Hubbry Logo
Atlantic meridional overturning circulationAtlantic meridional overturning circulationMain
Open search
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation
Community hub
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation
Atlantic meridional overturning circulation
from Wikipedia

Topographic map of the Nordic Seas and subpolar basins with surface currents (solid curves) and deep currents (dashed curves) that form a portion of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation. Colors of curves indicate approximate temperatures.

The Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) is the main ocean current system in the Atlantic Ocean.[1]: 2238  It is a component of Earth's ocean circulation system and plays an important role in the climate system. The AMOC includes Atlantic currents at the surface and at great depths that are driven by changes in weather, temperature and salinity. Those currents comprise half of the global thermohaline circulation that includes the flow of major ocean currents, the other half being the Southern Ocean overturning circulation.[2]

The AMOC is composed of a northward flow of warm, more saline water in the Atlantic's upper layers and a southward, return flow of cold, less salty, deep water. Warm water from the south is more saline ('halocline') because of the higher evaporation rate in the tropical zone. The warm saline water forms the upper layer of the ocean ('thermocline'), but when this layer cools down, the density of the salty water increases, making it sink into the deep. This is an important part of the motor of the AMOC system. The limbs are linked by regions of overturning in the Nordic Seas and the Southern Ocean. Overturning sites are associated with intense exchanges of heat, dissolved oxygen, carbon and other nutrients, and very important for the ocean's ecosystems and its function as a carbon sink.[3][4] Changes in the strength of the AMOC can affect multiple elements of the climate system.[1]: 2238 

Climate change may weaken the AMOC through increases in ocean heat content and elevated flows of freshwater from melting ice sheets.[5] Studies using oceanographic reconstructions suggest that as of 2015, the AMOC was weaker than before the Industrial Revolution.[6][7] There is debate over the relative contributions of different factors and it is unclear how much of this weakening is due to climate change or the circulation's natural variability over millennia.[8][9] Climate models predict the AMOC will further weaken during the 21st century.[10]: 19  This weakening would reduce average air temperatures over Scandinavia, Great Britain, and Ireland, because these regions are warmed by the North Atlantic Current.[11] Weakening of the AMOC would also accelerate sea level rise around North America and reduce primary production in the North Atlantic.[12]

Severe weakening of the AMOC may lead to a collapse of the circulation, which would not be easily reversible and thus constitutes one of the tipping points in the climate system.[13] A collapse would substantially lower the average temperature and amount of rain and snowfall in Europe.[14][15] It may also raise the frequency of extreme weather events and have other severe effects.[16][17]

Overall structure

[edit]
AMOC in relation to the global thermohaline circulation (animation)

The Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) is the main current system in the Atlantic Ocean[1]: 2238  and is also part of the global thermohaline circulation, which connects the world's oceans with a single "conveyor belt" of continuous water exchange.[18] Normally, relatively warm, less-saline water stays on the ocean's surface while deep layers are colder, denser and more-saline, in what is known as ocean stratification.[19] Deep water eventually gains heat and/or loses salinity in an exchange with the mixed ocean layer, and becomes less dense and rises towards the surface. Differences in temperature and salinity exist between ocean layers and between parts of the World Ocean, and together they drive the thermohaline circulation.[18] The Pacific Ocean is less saline than the other oceans because it receives large quantities of fresh rainfall.[20] Its surface water is insufficiently saline to sink lower than several hundred meters, meaning deep ocean water must come from elsewhere.[18]

Ocean water in the North Atlantic is more saline than that in the Pacific, partly because extensive evaporation on the surface concentrates salt within the remaining water and partly because sea ice near the Arctic Circle expels salt as it freezes during winter.[21] Even more importantly, evaporated moisture in the Atlantic is swiftly carried away by atmospheric circulation before it can fall back as rain. Trade winds move this moisture across Central America and to the eastern North Pacific, where it falls as rain.[22] Major mountain ranges such as the Tibetan Plateau, the Rocky Mountains and the Andes prevent any equivalent moisture transport back to the Atlantic.[23]

Due to this process, Atlantic surface water becomes salty and therefore dense, eventually downwelling to form the North Atlantic Deep Water (NADW).[24] NADW formation primarily occurs in the Nordic Seas and involves a complex interplay of regional water masses such as the Denmark Strait Overflow Water (DSOW), Iceland-Scotland Overflow Water (ISOW) and Nordic Seas Overflow Water.[25] Labrador Sea Water may play an important role as well but increasing evidence suggests water in Labrador and Irminger Seas primarily recirculates through the North Atlantic Gyre and has little connection with the rest of the AMOC.[4][26][14]

A summary of the path of the thermohaline circulation. Blue paths represent deep-water currents, while red paths represent surface currents

The NADW is not the deepest water layer in the Atlantic Ocean; the Antarctic bottom water (AABW) is always the densest, deepest ocean layer in any basin deeper than 4,000 metres (2.5 mi).[27] As the upper reaches of the AABW flow upwells, it melds into and reinforces the NADW. The formation of the NADW is also the beginning of the lower cell of the circulation.[18][3] The downwelling that forms the NADW is balanced by an equal amount of upwelling. In the western Atlantic, Ekman transport, the increase in ocean-layer mixing caused by wind activity, results in strong upwelling in the Canary Current and the Benguela Current, which are located on the northwest and southwest coasts of Africa. As of 2014, upwelling is substantially stronger around the Canary Current than the Benguela Current, though an opposite pattern existed until the closure of the Central American Seaway during the late Pliocene.[28] In the Eastern Atlantic, significant upwelling occurs only during certain months of the year because this region's deep thermocline means it is more dependent on the state of sea surface temperature than on wind activity. There is also a multi-year upwelling cycle that occurs in synchronization with the El Niño/La Niña cycle.[29]

At the same time, the NADW moves southward and at the southern end of the Atlantic transect, around 80% of it upwells in the Southern Ocean,[24][30] connecting it with the Southern Ocean overturning circulation (SOOC).[31] After upwelling, the water is understood to take one of two pathways. Water surfacing close to Antarctica will likely be cooled by Antarctic sea ice and sink back into the lower cell of the circulation. Some of this water will rejoin the AABW but the rest of the lower-cell flow will eventually reach the depths of the Pacific and Indian oceans.[18] Water that upwells at lower, ice-free latitudes moves further northward due to Ekman transport and is committed to the upper cell. The warm water in the upper cell is responsible for the return flow to the North Atlantic, which occurs mainly around the coast of Africa[clarification needed] and through the Indonesian archipelago. Once this water returns to the North Atlantic, it becomes cooler and denser, and sinks, feeding back into the NADW.[31][24]

Role in the climate system

[edit]
Heat transfer from the ocean to atmosphere (left) and an increase in Atlantic Ocean heat content (right) observed when the AMOC is strong[32]

Equatorial areas are the hottest part of the globe; due to thermodynamics, this heat moves towards the poles. Most of this heat is transported by atmospheric circulation but warm, surface ocean currents play an important role. Heat from the equator moves either northward or southward; the Atlantic Ocean is the only ocean in which the heat flow is northward.[33] Much of the heat transfer in the Atlantic occurs due to the Gulf Stream, a surface current that carries warm water northward from the Caribbean. While the Gulf Stream as a whole is driven by winds alone, its northern-most segment, the North Atlantic Current, obtains much of its heat from thermohaline exchange in the AMOC.[3] Thus, the AMOC carries up to 25% of the total heat toward the northern hemisphere,[33] and plays an important role in the climate around northwest Europe.[34]

Because atmospheric patterns also play a large role in heat transfer, the idea the climate in northern Europe would be as cold as that in northern North America without heat transport via ocean currents (i.e. up to 15–20 °C (27–36 °F) colder) is generally considered incorrect.[35][36] While one modeling study suggested collapse of the AMOC could result in Ice Age-like cooling, including sea-ice expansion and mass glacier formation, within a century,[37][38] the accuracy of those results is questionable.[39] There is a consensus the AMOC keeps northern and western Europe warmer than it would be otherwise,[16] with the difference of 4 °C (7.2 °F) and 10 °C (18 °F) depending on the area.[14] For instance, studies of the Florida Current suggest the Gulf Stream was around 10% weaker from around 1200 to 1850 due to increased surface salinity, and this likely contributed to the conditions known as Little Ice Age.[40]

The AMOC makes the Atlantic Ocean into a more-effective carbon sink in two major ways. Firstly, the upwelling that takes place supplies large quantities of nutrients to the surface waters, supporting the growth of phytoplankton and therefore increasing marine primary production and the overall amount of photosynthesis in the surface waters. Secondly, upwelled water has low concentrations of dissolved carbon because the water is typically 1,000 years old and has not been exposed to anthropogenic CO2 increases in the atmosphere. This water absorbs larger quantities of carbon than the more-saturated surface waters and is prevented from releasing carbon back into the atmosphere when it is downwelled.[41] While Southern Ocean is by far the strongest ocean carbon sink,[42] The North Atlantic is the largest single carbon sink in the northern hemisphere.[43]

Abrupt changes during the Late Pleistocene

[edit]
A reconstruction of how Heinrich events would have likely proceeded, with the Laurentide ice sheet first growing to an unsustainable position, where the base of its periphery becomes too warm, and then rapidly losing ice until it is reduced to sustainable size[44]

Because the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) is dependent on a series of interactions between layers of ocean water of varying temperature and salinity, it is not static but experiences small, cyclical changes[45][8] and larger, long-term shifts in response to external forcings.[46] Many of those shifts occurred during the Late Pleistocene (126,000 to 11,700 years ago), which was the final geological epoch before the current Holocene.[47] It also includes the Last Glacial Period, which is colloquially known as the "last ice age".[48] Twenty-five abrupt temperature oscillations between the hemispheres occurred during this period; these oscillations are known as Dansgaard–Oeschger events (D-O events) after Willi Dansgaard and Hans Oeschger, who discovered them by analyzing Greenland ice cores in the 1980s.[49][50]

D-O events are best known for the rapid warming of between 8 °C (15 °F) and 15 °C (27 °F) that occurred in Greenland over several decades.[48] Warming also occurred over the entire North Atlantic region but equivalent cooling over the Southern Ocean also occurred during these events. This is consistent with the strengthened AMOC transporting more heat from one hemisphere to another.[51] The warming of the northern hemisphere would have caused ice-sheet melting and many D-O events appear to have been ended by Heinrich events, in which massive streams of icebergs broke off from the then-present Laurentide ice sheet. As the icebergs melted in the ocean, the ocean water would have become fresher, weakening the circulation and stopping the D-O warming.[44]

There is not yet a consensus explanation for why AMOC would have fluctuated so much, and only during this glacial period.[52][53] Common hypotheses include cyclical patterns of salinity change in the North Atlantic or a wind-pattern cycle due to the growth and decline of the region's ice sheets, which are large enough to affect wind patterns.[48] As of late 2010s, some research suggests the AMOC is most-sensitive to change during periods of extensive ice sheets and low CO2,[54] making the Last Glacial Period a "sweet spot" for such oscillations.[53] It has been suggested the warming of the southern hemisphere would have initiated the pattern as warmer waters spread north through the overall thermohaline circulation.[52][51] The paleoclimate evidence is not currently strong enough to say whether the D-O events started with changes in the AMOC or whether the AMOC changed in response to another trigger.[55] For instance, some research suggests changes in sea-ice cover initiated the D-O events because they would have affected water temperature and circulation through Ice–albedo feedback.[52][56]

