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Pashtuns[f] (Pashto: پښتانه, Romanized: Pəx̌tānə́ (masc.);[g] پښتنې, Romanized: Pəx̌tané (fem.)[h][25]), also known as Pakhtuns,[26] Pukhtoons, or Pathans,[i] are a nomadic,[30][31][32] pastoral[33][34] Iranic ethnic group[26] primarily residing in southern and eastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan.[35][36] They were historically referred to as Afghans[j] until 1964,[42][43] after the term's meaning had become a demonym for all citizens of Afghanistan, regardless of their ethnic group, creating an Afghan national identity.[42][44]

Key Information

The Pashtuns speak the Pashto language, which belongs to the Eastern Iranian branch of the Iranian language family, the Wanetsi language, mainly among Pashtuns of the Tareen tribe, and Ormuri among non-Pashtun Ormur people and Wazir Pashtuns. Additionally, Dari serves as the second language of Pashtuns in Afghanistan,[45][46] while those in Pakistan speak Urdu and English.[23][47] In India, the majority of those of Pashtun descent have lost the ability to speak Pashto and instead speak Hindi and other regional languages,[48][24][49] while those in Iran primarily speak Southern Pashto, and Persian as a second language.

Pashtuns form the world's largest tribal society, comprising from 60–70 million people, and between 350–400 tribes with further having more sub-tribes, as well as a variety of origin theories.[50][51][52][53][54][51][52][55] In 2021, Shahid Javed Burki estimated the total Pashtun population to be situated between 60 and 70 million, with 15 million in Afghanistan.[1] Others who accept the 15 million figure include British academic Tim Willasey-Wilsey[2] as well as Abubakar Siddique, a journalist specializing in Afghan affairs.[3] This figure is disputed due to the lack of an official census in Afghanistan since 1979 due to continuing conflicts there.[56]

They are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the second-largest ethnic group in Pakistan,[4] constituting around 42–47% of the total Afghan population and around 15.4% of the total Pakistani population[57][58][59][4] In India, significant and historical communities of the Pashtun diaspora exist in the northern region of Rohilkhand, as well as in major Indian cities such as Delhi and Mumbai.[60][61]

Geographic distribution

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Afghanistan and Pakistan

[edit]

Pashtuns are spread over a wide geographic area, south of the Amu river and west of the Indus River. They can be found all over Afghanistan and Pakistan.[35] Big cities with a Pashtun majority include Jalalabad, Kandahar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Khost, Kohat, Lashkar Gah, Mardan, Ghazni, Mingora, Peshawar, Quetta, among others. Pashtuns also live in Abbottabad, Farah, Herat, Islamabad, Kabul, Karachi, Kunduz, Lahore, Mazar-i-Sharif, Mianwali, and Attock.[citation needed]

The city of Karachi, the financial capital of Pakistan, is home to the world's largest urban community of Pashtuns, larger than those of Kabul and Peshawar.[62] Likewise, Islamabad, the country's political capital, also serves as the major urban center of Pashtuns. More than 20% of the city's population belongs to the Pashto-speaking community.[citation needed]

India

[edit]

Pashtuns in India often identify as Pathans (the Hindustani word for Pashtun), and are referred to this way by other ethnic groups of the subcontinent.[k][64][65][66] Some Indians claim descent from Pashtun soldiers who settled in India by marrying local women during the Muslim conquest in the Indian subcontinent.[67]

Many Pathans chose to live in the Republic of India after the partition of India. Khan Mohammad Atif, a professor at the University of Lucknow, estimates that "The population of Pathans in India is twice their population in Afghanistan".[68]

Historically, Pashtuns settled in various cities of India before and during the British Raj in colonial India. These include Bombay (now called Mumbai), Farrukhabad, Delhi, Calcutta, Saharanpur, Rohilkhand, Jaipur, and Bangalore.[60][69][61] The settlers are descended from both Pashtuns of present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan (British India before 1947). In some regions in India, they are sometimes referred to as Kabuliwala.[70]

In India significant Pashtun diaspora communities exist.[71][67] While speakers of Pashto in the country number only 21,677 as of 2011, estimates of the ethnic or ancestral Pashtun population in India range from 3,200,000[72][73][74] to 11,482,000,[75] to as high as double their population in Afghanistan (approximately 30 million).[l]

Pashtun-inhabited areas in Pakistan and Afghanistan (including the southern borders of the former Soviet Union, the northeastern borders of Iran, and the northwestern borders of India disputed with Pakistan), in early 1980s.

The Rohilkhand region of Uttar Pradesh is named after the Rohilla community of Pashtun ancestry; the area came to be governed by the Royal House of Rampur, a Pashtunized Jat dynasty.[76][77] They also live in the states of Maharashtra in central India and West Bengal in eastern India that each have a population of over a million with Pashtun ancestry;[75] both Bombay and Calcutta were primary locations of Pashtun migrants from Afghanistan during the colonial era.[78] There are also populations over 100,000 each in the cities of Jaipur in Rajasthan and Bangalore in Karnataka.[75] Bombay (now called Mumbai) and Calcutta both have a Pashtun population of over 1 million, while Jaipur and Bangalore have an estimate of around 100,000. The Pashtuns in Bangalore include the Khan siblings Feroz, Sanjay and Akbar Khan, whose father settled in Bangalore from Ghazni.[79]

During the 19th century, when the British were recruiting peasants from British India as indentured servants to work in the Caribbean, South Africa and other places, Rohillas were sent to Trinidad, Surinam, Guyana, and Fiji, to work in the sugarcane fields and perform manual labour.[80] Many stayed and formed communities of their own. Some of them assimilated with the other South Asian Muslim nationalities to form a common Indian Muslim community in tandem with the larger Indian community, losing their distinctive heritage. Some Pashtuns travelled as far as Australia during the same era.[81]

Today, the Pashtuns are a collection of diversely scattered communities present across the length and breadth of India, with the largest populations principally settled in the plains of northern and central India.[82][83][l] Following the partition of India in 1947, many of them migrated to Pakistan.[82] The majority of Indian Pashtuns are Urdu-speaking communities,[84] who have assimilated into the local society over the course of generations.[84] Pashtuns have influenced and contributed to various fields in India, particularly politics, the entertainment industry and sports.[l]

Iran

[edit]

Pashtuns are also found in smaller numbers in the eastern and northern parts of Iran.[85] Records as early as the mid-1600s report Durrani Pashtuns living in the Khorasan province of Safavid Iran.[86] After the short reign of the Ghilji Pashtuns in Iran, Nader Shah defeated the last independent Ghilji ruler of Kandahar, Hussain Hotak. In order to secure Durrani control in southern Afghanistan, Nader Shah deported Hussain Hotak and large numbers of the Ghilji Pashtuns to the Mazandaran province in northern Iran. The remnants of this once sizeable exiled community, although assimilated, continue to claim Pashtun descent.[87] During the early 18th century, in the course of a very few years, the number of Durrani Pashtuns in Iranian Khorasan, greatly increased.[m] Later the region became part of the Durrani Empire itself. The second Durrani king of Afghanistan, Timur Shah Durrani was born in Mashhad.[88] Contemporary to Durrani rule in the east, Azad Khan Afghan, an ethnic Ghilji Pashtun, formerly second in charge of Azerbaijan during Afsharid rule, gained power in the western regions of Iran and Azerbaijan for a short period.[89] According to a sample survey in 1988, 75 per cent of all Afghan refugees in the southern part of the Iranian Khorasan province were Durrani Pashtuns.[n]

In other regions

[edit]

Indian and Pakistani Pashtuns have utilized the British/Commonwealth links of their respective countries, and modern communities have been established starting around the 1960s mainly in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia but also in other commonwealth countries (and the United States). Some Pashtuns have also settled in the Middle East, such as in the Arabian Peninsula. For example, about 300,000 Pashtuns migrated to the Persian Gulf countries between 1976 and 1981, representing 35% of Pakistani immigrants.[90] The Pakistani and Afghan diaspora around the world includes Pashtuns.

Etymology

[edit]

Ancient historical references: Pashtun

[edit]

A tribe called Pakthās, one of the tribes that fought against Sudas in the Dasarajna, or "Battle of the Ten Kings", are mentioned in the seventh mandala of the Rigveda, a text of Vedic Sanskrit hymns dated between c. 1500 and 1200 BCE:[91][92]

Together came the Pakthas (पक्थास), the Bhalanas, the Alinas, the Sivas, the Visanins. Yet to the Trtsus came the Ārya's Comrade, through love of spoil and heroes' war, to lead them.

— Rigveda, Book 7, Hymn 18, Verse 7

Heinrich Zimmer connects them with a tribe mentioned by Herodotus (Pactyans) in 430 BCE in the Histories:[93][94][95]

Other Indians dwell near the town of Caspatyrus[Κασπατύρῳ] and the Pactyic [Πακτυϊκῇ] country, north of the rest of India; these live like the Bactrians; they are of all Indians the most warlike, and it is they who are sent for the gold; for in these parts all is desolate because of the sand.

— Herodotus, The Histories, Book III, Chapter 102, Section 1

These Pactyans lived on the eastern frontier of the Achaemenid Arachosia Satrapy as early as the 1st millennium BCE, present-day Afghanistan.[96] Herodotus also mentions a tribe of known as Aparytai (Ἀπαρύται).[97] Thomas Holdich has linked them with the Afridi tribe:[98][99][100]

The Sattagydae, Gandarii, Dadicae, and Aparytae (Ἀπαρύται) paid together a hundred and seventy talents; this was the seventh province

— Herodotus, The Histories, Book III, Chapter 91, Section 4

Joseph Marquart made the connection of the Pashtuns with names such as the Parsiētai (Παρσιῆται), Parsioi (Πάρσιοι) that were cited by Ptolemy 150 CE:[101][102]

"The northern regions of the country are inhabited by the Bolitai, the western regions by the Aristophyloi below whom live the Parsioi (Πάρσιοι). The southern regions are inhabited by the Parsiētai (Παρσιῆται), the eastern regions by the Ambautai. The towns and villages lying in the country of the Paropanisadai are these: Parsiana Zarzaua/Barzaura Artoarta Baborana Kapisa niphanda"

— Ptolemy, 150 CE, 6.18.3–4

Strabo, the Greek geographer, in the Geographica (written between 43 BC to 23 AD) makes mention of the Scythian tribe Pasiani (Πασιανοί), which has also been identified with Pashtuns given that Pashto is an Eastern-Iranian language, much like the Scythian languages:[103][104][105][106][107]

"Most of the Scythians...each separate tribe has its peculiar name. All, or the greatest part of them, are nomades. The best known tribes are those who deprived the Greeks of Bactriana, the Asii, Pasiani, Tochari, and Sacarauli, who came from the country on the other side of the Iaxartes (Syr Darya)"

— Strabo, The Geography, Book XI, Chapter 8, Section 2

This is considered a different rendering of Ptolemy's Parsioi (Πάρσιοι).[106] Johnny Cheung,[108] reflecting on Ptolemy's Parsioi (Πάρσιοι) and Strabo's Pasiani (Πασιανοί) states: "Both forms show slight phonetic substitutions, viz. of υ for ι, and the loss of r in Pasianoi is due to perseveration from the preceding Asianoi. They are therefore the most likely candidates as the (linguistic) ancestors of modern day Pashtuns."[108]

Middle historical references: Afghan

[edit]

In the Middle Ages until the advent of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century, the Pashtuns were often referred to as "Afghans".[o] The etymological view supported by numerous noted scholars is that the name Afghan evidently derives from Sanskrit Aśvakan, or the Assakenoi of Arrian, which was the name used for ancient inhabitants of the Hindu Kush.[109] Aśvakan literally means "horsemen", "horse breeders", or "cavalrymen" (from aśva or aspa, the Sanskrit and Avestan words for "horse").[110] This view was propounded by scholars like Christian Lassen,[111] J. W. McCrindle,[112] M. V. de Saint Martin,[113] and É. Reclus,[114][115][116][117][118][119]

Bactrian document in the Greek script from the 4th century mentioning the word Afghan (αβγανανο): "To Ormuzd Bunukan from Bredag Watanan, the chief of the Afghans"

The earliest mention of the name Afghan (Abgân) is by Shapur I of the Sassanid Empire during the 3rd century CE,[120] In the 4th century the word "Afghans/Afghana" (αβγανανο) as a reference to a particular people is mentioned in the Bactrian documents found in Northern Afghanistan.[121][122]

"To Ormuzd Bunukan, from Bredag Watanan ... greetings and homage from ... ), the ( sotang ( ? ) of Parpaz ( under ) [ the glorious ) yabghu of Hephthal, the chief of the Afghans, ' the judge of Tukharistan and Gharchistan . Moreover, ' a letter [ has come hither ] from you, so I have heard how [ you have ] written ' ' to me concerning ] my health . I arrived in good health, ( and ) ( afterwards ( ? ) ' ' I heard that a message ] was sent thither to you ( saying ) thus : ... look after the farming but the order was given to you thus. You should hand over the grain and then request it from the citizens store: I will not order, so.....I Myself order And I in Respect of winter sends men thither to you then look after the farming, To Ormuzd Bunukan, Greetings"

— the Bactrian documents, 4th century

"because [you] (pl.), the clan of the Afghans, said thus to me:...And you should not have denied? the men of Rob[123] [that] the Afghans took (away) the horses"

— the Bactrian documents, 4th century, Sims-Williams 2007b, pp. 90–91

"[To ...]-bid the Afghan... Moreover, they are in [War]nu(?) because of the Afghans, so [you should] impose a penalty on Nat Kharagan ... ...lord of Warnu with ... ... ...the Afghan... ... "

— the Bactrian documents, 4th century, Sims-Williams 2007b, pp. 90–91

The name Afghan is later recorded in the 6th century CE in the form of "Avagāṇa" [अवगाण][124] by the Indian astronomer Varāha Mihira in his Brihat-samhita.[125][126]

"It would be unfavourable to the people of Chola, the Afghans (Avagāṇa), the white Huns and the Chinese."[126]

— Varāha Mihira, 6th century CE, chapt. 11, verse 61

The word Afghan also appeared in the 982 Ḥudūd al-ʿĀlam, where a reference is made to a village, Saul, which was probably located near Gardez, Afghanistan.[127]

"Saul, a pleasant village on a mountain. In it live Afghans".[127]

The same book also speaks of a king in Ninhar (Nangarhar), who had Muslim, Afghan and Hindu wives.[128] In the 11th century, Afghans are mentioned in Al-Biruni's Tarikh-ul Hind ("History of the Indus"), which describes groups of rebellious Afghans in the tribal lands west of the Indus River in what is today Pakistan.[127][129]

Al-Utbi, the Ghaznavid chronicler, in his Tarikh-i Yamini recorded that many Afghans and Khiljis (possibly the modern Ghilji) enlisted in the army of Sabuktigin after Jayapala was defeated.[130] Al-Utbi further stated that Afghans and Ghiljis made a part of Mahmud Ghaznavi's army and were sent on his expedition to Tocharistan, while on another occasion Mahmud Ghaznavi attacked and punished a group of opposing Afghans, as also corroborated by Abulfazl Beyhaqi.[131] It is recorded that Afghans were also enrolled in the Ghurid Kingdom (1148–1215).[132] By the beginning of the Khilji dynasty in 1290, Afghans have been well known in northern India.

