities across the Muslim world have compounded these divisions, rendering abstract calls for ummah-wide unity impractical amid local grievances and power competitions. Pan-Islamist ideologies, by downplaying these realities in favor of religious primacy, have inadvertently fueled splinter groups; the rise of jihadist entities like ISIS in 2014, invoking caliphal restoration, provoked backlash from both nationalist states and rival Islamists, leading to intra-Muslim warfare that killed over 100,000 in Iraq and Syria by 2018. External funding dynamics, such as Saudi Arabia's post-1967 export of Wahhabism, amplified Sunni pan-Islamism while alienating non-Arab and moderate factions, distorting regional balances and sustaining cycles of radicalization and counter-radicalization. These factors collectively illustrate how pan-Islamism's causal oversight of ground-level diversities and rivalries has not only failed to consolidate unity but has catalytically intensified fragmentation and volatility.

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