The significant warming of the Northern Hemisphere and the equivalent cooling of the South, indicated by paleoclimate data and replicated in simulations, is consistent with significant AMOC strengthening.[57]

D-O events are numbered in reverse order; the largest numbers are assigned to the oldest events.[52] The penultimate event, Dansgaard–Oeschger event 1, occurred some 14,690 years ago and marks the transition from the Oldest Dryas period to the Bølling–Allerød Interstadial (Danish: [ˈpøle̝ŋ ˈæləˌʁœðˀ]), which lasted until 12,890 years Before Present.[58][59] It was named after the two sites in Denmark with vegetation fossils that could only have survived during a comparatively warm period in the northern hemisphere.[58] The major warming in the northern hemisphere was offset by southern-hemisphere cooling and little net change in global temperature, which is consistent with changes in the AMOC.[57][60] The onset of the interstadial also caused a period of sea level rise from ice-sheet collapse that is designated Meltwater pulse 1A.[61]

The Bølling and Allerød stages of the interglacial were separated by two centuries of the opposite pattern – northern-hemisphere cooling, southern-hemisphere warming – which is known as the Older Dryas because the Arctic flower Dryas octopetala became dominant where forests were able to grow during the interglacial.[58] The interglacial ended with the onset of the Younger Dryas (YD) period (12,800–11,700 years ago), when northern-hemisphere temperatures returned to near-glacial levels, possibly within a decade.[62] This happened due to an abrupt slowing of the AMOC,[63] which, in a similar manner to Heinrich events, was caused by freshening due to ice loss from the Laurentide ice sheet. Unlike true Heinrich events, there was an enormous flow of meltwater through the Mackenzie River in what is now Canada rather than a mass iceberg loss.[64] Major changes in the precipitation regime, such as the shift of the Intertropical Convergence Zone to the south, increased rainfall in North America, and the drying of South America and Europe, occurred.[63]: 1148  Global temperatures again barely changed during the Younger Dryas and long-term, post-glacial warming resumed after it ended.[60]

Stability and vulnerability

[edit]
In the classic Stommel box models, AMOC tipping occurs either because of a large increase in freshwater volumes which makes the circulation impossible (B-tipping), or because of a lower increase which makes it possible for circulation's own variability to push it to collapse (N-tipping). As freshwater input increases, probability of N-tipping increases. If the probability is at 100%, B-tipping occurs [65]

The AMOC has not always existed; for much of Earth's history, overturning circulation in the northern hemisphere occurred in the North Pacific. Paleoclimate evidence shows the shift of overturning circulation from the Pacific to the Atlantic occurred 34 million years ago at the Eocene-Oligocene transition, when the Arctic-Atlantic gateway had closed.[66] This closure fundamentally changed the thermohaline circulation structure; some researchers have suggested climate change may eventually reverse this shift and re-establish the Pacific circulation after the AMOC shuts down.[67][38] Climate change affects the AMOC by making surface water warmer as a consequence of Earth's energy imbalance and by making surface water less saline due to the addition of large quantities of fresh water from melting ice – mainly from Greenland – and through increasing precipitation over the North Atlantic. Both of these causes would increase the difference between the surface and deep layers, thus making the upwelling and downwelling that drives the circulation more difficult.[68]

In the 1960s, Henry Stommel did much of the research into the AMOC with what later became known as the Stommel Box model, which introduced the idea of Stommel Bifurcation in which the AMOC could exist either in a strong state like the one throughout recorded history or effectively collapse to a much weaker state and not recover unless the increased warming and/or freshening that caused the collapse is reduced.[69] The warming and freshening could directly cause the collapse or weaken the circulation to a state in which its ordinary fluctuations (noise) could push it past the tipping point.[65] The possibility the AMOC is a bistable system that is either "on" or "off" and could suddenly collapse has been a topic of scientific discussion ever since.[70][71] In 2004, The Guardian published the findings of a report commissioned by Pentagon defense adviser Andrew Marshall that suggests the average annual temperature in Europe would drop by 6 °F (3.3 °C) between 2010 and 2020 as the result of an abrupt AMOC shutdown.[72]

Modeling AMOC collapse

[edit]
In a typical full-scale climate model, AMOC is greatly weakened for around 500 years but does not truly collapse, even in a test scenario where CO2 concentrations suddenly quadruple.[73] There are concerns that this kind of a simulation is too stable [74]

Some of the models developed after Stommel's work suggest the AMOC could have one or more intermediate stable states between full strength and full collapse.[75] This is more-commonly seen in Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs), which focus on certain parts of the climate system like AMOC and disregard others, rather than in the more-comprehensive general circulation models (GCMs) that represent the "gold standard" for simulating the entire climate but often have to simplify certain interactions.[76] GCMs typically show the AMOC has a single equilibrium state and that it is difficult or impossible for it to collapse.[77][73] Researchers have raised concerns this modeled resistance to collapse only occurs because GCM simulations tend to redirect large quantities of freshwater toward the North Pole, where it would no longer affect the circulation, a movement that does not occur in nature.[45][78]

In one paper, AMOC collapse only occurs in a full general circulation model after it ran for nearly 2000 years, and freshwater quantities (in Sv) increased to extreme values.[37] While the conditions are unrealistic, the model may also be unrealistically stable, and the full implications are not clear without more real-world observations[39]

In 2024, three researchers performed a simulation with one of the Community Earth System Models (CIMP) in which a classic AMOC collapse had occurred, much like it does in intermediate-complexity models.[37] Unlike some other simulations, they did not immediately subject the model to unrealistic meltwater levels but gradually increased the input. Their simulation had run for over 1,700 years before the collapse occurred and they had also eventually reached meltwater levels equivalent to a sea level rise of 6 cm (2.4 in) per year,[39] about 20 times larger than the 2.9 mm (0.11 in)/year sea level rise between 1993 and 2017,[79] and well above any level considered plausible. According to the researchers, those unrealistic conditions were intended to counterbalance the model's unrealistic stability and the model's output should not be regarded as a prediction but rather as a high-resolution representation of the way currents would start changing before a collapse.[37] Other scientists agreed this study's findings would mainly help with calibrating more-realistic studies, particularly once better observational data becomes available.[39][38]

Some research indicates classic EMIC projections are biased toward AMOC collapse because they subject the circulation toward an unrealistically constant flow of freshwater. In one study, the difference between constant and variable freshwater flux delayed collapse of the circulation in a typical Stommel's Bifurcation EMIC by over 1,000 years. The researchers said this simulation is more consistent with reconstructions of the AMOC's response to Meltwater pulse 1A 13,500–14,700 years ago and indicates a similarly long delay.[65] In 2022, a paleoceanographic reconstruction found a limited effect from massive freshwater forcing of the final Holocene deglaciation ~11,700–6,000 years ago, when the sea level rise was around 50 m (160 ft). It suggested most models overestimate the effects of freshwater forcing on the AMOC.[80] If the AMOC is more dependent on wind strength – which changes relatively little with warming – than is commonly understood, then it would be more resistant to collapse.[81] According to some researchers, the less-studied Southern Ocean overturning circulation (SOOC) may be more vulnerable to collapse than the AMOC.[82]

High-quality Earth system models indicate a collapse is unlikely and would only become probable if high levels of warming (≥4 °C (7.2 °F))[14] are sustained long after 2100.[78][83][84] Some paleoceanographic research seems to support this idea.[80][65] Some researchers fear the complex models are too stable[74] and that lower-complexity projections pointing to an earlier collapse are more accurate.[85][86] One of those projections suggests AMOC collapse could happen around 2065 (updated from 2057 in August 2025)[87] but many scientists are skeptical of the projection.[88] Some research also suggests the Southern Ocean overturning circulation may be more prone to collapse than the AMOC.[82][16] In October 2024, 44 climate scientists published an open letter, claiming that according to scientific studies in the past few years, the risk of AMOC collapse has been greatly underestimated, it can occur in the next few decades, with devastating impacts especially for Nordic countries. They called on Nordic countries to ensure the implementation of the Paris Agreement to prevent it.[89][90]

[edit]

Until 2024 there was a disagreement between observations showing a slowdown of the circulation and climate models showing a stable circulation. In November 2024, Nature Geoscience published a study which tried to solve the problem. The scientists used "Earth system and eddy-permitting coupled ocean–sea-ice models". Then observations and models corresponded to each other much better. The study found a slowdown of 0.46 sverdrups per decade since 1950.[91]

Observations

[edit]
1992–2002 altimeter data from NASA Pathfinder indicated a slowing (red) in the subpolar gyre region. This was used as a proxy for the AMOC before the initiation of RAPID, and before subsequent research demonstrated the subpolar gyre often behaves separately from the larger circulation [4]
RAPID tracks both the AMOC itself (third line from the top, labelled MOC) as well as its separate components (three lower lines) and the AMOC flow combined with the subpolar gyre and/or the western boundary current flow (upper two lines) AMOC flow during 2004–2008 appears stronger than afterwards[92]

Direct observations of the strength of the AMOC have been available since 2004 from RAPID, an in situ mooring array at 26°N in the Atlantic.[93][92] Observational data needs to be collected for a prolonged period to be of use. Thus, some researchers have attempted to make predictions from smaller-scale observations; for instance, in May 2005, submarine-based research from Peter Wadhams indicated downwelling in the Greenland Sea – a small part of the AMOC system – which was measured using giant water columns nicknamed chimneys, transferring water downwards was at less than a quarter of its normal strength.[94][95] In 2000, other researchers focused on trends in the North Atlantic Gyre (NAG), which is also known as the Northern Subpolar Gyre (SPG).[96] Measurements taken in 2004 found a 30% decline in the NAG relative to the measurement in 1992; some interpreted this measurement as a sign of AMOC collapse.[97] RAPID data have since shown this to be a statistical anomaly,[98] and observations from 2007 and 2008 have shown a recovery of the NAG.[99] It is now known the NAG is largely separate from the rest of the AMOC and could collapse independently of it.[14][100][16]

By 2014, there was enough processed RAPID data up until the end of 2012; these data appeared to show a decline in circulation which was 10 times greater than that which was predicted by the most-advanced models of the time. Scientific debate about whether it indicated a strong impact of climate change or a large interdecadal variability of the circulation began.[45][101] Data up until 2017 showed the decline in 2008 and 2009 was anomalously large but the circulation after 2008 was weaker than it was in 2004–2008.[92]

The AMOC is also measured by tracking changes in heat transport that would be correlated with overall current flows. In 2017 and 2019, estimates derived from heat observations made by NASA's CERES satellites and international Argo floats suggested 15–20% less heat transport was occurring than was implied by the RAPID, and indicated a fairly stable flow with a limited indication of decadal variability.[102][103]

The strength of Florida Current has been measured as stable over the last four decades after correction for changes in Earth's magnetic field.[104]

Reconstructions

[edit]