Ibn Battuta, when visiting Afghanistan following the era of the Khilji dynasty, also wrote about the Afghans.

"We travelled on to Kabul, formerly a vast town, the site of which is now occupied by Afghans. They hold mountains and defiles and possess considerable strength, and are mostly highwaymen. Their principal mountain is called Kuh Sulayman. It is told that the prophet Sulayman [Solomon] ascended this mountain and having looked out over India, which was then covered with darkness, returned without entering it."[133]

— Ibn Battuta, 1333

Ferishta, a 16th-century Muslim historian writing about the history of Muslim rule in the subcontinent, stated:

He [Khalid bin Abdullah son of Khalid bin Walid] retired, therefore, with his family, and a number of Arab retainers, into the Sulaiman Mountains, situated between Multan and Peshawar, where he took up his residence, and gave his daughter in marriage to one of the Afghan chiefs, who had become a proselyte to Mahomedism. From this marriage many children were born, among whom were two sons famous in history. The one Lodhi, the other Sur; who each, subsequently, became head of the tribes which to this day bear their name. I have read in the Mutla-ul-Anwar, a work written by a respectable author, and which I procured at Burhanpur, a town of Khandesh in the Deccan, that the Afghans are Copts of the race of the Pharaohs; and that when the prophet Moses got the better of that infidel who was overwhelmed in the Red Sea, many of the Copts became converts to the Jewish faith; but others, stubborn and self-willed, refusing to embrace the true faith, leaving their country, came to India, and eventually settled in the Sulimany mountains, where they bore the name of Afghans.[40]

History and origins

[edit]
The Arachosia Satrapy and the Pactyan people during the Achaemenid Empire in 500 BCE

The ethnogenesis of the Pashtun ethnic group is unclear. There are many conflicting theories among historians and the Pashtuns themselves. Modern scholars believe that Pashtuns do not all share the same origin. The early ancestors of modern-day Pashtuns may have belonged to old Iranian tribes that spread throughout the eastern Iranian plateau.[134][p][36] Historians have also come across references to various ancient Indo-Aryan tribes called Pakthas (Pactyans) between the 2nd and the 1st millennium BC,[135][136][96] although according to Richard N. Frye the identification of Pashtuns with the Pakhtas is a mere guess and not proven. And scholars such as Georg Morgenstierne propose the derivation of Pashto from Parsa or Parswana.[137]

Mohan Lal stated in 1846 that "the origin of the Afghans is so obscure, that no one, even among the oldest and most clever of the tribe, can give satisfactory information on this point."[138] Others have suggested that a single origin of the Pashtuns is unlikely but rather they are a tribal confederation.

"Looking for the origin of Pashtuns and the Afghans is something like exploring the source of the Amazon. Is there one specific beginning? And are the Pashtuns originally identical with the Afghans? Although the Pashtuns nowadays constitute a clear ethnic group with their own language and culture, there is no evidence whatsoever that all modern Pashtuns share the same ethnic origin. In fact it is highly unlikely."[127]

— Vogelsang, 2002

Linguistic origin

[edit]
Sculpture of a Saka warrior in Termez, Uzbekistan

Pashto is generally classified as an Eastern Iranian language.[q][140][141] It shares features with the Munji language, which is the closest existing language to the extinct Bactrian,[142] but also shares features with the Sogdian language, as well as Khwarezmian, Shughni, Sanglechi, and Khotanese Saka.[r]

It is suggested by some that Pashto may have originated in the Badakhshan region and is connected to a Saka language akin to Khotanese.[s] In fact major linguist Georg Morgenstierne has described Pashto as a Saka dialect and many others have observed the similarities between Pashto and other Saka languages as well, suggesting that the original Pashto speakers might have been a Saka group.[143][144] Furthermore, Pashto and Ossetian, another Scythian-descending language, share cognates in their vocabulary which other Eastern Iranian languages lack[145] Cheung suggests a common isogloss between Pashto and Ossetian which he explains by an undocumented Saka dialect being spoken close to reconstructed Old Pashto which was likely spoken north of the Oxus at that time.[146] Others however have suggested a much older Iranic ancestor given the affinity to Old Avestan.[t]

Diverse origin

[edit]

According to one school of thought, Pashtun are descended from a variety of ethnicities, including Persians, Greeks, Turks, Arabs, Bactrians, Dards, Scythians, Tartars, Huns (Hephthalites), Mongols, Moghals (Mughals), and anyone else who has crossed the region where these Pashtun live. Unexpectedly, this includes alleged ties of Israelite descent.[147][u]

Some Pashtun tribes claim descent from Arabs, including some claiming to be Sayyids.[148]

One historical account connects the Pashtuns to a possible Ancient Egyptian past but this lacks supporting evidence.[149]

Henry Walter Bellew, who wrote extensively on Afghan culture, noted that some people claim that the Bangash Pashtuns are connected to Ismail Samani.[150]

Greek origin

[edit]

According to Firasat et al. 2007, a proportion of Pashtuns may descend from Greeks, but they also suggest that Greek ancestry may also have come from Greek slaves brought by Xerxes I.[151]

The Greek ancestry of the Pashtuns may also be traced on the basis of a homologous group. And Haplogroup J2 is from the Semitic population, and this haplogroup is found in 6.5% of Greeks and Pashtuns and 55.6% of the Israelite population.[152]

A number of genetic studies on Pashtuns have lately been undertaken by academics from various institutions and research institutes. The Greek heritage of Pakistani Pashtuns has been researched in. In this study, the Pashtuns, Kalash, and Burusho to be descended from Alexander's soldiers considered.[153]

Henry Walter Bellew (1834–1892) was of the view that the Pashtuns likely have mixed Greek and Indian Rajput roots.[154][155]

Following Alexander's brief occupation, the successor state of the Seleucid Empire expanded influence on the Pashtuns until 305 BCE when they gave up dominating power to the Indian Maurya Empire as part of an alliance treaty.[156]

Some groups from Peshawar and Kandahar believe to be descended from Greeks who arrived with Alexander the Great.[157]

Hephthalite origin

[edit]

According to some accounts the Ghilji tribe has been connected to the Khalaj people.[158] Following al-Khwarizmi, Josef Markwart claimed the Khalaj to be remnants of the Hephthalite confederacy.[159] The Hephthalites may have been Indo-Iranian,[159] although the view that they were of Turkic Gaoju origin[160] "seems to be most prominent at present".[161] The Khalaj may originally have been Turkic-speaking and only federated with Iranian Pashto-speaking tribes in medieval times.[162]

However, according to linguist Sims-Williams, archaeological documents do not support the suggestion that the Khalaj were the successors of the Hephthalites,[163] while according to historian V. Minorsky, the Khalaj were "perhaps only politically associated with the Hephthalites."[158]

According to Georg Morgenstierne, the Durrani tribe who were known as the "Abdali" before the formation of the Durrani Empire 1747,[164] might be connected to with the Hephthalites;[165] Aydogdy Kurbanov endorses this view who proposes that after the collapse of the Hephthalite confederacy, Hephthalite likely assimilated into different local populations.[166]

According to The Cambridge History of Iran volume 3, Issue 1, the Ghilji tribe of Afghanistan are the descendants of Hephthalites.[167]

Anthropology and oral traditions

[edit]

Theory of Pashtun descent from Israelites

[edit]

Some anthropologists lend credence to the oral traditions of the Pashtun tribes themselves. For example, according to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the theory of Pashtun descent from Israelites is traced to Nimat Allah al-Harawi, who compiled a history for Khan-e-Jehan Lodhi in the reign of Mughal Emperor Jehangir in the 17th century.[168] The 13th century Tabaqat-i Nasiri discusses the settlement of immigrant Bani Israel at the end of the 8th century CE in the Ghor region of Afghanistan, settlement attested by Jewish inscriptions in Ghor. Historian André Wink suggests that the story "may contain a clue to the remarkable theory of the Jewish origin of some of the Afghan tribes which is persistently advocated in the Persian-Afghan chronicles."[169] These references to Bani Israel agree with the commonly held view by Pashtuns that when the twelve tribes of Israel were dispersed, the tribe of Joseph, among other Hebrew tribes, settled in the Afghanistan region.[170] This oral tradition is widespread among the Pashtun tribes. There have been many legends over the centuries of descent from the Ten Lost Tribes after groups converted to Christianity and Islam. Hence the tribal name Yusufzai in Pashto translates to the "son of Joseph". A similar story is told by many historians, including the 14th century Ibn Battuta and 16th century Ferishta.[40] However, the similarity of names can also be traced to the presence of Arabic through Islam.[171]

This theory of Pashtuns Jewish origin has been largely denied and is said that Its biblical claims are anecdotal, its historical documentation is inconsistent, its geographic claims are incoherent, and its linguistic assertions are implausible.[172]

One conflicting issue in the belief that the Pashtuns descend from the Israelites is that the Ten Lost Tribes were exiled by the ruler of Assyria, while Maghzan-e-Afghani says they were permitted by the ruler to go east to Afghanistan. This inconsistency can be explained by the fact that Persia acquired the lands of the ancient Assyrian Empire when it conquered the Empire of the Medes and Chaldean Babylonia, which had conquered Assyria decades earlier. But no ancient author mentions such a transfer of Israelites further east, or no ancient extra-Biblical texts refer to the Ten Lost Tribes at all.[173]

Some Afghan historians have maintained that Pashtuns are linked to the ancient Israelites. Mohan Lal quoted Mountstuart Elphinstone who wrote:

"The Afghan historians proceed to relate that the children of Israel, both in Ghore and in Arabia, preserved their knowledge of the unity of God and the purity of their religious belief, and that on the appearance of the last and greatest of the prophets (Muhammad) the Afghans of Ghore listened to the invitation of their Arabian brethren, the chief of whom was Khauled...if we consider the easy way with which all rude nations receive accounts favourable to their own antiquity, I fear we much class the descents of the Afghans from the Jews with that of the Romans and the British from the Trojans, and that of the Irish from the Milesians or Brahmins."[174]

— Mountstuart Elphinstone, 1841

This theory has been criticized for not being substantiated by historical evidence.[171] Zaman Stanizai criticizes this theory:[171]

"The 'mythified' misconception that the Pashtuns are the descendants of the lost tribes of Israel is a fabrication popularized in 14th-century India. A claim that is full of logical inconsistencies and historical incongruities, and stands in stark contrast to the conclusive evidence of the Indo-Iranian origin of Pashtuns supported by the incontrovertible DNA sequencing that the genome analysis revealed scientifically."

— [171]

According to genetic studies Pashtuns have a greater R1a1a*-M198 modal halogroup than Jews:[175]

"Our study demonstrates genetic similarities between Pathans from Afghanistan and Pakistan, both of which are characterized by the predominance of haplogroup R1a1a*-M198 (>50%) and the sharing of the same modal haplotype...Although Greeks and Jews have been proposed as ancestors to Pathans, their genetic origin remains ambiguous...Overall, Ashkenazi Jews exhibit a frequency of 15.3% for haplogroup R1a1a-M198"

— "Afghanistan from a Y-chromosome perspective", European Journal of Human Genetics

Modern era

[edit]
Afghan Amir Sher Ali Khan (in the center with his son) and his delegation in Ambala, near Lahore, in 1869

Their modern past stretches back to the Delhi Sultanate (Khalji and Lodi dynasty), the Hotak dynasty and the Durrani Empire. The Hotak rulers rebelled against the Safavids and seized control over much of Persia from 1722 to 1729.[176] This was followed by the conquests of Ahmad Shah Durrani who was a former high-ranking military commander under Nader Shah and founder of the Durrani Empire, which covered most of what is now Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Indian Punjab, as well as the Kohistan and Khorasan provinces of Iran.[177] After the decline of the Durrani dynasty in the first half of the 19th century under Shuja Shah Durrani, the Barakzai dynasty took control of the empire. Specifically, the Mohamedzais held Afghanistan's monarchy from around 1826 to the end of Zahir Shah's reign in 1973.

During the so-called "Great Game" of the 19th century, rivalry between the British and Russian empires was useful to the Pashtuns of Afghanistan in resisting foreign control and retaining a degree of autonomy (see the Siege of Malakand). However, during the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (1880–1901), Pashtun regions were politically divided by the Durand Line – areas that would become western Pakistan fell within British India as a result of the border.

Leader of the non-violent Khudai Khidmatgar, also referred to as "the Red shirts" movement, Bacha Khan, standing with Mohandas Gandhi

In the 20th century, many politically active Pashtun leaders living under British rule of undivided India supported Indian independence, including Ashfaqulla Khan,[178][179] Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, Ajmal Khattak, Bacha Khan and his son Wali Khan (both members of the Khudai Khidmatgar), and were inspired by Mohandas Gandhi's non-violent method of resistance.[180][181] Many Pashtuns also worked in the Muslim League to fight for an independent Pakistan through non violent resistance, including Yusuf Khattak and Abdur Rab Nishtar who was a close associate of Muhammad Ali Jinnah.[182] The Pashtuns of Afghanistan attained complete independence from British political intervention during the reign of Amanullah Khan, following the Third Anglo-Afghan War. By the 1950s a popular call for Pashtunistan began to be heard in Afghanistan and the new state of Pakistan. This led to bad relations between the two nations. The Afghan monarchy ended when President Daoud Khan seized control of Afghanistan from his cousin Zahir Shah in 1973 on a Pashtun Nationalist agenda, which opened doors for a proxy war by neighbours. In April 1978, Daoud Khan was assassinated along with his family and relatives in a bloody coup orchestrated by Hafizullah Amin. Afghan mujahideen commanders in exile in neighbouring Pakistan began recruiting for a guerrilla warfare against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan – the Marxist government which was also dominated by Pashtun Khalqists who held Nationalist views including Hafizullah Amin, Nur Muhammad Taraki, General Mohammad Aslam Vatanjar, Shahnawaz Tanai, Mohammad Gulabzoy and many more. In 1979, the Soviet Union intervened in its southern neighbour Afghanistan in order to defeat a rising insurgency. The Afghan mujahideen were funded by the United States, Saudi Arabia, China and others, and included some Pashtun commanders such as Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi and Mohammad Yunus Khalis. In the meantime, millions of Pashtuns joined the Afghan diaspora in Pakistan and Iran, and from there tens of thousands proceeded to Europe, North America, Oceania and other parts of the world.[183] The Afghan government and military would remain predominantly Pashtun until the fall of Mohammad Najibullah's Republic of Afghanistan in April 1992.[184]

American diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad with the Taliban officials Abdul Ghani Baradar, Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai and Suhail Shaheen
Imran Khan, Pakistani cricketer-turned-politician and former Prime Minister, belongs to the Niazi tribe.

Many high-ranking government officials in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan were Pashtuns, including: Abdul Rahim Wardak, Abdul Salam Azimi, Anwar ul-Haq Ahady, Amirzai Sangin, Ghulam Farooq Wardak, Hamid Karzai, Mohammad Ishaq Aloko, Omar Zakhilwal, Sher Mohammad Karimi, Zalmay Rasoul, Yousef Pashtun. The list of current governors of Afghanistan also include large percentage of Pashtuns. Mullah Yaqoob serves as acting Defense Minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani as acting Interior Minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi as acting Foreign Minister, Gul Agha Ishakzai as acting Finance Minister, and Hasan Akhund as acting Prime Minister. A number of other ministers are also Pashtuns.

The Afghan royal family, which was represented by King Zahir Shah, are referred to Mohammadzais. Other prominent Pashtuns include the 17th-century poets Khushal Khan Khattak and Rahman Baba, and in contemporary era Afghan Astronaut Abdul Ahad Mohmand, former US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, and Ashraf Ghani among many others.

Many Pashtuns of Pakistan and India have adopted non-Pashtun cultures, mainly by abandoning Pashto and using languages such as Urdu, Punjabi, and Hindko.[185] These include Ghulam Mohammad (first Finance Minister, from 1947 to 1951, and third Governor-General of Pakistan, from 1951 to 1955),[186][187][188][189][190] Ayub Khan, who was the second President of Pakistan, Zakir Husain who was the third President of India and Abdul Qadeer Khan, father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Many more held high government posts, such as Asfandyar Wali Khan, Mahmood Khan Achakzai, Sirajul Haq, and Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, who are presidents of their respective political parties in Pakistan. Others became famous in sports (e.g., Imran Khan, Mansoor Ali Khan Pataudi, Younis Khan, Shahid Afridi, Irfan Pathan, Jahangir Khan, Jansher Khan, Hashim Khan, Rashid Khan, Shaheen Afridi, Naseem Shah, Misbah Ul Haq, Mujeeb Ur Rahman and Mohammad Wasim) and literature (e.g., Ghani Khan, Hamza Shinwari, and Kabir Stori). Malala Yousafzai, who became the youngest Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 2014, is a Pakistani Pashtun. Pashtuns are considered to be well-integrated in the Pakistani society, and as per a 2009 Pew Research Center report 92% of the Pashtuns identified with their Pakistani identity before their ethnic Pashtun identity.[191]

Many of the Bollywood film stars in India have Pashtun ancestry; some of the most notable ones are Aamir Khan, Shahrukh Khan, Salman Khan, Feroz Khan, Madhubala, Kader Khan, Saif Ali Khan, Soha Ali Khan, Sara Ali Khan, and Zarine Khan.[192][193] In addition, one of India's former presidents, Zakir Husain, belonged to the Afridi tribe.[194][195][196] Mohammad Yunus, India's former ambassador to Algeria and advisor to Indira Gandhi, is of Pashtun origin and related to the legendary Bacha Khan.[197][198][199][200]

In the late 1990s, Pashtuns were the primary ethnic group in the ruling regime i.e. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban regime).[201][202][failed verification] The Northern Alliance that was fighting against the Taliban also included a number of Pashtuns. Among them were Abdullah Abdullah, Abdul Qadir and his brother Abdul Haq, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Asadullah Khalid, Hamid Karzai and Gul Agha Sherzai. The Taliban regime was ousted in late 2001 during the US-led War in Afghanistan and replaced by the Karzai administration.[203] This was followed by the Ghani administration and the reconquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan).

The long wars in Afghanistan have led to Pashtuns gaining a reputation for being exceptional fighters.[204] Some activists and intellectuals are trying to rebuild Pashtun intellectualism and its pre-war culture.[205]

Genetics

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The majority of Pashtuns from Afghanistan belong to R1a, with a frequency of 50–65%.[206] Subclade R1a-Z2125 occurs at a frequency of 40%.[207] This subclade is predominantly found in Tajiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks and in some populations in the Caucasus and Iran.[208] Haplogroup G-M201 reaches 9% in Afghan Pashtuns and is the second most frequent haplogroup in Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan.[206][209] Haplogroup L and Haplogroup J2 occurs at an overall frequency of 6%.[206] According to a Mitochondrial DNA analysis of four ethnic groups of Afghanistan, the majority of mtDNA among Afghan Pashtuns belongs to West Eurasian lineages, and share a greater affinity with West Eurasian and Central Asian populations rather than to populations of South Asia or East Asia. The haplogroup analysis indicates the Pashtuns and Tajiks in Afghanistan share ancestral heritage. Among the studied ethnic groups, the Pashtuns have the greatest mtDNA diversity.[210] The most frequent haplogroup among Pakistani Pashtuns is haplogroup R which is found at a rate of 28–50%. Haplogroup J2 was found in 9% to 24% depending on the study and Haplogroup E has been found at a frequency of 4% to 13%. Haplogroup L occurs at a rate of 8%. Certain Pakistani Pashtun groups exhibit high levels of R1b.[211][212] Overall Pashtun groups are genetically diverse, and the Pashtun ethnic group is not a single genetic population. Different Pashtun groups exhibit different genetic backgrounds, resulting in considerable heterogeneity.[213]

Y haplogroup and mtdna haplogroup samples were taken from Jadoon, Yousafzai, Sayyid, Gujar and Tanoli men living in Swabi District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan. Jadoon men have predominantly East Asian origin paternal ancestry with West Eurasian maternal ancestry and a lesser amount of South Asian maternal ancestry according to a Y and mtdna haplogroup test indicating local females marrying immigrant males during the medieval period. Y Haplogroup O3-M122 makes up the majority of Jadoon men, the same haplogroup carried by the majority (50–60%) of Han Chinese. 82.5% of Jadoon men carrying Q-MEH2 and O3-M122 which are both of East Asian origin. O3-M122 was absent in the Sayyid (Syed) population and appeared in low numbers among Tanolis, Gujars and Yousafzais. There appears to be founder affect in the O3-M122 among the Jadoon.[214][215][216] 76.32% of Jadoon men carry O3-M122 while 0.75% of Tanolis, 0.81% of Gujars and 2.82% of Yousafzais carry O3-M122.[217][218]

56.25% of the Jadoons in another test carried West Eurasian maternal Haplogroup H (mtDNA).[219] Dental morphology of the Swabi Jadoons was also analysed and compared to other groups in the regions like Yousufzais and Sayyids.[220]

Definitions

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The most prominent views among Pashtuns as to who exactly qualifies as a Pashtun are:[221]

  1. Those who are well-versed in Pashto and use it significantly. The Pashto language is "one of the primary markers of ethnic identity" among Pashtuns.[222]
  2. Adherence to the code of Pashtunwali.[221][223] The cultural definition requires Pashtuns to adhere to Pashtunwali codes.[224]
  3. Belonging to a Pashtun tribe through patrilineal descent, based on an important orthodox law of Pashtunwali which mainly requires that only those who have a Pashtun father are Pashtun. This definition places less emphasis on the language.[225]

Tribes

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A map of Pashtun tribes[226]

A prominent institution of the Pashtun people is the intricate system of tribes.[227] The tribal system has several levels of organization: the tribe they are in is from four 'greater' tribal groups: the Sarbani, the Bettani, the Gharghashti, and the Karlani.[228] The tribe is then divided into kinship groups called khels, which in turn is divided into smaller groups (pllarina or plarganey), each consisting of several extended families called kahols.[229]

Durrani and Ghilji Pashtuns

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The Durranis and Ghiljis (or Ghilzais) are the two largest groups of Pashtuns, with approximately two-thirds of Afghan Pashtuns belonging to these confederations.[230] The Durrani tribe has been more urban and politically successful, while the Ghiljis are more numerous, more rural, and reputedly tougher. In the 18th century, the groups collaborated at times and at other times fought each other. With a few gaps, Durranis ruled modern Afghanistan continuously until the Saur Revolution of 1978; the new communist rulers were Ghilji.[231] Tribal allegiances are stronger among the Ghilji, while governance of the Durrani confederation is more to do with cross-tribal structures of land ownership.[230]

Language

[edit]
Map of Pashto-speaking areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Pashto is the mother tongue of most Pashtuns.[232][233][234] It is one of the two national languages of Afghanistan.[235][236] In Pakistan, although being the second-largest language being spoken,[237] it is often neglected officially in the education system.[238][239][240][241][242][243] This has been criticized as adversely impacting the economic advancement of Pashtuns,[244][245] as students do not have the ability to comprehend what is being taught in other languages fully.[246] Robert Nichols remarks:[222]

The politics of writing Pashto language textbooks in a nationalist environment promoting integration through Islam and Urdu had unique effects. There was no lesson on any twentieth century Pakhtun, especially Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the anti-British, pro-Pakhtun nationalist. There was no lesson on the Pashtun state-builders in nineteenth and twentieth century Afghanistan. There was little or no sampling of original Pashto language religious or historical material.

— Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors, Chapter 8, page 278

The map of Pashto speaking areas of Pakistan

Pashto is categorized as an Eastern Iranian language,[247] but a remarkably large number of words are unique to Pashto.[248][249] Pashto morphology in relation to verbs is complex compared to other Iranian languages.[250] In this respect MacKenzie states:[251]

If we compare the archaic structure of Pashto with the much simplified morphology of Persian, the leading modern Iranian language, we see that it stands to its 'second cousin' and neighbour in something like the same relationship as Icelandic does to English.

— David Neil MacKenzie

Pashto has a large number of dialects: generally divided into Northern, Southern and Central groups;[252] and also Tarino or Waṇetsi as distinct group.[253][254] As Elfenbein notes: "Dialect differences lie primarily in phonology and lexicon: the morphology and syntax are, again with the exception of Wanetsi, quite remarkably uniform".[255] Ibrahim Khan provides the following classification on the letter ښ: the Northern Western dialect (e.g. spoken by the Ghilzai) having the phonetic value /ç+/, the North Eastern (spoken by the Yusafzais etc.) having the sound /x/, the South Western (spoken by the Abdalis etc.) having /ʂ/ and the South Eastern (spoken by the Kakars etc.) having /ʃ/.[256] He illustrates that the Central dialects, which are spoken by the Karlāṇ tribes, can also be divided on the North /x/ and South /ʃ/ distinction but provides that in addition these Central dialects have had a vowel shift which makes them distinct: for instance /ɑ/ represented by aleph the non-Central dialects becoming /ɔː/ in Banisi dialect.[256]

The first Pashto alphabet was developed by Pir Roshan in the 16th century.[257] In 1958, a meeting of Pashtun scholars and writers from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, held in Kabul, standardized the present Pashto alphabet.[258]

Culture

[edit]
Local clothes used by Pashtun children

Pashtun culture is based on Pashtunwali, Islam and the understanding of Pashto language. The Kabul dialect is used to standardize the present Pashto alphabet.[258] Poetry is also an important part of Pashtun culture and it has been for centuries.[259] Pre-Islamic traditions, dating back to Alexander's defeat of the Persian Empire in 330 BC, possibly survived in the form of traditional dances, while literary styles and music reflect influence from the Persian tradition and regional musical instruments fused with localized variants and interpretation. Like other Muslims, Pashtuns celebrate Islamic holidays. Contrary to the Pashtuns living in Pakistan, Nowruz in Afghanistan is celebrated as the Afghan New Year by all Afghan ethnicities.[citation needed]

Jirga

[edit]

Another prominent Pashtun institution is the lóya jirgá (Pashto: لويه جرګه) or 'grand council' of elected elders.[260] Most decisions in tribal life are made by members of the jirgá (Pashto: جرګه), which has been the main institution of authority that the largely egalitarian Pashtuns willingly acknowledge as a viable governing body.[261]

Religion

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The tomb of Ahmad Shah Durrani in Kandahar City, which also serves as the Congregational Mosque and contains the sacred cloak that the Islamic prophet Muhammad wore.