Recent past

[edit]
A 2021 comparison of the post-2004 RAPID observations with the 1980–2004 reconstructed AMOC trend had indicated no real change across 30 years [105]

Climate reconstructions allow research to assemble hints about the past state of the AMOC, though these techniques are necessarily less reliable than direct observations. In February 2021, RAPID data was combined with reconstructed trends from data that were recorded 25 years before RAPID. This study showed no evidence of an overall decline in the AMOC over the past 30 years.[105] A Science Advances study published in 2020 found no significant change in the AMOC circulation compared to that in the 1990s, although substantial changes have occurred across the North Atlantic in the same period.[106] A March 2022 review article concluded while global warming may cause a long-term weakening of the AMOC, it remains difficult to detect when analyzing changes since 1980, including both direct – as that time frame presents both periods of weakening and strengthening – and the magnitude of either change is uncertain, ranging between 5% and 25%. The review concluded with a call for more-sensitive and longer-term research.[107]

20th century

[edit]
A 120-year trend of sea surface temperature differences from the mean warming trend – a proxy for AMOC state – shows no net change until around 1980.[8]

Some reconstructions have attempted to compare the current state of the AMOC with that from a century or so earlier. For instance, a 2010 statistical analysis found a weakening of the AMOC has been continuing since the late 1930s with an abrupt shift of a North-Atlantic overturning cell around 1970.[108] In 2015, a different statistical analysis interpreted a cold pattern in some years of temperature records as a sign of AMOC weakening. It concluded the AMOC has weakened by 15–20% in 200 years and that the circulation slowed during most of the 20th century. Between 1975 and 1995, the circulation was weaker than at any time over the past millennium. This analysis had also shown a limited recovery after 1990 but the authors cautioned another decline is likely to occur in the future.[6]

In 2018, another reconstruction suggested a weakening of around 15% has occurred since the mid-twentieth century.[109] A 2021 reconstruction used over a century of ocean-temperature-and-salinity data, which appeared to show significant changes in eight independent AMOC indices that could indicate "an almost complete loss of stability". This reconstruction was forced to omit all data from 35 years before 1900 and after 1980 to maintain consistent records of all eight indicators.[86] These findings were challenged by 2022 research that used data recorded between 1900 and 2019, and found no change in the AMOC between 1900 and 1980, and a single-sverdrup reduction in AMOC strength did not occur until 1980, a variation that remains within range of natural variability.[8]

Sediment analyses shows a weakening of the AMOC by 20% from the middle of the 20th century.[110]

Millennial scale

[edit]
Model simulations of the Atlantic Multidecadal Variability over the past millennium (green) largely match a reconstruction based on coral and marine sediment evidence (blue) until the late 20th century. The sharp divergence could be caused by increasing "memory" of past atmospheric changes in the AMOC. This could precede its destabilization.[111]

According to a 2018 study, in the last 150 years, the AMOC has demonstrated exceptional weakness when compared to the previous 1,500 years and indicated a discrepancy in the modeled timing of AMOC decline after the Little Ice Age.[112] A 2017 review concluded there is strong evidence for past changes in the strength and structure of the AMOC during abrupt climate events, such as the Younger Dryas and many of the Heinrich events.[113] In 2022, another millennial-scale reconstruction found the Atlantic multidecadal variability strongly displayed increasing "memory", meaning it is now less likely to return to the mean state and instead would proceed in the direction of past variation. Because this pattern is likely connected to the AMOC, it could indicate a "quiet" loss of stability that is not seen in most models.[111]

In February 2021, a major study in Nature Geoscience reported the preceding millennium saw an unprecedented weakening of the AMOC, an indication the change was caused by human actions.[7][114] The study's co-author said the AMOC had already slowed by about 15% and effects now being seen; according to them: "In 20 to 30 years it is likely to weaken further, and that will inevitably influence our weather, so we would see an increase in storms and heatwaves in Europe, and sea level rises on the east coast of the US."[114] In February 2022, Nature Geoscience published a "Matters Arising" commentary article co-authored by 17 scientists that disputed those findings and said the long-term AMOC trend remains uncertain.[9] The journal also published a response from the authors of 2021 study, who defended their findings.[115]

Possible indirect signs

[edit]
The cold blob visible on NASA's global mean temperatures for 2015, the warmest year on record up to 2015 since 1880. Colors indicate temperature evolution (NASA/NOAA; 20 January 2016).[116]

Some researchers have interpreted a range of recently observed climatic changes and trends as being connected to a decline in the AMOC; for instance, a large area of the North Atlantic Gyre[117] near Greenland has cooled by 0.39 °C (0.70 °F) between 1900 and 2020, in contrast to substantial ocean warming elsewhere.[118] This cooling is normally seasonal; it is most-pronounced in February, when cooling reaches 0.9 °C (1.6 °F) at the area's epicenter but it still experiences warming relative to pre-industrial levels during warm months, particularly in August.[117] Between 2014 and 2016, waters in the area stayed cool for 19 months before warming,[119] and media described this phenomenon as the cold blob.[120]

The cold-blob pattern occurs because sufficiently fresh, cool water avoids sinking into deeper layers. This freshening was immediately described as evidence of a slowing of the AMOC slowdown.[120] Later research found atmospheric changes, such as an increase in low cloud cover[121] and a strengthening of the North Atlantic oscillation (NAO) have also played a major role in this local cooling.[118] The overall importance of the NAO in the phenomenon is disputed[119] but cold-blob trends alone cannot be used to analyze the strength of the AMOC.[121]

Another possible early indication of a slowing of the AMOC is the relative reduction in the North Atlantic's potential to act as a carbon sink. Between 2004 and 2014, the amount of carbon sequestered in the North Atlantic declined by 20% relative to 1994–2004, which the researchers considered evidence of AMOC slowing. This decline was offset by a comparable increase in the South Atlantic, which is considered part of the Southern Ocean.[122] While the total amount of carbon absorption by all carbon sinks is generally projected to increase throughout the 21st century, a continuing decline in the North Atlantic sink would have important implications.[123] Other processes that were attributed in some studies to AMOC slowing include increasing salinity in the South Atlantic,[124] rapid deoxygenation in the Gulf of St. Lawrence,[125][126] and an approximately 10% decline in phytoplankton productivity across the North Atlantic over the past 200 years[127], although this evidence is contested[128][129].

Projections

[edit]

Individual models

[edit]
Climate models are often calibrated by comparing their simulations after CO2 concentrations have been suddenly quadrupled. Under those conditions, older fifth-generation climate models (top) simulate substantially smaller declines in AMOC strength than the sixth generation (bottom) [130]

Historically, CMIP models, the gold standard in climate science, show the AMOC is very stable; although it may weaken, it will always recover rather than permanently collapse – for example, in a 2014 idealized experiment in which CO2 concentrations abruptly double from 1990 levels and do not change afterward, the circulation declines by around 25% but does not collapse, although it recovers by only 6% over the next 1,000 years.[131] In 2020, research estimated if warming stabilizes at 1.5 °C (2.7 °F), 2 °C (3.6 °F) or 3 °C (5.4 °F) by 2100; in all three cases, the AMOC declines for an additional 5–10 years after the temperature rise ceases but does not approach collapse, and partially recovers after about 150 years.[84] Many researchers have said collapse is only avoided due to biases that persist across the large-scale models.[77][74]

While models have improved over time, the sixth and as of 2020 current generation CMIP6 retains some inaccuracies. On average, those models simulate much greater AMOC weakening in response to greenhouse warming than the previous generation;[130] when four CMIP6 models simulated the AMOC under the SSP3-7 scenario in which CO2 levels more than double from 2015 values by 2100 from around 400 parts per million (ppm) to over 850 ppm,[132]: 14  they found it declined by over 50% by 2100.[133] The CMIP6 models are not yet capable of simulating North Atlantic Deep Water (NADW) without errors in its depth, area or both, reducing confidence in their projections.[134]

If CO2 concentrations were to double by 2100 from their 2015 values, then the AMOC strength would decline by over 50%. Reductions in methane warming or sulfate aerosol cooling, or both, would have an effect of around 10% by comparison [133]

To address these problems, some scientists experimented with bias correction. In another idealized CO2 doubling experiment, the AMOC collapsed after 300 years when bias correction was applied to the model.[78] One 2016 experiment combined projections from eight then-state-of-the-art CMIP5 climate models with the improved Greenland ice-sheet melt estimates. It found by 2090–2100, the AMOC would weaken by around 18% (3%–34%) under the intermediate Representative Concentration Pathway 4.5, and by 37% (15%–65%) under the very high Representative Concentration Pathway 8.5, in which greenhouse gas emissions increase continuously. When the two scenarios were extended past 2100, the AMOC stabilized under RCP 4.5 but continued to decline under RCP 8.5, leading to an average decline of 74% by 2290–2300 and a 44% likelihood of a complete collapse.[83] In 2020, another team of researchers simulated RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 between 2005 and 2250 in a Community Earth System Model that was integrated with an advanced ocean physics module. Due to the module, the AMOC was subjected to four-to-ten times more freshwater when compared to the standard run. It simulated for RCP 4.5 very similar results to those of the 2016 study while below RCP 8.5, the circulation declines by two-thirds soon after 2100 but does not collapse past that level.[135]

In 2023, a statistical analysis of output from multiple intermediate-complexity models suggested an AMOC collapse would most likely happen around 2065 (updated from 2057 in August 2025) with 95% confidence of a collapse between 2037 and 2109.[87] This study received a lot of attention and criticism because intermediate-complexity models are considered less reliable in general and may confuse a major slowing of the circulation with its complete collapse. The study relied on proxy temperature data from the Northern Subpolar Gyre region, which other scientists do not consider representative of the entire circulation, believing it may be subject to a separate tipping point. Some scientists have described this research as "worrisome" and noted it can provide a "valuable contribution" once better observational data is available but there was widespread agreement among experts the paper's proxy record was "insufficient".[88]

New long-duration CMIP6 projections

A 2025 multi-model analysis extended CMIP6 simulations beyond 2100 and explicitly tracked the fate of the *deep* northern overturning cell (the part of the AMOC linked to NADW formation). Under the high-emissions scenario SSP5-8.5, all nine models that were run past 2100 progressed from late-20th-century overturning transports of about 14–26 Sv over ~1,000 m at 26°N to just ~1–6 Sv, accompanied by an abrupt shoaling and a shift of the depth of maximum overturning from a NADW-dominated state to one linked to subtropical downwelling.[136] In these runs, a collapse of deep winter convection across subpolar basins preceded the northern overturning shutdown by roughly three decades on average, consistent with a sequence in which the breakdown of deep mixing destabilizes the overturning via Welander (mixing) and Stommel (salt-advection) feedbacks.[136] The models also retained a shallow, wind-driven, subtropical overturning cell, so the post-2

Major review studies

[edit]
AMOC is considered to be one of the several major parts of the climate system which could pass tipping point around a certain level of warming and eventually transition to a different state as a result. The graphic shows the levels of warming where this tipping is most likely to occur for a given element[137][14]