Before Islam there were various different beliefs which were practised by Pashtuns such as Zoroastrianism,[262] Buddhism and Hinduism.[263]

The overwhelming majority of Pashtuns adhere to Sunni Islam and belong to the Hanafi school of thought. Small Shia communities exist in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Paktia. The Shias belong to the Turi tribe while the Bangash tribe is approximately 50% Shia and the rest Sunni, who are mainly found in and around Parachinar, Kurram, Hangu, Kohat and Orakzai.[264]

Men doing Islamic salat (praying) outside in the open in the Kunar Province of Afghanistan

A legacy of Sufi activity may be found in some Pashtun regions, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as evident in songs and dances. Many Pashtuns are prominent Ulema, Islamic scholars, such as Maulana Aazam an author of more than five hundred books including Tafasee of the Quran as Naqeeb Ut Tafaseer, Tafseer Ul Aazamain, Tafseer e Naqeebi and Noor Ut Tafaseer etc., as well as Muhammad Muhsin Khan who has helped translate the Noble Quran, Sahih Al-Bukhari and many other books to the English language.[265] Many Pashtuns want to reclaim their identity from being lumped in with the Taliban and international terrorism, which is not directly linked with Pashtun culture and history.[266]

Little information is available on non-Muslim as there is limited data regarding irreligious groups and minorities, especially since many of the Hindu and Sikh Pashtuns migrated from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after the partition of India and later, after the rise of the Taliban.[267][268]

There are also Hindus who claim to be Pashtun, sometimes known as the Sheen Khalai (though their ethnic claim is disputed by other Pashtuns), who have moved predominantly to India.[269][270] A small Hindu community, known as the Sheen Khalai meaning 'blue skinned' (referring to the color of Pashtun women's facial tattoos), migrated to Unniara, Rajasthan, India after partition.[271] Prior to 1947, the community resided in the Quetta, Loralai and Maikhter regions of the British Indian province of Baluchistan.[272][271][273] They are mainly claim to be members of the Pashtun Kakar tribe. Today, they continue to speak Pashto and celebrate Pashtun culture through the Attan dance.[272][271]

There is also a minority of Pashto speaking Sikhs in Tirah, Orakzai, Kurram, Malakand, and Swat. Due to the ongoing insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, some Pashto speaking Sikhs were internally displaced from their ancestral villages to settle in cities like Peshawar and Nankana Sahib.[274][275][276]

Pashto literature and poetry

[edit]
Mahmud Tarzi, son of Ghulam Muhammad Tarzi, became the pioneer of Afghan journalism for publishing the first newspaper Seraj al Akhbar.[277]

The majority of Pashtuns use Pashto as their native tongue, belonging to the Iranian language family,[278] and spoken by up to 60 million people.[279][280] It is written in the Pashto-Arabic script and is divided into two main dialects, the southern "Pashto" and the northern "Pukhto". The language has ancient origins and bears similarities to extinct languages such as Avestan and Bactrian.[281] Its closest modern relatives may include Pamir languages, such as Shughni and Wakhi, and Ossetic.[282] Pashto may have ancient legacy of borrowing vocabulary from neighbouring languages including such as Persian and Vedic Sanskrit. Modern borrowings come primarily from the English language.[283]

The earliest describes Sheikh Mali's conquest of Swat.[284] Pir Roshan is believed to have written a number of Pashto books while fighting with the Mughals. Pashtun scholars such as Abdul Hai Habibi and others believe that the earliest Pashto work dates back to Amir Kror Suri, and they use the writings found in Pata Khazana as proof. Amir Kror Suri, son of Amir Polad Suri, was an 8th-century folk hero and king from the Ghor region in Afghanistan.[285][286] However, this is disputed by several European experts due to lack of strong evidence.

The advent of poetry helped transition Pashto to the modern period. Pashto literature gained significant prominence in the 20th century, with poetry by Ameer Hamza Shinwari who developed Pashto Ghazals.[287] In 1919, during the expanding of mass media, Mahmud Tarzi published Seraj-al-Akhbar, which became the first Pashto newspaper in Afghanistan. In 1977, Khan Roshan Khan wrote Tawarikh-e-Hafiz Rehmatkhani which contains the family trees and Pashtun tribal names. Some notable poets include Malak Ahmad Khan Yusufzai Abdul Ghani Khan, Afzal Khan Khattak, Ahmad Shah Durrani, Gaju Khan Kalu Khan Yousafzai Ajmal Khattak, Ghulam Muhammad Tarzi, Hamza Shinwari, Hanif Baktash, Khushal Khan Khattak, Nazo Tokhi, Pareshan Khattak, Rahman Baba, Shuja Shah Durrani, and Timur Shah Durrani.[288][289]

Media and arts

[edit]

Pashto media has expanded in the last decade, with a number of Pashto TV channels becoming available. Two of the popular ones are the Pakistan-based AVT Khyber and Pashto One. Pashtuns around the world, particularly those in Arab countries, watch these for entertainment purposes and to get latest news about their native areas.[290] Others are Afghanistan-based Shamshad TV, Radio Television Afghanistan, TOLOnews and Lemar TV, which has a special children's show called Baghch-e-Simsim. International news sources that provide Pashto programs include BBC Pashto and Voice of America.

Producers based in Peshawar have created Pashto-language films since the 1970s.

Pashtun performers remain avid participants in various physical forms of expression including dance, sword fighting, and other physical feats. Perhaps the most common form of artistic expression can be seen in the various forms of Pashtun dances. One of the most prominent dances is Attan, which has ancient roots. A rigorous exercise, Attan is performed as musicians play various native instruments including the dhol (drums), tablas (percussions), rubab (a bowed string instrument), and toola (wooden flute). With a rapid circular motion, dancers perform until no one is left dancing, similar to Sufi whirling dervishes. Numerous other dances are affiliated with various tribes notably from Pakistan including the Khattak Wal Atanrh (eponymously named after the Khattak tribe), Mahsood Wal Atanrh (which, in modern times, involves the juggling of loaded rifles), and Waziro Atanrh among others. A sub-type of the Khattak Wal Atanrh known as the Braghoni involves the use of up to three swords and requires great skill. Young women and girls often entertain at weddings with the Tumbal (Dayereh) which is an instrument.[291]

Sports

[edit]
Shahid Afridi, former captain of the Pakistan national cricket team

Both the Pakistan national cricket team and the Afghanistan national cricket team have Pashtun players.[292] One of the most popular sports among Pashtuns is cricket, which was introduced to South Asia during the early 18th century with the arrival of the British. Many Pashtuns have become prominent international cricketers, including Imran Khan, Shahid Afridi, Majid Khan, Misbah-ul-Haq, Younis Khan,[293] Umar Gul,[294] Junaid Khan,[295] Fakhar Zaman,[296] Mohammad Rizwan,[297] Usman Shinwari, Naseem Shah, Shaheen Afridi, Iftikhar Ahmed, Mohammad Wasim and Yasir Shah.[298] Australian cricketer Fawad Ahmed is of Pakistani Pashtun origin who has played for the Australian national team.[299]

Makha is a traditional archery sport in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, played with a long arrow (gheshai) having a saucer shaped metallic plate at its distal end, and a long bow.[300] In Afghanistan, some Pashtuns still participate in the ancient sport of buzkashi in which horse riders attempt to place a goat or calf carcass in a goal circle.[301][302][303]

Women

[edit]

Pashtun women are known to be modest and honourable because of their modest dressing.[304][305] The lives of Pashtun women vary from those who reside in the ultra-conservative rural areas to those found in urban centres.[306] At the village level, the female village leader is called "qaryadar". Her duties may include witnessing women's ceremonies, mobilizing women to practice religious festivals, preparing the female dead for burial, and performing services for deceased women. She also arranges marriages for her own family and arbitrates conflicts for men and women.[307] Though many Pashtun women remain tribal and illiterate, some have completed universities and joined the regular employment world.[306]

Malala Yousafzai, Pakistani activist for female education and the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize laureate

The decades of war and the rise of the Taliban caused considerable hardship among Pashtun women, as many of their rights have been curtailed by a rigid interpretation of Islamic law. The difficult lives of Afghan female refugees gained considerable notoriety with the iconic image Afghan Girl (Sharbat Gula) depicted on the June 1985 cover of National Geographic magazine.[308]

Modern social reform for Pashtun women began in the early 20th century, when Queen Soraya Tarzi of Afghanistan made rapid reforms to improve women's lives and their position in the family. She was the only woman to appear on the list of rulers in Afghanistan. Credited with having been one of the first and most powerful Afghan and Muslim female activists. Her advocacy of social reforms for women led to a protest and contributed to the ultimate demise of King Amanullah's reign in 1929.[309] Civil rights remained an important issue during the 1970s, as feminist leader Meena Keshwar Kamal campaigned for women's rights and founded the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) in the 1977.[310]

Pashtun women these days vary from the traditional housewives who live in seclusion to urban workers, some of whom seek or have attained parity with men.[306] But due to numerous social hurdles, the literacy rate remains considerably lower for them than for males.[311] Abuse against women is present and increasingly being challenged by women's rights organizations which find themselves struggling with conservative religious groups as well as government officials in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to a 1992 book, "a powerful ethic of forbearance severely limits the ability of traditional Pashtun women to mitigate the suffering they acknowledge in their lives."[312]

Further challenging the status quo, Vida Samadzai was selected as Miss Afghanistan in 2003, a feat that was received with a mixture of support from those who back the individual rights of women and those who view such displays as anti-traditionalist and un-Islamic. Some have attained political office in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[313] A number of Pashtun women are found as TV hosts, journalists and actors.[69] In 1942, Madhubala (Mumtaz Jehan), the Marilyn Monroe of India, entered the Bollywood film industry.[192] Bollywood blockbusters of the 1970s and 1980s starred Parveen Babi, who hailed from the lineage of Gujarat's historical Pathan community: the royal Babi Dynasty.[314] Other Indian actresses and models, such as Zarine Khan, continue to work in the industry.[193] During the 1980s many Pashtun women served in the ranks of the Afghan communist regime's Military. Khatol Mohammadzai served paratrooper during the Afghan Civil War and was later promoted to brigadier general in the Afghan Army.[315] Nigar Johar is a three-star general in the Pakistan Army, another Pashtun female became a fighter pilot in the Pakistan Air Force.[316] Pashtun women often have their legal rights curtailed in favour of their husbands or male relatives. For example, though women are officially allowed to vote in Pakistan, some have been kept away from ballot boxes by males.[306]

Notable people

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Explanatory notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Pashtuns, also known as Pakhtuns or Pathans, are an Eastern Iranian ethnic group primarily inhabiting southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan, where they constitute the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the second-largest in Pakistan. Their population is estimated at 50 to 60 million, with approximately 17 million in Afghanistan and over 40 million in Pakistan based on linguistic and ethnic self-identification data from recent censuses. They speak Pashto, an Eastern Iranian language of the Indo-European family, and are predominantly Sunni Muslims. Historically, Pashtuns trace their ethnogenesis to ancient Eastern Iranian tribes that migrated to the region, with linguistic and archaeological evidence supporting Indo-European roots rather than unsubstantiated folk claims of Semitic descent. Their tribal structure, organized into numerous confederacies and clans, has fostered a reputation for fierce independence and martial prowess, enabling them to resist centralized authority and foreign invasions throughout centuries, from the Mughal Empire to British colonial forces and Soviet incursions. This resilience stems from a decentralized social order that prioritizes kinship ties over state loyalty, often leading to persistent intertribal conflicts but also remarkable cohesion in external threats. Central to Pashtun identity is Pashtunwali, an unwritten code of honor emphasizing nanawatai (asylum for fugitives), melmastia (hospitality), badal (revenge), and ghayrat (defense of honor), which regulates conduct and dispute resolution independent of formal law, sometimes perpetuating cycles of vendetta while promoting generosity toward guests regardless of background. In modern politics, Pashtuns have dominated Afghan governance, with monarchs, presidents, and the Taliban—predominantly Pashtun—drawing legitimacy from ethnic Pashtun nationalism, though this has exacerbated tensions with other groups like Tajiks and Hazaras. In Pakistan, Pashtun communities influence border regions and urban centers, contributing to movements like the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement advocating against military operations, amid ongoing disputes over the Durand Line border. Their role in regional instability, including Taliban governance since 2021, underscores a causal link between tribal autonomy and resistance to imposed modernity, yielding both cultural preservation and challenges to nation-building.

Identity and Definitions

Ethnic Boundaries and Self-Perception

Pashtuns constitute an Iranic ethnic group whose identity is primarily delineated by proficiency in the Pashto language and adherence to Pashtunwali, the traditional tribal code emphasizing honor, hospitality, revenge, and independence. This code serves as a cultural benchmark distinguishing Pashtuns from adjacent populations, with self-identification reinforced through linguistic and normative conformity rather than rigid biological criteria. Worldwide estimates place the Pashtun population at approximately 50 to 60 million, predominantly concentrated in Afghanistan and Pakistan, though precise figures remain contested due to inconsistent census data and nomadic traditions. Ethnic boundaries are maintained through practices of endogamy, whereby marriages are preferentially arranged within Pashtun tribes or clans, and claims of patrilineal descent from eponymous ancestors, fostering exclusivity against groups like Tajiks—who lack comparable tribal genealogies—and Baloch, who share some pastoral traits but diverge in linguistic and customary frameworks. Pashtun self-perception prioritizes these socio-cultural markers over phenotypic uniformity, allowing for assimilation of non-Pashtun speakers who adopt Pashto and Pashtunwali, though such fluidity is rarer in core tribal heartlands. Internally, Pashtun identity exhibits significant diversity across regional variants, including Eastern Pashtuns in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Southern groups in Kandahar, and Northern communities in Afghanistan's Kunduz region, each associated with distinct Pashto dialects such as the Northeastern (Yusufzai-influenced) and Southwestern (Durrani-centric) forms. This heterogeneity precludes a monolithic self-conception, as subgroup loyalties often supersede broader ethnic unity, with variations in dialect, attire, and Pashtunwali interpretation reflecting geographic and historical divergences.