Large review papers and reports are capable of evaluating model output, direct observations and historical reconstructions to make expert judgements beyond what models alone can show. Around 2001, the IPCC Third Assessment Report projected high confidence the AMOC thermohaline circulation would weaken rather than stop and that warming effects would outweigh cooling, even over Europe.[138] When the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report was published in 2014, a rapid transition of the AMOC was considered "very unlikely" and this assessment was offered at a high level of confidence.[139]

In 2021, the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report again said the AMOC is "very likely" to decline within the 21st century and that there was a "high confidence" changes to it would be reversible within centuries if warming was reversed.[10]: 19  Unlike the Fifth Assessment Report, it had only "medium confidence" rather than "high confidence" in the AMOC avoiding a collapse before the end of the 21st century. This reduction in confidence was likely influenced by several review studies that draw attention to the circulation stability bias within general circulation models,[140][141] and simplified ocean-modelling studies suggesting the AMOC may be more vulnerable to abrupt change than larger-scale models suggest.[85]

The synthesis report of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report summarized the scientific consensus as follows: "The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation is very likely to weaken over the 21st century for all considered scenarios (high confidence), however an abrupt collapse is not expected before 2100 (medium confidence). If such a low probability event were to occur, it would very likely cause abrupt shifts in regional weather patterns and water cycle, such as a southward shift in the tropical rain belt, and large impacts on ecosystems and human activities."[142]

In 2022, an extensive assessment of all potential climate tipping points identified 16 plausible climate tipping points, including a collapse of the AMOC. It said a collapse would most likely be triggered by 4 °C (7.2 °F) of global warming but that there is enough uncertainty to suggest it could be triggered at warming levels of between 1.4 °C (2.5 °F) and 8 °C (14 °F). The assessment estimates once AMOC collapse is triggered, it would occur between 15 and 300 years, and most likely at around 50 years.[14][100] The assessment also treated the collapse of the Northern Subpolar Gyre as a separate tipping point that could tip at between 1.1 °C (2.0 °F) degrees and 3.8 °C (6.8 °F), although this is only simulated by a fraction of climate models. The most likely tipping point for the collapse of Northern Subpolar Gyre is 1.8 °C (3.2 °F) and once triggered, the collapse of the gyre would occur between 5 and 50 years, and most likely at 10 years. The loss of this convection is estimated to lower the global temperature by 0.5 °C (0.90 °F) while the average temperature in Europe would decrease by around 3 °C (5.4 °F). There would also be substantial effects on regional precipitation levels.[14][100]

The "State of the cryosphere" report, dedicates significant space to AMOC, saying it may be enroute to collapse because of ice melt and water warming. Impacts will include cooling of Northern Europe faster than 3°C per decade, "with no realistic means of adaptation". At the same time, the Antarctic Circumpolar Current (ACC) is also slowing down and the Weddell Sea Bottom Water is losing volume, what can impact global ocean circulation and climate.[143] UNESCO mentions that the report in the first time "notes a growing scientific consensus that melting Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, among other factors, may be slowing important ocean currents at both poles, with potentially dire consequences for a much colder northern Europe and greater sea-level rise along the U.S. East Coast."[144]

In February 2025, a study published in Nature concluded that the AMOC is resilient to extreme greenhouse gas and North Atlantic freshwater forcings across 34 climate models, suggesting that an AMOC collapse is unlikely in the 21st century.[145]

Effects of AMOC slowdown

[edit]
AMOC was weaker than now during the last interglacial period, and this had been connected to the cooling of North Atlantic Ocean temperatures and the reduction in precipitation over Europe and Africa (blue) [146]

As of 2024, there is no consensus on whether a consistent slowing of the AMOC circulation has occurred but there is little doubt it will occur in the event of continued climate change.[26] According to the IPCC, the most-likely effects of future AMOC decline are reduced precipitation in mid-latitudes, changing patterns of strong precipitation in the tropics and Europe, and strengthening storms that follow the North Atlantic track.[26] In 2020, research found a weakened AMOC would slow the decline in Arctic sea ice.[147] and result in atmospheric trends similar to those that likely occurred during the Younger Dryas,[63] such as a southward displacement of Intertropical Convergence Zone. Changes in precipitation under high-emissions scenarios would be far larger.[147]

A decline in the AMOC would be accompanied by an acceleration of sea level rise along the U.S. East Coast;[26] at least one such event has been connected to a temporary slowing of the AMOC.[148] This effect would be caused by increased warming and thermal expansion of coastal waters, which would transfer less of their heat toward Europe; it is one of the reasons sea level rise along the U.S. East Coast is estimated to be three-to-four times higher than the global average.[149][150][151]

A proposed tipping cascade where the AMOC would mediate a connection between the other tipping elements.

Some scientists believe a partial slowing of the AMOC would result in limited cooling of around 1 °C (1.8 °F) in Europe.[152][153][146] Other regions would be differently affected; according to 2022 research, 20th-century winter-weather extremes in Siberia were milder when the AMOC was weakened.[32] According to one assessment, a slowing of the AMOC is one of the few climate tipping points that are likely to reduce the social cost of carbon, a common measure of economic impacts of climate change, by −1.4% rather than increasing it, because Europe represents a larger fraction of global GDP than the regions that will be negatively affected by the slowing.[154] This study's methods have been said to have underestimating climate impacts in general.[155][156] According to some research, the dominant effect on an AMOC slowdown would be a reduction in oceanic heat uptake, leading to increased global warming,[157] but this is a minority opinion.[14][158]

A 2021 study said other well-known tipping points, such as the Greenland ice sheet, the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and the Amazon rainforest would all be connected to the AMOC. According to this study, changes to the AMOC alone are unlikely to trigger tipping elsewhere but an AMOC slowdown would provide a connection between these elements and reduce the global-warming threshold beyond which any of those four elements – including the AMOC itself – could be expected to tip, rather than the thresholds that have been established from studying those elements in isolation. This connection could cause a cascade of tipping over several centuries.[159]

Effects of an AMOC shutdown

[edit]

Cooling

[edit]
Modelled 21st century warming under the "intermediate" global warming scenario (top). The potential collapse of the subpolar gyre in this scenario (middle). The collapse of the entire Atlantic Meriditional Overturning Circulation (bottom).

A complete collapse of the AMOC will be largely irreversible[26] and recovery would likely take thousands of years.[160] A shutting down of the AMOC is expected to trigger substantial cooling in Europe,[161][13] particularly in Britain and Ireland, France and the Nordic countries.[162][163] In 2002, research compared AMOC shutdown to Dansgaard–Oeschger events – abrupt temperature shifts that occurred during the Last Glacial Period. According to that paper, local cooling of up to 8 °C (14 °F) would occur in Europe.[164] In 2022, a major review of tipping points concluded an AMOC collapse would lower global temperatures by around 0.5 °C (0.90 °F) while regional temperatures in Europe would fall by between 4 °C (7.2 °F) and 10 °C (18 °F).[14][100]

A 2020 study assessed the effects of an AMOC collapse on farming and food production in Great Britain.[165] It found within Great Britain an average temperature drop of 3.4 °C (6.1 °F) after the effect of warming was subtracted from collapse-induced cooling. A collapse of the AMOC would also lower rainfall during the growing season by around 123 mm (4.8 in), which would in turn reduce the area of land suitable for arable farming from 32% to 7%. The net value of British farming would decline by around £346 million per year – over 10% of its value in 2020.[15]

In 2024, one study that modeled the effect of an AMOC collapse on a pre-industrial world, predicted a more severe cooling in Europe. It predicted the average sea surface temperatures in northwest Europe falling 10 °C (18 °F) and the average February temperatures on land falling between 10 °C (18 °F) and 30 °C (54 °F) within a century in northern and western Europe. This change would result in sea ice reaching into the territorial waters of the British Isles and Denmark during winter while Antarctic sea ice would diminish.[37][38][166] These findings do not include the counteracting warming from climate change, and the modeling approach used by the paper is controversial.[39]

A 2015 study led by James Hansen found a shutdown or substantial slowing of the AMOC will intensify severe weather because it increases baroclinicity and accelerates northeasterly winds up to 10–20% throughout the mid-latitude troposphere. This could boost winter and near-winter cyclonic "superstorms" that are associated with near-hurricane-force winds and intense snowfall.[17] This paper has also been controversial.[167]

Other

[edit]
Impacts of El Niño on climate
Impacts of La Niña on climate
Changes to temperature and precipitation during El Niño (left) and La Niña (right). The top two maps are for Northern hemisphere winter, the bottom two for summer.[168] While the El Niño–Southern Oscillation occurs due to the processes in the Pacific Ocean, a connection between the Pacific and the Atlantic means that changes in AMOC can conceivably affect it

Several studies have investigated the effect of a collapse of the AMOC on the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO); results have ranged from no overall impact[169] to an increase in ENSO strength,[67] and a shift to a dominant La Niña conditions with an about 95% reduction in El Niño extremes but more-frequent extreme rainfall in eastern Australia, and intensified droughts and wildfire seasons in the southwestern U.S.[170][171][172]

A 2021 study used a simplified modeling approach to evaluate the effects of an AMOC collapse on the Amazon rainforest, and its hypothesized dieback and transition to a savanna state in some climate-change scenarios. This study found an AMOC collapse would increase rainfall in the southern Amazon due to the shift of an Intertropical Convergence Zone, and this would help to counter the dieback and potentially stabilize the southern part of the rainforest.[173] A 2024 study found the seasonal cycle of the Amazon could reverse with dry seasons becoming wet and vice versa.[37][38][39]

A 2005 paper said severe disruption of the AMOC would collapse North Atlantic plankton counts to less than half of their normal biomass due to increased stratification and the large decline in nutrient exchange among ocean layers.[12] A 2015 study simulated global ocean changes under AMOC slowing and collapse scenarios, and found these events would greatly decrease dissolved oxygen content in the North Atlantic, although dissolved oxygen would slightly increase globally due to greater increases across other oceans.[174]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
![Schematic of the thermohaline circulation][float-right] The Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) constitutes the primary mechanism of large-scale, density-driven ocean circulation in the Atlantic basin, featuring northward advection of warm, saline surface waters—primarily via the and —and their southward return as cold, dense formed through in the subpolar gyre. This system transports approximately 15–20 Sverdrups of water and over 1 petawatt of heat poleward, exerting a profound influence on hemispheric by moderating temperatures in and modulating global precipitation patterns through its interaction with . Direct measurements from the RAPID-MOCHA array at 26.5°N latitude reveal a multi-decadal weakening trend of about 3–4 Sverdrups since , attributed to reduced deep water formation amid freshwater inputs from melting and increased , though this decline appears to have stabilized since the early . Paleoclimate proxies indicate past AMOC collapses during Heinrich events and Dansgaard-Oeschger cycles, linked to massive ice discharges disrupting Nordic Sea , underscoring its potential for abrupt shifts under sufficient freshwater forcing. Contemporary modeling ensembles, however, suggest substantial resilience to projected and even extreme freshwater perturbations, with no consensus on an imminent tipping point despite variability in sensitivity across simulations. The AMOC's stability hinges on the balance between thermal and haline buoyancy gradients, where ongoing anthropogenic warming may counteract salinity-driven weakening through enhanced subtropical evaporation, though empirical monitoring remains essential to resolve discrepancies between observations and projections.

Definition and Components

Physical Structure and Mechanisms

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) comprises a northward flux of warm, saline waters in the upper layers, balanced by a southward return of colder, denser deep waters. This structure is evident in meridional sections where the overturning streamfunction peaks at approximately 15–20 Sverdrups (Sv), with the upper branch occupying depths shallower than about 1000 meters and the lower branch extending to abyssal depths. Key components include the northward-flowing and in the upper limb, which transport and salt poleward, and the formation of (NADW) through deep in the Nordic Seas and . NADW, characterized by temperatures around 2–4°C and salinities of 34.9–35.0, constitutes the primary southward branch, while a shallower return flow of (AABW) occupies the deep western boundary. The density-driven nature arises from cooling and increased in the subpolar North Atlantic, where winter reaches depths of 2000 meters or more, enabling water mass transformation. Mechanisms sustaining the AMOC involve forcing from surface heat loss and minus , creating meridional gradients that drive the sinking of dense waters. Unlike wind-driven gyres, the overturning is primarily thermohaline, with differences (Δρ/ρ ≈ 10^{-3}) generating geostrophic flows that compensate the meridional gradients. Observational estimates from programs like RAPID confirm the component dominates the total overturning, with wind contributions modulating but not overturning the circulation. The interplay of and maintains the required contrast, as freshwater inputs in the must be balanced by export northward; disruptions in this salt- feedback can alter stability, though empirical data indicate robustness under current forcings. Vertical shear in the flow arises from thermal wind balance, with warmer surface waters sloping equatorward in the deep return path.

Key Subsurface and Surface Elements


The surface branch of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) features northward transport of warm, saline water from subtropical to subpolar latitudes, primarily via the Gulf Stream and North Atlantic Current, with peak intensities of 13–20 Sverdrups (Sv). The Gulf Stream separates from the North American coast at Cape Hatteras, continuing as the North Atlantic Current eastward of the Grand Banks. This upper-ocean flow, extending to depths of roughly 1000 m, is driven by westerly winds inducing Ekman transport and buoyancy gradients from air-sea heat and freshwater fluxes.
In the subpolar North Atlantic, wintertime cooling and salinize surface waters, increasing and triggering open-ocean that penetrates to depths exceeding 1500 m. The subsurface branch comprises the southward return of cold, dense (NADW) in the deep western boundary current, at rates of 13–17 Sv below 2000 m. NADW formation totals 15–18 Sv, augmented by entrainment, with primary sources in the Nordic Seas and . In the Nordic Seas, deep convection reaches 3000 m, followed by dense overflows across the Greenland-Scotland Ridge: Denmark Strait Overflow Water (2.4–2.9 Sv) and Faroe Bank Channel overflow (2.4–2.7 Sv), contributing to lower NADW. The Labrador Sea generates Labrador Sea Water (LSW) through convection to 1500–2200 m, yielding 2–4 Sv of relatively fresh (salinity <34.88), cold water that forms upper NADW after mixing with overflow components like Iceland-Scotland and Denmark Strait waters. LSW acts as a salinity minimum at intermediate depths, ventilating the North Atlantic and influencing NADW properties through entrainment and spreading. The deep southward flow balances surface convergence via diapycnal mixing and wind-driven , predominantly in the .

Historical Context and Measurement

Early Theoretical Foundations

The theoretical foundations of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) developed in the mid-20th century amid advances in understanding buoyancy-forced ocean dynamics, distinct from wind-driven gyres. Density gradients arising from temperature (thermo) and salinity (haline) variations were recognized as drivers of deep meridional flows, with cold, dense water sinking in high northern latitudes—particularly the North Atlantic—and returning southward at depth, compensating for upwelling elsewhere. This conceptualization built on earlier equilibrium theories from the late 1940s, which integrated meridional transports into steady-state current models, emphasizing the role of high-latitude convection in sustaining poleward heat flux. Henry Stommel's contributions were instrumental, as he extended Sverdrup's theory to include abyssal components. Collaborating with Arnold Arons in the late , Stommel outlined a global deep circulation pattern wherein surface waters cool and densify in polar regions, sink to form deep western boundary currents flowing equatorward, and gradually upwell through diapycnal mixing, closing the loop via meridional compensation. In a survey, Stommel synthesized these ideas, highlighting how precipitation-evaporation imbalances and could sustain net fields in buoyancy-driven regimes. Stommel's 1961 two-box model marked a foundational advance by demonstrating in . The idealized setup featured two well-mixed reservoirs—one and one subpolar—interconnected by friction-dominated channels at surface and deep levels, with fixed heat fluxes cooling the subpolar box and salinity fluxes increasing its density relative to in the . Mathematical analysis revealed two stable equilibria: a "strong" state with vigorous overturning driven by subpolar sinking and a "weak" state with reduced or reversed flow, separated by a triggered by excessive freshwater input diluting subpolar densities. This feedback—wherein stronger overturning advects salt northward, reinforcing density contrasts—underpinned the model's prediction of abrupt transitions, providing an early causal mechanism for AMOC sensitivity without relying on external forcings alone. These models established the AMOC as a self-regulating system vulnerable to salinity perturbations, influencing later interpretations of paleoclimatic shifts and modern stability assessments, though empirical validation awaited direct observations.

Modern Observational Programs and Data Collection

The RAPID-MOCHA-WBTS array, operational since April 2004, represents the primary modern observational system for monitoring the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) at 26.5°N. This trans-basin mooring array spans from the Florida Straits to the eastern Atlantic margin, incorporating approximately 20-30 moorings equipped with acoustic Doppler current profilers, current meters, conductivity-temperature-depth sensors, and bottom pressure recorders. These instruments measure full-depth profiles of velocity, temperature, and salinity, enabling the calculation of meridional heat, mass, and freshwater transports through integration of geostrophic and Ekman components. Complementary data include continuous Florida Current transport via submarine cable measurements and surface Ekman transport derived from satellite altimetry and wind stress observations. By 2023, the array had yielded nearly two decades of continuous time series, with data processed and publicly released periodically by collaborating institutions such as the UK National Oceanography Centre and NOAA's Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory. The Overturning in the Subpolar North Atlantic Program (OSNAP), deployed in June 2014, extends direct AMOC observations to higher latitudes around 59.5°N, focusing on the subpolar North Atlantic where deep formation occurs. OSNAP consists of two trans-basin sections: an eastern array from southeastern to (approximately 20 moorings) and a western array from to the shelf (about 10 moorings), augmented by over 200 subsurface floats for Lagrangian tracking of water mass transformations. Moorings employ similar to RAPID, including current profilers and hydrographic sensors, to quantify overturning circulation, heat fluxes, and freshwater budgets across the basin. Initial deployments provided baseline data through 2016, with subsequent recoveries and redeployments in 2020 extending observations; results have revealed significant overturning variability linked to subpolar gyre dynamics and air-sea interactions. These programs integrate with broader ocean observing systems, such as floats for profile data and satellite remote sensing for sea surface height and winds, to refine AMOC estimates and resolve spatial gaps between latitudes. The AMOC Program coordinates multi-array efforts, including southern extensions like at 34.5°S and MOVE at 16°N, fostering data synthesis across the Atlantic basin for comprehensive monitoring. Together, these initiatives have transitioned AMOC assessment from sporadic ship-based sections to sustained, high-resolution records, enhancing understanding of short-term variability and long-term trends while addressing challenges like instrument and deployment logistics in harsh environments.

Climatic and Oceanic Role

Heat and Energy Redistribution

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) facilitates the primary mechanism for meridional heat redistribution in the North Atlantic Ocean by transporting warm, saline surface waters northward from the and toward the high latitudes. This northward releases substantial to the atmosphere upon cooling and densification in the Nordic Seas and , where the waters sink and form (NADW). The process effectively transfers heat poleward, counteracting the radiative imbalance between equatorial solar insolation and polar heat loss. Direct measurements from the RAPID-MOCHA observational array at 26.5°N indicate that the AMOC contributes approximately 1.25 petawatts (PW) of northward transport, representing the dominant component of total oceanic at that . This flux, equivalent to about 25 times the total of human civilization, peaks in the and diminishes northward as is progressively released to the atmosphere and formation enhances density-driven sinking. In the subpolar North Atlantic, air-sea associated with AMOC-driven exceed 200 W/m² during winter, driving atmospheric warming that propagates downstream via storm tracks. The heat redistribution by the AMOC profoundly influences regional climates, particularly in , where the release of oceanic heat moderates temperatures relative to continental interiors at similar latitudes. Simulations indicate that without the AMOC, winter temperatures in northwest Europe would drop by 3–5°C on average, with greater reductions up to 10°C in during cold seasons, due to diminished warm air from the . This effect stems from the poleward energy transport mitigating the equator-to-pole gradient, stabilizing mid-latitude patterns and reducing the frequency of extreme cold outbreaks. Globally, the AMOC accounts for roughly one-third of the total cross-equatorial heat transport into the , linking Atlantic dynamics to hemispheric energy balance and influencing rainfall and Indian variability through teleconnections.

Biogeochemical Transport and Ecosystem Support

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) plays a pivotal role in the meridional transport of biogeochemical constituents, including s, dissolved oxygen, and carbon, across ocean basins. The northward-flowing advects nutrient-enriched intermediate waters from the subtropical Atlantic toward higher latitudes, forming a "nutrient stream" that replenishes the subpolar North Atlantic's inventory and sustains regional productivity hotspots. This transport compensates for nutrient removal during winter , where surface waters sink to form (NADW), effectively exporting remineralized nutrients southward in the deep return flow. Similarly, deep ventilates the ocean interior with oxygen, with AMOC-mediated sinking introducing approximately 10-15% of the global oceanic oxygen supply annually through high-latitude . Carbon cycling is tightly coupled to AMOC dynamics, as the circulation enhances sequestration via both physical and biological pumps. Surface waters in the North Atlantic absorb atmospheric CO₂ during cooling and , with the overturning exporting roughly 0.5-1 Pg C yr⁻¹ southward in NADW, contributing to the ocean's role in storing about 25% of anthropogenic carbon emissions. , driven by availability, further amplifies this through particulate organic carbon export to depth, where AMOC strength influences remineralization rates and deep-water carbon reservoirs. Observations from mooring arrays indicate that AMOC variability modulates carbon uptake efficiency, with stronger overturning correlating to increased of . These processes underpin North Atlantic marine ecosystems by fueling and maintaining habitat suitability. Nutrient convergence in the subpolar gyre supports annual blooms exceeding 100 g C m⁻² yr⁻¹ in regions like the Irminger and Seas, forming the foundation for , fish stocks, and higher trophic levels, including commercially vital species such as (Gadus morhua) and (Scomber scombrus). Enhanced oxygenation from deep water formation mitigates risks in intermediate depths, preserving in demersal communities. The AMOC thus sustains fisheries yields estimated at over 2 million tonnes annually in the Northeast Atlantic, with disruptions to nutrient and oxygen transport posing risks to stability.