Tribal Confederations and Clans

The Pashtun social organization centers on a hierarchical tribal system, with confederations as the primary units encompassing multiple tribes, which further segment into clans known as khel or sub-tribes. This structure operates as a segmentary lineage system, where groups balance opposition and solidarity based on proximity of descent, facilitating temporary alliances against external threats while enabling internal feuds over resources or honor among closer kin. In this acephalous framework, authority emerges contextually through elders or maliks rather than centralized chiefs, with lineages tracing patrilineal descent to define membership and obligations. The major confederations include the Sarbani, encompassing tribes like the Durrani (also Abdali) and Yusufzai; the Ghilzai (Ghilji); the Bettani; and the Karlanri. Durrani tribes, predominant in southwestern Afghanistan, have historically supplied ruling elites, with subgroups such as Popalzai, Barakzai, and Alikozai forming key networks. Ghilzai, concentrated in eastern and southeastern regions, represent a rival power base, often associated with pastoralist and warrior elements, comprising branches like Hotaki and Tokhi that have clashed with Durrani over dominance. Yusufzai, a Sarbani offshoot, exert influence in northern areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier, with segments like Mandanr and Ilmzai maintaining autonomy through jirgas. These confederations account for the bulk of Pashtun populations, with Durrani and Ghilzai alone forming about two-thirds in Afghanistan. Identity hinges on genealogical claims, with clans segmenting into khel—extended patrilineal groups of 500 to 2,000 members—that serve as the basic units for conflict resolution and mobilization. Oral lore posits a common patrilineal origin from Qais Abdur Rashid, a purported Arab contemporary of Muhammad whose descendants branched into the four confederacies, though this serves more as mythic consolidation than verifiable history. Rivalries, such as between Durrani and Ghilzai, stem from this segmented opposition, where balanced hostilities prevent any single group from monopolizing power, reinforced by the system's emphasis on equivalence among lineages.

Geographic Distribution

Primary Homelands in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Pashtuns form the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, comprising an estimated 42% of the population according to assessments by international observers, with concentrations in the southern and eastern regions including Kandahar Province, where they constitute the majority, and Nangarhar Province, dominated by Pashtun communities alongside smaller Pashai and Tajik groups. In Pakistan, Pashtuns account for approximately 15-18% of the total population, primarily residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where they form the predominant ethnic group, and northern districts of Balochistan, such as those inhabited by tribes like the Kakar and Tareen. These demographics are often proxied by Pashto language speakers in censuses, with the 2017 Pakistan census recording Pashto as the mother tongue for about 15.4% of the populace. The Durand Line, delineated in 1893 through an agreement between British India and the Emirate of Afghanistan, serves as the international border separating these homelands, transecting Pashtun tribal territories and creating an artificial division across ethnic kin groups. This boundary has historically bisected clans and confederations, such as those in Waziristan and the Suleiman Mountains, complicating traditional cross-border movements integral to Pashtun social and economic patterns. Geographically, Pashtun primary territories encompass rugged Hindu Kush highlands, arid plateaus, and semi-desert lowlands, fostering a lifestyle centered on pastoralism and dryland agriculture. Rural settlements predominate, with urban centers like Kandahar and Peshawar serving as hubs, though nomadic herding persists among Kuchi subgroups who traverse seasonal routes in these arid zones for livestock grazing on sparse pastures. Such adaptations reflect the harsh environmental constraints, where over half the land remains suitable only for herding rather than intensive farming, sustaining tribal economies amid limited water resources and variable rainfall.

Presence in Iran, India, and Diaspora Communities

Pashtuns in Iran, estimated at 500,000 to 2.5 million individuals, are concentrated in eastern border provinces such as North Khorasan, Razavi Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchestan, where they form minority communities often bilingual in Pashto and Persian. These populations trace origins to 18th-century settlements by Pashtun tribes from Afghanistan, with significant augmentation from Afghan refugees fleeing conflicts starting with the 1979 Soviet invasion, many of whom integrated into local economies as laborers or herders while maintaining tribal affiliations. In India, ethnic Pashtuns, known as Pathans, descend primarily from migrations during the 11th to 18th centuries under Muslim rulers, establishing enclaves in Rohilkhand (present-day Uttar Pradesh) and urban centers like Delhi and Mumbai. The Rohilla Pathans, a notable subgroup, arrived in the early 18th century under leaders like Daud Khan and ruled semi-autonomously until British conquest in 1774, with remnants numbering around 40,000 in Bareilly District per the 1901 census. The 2011 Indian census recorded only 21,677 Pashto mother-tongue speakers, indicating a small core of linguistic continuity amid broader self-identification claims exceeding 3 million, which likely encompass partial descent or cultural adoption rather than unmixed ethnicity. Pashtun diaspora communities outside these regions expanded post-1979 due to war-driven displacement, forming notable groups in the United Arab Emirates (labor migrants in construction), the United Kingdom (via Pakistani Pashtun chains), and the United States (refugee resettlement programs). In the UAE, Southern Pashtuns maintain close-knit networks for economic survival, while in Western countries, second-generation members balance preservation of Pashtunwali customs and Pashto language against assimilation into multicultural societies, with community organizations aiding cultural retention. These expatriates, totaling hundreds of thousands globally, often navigate dual identities, with remittances sustaining homeland ties but generational shifts eroding traditional tribal structures.

Etymology and Historical Naming

Ancient and Medieval References

The Greek historian Herodotus, writing in the mid-5th century BCE, provides one of the earliest potential references to a people linked to the Pashtuns in his Histories. He describes the Pactyans (Παστυανοί) as a tribe inhabiting the Paktyike district on the eastern edge of the Achaemenid satrapy of Arachosia, contributing 8,000 cavalry to the Persian forces. This location aligns with southeastern Afghanistan and adjacent areas of modern Pakistan, prompting scholars to propose a phonetic and geographic connection to the Pashtuns based on the similarity between "Pactyans" and "Pakhtuns," though direct continuity remains speculative without linguistic or archaeological confirmation. In medieval Islamic sources, the term "Afghan" first appears as an exonym for Pashtun tribes during the 10th century CE. The Hudud al-'Alam, an anonymous Persian geographical compendium dated to 982–983 CE, records "Afghans" (Aughān) residing in a cluster of villages east of Gardez near the Sulaiman Mountains, portraying them as a distinct mountain-dwelling people engaged in pastoralism. This reference situates the Afghans in the tribal highlands corresponding to core Pashtun territories, distinguishing them from lowland or urban populations in the broader Persianate world. By the 11th century, the ethnonym "Afghan" recurs in works by scholars like Al-Biruni, who in his Indica (c. 1030 CE) notes Afghans as warlike tribes along the Indian frontier, reinforcing its application to Pashtun groups amid Ghaznavid and Ghurid expansions. These texts reflect external Persian and Arabic observers' perceptions, with "Afghan" likely deriving from a regional toponym or tribal name, gradually supplanting earlier classical designations. The endogenous terms "Pashtun" and "Pakhtun," rooted in self-identification via the Pashto language, emerge more prominently in later medieval Pashto poetry and tribal genealogies, signaling an internal evolution from exonyms.

Evolution of Terms like "Afghan" and "Pathan"

Following the foundation of the Durrani Empire in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Abdali, a Pashtun chieftain from the Abdali (later Durrani) tribe, the term "Afghan" expanded from its prior ethnic reference to Pashtuns to denote subjects of the multi-ethnic empire, which spanned modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of Iran and India, though it continued to evoke Pashtun dominance in governance and military structures. British colonial administrators in India, confronting Pashtun tribes across the Indus River, adopted "Pathan"—a Hindi term—as a distinct appellation for these groups to differentiate them from "Afghans" tied to the Kabul-centered kingdom, reflecting administrative needs amid frontier conflicts like the Anglo-Afghan Wars of 1839–1842 and 1878–1880. This nomenclature persisted in British India, where "Pathan" connoted martial Pashtun communities in regions like the North-West Frontier Province, while "Afghan" implied the sovereign state's inhabitants under Pashtun rulers. The Third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 culminated in the Treaty of Rawalpindi on August 8, 1919, granting Afghanistan complete independence from British influence over its foreign affairs and solidifying "Afghan" as the official demonym for all citizens of the newly sovereign nation, encompassing Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others, despite Pashtun-centric policies under King Amanullah Khan. This shift nationalized the term, decoupling it from exclusive ethnic usage and prompting resistance from non-Pashtun groups who viewed it as Pashtun imposition, while "Pashtun" endured in Iranic linguistic scholarship to denote the ethnic group and its Eastern Iranian language, Pashto, avoiding conflation with the state's broader polity. Contemporary transliteration variations—"Pushtun," "Pashtun," and "Pakhtun"—stem from phonological differences in Pashto dialects: southern varieties (e.g., Kandahari) render the ethnonym with a fricative /ʃ/ as "Pashtun," northern ones (e.g., Yusufzai) with a velar /x/ as "Pakhtun," and "Pushtun" as a legacy British romanization from the 19th century favoring the /ʃ/ approximation. These spellings fuel regional assertions of authenticity, with Pakistani Pashtuns often favoring "Pakhtun" to align with northern dialect prestige and Afghan southerners retaining "Pashtun," highlighting ongoing tensions between dialectal identity and standardized nomenclature in binational contexts.

Origins: Theories and Evidence

Linguistic and Archaeological Indicators

Pashto, the primary language of the Pashtuns, belongs to the Eastern Iranian subgroup of the Indo-Iranian branch within the Indo-European language family. It exhibits phonological and morphological features, such as lambdacism (the shift of *r to l in certain positions), characteristic of Eastern Iranian languages, distinguishing it from Western Iranian tongues like Persian. Linguistic evidence indicates descent from Old Iranian dialects akin to Avestan, with Proto-Eastern Iranian likely diverging from a common Iranian ancestor around the late 2nd millennium BCE, potentially near 1000 BCE, as Avestan texts composed circa 1500–400 BCE reflect an early Eastern Iranian stage. Archaeological correlates for proto-Pashtun ethnogenesis emphasize gradual cultural formation rather than a discrete origin point, centered in the Sulaiman Mountains straddling modern Pakistan and Afghanistan. This region, referenced in early medieval accounts as a homeland for groups termed "Afghans" by 982 CE, shows continuity in pastoral-nomadic material culture from Iron Age settlements onward. Migrations of Iranic nomads, particularly Indo-Scythians (Sakas), into northwestern South Asia from Central Asia between the 2nd century BCE and 1st century CE, introduced equestrian artifacts, burial mounds, and fortified sites consistent with later Pashtun tribal patterns, suggesting linguistic and cultural infusion in the Pashto-speaking corridor. The Gandhara Grave Culture (circa 1400–800 BCE), documented in cemeteries of the Swat Valley and adjacent areas, features terracotta urns, iron weapons, and flexed burials that align with early Indo-Iranian migratory phases, potentially laying groundwork for subsequent Iranic overlays in the same northwestern frontier. However, direct attribution to proto-Pashtuns is inferential, as the culture predates consolidated Pashtun identity and lacks unambiguous linguistic markers; reanalysis of these sites highlights diverse burial manipulations indicating fluid ethnic interactions rather than monolithic origins. Overall, these indicators support an ethnogenesis process in the Sulaiman uplands, blending indigenous substrates with Eastern Iranian linguistic and nomadic archaeological inputs over centuries, without evidence for a singular "cradle" migration event.

Anthropological and Migration Hypotheses

Anthropological hypotheses posit that Pashtun ethnogenesis resulted from multi-wave migrations of Indo-Iranian pastoralists originating from the Eurasian steppes, with initial influxes around 2000 BCE associated with the Sintashta and Andronovo cultures, which facilitated the spread of Eastern Iranian linguistic and cultural elements into the Afghanistan-Pakistan highlands. These early movements involved small-scale, gradual diffusions rather than mass conquests, leading to the assimilation of local Bronze Age populations and the establishment of proto-Iranian tribal structures in the region by the late 2nd millennium BCE. Subsequent overlays from nomadic Scythian and Saka groups, Eastern Iranian peoples active from the 9th century BCE to the 5th century CE, contributed to Pashtun tribal diversity through intermarriage and cultural exchange in areas like Sistan and the Hindu Kush, as evidenced by archaeological remains of kurgan burials and horse-riding artifacts consistent with steppe nomadism. These migrations reinforced pastoralist traditions but did not supplant earlier Indo-Iranian settlers, instead fostering segmented lineage systems observed in Pashtun social organization. Theories of Hephthalite (White Hun) admixture in the 5th century CE suggest limited integration of Central Asian nomadic elements into eastern Iranian tribes, particularly in Bactria and Kabul regions, but lack evidence for dominant replacement of local populations; instead, Hephthalite collapse around 565 CE led to absorption into existing frameworks without altering core Pashtun linguistic or kinship patterns. Contemporary anthropology rejects monolithic descent narratives, emphasizing diverse tribal fusions shaped by iterative migrations, environmental adaptations, and interactions with neighboring groups like Bactrians, over singular origin events. This view aligns with the absence of uniform oral traditions across Pashtun confederations, which instead reflect layered ethnogenesis.

Genetic Profile

Key DNA Studies and Haplogroups

Genetic studies of Pashtun populations reveal a predominant Y-chromosome haplogroup R1a1a (also denoted as R-M198 or R1a-M17), with frequencies ranging from 50% to 65% across samples from Afghanistan and Pakistan, associating them with broader Indo-Iranian paternal lineages shared among groups like Tajiks and Persians. A 2012 analysis of 190 Pashtun males from Afghanistan reported 62.1% R1a1a*-M198 overall (50% in northern samples, 65.8% in southern), alongside lower frequencies of L3-M357 (7.4%) and G2c-M377 (5.3%), with subclades like R1a-Z2125 noted in later reviews as common indicators of regional Indo-Iranian expansions. Similarly, a study of major Afghan ethnic groups found 51.02% R1a1a-M17 in Pashtuns, aligning closely with Tajiks (30.36%) and contrasting with East Asian-influenced C3-M217 in Hazaras and Uzbeks. Mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) profiles exhibit high diversity, reflecting South and Central Asian maternal admixtures with West Eurasian elements, rather than a uniform origin. In four Pashtun tribes (Bangash, Khattak, Mahsud, Orakzai) from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, analyzed in 2016, haplogroups showed 67% West Eurasian ancestry (e.g., HV 15%, U 17%) and 28% South Asian (M lineage), with overall diversity comparable to Central Asian and European populations. A 2022 study of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ethnic groups, including Pashtun tribes like Yousafzais and Jadoons, reported mtDNA haplotypic diversity of 0.970–0.994, comprising 50.8% West Eurasian (e.g., H, U7), 39% South Asian (e.g., U2, M3), and 10.2% East Eurasian lineages, indicating extensive gene flow and clustering with Central Asian populations. Minor markers like J1b (4%) in Khattak suggest limited Neolithic or Jewish-linked influxes, but these do not dominate. Autosomal DNA analyses underscore clinal variation and heterogeneity, with no evidence of a singular "pure" ancestry but rather a mosaic blending Central-South Asian components and affinities to neighboring Indo-Iranian groups. Pashtun samples display significant internal diversity, shaped by historical migrations and intermarriage, showing genetic continuity with Tajiks and Persians via shared R1a dominance while incorporating South Asian and minor East Asian elements. This variation increases from Pakistani lowlands to Afghan highlands, refuting monolithic origin claims and highlighting regional admixture over time. Y-STR profiling in tribes like Yousafzais confirms high haplotype uniqueness (89.52% in one sample of 146 males), supporting forensic and phylogenetic distinctions without elevated Jewish-specific markers like Cohen Modal Haplotype.