Paleoclimatic Variations

Glacial-Interglacial Shifts

During glacial periods, such as the (LGM, approximately 26,000–19,000 years ago), proxy records indicate a generally shallower and weaker Atlantic Meridional Overcirculation (AMOC) compared to states, with reduced formation of (NADW) and a greater influence of southern-sourced (AABW) extending northward. Multi-proxy evidence, including radiogenic neodymium isotopes (εNd) from deep-sea sediments and benthic foraminiferal δ13C gradients, supports a reorganization where the overturning cell reached only intermediate depths (~2,000–2,500 m) rather than penetrating to full abyssal levels as in modern conditions. This configuration likely resulted from increased freshwater input from expanded ice sheets, lowered sea levels altering ocean gateways, and expanded coverage inhibiting deep in the Nordic Seas. The transition to interglacial circulation during involved a progressive strengthening and deepening of the AMOC, culminating in -like vigor by around 11,700 years ago. flux proxies and flow speed reconstructions from the northwest Atlantic reveal a gradual intensification, with surface currents accelerating by approximately 8 cm/s from LGM minima to levels, driven by rising temperatures, melting ice sheets, and restored salinity gradients that enhanced North Atlantic . Pa/Th ratios in Bermuda Rise cores, which inversely track AMOC export of , show elevated values (indicating slowdown) persisting through the LGM but declining sharply during (~14,700–14,200 years ago), signaling resumed vigorous overturning. Strength estimates from models calibrated to these proxies suggest glacial AMOC maxima of 12–15 Sverdrups (Sv), increasing to 18–20 Sv in the early , though uncertainties arise from proxy sensitivities to regional ventilation rather than basin-wide transport. Interglacial periods, exemplified by the current , feature a robust, deep-reaching AMOC sustained by favorable density contrasts and minimal ice-sheet interference, facilitating efficient heat and . Comparisons with the Last Interglacial (Marine Isotope Stage 5e, ~130,000–115,000 years ago) via PMIP4 model ensembles and sparse proxy indicate comparable or slightly enhanced strengths under warmer orbital forcings, with no systematic weakening. However, glacial-interglacial amplitudes vary regionally; deep North Atlantic sites record more pronounced shifts than subtropical records, highlighting the role of dynamics in modulating full-cell overturning. These shifts underscore AMOC's sensitivity to ice volume and freshwater balance, with empirical reconstructions emphasizing causal links to orbital insolation changes rather than solely internal feedbacks.

Abrupt Events in the Late Pleistocene

During the , particularly the spanning 3 and 2 (approximately 60,000 to 15,000 years ago), the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) exhibited abrupt variations associated with Dansgaard–Oeschger (D–O) events and Heinrich events. These oscillations involved shifts between strong and weak AMOC states, inferred from ocean sediment proxies such as benthic δ¹³C gradients, ²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th ratios, and sortable silt grain sizes, which indicate changes in deep water formation and export. Weak AMOC phases corresponded to cold stadials with reduced (NADW) production, while transitions to strong states drove rapid warmings. Heinrich events, occurring roughly every 6,000–7,000 years, involved massive iceberg discharges from the Laurentide Ice Sheet into the North Atlantic, delivering freshwater fluxes estimated at up to 0.13 Sv and suppressing through surface freshening. Proxy records from sites like Bermuda Rise show elevated ²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th ratios and depleted δ¹³C values during these stadials (e.g., Heinrich Stadial 1 at ~17,500–14,700 years ago, and earlier events in MIS 3), signaling a weakened or regionally variable AMOC with diminished NADW export to the Atlantic. These disruptions lasted centuries to millennia, with evidence of compensation through enhanced deep and warming of 2–3°C, alongside CO₂ rises of 10–15 ppm. Recovery followed as subsurface buildup or wind-driven changes enabled resumption, though full AMOC shutdown remains debated, with some proxies indicating persistent but shallow circulation. Dansgaard–Oeschger events, numbering about 25, featured abrupt temperature rises of 10–15°C over decades during interstadials, linked to AMOC intensification and southward expansion of NADW influence. Sediment cores reveal δ¹³C increases and reduced ²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th during these warm phases, contrasting with stadial weakenings, particularly evident in MIS 3 records where most events show clear circulation shifts, though shorter ones lack robust signals. Mechanisms involve a salt-advection feedback: prolonged weak AMOC allows salt accumulation in the subtropical gyre, eventually triggering deep and rapid strengthening, though internal ocean-atmosphere-ice dynamics contribute without requiring external freshwater forcing in all cases. The stadial (12,900–11,700 years ago), marking the final major abrupt event, saw AMOC weakening evidenced by diminished nutrient transport to the subpolar North Atlantic and radiocarbon anomalies indicating deep water reorganization. Proxy data, including reduced intermediate water ventilation, support a freshwater trigger from glacial Lake Agassiz drainage, leading to surface freshening and NADW suppression, though models and some records suggest a reorganized rather than complete shutdown, with southward-shifted sites. This event interrupted deglacial warming, underscoring AMOC sensitivity to meltwater pulses during transitions.

Direct Instrumental Records

The primary direct instrumental records of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) derive from the RAPID-MOCHA-WBTS mooring array at 26.5°N, initiated in April 2004 as a collaboration between the UK's National Oceanography Centre, the University of Miami, and other institutions. This trans-basin system deploys approximately 20 moorings equipped with current meters, conductivity-temperature-depth sensors, and inverted echo sounders to measure full-depth velocity, temperature, and salinity profiles, enabling computation of the overturning streamfunction via geostrophic and Ekman transport integration. Observations span continuously from 2004 through 2023, with data updates extending into 2024, providing the longest high-resolution time series of basin-wide AMOC strength. The RAPID array records indicate a time-mean AMOC transport of approximately 17.2 Sverdrups (Sv; 1 Sv = 10^6 m³/s) at this latitude, dominated by northward surface flow and southward deep return, with heat transport averaging 1.2 petawatts northward. Variability manifests across timescales, from daily fluctuations exceeding 5 Sv to interannual shifts linked to forcing, subtropical gyre adjustments, and subpolar changes. Early records (2004–2009) show strengthening to peaks near 20 Sv, followed by a downturn around 2009–2010 associated with weakened , yielding an overall linear decline of about 1.0 Sv per decade through 2023. Updated analyses as of September 2024 confirm this weakening resumed after brief stabilization, though embedded within noise from and unresolved mesoscale eddies, with annual uncertainties around 0.9 Sv. Supporting direct measurements of the Current, comprising roughly half the AMOC's transport, utilize voltage recordings between and at 27°N, calibrated against ship-based sections and satellite altimetry, since 1982. These yield a corrected mean transport of 31.8 Sv, with no statistically significant trend (-0.1 ± 0.2 Sv/decade over 1982–2023), contrasting some uncorrected estimates and implying stability in western boundary dynamics despite broader AMOC variability. Prior to 2004, direct AMOC estimates depended on infrequent hydrographic cruises yielding snapshot transports, such as 18–20 Sv from World Ocean Circulation Experiment sections in the , but lacking the temporal continuity for trend assessment. Limited arrays at other latitudes, like the MOVE program at 16°N since 2000, provide additional snapshots but remain less comprehensive for full overturning.

Proxy-Based Reconstructions

Proxy-based reconstructions of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) rely on paleoceanographic indicators preserved in marine sediments, ice cores, and other archives to infer past circulation strength over timescales from centuries to millennia. Common proxies include the ratio of protactinium-231 to thorium-230 (²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th) in North Atlantic sediments, where lower ratios signal enhanced southward export of the less particle-reactive ²³¹Pa, indicative of vigorous deep water formation and overturning. Other methods utilize sea surface temperature (SST) patterns from foraminiferal Mg/Ca or alkenone proxies, statistically linked to AMOC variability via regression models trained on modern or simulated data, as well as benthic foraminiferal δ¹³C gradients reflecting nutrient-rich southern-sourced water intrusion. These approaches reveal AMOC dynamics but carry uncertainties from local sediment focusing, proxy calibration assumptions, and potential non-AMOC influences like productivity changes. During the (LGM, approximately 26,500–19,000 years ago), multiple proxy records converge on a weakened and shallower AMOC compared to the , with ²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th ratios elevated in the deep North Atlantic, suggesting reduced deep convection and export. Benthic δ¹⁸O and Cd/Ca data further indicate dominance of glacial southern-sourced waters in the deep Atlantic, supporting a circulation state with overturning cell depths around 1,500–2,000 meters rather than the modern ~4,000 meters. Post-LGM saw AMOC resurgence, coinciding with warming and meltwater pulses, though punctuated by transient weakenings during Heinrich events. Over the Holocene (last 11,700 years), reconstructions depict a relatively stable AMOC with multi-centennial fluctuations but no sustained weakening trend. A synthesis of 22 SST proxy records yields an AMOC index varying by ~2–3 Sverdrups (Sv) around a mean of ~16–18 Sv, comparable to modern estimates, with phases of strengthening during the early-to-mid Holocene and minor dips linked to cooling events like the 8.2 ka event. ²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th-based records from the subtropical North Atlantic confirm low variability, with ratios implying AMOC strengths within 10–20% of present-day values throughout most of the epoch. Last-millennium extensions, incorporating additional proxies like δ¹⁸O in corals and speleothems indirectly tied to AMOC-modulated precipitation, show no long-term decline; instead, stability persists amid natural forcings such as volcanic activity and solar irradiance. Comparisons between proxy series and direct observations, such as RAPID array measurements since 2004, indicate alignment in recent centuries, with no proxy evidence for the multi-decadal weakening claimed in some model-derived indices. Discrepancies arise in model-proxy mismatches for the LGM, where simulations often overestimate AMOC vigor, highlighting potential biases in glacial boundary conditions or parameterizations. Overall, empirical proxy data underscore AMOC resilience to past climate shifts, challenging narratives of imminent collapse without corresponding freshwater anomalies exceeding those observed.

Assessments of Recent Stability or Decline

Direct measurements from the RAPID-MOCHA array at 26.5°N, operational since April 2004, have recorded the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) strength averaging approximately 17 Sverdrups (Sv), with notable multi-annual fluctuations including dips to around 15 Sv in 2009-2010 and 2015-2016. Over the 2004-2023 period, the array detected a weakening trend of 1.0 [0.4–1.6] Sv per decade, consistent with some climate model projections but attributed partly to natural variability and wind-driven changes rather than a monotonic decline. However, analyses indicate that substantial AMOC weakening occurred primarily in the 2000s, with the trend pausing or stabilizing since the early 2010s, as evidenced by sustained transport levels without further acceleration of decline. Proxy-based reconstructions extending beyond instrumental records suggest that recent AMOC variations remain within historical ranges, with no evidence of unprecedented weakening. For instance, 120-year series derived from and proxies show decadal oscillations but overall stability compatible with pre-industrial conditions, challenging claims of anthropogenic-driven tipping. Comparisons of RAPID with multi-century reconstructions further indicate that observed trends do not exceed internal variability bounds from the past millennium, underscoring resilience amid freshwater perturbations. A 2025 study using Bayesian time-series methods on combined observational and proxy affirmed AMOC stability, estimating low probability of imminent under current forcings. Assessments of AMOC stability highlight model-observation discrepancies and critique exaggerated decline narratives. Multi-model ensembles project a 18-43% weakening by 2100 under high-emission scenarios, far less severe than earlier single-model estimates of near-collapse, emphasizing compensatory mechanisms like Southern Ocean influences. Empirical syntheses question the dominance of freshwater forcing in recent changes, noting insufficient evidence for AMOC sensitivity beyond natural decadal modes like the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation. While some physics-based indicators suggest early warning signals of slowdown, these rely on model assumptions critiqued for overlooking eddy compensation and aerosol effects that may have masked greenhouse-driven trends. Overall, 2024-2025 peer-reviewed evaluations converge on gradual, non-catastrophic adjustment rather than rapid decline, with observational pauses reinforcing empirical bounds on tipping risks.