Implications for Ancestry and Diversity

Genetic analyses of Pashtun populations reveal a predominantly Iranic paternal ancestry, with haplogroup R1a1a-M17 comprising approximately 51% of Y-chromosomes, consistent with Bronze Age Indo-Iranian expansions into the region around 4,700 years ago. However, this base is hybridized with substantial South Asian contributions, including 20.41% of lineages from haplogroups L-M20, H-M69, and R2a-M124, indicating gene flow from ancient Indian populations and shared Neolithic roots dating back roughly 10,600 years. Autosomal studies further demonstrate admixture, featuring high Baloch (32-39%, proxy for ancient Iranic-Zagros farmer ancestry) and Caucasian components alongside South Indian (9-26%, reflecting Ancestral South Indian admixture) and minor Northeast European elements, underscoring a non-isolated ethnogenesis through regional interactions rather than purity. Evidence of Central Asian admixtures, including trace East Asian and Siberian autosomal signals (1-11% in sampled individuals), points to historical incorporations from Turkic or Mongol expansions, though these remain minor compared to the Iranic core and lack dominance in Y-chromosomes (e.g., rare C3-M217 at 2%). Such hybridity debunks isolationist narratives, as Pashtun genetics form a continuum with neighboring Tajiks and North Indians, reflecting endogamous tribal structures that preserved diversity amid invasions without wholesale replacement. Intra-Pashtun variation, marked by high Y-chromosomal diversity and limited gene flow, aligns with tribal divisions; for instance, southern groups like Durrani exhibit potentially elevated West and East Asian autosomal traces relative to northern Ghilzai, mirroring confederation-specific migration paths and endogamy rather than uniform ancestry. While DNA delineates this resilient admixture profile—enabling genetic continuity through absorption of external elements without erasure of core Iranic markers—it falls short in explicating cultural ethnogenesis, as shared haplogroups do not predict linguistic or social unity across diverse subclades and regions. This limitation underscores that genetic diversity informs biological ancestry but requires integration with linguistic and archaeological data for fuller causal reconstruction, avoiding overreliance on haplogroups alone for identity formation.

Historical Trajectory

Pre-Islamic and Early Islamic Eras

The regions historically linked to Pashtun tribes, including the Sulaiman Mountains and eastern Hindu Kush, featured pastoral and semi-nomadic groups that resisted imperial incursions during the pre-Islamic era. In 327 BCE, during Alexander the Great's campaign, Macedonian forces faced determined opposition from the Aspasii and Assakenoi tribes in the Swat and Buner areas—territories now predominantly Pashtun—in battles that caused heavy Greek casualties and nearly derailed the invasion. These encounters highlight the rugged terrain's role in sustaining local autonomy against centralized powers. Later, under the Kushan Empire (c. 30–375 CE), with its capital at Peshawar, indigenous tribes in the Kabul and Indus river basins integrated into the realm's administrative and military structures, benefiting from Silk Road commerce while retaining tribal identities. Tribal migrations intensified between the 7th and 10th centuries CE, as Pashtun groups expanded from southern strongholds like Waziristan into the Kabul River valley, displacing or assimilating prior Tajik and Hindu Shahi populations amid the fragmentation of Buddhist-Hindu kingdoms following initial Arab raids. The first documented reference to "Afghans" occurs in 982 CE, describing tribes in the Sulaiman range submitting to Ghaznavid forces. The early Islamic period marked accelerated Islamization and tribal consolidation under the Ghaznavid dynasty (977–1186 CE), centered in Ghazni. Founded by the Turkic slave-soldier Sebuktigin, the regime subjugated Afghan tribes through campaigns, incorporating them as auxiliaries in raids into India, while patronizing Hanafi Sunni institutions that facilitated conversions among hill folk. Ghaznavid armies, bolstered by local Pashtun levies including proto-Ghilji elements, extended influence eastward, laying groundwork for confederative structures. By the 12th century, under succeeding Ghurids—who drew support from Pashtun warriors—tribal precursors to major clans like the Ghilji asserted regional emirates, challenging Seljuq and Ghaznavid remnants before Mongol disruptions circa 1200 CE. This era solidified Pashtun adherence to Sunni Islam, blending pre-existing honor codes with sharia influences amid power vacuums.

Imperial Periods: Durrani Empire and Beyond

Ahmad Shah Durrani, born Ahmad Khan Abdali in 1722, established the Durrani Empire in 1747 after the assassination of Persian ruler Nader Shah, uniting Pashtun tribes under his leadership from the Abdali (later Durrani) confederacy in Kandahar. His forces rapidly expanded westward to capture Herat in 1748, incorporating regions of modern-day western Afghanistan, eastern Iran, and Khorasan, while eastward campaigns targeted Mughal territories, culminating in victories that extended influence to Delhi by 1757. The empire's peak under Ahmad Shah encompassed approximately 2 million square kilometers, including present-day Afghanistan, much of Pakistan, parts of northern India, and Central Asian khanates up to the Amu Darya River, sustained by a multi-ethnic army dominated by Pashtun cavalry and tribute from subjugated areas. Ahmad Shah's nine invasions of India between 1747 and 1769, including the decisive Third Battle of Panipat in 1761 against the Marathas, temporarily halted Sikh and Maratha advances but failed to secure permanent control over Punjab, reflecting the empire's reliance on mobile warfare rather than administrative consolidation. Upon his death in 1772, the throne passed to his son Timur Shah, who relocated the capital to Kabul in 1773 to centralize power amid growing Sikh incursions in the east and Persian threats in the west, yet faced persistent tribal revolts that strained imperial cohesion. Timur Shah's successors, including Zaman Shah and Mahmud Shah, presided over fragmentation as internal rivalries and external pressures—such as the rise of the Sikh Empire under Ranjit Singh, which annexed Multan in 1818—eroded peripheral territories by the early 19th century. The Durrani Empire's decline accelerated under the Sadozai dynasty's later rulers, giving way to the Barakzai clan under Dost Mohammad Khan, who consolidated control in Kabul by 1826 but contended with divided loyalties among Pashtun tribes. The First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842) marked a pivotal fracture, as British forces from India occupied Kabul in 1839 to install a puppet ruler, only to suffer catastrophic retreat in 1842, with nearly 16,000 troops and civilians killed, underscoring the limits of external imposition on Pashtun tribal autonomy. Subsequent conflicts, including the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), further diminished Afghan sovereignty, with British victories at Peiwar Kotal in 1878 and Kandahar in 1880 imposing the Treaty of Gandamak, which ceded foreign policy control while preserving nominal independence. In frontier regions like Waziristan and the North-West Frontier Province, known as Yaghistan—"land of the rebels"—Pashtun tribes mounted sustained guerrilla resistance against British encroachment through the late 19th century, exemplified by uprisings such as the 1897 Mohmand and Tirah campaigns, where tribal lashkars inflicted heavy casualties, embodying the Pashtunwali code's emphasis on ghayrat (honor) and badal (revenge) in defense of autonomy. These yaghi movements, often led by mullahs invoking jihad, prevented full pacification until the early 20th century, highlighting the enduring martial ethos that had propelled Durrani expansions but now fragmented imperial unity. By 1919, repeated wars had reduced the empire's remnants to a buffer state, reliant on tribal levies yet vulnerable to internal schisms.

Colonial Encounters and 20th-Century Conflicts

The Durand Line, established by an 1893 agreement between British India and Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan, demarcated the border dividing Pashtun-inhabited territories, placing approximately half of the Pashtun population under British control in what became Pakistan after 1947. This arbitrary division ignored longstanding tribal affiliations and nomadic patterns, fostering resentment among Pashtuns who viewed the line as an illegitimate imposition that fragmented their ethnic homeland. The agreement, signed under duress amid British imperial pressures following the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880), failed to quell Pashtun resistance, as tribes continued cross-border raids and uprisings against colonial authority in the North-West Frontier Province. Post-independence, the partition of British India in 1947 intensified Pashtun grievances, prompting Afghanistan to reject the Durand Line's legitimacy and advocate for Pashtun self-determination through the Pashtunistan movement. Led by figures like Abdul Ghaffar Khan in Pakistan and supported by Afghan governments until the 1970s, the movement demanded either unification of Pashtun areas or an independent state, resulting in skirmishes and diplomatic tensions, including Afghanistan's vote against Pakistan's UN admission in 1947. Pakistani efforts to integrate Pashtun regions via "One Unit" policies and military operations in the 1950s–1960s suppressed autonomy aspirations but did not eradicate irredentist sentiments. The Saur Revolution on April 27–28, 1978, saw the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist-Leninist group, overthrow President Mohammed Daoud Khan in a coup led by the Khalq faction. The PDPA's radical land reforms, women's rights initiatives, and anti-Islamic policies alienated conservative rural Pashtuns, sparking widespread uprisings in Pashtun-majority provinces like Kunar and Paktia by mid-1978. The Soviet Union invaded on December 24, 1979, deploying over 100,000 troops to prop up the faltering PDPA regime after the assassination of leader Hafizullah Amin, but encountered fierce mujahideen resistance predominantly from Pashtun tribes. Pashtun mujahideen groups, such as those under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Yunis Khalis, received arms and training via Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in a U.S.-backed Operation Cyclone that supplied Stinger missiles from 1986, contributing to the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989 after an estimated 1–2 million Afghan deaths, mostly Pashtun civilians. Following the fall of PDPA President Najibullah's government in April 1992, a civil war erupted among mujahideen factions, with Pashtun-led Hezb-e-Islami clashing against Tajik-dominated Jamiat-e-Islami and Uzbek forces, leading to the destruction of Kabul and displacement of over 2 million people by 1994. In this vacuum, the Taliban emerged in Kandahar in 1994 as a predominantly Pashtun movement of religious students (talibs) from Pakistani madrasas, initially backed by ISI to curb warlordism and restore order. Led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban rapidly expanded, capturing Kabul in September 1996 and controlling 90% of Afghanistan by 2001, enforcing strict Pashtunwali-influenced governance amid ongoing factional strife.

Language

Pashto Linguistics and Dialects

Pashto possesses a complex phonological system characterized by retroflex consonants, including voiceless /ʈ/ and voiced /ɖ/, alongside aspirated stops such as /pʰ/, /tʰ/, /ʈʰ/, /kʰ/, and their voiced counterparts /bʱ/, /dʱ/, /ɖʱ/, /gʱ/. These features distinguish Pashto from neighboring Iranian languages, with retroflex stops exhibiting shorter voice onset times compared to other places of articulation. The language also includes fricatives like /x/ and /ɣ/, and a series of sibilants, contributing to its phonetic richness. Grammatically, Pashto employs a split-ergative alignment, particularly evident in past and perfect tenses, where transitive subjects receive ergative case marking if the action is volitional, as in ma xər wowaxo ("I beat the donkey"). Non-volitional agents, however, take genitive case, such as zama na ghwa wraka shwa ("I have become separated from a cow"). Nouns inflect for four cases—direct, oblique, ablative, and vocative—with gender and number agreement influencing verbs and adjectives. Pashto dialects form a continuum broadly classified into Northern (Yusufzai, spoken in Peshawar and Swat regions) and Southern (Kandahari, prevalent in Kandahar and Quetta areas) varieties, with mutual intelligibility ranging from 72% to 89% between them based on recorded text testing. Central dialects, found in Waziristan and Bannu, cluster at around 80% lexical similarity internally but diverge more from Northern and Southern forms. Waneci, spoken near Harnai in Baluchistan, stands as an outlier with only 71-75% lexical similarity to standard Pashto varieties and limited comprehension by Pashto speakers, leading some linguists to classify it separately. The vocabulary of Pashto incorporates substantial borrowings, particularly from Persian (e.g., Hindustan for India) and Arabic, which introduced ten additional phonemes adapted to Pashto pronunciation, influencing religious and administrative terms. Post-colonial influences added English loanwords for technology and trade, such as computer, internet, and mobile. These integrations reflect historical contacts, with Persian and Arabic loans comprising a significant portion due to cultural and Islamic exchanges.

Script, Standardization, and Usage

Pashto employs a modified Perso-Arabic script featuring 44 letters, including four unique to its retroflex and aspirated sounds absent in Persian or standard Arabic alphabets. This writing system, adapted following the Islamic conquests, saw dedicated development for Pashto phonemes by the 16th century through scholars like Bayazid Pir Roshan, with broader institutional use emerging in the 19th century via military and administrative reforms in the region. Standardization initiatives gained momentum in the 20th century, particularly in Afghanistan, where Pashto was designated the national language by royal decree on August 22, 1936, prompting efforts to unify orthography and vocabulary amid dialectal diversity. The Pashto Adabi Tolana (Pashto Academy), established in 1937 under King Zahir Shah's government, spearheaded literary research, dictionary compilation, and script reforms to foster a standardized form, though persistent Afghan-Pakistani orthographic divergences—such as vowel notations and loanword adaptations—have limited full unification. In Afghanistan, Pashto's usage reflects functional diglossia alongside Dari Persian, with Dari dominating formal administration and literature due to its earlier standardization, while Pashto prevails in tribal and regional contexts, education mandates since 1936, and official bilingual policies under the 2004 constitution. This dynamic has fueled ethnic-linguistic tensions, as Pashto's less codified prestige form competes for institutional parity despite promotion campaigns. Radio and television broadcasting have been pivotal in sustaining Pashto's oral primacy, with state outlets like Radio Afghanistan transmitting in standardized varieties since the 1920s and expanding post-1936 to reach rural audiences, thereby bridging script-based literacy gaps and reinforcing spoken norms over written uniformity. In Pakistan, provincial media and private channels similarly prioritize Pashto content, aiding dialect preservation amid Urdu dominance. Pashtun diaspora communities, particularly in Europe, North America, and Australia, frequently resort to Roman transliterations for informal writing, as many second-generation speakers lack fluency in Perso-Arabic script and adapt Latin systems for digital communication and social media. Standardized Romanization schemes, such as those outlined by the UK Foreign Office, facilitate this but vary, contributing to non-uniform representations outside traditional script domains.

Social Structure

Pashtunwali: The Honor Code

Pashtunwali constitutes the unwritten ethical and behavioral code central to Pashtun tribal identity, regulating interpersonal and communal interactions in environments lacking formal state governance. This code, predating Islamic influences and persisting across Pashtun-inhabited regions, emphasizes self-reliance and collective enforcement through social sanctions rather than codified laws. Adherence is voluntary yet binding, with non-compliance risking ostracism or loss of status within the tribe. The core tenets include melmastia, obligating unconditional hospitality and protection for guests, irrespective of their enmity toward the host, to uphold communal generosity. Nanawatai extends asylum to fugitives or enemies seeking refuge, prohibiting harm while under protection and often facilitating reconciliation. Badal mandates retaliation or compensation for offenses to restore equilibrium, viewing inaction as dishonor. Ghayrat demands vigilant defense of personal, familial, and tribal honor against perceived insults or threats. In decentralized tribal settings, Pashtunwali functions as an informal governance mechanism, promoting intra-tribal loyalty by linking individual reputation to code compliance and deterring defection through the threat of perpetual enmity or exclusion. It sustains cohesion amid resource scarcity and external pressures by prioritizing collective defense over individual gain, as evidenced in historical resistance to centralized authority. Critics note that Pashtunwali's emphasis on badal sustains protracted vendettas, escalating minor disputes into multi-generational feuds that undermine stability in areas interfacing with state institutions. Its rigidity in stateless contexts clashes with modern legal frameworks, complicating conflict resolution where tribal autonomy erodes under governmental oversight. Despite these limitations, empirical observations in Pashtun regions affirm its role in maintaining order absent formal policing.

Jirga System and Tribal Governance

The jirga represents a decentralized tribal governance mechanism among Pashtuns, consisting of assemblies of male elders who convene to adjudicate disputes through consensus, frequently overriding or paralleling weak state judicial systems. These councils, drawn from respected community figures valued for their perceived impartiality and knowledge of customary norms, handle civil matters such as land allocation, inheritance, and commercial disagreements, as well as criminal cases including homicides and thefts. Decisions emerge from deliberative discussions aiming for unanimity, with binding enforcement reliant on communal pressure and social ostracism for non-compliance rather than coercive state apparatus. In resolving blood feuds, a prevalent source of prolonged violence in Pashtun society, jirgas negotiate compensatory payments termed diya or blood money, which substitute for retaliatory killings and thereby interrupt cycles of vengeance that can span generations. This approach has demonstrated practical utility in regions with limited governmental reach, such as Pakistan's former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where jirgas resolved thousands of disputes annually prior to formal integration efforts, fostering relative stability by aligning resolutions with local power equilibria. Empirical observations in eastern Afghanistan, including Khost province, indicate a measurable reduction in active feuds attributable to jirga-mediated diya agreements, underscoring their role in de-escalating conflicts where formal courts fail due to corruption or inaccessibility. Notwithstanding these strengths, jirgas are susceptible to structural biases favoring dominant clans, as influential elders or those aligned with powerful lineages can sway outcomes toward partiality, undermining claims of neutrality and perpetuating inequalities in dispute settlements. Such dynamics arise from the absence of formalized evidentiary standards or external oversight, allowing wealth, kinship ties, or intimidation to distort consensus, particularly in inter-tribal cases where weaker parties face disproportionate burdens. The jirga's prominence has waned with accelerating urbanization in Pashtun-populated areas, which fragments tribal networks as migrants to cities like Peshawar or Kabul prioritize state institutions over elder-led forums, eroding the social cohesion essential for enforcement. Concurrently, Taliban governance since 2021 has accelerated this marginalization through centralized imposition of sharia-based courts, which supplant jirgas with ideologically uniform judicial bodies under clerical control, viewing traditional assemblies as insufficiently aligned with their interpretive monopoly. This shift reflects a broader tension between customary decentralization and authoritarian centralization, with jirgas persisting mainly in peripheral rural enclaves resistant to such reforms.

Culture and Customs

Religion: Sunni Islam and Sufi Influences

Prior to their conversion to Islam, Pashtuns practiced Hinduism and Buddhism, considering music sacred and employing it in many religious rituals. Today, a small Hindu Pashtun minority persists. The vast majority of Pashtuns follow Sunni Islam within the Hanafi school of jurisprudence, which emphasizes rational interpretation of Islamic law and has shaped their religious practices since the early medieval period. This adherence aligns with broader South Asian and Central Asian Sunni traditions, where Hanafi fiqh predominates due to historical Ottoman and Mughal influences. A notable strain within this framework is the Deobandi movement, founded in 1866 in Deoband, India, as a response to British colonial rule and perceived religious laxity; it promotes scripturalist revivalism and has become particularly resonant among Pashtuns, fostering stricter orthodoxy that critiques folk practices and, in some cases, underpins militant ideologies. Deobandi madrasas, numbering over 20,000 in Pakistan alone by the early 21st century, have educated generations of Pashtun clergy, amplifying this school's emphasis on tawhid (monotheism) over intermediary veneration. Counterbalancing this orthodoxy are Sufi influences, especially from the Naqshbandi order, which traces its roots to the 14th-century founder Baha-ud-Din Naqshband and stresses silent dhikr (remembrance of God) alongside adherence to sharia; among Pashtuns, Naqshbandi pirs (spiritual guides) have historically fostered community cohesion by mediating between tribal autonomy and Islamic norms, often earning patronage from Pashtun rulers since the 18th century. This mystical strand integrates esoteric knowledge with everyday piety, distinguishing Pashtun Islam from more rigid Salafi variants elsewhere. Elements of syncretism endure, particularly in the veneration of saints' shrines (ziyarat), where Pashtuns seek intercession—a practice rooted in Sufi hagiography but echoing pre-Islamic reverence for sacred landscapes and ancestors, as seen in rituals at sites like those of the Kakari subtribe blending invocations with local folklore. Such customs persist despite Deobandi critiques labeling them bid'ah (innovation), highlighting tensions between puritan revivalism and enduring mystical-tribal fusions in Pashtun religious identity.

Literature, Poetry, and Oral Traditions

Pashtun expressive traditions emphasize poetry as a medium for articulating the warrior ethos, tribal autonomy, and adherence to Pashtunwali, often through oral forms that prioritize brevity, rhythm, and invocation of honor (nang), revenge (badal), and independence. These works, recited in gatherings or during conflicts, reinforce collective identity amid historical invasions, blending martial valor with lyrical depth to inspire resistance and unity. Khushal Khan Khattak (1613–1689), a Khattak tribal chief and warrior who led revolts against Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, authored over 45,000 verses in Pashto, including ghazals that glorified Pashtun sovereignty and critiqued subjugation. His poetry, such as ghazals rallying tribes for confederation—"Better to die like a warrior than live enslaved"—fuses personal defiance with calls for ethnic solidarity, embedding Pashtunwali's emphasis on bravery and self-rule while influencing later anti-colonial sentiments. Landays, anonymous two-line folk poems typically of nine syllables in the first line and thirteen in the second, originate from Pashtun women's oral compositions dating back at least 1,000 years and convey erotic longing, maternal grief, and subtle rebellion against patriarchal constraints. Examples like "May God destroy your outsized rifle / It has turned my warrior love to a widow's share" juxtapose warfare's toll with defiant sensuality, recited covertly at weddings or mourning rituals to voice unfiltered emotions under Pashtunwali's honor code. Tappas, succinct quatrains or single-rhymed verses sung improvisationally, distill Pashtunwali tenets into proverbial wisdom on hospitality (melmastia), fortitude, and pastoral resilience, often performed at jirgas or celebrations to affirm social norms. Rooted in pre-Islamic oral heritage, they evoke heroic vignettes—such as a shepherd's vigilance mirroring tribal vigilance—and sustain cultural continuity through everyday recitation.

Arts, Media, Sports, and Daily Life

Buzkashi, a rugged equestrian sport prevalent among Pashtuns in Afghanistan and northern Pakistan, involves teams of horseback riders competing to seize a decapitated goat or calf carcass from the center of the field and deliver it to a designated goal, often amid intense physical confrontations. The game tests riders' strength, equestrian skill, and strategic maneuvering, with matches lasting hours and drawing large crowds during winter seasons. It embodies Pashtun ideals of valor and endurance, tracing origins to nomadic raiding practices centuries ago, though formalized rules vary by region—such as the Afghan "Tulpar" style emphasizing individual prowess over team play. The sport faced suppression under Taliban governance from 1996 to 2001, when such public gatherings were curtailed, but revived post-2001 with government sponsorship of national tournaments. The Attan dance, a communal Pashtun tradition performed to rhythmic drumming, unites dancers in an expanding circle with synchronized spins, claps, and sword-wielding motions symbolizing military readiness and tribal solidarity. Dating to pre-Islamic eras in Afghanistan's mountainous regions, it features groups of up to dozens forming human chains that rotate clockwise, accelerating to represent battle formations or joyous defiance. Commonly enacted at weddings, festivals like Nowruz, and victory celebrations, Attan reinforces social bonds and cultural identity, with variations incorporating rifles for martial emphasis in rural settings. In Pashtun-majority areas, radio endures as the dominant medium due to widespread illiteracy and rugged terrain limiting television access, with stations like Radio Kabul—established in 1927—broadcasting Pashto-language news, folk music, and poetry recitals reaching rural households by the millions. Cinema, once vibrant with Pashto films produced in Peshawar and Kabul from the 1940s onward, sharply declined after the 1979 Soviet invasion and Taliban bans, which shuttered theaters and confiscated equipment, reducing output to underground or exile productions. Daily attire among Pashtun men features the shalwar kameez—a loose knee-length tunic paired with baggy trousers—often topped with a waistcoat and turban (lungi or pakol hat), adapted for mobility in pastoral or mountainous lifestyles. Cuisine emphasizes hearty, meat-based dishes like Chapli kebab, spicy minced beef patties grilled with pomegranate seeds and coriander, originating in Peshawar's Pashtun markets as a staple for communal meals. Traditional meals revolve around rice pilafs (e.g., kabuli pulao with lamb and carrots) and naan bread, prepared over open fires to sustain nomadic or agrarian routines.

Gender Roles and Family Dynamics

Traditional Norms under Pashtunwali

Pashtun society under Pashtunwali organizes family life around a patrilineal kinship system, where descent, inheritance, and social identity trace exclusively through male lines, forming hierarchical segments from nuclear families to broader tribal confederacies. Extended families typically reside patrilocally, with brides relocating to the husband's natal household upon marriage, fostering residential unity across three to four generations under the authority of the senior male patriarch. This structure reinforces clan cohesion, as household decisions prioritize collective honor and resource pooling for survival in rugged terrains. Polygyny features prominently among affluent or influential males, enabling multiple wives to forge alliances between kin groups and expand familial networks, in line with Pashtunwali's emphasis on strategic kinship ties. Male guardianship, embodied in the principle of namus, mandates men as protectors of female relatives' conduct and safety, linking a man's personal standing to the perceived purity and seclusion upheld within the household. Breaches in this guardianship demand retribution to restore equilibrium, underscoring Pashtunwali's integration of familial roles into broader codes of revenge and hospitality. Large family sizes, often yielding 5 to 7 children per union, sustain clan demographics and military capacity, as numerical superiority bolsters tribal resilience against rivals in feuds or raids. This pro-natalist norm aligns with Pashtunwali's valorization of progeny as extensions of male lineage, ensuring perpetual vendettas and alliances through generational continuity.

Status of Women: Achievements and Restrictions

Pashtun women have occasionally achieved prominence in historical military contexts, as exemplified by Malalai of Maiwand, who during the Battle of Maiwand on July 27, 1880, rallied retreating Afghan forces against British troops by replacing a fallen flag-bearer and chanting motivational verses, ultimately dying in combat and contributing to the Afghan victory. Such instances remain exceptional, reflecting rare breakthroughs in a predominantly male domain of warfare under Pashtunwali's emphasis on male protection of the group. In rural economies, Pashtun women contribute through herding livestock, agricultural labor, and handicrafts such as embroidery, weaving, and carpet-making, which provide supplementary family income and preserve cultural traditions amid limited formal employment opportunities. These roles, often home-based, align with segregation norms while supporting household resilience in pastoral and agrarian settings. Purdah enforces strict gender segregation in Pashtun society, confining women primarily to domestic spheres and limiting public interactions to preserve family honor (ghairat), a practice rooted in tribal customs rather than solely Islamic doctrine. This seclusion restricts mobility and social participation, adapting to environments of chronic insecurity where external threats necessitate protective isolation. Access to education for Pashtun women has historically lagged, with rural literacy rates in Pakistan around 25% for girls and completion of lower secondary school at 44.7% in Afghanistan as of 2019, though post-2021 Taliban policies barred over 1 million girls beyond primary levels, reversing prior incremental gains. In Pakistan's Pashtun areas, conservative influences have similarly curbed enrollment, tying female schooling to familial honor concerns. Honor killings, where women are murdered by kin for perceived violations of chastity or family reputation, occur frequently in Pashtun-dominated regions, with estimates of several hundred annually in Pakistan's tribal areas and Afghanistan, often underreported due to jirga approvals or police complicity. These acts enforce Pashtunwali's nanawatai and badal principles but impose severe costs on female autonomy. Traditional restrictions, while limiting individual agency, foster family and tribal stability in volatile borderlands, where extended kin networks under Pashtunwali have sustained cohesion amid invasions and insurgencies, contrasting with individualism imported from Western models that correlate with higher familial fragmentation in urbanizing Pakistani Pashtun communities. Empirical patterns of low divorce and high fertility in these structures suggest adaptive functionality over ideological critiques, prioritizing group survival in resource-scarce terrains.