Theoretical Modeling and Future Projections

Simulation Approaches and Uncertainties

![Differences in CMIP model projections of AMOC][float-right] Comprehensive coupled general circulation models (GCMs), such as those in the Phase 6 (CMIP6), simulate the AMOC by resolving ocean-atmosphere interactions, including heat and freshwater fluxes that drive deep water formation in the North Atlantic. These models typically project an AMOC weakening of 20-50% by 2100 under high-emission scenarios like SSP5-8.5, though the ensemble mean decline is around 34% at 26°N. Simplified box models, building on Stommel's 1961 framework, abstract the system into northern and southern hemispheres to analyze via salinity-density feedbacks, aiding understanding of potential tipping thresholds. Process-oriented studies, including high-resolution ocean models and targeted freshwater hosing experiments in frameworks like CESM, isolate mechanisms such as subpolar gyre dynamics and eddy influences on . Uncertainties in AMOC simulations stem primarily from inter-model spread, which accounts for a significant portion of projected and variability, as differences in AMOC response amplify regional climate signals. Model biases, including excessive North Atlantic and flawed representation of deep convection sites, lead to overestimated present-day AMOC strength and hinder accurate simulation of variability modes like the Atlantic Multidecadal Variability. Persistent errors in the Atlantic freshwater budget, often linked to Indian Ocean flux deficiencies, propagate to alter overturning stability. Parameterizations of sub-grid processes, such as mesoscale eddies and vertical mixing, contribute to divergent projections, with some models exhibiting overly stable AMOC regimes that fail to capture observed variability or paleoclimate shutdowns. Recent analyses across 34 CMIP-style models under extreme forcings indicate AMOC resilience without collapse, challenging tipping point narratives by showing no in most configurations despite hosing experiments. However, overturning pathway differences—northern vs. southern cell dominance—modulate weakening rates, with southern pathways linked to lesser declines. Validation against RAPID array observations reveals models underestimating multidecadal trends, while proxy reconstructions highlight discrepancies in glacial-interglacial amplitudes, underscoring the need for improved Labrador Sea convection and melt incorporation. These uncertainties imply that while GCM ensembles provide robust signals of slowdown, absolute magnitudes and thresholds remain unreliable, necessitating hierarchical modeling from idealized to eddy-resolving simulations for causal disentanglement.

Scenarios of Slowdown or Disruption

Climate models project a weakening of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) over the across various emission scenarios, primarily driven by reduced density contrasts from surface warming and increased freshwater input to the North Atlantic. In the Phase 6 (CMIP6) ensemble of 27 models, the AMOC at 26°N is expected to decline by an average of 34% under the high-emission SSP5-8.5 scenario by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels, with ranges from minimal change to substantial reductions depending on model physics. This slowdown arises from mechanisms such as enhanced melt contributing to subpolar gyre freshening and suppressed deep convection in key sites like the . Scenarios of more severe disruption, including potential shutdown, emerge in select high-resolution simulations under extreme forcings. A 2025 study using the MOM6-FABM-PISCES model under idealized abrupt quadrupling of CO2 followed by stabilization projects AMOC persistence without collapse, but extensions to high-emission pathways reveal a tipping point after 2100 triggered by winter shutdown in the , Irminger, and Seas due to cumulative surface freshening. A separate 2025 study from Utrecht University using physics-based indicators in CESM simulations estimates the onset of AMOC collapse potentially as early as the 2060s under moderate to high warming scenarios (around 4°C global warming), though this remains a modeling projection amid ongoing debates on tipping point likelihood and model uncertainties. In these cases, the overturning strength drops below 4 Sv, halting formation and leading to a near-permanent weak state, with recovery times exceeding millennia based on paleoclimate analogs. Such outcomes depend on parameterized subgrid processes like eddy mixing, which coarser CMIP models often overestimate, potentially inflating resilience. Contrasting multi-model assessments highlight AMOC resilience against tipping in most projections. Analysis of 34 climate models subjected to extreme concentrations and additional North Atlantic freshwater hosing equivalent to accelerated ice melt shows sustained overturning, with no simulated collapses even under forcings exceeding historical precedents. The assesses the likelihood of AMOC collapse before 2100 as low (less than 10%) across scenarios, attributing projected weakenings to linear responses rather than nonlinear thresholds, though it notes medium in long-term risks beyond the century. Discrepancies stem from model biases, such as underrepresentation of Nordic Seas overflows or overstated stability in low-resolution grids, underscoring uncertainties in threshold detection. Empirical constraints from ongoing observations, like RAPID array data, further suggest that while a ~15% slowdown has occurred since the mid-20th century, dynamical indicators do not yet signal proximity to bistable regimes required for disruption.

Critiques of Tipping Point Narratives

Critiques of tipping point narratives for the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation (AMOC) emphasize discrepancies between model-based projections and empirical observations, as well as uncertainties in paleoclimate proxies and forcing mechanisms. Proponents of imminent tipping often cite simplified models or select simulations showing abrupt shutdowns under hypothetical freshwater hosing, yet these overlook the AMOC's demonstrated resilience in comprehensive multi-model ensembles and direct measurements. For instance, of air-sea heat fluxes from reanalysis products and 24 CMIP6 models indicates no statistically significant decline in AMOC strength from the 1960s to 2017, challenging claims of ongoing destabilization toward a critical threshold. This stability persists despite regional freshening trends, suggesting internal variability or compensatory processes, such as enhanced , may buffer against collapse. Model dependencies further undermine tipping assertions, as projections of AMOC multistability require exaggerated freshwater biases not observed in reality. In 34 CMIP6 simulations subjected to abrupt quadrupling of CO2 or 0.3 Sv North Atlantic freshwater forcing, the AMOC weakened by 20–81% (mean 54%) but stabilized at reduced levels without crossing into irreversible off states, sustained by wind-driven in the and an open . Critics note that such models often fail to reproduce 20th-century AMOC variations, including the lack of observed strengthening during cooling, eroding in their extrapolation to future tipping risks. The concurs, projecting AMOC weakening of 4–46% by 2100 under low-emissions scenarios with medium , but assigns low to abrupt collapses or tipping events this century due to these representational limitations. Paleoclimate invoked for tipping vulnerability, such as Heinrich events or Dansgaard-Oeschger oscillations, lacks robust attribution to freshwater-driven AMOC shutdowns. Proxy records like δ¹³C gradients or ²³¹Pa/²³⁰Th ratios are confounded by non-circulation factors, including biological and air-sea , yielding inconsistent reconstructions of past AMOC amplitudes. Moreover, model-simulated freshwater fluxes needed to trigger historical weakenings (e.g., 0.2 Sv during Heinrich Stadial 1) exceed estimates from ice-sheet reconstructions like GLAC-1D, revealing a "meltwater " where timings and volumes misalign with geological data. These gaps imply alternative drivers, such as sea-ice dynamics or wind shifts, may dominate abrupt changes, reducing the applicability of freshwater-tipping analogies to anthropogenic scenarios where melt rates remain subcritical (current ~0.005 Sv). Overall, while AMOC weakening remains plausible under sustained warming, narratives framing it as an imminent, irreversible tipping element overstate risks by prioritizing unstable model configurations over observational stability and mechanistic realism. Empirical data from sustained arrays like RAPID (2004–present) show variability but no monotonic decline to tipping thresholds, reinforcing calls for refined diagnostics beyond variance-based early-warning signals, which can mislead in noisy systems. This perspective aligns with assessments prioritizing causal density gradients over bistable rhetoric, cautioning against policy responses predicated on low-probability catastrophes absent corroborating evidence.

Factors Influencing Stability

Salinity and Freshwater Dynamics

The (AMOC) depends on gradients to maintain contrasts that drive deep in the subpolar North Atlantic, particularly in the and Nordic Seas, where (NADW) forms. Seawater increases with , enabling surface waters to sink upon cooling; reductions in sea surface (SSS) diminish this , stabilizing the and hindering vertical mixing essential for overturning. The North Atlantic's exceeds that of adjacent basins due to net in subtropical regions, which concentrates salt before northward transport via the wind-driven gyre and boundary currents. Freshwater inputs counteract this salinification, primarily from Arctic Ocean export, estimated at 2,500–3,500 km³ per year through (about 80% of total) and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This export comprises river discharge from major Eurasian (e.g., Ob, Yenisei, Lena) and North American rivers, totaling around 3,300 km³ annually, augmented by melt and minus within the . Accumulation in the precedes episodic releases, such as those observed in the early 1990s and 2010s, which propagate southward via the . Observational data reveal multidecadal freshening trends in the subpolar North Atlantic, with SSS declines of 0.1–0.2 psu per decade in the Irminger and Seas since the mid-20th century, linked to enhanced freshwater fluxes amid loss and increased continental runoff. The Great Salinity Anomaly (1968–1976) exemplified this dynamic, with SSS perturbations up to -0.3 psu reducing convection to shallow depths (<1,000 m) and temporarily weakening AMOC by 10–20%, yet recovery ensued as anomalies advected away. Recent freshening, including 0.2–0.4 psu drops in the tied to destabilization around 2014–2016, correlates with suppressed deep mixing but no sustained AMOC collapse, as evidenced by proxy and direct measurements. Additional anthropogenic influences include meltwater, contributing ~250–500 Gt annually since 2000, routed through fjords into the East Greenland Current, and amplified in a warming atmosphere. Modeling experiments applying realistic freshwater hosing (e.g., 0.1–0.3 Sv equivalent) demonstrate AMOC sensitivity, with slowdowns of 20–50% before thresholds, but empirical resilience persists through wind-driven adjustments and fluxes that redistribute . Subarctic freshening has intensified since the 1950s, potentially explaining observed AMOC variability, yet multi-model assessments affirm stability under current forcings, underscoring compensatory ocean dynamics over simplistic tipping narratives.

Natural Variability Versus Anthropogenic Forcing

The Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) displays substantial natural variability across timescales from interannual to multidecadal, primarily driven by atmospheric-ocean interactions including the (NAO) and the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). The NAO influences AMOC strength through wind-driven changes in and subpolar gyre dynamics, with positive NAO phases enhancing northward heat transport and negative phases weakening it on decadal scales. Similarly, the AMO, characterized by anomalies in the North Atlantic, correlates with AMOC fluctuations, where a positive AMO phase aligns with periods of stronger overturning due to increased salinity and density gradients in the Nordic Seas. These internal modes can produce AMOC variations of 2–5 Sverdrups (Sv) over decades, comparable to the amplitude of observed trends since the mid-20th century. Detection and attribution analyses of AMOC changes since 1900, using proxies and ocean model hindcasts, conclude that natural variability has dominated observed fluctuations, with no reliable emergence of anthropogenic forcing signals as of 2022. This assessment aligns with preindustrial control simulations from CMIP6 models, which replicate the range of multidecadal AMOC variability seen in instrumental records without external forcings. Anthropogenic are theoretically expected to weaken AMOC via amplification, increased precipitation, and ice melt-induced freshwater input, reducing North Atlantic deep . However, cooling from mid-20th-century may have temporarily offset this by enhancing gradients, leading to AMOC strengthening until the before a subsequent decline as forcing intensified. Direct observations from the RAPID array (2004–present) show an initial weakening of approximately 3 Sv per decade through the , but this trend paused after 2016, consistent with a shift in natural modes rather than a monotonic anthropogenic decline. Reconstructions extending to the early , derived from hydrographic data and proxies, indicate no net AMOC decline since the when accounting for air-sea flux estimates, underscoring the role of decadal-scale natural oscillations in modulating apparent trends. models often underestimate this internal variability, projecting stronger and earlier anthropogenic slowdowns (e.g., 10–20% by 2100 under high-emission scenarios) that exceed observed ranges, potentially inflating tipping point risks. Internal variability alone can link AMOC strength to surface air temperature anomalies, even in unforced simulations, complicating attribution to external forcings like CO2 increases. Ongoing monitoring, such as from the OSNAP array since , continues to resolve whether emerging anthropogenic signals will surpass natural noise, but current favors variability as the primary driver of recent changes.

Resilience Mechanisms from Empirical Data

Empirical observations from air-sea reanalyses indicate that the decadal-averaged AMOC strength at 26.5°N remained stable from 1963 to , with no overall decline despite interannual and decadal variability. This inference, derived from basin-wide heat budget constraints across multiple reanalysis datasets, contrasts with earlier sea surface temperature-based estimates suggesting weakening and highlights a resilience to cumulative freshwater inputs from gateways and melt, which exceeded 400 Gt annually by the . The absence of a downward trend implies compensating mechanisms, such as enhanced subtropical maintaining meridional gradients, as evidenced by sustained southward salt transport in hydrographic sections. Direct moored observations from the RAPID array at 26.5°N since reveal high-frequency variability dominated by wind-driven , which accounts for over 50% of overturning fluctuations on seasonal to interannual scales, providing a dynamic stabilization against buoyancy-driven slowdowns. A pronounced weakening phase from to 2012, reducing AMOC strength by approximately 3 Sv below the long-term mean of 17 Sv, was followed by a partial recovery to near-average levels by the late , coinciding with strengthened westerly winds over the subpolar North Atlantic. This rebound, corroborated by independent hydrographic estimates, underscores wind-forcing as an empirical resilience factor, enabling rapid adjustments that counteract density perturbations from freshwater pulses without propagating to a persistent off state. Cable-based transport measurements of the Florida Current, the primary upper limb of the AMOC, demonstrate steady volume transport of about 31 Sv from 1982 to 2022, with no detectable decline amid rising regional temperatures and sea level. This stability, independent of deep convection signals, reflects resilience through persistent wind stress curl sustaining gyre circulation, which imports saline waters to offset Nordic Sea freshening observed in concurrent salinity records dropping by 0.1–0.2 psu per decade. Such observations collectively affirm that AMOC resilience manifests through multi-scale feedbacks, including Ekman compensation and gyre-salinity advection, observable in instrumental records spanning decades.

Hypothetical Impacts of Major Disruptions

Regional Climatic Shifts

Modeling studies of a hypothetical AMOC collapse or severe slowdown indicate pronounced cooling in the northern , with surface temperature reductions exceeding 3°C south of due to diminished northward heat transport. This cooling extends to adjacent continental regions, particularly , where winter temperatures could plummet by several degrees Celsius, potentially overriding anthropogenic global warming and leading to colder, drier conditions even under moderate emission scenarios. In high-emission pathways, the relative cooling impact on diminishes somewhat due to baseline warming, but absolute anomalies remain significant, with enhanced winter extremes and reduced summer precipitation. In contrast, southern Europe would face intensified and prolonged droughts under modeled AMOC collapse scenarios, with the dry season extending by up to 60% (versus 40% without collapse), reduced winter precipitation in Mediterranean regions, and aggravated water stress, agriculture, and resources; these effects could persist for centuries even with emission mitigation. Eastern would experience less severe but notable cooling compared to , primarily along the Atlantic seaboard, accompanied by shifts in patterns, accelerated sea-level rise on the U.S. East Coast due to dynamic alterations in ocean circulation and gyre-scale heat content changes, and potential disruptions such as altered fish habitats. high latitudes north of 40°N broadly face amplified cooling, up to 1.8°C below targeted warming levels in some overshoot scenarios, driven by reduced ocean heat fluxes and increased low-level over the North Atlantic. Arctic amplification weakens, with models showing delayed loss—preserving over 10% more summer ice and up to 50% more winter ice in key basins like the and Barents Seas—resulting in a cooler, more stable relative to greenhouse-only forcings. Tropical regions undergo shifts in the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ), with a southward displacement leading to reduced rainfall south of approximately 7°N in the Atlantic and drier conditions in the Sahel, exacerbating drought vulnerability from associated freshwater perturbations like ice sheet melt. Conversely, northern tropical Atlantic areas may see increased precipitation, while midlatitude jets shift poleward, altering storm tracks and enhancing precipitation deficits over the North Atlantic warming hole. These hemispheric asymmetries highlight the AMOC's role in redistributing heat, with global mean surface cooling of about 0.2°C in weakened scenarios, though regional extremes dominate the climatic signal. These modeled impacts under high-emission scenarios represent possible outcomes from simulations but are not inevitable, given empirical indications of AMOC resilience.

Broader Global and Ecological Effects

A major disruption to the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) would alter global heat redistribution, potentially inducing a cooling anomaly in the extratropics while exacerbating warming in the tropics and , based on freshwater hosing simulations in global climate models. This hemispheric asymmetry arises from reduced northward heat transport, leading to a net of approximately 0.5–1°C superimposed on anthropogenic warming, though the magnitude remains model-dependent and contested due to varying sensitivities in ocean-atmosphere coupling. Precipitation patterns would shift substantially, with a southward migration of the (ITCZ) reducing rainfall in the northern tropics, including the and northern , while intensifying southern s in regions like the southern Amazon and . Multi-model assessments indicate a robust reconfiguration of tropical systems, with weakened s (e.g., Indian, East Asian, West African) experiencing 10–20% precipitation declines under simulated AMOC collapse scenarios, driven by altered and thermodynamic gradients; these disruptions across Asia, Africa, and South America could affect billions by amplifying food and water insecurity through heightened drought risks in rain-fed areas. These changes could amplify risks in rain-fed agricultural zones, though empirical paleoclimate proxies from events like the suggest variability in responses tied to background states. Ecologically, AMOC weakening would diminish nutrient upwelling in the subpolar North Atlantic, curtailing primary productivity and by 20–50% in model experiments, with cascading reductions in higher trophic levels such as and . Fisheries reliant on North Atlantic like and could face collapses, as observed in historical analogs of circulation slowdowns, disrupting webs and exacerbating pressures. Additionally, reduced deep-water ventilation would impair the 's capacity, potentially increasing atmospheric CO2 by 10–20 ppm over centuries through diminished efficiency and altered solubility, though this effect is partially offset by global warming's countervailing influences on ocean chemistry.

Ongoing Research and Debates

Recent Empirical Findings (2020-2025)

The RAPID-MOCHA-WBTS array at 26°N has provided continuous direct measurements of AMOC strength since 2004, with data extending through 2023 revealing an observed weakening of 1.0 Sv per decade (95% : 0.4–1.6 Sv/decade), consistent with earlier declines noted from 2004–2012 but amid significant interannual variability. This trend reflects reductions in the upper-layer northward transport and changes in deep southward flow, though the array's focus on subtropical latitudes limits inferences about subpolar gyre dynamics. A 2021 hydrographic reconstruction spanning 1954–2017, incorporating repeated ship-based sections and integrating observations, found no statistically significant long-term decline in AMOC strength, attributing apparent RAPID weakening to incomplete sampling of deep circulation variability rather than a persistent slowdown. This contrasts with proxy-based estimates, such as a reconstruction of indices indicating a 15% AMOC reduction since the late , though such proxies face criticism for sensitivity to non-AMOC factors like aerosols. Observational evidence from 2020–2025 includes mid-depth warming in the equatorial Atlantic, interpreted as a of reduced deep water formation and AMOC slowdown, benchmarked against historical hydrographic data. Complementary analyses of North Atlantic sea surface temperatures and profiles suggest that while short-term fluctuations persist, anthropogenic forcing has not yet produced unambiguous multi-decadal weakening beyond natural variability, with some studies emphasizing the role of mesoscale eddies in masking trends. These findings underscore ongoing uncertainties in distinguishing signal from noise in sparse observational records.

Controversies in Interpretation and Policy Implications

Interpretations of Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) dynamics remain contested, particularly regarding claims of an imminent tipping point leading to collapse. A 2023 statistical analysis using and proxies estimated a potential AMOC shutdown between 2025 and 2095 under current emissions trajectories, interpreting variance increases as early warning signals of critical slowing down. However, this approach has faced criticism for relying on indirect proxies prone to noise and for extrapolating beyond observational limits, with subsequent reviews questioning the robustness of such indicators in noisy datasets. In contrast, direct measurements from the RAPID array since 2004 indicate a slowdown of approximately 15% since the mid-20th century but no acceleration toward instability, while a 2025 reanalysis of 60-year proxy records found no overall AMOC decline when accounting for instrumental biases. Multi-model ensembles further highlight discrepancies: while some individual climate models simulate bistable AMOC regimes vulnerable to freshwater perturbations, a assessment across 34 CMIP6 models under extreme and freshwater forcings found persistent overturning circulation without , attributing prior tipping simulations to model-specific biases like excessive freshwater export. Empirical evidence from paleoclimate reconstructions, including the Last Interglacial, supports AMOC resilience to high-latitude warming exceeding current levels, with collapses linked more to massive meltwater pulses than gradual forcing. These findings underscore that while anthropogenic warming contributes to weakening via loss, natural variability—such as decadal oscillations—dominates observed fluctuations, challenging narratives of deterministic anthropogenic tipping. Policy responses to AMOC risks emphasize emissions reductions to avert modeled disruptions, with projections of 18-43% weakening by 2100 under high-emissions scenarios informing calls for net-zero targets to preserve stability. Yet, given low-confidence assessments of century-scale collapse in IPCC evaluations and evidence of model overestimation of , such policies prioritizing low-probability events over verifiable threats like regional sea-level rise from observed slowdowns. strategies, including enhanced subpolar gyre monitoring and preparedness for northern European cooling offsets to global warming, are advocated independently of collapse fears, as partial weakening could amplify winter storms without systemic failure. Proposals for geoengineering interventions, such as Bering Strait damming to reduce Arctic freshwater inflow, remain speculative and untested, reigniting debates on amid uncertain baselines. Overall, reflects interpretive divides, with empirical resilience data suggesting a focus on observation networks over alarm-driven mitigation.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.