Political and Military Influence

Dominance in Afghan Politics

The Durrani Empire, established in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, a Pashtun military commander from the Abdali tribe, marked the foundation of the modern Afghan state through unification of Pashtun tribes and extension of control over diverse regions and ethnic groups. This Pashtun-led monarchy persisted until 1973, with rulers from Pashtun dynasties maintaining central authority via tribal alliances, military campaigns, and administrative favoritism toward Pashtun elites, which helped forge a cohesive polity amid Afghanistan's ethnic fragmentation. Successive kings, including Dost Mohammad Khan (r. 1826–1863 and 1863–1869) and Habibullah Khan (r. 1901–1919), reinforced Pashtun dominance by prioritizing Pashtun recruitment in the army and court, enabling governance over non-Pashtun populations like Tajiks and Hazaras through a balance of coercion and co-optation. Following the 1973 coup, Mohammed Daoud Khan, a Pashtun and former prime minister, abolished the monarchy and pursued policies emphasizing Pashtun national identity, including advocacy for Pashtun cultural promotion and territorial claims aligned with ethnic interests, to strengthen state cohesion during modernization efforts. Daoud's regime (1973–1978) viewed the military as a key instrument for embedding Pashtun influence in governance, though these initiatives strained relations with non-Pashtun regions and contributed to internal unrest, such as the 1975 Panjshir uprising led by Tajik forces. The Taliban's capture of Kabul in 1996 established a Pashtun-dominated emirate that controlled much of Afghanistan until 2001, with leadership and core policies reflecting the group's predominantly Pashtun composition and tribal origins in southern Afghanistan. Regaining power in August 2021, the Taliban has consolidated Pashtun centrality by appointing Pashtuns to the overwhelming majority of cabinet and ministerial posts, including supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada and key figures like Mullah Hasan Akhund as prime minister, sidelining other ethnicities in decision-making structures. Pashtun political preeminence has achieved relative unity in Afghanistan's ethnically diverse society—where Pashtuns comprise the largest group at approximately 40–50% of the population—by leveraging historical state-building precedents and tribal networks to impose centralized rule, averting fragmentation seen in prior non-Pashtun-led interim governments. Critics, however, contend that this dominance perpetuates marginalization of minorities, including systematic exclusion of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras from power, exacerbating grievances through ethnic nepotism and policies favoring Pashtun cultural norms over inclusive representation. Such asymmetries have fueled accusations of hegemony, though proponents argue they reflect demographic realities rather than deliberate suppression.

Role in Pakistan and Cross-Border Dynamics


Pashtuns constitute approximately 15.4% of Pakistan's population, numbering around 38 million as of recent estimates, with the majority residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and adjacent areas. Under British colonial rule, the Frontier Crimes Regulation of 1901 governed Pashtun tribal regions through indirect administration, empowering political agents to enforce tribal customs via jirgas while applying collective punishments such as fines and blockades for offenses. This system preserved Pashtun autonomy but limited formal legal integration until its partial reforms and eventual repeal in 2018.
Following Pakistan's independence in 1947, integration efforts intensified with the One Unit scheme implemented in 1955, which amalgamated the North-West Frontier Province—predominantly Pashtun—with other western regions into a single West Pakistan unit to counterbalance East Pakistan's demographic weight. Pashtun leaders, including Abdul Ghaffar Khan, opposed the measure for eroding provincial autonomy and ethnic representation, viewing it as a centralizing imposition that diluted regional identities. The scheme dissolved in 1970, restoring provinces, yet it marked a shift toward administrative assimilation, incorporating Pashtun areas into national governance structures despite persistent tribal governance elements. In contemporary Pakistan, tensions arise from perceived state overreach, exemplified by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), founded in February 2018 after the extrajudicial killing of Pashtun student Naqeebullah Mehsud by police in Karachi. PTM organized nonviolent protests against alleged military abuses, including enforced disappearances and profiling of Pashtuns during counterinsurgency operations, drawing thousands to rallies in cities like Lahore on April 22, 2018. The government banned PTM as a proscribed organization on October 7, 2024, under anti-terrorism laws, citing threats to security and accusing it of fomenting ethnic division, a move criticized by human rights groups for stifling dissent. Economic migration has driven millions of Pashtuns from rural tribal areas to urban centers like Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad since the mid-20th century, seeking employment in construction, transport, and informal sectors amid limited local opportunities. This influx has fostered expansive Pashtun kinship networks and ethnic enclaves, bolstering community solidarity and economic remittances back to villages, while contributing to urban labor dynamics. Cross-border dynamics stem from the 1893 Durand Line, which bisects Pashtun territories between Pakistan and Afghanistan, sustaining familial and tribal ties that transcend state boundaries but complicate bilateral relations through shared cultural and migratory flows.

Islamist Movements: Taliban and TTP

The Taliban, predominantly composed of Pashtuns, emerged in 1994 in Kandahar, Afghanistan, as a movement blending Deobandi Islamic scholarship from Pakistani madrasas with elements of the Pashtunwali tribal code, emphasizing strict moral enforcement alongside customary notions of honor and hospitality. This fusion appealed to Pashtun grievances amid post-Soviet chaos, positioning the group as restorers of order through an austere interpretation of Sharia law adapted to local tribal dynamics. By 1996, the Taliban had captured Kabul, establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which they recaptured on August 15, 2021, following the U.S. withdrawal, thereby restoring their emirate governance structure. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), formed in December 2007 as an umbrella alliance of militant groups in Pakistan's Pashtun tribal areas, draws from similar Deobandi roots but directs its insurgency against the Pakistani state, seeking to impose Sharia and expel perceived foreign influences from Pashtun lands. Predominantly Pashtun, the TTP has framed its operations as resistance to state encroachments on tribal autonomy, conducting over 1,000 attacks in the first half of 2025 alone. By mid-2025, the group intensified efforts to rebrand itself from a jihadist outfit to a defender of Pashtun ethnic interests, invoking traditional assemblies like jirgas to legitimize its stance against Pakistani military operations. These movements have exploited security vacuums in Pashtun-majority regions, with the Taliban's 2021 return emboldening TTP resurgence through shared ideological ties and sanctuary in Afghanistan. However, internal fractures persist, notably rivalries with ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), which has drawn defectors from both groups by criticizing their nationalist Pashtun leanings as deviations from global caliphate goals, leading to clashes that undermine unified militant fronts. The Taliban's campaigns against ISIS-K have reduced the latter's territorial hold but highlight ongoing schisms within the broader Islamist ecosystem.

Contemporary Challenges and Controversies

Border Clashes and Pashtun Nationalism (2020s Developments)

In October 2025, border clashes between Pakistani forces and the Taliban escalated significantly, triggered by Pakistan's ongoing efforts to complete fencing along the disputed Durand Line to curb cross-border militancy. On October 9, Pakistani airstrikes targeted Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) positions in Afghan provinces including Khost, Paktika, and Kandahar, prompting Taliban retaliation with ground assaults on Pakistani border posts. These incidents, occurring across at least seven locations along the 2,600 km frontier, resulted in dozens of casualties, with Afghanistan claiming 58 Pakistani soldiers killed in retaliatory operations on October 12, while Pakistan reported 23 of its personnel lost and over 200 Taliban fighters eliminated. The fighting led to the temporary closure of key border crossings, disrupting trade and highlighting the fragility of bilateral relations. The Taliban government explicitly rejected Pakistan's fencing initiatives, framing them as violations of Pashtun territorial integrity and reaffirming their non-recognition of the Durand Line, a 19th-century demarcation they view as an artificial colonial divide separating ethnic kin. This rhetoric aligns with longstanding irredentist sentiments, revived in the 2020s by groups like the TTP, which has rebranded itself as a defender of Pashtun societal interests against perceived Pakistani encroachments, invoking tribal jirgas and nationalist appeals to justify operations from Afghan soil. Similarly, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) in Pakistan has amplified cross-border grievances, protesting military operations and fencing as assaults on Pashtun autonomy, though Pakistani authorities banned the PTM in October 2024 amid accusations of fomenting unrest. These developments underscore a resurgence of Pashtunistan-oriented nationalism, emphasizing ethnic unity over state boundaries. Amid the violence, multiple truces were brokered, including a temporary ceasefire announced on October 15 following heavy exchanges, and a broader agreement on October 19 during talks in Doha, Qatar, though Pakistani officials expressed skepticism about its durability, warning of potential "open war" if TTP attacks persisted. Casualty figures from the October clashes included significant civilian losses, with UN monitors reporting over 40 Afghan non-combatants killed, reflecting the enduring tribal interconnections that span the border and complicate enforcement efforts. These episodes illustrate how Pashtun kinship networks sustain informal cross-border mobility, often overriding state controls and fueling cycles of retaliation.

Militancy, Terrorism, and Internal Conflicts

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a predominantly Pashtun militant group, conducted a significant portion of Pakistan's 521 terrorist attacks in 2024, contributing to 852 fatalities amid a 23% rise in violence from the prior year. These operations, concentrated in Pashtun-majority regions like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and former Federally Administered Tribal Areas, targeted security forces and civilians, reflecting TTP's strategy of asymmetric warfare against the Pakistani state. Concurrently, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), drawing recruits from Pashtun areas in Afghanistan and Pakistan, executed high-profile assaults, including bombings in eastern Afghanistan and cross-border incursions, exacerbating instability in Pashtun heartlands. Persistent tribal rivalries among Pashtuns, notably between the Ghilzai (often providing rank-and-file fighters) and Durrani (historically aligned with state elites), have shaped militant alignments and internal fractures. In modern conflicts, Ghilzai dominance within Taliban structures has fueled tensions with Durrani factions, leading to sporadic clashes over resource control and leadership in insurgency networks, independent of external influences. The opium trade sustains Pashtun-linked militants, with the Taliban extracting taxes on cultivation and trafficking in Afghanistan's Pashtun south and east, generating revenue estimated at tens of millions annually to fund operations. Similar extortion in Pakistan's tribal belts bolsters TTP warlords, embedding narcotics into militant economies despite Taliban bans on poppy farming, which have proven unevenly enforced. Claims that U.S. drone strikes in Pashtun regions from 2004–2018 fueled radicalization lack strong empirical support; surveys and data from Pakistan indicate minimal blowback, with strikes correlating to reduced militant capabilities rather than recruitment surges. Pre-existing ideological and tribal drivers, including Salafi-jihadist appeals and Pashtun resistance to central authority, better explain militancy's persistence, as violence predated intensified drone campaigns.

Human Rights Critiques and Cultural Defenses

International human rights organizations have characterized the Taliban's policies toward women since their 2021 takeover as "gender apartheid," citing systematic bans on female secondary and higher education, restrictions on employment in most sectors, and prohibitions on public participation without male guardianship. These measures have deprived approximately 1.4 million girls of schooling as of 2024, exacerbating Afghanistan's already low female adult literacy rate of 22.6% in 2022, with Pashtun-dominated rural and tribal regions showing even lower figures around 20-30%. In Pakistan's former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), predominantly Pashtun, female literacy hovers at 7.8%, reflecting similar cultural constraints on girls' education. Critics, including UN experts and advocacy groups, argue these restrictions violate universal human rights standards, fostering dependency, economic stagnation, and intergenerational illiteracy that hinder societal development. However, such assessments often originate from institutions with Western liberal frameworks, potentially undervaluing adaptive cultural mechanisms in high-anarchy environments where formal state enforcement is absent or predatory. Defenders of Pashtunwali, the Pashtun tribal code emphasizing honor (nang), hospitality (melmastia), and revenge (badal), contend it sustains social stability and deterrence in ungoverned tribal zones, where centralized liberal governance has repeatedly collapsed into corruption or civil war. Empirical observations indicate that despite elevated violence rates, Pashtun areas exhibit structured social order through customary dispute resolution, contrasting with broader Afghan instability post-2001 interventions that prioritized imported rights models over local realities. Lower female literacy in these zones correlates with maintained tribal cohesion and reduced chaos from external impositions, as Pashtunwali prioritizes collective survival and vendetta-based accountability over individualistic education mandates that have yielded minimal long-term gains elsewhere in the region. Proponents assert this relativism reflects causal efficacy in anarchic contexts, where universalist reforms have empirically fueled backlash and fragmentation rather than empowerment.

Notable Pashtuns

Ahmad Shah Durrani (c. 1722–1772), a Pashtun leader from the Abdali tribe, founded the Durrani Empire in 1747, unifying Pashtun tribes and establishing what is considered the basis of modern Afghanistan through conquests extending from Khorasan to the Indus River. Khushal Khan Khattak (1613–1689), chief of the Khattak tribe, was a Pashtun warrior-poet who led resistance against Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, authoring over 45,000 verses in Pashto that emphasized tribal independence and valor, earning him recognition as a foundational figure in Pashto literature. Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988), from the Muhammadzai subtribe, organized the nonviolent Khudai Khidmatgar movement among Pashtuns in the North-West Frontier Province, advocating for Indian independence alongside Mahatma Gandhi and promoting Pashtun unity through education and pacifism despite British repression. Hamid Karzai (b. 1957), of the Popalzai Durrani subtribe, served as President of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014, leading post-Taliban reconstruction efforts as the first democratically elected leader in the country's history. Malala Yousafzai (b. 1997), a Pashtun from the Swat Valley, survived a Taliban assassination attempt in 2012 for advocating girls' education, becoming the youngest Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 2014 and founding the Malala Fund to support global female education. Imran Khan (b. 1952), from the Niazi tribe, captained Pakistan's cricket team to the 1992 World Cup victory and served as Prime Minister from 2018 to 2022, implementing policies on corruption and foreign relations amid Pashtun regional influence. Mullah Mohammed Omar (c. 1960–2013), a Pashtun from Kandahar, founded the Taliban in 1994, leading it to capture Kabul in 1996 and impose strict Sharia rule until 2001, shaping Islamist governance in Afghanistan.

References

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